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Background

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(SSC)

In April 1935, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities published their Final Report (Part II) which in essence faulted the CPT and to some extent for its error of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's ongoing plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its ~~personal~~ attempts on the life of ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's ~~report~~ <sup>report</sup> is ~~discussed~~ <sup>discussed</sup> on pages 6-7 of its ~~findings~~ <sup>findings</sup> but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

P 7  
Part II  
have

"Senior CPT officials also should have realized that their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should have realized that CPT operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they duped their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts. These officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CPT had no

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existence of a foreign conspiracy.

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Stung by the Senate criticism and the "reptiling effect" that Book II ~~has~~ occasioned in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer at least within the Agency, the critical questions posed in the Ford Report. However even the 1977 Report tacitly recognizes the inadequacy of the CIA's response to the Warren Commission's quest for all relevant information. ["Relevancy" is of course, the "bugwood" upon which the Senate and Agency each base their position of the <sup>in the importance</sup> anti-Castro plots to the Commission's work.] On page 10 of the Agency's Conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges that:

"While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms - the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement <sup>in the assassination (GFK)</sup> because of tension of the time.

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..... The Agency should have

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P 10  
1977 ~~Final~~  
Report

taken broader in its terms, than,  
as well."

Conflicting

to the work of  
the ~~United~~  
Committee

It is not the purpose of  
this analysis to detail ~~and~~ the  
viewpoints of the SSC and CPTA  
with regard to the significance  
of the CIA's Castro ~~unsuccessful~~  
attempts and to resolve ~~the~~ <sup>the parties</sup>  
controversy as to ~~the~~ <sup>the operations</sup> importance.

~~Rather~~ Instead this paper seeks  
to present a comprehensive  
review of all the facts, drawn from  
a variety of sources, of organized  
Cubans' involvement or potential  
involvement in CPTA operations  
against Cuba during 1960-63.

Certain influences and conclusions  
~~to~~ will then be drawn upon  
the nature, scope, and motivation  
~~of the operations~~ of the syndicate  
participants in the operations.

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Envolvement of Raymond Payne in  
CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro

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The genesis of the <sup>utilization</sup> ~~use~~ of the United States ~~ground~~ syndicate of the CIA ~~to~~ attempt to assassinate Castro is of the 1967 Inspectors General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, ~~was~~ Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffell Edwards.<sup>+</sup>

[1967 IG Rpt. p. 74; Intern Rpt p. 74; Sec. 1.5]

Edwards assigned the specific task of locating the right party to "eliminate or assassinate" Castro, to James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Special Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Mahon <sup>+</sup> who ~~has~~ had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive cover operations, would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel.

<sup>+</sup> [Mahon's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp 74-75, Intern Rpt.]

0002181 Although Mahon and O'Connell differ as to who initially brought up John Rosselli's name for consideration there was a meeting between Mahon and Rosselli at the Brown Duty Restaurant in Los Angeles in early September 1968 [Intern Rpt. p. 75]

SECRET

[Comment: Mahon seems the

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logical person to have thought of and contacted Roselli for several reasons. In an office of Security file on SA Morgan, Mahan's attorney, there is a memo to the DCP dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that "Mr. Mahan advised that he had met one John Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the ice-making machines on the Strip. Mahan advised that, if Roselli was in fact a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests."

Quoted?

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Comment

Confirmation of <sup>see</sup> Mahan - Roselli contact is found in Roselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959. [See Roselli write-up] from Mahan to Roselli

Comment

data

Mahan and Roselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1950. [see] Hunt, newspaper, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.

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Rosselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Mahan and Council to discuss further details.

[ Defense Report p. 76; Office of Security memo from Morgan file, dated 19 Nov. 1970 ]

Although the Dujean's Periodic Report places the meeting at the Playa Station on 14 September 1960, Rosselli recalled that the ~~event~~ discussion took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

#### Comment

Tony de Varona admitted going to NYC at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Rosselli at this time or [ Festung of de Varona, that his visit had an assassination motivation ]

According to a 19 Nov. 1970 memo to the D.C.I., it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Rosselli "agreed to introduce him (Mahan) to a friend, 'Sam Gold', who knew the Cuban crowd."

#### Comment:

The timing of the introduction of both ~~varona~~ <sup>varona</sup> (Gold) and Traffante ("Joe") is ~~an~~ important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plot. Accordingly

to the 1967 I. G. Report, the ~~entry~~ <sup>entry</sup> of biancaia took place <sup>(a)</sup> during the week of 25 September 1960: . . . . .  
[ 1967 I. G. Report, p 18 ]

date certain  
is ~~not~~ <sup>although</sup>

In contrast, the SSC Interm Report at p. 76, does not ~~state~~ <sup>state</sup> biancaia's initial appearance ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> "certainly prior to October 18." (p 76) because of conflicting ~~testimony~~ evidence between the 1967 I. G. September date and Mahon's Senate testimony which set the interde in ~~at~~ November 1960. As a compromise, the Interm Report reasoned that biancaia had been introduced to ~~the~~ Mahon "prior to October 18" because the Las Vegas wiretap occurred in October 30, 1960, and ~~at~~ <sup>the</sup> DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo dated 15 October 1960 which revealed an FBI FLSur quoting biancaia as discussing his involvement in an assassination plot against Castro <sup>(b)</sup> FBI memo, dated 15 Oct 1960 from Horro to Bissell; Interm Report, p 79 ]

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[ Comment:  
Each ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> dual reasons listed on the Interm Report on p 77 are subject to critical analysis which will be dealt with separately ~~in the below~~ ]

[ Comment:  
Although the 1967 I. G. Report ~~stated~~



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That "Mahon pointed out "bold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "bold" or Joe"; the Intern Report disputes this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's Senate testimony and stating that "The Support Chief, who was using the name 'Tom Jeds,'" said he had met "Sam" and Joe, once, and then met briefly E.O.C. 5130/75, pp 26-29; Intern Report p. 70

Comment  
~~Statement~~

Conflicts appear also on several related minor points surrounding the September 1968 meeting in N.Y.C. and Miami. For instance:

1) Did Roselli know from the beginning that ~~Mahon~~ the operation was CFA?

a) O'Connell stated that Mahon told Roselli that they were representing international business interests whereas Roselli testified that Mahon told him that O'Connell was CFA [Intern Report p. 70

Also, footnote 1 on p. 76 indicates that Roselli told O'Connell "about 3 weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of persons, that "I am not kidding, I mean what you work for".

The importance of Roselli's recognition of CFA ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> is that it is doubtful if Brennan and Tammante

could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. This theme will be developed more fully below.

2) Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some major interests of Wall Street that had rich interests and properties around Cuba. . . . (Roselli; 6/24/75 pp 9, 17)

CF. Jack Anderson column of Jan. 19, 1971, which states that (4) "Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? . . . . None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings."

If Anderson's source for this article were Roselli and ~~William~~ William Harry, who was not party to the details of Phase F, it is another ~~example~~ <sup>example</sup> of serious discrepancies between the CIA, Senate, and Anderson versions which all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Roselli.

3) The alleged ~~discovery~~ "surprise discovery" by Mahon and O'Connell as to the ~~positive~~ identification of "Sam Bold" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, ~~all~~ although it is

possible that the Senate Committee Staff overlooked the Miami newspaper

Sunday supplement (Panda) which purportedly included pictures of persons and T. Mahan, their ~~relationship~~ <sup>showing</sup> Mahan and O'Connell, ~~etc~~ <sup>the</sup> nature of the people with whom they were dealing, it is a relatively easy matter to research Panda magazine for the months of October and November. It would appear that ~~they~~ O'Connell and Mahan were looking for an ~~easy~~ <sup>easy</sup> post facto reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top mafiosi in the United States. O'Connell testified that his discovery was after "we were up to our ears in it" which is difficult to fathom since the operation was in the embryonic stage and no file was delivered to Bonelli et al until approximately March 1961, <sup>whatever the</sup> reason, the Senate staff insists it could not find the Panda <sup>in the Bureau</sup> <sub>RTT, FBI</sub>

The principle in Phase 7 of the operation ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> also disagree as to the roles which were to be played by both "Gold" and "Joe" in ~~Phase~~ <sup>the</sup> pre - Bay of Pigs phase of the operation.

Although Mahan described Bonenna as playing a "key" role,

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Quoted  
p. 15

(Mahan, 7/29/75, p. 34) and discussed his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the mission"; Roselli downplayed Brancosi's part to that of a "back-up" man. (Roselli 6/24/75, p. 15)

~~All of the intermediate steps~~  
Whether Roselli received a message from Brancosi's murder four days before Roselli's Senate appearance is open for question. J. Roselli's characterization of Brancosi's role as minor is in contrast to his alleged <sup>recruitment of</sup> ~~description of~~ Brancosi's "knowledge of the Cuban word" used in the 19 Nov. 1970 memo reviewed.

Senitt  
7  
due to his

Trafficante's involvement in Phase I is even more justified by the available evidence. The 1967 Feb. Report and Senate Interim Report ~~also~~ state that "Goel" identified "Joe" to Mahan as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there. (Feb. Report p. 19; Interim Report, p. 775. To support the description of Trafficante as a courier, the ~~1967 Feb. Report~~ Interim Report quotes p. 19 of the 1967 Feb. Report in stating that, "At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana in syndicate business."

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Comment <sup>partially</sup>

This unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government records <sup>of other agencies</sup>. As an example, State Department files reflect that Traffianto applied for a passport <sup>in Cuba</sup> on October 4, 1959 and received that document in Havana on February 2, 1960.

(See Traffianto file, State Dept). ~~None~~ ~~was~~ ~~sent~~. No records available to the Committee from DNS, State Department or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau ~~and~~ maintained decent surveillance on Traffianto during the period. Dr

recalled

~~Traffianto~~ testified that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed these sojourns within two or three months after his release. <sup>from prison</sup> Testimony, pp 4-53, Oct 2, 1978

in Havana

His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos were either closed or operating in the mid-1960, and law enforcement reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently ~~in~~ during the pre-Bay of Pigs period.

By the time of the Senate testimony of Roswell, however, Traffianto's role had diminished to a joint

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even below Biancani, <sup>from</sup> "courier" he had been reduced to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate ~~communications~~ been Rosselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. Initially, Traffucante and Rosselli 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances done tail well but remain in contradiction to the ~~the~~ facts as reported in 1983 of the jurisprudence.

they were being

### Comment?

The Senate testimony of Rosselli and Traffucante needs to be outlined ~~separately~~ with a view to contrasting the "courier vs interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not vigorously cross examine either man on this discrepancy nor did ~~they~~ the Johnson Report "hint" at the problem.

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method ~~to~~ to be employed to accomplish the goal. The Agency took the simplistic, straight forward approach of shorting Castro but this ~~plan~~ <sup>SECRET</sup> was rejected.

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by Binns. In a Comment to its 1967 Report, the Inspector General noted that Binns was flatly opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Binns stated a preference for lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Trappan (Joe; the courier) was ~~in touch~~ in touch with a ~~disgruntled~~ Cuban official with access to Castro's guard presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangster named their man inside as Juan Orta, who was then office chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister Castro. The gangster said that Orta had once been in a position to receive backpicks from the gangster outfits but had since lost that source of income and needed the money. [F.B. Report, p 25]

Comment

The observations <sup>quoted above</sup> of the 1967 F.B. Report ~~are~~ are ~~of~~ extremely significant in several respects. First, the poison pill ~~of~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~originally~~ <sup>originally</sup> with Binns, not the Agency; a point

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which is crucial to the final  
conclusion presented below.

Secondly, Trappanese is identified  
as ~~providing~~ having access to, and  
providing the <sup>private</sup> assassin in Cuba  
which is in consistent with  
his self-serving role description  
of "in the pocket". His ability to  
recruit into operations ~~is~~ was  
directly tied to his former  
gambly empire associations  
which formed a constant pattern  
for all his ~~dealing~~ <sup>conduct</sup> for Trappanese both  
during and after his Cuban days.  
[ See Trappanese profile ]

Comment

note

Speculation concerning this  
note arose during the Agency's 1977  
Report when it was forced to  
address a problem raised by  
an April 23, 1975 article, covering  
Frank Stupis, written by Paul  
Merkell of the New York Daily News.  
Stupis was quoted as saying,  
"The third (assassination) scheme  
involved planting a bomb in Castro's  
office. I had access to the Rome  
Minister's office," Stupis said. "I knew  
Fidel's private secretary, Juan Ochoa.  
I recruited him to work with the  
Embassy. I ~~recruited~~ Embassy in Havana.  
What was his body to the

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writes of the 1977 Report was the fact that Onta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Stuzis with Trappanets and with a "gamble partner" of Trappanets, Norman Rotoman. (See Rotoman's profile. Coupled with Stuzis' <sup>alleged</sup> past relationships, is the allegation that Stuzis had a role in ~~an~~ inspecting the gamble casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an contact with Onta in seeing gamble "high roller".

A second aspect of Mishkin's ~~the~~ news series involved a claim by Maita Joerg that she had acted on behalf of Stuzis in 1960 in attempt to poison Castro when dove tailed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on Domencas' electronically surveilled conversation in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' <sup>SECRET</sup> some drink or food of Castro" (Memo, Home to DCF, AD, DDC, 10/19/60).

The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows:

It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities...

Additional considerations:

1. Current syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own activity prior to CPTA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been Agency when CPTA was still in place in 1962 April
2. Syndicate operators could have had contacts such as those in New York Daily News staff in 1975 and 1976.
3. Frank Stupin seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.
4. Stupin has not been a useful source. He probably knew Osta in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Osta arranged roll of masses.

If there was an earlier operator in Osta, it was not CPTA's; could have been earlier operators of syndicate. Stupin could have been or been involved in syndicate operation or picked up gossip from Miami in 1965 after Osta visited there.

Neither the 1967 I-C Report  
 or the SSC Interim Report can  
 pinpoint the precise date on which  
 the Agency processed the poison pills  
 which Dr. Connell delivered to Rosselli  
 { Interim Report, p 83. The chain of  
 custody, according to the 1967 I-C  
 Report ~~was~~ was for the lethal  
 pills to be delivered from Rosselli  
 to Truffante. Although the next  
 intervening steps remain a  
 mystery, Rosselli reports to Connell  
 that the pills had been delivered to  
 Sata in Cuba in late February - early  
 March 1961 { Interim Rpt, p 27; Interim Rpt p 8

Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported  
 the version of Joe Shimon ~~whose~~  
~~story~~ whose memory was that the  
 money and pills for the operation were  
 delivered at a meeting at the Fontainebleau  
 Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by  
 "Mahan, Rosselli, Truffante, and the  
 Cubans" { Interim Rpt p 15. Shimon's  
~~memory~~ story is filled with  
~~quite~~ details which are documented  
 on p 2 of the report, but his credibility  
 is subject to serious question as  
 his account is not shared by  
 anyone else connected with the plan  
 and nor is his relationship with

verid

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0002198 Roselli, Brancana, or Truffante appear as "copy" as he would lead me to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a source for Fred Belmont's column of January 19, 1961, which fixed the date of the passage of the person at the Fourtanbleat <sup>by Roselli</sup> as March 13, 1961, and contained the report that Castro became ill a few ~~days~~ weeks later.

The real problem with Shimon's stay is that the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Ota could or would not attempt the poisoning; a fact apparently unknown to Shimon before his "leak" to Belmont and his Senate testimony.]

### Comment

One additional fact concerning Ota's inability to carry out the mission ties in with the final thesis of this report. Ota "lost his position in Castro's office on 26 January 1961, while ~~he~~ planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington."

It would seem though, that the gangster did know that Ota had already lost his access to Castro [ ~~the~~ 1967 ~~to~~ Report p. 27 ]

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With the failure of Onto  
to produce the desired results,  
the project was at a standstill.  
Once again, Santos Trujillo  
assumed command. Roselle  
commented that "Trujillo believed  
a certain leading figure in  
the Cuban exile movement ~~etc~~ might  
be able to accomplish the mission."  
[~~File~~ 1967 DC Lpt. 10.29; Dater Rpt ps.

## Comment:

The wild leader was, of course  
Tony de Varona, ~~the~~  
who was the subject of speculation  
in an FBI memorandum of 11 Jan 1961  
associating him with receiving financial  
aid from American gangsters for  
anti-Castro activities which were  
the CIA operation.

At the time of his introduction  
into the CIA mob jobs, de Varona was already  
being funded by the Agency through  
the Revolutionary Front and was being  
involved in CIA planning for the  
Bay of Pigs invasion which was  
imminent.

De Varona was also <sup>being</sup> ~~used~~  
by Mike McRaney whose ~~address~~  
agency was ~~not~~ engaged in  
promoting Varona's image in  
collaboration with McRaney from  
in 1960-61

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0002200 <sup>1</sup> "Purri" or "Chillo" Mendezal Mendez  
is described in Tupper's FBI files  
as a close Cuban associate.

Completing the picture of  
support for Varona in the promotional  
efforts of the Dins and Eddie  
Cullini, McHenry and Harry Musson  
associates, who were reportedly  
working through a Washington DC,  
public relations firm, E. Swack  
& Moss and Associates. Moss had  
previous CPTA associations and  
was supposedly acting as a emissary  
for funds supplied by the Cullini  
benefactors with the understanding  
that their group would have  
"privileged treatment" in the  
"Cuba of the Future". Attempts  
to verify these reports were  
unsuccessful. [ 1967 FBI Report  
p. 30 ]

The heavy influence  
using the Cullini brothers as a  
"front" is particularly interesting  
in light of Varona's admission  
that Jorge Pujol arranged a  
meeting in Miami in ~~the summer~~  
1960 wherein Varosa offered to  
financially "back" Varona's  
efforts to ~~assist~~ "educate"  
the Cuban people about Castro,  
which may be a euphemism for  
anti-Castro plots. [ See Varona transcript

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The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency ~~and~~ engaged ~~some~~, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Vanna, <sup>as a</sup> ~~an~~ individual who had the potential of uniting the ~~various~~ <sup>various</sup> multitudes of exile groups who were in a combative infernal feud. de Vanna was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S.

government and criminal syndicates to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors. [ See Vanna testimony - ]

Although de Vanna has no memory of meeting Truffante, the Tampa court has admitted that he acted as an "interceptor" in several meetings attended by de Vanna, Roselli, Benavides, and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael, "Macho" Penar, a Truffante family partner from Havana who continued to serve Truffante in Miami during the 1950s. Truffante claimed that Roselli had primary contact with Penar but this appears unlikely in view of Truffante's long-standing friendship with Penar on Cuba. And Roselli's admission to

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O'Connell that ~~Trappanese~~ Trappanese would provide the replacement for the ill-fated, Juan Orta who had escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961.

Comment: Paralleling ~~Paralleling~~ the situation at the Senate hearings July 1975 when Rosselli's depiction of Trappanese role ~~changed~~ changed from ~~his~~ his "counsel" character ~~in 1960 as reported by~~ in 1960 as reported by the Agency to conform to Trappanese' "interpreter" state report, in the recent interview with ~~the~~ ~~man~~ who spoke with Trappanese' ~~Committee~~ ~~testimony~~ testimony ~~he~~ he was an ~~interpreter~~ ~~with~~ ~~de~~ ~~la~~ ~~Barra~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~not~~ ~~well~~ ~~in~~ ~~both~~ instances to minimize Trappanese' exposure (See C.F. Fonzi interview with Cener, May? 1978 and Trappanese testimony, Oct 7, 1977)

~~Haggren, the meeting with~~  
~~Vanna came to pass, the~~

geopolis of the ~~ambiguity~~ ~~ambiguity~~ exists as to the introduction of de Vanna into phase one of the Castro assassination plots, more ~~clear~~ ~~ambiguity~~ confusion surrounds de Vanna's ~~as~~ actual participation prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The I & Report indicates that de Vanna attempted a second ~~run~~ ~~run~~ before the ~~Castro~~ ~~invasion~~ ~~that~~ ~~Rosselli~~ Rosselli was positive that only one



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attempt, (Orta) was made. He was also positive that he delivered both pills, money and supplies to de Vanna which is corroborated by O'Connell ~~reports~~ during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in speculation that only one pre-Pray of Pigs attempt was made, and that de Vanna was the contact in the United States who arranged for [Orta] to administer the poison.

Comment

There appears to be no factual way to resolve de Vanna's initial contribution to the poison attempts especially since Vanna denies ever having received poison pills from Roselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time. [See Vanna transcript]

Comment

The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Vanna participate in the mob's plot while ~~in~~ employing his part on the Peruvian Canal. However, "Steps <sup>were</sup> taken to end his participation in the syndicate plan but [they] were apparently ineffective". [See I.C. Report, p 325]

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Phase II

the mob The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort, curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, but it was not until April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Roselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro, does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both Harvey and Council swore that Harvey "took over a going operation". I.E.O. Rept p 33. The exact details of what that operation might have been ~~cannot be discerned~~ has not been uncovered, but Roselli's ability to regenerate his forces ~~was~~ in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous *de l'homme noir* was to provide the ~~individuals~~ individuals who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant ~~important~~ differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and

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superiority in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

Fact In Phase One, Roselli et al had demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the matter operated and the ability of the ~~source~~ <sup>perpetrator</sup> assassin was deliberately vague. After ~~the~~ Harry contacted Roselli in Miami in April 1962, Harry reported that "the plan in which the ~~material~~ material was to be introduced to Castro's Ford (which involved) an asset of ~~source~~ <sup>source</sup> who had access to someone in a <sup>restaurant</sup> restaurant frequented by Castro." By June 1962 after the ~~Vanna~~ <sup>Vanna</sup> had received money and instructions from the JMWAVE station and had personally sent the ~~plan~~ <sup>plan</sup> to Cuba, ~~the~~ "Roselli" reported to Harry on 21 June that Vanna had dispatched a team of ~~three~~ <sup>four</sup> men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harry said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited will to make the attempt -- perhaps using the pills. Harry never heard

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work for Pearson and did know  
that Anderson had more than a  
passing acquaintance with Morgan.  
- Morgan also fought with  
Pat Coyne of N 82

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their names or anything about them"  
 [1967 DO Report p573]

Comment

As the 1967 DO author correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "favorite restaurant" personifying ~~was the same plan that Edwards~~ was familiar in that Edwards had decided previously the same plan. The fact that Vauma related the exact modes of contact to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

- (1) Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an ongoing operation in April 1962 or
- (2) he had not had been working w/ Vauma before, during, and after the Bay of Pigs and requested the CIA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or
- (3) de Vauma was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain their financial backing or in response to directives from repressed regimes

Second

The cast of underworld

character changed. Agency had insisted that Mahue and someone be dropped from the operation which Rosselli readily acceded to. Traffante's "infiltration" role was assumed by "Marco", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the name Oscar Boney and today.

### Comment

"Marco" introduction into one of the most sensitive CPT covert actions in history without any attempt <sup>by the Agency</sup> to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently with ~~the~~ <sup>approval</sup> of the top brass in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

Although the 1947-50 Report characterizes Marco as "Rosselli's man", it is probable that this individual was ~~never~~ drafted by Traffante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

SECRET

0002508

2.

mafia <sup>was</sup> plots slow and un-dramatic  
 Rosselli, in May 1962, reported to  
 Hany that the plots and guns which  
 had been delivered to Varma in Miami  
 in April had arrived in Cuba, and an  
 three-man team had been dispatched  
 in June to execute the plan. [Interim Report  
 p 843]

unidentified

7.

During September 1962, ~~and~~ Rosselli  
 related to Hany that de Varma ~~was~~  
 readying a second three-man team  
 who were "supposedly military men  
 whose assignment was to penetrate  
 Castro's body guard. During this period  
 the 'medicene' was reported as still in  
 place and the three men of the first  
 team safe. [1967 I.C. Report, p 515]  
 However, the second team never  
 made Cuba and a series of alibis  
 were constructed during December and  
 January 1963. Nevertheless, de Varma  
 supposedly collected \$200 for the maintenance  
 of these individuals from Rosselli  
 who had received the payment from  
 Hany. [1967 I.C. Report p 523]

unidentified

In mid-July 1963 both  
 Hany and Rosselli agreed that "nothing  
 was happening and that there was  
 not much chance that anything would  
 happen in the future" [1967 I.C. Report p 52]  
 Rosselli was instructed to ease  
 his way out of touch with  
 Varma ~~which~~ <sup>by</sup> ~~himself~~ <sup>himself</sup> did.  
 The last meeting between Hany

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0002209

and Rosselli occurred in Washington  
D.C. in June 1963. When he was  
Harvey's ~~guest~~ overnight guest. Hence  
their meeting ostensibly was not directly  
related to any assassination plots.

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CONCLUSION

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0002210

in part,

The available evidence suggests that ~~the Agency~~ the thesis which is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Disproportionate Benefits Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CFA singly found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate itself had under way. ... In a ~~series~~ <sup>series</sup>, CFA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." L 1977 FB Rpt p 208

7.

The relevant evidence is as follows

1. FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 re Biarranca ET SUR:

... Biarranca reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin to be on three occasions. ... Biarranca claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro. L 1977 FB Rpt p 195

Comment

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Although the reported meetings between Mahon, Prindle, and Biarranca

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are subject to different interpretations,

it is clear that no plans were finalized between the parties until sometime after October 5, 1960. The date of the <sup>FBI's</sup> intercepted conversation of Poincaré.

The grim pills, prepared by the CPTA at Poincaré's request, were not ready for delivery until late February - early March 1961, so that it is difficult to see how Poincaré's November 1960 assassination plot could be a part of the CPTA operation. Rather, it appears that the mob had its poison plan in progress, using a mixture of Castro, to accomplish the deed, when the CPTA fortuitously happened along to offer its support.

The mob was then in a perfect position. If their ~~present~~ private plot actually worked and Castro died, then the Syndicate had enormous blackmail potential against the CPTA which it could exercise at the opportune moment. However, if their ~~plot~~ back-fired, then their position would be that they were only attempting to expedite the wishes of their Government.

intrigue

Additional Comment

The actions of Poincaré's "hired hand", Richard Cain, ~~was~~ not to raise some interesting possibilities. Given Cain's admission

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0002212

to the FBI that he had been  
joined the Chicago Police Department  
and Sheriff's office while on permanent  
payroll. Cain's approach to ~~the~~  
the OIA Chicago office in the fall of  
1960 to ~~obtain~~ ~~his~~ ~~services~~  
information on the Cuban communit~~y~~  
appears ~~to be~~ <sup>a little more than</sup> coincidental, then  
when FBI files indicate that  
he is planning to go to Cuba for  
Life magazine (and on staff), and  
to "buy" influential Cubans in  
Havana ostensibly for ex-pudor  
Prio (second staff) the coincidence  
seems more suspect. The suspicion  
is that Cain was being sent  
by someone to supervise the poisoning  
attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain called  
me the "arranger to be" when someone  
referred to in <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ ~~report~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~OCT 1960~~ or he  
could be the contact man for the  
operation.

I tie in memo on Cain with  
Salerno's view, which is strongly supported  
by the evidence, that Cain was the  
"missing second man" in the ~~the~~ ~~report~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~OCT 30, 1960~~. Mahan needs  
to be questioned on this point.

Cain continued to "volunteer"  
information and assistance to the CPB  
during 1961-1963. In August 1963,  
he offered information on the DRE  
Stuholtz Directory in Chicago to the  
office of the Agency. In ~~the~~ ~~report~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~OCT 1960~~ Cuba

0002213

was the former head of the Directorate  
in Cuba when he was a major  
power in deposing Batista.

In September 1963, Cain reported  
to the Chicago office of the CIA that  
DRB was in a deal to purchase  
a large arms shipment. He was  
told by the Agency to "get out  
of the picture" with a disclaimer  
which is subject to several interpretations  
including the fact that the CIA  
was a willing participant in the deal.

Again on November 27, 1963, Cain  
now the chief investigator for Cook  
County Sheriff's office, gave the Agency  
some information that Oswald was  
in ~~Cuba~~ Chicago in April 1963 with  
the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and  
had purchased the ~~massacre~~  
rifle in March 1963.

## 2. Recruitment of ~~potential~~ <sup>the potential</sup> Assassins

In ~~recruiting~~ <sup>identifying</sup> the potential poisoner,

Beaucana spoke of a "guy" who  
was close to Castro while the  
individual recruited for the CIA pills  
was Juan Dorta, a secretary in  
Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "guy" referred  
to by Beaucana can never be ascertained  
but Trafficante was clearly in the  
best position to recruit ~~at least one~~  
one of Castro's Cuban ministers due to  
his multitudinous contacts in the  
Cuban government and political circles

000221A

It was common for American gangsters, have Cuban mistresses and Trafficante, Rothman, and Truine will typify examples. Also, one witness told the Committee that Castro was accustomed to coming at the Nacional Hotel (owned by Mike McManis) conveniently on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Trafficante to have arranged for a young woman to service Castro and to attempt to poison him.

Elaine Torony is a compelling witness to say the least, and her potential as an assassin recruited by Frank Stupis has been previously discussed. However, one certainty point is that she was also Vladimir Torony's mistress and, there would have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Torony is totally uncooperative and Torony was not asked about her relationship with Torony in Cuba so that we do not know the dated match.

Comment

Guerrero Ortega, the man identified to the Agency as the gangster's contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably recruited by Trafficante, but to be a former receipt of gangster "kickbacks".

One fact is extremely bothersome however, in attempting to gauge the depth of the mob's involvement in various plots to execute the mass murder plan.

According to the ~~SECRET~~ FBI Report 2/1/52

Osta "lost his position in the Prime Minister's Office in 26 Jan 1961, which opening for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Wash DC". According to the official version Osta accepted the pills in late Feb - early March 1961 and kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them" [1967 Feb Rpt p 275]

7. If the mob was close enough to Osta to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Osta had lost his position of accessibility. The other possibility is that the pills were left in the United States and then were available to him at Havana when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises then, as to whether the mob was pursuing their own misspecified plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the Bay for its ulterior motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase II of the operation which began in April 1962, ~~there is~~ the same possibilities exist. If Hany and O'Connell are correct in assuming that Hany had walked into an "ongoing" operation, then ~~it can~~ <sup>it can</sup> be assumed that the mob's relationship with de Verna, which per the CIA publication according to the FBI Summary of 21 Dec 1960, and 15 Jan 1961 had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs ~~with~~ <sup>with</sup> the receipting.

0002216

of the CFA's participation, funding and mutual support could, once again, be returned to the Agency although de Vane would continue to deal through his not vitally, Russell and "Mac".

Due to the loose structure of Phase II in terms of the ambiguous nature of the operational means of attack, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the complete reliance of Harry upon Russell and not that which was actually being carried out, the Agency's ~~ability~~ <sup>lack of interest</sup> to corroborate Russell's information, the ~~speculation~~ <sup>speculation</sup> arises that the syndicate was not serious trying to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the solidification of Soviet influence on Castro's Cuba. Being ~~solid~~ <sup>solid</sup> ~~summarized~~ <sup>summarized</sup> ~~Trappante, Tampa and other~~ <sup>small Cuba based operations</sup> must have realized that the "golden goose" of America had laid its last egg, and that fortune will to be made elsewhere. Certainly, the evidence shown ~~clearly~~ <sup>clearly</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> the Bahamas, Las Vegas, and Trappante projects in the Dominican Republic, and a new operation for ~~Cuba~~ <sup>Cuba</sup> ~~operations~~ <sup>operations</sup> in Florida with the ~~influx~~ <sup>influx</sup> of Cuban ~~workers~~ <sup>workers</sup>. It was also abundantly clear that the new Justice Department program in regard crime would never permit the "wide-open" Cuba of the pre-Tennet era ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> even if Castro ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> and all his Communist associates could be eliminated. SECRET

lack of interest

7?

~~SECRET~~ Despite the obvious

0092217 business more in  
 continuity the prosecution attempts  
 against Castro in a substantive way.  
 There still was a percentage in  
 "stringing the Agency along." First, there  
 was no expense to the syndicate  
 because the Agency was providing full  
 logistical support for Umana. Second,  
 there was the mounting pressure  
 from the ~~State~~ FBI and Justice Department  
 which had to be blunted, if possible.  
 No better weapon to accomplish this  
 goal could be found than to use  
 one agency (CPTA) against another (C).

A brief look at the record shows the  
 employment of ~~the~~ strategy ~~at~~ at moments  
 of crisis for those who participated in  
 the plot.

### 1. Robert Mahan

- Quarterly Long Committee subpoena  
 in 1966 [ Intern Report, p 79, note 3; Intern <sup>Edward</sup> <sub>P Morgan</sub>
- solidification of position with  
 CPTA and with Hughes Department  
 [ Hughes was definitely told of the project of Mahan  
 in Nov. 1960, and was himself involved in an  
 alliance with the CPTA which in fact, occurred  
 later when Mahan was Hughes' principal agent ]  
 [ Intern Report, p 75, note 2; Mahan memo, Turkey? ]  
 - Dispute with Hughes; See memo 20 May 1971  
 in office of Sec'y <sup>file</sup> on Edward P Morgan

### 2. John Roselli

- evading criminal prosecution [ Intern  
 Report, p 55, note 4,
- use in ~~legal~~ memos in March 1971 to  
 attempt to reduce sentence
- ~~was~~ attempts to delay deportation  
 hearings with JNS which included



0002218

Jack Anderson's journal intervention  
with FRS (see Anderson interview, and  
CFA Russell's file; ~~re~~ CFA office  
of Security file re Edward P. Morgan)

### 3. Sam Brancana

- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas  
where Brancana got Madam to take the heat  
for him by turning the tap was a  
result of the CFA plots.

- Early 1962, intervention with FIVE  
Farrell of FNS re possible deportation  
[See Tab C, Russell CFA file,  
stating that inf. E Swab, Osborn, Reginald  
Locca, & Houston know]

- attempts to ward off FSD surveillance  
in 1963 & 1967 DC Report p 129]

- Conversation with Sam Pupich  
on 3 May 1967, Sam comments that  
Russell and Brancana have CFA  
'over a barrel' because of "that operation".  
He said that he doubted that the FBI  
would be able to do anything about either  
Russell or Brancana because of their  
previous activities with your people."  
(1967 F.B. Rpt p 131)

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Notes re Jack Anderson  
"Castro Retaliation" theory

0002219

March 3, 1967 }  
March 7, 1967 } Drew Pearson Office

Source:

1967 I.B. Report:

1) It is quite likely that Rosselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson the recipients

(P 120)

- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from bits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source Rosselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked

(P 120)

- Impact

The Rosselli boom contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination in retaliation for US attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that boom may also have been this (P 122)

- Mahon

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does have good reasons not wanting the story aired further. Unfortunate publicity might cause him to lose his microphone

032721

Client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Roselli and vice versa.

- The Pearson story, which is now carrying so much distress, includes one detail that is not found in Phase Two: the three-man team  
Comment

Not necessary since Pearson was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the 3-man team initially and may have used Roselli on the concept in Phase Two or Roselli just didn't mention the 3-man team to Mahan or O'Connell during Phase 1  
Comment

- In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a leak to Pearson, Agency makes the following point:

If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CIA for help. Eq 123

Since Agency can figure an ulterior motive, they deduce that Roselli is drinking too much and ~~is~~ talking to Morgan who is also drinking and talking to ~~himself~~ Pearson.

Comment

Drew Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best gordies: the story of the pills

See p 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high-level meeting at the Dept of State at which plans for the assassination were discussed."

I-6 speculates that Pearson is falling about the so frequent meeting of the Special Group (Signal) which was attended by Harvey. (p 112)  
E R F K was not present

2. Other Sources

a) Memo re 15 Feb 1972

DCI aware that Russell's were going to expose plots. He "decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Russell or someone in his behalf furnishing Jack Braden details of the incident"

(Memo in office of security file re Morgan)

3. Memo: 20 May 1971

Subject: Exposed

Mr. <sup>Hy</sup> Peace (former CIA & now with Exposed) said Mahon & Braden together on some oil mix deal. ... Recent exposure of Braden re Mahon's role in the Carter Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robert Mahon using his son Peter, as an intermediary.

Believe they is that Mahan probably thought that such publicity would "scare them off" (re. Felt's in re new CIA stuff to influence Hughes)

-Magan makes noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Mahan because of his past involvement with CIA  
 [Σ Memo in Security File re Magan]

4. Memo 19 Nov 1970

7 ?  
 - Hay had contacts with Roselli in November - December 1967 and January 1968 following Roselli conversion.  
 - 17 Nov 1970

Magan had received a call from Tom Wadden who requested Roselli that Roselli faced deportation and would blow story. DCF decided to ignore threat and Mahan agreed.

"Mahan further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it reflected him generally.

5. 19 Dec. 1967

- Summary conversation instigated by Hay on Roselli's behalf to get CIA interested directly or at least discover how good court case against Roselli was.

- Calls from Roselli began on October 6. Hay. Roselli knew what Agency had done for Mahan with Sen. Long because Ed Magan told

Roselli:

- Also, the Director General had sent Harry a news clipping re Agency use of Bincon & generally the August 1963 Chicago story of Sandy Smith

Roselli said the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Attorney General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- J. Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Bincon story

- Mahan admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase 7 operation but to Agency delaying on long committee subpoena

- Mahan visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Mahan) had been identified as the "client" by Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity effect of his relationship with Hughes, with Roselli

- Mahan denied document letter from inman & said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962

- Roselli met Morgan through Hank Reenspan in the 1950s

- Mahan recalled that Morgan and Roselli met with Bincon in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the ~~suppression~~ impression that Roselli sought legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances

- Roselli under pressure from FBI during hearings had a 99 yr old grand

- Belvid Morgan had done some

Jan 6<sup>th</sup>

15 Jan 1977

0002225

Memo re request of Dade City  
investigator for information on  
B Cabanis:

1. a. Ramon Don Estevan  
b. Rolando Masferrer Rojas  
c. Luciano Nueves  
d. Jose de la Torre  
e. Jose Quintana  
f. Joaquin Herminio Cortez  
g. Manolo Artime  
h. M.L.H.

2. Two of the 3 Cubans mentioned in  
Roselli (SSCP) testimony.

Two names mentioned in a Dec  
1970 office of Security memo

v. No background investigation done on  
Roselli or Brancura

vi. Sporadic contacts, direct and indirect  
between Roselli's Agency opponents reported  
approx. 1971.

vii. O'Connell has already been interviewed  
by Dade City.

viii. Office of Security has no such  
evidence that Cuban Fulbrighter could have  
been involved or Cuban agents in Miami area  
during time of his death.

0002225

Nieves

c. Released in March 1965 after serving approx 16 months of a 20 yr sentence for anti-Castro job; went to Spain briefly where he was of interest to Madrid Station  
 - August 1965 entered US  
 - Nov 1965 to Jan 1966 of operational interest to DDO

Shirwin

He is mentioned in the John Roselli file as a personal friend of Roselli. It is further noted that Shirwin knew Roselli but nature & extent of their official/social relationship is unknown

30 August 1976 report by S/A Edward C. Rudiger, Alexandria FPD office.  
 - Cuban contacts of Roselli

## 1. Juan Ota

was an official of the Castro Govt circa 1960-61 and was a contact of Santos Trafficante. Ota was reportedly selected by Trafficante to make the assassination attempt against Castro.

## 2. Tony Varona

When Juan Ota was not successful in carrying out the mission against Castro, Trafficante suggested Varona be used. Roselli contacted Varona. Varona was to use



assets of his son to carry out the mission.  
Varona also reportedly used his son's initials  
to assist him in this effort but there is  
no identifying info in regard to the mission.

3. Roselli had a man, also presumably in  
Miami, known as Harvey or "Macco",  
who also used the names Garcia Gomez  
and Godoy. Harvey was unable to  
identify Macco, who was described as  
Cuban who spoke Italian.

517-339-3523  
F. No info in regard to death or  
welfare threats against Roselli or  
Cuban in G1 or Mexico, Venezuela, Togo,  
Surrey, or Myanmar in C1

3. Memo 15 Feb 1972

4. The Agency was aware that Roselli  
intended to expose his participation in the  
plot should we not intervene on  
his behalf. The DCP decided to  
ignore his threats and take a calculated  
risk as to the consequences that might occur  
by the disclosure of his story. This was  
subsequently done by Roselli or someone  
on his behalf furnishing Jack & William  
details of the incident.

0002229

Memo 20 May 1971

Subject: Futer Tel

005 - Magan had been engaged by Rappin  
 Tolpe getting thru Makin's efforts. (H. Pearce  
 from Agency man's Futer Tel now, said Magan  
 made noises to certain Rappin officials, that  
 they had better take it easy on Makin because  
 of his past involvement w/ LIT.

2 [redacted] - in 1962-64 was in touch  
 w/ Makin & simultaneously wrote out details  
 of a [redacted]

[redacted]

For past several days Magan had been quite quiet.

In May 10, 1971 Mr. Pearce said Makin  
 & Hadwin are involved together in some oil well  
 deals. Futer Tel took note this & all other  
 such similar matters to trace the source & disburse  
 of funds. Recent exposure by Hadwin re  
 Makin's role in the Cuban Revolution was a  
 deliberate exposure instigated by Capt. Makin  
 using his son Peter as an intermediary.  
 Pearce's theory is that Makin prob. that  
 such publicity would 'scare them off'.  
 The Futer Tel staff is aware of a number of  
 contacts & meetings between Peter Makin  
 and Jack Anderson or a number of his staff.

19 Nov 1970

For: D C I  
Suly Roselli, Johnny

2. In August 1960, Mr. Richard M. Brisell advised  
Col. Sheffeld Edwards to inform of the office of  
Security had assets that may assist in a  
sensitive mission requiring espionage-type  
action. The mission target was Fidel Castro

5. Mr. Mahan advised that he had met  
one J R on several occasions within the past year.  
He did not know him casually per. details, but  
was given to understand that he was a  
high ranking member of the 'squad' and controlled  
all of the old money matters in the group.

Mahan would like, if R was in fact a  
member of the Club, he undoubtedly  
had connections leading into the Cuban  
family interests.

6. Mahan to approach R who knew M as a per  
son. heavily financed & frequent visitor.

7. Pitch made on 14 Sept 1960 at Hilton Plaza  
His initial reaction was to avoid getting involved  
but, thru M's persuasion, he agreed to introduce  
him to a friend Sam Gold who knew the  
Cuban crowd." No money required or paid.

8. During the week of 25 Sept, Mahan  
introduced to Sam Stagg at the Four Seasons  
It was several weeks after Sam meeting  
w/ Sam and Joe, who was identified

SECRET

0002232

- to him as a courier operating between Havana & Miami that he saw photos in Sunday "Supplement" of Parade
9. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission Sam suggested that they not resort to ferreting but if he could be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a perfective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving bank-bank payments from the quarterly mints, who still had access to Castro and was in a financial bind.
  11. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of repeated attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet & was kicked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts w/out success.
  12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Gregory Shuman ... had become disinterested w/ the apparent ineffectual progress of the Orta and was willing to handle the mission thru his own resources.
  13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he may be given \$10,000 for organizational expenses & \$100 per commission

secret says R. K. on memorandum saying up  
to make it in court in writing. At our report possibly  
17. May 1962 Harry told me as Case  
officer & it is not known by this office  
whether R. was used equitably from  
that point on

0002233

17. Illegal entry Nov. 1967  
18. 2 Dec 1968 R. arrested by F. U. S. A.  
19. Harry reported to office of Harry his  
contacts w/ R. in Nov - Dec 1967 & Jan 1968.  
It was his belief that Johnny was in contact  
the Agency for assistance in deportation  
unless he actually forced deportation.  
R. expressed confidence that he would win  
an appeal.

20. 17 Nov 1970.  
Mahn called O'Connell to advise  
that Mahan's attorney, Ed Morgan, had  
received a call from Tom Wadden who stated  
appeal exhausted & R. forced deportation.  
If someone did interfere on R's  
behalf, he would make a complete  
expose of his activities in Agency

21. 18 Nov 1970. D. C. F. Lynch's direct  
not to arrest R. Mahan was so  
pleased by Agency's position & he was in  
complete agreement w/ our stand. He further  
advised that he was not concerned about  
any publicity as it appeared quickly.

Anders McCall June 18, 1971  
by attorney's school books; fast turn on a

stop; last of Feb or first of March 1963  
March 13, 1961 R delivered capsules to his  
contact at Fontainebleau

0102255

- a few weeks later contact ill

Feb 23, 1971

Once he called on Chi racket boss  
Sam Giancana to line up a contact.  
The confidential files report that he had  
"gambly interest and an interest in the  
shrimp business in Cuba". However, the  
Chi gangster took no direct part in the  
massive plot.

19 Dec 1967

Memo For Record

Telephone conversation Harry & Howard Osborn

2. The suit involved Dir of Security  
the subject of our last broken conversation  
re J.R. the validity of the Justice Dept case  
against him; & whether or not the Justice Dept  
to consider any possible intervention on  
his behalf

3. Harry indicated that he thought the  
policy of "sitting tight" might be alright,  
but that he felt it would be a simple  
matter for the Dir to see Howard personally  
& determine on an individual case by case basis  
what actual case the Justice Dept had.

Osborn - speculates Harry might  
find out validity of case for purpose of  
Harry to work for. Major

11 Dec 1947

1. Harry reported luncheon meetings w/ Pajich on 8th Dec. & Osborn on Dec 9th
2. 26 Nov. 1947. R calls Harry. who met him at Madison Hotel for 3 hrs.

27 Nov, they "bumped" into Tom Taylor & Harry called R as "Mr. Ralston."

28 Nov spent 11 hours at Pittsburg

4. Harry to Harry, County Club.

R in town to see Morgan re a radio station in San Jose. Not worked re until when he brought.

- R said he had not seen someone since 1965 (Papich checking & may respond to Harry)

- R & H state or imply that he wanted help from Agency.

6. Jolly told Harry re luncheon meeting w/ Col. Edwards in 1944 & long meeting of 'Council' had w/ Miller & R in Cal when he returned from duty in Far East

7. Harry insists that he must know status of case. If it is a good case, Harry feels the Agency must exert influence to have the matter "handled". If it is not a good case, Carl Harry will tell Jolly & he will walk it out.

10. Harry independent as reputation his contact was more than to protect Agency

SECRET

0002237

He had my the highest regard for Agency  
and the way we had handled his problem.

8 Nov 1967

R. Harry is source

R called on Oct 22nd & 27th. but  
Harry refused to discuss R's activity

- R wondered why Agency would not  
do as much for him as it did for Maku.  
Ed Morgan knew what Harry did for Maku  
w/ Sen. Long & had told Jolley about this.

4 Oct 67

Osborn & Harry at lunch.

- R quite vehement & bitter re  
Makum indirectly Makum would "sell anyone  
down the river to protect his name."

- Dor had sent Harry news clipping  
re use of banana. R said leak came  
from Sen. Kennedy office when he was still to

Eye on Makum

28 April 67

1. Council - Morgan allegedly contacted some high level  
officials in Oct indirectly he had a client  
who had been involved in an operation against Maku.  
~~Makum~~ Makum recalled & said he had told Morgan  
when Agency delays on Harry subpoena.

2. Makum surely upset to find if he  
had been identified as client source



publicity on his relationship w/ Hayes.

5. No knowledge of mission after April 1946 & never discussed latter phases w/ R. Mahon - R met Magon thru Pearson in 1950's when Magon was legal work for Lai Vang Sun.

R & Magon in Vegas sometime in March. Jim Cannon in town "it was Mahon's recollection that these individuals spent some time together. He was under the impression that they sought legal advice from Magon but did not know nature of their conversation.

7. Claimed R had detour w/ rapidly developing; 11 yr old girl & account of <sup>Shirley</sup> ~~James~~ for father to report. R pretty promise for Mahon to hire his friends.

8. Believed Magon had done some work for Pearson & did know that Pearson had more than a passing acquaintance w/ Magon.

Magon fight w/ Pat Coyne for NSA.

9. Knows only heavy problem w/ the FBI but don't know details.

10. It is evident that Mahon is deeply concerned about possibility of being identified w/ Castro project. but placed cooperation w/ to heavy involvement

SECRET

1002239

Sen Long Mahu

S. Shonker, Long's personal atty, told me  
that Mahu would be away.

7 June 66

Mahu reported by Morgan is dead  
w/ St Louis atty, a personal friend of Long,  
re Mahu's appearance -

3. Fensterwald. had identified some  
names, etc by name to O Connell &  
Col. Edwards.

In the case of Sam, Ed Dubois  
& a couple of his technicians now aware  
of Mahu's tie-in w/ Hancock.

31 May 1966

Mahu asked if "Sam grant" was in  
the mind

12. Morgan had advised Mahu that he  
knew Long's personal atty who exerts great  
influence on Long. They flew to St Louis  
& then the 3 men flew to D.C. & met  
w/ Long & Fensterwald. Fensterwald  
wanted Mahu as his "ace in the hole"  
so that Mahu's credits were good enough  
for T.V. Also that Mahu was not just  
enough to hold behind. When Long saw  
M, Fensterwald would proceed

13. Mahu claims name of [unclear]

SECRET

Sam thru a series of circumstances  
that were planned at our request.  
The Hon. R.D. RFX was orally  
briefed on the background that led up  
to Mikoy's involvement & a Top Secret  
document furnished to Justice Dept  
which served as a backup of the  
briefing

000000

000000

SECRET

P3

Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Govt attitude toward the Cuban regime.

a. Prior to August 1960

All of the identifiable schemes prior to Aug. 1960, w/ one possible exception, were carried off at discredibly low cost primarily by inflating his balloon or by altering his appearance.

b. August 1960 to April 1961

Plots aggressively pursued; view of at least some of participants as one aspect of effort to overthrow regime ultimately in BOB.

c. April 1961 to late 1961

Major scheme begun Aug 60 was called off after BOB & removed documents to several units.

d. Late 1961 to late 1962

Particular scheme reactivated in early 1962 & pushed vigorously in era of MINIBOOT.

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After MINIBOOT & collapse of Project MINIBOOT, aggressive scheme begun Aug. 60; revised in April 1962; were finally terminated in early 1963.

P6 Drew Pearson column of 2 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to arm Castro.

He also has info:

- a) State Dept meeting at which agreement drawn
- b) team actually landed in Cuba w/ pills

SECRET

5. If ~~syndicate~~ <sup>SECRET</sup> ~~activity~~ is an  
operation, tends to reinforce thought  
that details would have been  
characterized by direction or security despite  
that Oct 1942 report.

pas Ford Report requires that prob  
plots have no relation in a practical  
thing

---

### Ruby - Traffante

#### On the Report Assassination Proposals

5 agent messages were identified that  
made reference to plans to kill Castro or  
proposing such action. Three of the  
messages related to the same operator  
the other two relating to separate  
proposals; there is no indication  
that any of these proposals was the  
result of CPTA initiative.

WARRONC 15. Identified 29 May 1942  
and was identified 30 August 42. He has  
been reported as never admitting that  
he was a CPTA agent. His name not  
given to me. Three other were

0002243

SECRET

AMKASH

0002244

SECRET

SSC

1) inferre that AMKASH a custo agent  
with the mission of providing a plot agent Castro  
so that Castro had justification for retaliation;

or

2) AMKASH so in detail the details would have  
been known since providing Castro

what he should have been reported to USC

Agony - The character of the relationship  
between CIA and AMKASH (I), prior to Oswald  
murder of President Kennedy, was so insubstantial  
and inconclusive that it provided no basis for  
AMKASH (I) to feel that he had any tangible  
CIA support for plotting against Castro.

... there was little for him to  
report or leak!

Comment p 5

Over a year passed between August  
1962 and Sept 1963 when he was next  
contacted by CIA. In terms of the  
relationship that he had with CIA the  
critical period, since is therefore between  
5 Sept and 22 Nov 1963

Reason for hiatus is clear.  
CF 13  
Solid report AMKASH In Havana Cuba; he was  
recontacted due to his potential.

SECRET

SECRET

0002245

Cable on Sept 7th says "AMLAH ~~with~~ <sup>totally</sup> spotted that who will always be a control problem.

... is best approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among whom we may then find persons susceptible to long distance and covert activity

Clear, at that point, while AMLAH was viewed as potentially important, he was also viewed as a person of uncertain capability, requiring careful but long range development for whatever course of action that might later ensue

3-4 of SSC Summary and Findings, printed AMLAH as an ~~important~~ plot & inferred in that Carter Sept 7th speech might have been a result of leak by AMLAH

10 "The fact remains that whatever views AMLAH may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time

Fitzgerald meeting should be reported high-power up w/ selective rights

SECRET

14 Nov from WHIP reported that [redacted] satisfied w/ policy considerations but unhappy over fact he had not been given technical assistance. He can understand why he had not been given "Cuban small piece of equipment which presented a final solution to the problem".

### Comment

In essence he [redacted] was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. While that may not seem a very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a govt, it is directly relevant to the question of what [redacted] was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (p. 18) to the effect that it was not clear how [redacted] interpreted the part of a [redacted] case.

Case: July 1964 FBI Report states that [redacted] unhappy with CIA program and [redacted] had refused to support [redacted]

19 Nov 63 Fitzgerald "approved" telling [redacted] he would be given a cache inside Cuba. The cache



could, if he requested it, include...  
high power refer w/ sec... ..

19 Nov. Mark ASH tells CIA he is  
returning to Cuba.

Request by headquarters to ask him  
to delay for 1 more meeting.

Mark ASH agrees "if it is smug  
intensity"

As a SSC speculator that this is fact  
indicates he might receive specific support  
Agency - at best a piece of highly  
speculative analysis, not supported by  
the evidence.

[ Fails to mention per w/ collecting  
Opinion

M HU [redacted]

p 26

"A"

"unaware of MARK ASH 1963 association  
with CIA"

No info at least 1 1/2 years  
after death of JFK; no idea of 1963  
CIA ties w/ Mark ASH what was  
my intention

c. CIA trace (sent in early 1961 & again in early 1962) supplied list of pills to US gambling syndicate members. . . . The 1961 plot aborted & pills were recovered.

These furnished in April 1962 pursuant of gambling rep. to a Cuban wife leader in Fla who in turn, had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962, the wife leader reported that a team of 3 men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

28. . . . While the events described of the Cuban did occur & are subject to being patched together as the one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative relationship among them is unproven.

Q 18: During the week of 25 Sept 1960, O'Connell's Mahan went to Miami where Roselli introduced my Mahan to "Sam Gold" at a meeting in the Fontainebleau Hotel. "Gold" said he had a man whom he identified only as "Joe", who would serve as a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there. Mahan provided a "lead" to O'Connell from address but O'Connell never met either "Gold" or "Joe".

Q 19: At that time the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba. Trafficking was making regular trips between Miami & Havana as syndicate members.

SECRET

p.24 Despite the document that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets.

0002252

Comment - Giancana was fully opposed to the use of poisons. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival's escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Troy (Joe; the courier was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and personally of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangster named this man inside as Juan Ota who was then Official Chief and Director General of the office of the Puma Mountain. The gangster said that Ota had once been in a position to receive intelligence from the gambling interests, had some lost that source of income and needed the money.

p.27. Late Feb - March 1961

As passed the pills to Troy. Raddi reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Ota. Ota is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them. According to the gangster, Ota got cold feet.

Comment Ota lost his position in 8/61

SECRET

SECRET

officer on 26 Jan. 1961, while getting for the  
operation was still going on in Miami & Wash DC.

0002254 He took refuge in the Singapore Embassy  
April, 1961...

... It would seem that, that the  
gangster did know that Vita had already  
sent his name to Castro.

p 30. The Cubans' brother was believed to be  
in touch with Vanna. This man had been  
reported to have offered Vanna large sums  
of money for his operations against Castro with  
the understanding that they would receive  
privileged treatment "in the Cuba of the future".  
Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful.

p 31. Traff appeared Vanna and told her  
that he had contacts who wanted to do work with  
Castro & that they would pay big money for the  
commit.

Roselli said as a loyal person he would  
interview he could & would never divulge  
the operation.]

p 31. R wrote deliver money to Vanna for expenses.  
- O'Connell recalls 50,000; Edwards recalls  
25,000; Pennington recalls 25,000

p 32 Roselli gave the jills and money to Vanna. Also  
Roselli dealt with ~~under~~ a pseudonym. Little  
is known of the delivery channels beyond Vanna

SECRET

p. 32 <sup>200</sup> Edwards recalls something about a contact who worked in a restaurant frequented by Castro.

0002255

p. 33 (O'Connell) believes that there was something going on between April 1961 and April 1962 but he cannot now recall what. He agrees with Bill Harry that when the operation was over in April 1962, Harry took over a "going operation".

p. 34. O'Connell believes he must have passed the pills, but he has no specific recollection of doing so.

p. 49. Roselle needed Bran. & Troff in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase because he had Vernon. However, it would be naive to assume that Roselle did not take the precaution of informing Super up in the syndicate but he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate.

p. ~~47~~<sup>51</sup> June 1962 Harry said they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt. <sup>perhaps using the pills.</sup>

Harry never learned their names or anything about them.

p. 52 Harry says Roselli wasn't kidding him. He agreed with Harry that nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future.

p. 201 RFK - I trust that if you ever ~~try~~<sup>try</sup> to do business with regard to ~~some~~ - with ~~you~~ <sup>you</sup> ~~you~~ <sup>you</sup> you will let the Attorney General know before you do it. Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request.

p. 64. The Attorney General's copy of the memo for the record of that meeting (May 62 by Edwards & Houston) is in possession of the AG's office.

p. 67. Chicago Sun-Times article of 16 August 1963 cites Justice Dept belief that Oswald never did any spying - merely pretended to go along "in the hope that the Justice Dept done to put him behind bars might be slowed or at least affected - by his use of co-operation w/ ~~unsub~~ <sup>unsub</sup> ~~get~~ <sup>get</sup> ~~apprec~~ <sup>apprec</sup>."

Article puts his cooperation from 1959 to some time in 1960 - long before the above rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Reports McBain's bugging incident.

p69 20 August 1963 Chicago Daily News

FBI agent taking beer who allegedly says:

Why don't you fellows leave me alone?  
I'm one of you.

Person pictured as being approached by CIA but denying

0002258

AMLABSH

079

- DR took Presidential Oath which they refused to surrender to Che; but did to Fidel
- Cuba believed to be in participation in assassination of Gen Antonio Blanco Rico, head of Batista's military in Havana
- DR quite apart from 20th of July but signed a unity pact

⇒ ... Agency was primarily oriented in helping Cuba's actions in ~~Latin~~ PRON program directed against Cuban military leaders, with receiving his plan for technical assistance in an assassination attempt. The voluminous project files and info furnished us by Nestor Sanchez, Cuban case officer, do not wholly support these recollections. The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cuba's operations.

087 14 Sept 1963

Cuba wrote Tapedino - "I don't intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again!" whom you should tell him, "so they don't

make the trip: I want to get away from politics completely?

192 Sancy says that, while Cuba was anxious to do away with Castro, Cuba was not willing to sacrifice his own life in exchange for Castro. What Cuba really wants was high-powered, silenced rifle w/ an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards. Cuba finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was) he was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try."

The Drew Pearson Story

a) <u>Published Details</u> Robert Kennedy may have <del>is</del> not true. He was briefed on Phase 1 and an execution plot	<u>The Facts as we know them</u> He was not <del>is</del> briefed on Phase 2
--	---

b) Three (3) men arrested in Havana; one still in prison	R tells Hany on 21 June 7, that Mann says 3 men involved. We do not know their identities or what may have happened to them. We have no proof that they were actually disabled. Most of the arrested captives are executed during this period of this year
--	--



could have enough at ~~that~~ this report has come out  
to believe that ~~it~~ was seen by ~~him~~ in the ~~document~~ investigation. It  
was also stated by Castello in  
the Philippines under ~~secret~~  
investigation. We have no  
independent corroboration of any sort. (No  
that ~~was~~ in met w/ ~~Resales~~  
in Las Vegas March 1965)

0002260

SECRET

1977

SECRET

9 May 1967

Beamborough apparently to be used as a person  
by Garrison to show Oswald a CIA agent  
& was to be used to associate Castro. Garrison  
alleges he has letters signed by CIA rep  
or by Sen. RFK authorizing certain persons  
to work with Cuban for name of Castro.  
This memo is intended to record that  
such letters were used & therefore could  
not be in Garrison's possession.

0002261

SECRET

Request

SECRET

0002265

- Richard Cain aka Robert Scully Cain  
Richard Scalpette  
DOB OCT 1931 Chicago

FBI memo

- 21 Dec 1960 not primary info

- 18 Jan 1961  
identified individuals

- Identity of W1 ROOUE

- April 61 to April 62 <sup>000</sup> <sup>188</sup> matters

- ~~some~~ "something going on"  
independent of Agency

- RFT security called on 4 March 67  
to obtain memo; already seen article  
of 7 March 67

- 15 March 65

Bango in Madrid & claims group  
in Cuba naty.

Jailed in July 62

1 March 66 Arrests in Cuba

Trial of some mems late fall 64 & early 65  
w/ Airline meetings

SECRET

10 Jan 64 "Report" Brulli memo approach The White

SECRET

0002266

O'Connell interview of Malcom in May 1960

- Additional info on S.T. GR o SO contained in material previously shared for review on Sturgis

- Chicago Trib

Dec 28, 31, 1973

- Cairn

- Fall 1960, contact in Chicago

- Summer 1961 Mexico City

- April 1962 Mexico City

- 4 June 62 departed

- 19 Aug 63 Chicago

- 26-30 Aug 63 Info - re Student Directory, Miami

- 12 Sept 63 DRF items purchase

- toll to get out of picture

- 1 May 1972 disappear.

27 NW 63

- Fair Play met in Feb 63 at 907

~~807~~ S. Spaulding under direction Michael Criley

- LHO purchased rifle March 63

- Sturgis suspect LHO in Chicago 1963 April.

SECRET

1. Ramon Don Pestevy Dominguez  
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1934
  2. Rolando Magener Rojas  
DOB 12 Jan 1918
  3. Lucio Navés
  4. Jose de la Torre
  5. Jose Quintana  
DOB 3 Oct 45 *replu of mung*
  6. Joaquin Antonio Arroyo DOB 10 Jan 43
- Edward Percipit Morgan DOB 28 May 1913 St. Louis

SECRET

0002268

Morgan

Covert Security Clearance on 2 Feb 1951 for use as "cut out" re negotiations for sale of Redwood Dist Studios & John Hopewell's.

Amended & Approved March 1951 to include Morgan's use in providing covert legal support for operations in the form of a "cut out"; legal advice transmission of funds in connection with PDD projects.  
 ∴ PDD should make decision whether to release info.

Personnel

Resorts Int. #591 722

Wallace Brown OS file # 473 865

- assoc w/ Meyer Lansky

- Corp. Grand Bahama Development Corp

w/ Robert Whisnant (#633 974) and

John P. Roulett (#639 997)

Cairn

According to DeMar, Cairn in Mexico 1961 into 1962

-1964-65

SECRET

**SECRET**

0002269


7-Mar-35  
St Paul, Minn  
36 yr

Bradley Earl Ayers  
Eglin AF Base Fla.

April 12, 1971 Post

April 27, 1971 Post

Sunday April 18 1971



campus of Mum U.

Room; Harry, Robinson (Wp) Big Paper

Tracing sites

Orlando Hts. Key

Upper Key Camp

Card found in edge of P. P. P.

Security Approval

Date 10 Aug 1964

Refined 23826 (DDP) (W/H) (S/H)

Case No. 366085

Request For Recusal Notice

Serial No  
366085

Nature

Separation Return to Parent SUC 12-15-64

Organizational Designations:  
DDP / S/H S Forward of copies to [unclear] - JM W/V  
US Field Office Paramilitary Branch Section 117  
Reinstated C.R.C. Indiv. Pol. Orgs

**SECRET**

ZR/RIFLE

All (cable) traffic bearing ZR/RIFLE to be delivered in sealed envelope to Chief FI/Div. D, 15024 Bldg only

- Personally approved of DD Plans

Harry  
Chief FI/Div. D

19 Feb 1962

To Harry re authorization of ATWR for ZR/RIFLE activities thru Dec 1962.

Because of sensitive nature of this activity, accounts for funds will be of general category & of your category

2. Salary \$300 per yr; \$750 in addition to salary
3. Money to be conserved in lieu of project & constitute authorization for all travel, per diem, operations & other expenses
4. Eyes only

Rich. D Helms.

Hand written notes

Morgan - Roselli - Mahan - Gannon

- Mackin Las Vegas

Morgan & Jack Hudson

- 1) Prior to August
- 2) August to April 61 (B 60)
- 3) April 61 to late 61
- 4) late 61 to late 62 (Custom message center)
- 5) late 62 to ~~late 63~~

SECRET



Roselli of started in Sept 66  
 (Mahan to Rodde to Grancena)  
 to Supd 7 May 67

Taylor became chairman of ICS  
 on 9 Aug 67

Rush, McNamee, Taylor, Bundy,  
 Ottowen, Silpatant, Landell,  
 Murren, McClure

Memo For Record

Rept at request of DCF; conveyed  
 to FO on 23 March 67

The one stayback been up (FO)  
 all notes, & other derived source material  
 destroyed 23 May 67.

Memo: Chug WTT (Dawson)

From: Dir of Security

Subject: WTT (Security Object)

Final recovery of memos expended on  
 a sensitive paper of interest to DD/P; Chug WTT  
 & Dir of Security

Disbursed.

25 Sept 1965 thru 70 Contact  
 6 Feb 1961

SECRET

6907.

11 Feb 1961 To Remyal April 1961  
 31 Jan 1961  
 14 Feb 61 ~~61~~ Criminal Symposium 1,043  
 26 Sept 1961  
 12 Feb 1961 ~~993~~ 993

Page 3  
To Rpt

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After morale crisis Oct 62 & collapse of MOWOODS, aggressive scheme that was begun in Aug 1960; covered in April 1962, was finally smashed in 1963  
 Two other plots were organized in 1963 but were impracticable & nothing came of them

P 9

b. 10 August 1962

Meeting of Special Group (Krymchuk) wherein McNamara brooded subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders.

Result - Project MOWOODS named by Lansdale

31 Jul 64

Discussion at Special Group of a clandestine service means of exile plot to kill Castro. CIA had refused to fund. Mike had no money.

and Deakin

P 2 Gonzalez Callanetta

Press Release  
7 March 1966

Missing page

- program of contact for intelligence; not  
 fourth to form support  
 - Jose ROBERTO, Alberto Blanco Ramirez, Luis Tapedera

Late Sept 1960

Edwards, O'Connell, Bissell of James  
Bispingwell; Edwards then brief  
Allen Dulles & General Cabell.

Mahon called O'Connell & pointed out  
Paradise sector showing Gold & Joe  
(Presumably just time, Mahon & O'Connell  
know names)

Joe a courier to Castro make  
arrangements there re entry to Gold

- Traff making regular trips to Havana
- 7 Jan 59 - casino closed
- 13 Jan 59 - Castro announces re opening
- 17 Feb 59 - Cabell announces opening
- 30 Sept 61 - last casino closed

P 23

Technical Chief TSD

4 approaches: (1) highly toxic like shellfish  
poison to be admitted via pin (Cuba's Committee  
Roosevelt's suit was supplied to Gary Powers  
(2) bacterial material in liquid or (3) cigar  
or 1) handwriting

P 29. March April 1961

Roselli told O'Connell that Traff knew a  
man high up in exil movement. (Vanna  
Rpt from ~~SECRET~~ suggest him Traff

known values:

- a) 21 Dec 1960 FBI memo re gangster financing Cuban activities to overthrow Castro.
- b) 18 Jan 1961 memo to [redacted] with case summary. Had hired Moss as a front man

CIA had contact in Miami but no indication of any involvement in Cuba.

24

March (1959) memo in [redacted] Division on

[redacted]

- Nov 62 by CIA Staff indy re MAJOR

[redacted]

Roselli to deliver \$400k. Estimate vary but Eskerline says 10,000 + 100k of commutation as per secret memo.

Comment - V one of 5 key figures in [redacted] from a heavy involvement in [redacted] Steps taken to end his participation in [redacted] plan but apparently ineffective.

People who knew:

1. J. J. - original man to go in
2. A. V. -
3. son-in-law of H.V.

Phase 2

SECRET

6002275

Harry briefed by authority of Bissell  
in Feb 1961 in connection with a general  
stand-by capability for Executive action

Harry had already discussed problem  
w/ <sup>05</sup>Arnold Silver & Sidney both who  
look parties possibly cut in to Cuba  
project.

Helm's brief on general concept but  
not on ongoing Cuba plot <sup>(murd 05)</sup>

AS W/N account of <sup>(murd 05)</sup> Silver use  
in Congo; Justin O'Donnell summit with  
ZR RIFLE covered as a FID operation  
(ostensibly to develop a capability to enter safer  
& kidnap carriers)

15 Nov 61 - Harry discusses application of  
ZR RIFLE to Cuba; instructed by Bissell  
to run syndicate operation

Unrelated - Helms puts Harry in  
charge of Agency's Cuba task force

Late 1961 - Early 1962 Harry busy

Early March 62

- Much later Harry takes over Castro
- Harry view

came to threat of Castro operations  
ZR RIFLE so being symmetrical.

- Exec Action is symmetrical w/ AS/N
- ZR RIFLE ~~SECRET~~ used to Exec Action  
ZR RIFLE alone meant Castro

Harry  
in operation

A review of his correspondence was unrevealing

(Permanently handled Castro operations & L/N use any of assets being developed in ZR RIFLE)

- Memo of Harry after he left Task Force W & going to Rome on 27 June 1963 to Chief FI / Staff that ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> to help AT W in no longer work & support ~~himself~~.

- Records (OLLA-1974, 24 April 64) show termination of  status on 21 April 64.

<sup>There is no indication in the file that the Exec Adm</sup>  
 Copy of ZR/RIFLE / ATWIN ~~was ever used~~  
 Edwards -

- No activity after B of P until Harry met Rosell & recontacted April 62.

- Edwards inf contact w/ RFK over McBuire wiretap

- 14 May 62 - Harry called Edwards & indicated he was bringing Rosell from ~~with~~ <sup>with</sup> us

743  
 Harry - took out a "gring" operation since he described plan for getting possession to a favorite Castro restaurant. The mechanics were identical to those described by Edwards and as reported in Phase one's

- O'Connell thinks "something going on" before April 61 & April 62 but can't remember

0002277

April 8<sup>th</sup> approx

- Harry met w/ Russell & O'Connell
- O'Connell pointed Mahan there
- ! Harry says he would have recognized Mahan; saw him socially once or twice after 1947 when Harry came to Agony; not since '52 when Harry went to Berlin.

- Edwards, <sup>deliberately</sup> <sup>by</sup> <sup>himself</sup> Harry did not mention Mahan when he first

p45

O'Connell out of June 62 when he was assigned PCS to

p47

18 April 62  
O'Connell gets calls for Russell weekly w/ Harry in Miami

O'Connell says operation going on when Harry took it over altho he could remember when it was started

Harry specified that bean not to be brought in for 2nd phase & further Roubli bound upon.

Roubli right that bean used him what was going on; R replied "nothing" bean - "too bad"

p48

Macco - whether a Venocato record known MACEO Mackle who Harry probably would have known. Also, 15' clear Macco was "Roubli man"

Roubli connected to 2nd phase as a contact to Vienna.

p 49. When the jobs were given to ...  
Vanna reported errors and equipment needed for  
his end of the operation.

0002278

SECRET

V requested names & support of Powell  
joined next to Harry. With help  
of Shaddy, chief of TMDAHS,  
about 5M of weapon & equipment.

April 1962

- a) explosives
- b) detonators
- c) 20.30 caliber rifles
- d) 20.45 cal. handguns
- e) 2 radios
- f) 1 boat radio

Harry & Shaddy went U-Haul  
& put truck in pickup lot for  
delivery to Miami, FL, or via son in Cal.  
Harry & Shaddy set up watch on  
do Powell & Connel.

p 50

May 62 - Powell reported that the job was in Cuba at the  
restaurant reported used regularly by Castro.  
Jan 62

V had ~~sent~~ <sup>dispatched</sup> 3 men team to Cuba  
Sept 1962

Harry saw Powell in Miami on  
7-11 Sept. Another 3 man team  
of military men assigned to penetrate  
Castro's body guard but never happened.  
"Medicine" reported safe still in place and first team safe  
Sept 62 - Jan 63

p 51  
Military men  
needed to  
take off

Harry in Miami. 22 Dec - a team  
of saw Powell & Macco sent Texas. Gave  
Powell 2700 to V for expense of 3 military  
men who never left (in Fla keys)  
Feb 63

Delay due to  
of conditions in  
of not much success

Harry left word for Macco in  
Miami 11-14 Feb that nothing new & looked  
as if dead off. (Just how Harry left this  
word for Macco is not clear)

SECRET



April May 63

Helms approved a last meeting  
w/ Harry Roselli before Harry left  
for Rome

55 People who knew  
Bruce Cheever (Harry defmt 1962)  
knew Harry meeting w/ gangster in  
Reno in winter of '62

May 62

Shuf Edwards & Lawrence Houston briefd  
RFK "all the way". RFK agreed not to  
prosecute wiretap case but wanted to be  
informed of Agency's role in "gangster" affairs.  
RFK asked for a memo of  
the meeting via a phone call. Memo  
prepared on 14 May 1962 by Edwards & Houston.  
NO briefing of McLean, <sup>Conrad</sup> Carter, or Helms.

RFK not told that Phase II had  
begun; that V had little or no info re Phase II.

On 14 May 62 Harry briefd Helms;  
adviser against briefing McLean & Conrad  
Carter. Writer Edwards & Houston  
is not going to be used

Comment

RFK's secretary called on 4 March 67  
to obtain Edwards memo. He knew

SECRET

0002280

of Pearson article of 7 March 47 &  
apparently wanted to check his recollection  
of what he had been briefed upon.

Helmus had turned in w/ RFK  
& allowed him to read memo. He  
did not leave a copy.

---

1954-55 Mahon served by Neardness  
to offset Onassis control of Saudi oil shipments  
Worked at top levels of U.S. & British govt  
& met at least once w/ Nixon.

O'Connell rept'd that during negotiations  
w/ Long Committee, Mahon stated he  
might buy his attorney ~~in~~ ~~the~~  
in past activities.

SECRET

10-11 Sept 62 <sup>03</sup> SECRET

(Wainwright) Tepedino & Cubela in  
Copenhagen (Wainwright) used "unassessable"  
& Cubela insisted "elementary"

14-23 Sept 62

<sup>03</sup> Cubela, Tepedino, (Wainwright) &  
Earle Williams from Madrid; met in Paris.  
Cubela given S/W training &  
supplies; shown a handwritten document.  
Refused to be photographed.

(Williams)<sup>03</sup> cubela that no physical  
elimination missions be given as a  
requirement but he might do it on his  
own initiative. Headquarters strongly comm. that  
no physical elimination missions be given Cubela.

5-8 Sept 63

Brazil - met by (Wainwright)  
Tepedino & Nestor Sanchez who became  
case officer.

Cubela showed 2 S/W manuals but  
only 1 record. Afraid of postal censorship.  
Shot by Ramon Guim Diaz  
AMTRANK-10 who was being moved  
DIAZ Isalque (AMICE-14) who had  
been sent to recruit AMTR

SECRET

14 Sept 63

From Brazil Cubela flew to Paris  
& was going to tell Castro after the fact

0002281

9 March 61 03 - Mexico City status

P28

(Jack Stewart) met w/ Cubela in Mexico City, arranged by Carlos Tepedeno Hernandez, a long-time friend. Cubela was (Stewart) from Havana where he was once assigned.

Cubela and leader of DR are like group of leftist students signed in 1956 to fight Batista; Nestor Sanchez - case officer.

28 March 61

Both Cubela & Cota wanted to defect; according to asset of Miami Station.

Ex-filtration called off a report that Cuban police aware of Cubela's desire to defect & his departure plans.

Comment:  
First of 3 rumormongers within DR; but unknown if Cubela consented of meet in Cuba! Other two links are even more nebulous

~~15 Jan 61~~ 14 August 61

Message from aviation station (god friend) Tepedeno that Cubela going to Paris & wanted to talk <sup>under a friend of Stewart's</sup> No indication of any money.

SECRET

15 Jan 62

Lucia Echevarria Bianchi told an asset (HM contact-1) that Cubela going to Helsinki & wanted to defect.

SECRET

Would stop in Paris to see Tepedino

0002283

27 June 1962

Tepedino approached FBI in Miami on 11 June with idea that Cabelo wanted to defect. FBI sent a detailed memo to CIA since they knew Tepedino to be a CIA asset.

8 July 62

Tepedino dissatisfied w/ CIA handling of Cabelo's "defection" in Paris in 61 so he contacted FBI. Stated his source of info on rumors for defection were w/ Chivarrias.

30 July - a August 62 '63

Wm Wainwright met w/ Tepedino a jeweler in NYC & both went to Helsinki, Cuba. Talked into being recruited in place of not defecting.

Cabelo wanted to blow up oil refineries, kill Castro, Carlos Rodriguez, & Soviet presence.

7-a August 62

Meeting in Stockholm because Helsinki too risky. Cabelo stated that he told 4 of his Cuban associates that he met Tepedino in Helsinki.

SECRET

SECRET

that he was taking a vacation.

0002286

3 Oct 63

Sandy arrives in Paris to meet w/ Cuba who had written Tejada on NY that he did not want to continue.

CIA had to tell [redacted] 24 [that contacts were for purposes of deflection; [redacted] Cuba under surveillance.]

11 Oct 63 Sandy calls that Cuba insist on meeting w/ RFK; advised Cuba going to try an attempt on Castro even w/out US support.

29 Oct 63

Fitzguald, Deputy SAs, go to Paris & get approval from Helms.

Fitz states he told Cuba that US would have no part in attempt on Castro's life.

Winton went from Sandy in company

14 Nov 63

19 Nov 63

Sandy memo states Fitz assumes that Cuba would get cache of rifles w/ scopes inside Cuba, on request

22 Nov 63

SECRET

Sandy arrives in Paris on Nov 22 after getting run w/ ~~Robert Kennedy~~

Sandy says Cuba accepted gun but stated he would not take it to

Cuba with him. SECRET

0002287

Cubela asked for a cache of arms to be placed at AMTRUNK is L2 high-power rifle w/ telescopic sights; 20 grenades; 2000 C-4 sticks  
amm. As they left meeting, heard JFK shot.

Sandy stated he rec'd an OP in cable from Fitzgerald that briefly is "off" but nothing in AMTRUNK file.

Cubela w/ a take S/W with him to Prague  
1 Dec 63

Cubela returns from Prague to Cuba  
19 Feb 1964

JMWAVE to have 2 caches in place in March.

Done on 17-21 March 64 on AMTRUNK VIII

24 April 1964

Tegedino had been brief to meet Carlos Jorge ROBINSO mungy who has message from Cubela.

3 May 64 - Robins says Cubela wanted a silencer  
30 August 64

Artime record info thru Madrid that a group of doubtful members of Castro regime would to ~~be~~ establish direct contact. 7 Oct 64, Artime sees

Alberto BLANCO Romariz.

13 Nov. 64. SECRET

Artime agrees to talk to AMTRUNK-1 if it turns out he is contact man for internal dissent group. Artime

Think if ~~ARMIST~~ is chief of ~~secret~~  
group we can forget about ~~operation~~  
4 Dec 64

Sanchez prepares a memo for 6570 for  
Arteme to maintain contacts w/ ~~secret~~  
group's reps in ~~Spain~~. Arteme does  
6-7 Dec 64

Sanchez meets Cubela in Paris & was  
~~not~~ going to continue his plans  
Told US. could not be involved.  
10 Dec 64.

Arteme did not know nor Cubela  
that CIA in direct contact with ~~them~~.  
Rather STS continued to put both  
men together.

CIA did want to put select  
weapons on ~~the~~ Cubela's hands directly  
but could do it. Thus Arteme  
27 Dec; 30 Dec (initial)

Cubela & Arteme meet in <sup>Madrid</sup> Madrid.  
Arteme reports to Sanchez that Cubela  
had requested a select for FAT rifle  
but Americans w/n give him one.

Arteme to come up w/ select or  
different rifle in Cuba.

11 Feb 65

Cubela to receive pistol w/ select  
& Belgian FAT rifle w/ select from  
Arteme's secy ~~SECRET~~ <sup>both</sup> weapons come  
from ~~the~~ US. & are now in Madrid.



Congress

12 Feb 65

SECRET

0002289

Artemio has never talked to Cubela  
in Madrid.

4 March 65 - Cubela in Havana; source  
is friend of Tepedino's who telephoned him

15 March 65

Rafael Garcia-Bango Director  
arrives in Madrid from Cuba & introduced  
to a state officer.

Publicly close friends of Cubela; & claims  
to be in touch w/ group of wealthy leaders  
planning to overthrow Castro.

Added in July to 2 for sup. Traff.  
as source for Cypri Hotel. Traff. - 4 months  
| Another name - link

June 1965

Victor ESPINOSA Hernandez, a former  
PRM trustee who was arrested as a militant  
on 20 March 1961, contacted FWS via lawyer  
FBT on 3 June 65.

Espinosa stated he had received letter  
from a friend in Paris urging him  
to meet w/ Albert Polanco who had a  
message from Cubela who wanted it delivered  
to CIA

Monge - Cubela in a position to help Castro  
& would CIA & US Govt be willing to support them  
If "yes", give details on what he needed.

SECRET

Cubela had wanted money in Paris  
on 1 Feb 65. Travel down & report -

16 Feb 65 Sandy gave hint to.

0002290 Tepehu 7,00 in NY C.

SECRET

23 June 1965 Headquarters sent cable Kennedy contact. 'convincing proof that evidence from [redacted] group measure', Fernando A&A?

1 March 66 - Cuba's brain arrested for activities w/ CIA

Jose Luis Gonzalez Ballarín, Alberto Blanco Romany, Juan Alena Navarro. Confirmed

Also appearing - Guillermo Cienfuegos Alvarez, Royal Herminio Udy

Gonzalez Ballarín<sup>03</sup> - attests in Spanish contact of [redacted] at US Embassy in Madrid. 32

Cuba met w/ Artem in Spain in Feb. 1965.

Artem sent Ballego to US to get Helicop's signt & silencer. Delivered to Blanco Romany who delivered it to Gonzalez Ballarín then to Cuba the day before he left Madrid.

Tasco

Said in Cuba's residence were Helicop's signt, F&H rifle + 9 March 66

Castro sent personal letter that death sentence not be asked. 10 March 66

Cuba testimony:

Silencer did not break; I threw it away because it was burning my hands

SECRET

0002291 I spoke to Fidel in January. He opened  
the door to me <sup>SECRET</sup> but I did not have  
the courage to tell him

(Comment)

Trial evidence confined to trip to  
Europe in Feb 64 & Aug 65 to meet  
w/ Botwin. No mention of March 64 thru  
Nov 65 contacts w/ Agency.

No hint of poison pen Nov 63.

Speculate

If full details would have come out,  
Castro would have little to complain  
of. ~~It is not possible to speculate on our own luck.~~

2 high-level  
embassy meetings  
where Castro  
was usually  
discouraged

Special Group (August)

18 August 62 (probably one described by Pearson)  
State: Dean Rusk, Alexei Johnson, Edwin  
Martin, Richard Goodwin, Robt Hurwath  
which have

Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy (RFT absent)  
Deputy:

McNamara, Belafante, Kennedyer, Lansdale  
CIA - McCone Harry

USIA - Edward Murrow, Donald Wilson

Secy - Thomas Parrott

Parrott's notes & a number of  
but McNamara & King would have ~~mentioned~~  
raising it & Murrow's comment.

No one raised exception to McNamara  
'hardly agree' <sup>SECRET</sup>

Lansdale wrote memo on 13 August  
to Harry, Hurwath, Harris, & Wilson which

Probab Pearson's info wa high-level  
mety was 10 Sept 62

O'Connell interviewed Mahan in May 67  
& wrote a report:

- 1 - Mahan taught Morgan in Phoenix
- 2 - Never heard of Place II from Roselli  
or anyone

0002293

- 3. Roselli started to Morgan by Greenspan
- 4 - Mahan suspects Roselli in chain of Morgan
- 5 - Roselli definitely heard; Morgan in Vegas recently "in secret"

6 - Garrison, Morgan, Roselli in Vegas  
in March. <sup>been with</sup> In truck w/ Roselli; so was Morgan

It is

our impression that Greenspan also involved  
in the conversation.

<sup>1222</sup> Point finger to Roselli as source of info  
and to confirm Morgan as Pearson's source.

Es Robt Mahan  
reduces non  
DA intelligence  
with immediate  
knowledge of the  
Robert Kennedy  
shoot

<sup>1223</sup> Summer of 62 - Edwards, Mahan, & Roselli  
had lunch & Edwards said he told Roselli  
he in front RFK of Roselli's confidence.

Pearson's story seems to rely on ref  
above. Could be Hong if ref source.

Probably from 2 sources:

State Dept meeting + met. organ  
so Roselli chief suspect.

Inference: Roselli definitely had lunch &  
Morgan definitely talking to a newspaperman friend (Morgan)

SECRET

Lansdale memo covered drafting papers for various subjects related to Cuban operation. A portion of case found CIA copy of memo was "including elimination of leaders". Lansdale repeated tried to raise assumption of Castro w/ Hany over next several weeks but Hany did not.

0002292

It hurt 5 people in Lansdale's office when MOW took to Lansdale out of CIA memorandum as part of it.

30 July 1964

303 Committee met in Situation Room of White House.

McBryne Bundy, Vance, Malone, Thomas Hughes & Des. Fitzgerald for a discussion of Cuba.

~~Thomas~~ Peter Jensen as secy.

10 June 64 memo from DDJP to Don re Mafia plot to assassinate Castro.

Price was 150,000 w/ 10,000 copies. Cuban exile: Jose Maria "Pepina" Bosch, Basilio Rum, to contribute 50,000. He approved JMWAVE for US participation. Refused outright 19 August 64.

DCI (McConnell) to Bundy - re FBI interest w/ all participants.

SECRET

0002294

Publicity has not been its course:

- a) Pearson has not yet used the pills & fact of State Dept meeting
- b) Baum has not revealed full case; CIA should be prominently displayed when he does
- c) P wants Pearson in custody & will be deported

Pearson stay in custody & detail found only in C here the 3 man team.

p 126. Put in it but slight - that there is no other motive in Speedy's stay.

p 127. We do not know that Carter actually tried to retaliate, but we do know that there were such plots against Carter. Unhappily, it now appears that Baum may also know this.

p 129. Wilson reports that Taylor is in jail in Tampa. Powell is persona non grata in San Diego, being refused register <sup>with police</sup> some he is in town. None of them would have connections about disapp in his CIA connections when he was pulled by law enforcement author. Evidence has already shown it when the FBI was ready in 1963, Powell appears to deny it in his conversation with Meyer's Baum.

P. 131. Supch - 3 May 1967

Comment: Red base CIA over a barrel

Tab A

SECRET

0002295

241 July 75 memo

Santino Tropp

4. ST desired person full to agent who had access to Castro

When this attempt failed, T supported another candidate (cancelled re BOP)

- Mahan former contact subject w/ Office of Security
- Roselli connections

Nov 1967 - illegal entry

Dec 68 - Firms Club

Senate Staff 7-8-June 1975

Ad Hoc Staff

NO 838-75

9 June 75

4. Report to Maxwell Taylor made by Dick Bissell on 8-Dec 1971 DDO

(maybe on continuing the action capability)

5. Who is Torrella (yet another alleged Castro assassin) DDO

6. - WIRROU's operational aliases?

- who was (WIZARD 14) (John Stein's memo)

- 2 young officers who contacted WIRROU DDO

- want to know John Stein's all WIRROU file by Walt P. Lee

SECRET

1/1

SECRET

Memo 5 May 1967  
July - Wm K. Army

6002296

Missing

1. ~~Harvey~~ <sup>Bill</sup> ~~Harvey~~ contacted Papich to report to Papich some contact he had w/ "gangster" and offer his copy to FBI. He expanded to Papich. ---

16 May 67

Tab B Atlanta Edward Cohen 7 April 77  
Finn Pemburo  
re Duke City  
Morgan associated w/ Agency circa 1951 as a lawyer "cut out" in matters of contact to DDO.

Stuart Pierpont Morgan  
DDB 28 May 1913 St Louis

Richard Scully Cain  
MKA - Richard Scalpette SS 357-22-333  
1969 TexasKanaTex (Reg No. 17169-TT)

In May 1964 Bolden refused to testify before Warren Com. in absence of counsel George Howard.

SECRET

Chicago American for 26 Nov. 1963 in column Daily Day by Maggie's Day - rumor that assassination planned w/for FBI of Chicago



SECRET

1 Sept 47 issue of life

Garrison a guest of Mario Maurino,  
a henchman of Marcella, as far as the  
barron denied knowledge of Maurino connect  
to Marcella.

TO Chief SRS  
Sulge. Carr

9 Oct 1947

TAD  
R

Info re meeting of Fair Play  
under Richard Criley (# 346 116)

Source of info on Guillermo WSCOBOR  
who was 'int' of Horace Speeds (SAS)  
leads obtained from Ralph PEREZ (44426  
Speed #C199499)

WSCOBOR recruiting Cubans for Communist  
Party in Chicago.

0002297

SECRET

File

7 Dec 1978 VCF for Doc of Secret  
Russell, Gelling

9 August 1976

SECRET

Brief memo Subj: Gelling, Russell

0002798

Tab B & C

Additional info re Traff, Russell, &  
Brenner contained in material previously  
released for review re Sturgis.

21 May 1975 Memo by Pridemore  
re Arthur Ballito & Fred Hume assist

1. 12 Jan 1961 memo to FBI re  
recommend DuBois for ant-A atty whom  
he will disclose

2. A Hays is James Cantillon per a  
13 March 1961 report.

3. 22 May 61 FBI memo re interview  
w/ Col. P. Swain who said he contacted  
Mahan in fall of 1960 for use as a "cut-out"  
for Havana. Swain gave my impression  
to Mahan he would attempt to accomplish several  
clandestine efforts in Cuba.

10 Jan 1974

Memo: Chief Warden Hampton Downer

Subj: Salvatore Bramona & Richard Cain

Re Chicago Tribune Articles of 28 and 31

Dec. 1973

Richard S. Cain # 272141

DOB Oct 1931 in Chicago.

SECRET

Left Vice Squad in 1960; Accused  
Lohman.  
a J.F. from

CIA contacts

SECRET

0002299

A. Fall 1960

Cain initiated contact w/ Chicago office  
& volunteered info on Cuban cell groups in  
Chicago area.

B. June 61

Contacted Lohman of Chicago Field office  
re a Mr. Krougansky who was met w/  
President of Panama's <sup>an</sup> Investigative Commission.

C. Summer 61

Cain met in Mexico City by CIA staff  
identity & purpose unknown.

D. Oct 1961

Cain wrote to Lohman from Panama  
offering his services

E. April 1962

Cain makes unannounced visit to Hong  
Kong. William Scott & Warren Dean in Mexico City  
says he had an investigative agency w/  
branches in Chicago & LA which he used to  
provide training to Mexican Coast Agents

F. 4 June 62

Reported from Mexico for small number  
has books & information on Mexican officials  
& writing

G. 19 August 63

met in Chicago at Lake Shore Drive Athletic  
Club & Dolphin Club by Grace Speed w/ a  
Dev. Staff officer & Chief of Chicago DCD office.

He would like to work overseas  
for CIA

Cain worked for Cook City Sheriff  
& ~~was~~ in contact with Cubans in Chicago  
area & would provide info on undercover  
activities of Cubans particularly Paulino Sierra  
H. 26-38 Aug 1963

Cain informs the Student Directory,  
a Cuban exile group in Miami

- Miro Cordoyos informant in  
purchase arms

2 Sept 63 J. DRE people who had questioned  
arms. (Boris Speed) re Washington Chicago  
told Cain to get out of the picture  
H. 1967.

FBI investigating Cain's arms work  
& reconfirmed CIA sever contact

L. 15 April 1972

Cain returned to Chicago from Mexico  
City; then disappeared. May 1972 says he  
was going to Latin America. Involved  
in illegal arms deals (unconfirmed) &  
on various occasions stated he was CIA  
M. 16 May 1972

FBI agent in Mexico City used  
Mexico City Station for traces on Cain

Eastern Airlines job ed. Cain as  
Seymour told friend Howard. 5 May 77

27 Nov 63

By Robert B. P. Lohman

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Feb 63 met at 987 S. Spaulding Chicago under direction of Michael Wiley, Secy of Chicago Chapter. Assassination of Pan. denounced
3. LHO provided info in March 1963  
Shuff's office had not interviewed LHO at Feb meeting but strong suspicion he was in Chicago in April 1963 & responsible for firing the office of UPT
4. Shuff advised in late Feb 63 so had "officially" asked FBI for info on Fair Play for Cuba. If they developed anything definite they would notify FBI

~~Could not find~~ "that early in 1963 the Chicago Tribune took over operation in U.S. for Fair Play"

15 August 63

Sandy Smith Chicago Sun-Times following up a lead that he call CIA re report Bureau would get info from Cuba but no info of value.

Said he did not show info to Ed Butcher but to someone in Butcher's office (justified)

Breckenridge memo to Dad of requests

1. Persons in Sec H of paragraph 3 is contained in one 50 volume of material
2. Section B lists 3 American citizens. Contact is minimal
3. Quarter in Section C B 1 is Arteme; Also used by Mafia in custo operation

Detectives have already interviewed several who is related.

TAD C

1. Ramon Don Estevan Dimonquez (shortly) DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936
2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas family DOB 12 Jun 1948
3. Luciana Nieves (shortly)
4. Jose de la Tormenta (shortly)
5. Jose Quintana DOB 3 Oct 48  
 reported by name to Roubert
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortijo DOB 10 Jan 48
7. Manuel Arteme

TAB C

SECRET

0002303

14 March 1974

Mulreny w/ Terry Sengner

Frank O'Malley referred Hunt to  
Bob Mullen of the Mullen Group.

- O'Malley knew Hughes a client of  
Mullen's; this information pushed up in  
course of a casual relationship between  
O'Malley & Mullen in early 60's in connection  
with Full Cuba Committee.

Hunt & Mullen met in Paris during  
Marshall Plan

- when Mullen decided to hire Hunt  
possible insight on cover placements and  
circumstances.

- Hunt approached O'Malley for an  
introduction through Mullen & Sengner only details.

- Thomas C. Amato apparently refused job.

- Houston

- Rauf or intervention w/ Farrell of  
ISNS re possible departure of Brannon

- only people who know well P. Swann,  
Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, & Houston

SECRET

1977 Report

SECRET

0002304

AMTRUNK

Designed to identify & later use suspected  
personnel in armed forces in Cuba.

Bay 63, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez  
& Enrique Cayardo Robera developed Fernando  
Plan & Eustasio Castro.

Moreno defects in April 1961 & assoc. w/  
George Volsky; Cuban citizen of Polish origin.  
Presumably USSR <sup>1940s</sup> & then in Polish Ar Force under  
British Command. Married Cuban & moved in  
Miami May 61.

conf 63

Volsky contacts Ted Syula & met w/ w/ w/  
Gardner & Herwitch (State). CIA assigns plan  
to Miami Station & it is known as AMTRUNK

Nerve program very far & by Sept 63  
had 3 sources including Guin

Moreno in Oct 63 was removed from  
AMTRUNK due to indiscretion. He was pretty  
appal & JFK thru Volsky & Syula

Had some contacts but no real action  
capability; In '65 Guin & Piny arrested.

Syula & Volsky both Polish & met in Cuba  
in 195-60

SECRET

Joe Ricardo RABEL Nurey  
suspected agent who defected Dec 62 &  
joined AMTRUNK; returned to Cuba on her own



X in 65 to infiltrate his family. Arrested & given 30 yrs. but freed in 67.

Accusation RHPZ a Cuban agent as early as July 1963.

Possibility -

WTRUNK might have been an important Cuban plan from the beginning. Inf action was buying cables & some info's & infiltration.

M.D.

NY Daily News 20-25 April 1975 by Paul Maskeil, - quotes Sturgis on assassination attempts including using Juan data to bomb Castro. I recruited him to work w/ the embassy (US).

Sturgis' id of Vta, prior to its disclosure by external investigators, raises question as to what he knew.

Office of Security memo 1975 noting connection between Sturgis & Rothman in 262 citing FBI reports.

(made in conjunction w/ Daily News story)

Giancana in FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 indicated he had met w/ assassin-to-be. & pills in Castro's food or drink.

Since CIA pills not until Feb 1961, seems that most had their own plan.

SECRET

- Lorenzo claims Sturgis recruited her in 1960

Verna

0002307

FBI 21 Dec 1960

- MRO support for Mike

FBI 18 Jan 1961

V. receiving some of that support

Stungis could have learned of Mike's  
role after Mike settled in Miami in 1965

FBI report

14 August 1964 would a statement by a  
person jailed in Cuba by Troff.

### Other Proposals

1. May 1975

Cuban exile who came to be a  
contract employee stated that in Feb 1961 he  
was given a rifle & a memo to kill Castro.

Tried to enter Cuba 3 times & failed

2. May 1977 Anderson column re  
Antonio Veciana

On 3 occasions (Dec 1960, July 62, Havana)  
he proposed to CIA. He was assisting Castro

In 1970 report he made a proposal to  
an AID employee at an overseas post.

5 Agent Messages in 1961

SECRET

1. 3 of messages involved some group of agents

so probably same plan

1. 27 March 1961 AMBROSE 15

Plan to sabotage electric company in Havana & hit Castro at Sports Palace

2. 29 March 1961

same idea with effort to arrive on 30 March but no commitment as assassin

3. 5 April 61

only room for 50 men; would try 9 April but need military aid.

a) AMBROSE infiltrated several times & finally executed 30 August 62 after May 62 arrest. Reported as some identity he was CIA; & not mentioned in McBrown Book

b) AMCOAX 11 <sup>the</sup> ~~two~~ persons in

c) AMPUB 11 touch w/ AMBROSE

d) AM PANIC 17 & mentioned in McBrown book, Drey 30 yr sentence

All 3 people sentenced prior to Bay P-8 none had assassination mission. Only AMBROSE mentioned that!

06, 24

4. 4 June 61 [Moratori of Italian Embassy]

claimed he had plans for invasion w/in 30 days after killing Fidel.

Reply was that info was untrue & (Moratori) confession

SECRET

5. 3 May 61

0002309

- from a member of Revolutionary  
Recruiting movement saying they would try to  
kill Fidel today"

- Reply was "Lay low"  
- Maybe HRM P 46 1

Tab D

AMLASH

- Rejects notion that AMLASH a Cuban agent.
- No contact between August 1962 and Sept 1963
- 7 Sept & 9 Sept cables indicate that AMLASH is a "spoiled brat"; hopeless as an intelligence performer; but approach in chief espionage allowed to recruit his own cohorts."

Book V leaves inference that Castro's speech to Dan Horner after AMLASH leak lit CIA had not progressed anything at that time. & he met until 3 Oct 63

p 3-4 Summary of Findings

Nov 19, 63 AMLASH told CIA officer he was returning to Cuba. On 20 Nov he was reported as being under Federal Agency "of something untoward" AMLASH

p 26 SSC Final Rpt.

SECRET

On 24 Nov Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for names of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico,

Purpose was to determine significance  
LHO's contact w/ Soviets

But AMLAH 11 name was included  
in reference to contact between a member  
of the Soviet embassy & a Cuban cultural  
attache. NOT a report of a contact between  
AMLAH 11 and the Soviet

"H" role - Chief did not know of  
AMLAH 1963 associations w/ CIA

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### TABLE E

24 Nov 63 Subj: Cuban Proclamation following  
Assassination of Pan Koundak

28 Nov 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3)  
John Wilson - Hudson

29 Nov 63

Action on FTP request, Agency reports Almeida  
be turned out to Mexican authorities.

12 Dec 1963 CSCF-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)  
Subj: Wilson, Carlos John

30 Jan 1964 CSCF-3/779,814 (CI/Sec)  
Subj: Jack Ruby - LHO

SECRET

20 March 1964 CSCF-3/780/612 (SR/CF/R)  
Photos of individual Chief recently LHO

SECRET

10 June 1964 CSCI - 31781, 841 (CJ/R&A)  
Info re Ruby

6 Oct 64 CSCI - 316101446-64  
VIA DUCT interview on 9 Sept 1964  
His comments on 7 Photos Forwarded ~~to~~

W C Doc. 1054 Ruby & Associates.

0002311

SECRET

June 21/1977

1977 D.C. Report

SECRET

0002312

1. Comments on Final

The contents of the CFT are based on  
sums of information of low value and  
shall be handled, and on the non-reporting  
of various Agency operational activities that the  
SSC Final Report judges to have been relevant  
to the Warsaw Commun Agency.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that  
the creation of the intelligence system against Cuba  
would a negative influence on the quality of  
their support for the U.S. coverage.

"If your papers ... investigated p 2  
they should have ... facts ... p 7  
Certainly ... important, p 7

A central feature of the rationale in the  
concept that of Castro had allowed by these  
activities it would have provided some  
information against Cuba. Finally, the SSC  
Final Report makes it clear that if  
this they should have been passed  
and accepted at the time of the intelligence  
system (not to mention the U.S. subject to a  
review of the Government's Castro program  
to see what it might reveal.

Agency views the information they in  
the Final Report & pass form of "the

result of an evolution in perception.  
i.e. Provocative Report in 63 from  
both Cuba & USSR from Bay of Pigs.  
Minkov's; "Along with the army of US  
Colon program.

"The SSC Field Report has shifted to  
emphasis instead CIA operational activities  
against Cuba so requiring specific attention."

#### Review of Agency -

Persons ~~in charge~~<sup>very</sup> know details of 1963  
& 1964 operations for the most part are no  
longer available. Primary reliance on memory.

CIA has now conducted such a  
review - looking at "the other end"  
of a possible chain of evidence, which they  
had already could have stated. This has  
produced no new volume bearing on the  
assassination, altho' it has produced the basis  
for new lines of speculation. In fact, the  
review sometimes seemed to become  
a subtle exercise in trying to get  
back to the provocation being  
rather than being solid to existing  
evidence actually bearing on the  
assassination of Pres. Kennedy. The emphasis  
sometimes became one of asking if this  
Agency (which was not under review)  
could have provided clues to solve  
the assassination ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ Kennedy but



Had Castro learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the AMLABH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's penetration seemed to be tailored!

### Tab C

AMLABH

The Agency had set a fantastic allusion with this man during Pan Kennedy's life, altho the SSC Final Report - in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so extensively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate context in the paper at Tab D. The key point is that prior to Pan Kennedy's death the allusion ~~to~~ with AMLABH was ambiguous and without substance. Had Castro learned of it he could ~~not~~ have only said there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an understanding.

### p14 Now Consideration on the Syndicate Operation

In a series of stories by Paul Mossil in the New York Daily News, of April 20-25, 1974 it quoted Sturges as follows:

"The syndicate was involved in planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had

across to the Prime Minister's office, Stueger said. F. Bruno Felli's parents security guard Orta. F recruited him to work with the Embassy (Russian Embassy in Havana).

"He (Stueger) has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

Orta was the director of the office of the Prime Minister, which gave him <sup>access</sup> ~~access~~ that would make it possible for him to pass customs. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with it his access, in late June 1961. This was prior to delivery of the poison pills to him in late Feb or early March 1961. Orta's escape in this manner was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in Feb. 1965.

Some news stories discuss a possible relationship between Stueger and Trappanese, also mentioning a former Robinson as a former partner of Trappanese. Office of Sec. of State memorandum in 1975; not by <sup>and on 13 June 1974</sup>

a connection between Sturgis and Portman in 1960, citing FBI reports.

Butler's Aunt Spurgis reported to have had a role in gambling and. In this availability due to her "lost papers." One could deduce that Sturgis and Carter could have known one another because of their connection with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men heading the gambling operations.

From 1976 Sturgis also reports claim by Maria (Mamie) <sup>ETA</sup> Lorenz that she acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 re pain pills in jar of face cream.

Quotes - FBI memo on "Vermana":  
 "This seems to confirm some part involving a woman to kill Carter with poison known, the timing of events does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consolidation had been given to various schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been running ahead of its man!"

SECRET

In fact, it is possible that Vermana already was involved in independent

agitation with the ~~current~~ ~~agitation~~  
 when first appeared prior to 1947  
 in ~~the~~ ~~1947~~ ~~to~~ ~~carry~~ ~~out~~ ~~the~~ ~~United~~  
~~States~~, the 1947 ~~to~~ ~~Report~~ ~~upon~~  
~~the~~ ~~1947~~ ~~to~~ ~~Report~~ ~~upon~~  
 to ~~two~~ ~~FBI~~ ~~reports~~ ~~that~~ ~~bear~~ ~~on~~ ~~this~~.  
 One of them, on 21 Dec. 1940, indicates  
 support by the ~~current~~ ~~underworld~~  
 for some of the Cuban exiles. The  
 other report, on 18 Jan. 1941,  
 suggests that Varna was one of these  
 giving that support, altho' this was  
 not confirmed.

... to late in June 64 another group  
 plot in Miami area for 15,000.

Speculation that when ~~started~~  
 in April 1942 can appear just "blue  
 over & smelly" already "ongoing".

It is possible that CFA simply  
 found itself involved in providing  
 additional resources for independent  
 operations that the syndicate study  
 had under way.

In a sense CFA may have been  
 "piggy-backing" on the syndicate and  
 in addition to its material contribution  
 was also supplying an aura of official  
 sanction.