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1977 IER

6 AMTRUNK operation starting in 1963 sought to develop a capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into a group that could not take the Castro regime. It was conceived by Cuban exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to the CIA.

little concrete progress during JFK's life in 1965 CIA withdrew from its assoc. because believed to be compromised

basic ?! about security some corruption due to involvement of personalities who ^{are} suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having been foreign agents

IER speculates that it is unlikely (AMTRUNK) to develop any outline till long after JFK's death suggests that it is unlikely to have provoked Castro at that time to use assass in retaliation

7 a full review of the operation shows that prior to the President's assassination not only had the CIA not agreed to give any support to AMTRUNK / 1, but had rejected his proposal to assassinate "Castro"

8 CIA's Bureau and the relationship between AMTRUNK / 1 and 2/10 for would have

7

known only that there was an inconclusive association that clearly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the base for the postulated "provocation"

IOB down + denies possibility that actual CIA plottings w/ immense significance which may have provided CASTRO w/ postulated provocation for the JFK assass

Items Selected by the SSC for Critical Comment

8

reference to reported 5-hour delay of a Cuban airline flight from Mexico City, awakens arrival of mysterious passenger

* see file on Hilberto Polcarpo LOPEZ

IOB says flight on ground for only 4 hrs + it departed 1 hr before alleged arrival of the private aircraft

FBI investigated another man who departed on another Cuban flight - info was added for use in SSC report (somewhat), "a single report that caused him to be dramatized as a fall of errors as to be highly suspect"

also SSC emphasis in cable from Mex City station replying to 11/23/63 inquiry from CIA HQ asking for info on collection of information source

cable DIR 84885, 28-11-63 11111935
MEXI 7045 (IN 62281)

24 November 1963

IOB reply, part of meeting with [unclear] [unclear]

8 as having contact w/ the Soviets but
9 as the subject of a December 1960 meeting
between funding of Cuban Embassy w/ a
Soviet, concerning press conference to be held
by AMKASH/1 in ~~Feb~~ Feb + March 1961

* "On any event, the meeting in December
1960 was prior to President Kennedy's
inauguration, which removes it yet
further from any possible relevance to the
subject matter. It really is not difficult
to understand why ~~the~~ the reference to
AMKASH/1's name did not lead to detailed
research about him."

I gen'l conclusions

① "The SSC Final Report contains
numerous factual errors, both
in the extensive treatment of a
selected operation (AMKASH) and in
a number of separate incidents that
it presents."

② "while one ~~can~~^{can} make the point
in principle that the Warren
Commission could have well
broadened its review to include
the anti-Cuban programs
of the U.S. Government, in trying to
make the case for that concept
Book 10 of the SSC Final Report
is not a sound basis, though it
contains as its detail for the
particular kind. It is difficult to
characterize it as generally"

11

" it would have served to reinforce the credibility of (the Warren Commission's) efforts had it taken a broader view of the matter (or normal avenues of investigation). CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw then in general terms - the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of the time. It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt - as they obviously did - that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscientious review.

11111937

" it must be recognized that CIA cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have been in 1964

TAB B: CIA Pay on the Inquiry

2. b. SSC report, to considerable extent describes AM-Ash operation inaccurately. The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of JFK, in order to support the SSC view ^{that it} should have been reported to the WC.

c. question of aircraft flights on 11/22 & 11/24/62 to Hawaii
see "Unidentified Air Passengers" ~~file~~ folder

Travel to & fr USSR 1959-1962

11/26/63 Cable DIR 85133, 26.11.63

sent to [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

- requesting

any scrap info which bears on JFK's assassination

replies on 11/27/63:

[redacted]

(EN 68739), 11/27/63

(EN 68802) "

(EN 69005) "

(IN 69011) "

7 (EN 69100) "

(EN 69233) 11/11/63

(EN 69290) "

(IN 69328) 11/28/63

(EN 69352) 11/29/63

(IN 69411) "

(IN 694234) 12/15/63

(IN 694487) 12/16/63

(IN 694517) "

4 [redacted] (IN 69100) 11/27/63
[redacted] reported that British journalist
claimed that when imprisoned in Cuba in
1959 - Santos happened; lives in luxury
in jail, Santos visited frequently by other
American gangster lady

[redacted] (IN 69233) 11/27/63
[redacted] reported delight of Cuban embassy
staff over JFK death & instructions from
gov to cease looking happy in public

[redacted] (IN 69290) 11/27/63
[redacted] reported Soviets shocked - blame across
on extreme right wing

Other than above, initial reports produced
no other info

- 11/29/63 DIR 85973 query to [redacted] +
Frankfurt on Oswald's travel back to USSR
- 12/2/63 DIR 86077, query to Berlin,
Frankfurt, Bonn & [redacted]
- BONN 5579 (FN 73338) 12/4/63
- [redacted] 5116 (FN 73378) "
- MUNI 8316 (FN 75065) 12/6/63
- [redacted] 5545 (FN 76758) 12/9/63
- [redacted] 1400 12/9/63

1111939

above reports produced details about Oswald's
travel from USSR thru Germany & Netherlands
to US in June 1962

5 No evidence found through these queries
& related queries tying the S.O. to Oswald's
cases of JFK

II Oswald Mexico Visit Sept Oct 1963

Cable to Mexico on 11/28/63 DIR 85655,

"We have by no means excluded the
possibility that other as yet unknown
persons may have been involved or
even that other powers may have
played a role. Please continue all your
coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies
and your liaison w/ Mexicans

6 DIR 86064 30.11.63 11/30/63

Please follow all leads & tips - Question
if Oswald acted alone not fully resolved

DIR 88680 12/12/63

Continue watch of Soviets & Cubans for complacents,
propagandizers about the case. "FYI only,
Soviet Intel in India had letter sent
to (U.S. Government) leaders demanding
full investigation of case."

11111940

HMMW-12193, 17.12.16 17/17/63

7 HQ forwarded dispatch to Mexico section
congratulating them on job well done

"Your JFKVOY data, the statements of
Belova DUKAN, and your analyses were
very important in the quick clarification
of the case, blunting out the really
ominous specter of 'foreign backing'"

III Gen'l Collection Requirements

- 7 DIR 84603, 22, 11, 63
all CIA stations abroad get cable from HQ
saying look sharp for any unusual intelligence
developments. — Be in quick alert while new
Pres. Take over the reins"
- 8 "Were there relevant or significant information
on the subject of JFK assass + Oswald, it
would have been reported either in
responses to the expression of general
interest, or spontaneously, if such
information was known to Agency sources."
If one believes that there was a conspir-
acy, w/ Oswald involved, one must
accept the likelihood that his fellow
conspirators would not have shared their
knowledge beyond the narrow circle of
those directly involved. Conversely, if
there were no conspiracy, there obviously
would be nothing to report in the first
place. The absence of concrete reporting
seems to prove, regardless of which
is the case, as the basis for the ap-
parent SSC view that no collection
effort was undertaken."
- 9 ~~the~~ would be nothing to report in the first
place. The absence of concrete reporting
seems to prove, regardless of which
is the case, as the basis for the ap-
parent SSC view that no collection
effort was undertaken."

11111941
comment in HQ dispatch to Mex City Sta
on 12/17/63 - TFM MW-12193, 17.12.63
re limited reporting from other stations
"... this partly dictated by the facts of
the case itself."

in comment to the report, citing Oswald's initial
diplomatic relations in Cuba, JFK says that

9. There were no penetrations of CASTRO'S inner circle when any info on subject (JFK assassination) would exist.

10. However, assets in Cuba did have reporting requirements.

III. Unpursued Leads

re Cuban airline flights + mysterious passenger see file on Gilberto Policarpo LOPEZ

11. Flight of 11/22 + 11/25 to Cuba from Mexico were passenger flights -
Flight of 11/27 appears to have been a cargo flight w/ 1 passenger - the man referred to in Book II SSC.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cuban flights, filing cable reports to HQ.
CIA had surveillance team, so did the Mexicans. When provided photos of passports, + ^{copies} passenger list.

+ Also have LIEN VOY telephone tap against Cuban Embassy, transcripts of conversations w/ Cuban office + Mexican Airport Control Office.

11-111942

11/22 / 1963 Flight

Book I of SSC report + later CIA could not explain, at times SSC would be informed of follow-up on 11/22/63 flight. In fact, the SSC was advised.

12 that the Mexican authorities were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no recorded response. The current review revealed additional information from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject.

13 "The report (of 5 hour delay of Cubana flight from Mex City to Havana on 11/22/63) in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its summary of the matter."

The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight
re CIA passing report to FBI + FBI not

15 doing followup investg. for WC
ISR's list of inaccuracies in SSC report
in the position

1) Mex City Sta did not able HQ et al
man looked suspicious. There was a
12/5/63 cable MEXI-7253 (IN 74227)
which reported the man had crossed
at Laredo, Texas on 11/23/63,
what registered at hotel in Mex City on
11/25, checked out of hotel on 11/27/63
& was only passenger on Cubana flight
that night - good photo of him taken
at airport

2) dispatch followed HONIA-22571, 12/4/63
reporting info & comments photostats
& explanation following:
"Source states the timing and circum-
stances are concerning Salvador Trench
at airport Mexico and activities in Havana and
other areas."

15 also internal memo in ^{Mex Cy} Station -
see Memorandum for the 'Record, 12/3/63
which stated that the man was
reported to have "looked suspicious"

16 [redacted] Cable 3/19/64
[redacted] - 0829 (IN 43193) - info
was Cuban American on 11/27/63 flight
had by agent of Mexican federal

" The following should be noted about
the report: it misspelled the
man's name; it offered a bare state-
ment that he "was involved in the
Kennedy assassination"; it states
that he entered Mexico "on foot"
from Laredo, Texas (according to the
SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded
that he entered by automobile); it
asserts that he stayed at the Cuban
Embassy in Mexico City (while the date
and times of his registration and check-
out at a specific hotel in Mexico
City, where he stayed, were known); it
gave an incorrect number for his passport;
and, it stated that his Mexican tourist
Card was issued in Nuevo Laredo, (when
it was known to have been issued in
Tampa, Florida). "

11111944

17 Mex Cy Sta. memo to Washington,
Station cable contribute to copy on the
episode. When Mex City received
cable, the Deputy Chief of Station advised

SECRET

17 in MEXI - 8740 (IN 43940) 3/20/64

about the information in [redacted] report "jibe fully w/ that provided stated by [redacted] source 4 December 63"

"The mistake of that cable cannot be explained today, but wrong it obviously was."

"Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more info. on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources w/ access to info concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became available I queried informant he was queried and the results were provided the authorities."

TAB C CIA operations against CUBA

4 "While CIA produced considerable material for the investigation (see Tab E) that more was not reported is a meaningful indication what was known (then) by those actually involved (in Cuban operations (supply of info to W.C.), as distinguished from what might be hypothesized at a later date. To contend to the contrary - which ⁴⁴⁻¹¹¹⁹⁻¹⁵ ~~has been~~ suggested by some - would require a categorical employment of CIA personnel whom know aspects of both the report itself and the activities of the

7 Operation AMTRUNK see Folder No. 7 -
Operations to Splet
CASTRO regime; (AMTRUNK
operation)

Alfredo Antonio Moreno Lopez
Enrique Cayardo Robles

Cuban spies - developed operational
concept to overthrow
the Castro govt - known
as the Leonardo Plan

8 Moreno assoc in Miami

Jorge Aylboushyc Volsky
Cuban citizen of Polish origin

married Cuban national after WWII
reportedly imprisoned following Bo. govt
reportedly with Castroite

Leonardo Plan was discussed w/ Ad Szule
Szule claimed to govt contacts - it was
through his intercession that Leonardo
Plan gained govt-level support & approval

↓ Richard Goodwin was Szule contact at W. Ho
Volsky & Szule met Robert Harwitch
1. State Dept official to discuss the
plan - he presented the idea to CIA
CIA assigned it to Man Station &
became known as AMTRUNK

→ 4/17/63 - Szule tells Harwick that Miami Station gave
Volsky copy of memo re: report on the plan - not
considered official work

9 Early Sept 1963 - AMTRUNK had 3 intelligence
sources in Cuba

41111946

1) Man Station
2) Man Station
3) Man Station
Man was reportedly also to BIA/LS/16

10 Oct '63 - decision made to separate Moreno from operational details of AMTRUNK because of indiscretion + poor security practice

By Nov 1963 - some persons successfully recruited in Cuba but no progress in suborg. or any capabilities fraction

11 Szulc + Volsky considered to be highly suspect - re security considerations

12 also Jose Ricardo RABEL Nurse, Castro had Rabel set up Cuban

13 Maurice Long - lead job until 1960 when apptd Chief of Rural Affairs, defected to US in 1962 - recruited by JMWAVE Sta + used in AMTRUNK activities - returned to Cuba on his own in 1965. Was arrested and sentenced to 30 years in prison but set free in July or August of 1967. "There were accusations that RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations were never proven."

14 IGR Day - very little planning + concrete progress on AMTRUNK during IGR's life

New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

14

15 "While Onta (Tuson) was reported in early 1961 as being used in CIA-syndicate attempt against Castro, CIA had no direct relationship w/ him until he left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of info on the Cuban leadership."

16

17 It is pertinent to note that in addition to Sturgis's reported role in Castro got re gamblers, Onta's availability for assassin attempt was understood to be due his last payoff ~~to~~ he had received from gamblers interests. "One can deduce that Sturgis and Onta could have known one another because of their connections with the gambling activities as well as having contacts w/ the men heading the gambling orgs."

18

see 119 CIA support

18 "It is possible that Varona ^{7/17/61} already was involved in independent operations w/ the criminal syndicate when first approached per to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination. ^{Varona} ^{7/17/61} ^{Rev. de la Trinit}

4111948

As late as 6/10/64 - it was reported that these gangster ^{officers} were ^{to} be ⁱⁿ ^{the} ^{area} ^{of} ^{the} ^{Bay} ^{of} ^{Pigs} ⁱⁿ ^{March} ¹⁹⁶¹ ^{to} ^{carry} ^{out} ^{the} ^{Castro} ^{assassination} as available when approached by Keadle

SECRET

20 In 67 FBR, notes that case officer ~~XXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXX~~ said that the program reactivated
 in 4/62 & had been shut down following B.P
 in 4/61 - he felt that something was ongoing
 in interim. "It is possible that CIA
 simply found they involved in providing
 additional resources for independent opera-
 tions that the syndicate already had
 under way" ... "In a sense ~~the~~ CIA may
 have been peppy-backing in the syndicate
 and in addition to its material contribution,
 was also supplying an aura of official
 sanction."

21 Considerations:

- 1/ ^{Possible} Indep crim syndicate operation
 Costa prior to CIA involvement in
 late 1960. ~~to~~ May have continued
 after B.P 4/61 shutdown & be ongoing
 in some form when reactivated by CIA
 in 4/62
- 2/ Frank Sturges may have had
 contact w/ crim syndicate. Cards
 have been used by syndicate in its
 activities

22

3. Sturges probably knew Onto.
 However, Sturges not in Cuba when Onto
 given assassin role. But
 Sturges may have fabricated his
 story for Miami gossip.

23 Arthur Vinson ~~was~~ CIA Manager
 was connected w/ ~~the~~ ~~the~~ ~~the~~ Cuban
 exile incident. He proposed Castro ~~was~~
 in 3 occasions ^{to CIA} in 1/60, 7/62, 4/66 ~~was~~
~~was~~ ~~was~~ ~~was~~

Agent Messages re 61 re Castro assassination

26

5 agent messages made reference to plan to kill Castro a progressing same
3 related to same operation, 2 were separate proposals. No indication that they resulted from separate CIA initiative.
LA Division prepared summary of messages forwarded to Review Staff on 8/8/75.
Records of Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled. Subject not covered in Church Committee interim report.

27

B message: relate to same plan

(1st) 3/27/61 sent by agency asset AMBROUC/S re-proposes sabotage of electric company in Havana - coordinate w/ attempt to kill Castro at public appearance (as in accordance w/ Gen 1 Plan)

(2nd) 3/29/61 - AMBROUC/S sends 2nd message plan scheduled for 4/9/61 message answered on 3/30 agreeing to plan - addressed agn & issue but didn't commit on proposal to kill Castro

(3rd) 4/5/61 - presumably from AMBROUC/S 41111950 person he had been directed to contact only, medium for information. Said that on 4/9/61 plan would make it impossible to maintain identification in Cuba.

"your military and intelligence staffs are not to be involved in this operation"

The 4 agents named in plan

28

① AMBROSE/S - a) 201 file opened on 5/15/60
 POA issued 12/18/61
 OA issued 1/31/62
 debriefing on Nov 1960 -
 indicates that he had contact
 w/ plotters against CASTRO -
 claimed to have attempted to
 make ~~some~~ ^{similar} plans. Infiltrated
 on 12/9/60 - exfiltrated
 on 2/15/61

(b) infiltrated
 3/3/61
 exfiltrated
 4/19/61

Sold mission to org. resistance
 groups

(c) infiltrated
 12/17/61
 exfiltrated
 3/29/62

still same mission

(d) infiltrated
 5/2/62
 arrested 5/29/62 + executed 8/30/62

reported to never admit was CIA agent
 name not in McGovern's book given by Castro

11111951

② AMCOAX/1 - AMBROSE/S asked to contact
 him re gen'l plan for 4/61

a) POA - 1/5/61

mission was to org. paramilitary activity
 within Cuba

infiltrated
 12/61
 exfiltrated
 1/17/61 following D.P.

29

SECRET

29

(6) reinfilitrated

7/29/61 same mission
arrested

8/17/61 - serving 30 year term
in Mc Gowan's book

(3) AMRUG/1 - another AMBRONC contact
for 4/61 plan

a) recruited in 9/60 & infiltrated then
received androps in 12/60
returned to U.S. 5/15/61 following B.P.

b) infiltrated

6/29/61 - mission to org. resistance
groups
& conduct sabotage

arrested 7/61 & 30 year term
name in Mc Gowan book

30 (DAMPANIL/7 - another AMBRONC 4/61 contact

a) was a "walk-in" on 4/15/60

POA - 1/30/61

MOC name 8/12/60

mission to org. resistance in
Havana + Pinar del Rio

b) infiltrated 3/3/61

arrested 4/23/61 - 30 year term

in Mc Gowan book

c) was infiltrated on 8/60

infiltrated 11/60

(prior to POA) - 11111952

mission was sabotage & assass.

of prominent Cuban Communist

member in Havana

records destroyed by infiltration

in Cuba at that time

highly suspicious source who not authorized
to pass information on AMBRONC mission

TAB D AMLASH OPERATION

1 1975 ER says actual nature & sign. of AMLASH
is not def. than Book 2

Book 2 suggests that Amlash may have
been Castro agent w/ provocation mission
that would justify his retaliation &
in alternative Amlash was a security risk
by which details of plotting could have become
known to Castro, providing some provocation
& whatever the reasoning Amlash should
have been reported to W.C.

"We believe that neither these apply.
The character of the relationship between
CIA and Amlash/1, prior to Oswald's
assassination of President Kennedy
was so insubstantial and inconclusive
that it provided no basis for Amlash/1
to feel that he had any tangible
CIA support for plotting against CASTRO.
Whether one is inclined to see Amlash/1
as either a double agent or provocateur,
or simply as a man who carelessly
revealed what he was doing, there
was little for him to report or to leak."

As of Sept '63

5 Comment

11111953

"It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1
was not a recruited agent at that time -
nor was he ever for that matter, as
Operational Approval was never granted
for this purpose. By the end of August
1962 the CIA relationship with AMLASH/1

5 had made no real progress, although
he was viewed as an operational con-
tact w/ potential. On a year passed
between August 1962 and September 1963
when he was next contacted by CIA.
On terms of the relationship that he had
w/ the CIA the critical period, for
purpose of the paper, is therefore between
5 September and 22 November 1963.

7 9/9/62 HQ cable to AMLAST# case officer
~~report~~ ^{apparently} AMLAST# as chief conspir-
ator allowed to recruit his own
cohorts among whom he may find
persons susceptible to long
distance + covert disciplines -
Cable also spell out long range
requirements prior to action based
on Amblast's possible internal organiza-
tion

8 9/7/63 cable reporting first 63 meetings w/ Amblast
"Amblast still feels there only two ways
accomplish change either inside
job or invasion he realizes
sanctions realize little out of question,
According AMWASP, Amblast still
awaiting for US reveal plan of action

1. At conference - note reference to "inside
job" did not specify Amblast as conspirator
in Roche's camp, you had indicated
since you'll? of how to bring about change
and cooperation with Amblast, Roche

10

"The fact remains that whatever views Amalash/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time they could not have stemmed from anything said to Amalash/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing"

10/3/63 - Amalash case officer arrives in Paris to meet w/ Amalash even tho Amalash told Amalash he does not "intend to see your friend again"

Station officer in Paris had been in contact w/ him, 2 of whom participated in meetings that followed

10/11/63 - case officer cable Hq that Amalash claimed to have "necessary people and equipment inside Cuba) to accomplish overthrow w/out (U.S.) assistance"

11

Amalash wanted meeting w/ RFK for moral support assurance. Cable indicates that Amalash determined to attempt operation against Castro w/ or w/out (U.S.) support

11/11/63

Did not try to find meeting w/ RFK to help sell the persuasiveness of RFK + convince of full US support if there is a change of the that it got in Cuba

11 10/29/63 - Amblak meets w/ Fitzgerald
in Paris. Case office also at
meeting

12 11/13/63 - Case office memo summarizes
meeting of D.F. w/ Amblak
US support only after real coup
effected + group involved in position
to request U.S. support.
U.S. won't commit to isolated uprising

B D.F. in 1967 IER recalls that Amblak
repeatedly requested high powered rifle
w/ telescopic sights + other weapons to
kill Castro from a distance. D.F. stated
he rejected the request.
Case office memo said nothing of operational
nature discussed at Fitzg. meeting

11/14/63 - Contact report of Amblak's meeting
in New York re Amblak's reaction
to 10/29 Fitzgerald meeting -
Amblak happy about policy but
not fact that wasn't given
technical assistance for
operational plan.

14 If Amblak doesn't get advice
and materials from U.S. got
technical assistance he will become
fed up + we'll lose progress
made

Comment Book II at p. 18 ¹¹¹¹¹⁹⁵⁶ Chapter 2
Amblak's feelings in Fitzg. meeting
as recalled by IER says this not true
as corroborated by declassified report

7 months
11/19/63 - Fitz. approves telling Amlesh
what he would be given a cache
inside Cuba, to include high
power rifle w/ scope

11/19/63 - Amlesh tells CIA officer he plans
return to Cuba

11/20/63 - HQ cables Paris to delay
Amlesh departure to permit
one more meeting which Amlesh
requested

On same day, Amlesh agrees
to delay ^{departure} of its something inter-
esting. Case officer said couldn't
assure it but it was a meeting
Amlesh requested.

16

16
FBI ^{sup} notes is highly speculative
evidence of indication that Amlesh
might receive specific support
be requested

11/22/63 - Case officer in Paris meets
w/ Amlesh in afternoon

conclusion

11. ... there is every indication ^{11/19/57} that
during President Kennedy's life
Amlesh/1 had no basis for believing
that he had CIA support for
much of anything. Were he a
prosecutor reporting to Castro,
or if he was merely careless and
leaked what he knew, he had no
factual basis for linking a reporting
any actual plot directed against
the President.

Specific Issues & Backg

17 views of SSC as to why AMPLH is not
have been explained by us is
data of 95 of the Report

16F. changes being made in
subcommittee to JFK's death

18 interest to any CIA document
Anders' proposal. The agreement
w/ Anders is a commitment to him
and more of the same document
contact w/ him. The working
to learn about that contact
relationship was known w/ no
document provided to him for
what is the purpose

at per SSC with position on evidence
plate

19 "use our evidence to acknowledge in
principles the possibility - not merely
considered as a likelihood during the
Warren Commission inquiry - that
the operations could have occurred
the dates attributed to the Oswald
operation by the SSC Report."

"use this to not make a point
11111959
Warren Commission reports
could have been given by the Warren
Commission to the Warren Commission
of the JFK assassination, making it
impossible"

19

p 4 + P 19
SSC Final Report - attribute
Fitzgerald saying that
U.S. would support a coup &

gave gen' assurance that
U.S. would help in organizing
about the coup
attributed to case officer testimony
which doesn't give us/ 1963 volume
on subject

20

ISK says Fitzgerald ^{assurance of} support
contingent on if there is a
change in gov't in Cuba

- 21

re to CIA case officers who were
responsible for investigation
at time of WC - saying knowing
of Amlash operation would have
affected investigation - ISK says
" it is likely the views elicited
from CIA employees in 1975
probably were response to
representations by SSC staff
members as to what the operation
involved, as distinguished from
what it actually was "

21

Interview CIA officer re: investigation
read Fitzgerald testimony, interview
memoranda

The NMARS # case officer

same w/ synchmate stuff

Interview 67 FBR staff & internal
docs
also

21 p 249 Book II - reference to 67 FBR
wherein case officer Amlesh
ordered to break contact w/

Amlesh due to assassin of JFK

77 FBR says 67 FBR states that
case officer got cable from City saying
'everything was off' - but case
officer didn't testify that reason
for everything being off was JFK's
assass.

22 OPM cable never found - it may never
have been sent being case officer
misrecollection. FBR says 2
sources in Book II don't support its
version

11111960

p. n 30, p 17 Book II - ? of Amlesh of security
not until after JFK assassin was ? of
security of sufficient concern for CIA
to break relation w/ him

23 Amlesh as provocateur - discussed
strangely - several 10 years of Boyer
re: time - Mr. Boyer - much later - Amlesh
was not for period of CIA contact 3/61 - 11/64

p 269 Book II - re Amalash name as
 known contact of Soviets
 in Mex City - Amalash
 real name in list of
 names on the Mex City cable
 above used as basis for Book II
 discussion of why Amalash name
 in list did not lead to identification
 of Amalash operation

21 Amalash name brought up by Soviet
 embassy official and Cuban cultural
 attache in 12/60 re Amalash planned
 press conference in Mex City 2/61-3/61
 and a report of contact between Amalash
 and the Soviet which was subject of
 inquiry -
 the 12/60 removes the question from
 relevance to subject because of the
 Kennedy inquiry.

p 72 of Book II re 7/64 FBI report
 concerning CIA meetings w/ Amalash
 FBI report says meetings was to plan
 Castro assas. - badly misrep
 time & events - substantially post
 date JFK death & not relevant to
 WC inquiry

25 p 75 Book II re testimony of Chief SA [unclear] / CE
 re selection uncertain. Book II
 gives his opinion re Castro assas by
 Amalash full play despite [unclear]
 [unclear] to the reliability

25

P 68-75 Book I re what CIA might know about Amtrak, what was understood and conclusion that should have been drawn
TGR says Book I overlooks intricate details of Amtrak relationship during the period in question

26

P 78, 79, 105 Book I re Cuban exile designated A who informed FBI + CIA in mid-65 of Amtrak activities + A relationship w/ CIA. TGR says if read Book I carefully it is clear that 'A' was unaware of Amtrak's assoc. w/ CIA

- 1) info was 1 1/2 yrs after JFK case
- 2) informant had no knowledge of earlier CIA / Amtrak relationship

27

"
28 At the time of the 1967 FO report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that question now, it is clear that toward the operational relationship developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was unformed and without substance during his life. During that time it was not an assassination plot. The treatment of the question in the SSC Report is both impressive and misleading."

11/11/87

TAB F

Material Forwarded TO WARREN
COMMISSION AND FBI

Listed here are reports and other papers
submitted to the FBI (which had primary
responsibility for the investigation) and the
the Warren Commission.

4 sections to the list

F.1 Dossier to Dir. Comm. Comments

F.2 Dossier report to WC.

SECRET

E3 Dissem to FBI on Rumors & Allegations
 E4 Memoranda to W.C.

F 2

18

Dissemination of Reports to CIA Staff
 " Since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD, all cable traffic (inter-ally) including dissemination by cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Additionally, cable dissemination was released by CI/LIAISON. Copies were, therefore, available to the Staff.

Since CI Staff released all log-
 form CSCI's, coordination
 start from CSCI's, and maintain
 the CSCI log, the CI Staff received
 copies of all CSCI's.

18

Dissem. of Material to W.C.

19	Co D.	File Date	NOT C.D.'S		
			Date	Subj	DIDP
	100	12/13/63	1/21/64	memo from Helms	
	300	1/21/64		to J.L. Rankin	
	691	1/22/64		re. Draft 3's	
	321	1/25/64	2/5/64	for submission	
	347	1/31/64		to Secret 5/1	
	361	2/5/64		note from Kara	
				messages to Rankin	
				1.4 attaches	
				including report	
				Secret 5/1, on	
				L-110	
20	1182	2/8/64	2/18/64	memo for FBI	
				direct to	
				Adm. Sec. Room	
				Security 5/1	

28 22 July 1964 DDP 4-3712 C.D. 1273
Memo from Helms, DDP to Rankin
Subject: Apparent inconsistencies in
Material furnished the Commis-
sion by CIA and the Department
of State

29 11 September 1964 DDP 4-4793
Memo from DDP Helms to Rankin
Subject: Publication of Documents furnished
to the Commission by the CIA

32 13 Oct. 1964 DDP 4-5275
Memo from DDP Helms to Rankin
Subject: Public. of Docs furnished
to Commission by CIA

DOC. DATE DOC. NO. ORIGINATING OFFICE

1 11/23/63 DIR 84915 (WH/3)

Info related to telephone call on 9/28/63
to Soviet Embassy in Mex Cy. Request
FBI

2

41111064

Tab E - Materials Forwarded to W.C.

Tab F - Media Coverage of Oswald's Visit

Detail Sources on Oswald's Visit to My Lyon 63

under the type project

1. Unilateral Coverage

LIFSTICK - multi-line phone taps

3 photo sites, mobile surveillance team + mail intercept operation

LIFEAT - telephone taps -

- handled by case officer

+ recruited agents

3 photographic site subscripts

under LIFSTICK:

managed by a CIA agent

LIMITED - fixed on to directly of post office Soviet Embassy

LILYRIC - alternate photo base main street on American front door gate

LICALIA - South side of Soviet Compound backdoor - get good photo of Soviet personnel

2

closed down when Slater received word that photo of the "unidentified man" was being released by W.C.

Film collected 3 times/week from limited and Lilyric site

Secular film processed on outside by other agent like the above

3

mobile surveillance done by American staff officers - had team of 10 recruited agents

team would be activated by radio from limited site. When someone would intercept tape the Soviet Embassy

3 unilateral mail intercept; Libright - handled by American case officer

Latin Coverage

unreliable because as was the nature of Mexican service at the time

4 Telephone tap w/ Mexican, called Lienvoy run by Mex office - 30 lines on the ^{at one time} listening post, In 61 Station chief became project case officer on LIENVOY

Oriental Coverage

Mexicans asked for telephone numbers of Soviet, Cuban & Satellite Embassies to do Lienvoy tap - we discovered on unilateral lines toward discovery Mex connected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet lines, 3 Czech lines, 2 Polish lines, and 1 Yugoslav line - recorded, transcribed

plus monthly modest summaries for Station chief of interesting conversations
time lag of a day or two

5 Boris Yarosoff and Russian translation translations ran about a week behind date of conversation. All transcripts made in Spanish or English since they all Stalkief could read & because they ordered other transcripts for operations

- 5 Anne Goodpastore alerted ~~screened~~ all photographs as soon as station learned that Lee Oswald had joined Soviet Embassy.
- 6 Oswald came to alerting listening post operators from top of Soviet line. It was picked up & taken to B. Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay because Station personnel wanted to review the photograph, ~~coincidentally~~ w/ the typed transcript.

Tab A

Selected Newspaper Story w/ Comment
(A5) - Comments on Ronald Nease's
Wash Post article of 11/26/76
re CIA w/ held details of Oswald's call

2 memo - J. Lee Rankin 3/24/64 for PPP Helms
Subject: CIA Dissem of Inform LITD
date 10/10/63

2) Memo for Rankin from Helms 1/31/64
re Infr developed by CIA on
LITD activities in Mexy 9/28-10/3/63

3) Letter to Helms - 2/10/64 from Rankin

4) Memo for Rankin 2/19/64 from
Helms - re Infr on LITD Mexy, Activs
9/28 - 10/3/63

Tab 4 w/ CIA comments

1. Jack Anderson column 5/6/77 alleges CIA activity in Dallas in 1963
2. " " " 1/20/77 alleging CIA tied to false Oswald story
3. Norman Kempster story 1/1/77 alleging CIA w/ held date on Oswald
4. Clark Booth see involvement w/ Cuban exile
5. Ronald Kessler story 11/26/76 alleging CIA w/ held details of Oswald telephone calls, w/ report on handling of documents
6. John Gaskko story 11/13/76 alleges Oswald told Cubans of plans to kill Kennedy
7. Tabloid Midnight story 8/2/76 regarding CIA & Castro
8. Wash Post story 10/1/76 re CIA consideration of possibly interviewing LHO in 1960