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JFK Assassination System Identification Form

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NW 50955 DocId:32423705 Page 1

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The most important covert operational effort now needed is the observation and harassment of Viet Cong transiting South Laos into Vietnam. Operations presently directed against this target, while qualitatively well conceived are quantitatively too small in numbers of personnel and striking force available to accomplish more than a small part of the job to be done. Operations against North Vietnam are also still small quantitatively, and their expansion can only be obtained by extensive and costly efforts.

A subject eminently related to the improvement of Vietnamese intelligence collection and covert action operations is the availability of trained and experienced personnel.

This deficiency can be overcome in part by training of Vietnamese. Available trained and experienced personnel can also be augmented by the use of third country nationals. Some of these are:

1.

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b. To consider accelerating the creation of the Clandestine Action Service by assigning to it ten companies of trained troops (Rangers, Marines, or Airborne).

4. The following be assigned to MAAG for specific utilization in the training of the Clandestine Action Service:

a. Two U.S. Army Special Forces mobile training teams.

b. Ten U.S. Army Special Forces medical corpsmen.


5. For specific support of the Clandestine Action Service, 2 H-34 helicopters and 2 C-123 or Caribou Stol aircraft, together with spare parts, maintenance personnel and crews be made available to the GVN.

6. The use of as instructors and pilot personnel in covert operations in Vietnam be discussed with President Diem and his concurrence solicited.

7. CIA be given the responsibility for the operational control, cover and utilization of third country personnel, once committed to Vietnam.

8. Policy clearance be granted for the continuation of CIA operations aimed at harassment of Viet Cong lines of communications in South Laos whatever the outcome of the Geneva Conference on Laos or the current negotiations over a Souvanna Phouma government.

9. Resettlement of the Meo in the Lao-Vietnam border area be considered in the light of the progress of negotiations concerning Laos.



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has faced a problem of Communist insurgency for 2. a number of years and has effectively diminished this problem both through overt and covert programs designed to defeat the enemy on his own grounds and to deny him support of the local populace. thus has a pool of trained and experienced covert operations personnel who have faced and who have overcome problems not greatly dissimilar to those which face the Vietnamese today. have been particularly effective in the utilization of special counter-subversive police and it is in this area that the Vietnamese badly need experienced guidance. The Government has expressed considerable interest in aiding the Vietnamese Government in its fight against the Communists. It is believed that the use of selected cadre for counter. guerrilla and counter-subversive covert operations training could be accomplished through an appeal on the part of the Vietnamese Government itself. would need interpreters but their utility on a limited basis should still be considerably high.

3. <u>MEO</u>: The Meo tribesmen of Laos have proved themselves to be effective guerrilla fighters. Their motivation has largely been the protection of their homes and families in Xieng Khouang. Should a "neutralist" Souvanna Phouma government come to power in Laos it is probable that considerable effort will be made to destroy the guerrilla potential of the Meo. As an alternative to their annihilation, the Meo might be persuaded to migrate in significant

16