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FIRST WORKING DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENT

CUBA

MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS

I. Introduction

The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the movement of Communist propaganda materials from Cuba to and within Latin American countries. As in the program which addresses the problem of movement of subversive trainees to and from Cuba, the successful execution of the proposals will materially reduce the flow of propaganda, but will not eliminate it entirely.

Communist Cuba has many legitimate outlets through which propaganda materials flow. By eliminating these outlets, and by physically isolating Cuba from the remainder of Latin America, Communist propagandists and their sympathizers will be forced to rely more heavily upon production and dissemination of propaganda materials in a clandestine environment within each Latin American country, with a consequent increase in difficulty.

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

The total propaganda capability of the Castro regime includes not only the physical movement of materials printed

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in Cuba itself, but also the less detectable and controllable movement of funds and guidance to pro-Castro elements who locally print and distribute materials or carry out propa- ganda operations through other media such as radio and television. In this broad sense, "movement of propaganda materials" therefore includes small quantities, even single copies, of selected publications which are handcarried into a given country by legal or illegal travelers for subsequent reproduction; it also includes larger quantities of materials transmitted through Cuban and Soviet Bloc diplomatic instal- lations, shipments via postal channels, large or small quantities introduced through smuggling operations (that might also involve the movement of arms), oral transmission of propaganda guidelines by individual travelers or by Radio Havana, and the dissemination of slanted news by Prensa Latina for pick-up and replay by a wide variety of local outlets.

The general receptivity to Cuba propaganda materials has been minimal in Latin America, even in those countries where the Communist Party is legal. Propaganda efforts are limited by low membership and poor financial support of Communist Parties and Cuban front groups. In addition, Castro/Communists are faced with competition from liberal,

*Close - need to
evaluate
&
USIA
Hunt -
need to*

recast

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social-reform movements and the growing activity of the Catholic Church in the field of social reform. Nevertheless, means of transmission and dissemination of propaganda materials are impressive by their number and variety.

Though more intelligence is needed on the volume of printed propaganda being transmitted from Cuba by air and sea to other Latin American countries, it is possible to curtail the bulk of these movements by controls already established, or feasible. In Panama, for example, postal and customs authorities are destroying an average of 12 tons of Cuban propaganda per month. Another ten tons, from the unknown quantity which enters Costa Rica each month, is spotted in the post office or the airport and destroyed. Unfortunately, Castro and his mentors probably realize this, and as time goes by they will rely more and more on the transmission of thematic guidance only, to be exploited locally by front groups, Communist Parties, sympathetic journalists and radio/television commentators, and possibly clandestine radio transmitters. Training of subversives in Cuba already includes instruction in the tactics and techniques of psychological warfare, and as more trainees return to their homelands the volume of locally produced propaganda may be expected to rise.

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However, these local propagandists are not totally dependent on Cuba for either support or guidance. In some countries, such as Mexico and Argentina, there are commercial printing establishments, radio stations, periodicals, and newspapers that regularly print or broadcast pro-Castro materials as a matter of policy or ideological conviction. In other countries, notably Venezuela, there is relatively little proof of direct Cuban involvement in subversive/propaganda activity. This is in keeping with the communist principal that whenever possible guerrillas/subversives should be self-sustaining.

Cuban Radio Activities

Shortwave radio is the only principal direct and mass audience medium available to Cuba to carry subversive propaganda to Latin America, and maximum use is made of it. The Castro regime officially inaugurated its international broadcasting service (Radio Havana) on May 1, 1961, and has constantly increased its broadcast time so that now it is transmitting at total of 115:30 hours per week to Latin America (108:30) in Spanish and seven in Portuguese). In addition, Cuban standard wave broadcasts can be heard intermittently in much of the Caribbean area.

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Time is regularly allotted on Radio Havana to such groups of foreign nationals residing in Cuba as the so-called "Dominican Liberation Movement", the "Peruvian Anti-Imperialist Movement", the "Honduran Liberation Movement" and the "Guatemalan Information Committee". All of these broadcasts incite their listeners to revolt against their present governments. In the aftermath of the October crisis, the Cuban broadcasts have grown increasingly explicit in their attempts to incite violence. In recent months, the Venezuelan Government of Romulo Betancourt has been the target of very heavy Cuban attack, and special programs beamed to the Dominican Republic have been attacking President Bosch.

Communists and other Castro agents have been singularly unsuccessful in placing radio material on local medium wave stations in Latin America and they do little or no television placement. Their prime medium is short wave broadcasting.

Press and Publications

Despite restrictions imposed by many Latin American nations, Communist printed materials from Havana, Moscow and Peking still move fairly easily in the area. The Cuban Embassies in the five countries still maintaining diplomatic relations with the Castro regime supplement the long-established Soviet propaganda channels through their Mexico City, Montevideo and Buenos Aires Embassies. Cuban binational centers and

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similar front organizations serve as reception and dissemination points for Cuban propaganda materials. To carry its propaganda message to Latin America, Cuba greatly increased its output of periodicals and other publications directed at both mass and specialized audiences. More than 30 different Cuban periodicals circulate in the Hemisphere including, Bohemia, Verde Olivo and Trabajo which enjoy wide circulation. It is not possible to estimate the amount of Cuban printed material that is smuggled into the other American Republics.

In addition to the use of Cuban diplomatic missions, Communist Parties, binational centers and other front groups, there are some 228 publishing houses and bookstores which serve as outlets for these Cuban publications in all Latin American countries except Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Many of these offer books and publications at very low prices or give away two or three books with the purchase of one, and easy credit terms are available to anyone showing an interest in the Cuban publications.

Decrees banning Communist activity and propaganda have not prevented the continued clandestine publication and distribution of a number of periodicals, books and other printed materials in some countries, notably Argentina. The Argentina

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cooperative distributor CODILIBRO (Cooperativa Distribuidora de Libros), which is the Hemisphere's largest distributor of Communist books, serves most of the Communist/Castro publishers of Argentina. The Communist publishing house in Uruguay, Ediciones Pueblos Unidos (EPU), also serves as an important outlet for Castro/Communist propaganda.

Excluding TASS and New China News Agency (NCNA), Prensa Latina, the official Cuban news agency, is the principal Communist fast news agency operating in Latin American, and its services are used by media of far-left or overt Communist orientation. Prensa Latina is operating openly but not entirely without restriction in ten Latin American countries -- Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay. Although its users are limited chiefly to the above-mentioned media, in some countries there is fairly extensive unattributed use of Prensa Latina releases, especially in radio. There are 326 Communist and pro-Communist newspapers and periodicals in Latin America. Infiltration of the democratic press and the non-critical attitude of some newspapermen help give wider diffusion of the Cuban propaganda line.

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Films

Feature films and short documentaries relating to the Cuban revolution produced by the Cuban Institute of Motion Picture Art and Industry (ICAIC) play a more direct propaganda role than the films imported from the Bloc countries. Since the Cuban films tend to stress propaganda rather than art, and are, moreover, subject to confiscation because of illegal importation, their showings have been limited primarily to the binational centers and pro- Communist labor and student groups, and to private or clandestine meetings.

Cultural Activities

Penetration under the guise of "cultural" activities is a highly favored Communist propaganda technique in Latin America. There are 64 Cuban binational centers and friendship societies in the area. These vary in size and strength from mere paper organizations to active fronts such as exist in Mexico. These organizations serve as selection points for scholarships to Cuba. Current examples of the use of these front groups for Castro propaganda purposes are the upcoming "Continental Congress of Solidarity with Cuba" which is scheduled to meet in Rio de Janeiro in mid-March and the "Latin American Youth Congress" scheduled for Santiago, Chile.

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In addition, the various Cuban front groups are currently participating actively in the formation of the proposed Single Center of Latin American Workers, a pro-Cuban labor confederation.

It will be seen from this brief review of the nature and scope of the problem that Cuba is not only exporting propaganda materials, but is also exporting ideas, know-how, and funds which are effectively used by local collaborators or sympathizers in making the materials effective.

It is clear that actions needed to control the movement of propaganda are closely related to, or in some cases identical with, those taken to control the movement of persons and funds. For example, the severance of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the remaining Latin American Governments which recognize the Castro regime would substantially reduce the flow through Cuban diplomatic channels of funds and guidance involved in the local production of propaganda. Similarly, the proposed exchange of intelligence information on subversion, restrictions on the issuance of exit visas, air and sea shipping controls, and expanded intelligence coverage of subversive activities would reduce local production as well as the flow of material from Cuba.

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III. Direct Actions to Impede Legitimate Movement

Presented below is a summary of actions contemplated to impede legally executed movement of propaganda materials from Cuba to and within Latin American countries. For the purpose of this paper, legitimate movement is characterized as movement by recognized private and governmental carriers and communications as well as postal systems and diplomatic pouching. Propaganda materials include radio program scripts and recordings, printed materials (posters, pamphlets, magazines, leaflets, books, newspapers), news service output, motion pictures, equipment (duplicating or reproducing equipment, electronic communications equipment, and spare parts therefore) and supplies, especially paper stockpiles.

1. Immediate Impact Actions

The following actions offer promise of producing early and effective results.

a. Intelligence Actions

(1) Intensify US intelligence efforts in each country to identify individuals and organizations involved in ^{Cuba/ Castro} propaganda importation, reproduction, and/or dissemination; make available to each country selected intelligence concerning the extent of these individuals, organizations, and their activities.

Specifics to extend possible

Humitch - intensify etc

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~~Place in 1st place~~

Keep it in but change it.

~~(2) Encourage each country to offer rewards for information leading to interception of Communist propaganda materials.~~

~~(3) Expose, discredit and harass persons who visit Cuba in order to discourage travel to Cuba in connection with the movement of propaganda materials.~~

delete in preceding it.

(4) By covert means cause disruption in the re-production and distribution of propaganda materials, and in the procurement and delivery of related supplies and equipment.

USIA
put in 1st place

place in different effort.

b. Administrative Actions

(1) Induce (each) Latin American Country to:

(a) Limit or exclude the activities of Prensa Latina and ~~other hostile media~~ by denial of license to operate, disruption of distribution channels and pressures to reduce the number of subscribers.

CIA
delete Prensa Latina warrants from above.

(b) Organize surveillance and execute close control over in-country sources of newsprint and related supplies needed to reproduce locally propaganda materials received from Cuba.

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(3) Provide technical assistance to Latin American countries to improve postal and customs inspection procedures, and encourage them to establish or improve (censorship and) inspection of mail, baggage and other shipments from Cuba; assist them in developing better control of clandestine border crossings and smuggling operations as they relate to movement of propaganda.)

Put under last part

c. Actions Related to Common Carriers

Request Western Hemisphere nations to close their ports to shipping engaged in making Cuban ports of call.

in other paper

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through all means including OAS

d. Propaganda Actions

Initiate or intensify public information programs throughout Latin America designed to:

(1) Harass or eliminate Castro/Communist organized or sponsored cultural, industrial and agricultural exhibits in other countries.

(2) Encourage and assist local governments and civic groups to expose and discredit Communist propaganda activities, organizations and persons involved in these activities.

(3) ~~Focus unfavorable publicity on the use of transit facilities in Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile for the movement of propaganda materials from Cuba.~~

Place in other context.

2. Longer Range Actions

The following actions should also be undertaken without delay. Their ultimate results may be of far-reaching importance, but probably will be longer in realization.

a. Political Actions

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(1) Negotiate with Latin American governments to maintain close surveillance and control over Cuban mission propaganda activities which violate diplomatic standards.

~~(2) Conduct bilateral negotiations with Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil to impede printing of Communist propaganda materials in local printing plants.~~

*add
Mexico*

~~(3) Conduct negotiations with non-Communist governments of countries selling equipment, spare parts, and supplies to Cuba for the purpose of causing the delay or cessation of further shipments.~~

propaganda oriented printing

b. Intelligence Actions

(1) In separate diplomatic approaches to each country, urge full and effective cooperation with the OAS Special Consultative Committee on Security, and bilaterally among the several nations, in the interchange of information concerning movement of propaganda materials.

*approaches
of the
OAS*

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[Handwritten scribbles]

(2) Persuade each Latin American country to report promptly to the diplomatic mission of the country concerned the identity of any national of that country who arrives from Cuba and who is exposed to have been carrying propaganda materials.

c. Administrative Actions

As applicable, induce each Latin American country to:

(1) Adopt laws which would provide severe penalties for any person engaging in the dissemination of Cuban Communist propaganda aimed at the overthrow of the legal government.

~~Outlaw~~ Communist propaganda media, including newspapers, magazines, and books, produced or distributed within their countries.

(3) Deny seating of Cuban delegates to international meetings held in Latin America.

(Delegates are propaganda disseminators.)

(4) Inhibit spread of Cuban Friendship Societies in Latin America by an active program to expose their subversive activities and objectives. (Key members are propaganda disseminators.)

Internal Security

Put together

force or violence

*Comment
under
Sabotage*

(5) Offer rewards or other inducements to printing craftsmen to deface, destroy, or misinterpret Castro/Communist propaganda in the process of reproduction.

d. Actions Related to Common Carriers

~~Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands, Mexico, Canada, and Spain to persuade these countries to stop all commercial air line flights to Cuba; enlist the cooperation of other Western Hemisphere countries normally providing terminal services for any of the airlines involved, such as Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying pressure.~~

e. Propaganda Actions

~~(1) Organize and conduct lobbying activities to influence complacent Latin American governments to adopt staunch anti-Communist attitudes.~~

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2
Too small engaged to JSIA

(2) Complete and distribute, through United States Military Groups, anti-Communist ^{printed material and} film strips for use in Latin American troop education programs, in order to indoctrinate security forces with the need to counter Cuban propaganda and related subversive activities.

f. Sabotage Actions

(1) Organize a covert sabotage effort to disable printing and radio broadcasting installations in Cuba; sabotage paper stockpiles in Cuba.

(2) In Latin American countries, promote sabotage of equipment in local media and printing houses that regularly publish pro-Communist propaganda.

3. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions

a. Seek adoption by the OAS of a resolution calling upon all member states to terminate all carrier traffic with Cuba.

b. Propose adoption by the OAS of a resolution calling for the stoppage of the subversive propaganda flow by any medium or technique.

Will introduce Resolution

Bilaterally

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6. Recommend action by the OAS to establish a public information program focussing on the threat to the hemisphere posed by Cuban propaganda activities.

IV. Direct Actions to Impede Illegal Movement

As the actions outlined in the preceding sections become effective, movement of propaganda materials will be forced into clandestine channels. Additional measures to impede this illegal movement will therefore acquire steadily increasing importance.

1. Immediate Impact Actions

a. Intelligence Actions

(1) Use penetration and other intelligence techniques to identify efforts to move propaganda materials from Cuba to and/or within Latin American countries, and determine routes and methods employed; report selected information, consistent with requirements for protecting our own intelligence program to governments concerned.

(2) Utilize US intelligence capabilities to determine the nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean area, with special attending to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic;

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use evidence obtained as leverage to cause governments concerned to initiate surveillance and other control measures aimed at interception of propaganda materials.

b. Surveillance and Reporting Actions

(1) Continue US sea and air surveillance of the Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba.


(2) Continue the improvement, at high priority of US communications in Latin America, in order to improve alerting, reporting and control capabilities

c. Administrative Action

Induce each Latin American country to intensify police measures to seek and destroy the Communist propaganda apparatus in each country.

2. Longer Range Actions

a. Technical Assistance Actions



~~(2) Provide assistance, training, and equipment as required to bolster local harassment capabilities to delay, prevent, or destroy reproduction of imported Castro/Communist propaganda.~~

b. US Military Assistance Actions

Urge the accelerated improvement of internal security forces and police forces in Latin American

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countries and the intensification of patrol and intelligence activities aimed at preventing clandestine propaganda activities; provide equipment, training and advice as required.

3. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions

Propose adoption by the OAS of a resolution calling upon member states to collaborate in preventing illegal movement of propaganda materials from Cuba to, within, and between member states.

*Freedom
of movement
& freedom
of speech etc.*

*Must
define*

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