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
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

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Monday, March 17, 1975

Washington, D. C.



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the next eight years of President Eisenhower's Administration. There were some strengthening acts, as far as unification were concerned, under President Eisenhower which I think were exceedingly desirable. I do not know of any legislative action during those eight years regarding the intelligence community.

Then my next relationship to this subject came in the spring of 1961. President Kennedy was then President, and he phoned and asked that I come over. And I went over at once. It was just after the Bay of Pigs, and in all of the years I had known him I had never seen him as serious as he was on that occasion. The substance of his comment was that he had just had a major disaster and he said that the reason for the Bay of Pigs being such a catastrophe was one, he said -- and this is in effect -- I made the wrong decision; two, I made it because I had the wrong advice; three, I got the wrong advice because the facts upon which the advice was based were wrong; and the facts were wrong because our intelligence was faulty.

He indicated that he had been informed that as soon as the invading group reached the shores of Cuba that the people would rise up against Castro, they would be down on the beaches tossing roses at our men, and then they would triumphantly march through the streets of Havanna. Well, it was a real tragedy, and he said that I cannot endure another

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He said I could not survive another disaster of this one. kind. So he said I am creating an intelligence board, and he had already talked to Jim Killian of MIT and he said I am making him the head of the board and I have gotten some scientists and some military men and others, and I awant this board first to investigate, I want them to investigate all of the foreign operations of the CIA, and I want you to recommend changes that will improve that operation.

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So that the Vice President can pick up the theme, 10 I had gone through, Governor, the earlier phases of my 11 experience with the intelligence operation, and then I had 12 gotten through down to the fact that I was away Cofora a 13 number of years during the Eisehhower Administration, and now R I had gotten down to the spring of 1961 when President Kennedy 14 B called and told about the disaster that had befallen him at the LIBPARY Bay of Pigs. And he said that I must not have that happen He said I was startled and shocked at the fallacies again. in the intelligence information that we received, and I want to take whatever steps I can to improve it.

So he appointed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which you are thoroughly familiar with because of your service upon it. We met at the time, met with him, and he told ous of the seriousness which he attached to the function of the Board. He issued a directive at the time to the military services and to the CIA and other government

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
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`l [`]	great contributions to that. We had two very fine men, Dr.
2	William Baker of the Bell Laboratories, and Dr. Ben Lamb
3	of Polaroid. They worked very closely, and the Board
4	encouraged them, got all the money from the President that they
5	needed. We improved that a lot. We also got a great deal of
6	information in what is known as SIGINT, COMINT, ELINT and
7	RADINT signal intelligence, communications intelligence,
8	electronics intelligence and radar intelligence. The NSA has
9	spotters all through the world and they pick up all of the
10	adio signais that go out, and when the soviets faunch a
11	test missile we follow it from its inception, we follow its
12	whole flight, we determine whether it was successful or not.
13	We know down to the day almost the degree of success $\frac{5}{\varkappa}$
14	that the Russians have had in MIRVing their missiles. All of
15	that is very valuable. I remember being in one time
16	and going into a room and here sat three hundred
17.	all of them with those great puffy earphones on, and all they
18	were doing was monitoring any kind of signal that came out of
19	China. And it is very good. You pick up troop movements,
20	you pick up plane flights, you pick up missiles tests. None
21	of it is quite as good, of course, as having the Deputy
22	Premier being a CIA operative, but we are pretty well going
23	to have to give up that thought. We thought, the Board did,

that we could penetrate Cuba, and we gave a lot of time to At no time did I ever hear anybody suggest that Castro that.

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was going to be assassinated, or that there was any planeto assassinate Castro. But we were concerned about Cuba. President Kennedy was concerned about Cuba. We wondered whether or not there might be something going on between Cuba and the Soviet Union as later did. And I quess, I think I can remember six or seven teams who were wonderfully well trained and sent to Cuba at various times, landed at various locations, and every one of those teams were rolled up. Not: one of them endured. And the reason is that Castro set up an extraordinarily effective counterintelligence system. That is, he has a head of Counterintelligence, and in each province, he has a deputy, and under that man in each town or each city or hamlet there is another top man and then in each block there is a man, or in each precinct, and then in each block, and if the block is a large block, even down to two or three sections, and their main job is intelligence.

It exists in the towns, it exists out in the country, and if a stranger puts his face in Cuba today, in twenty-four hours I think this person is apprehended and he is brought in for interrogation.

So, we have to find other means and other means were found. You will remember that Cuban-U.S. confrontation that came later, and the presence of the Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba being discovered by our satellite type intelligence. We photographed ships at sea with devices on their deck, very

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carefully covered, and we covered the unloading of them, we kept flights going all of the time, because cloud covers sometimes interfere with it, until we had absolutely irrefutable evidence that the Soviet Union had offensive missiles in Cuba.

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Thereafter, it seems to me that the Eoreign Intelligence Advisory Board maybe the last two or three years I was on it, it seemed to me we had done about what we could do to take care of the large areas of important operations, and then I thought to some extent, the last two or three years, that our efforts did not produce much. I left the Foreign Intelligence Board at the beginning of 1968 when I went over to the Pentagon.

14 That was to become Secretary of Defense? MR. BELIN: 15 MR. CLIFFORD: Yes. And there in the Pentagon I had 16 some contact with the intelligence community, not too much. 17 That is handled mainly by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He 18 gets the daily briefings and then sifts them through and informs the Secretary of those items that are of immediate 19 20 moment. I did set a meeting a week with a representative of the CIA and he came over, we had a set time, Thursday mornings 21 at 10:00 o'clock, and he came over and we kept that every time 22 I was in town, and I got an hours briefing, so that I kept 23 up closely with that. I felt that was reasonably valuable. 24 25 We were not getting good intelligence from Vietnam.

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that you never heard of any attempt at assasination plots that might be planned by the CIA if any were planned?

3 No, at no time. We had something MR. CLIFFORD: 4 of a joke on the Board. Ambassador Robert Murphy, for whom 5 we all had the greatest respect and a great fondness, 6 wondered why the CIA could not do in Ho Chi Minh. He did not 7 think it would be too difficult a task, and every now and then 8 he brought it up and said, I can't understand why that can't be done, but it was something of a humorous bit after awhile, 10 but that's the only time I ever remember it coming up, and on 11 no serious occasion did the Board every suggest action of that 12 kind, nor were we ever informed that any effort of that kind was made, norewas it even being considered. 13

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When the teams were sent to Cuba over a period of 14 somettwo years and were rolled up, their function was not to 15 16 commit any assasinations. Their functions were towmake an effort to establish an intelligence base in Cuba that would 17 be effective and help us to know what was going on in Cuba, 18 being only 90mmiles from our shore. 19

MR. BELIN: But you indicated earlier that sometimes 20 in the intelligence community that the people who were super-21 vising know what the people who are being supervised tell 22 Is that a fair characterization of what your earlier 23 them. statement was? 24

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I think so. MR. CLIFFORD: I think we knew then that

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