

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

Agency Information

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10010-10078

RECORD SERIES : NSF

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : USIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : USIA INFORMATION AGENCY GUIDANCE ON CUBA

DATE : 10/02/1963
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Confidential
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/23/1993

OPENING CRITERIA : UPON AGENCY REVIEW

COMMENTS : NSF:CO:Cuba, General, 10/63:Box 39

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USIA INFORMATION GUIDANCE ON CUBA - OBJECTIVES AND THEMES

October 2, 1963

SECTION ONE - VOICE OF AMERICA BROADCASTS TO CUBA

Tab D

I. OBJECTIVES

Our main objective in the Cuban broadcasts is to keep the people of Cuba informed about developments inside Cuba and in the outside world, providing them a perspective in which to view their experience. In this effort, we strive to demonstrate U.S. support for Cuban freedom and concern for their present plight; to encourage the spirit of resistance in the Cuban people to the communist ideology and the pressures they face (each man and each family is a fortress against communism); to keep alive the hope and conviction that Cuba will again be free; and to discourage adjustment and cooperation with the regime which betrayed their hopes for the revolution. We do not, however, urge the Cuban people in any way to revolt.

II. THEMES

A. In pursuance of this objective, we stress the following aspects of U.S. policy toward Cuba:

- 1) The U.S. "cannot coexist with a Soviet satellite in this hemisphere."
- 2) The U.S. has made it clear, in the words of President Kennedy, that "we would not accept a Hungary in Cuba."
- 3) The U.S. is exerting every means except those which would bring on the danger of an international war (i.e. military action and blockade) to isolate and destroy the Castro communist regime.
- 4) Although not bound by a no-invasion pledge, it is not the intention of the U.S. under present conditions to invade. One reason for this position, in the words of President Kennedy, is that it would mean "killing thousands of Cubans and Americans, with all the hazards around the world" (Press Conference, February 14, 1963). He also said (December 31 backgrounder), "we are involved in attempting to check the advance of the Sino-Soviet bloc of a billion people, so that we have to maintain a perspective that is bound to be different than theirs (the exiles)."
- 5) The economic measures taken by the U.S. against Cuba are aimed at freeing the Cuban people from the communist regime, not making them suffer.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL - GROUP 4 (Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified 12 years after date of origin)

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E).

By Denney NARS, Date 10/29/74

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

- 6) In its dealings with the Cuban exiles, the U.S. Government takes into account the desires of the much larger number of people inside Cuba. President Kennedy has explained (April 24, 1963) that the U.S. refuses to recognize a government-in-exile because there is "no evidence that the exiles themselves could develop a government which would necessarily be the government which the people of Cuba would freely choose."
- 7) The U.S. is convinced, as President Kennedy has said on a number of occasions, including the Declaration of Central America, that "Cuba will soon join the family of free nations."
- 8) We are also convinced, as are Cuba's other neighbors, that "A genuine Cuban revolution will live again." (Declaration of Central America.) The U.S. is on record as sympathizing with the original aims of the revolution and as recognizing the right of the free Cuban people to carry out progressive reforms. Giving special emphasis to this theme, we want to reassure the Cuban people that the U.S. would not lend its support to any movement which would attempt to restore the oppression and corruption of the Batista dictatorship.

B. In reporting and commenting on developments inside Cuba, we stress the following aspects:

- 1) The continuous loss of freedom as the communist system tightens its grip on the people, relating this to communist ideology and tactics and dispelling the rationalization that these measures are only temporary or "voluntary" sacrifices for the revolution.
- 2) The material losses of the Cuban people under the communist regime, relating these losses to the worldwide failure of communism to produce. Contrast the contradiction between promise and fulfillment, making the point that old promises are forgotten and new ones made and that this will always be true as long as the communist regime is in power. Give special attention to: a) decreases in production; b) the meaning of the emulation (work norms) campaign; c) the enforced savings campaign; d) rationing; e) the loss of labor benefits; f) the new levelled wage scales; g) the false agrarian reform and restrictions on the campesino. Whenever possible, in commentaries and interviews, the Cuban people should be given credit for their refusal to cooperate and work enthusiastically for the communist regime. Caution: In reporting economic conditions to the Cuban people who are well aware of their own situation, extreme care should be exercised in determining the reliability of the source. We should never pitch our message solely on materialistic grounds, which are open to change, but should link

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

the material losses to the loss of basic freedoms, giving priority to the latter. In citing material losses, we should not give the impression that the pre-Castro years were the "good old days" and should recognize that many Cubans are no worse off materially under Castro than they were under Batista.

- 3) Internal political developments, such as the formation of the PURS (United Party of the Socialist Revolution) which demonstrate that the inevitable tendency of power is away from Castro and the young July 26 revolutionaries and toward the experienced organizers of the communist old-guard.
- 4) The dependence of the Cuban regime on the Soviet military and Bloc technicians and teachers (e.g. the report that 100 out of 600 professors at the University of Havana are foreigners), often meaning a loss of power and position for the Cubans.

C. In reporting and commenting on Cuba's relations with the Communist Bloc, we stress the following aspects:

- 1) The inability or unwillingness of the Bloc to provide economic aid in sufficient quantity to prevent the Cuban people from suffering food and goods shortages;
- 2) The exploitive nature of the economic relationship: the Soviets take hides and fruit while the Cubans lack shoes and food. The Soviets have a good deal in their purchases of Cuban sugar for which 80% of their payments are in barter and which they sell to the Russian people at _____ cents per pound.
- 3) Castro's trip to the Soviet Union did not represent a tribute to him personally or to Cuba as a nation, but instead represented a successful maneuver by the Soviet to use Castro as a pawn in their struggle with the Chinese to retain control of the international communist movement.
- 4) Castro's subservience to Soviet dictates is apparent in his acceptance following his visit to Russia of the role of Cuba in the Communist Bloc as a raw material supplier. In emphasizing the importance of sugar and in postponing industrialization, the Castro regime is assuming a role which it previously claimed made underdeveloped countries slaves to imperialism.
- 5) Cuba is a pawn in the Soviet game, as was so evident in the withdrawal of the missiles, and there is the ever-present possibility that the Soviets will sell out their Cuban followers when it suits their interests.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

III. SPECIAL TARGET AUDIENCES

In addition to such primary targets as labor, ^{the armed forces,} and farmers, efforts should be made to weaken the regime's support from the following sectors:

A. A special effort should be made to convince Cuban youth, who are generally considered the hard core of Castro's support, that the attention and importance they are now given is only temporary and that the system they are helping to maintain will rob them of all freedom and subject them to a discipline that stifles their natural desire for change and freedom of expression. The current campaign in the Soviet Union to rescind the freedom of expression which was allowed after Stalin's death should be exploited. The loss of university autonomy in Cuba should be exploited.

B. For the Cuban Negro audience, who comprise some 30% of the population and a large part of Castro's support, special attention should be given to factual reporting of the U.S. racial scene and a careful backgrounding of developments. We cannot hope to convince the Cuban Negro that there will be any early solution to the U.S.'s serious racial problems, but we can strive to offset the deadly Cuban propaganda exploitation of events such as those in Birmingham, Alabama, and to knockdown the venomous exaggerations of "Radio Free Dixie."

IV. PROGRAMMING RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Use should be made of recorded interviews with reputable Latin American leaders, including labor and students, who take a critical view of Cuba's communist regime and Cuba's ties to the communist bloc. Our aim is to convince the Cuban people that the Castro regime's claims of solid support from the Latin American people and of the imminence of other Cuban-type revolutions in Latin America are false and to show that instead the Latin Americans are choosing a democratic path to social and economic progress. Reports of specific progress under the Alliance for Progress (the building of schools, hospitals, housing, etc.) should be given attention in the broadcasts to Cuba.

B. Interviews with Cuban refugees in the broadcasts to Cuba should be considered primarily as vehicles for reflecting the resistance of the Cuban people to communism. Through the reports of our interviewees of specific and local resistance, we hope to give our audience a sense of identity with a general national resistance to the communist pressures demanding collaboration and conformity. (Refugee interviews in the other Spanish hours for the Latin American audience, by contrast, should be primarily vehicles for reporting conditions in Cuba.) The interviewee should be encouraged, if this can be accomplished convincingly, to pay

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

tribute to the courage of the people who remain in Cuba, as a means of off-setting the natural resentment of those left behind toward the exile.

6. Regular use should be made of analyses, book reviews, documentaries, and dramatizations which give an understanding of communist ideology and practice as a means of providing the Cuban people with a perspective on the experience they are enduring and bolstering their will to resist. The liberal use of quotations from U.S. and Latin American leaders and writers which contrast the philosophies of Democracy and Communism is recommended as useful in setting the inspirational tone suitable for Latin American audiences.

/NOTE: SECTION TWO FOLLOWS/

CONFIDENTIAL