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WALT ROSTOW

Box 458



July 16, 1975

Professor Walter Rostow
1 Wildwind Point
Austin, Texas 78746

Dear Professor Rostow:

We greatly appreciate the time you have devoted to cooperating with the Committee's inquiry. The Chairman has asked me to levy one additional request upon you.

To complete the record on the events under consideration in your testimony of July 9 before the Committee, would you please prepare a notarized, sworn affidavit answering the following questions:

1. What recollections do you have concerning the subjects discussed at your meeting with McGeorge Bundy and Richard Bissell at the Hay-Adams Hotel on January 27, 1961?

2. Do you recall or have a record of any other meetings, whether official or informal, between yourself and Richard Bissell between November 1, 1960 and March 1, 1961? Was there any discussion between yourself and Richard Bissell upon any of these occasions or in phone conversations during the same period that was related in any way to the establishment of a CIA project which included the capability to assassinate foreign leaders? What was the content of any such discussions?

Thanks very much for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
Chief Counsel

WALT ROSTOW

Chronology and Issues

Biographical Background

1942-1945	ROSTOW was in OSS, Research Analysis Branch (169)
1946	State Department, German-Austrian Section
1947	Teaching at Oxford
1949-51	Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva
1951-1961	MIT, Teaching faculty; consultant to Eisenhower Administration
Jan. 1961	DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Dec. 1961	STATE DEPARTMENT, Head of Policy Planning Council
1964	Appointed by LBJ as U.S. member, Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress
4/1/66-1/20/69	Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (in this position ROSTOW chaired the 303 Committee)

Chronology of Events

		Issues and Questions
1960		
October (Approx.)	BISSELL instructs JUSTIN O'DONNELL to go to CONGO to plan for the assassination of LUMUMBA (O'Donnell's testimony) on initiative of BISSELL without prior White House approval or knowledge (Bissell, 6/11, p. 55)	BISSELL testified that he told ROSTOW "the instruction as to O'DONNELL was my initiative." (BISSELL, 6/11, p. 55)
Late '60	CIA's BISSELL, EDWARDS, and O'CONNELL had initiated an assassination plot against CASTRO utilizing MAFIA contacts (ROSELLI, GIANCANA, TRAFFICANTE). Lethal cigars had already been prepared and poison pills were being developed.	Did ROSTOW learn any of this? What briefings of new President and his National Security advisers took place? Did ROSTOW make inquiries?
1961		
Jan. 20	ROSTOW appointed DEPUTY ASSISTANT to the PRESIDENT (KENNEDY) for National Security Affairs.	What areas of responsibility?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Issues and Questions

1961 (cont)

Jan. 25-6 (approx) BISSELL asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project ZRIFLE, including the capability to assassinate foreign leaders. The IG REPORT concluded from HARVEY's notes that BISSELL was "twice urged" to do this by the White House. HARVEY meets with SILVER, GOTTLIEB, and HELMS about it. (IG REPORT)

Bissell said that "presumably" Harvey's notes are accurate (Bissell, 6/9, p. 51)

Bissell testified: "There is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with ROSTOW and possibly BUNDY." (6/11, p. 46) He recalls that the conversations would have involved the general capability of perpetrating assassination, "all aspects of the creation of the capability" (6/11, p. 50), Bissell said it was "quite possible" that he discussed CASTRO, TRUJILLO, and LUMUMBA with ROSTOW as examples of assassination targets. (6/11, p. 50)

BISSELL testified that after Jan. 21, 1961 he met with ROSTOW "quite frequently and very informally," occasionally several times a week. (6/9, p. 81

BISSELL said that shortly after the advent of the JFK Administration, there were weekly luncheon meetings at the State Department with BUNDY, ROSTOW, CIA, State people and Defense. No agenda. (6/9, p. 81) BISSELL testified the "two urgings" from the White House could have come at successive meetings of this sort. But in reporting on EXECUTIVE ACTION, he felt that rather than reporting on developments to the luncheon meetings "as I normally operated I would have replied more to ROSTOW in this case", and he feels that he did report to ROSTOW in this way. (V. I, p. 82-3)

ROSTOW mentions these sessions in his book. (169, Diffusion of Power)

What was ROSTOW's functional relation to BISSELL?

April 18 Rostow attends first meeting on Cuba which concerned BAY OF PIGS mop-up (Rostow book, 209)

April 28 ROSTOW MEMO TO PRESIDENT
"If we can devise a policy for dealing with CASTRO short of a commitment to remove him soon at our military initiative...world opinion will support us in a policy of restraint on CASTRO and be more likely to move with us on SEAsia." (3)

Assassination meets the descriptions but it would not be restraint.

Issues and Questions

1961 (cont)

May 30 TRUJILLO ASSASSINATED
ROSTOW testified: "the generalized flow of intelligence at that time involved reports of plots to assassinate TRUJILLO...like once every week. And why we had to give guns to people who had access to guns in the Dominican military I don't know...I can't reconstruct the operation." (Rocky,178)

Guns were tightly controlled by DR Army. Was ROSTOW privy to State cable traffic on this?

December ROSTOW moves to STATE DEPARTMENT planning Council

1962

Sept. 3 ROSTOW MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT RE CUBA
"I have not been following the matter closely over recent months." Discusses "Soviet military deliveries to Cuba."

Under "Covert Action": ROSTOW said that the "limited, U.S.-dominated, professional covert capability against CUBA" does not promise "a broadly-based political movement capable of challenging the CASTRO regime's control system." (p. 5, #1)

Does this argue for assassination as quicker more direct approach? Or does it imply that the "control system" would outlive CASTRO, rendering assassination pointless?

ROSTOW's Memo reviews Lansdale's Two-Track Cover Operation:
1. Heightened effort along "present MONGOOSE lines"--inspire conflict within top of regime. (p. 5, bottom para.)
2. Recruit Cubans, within and without Cuba, to implement "plan of operation which aims at the overthrow of CASTRO primarily from within rather than by invasion from without." Basing outside U.S.; one U.S. adviser "equipped to provide finance, but not monitoring every move." (p. 6, top)

Sept 27 Special Group (Augmented) consider's ROSTOW paper. DDCI wants copy.

Oct. MISSILE CRISIS -- Mongoose dies.

1966-69 ROSTOW IS SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

22

The Bay of Pigs and Latin American Policy

Castro: A Romantic Revolutionary Close to Home

Kennedy's problems with the aggressive revolutionary Romantics in Djakarta, Cairo, and Accra were important; and they involved strategically significant parts of the world. The unyielding internecine tension on the Indian subcontinent was also a serious matter, diverting, as it did, significant talents and resources from essential tasks of development on behalf of more than a half-billion human beings, distorting the political life of two major nations, and rendering each, in different ways, increasingly vulnerable to external influence and manipulation. But for a working American politician these problems were relatively peripheral compared to the presence of Castro in Cuba.

By January 1961 Castro was an acknowledged part of the communist world, handsomely backed by the Soviet Union and other communist states. He was actively engaged in subversive action in Latin America and was holding up to the continent a revolutionary solution for its many economic and social ills. The communist base ninety miles from Florida was a direct and inescapable challenge to a vital American interest long incorporated in the Monroe Doctrine and a living part of the American political debate. And, as the result of Eisenhower's order of March 1960, Cuban opponents of Castro, assembled in Guatemala, were undergoing the final phase of military training for an invasion of Cuba, under the leadership and instruction of officers of the United States government.

The Bay of Pigs: One Man's Experience

At 7 A.M. on the morning of Tuesday, April 18, 1961, I attended my first meeting on Cuba. The Bay of Pigs operation had begun the day before. As I came to work early I met Ted Clifton, the President's military aide, in the White House Situation Room and asked him how it was going. He said badly. Later McGeorge Bundy asked me to come along to a meeting in the Cabinet Room.

At the far end of the table were the three senior officers of the CIA: Allen Dulles, Pearré Cabell, and Richard Bissell. The President, Bundy, Clifton, and I were the only others present.

Dulles reported the operation was failing: the men were trapped on the beaches and Castro's forces were moving systematically against them.

I had old and close ties to the three men reporting the incipient debacle. Dulles I had known a little from wartime OSS days, but well and warmly since 1951. With Cabell I had shared wartime years as a planner for the American air forces in Europe. Bissell was a friend of some thirty years, to whom I owed my start as an economist and much more. There they were telling our President the plan had failed and, three months into his administration, he was about to confront unmitigated disaster.

They were wholly professional, Kennedy completely calm. But all were evidently shaken.

After the meeting I asked Bundy if I could help in the mop-up. I did not know how my friends had gotten into this situation. I had no sense of higher wisdom or virtue. But I thought a fresh man might be useful. Bundy —and then Kennedy—agreed. I went over to the CIA operational headquarters, located in a temporary building along the Potomac, to monitor the situation.

The reports coming in chronicled the closing in of Castro's forces on the beachhead. The morale of the Washington team engaged in the operation progressively disintegrated. This was not the first tactical defeat Americans had ever suffered, nor even the worst that I had observed; but it was painful to see their composure break up. Bissell, however, remained collected as his men around him begged that he ask the President once more to throw American military power into the balance. As the situation on the beaches moved to final disaster during the night, he asked that I call the President, who was at a congressional reception, and arrange a meeting. Its purpose was to inform Kennedy and permit him to exercise such options as were available. I did so.

It was a session in the Oval Office no one present is likely to forget: the President, Rusk, and McNamara in white tie; General Lyman Lemnitzer and Admiral Arleigh Burke in full uniform with medals; the stark human tragedy of the men on the beaches and the reports of the Revolutionary Council in almost suicidal disarray; Bissell coolly laying out the options.

The limits and dilemmas of power—the relationship of power to the fate of human beings—was never more clear or poignant.

Kennedy was deeply and personally concerned with the fate of the men on the beaches, but he was not about to throw the full strength of the carrier-based aircraft into the battle and reverse his fundamental position that this was a conflict between Cubans, not a war between the United States and Cuba. The possibility of the men moving off the beaches into the hills was raised. It became starkly clear (to me, for the first time) that ~~the option of moving from an invasion to a guerrilla operation was precluded by geography and the choice of the invasion beach~~. Kennedy decided to permit a limited number of fighter sorties to protect the handful of old bombers operating in support of the operation. The purpose was to buy time in the hope that at least some of the men might be ~~withdrawn~~. He ordered American naval craft to go in close for the same purpose. Rusk pointed out that we would thereby be more deeply committed. Kennedy raised his hand just below his nose and said: "We're already in it up to here."

Bissell was instructed to inform the entrapped men to disengage as best they could, either to boats or into the countryside. As Bissell left the room, Kennedy told him to keep his chin up.

~~Adolf Berle and Arthur Schlesinger~~ were then dispatched from the meeting to the hardest mission of all: to meet with the Revolutionary Council in Miami and inform its members of the limits within which Kennedy was prepared to act.[2]

Somehow, it was difficult to go home that night. Some of us stayed around until almost four in the morning.

Hour by hour, day by day, the full measure of the failure, with its repercussions at home and abroad, pounded in on Kennedy and his advisers. Every hour hurt. There was an initial numbness, except for Kennedy who moved to accept full personal responsibility and pull the nation and his administration together. I saw only one reflection of his inner feeling: sitting in the rocking chair in his office, he was looking at the Washington *News*, whose headlines featured the final capture of the expedition. Then he let the paper crumple onto the floor without a word.

On ~~April 19~~ Kennedy met with his advisers at length in the afternoon, an afternoon climaxed by the five o'clock arrival of the leaders of the Revolutionary Council. It was a meeting at once painful, dignified, and necessary.

At one point, in mid-afternoon, the President left the room for a few minutes and Robert Kennedy spoke in anguish. He said we would have to act or be judged paper tigers by Moscow. We just could not sit and take it. All the famous talent assembled around the Cabinet table ought to be able to think of something to do. There was no response, as we awaited the President's return.

I had not known Robert Kennedy before his brother's inauguration and had never before spoken seriously to him. I asked if we could step out of the Cabinet Room for a moment. On the portico near the Rose Garden I told him

that if you're in a fight and get knocked off your feet, the most dangerous thing to do was to come out swinging. Then you could really get hurt. Now was a time to dance around until our heads cleared. We would have ample opportunity to prove we were not paper tigers in Berlin, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. This was a time to pause and think. He looked up expressionless. He finally said: "That's constructive."

The next day he came back to me and posed the question: If we shouldn't act now, what should we do about Cuba? He said I had a duty to come up with a plan. I promised to collect and set down my thoughts.

On ~~April 20~~ Kennedy delivered his defiant speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and the nation knew it had a leader who could absorb a severe blow and maintain command. It was the speech of a fighting Irishman.

As I worked through those long days with my colleagues, I was troubled, however, that the obsession with Cuba would divert thought and energy from the paths of action on which Kennedy had begun. ~~I therefore wrote a long memorandum to him on April 21~~ and ~~circulated it to Rusk, McNamara~~, and Bundy. It began in much the spirit of my talk with Robert Kennedy:

> Right now the greatest problem we face is not to have the whole of our foreign policy thrown off balance by what we feel and what we do about Cuba itself. We have suffered a serious setback; but that setback will be trivial compared to the consequences of not very soon regaining momentum along the lines which we have begun in the past three months.[3]

Over the weekend Cuba was temporarily pushed off the front pages. De Gaulle was at the peak of his troubles in Algeria. There was a threat that dissident French paratroopers would descend on Paris. De Gaulle appealed to the French people to block a *coup d'état*. On Sunday, April 23, Kennedy called from Glen Ora and asked me to come into the White House quietly to monitor what was happening in France and to keep him informed. I settled down in the White House shelter, where there was both communication equipment and a bunk. The only news available, in fact, came from David Schoenbrun's CBS broadcasts from Paris. It gradually became apparent that the descent on Paris would not take place; and I used the time to try my hand at a new approach to the problem posed by Cuba, as Robert Kennedy had suggested.

It had begun to be clear to me from Tuesday morning to Sunday night how the Bay of Pigs had come about. As Cuba emerged under communist control, a visceral reaction developed in the government that this was an outcome with which the United States could not live. Eisenhower shared this feeling, as his memoirs make clear, although his sentiments about Castro cannot be translated into a prediction of what he would have done about the Bay of Pigs plan if he had come to the moment of decision. The fears were in

part military, in part ideological, in part an ancestral sense that the Monroe Doctrine had been unacceptably violated. On the other hand, there was no basis in American foreign policy, OAS doctrine, or in international law that justified the United States going to war because a Latin American nation had gone communist. It had clearly happened because of the internal dynamics of Cuba, not because communist arms and men had moved illegally across international frontiers.

Simultaneously, however, a way of escaping the dilemma appeared to emerge. Out of Castro's quite real betrayal of his comrades in the July 26 Movement and of the humane democratic society they sought, there had come to the United States not Batista reactionaries, not mercenaries, but men prepared to give their lives to undo the perversion of Cuban history Castro had brought about.

The appeal of supporting these men on a clandestine basis was, under the circumstances, irresistible—an appeal strengthened, perhaps, by the successful CIA-backed overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala some seven years earlier.

The Cuban operation, as it evolved, acquired, of course, a momentum of its own; and it proved, of its nature, incapable of being handled on a clandestine basis. It therefore lacked strategic surprise and was technically inadequate in many respects, some of which are summarized below. But the fatal flaw, as I saw it that Sunday night, lay in the failure to distinguish the kinds of circumstances in which an American President could or could not bring American force overtly to bear. In the *United States in the World Arena* I had argued:

> It appears to be a characteristic of American history that this nation cannot be effective in its military and foreign policy unless it believes that both its security interests and its commitment to certain moral principles require the nation to act. . . . When idealism alone seemed to be the basis for positions taken the nation did not back its play. . . . Equally, the nation has not been effective when confronted by situations where its power interests might be involved but where a persuasive moral basis for American action was not present.[4]

A covert operation, by definition, cut across the "moral basis" for the engagement of American forces. And, before the event, Kennedy had drawn a sharp line between supporting Cuban dissidents and sending American forces into battle. Nevertheless, as I observed the denouement of the operation on Tuesday, I could not help feeling that some of the men involved had come to believe that in the last analysis Kennedy would be unable to hold to the policy he had expressed repeatedly, in public and private, before the event; namely, that this was a conflict among Cubans and regular United States forces would not be available for it. Somewhere within them, one felt, was the perhaps unconscious judgment that Kennedy simply could not afford to let it fail. It

was not only the men on the beaches who, until the end, had "an unshakable conviction that they would not be let down. It was inconceivable that they would be stranded."[5]

But Kennedy did hold to his policy. The operation had failed. And Castro had to be dealt with in other terms.

Sitting in the White House shelter, I began by listing on a yellow pad the specific dangers to the American interest that might arise from Castro's Cuba: the training and infiltrating of subversive agents and guerrillas; the invasion of neighboring states with Soviet arms; Soviet missiles aimed against the United States; an attack on Guantanamo or the Panama Canal; communist radio propaganda; and an example of economic and social development that would prove attractive in Latin America.

For each I suggested lines of action legally and morally open to the United States and, especially, to the hemisphere acting in concert on the principle of collective self-defense.

I called Robert Kennedy from the shelter and told him I would be ready to respond to his question by morning. The next day I went to Hickory Hill for an early breakfast. As we walked around the grounds I outlined this functional, overt, legal approach to dealing with Castro.

He seemed relieved that a coherent approach to Cuban policy had been formulated and he urged me to circulate it in the government. This I did through the committee, headed by Paul Nitze, charged with coordinating policy toward Cuba and the fate of the Cuban refugees in the United States.[6]

THE BAY OF PIGS: A RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATION

THERE have been a good many retrospective evaluations of the Bay of Pigs operation, public and private.[7] Evidently, it was flawed in terms of political and military intelligence. It could not be kept secret before the event and there was no strategic surprise; no coordination with dissidents in Cuba; an underestimation of the cohesiveness and strength of Castro's ground and air forces and of his ability to round up and neutralize his opposition. It was flawed tactically by the failure to provide sufficient air power and to protect the supply ship with its critically important ammunition supply. (Technically the operation ended with an ammunition shortage.) And the option Kennedy believed the men would have—of going to the hills if the invasion failed—was, in fact, foreclosed by the choice of the landing site.

The basic strategic flaw was, of course, political. If some fifteen hundred men were to serve as a catalyst in the overthrow of Castro, the burden of the effort would have to be borne by those already inside Cuba who were prepared to struggle for this result. And that meant organization, leadership, planning, and close coordination. Such possibilities may have existed, but they were not built into the enterprise.

All in all, it appears to have been an effort beyond the capacities of the CIA to mount successfully. And in such a covert enterprise, it was impossible to bring to bear all the talents and resources of the American government that would have been relevant.

That the plan was inherited from a previous administration by new men also played a role. Allen Dulles and his people were respected professionals and so were Lemnitzer and the Joint Chiefs. It was hard for the new men to pit their judgment with confidence against their predecessors'; although the President finally drew the hard line on his own by refusing to engage regular American forces to salvage the enterprise, if the initial plan failed.

And there was a brute political fact. Cuba was part of American politics. Kennedy had taken an activist position during the campaign. The dissolution of the brigade in Guatemala would have brought the men back to Miami. The story would out. Kennedy would be charged with having lacked the courage to back an enterprise that Eisenhower had prepared to eliminate communism from Cuba by the action of brave Cubans.

Sorensen flatly states that Kennedy regretted not having called off the operation[8]; and, although I worked closely with the President in the post-Bay of Pigs days, I have no evidence to challenge that assessment. Clearly, the short-run consequences of revoking the plan could hardly have been as painful as the debacle. In a larger sense, however, there may be some insight in a judgment of the event from a rather unlikely source. Gunnar Myrdal, for whom I had worked as a special assistant in the Economic Commission for Europe in 1947–1949, came to Washington later in the spring. He greeted me cheerfully by announcing we had a great President. I said I thought so, but we hadn't yet done much to prove it. I asked him what led to his assessment. Myrdal said: the Bay of Pigs—if Kennedy had called it off, he would have been ruined politically at home. He never would have freed himself of the charge that Castro's continued existence in Cuba was due to his failure to back Eisenhower's plan. But if he had engaged American forces to salvage a failing covert operation, he would have been ruined abroad. Now, suggested Myrdal, Kennedy could go on.

And Kennedy was determined to go on. Talking about my memorandum of April 21, he said the United States could simply not afford to brood or sulk or engage in protracted debate or passive introspection. Britain had gone through such a phase over Suez, France over Algeria. And freedom could survive because each represented only 6 or 7 percent of the free world's power. But the United States was 70 percent of that power. If we did not keep our perspective, if we did not continue to act effectively, the whole delicate and dangerous equilibrium of power in the world would come unstuck.

By his example, Kennedy brought his team back onto its feet. There was, however, much personal introspection and fresh thought about the organization of the executive branch. We—Kennedy and his men—were clearly responsible for the debacle, not abstract bureaucratic entities. There was no

our business. Bundy wrote a reflective memorandum to Kennedy which was as fine a piece of paper as I had ever read in government. In his own way, each of the others engaged in military and foreign policy asked: What went wrong, what must we now do to avoid further error? Kennedy brought in Maxwell Taylor to conduct a formal inquest. He also told Bundy and me to build up the flow of information to the Situation Room; and Bundy was asked to shift from a comfortable, high-ceilinged room in the Executive Office Building to a small office in the White House west basement close by the flow of traffic. (Remembering those days, I resisted all efforts to have that office redone in White House modern when I occupied it in 1966–1969. I felt it should remain as spare as a city editor's office.)

In getting back on our feet we had an asset. We had all seen, in one context or another, what tactical defeat looked like during the Second World War. (In my case, it was the dangerous and frustrating days of 1942–1943 when it appeared quite likely that daylight bombers, in which America had invested vast resources, would fail to penetrate German antiaircraft and fighter defenses without unacceptable losses.) We had known what it was to take stock, make new dispositions, and get on with the job. My wife caught this mood one night. I came home at three in the morning. She was sitting up in bed and said: "I've not seen you for years more cheerful or effective. You're an odd lot. You're not politicians or intellectuals. You're the junior officers of the Second World War come to responsibility." It remains a not bad characterization of the Kennedy administration.

THE TWO PUNTA DEL ESTES

KENNEDY'S post-Bay of Pigs policy toward Latin America emerged in two meetings at Punta del Este in August 1961 and January 1962. They dealt with the ideological and security challenges posed by Castro.

The first was formally a conference of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. It was the climax to the series of initiatives that had begun when, in 1958, President Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil had proposed Operation Panamerica as a kind of equivalent to the Marshall Plan for Latin America. Proximately, its purpose was to give substance to Kennedy's speech of March 13 formally launching the Alliance for Progress as a common effort to move Latin America into sustained economic and social progress.

The goals defined and agreed on at Punta del Este touched the whole spectrum of Latin America's endemic problems: housing, land reform, education, health, tax reform, domestic price stability, export prices, economic integration.

Fundamentally, however, the Charter of Punta del Este was a commitment of the Latin American governments to their peoples that economic and social progress, in all their dimensions, would move to the center of political

Punta del Este was agreement that "each of the countries of Latin America will formulate a comprehensive and well-conceived national program for the development of its own economy." The heart of the commitment for the United States was to supply, from public and private sources, some $20 billion for investment in Latin America of the $100 billion estimated as necessary to achieve an average annual 5 percent growth in GNP.

Kennedy's rhetoric—the rhetoric of democratic revolution—aimed to break through the crust of Latin American politics to strengthen and hearten those in Latin America dedicated to these purposes. The offer of enlarged American assistance was to provide not merely resources and increased American diplomatic leverage, but also a means of increasing the domestic political authority of those who, by generating serious measures of self-help, would permit their nations to qualify for increased loans from public resources.

Kennedy was not naive about the length of time this effort would require. He knew how deep-seated the problems of Latin America were and how long-unfolding to solution they were likely to be. But he knew also that he was not turning down a rain barrel: there was a Latin American generation emerging, competent and dedicated, oriented to action rather than rhetoric. And with these men and women he sought to make common cause.

There was both danger and unreality in the initial focusing of the Alliance for Progress around Kennedy and what Washington could and would provide. It was dangerous because it encouraged the illusion that the resolution of Latin America's problems could come from outside the area, by some kind of North American magic and money. It was unreal because, at most, only 20 percent of the material resources required could come from the United States, and a much smaller proportion of the political, institutional, and human effort that was even more important.

It became apparent, therefore, that the machinery of the Alliance for Progress should be altered so that, in image and in fact, it would be more an enterprise of Latin American cooperation and less an aid program run from Washington. As early as April 1962 Rusk underlined the abiding truth that the United States could be only a "junior partner" in the Alliance for Progress. This insight, shared among thoughtful Latin Americans, led to the creation of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress in November 1963, a development Kennedy greeted with some enthusiasm in his last major statement on Latin America, in Miami, on November 18.

An evaluation of the Alliance for Progress belongs later in this book (see below, pp. 424–425, 429–430). In Kennedy's time it was plagued by inevitable weaknesses. As the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) said in a report of November 1964:

> The Alliance for Progress is now completing its third year. Given its essential character, it was inevitable that progress be relatively slow in the initial stage. Past patterns of economic and social policy cannot be suddenly halted and sharply reversed. It takes time to develop national plans and programs which are not merely statements of aspiration and priority but which are effectively linked, in both concept and execution, to specific projects and tasks in the sectors of the economy. It takes time to formulate, legislate, and execute programs of fiscal and agrarian reform, and to gather the fruits of expanded educational, health, housing, and community development programs. It takes time to prepare projects and negotiate loans for their financing; but it takes even more time to execute projects and thus to put to effective use the requisite funds. It takes time to assemble the men and to build the institutions necessary to implement the economic and social objectives of the Punta del Este Charter. It takes time to convince men and women throughout the Hemisphere that the Alliance for Progress is a serious, sustained venture worth the commitment of their minds and hearts, and worthy of their confidence.
>
> Moreover, the years 1961–1962 were marked by a continuing deterioration in the terms of trade for Latin America which reduced import capacity and damped the rate of growth in Latin America as a whole.
>
> For all these reasons the over-all figures for Latin American growth did not achieve in 1962–1963 the target set at Punta del Este although they approximated the Punta del Este targets, if abstracted from the specific situation in two major countries.[1]

The two major countries were Argentina and Brazil, caught in a stop stage of the stop-and-go policies that marked the inflationary pattern of their economies.

In addition, as with AID as a whole, Kennedy took more time than he should have in getting the administration of the Alliance for Progress into effective order at the Washington end. In one of the oddest sessions with a President I can recall, Kennedy once found himself enmeshed with the problem of recruiting secretaries and mobilizing typewriters when he assembled around the Cabinet table the working-level officials and tried to get to the bottom of the initial bureaucratic confusion in the Latin American AID office. The result was that American resources, even those committed as loans, were not flowing out to Latin America at the promised rate in the first two years.

Nevertheless, from 1961 Latin America, out of the interplay of its own dynamics and Kennedy's leadership, was off on a new course.

Cuba was part of it. And Che Guevara undoubtedly enjoyed his role at Punta del Este in August. He could credit Castro with generating the Alliance for Progress (a half-truth) and explain why it was bound to fail and give way to the model of the communist revolution in Cuba. Kennedy was deeply concerned with the possibilities of Cuba as a showcase. He did not see how, with some $300 million in net annual Soviet aid, Cuba could fail to become

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operations against them. They said they would be prepared to form with the United States a special grouping outside the OAS to deal with Castro. This neither the United States nor the larger nations of Latin America wanted. That inhibition, supported by a call from President Kennedy to President Lleras Camargo of Colombia, yielded the bare two-thirds vote to exclude Cuba from the OAS plus a resolution adopted unanimously (excepting Cuba) proclaiming the doctrine of incompatibility and excluding Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board.

It was on these two resolutions that Rusk and the foreign ministers concentrated amidst the apparently shapeless swirl of a hemispheric diplomatic gathering.

Meanwhile, in a committee room inhabited by lesser officials, further resolutions of some consequence were hammered out to deal more directly with the threat posed by Cuba. These included the creation of a Special Consultative Committee of Experts on Security Matters to monitor and suggest measures to combat Cuban subversion; to suspend arms traffic to Cuba; and to study the possible extension of a trade embargo against Cuba. This was my primary arena of activity. Following upon the work I had done in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, I sought consensus on a set of propositions which would supply a legal hemispheric framework to deal not only with further Cuban subversive activity but also with the danger of Soviet (or even Chinese Communist) use of Cuba as a military base. The list of functional dangers set out in my memorandum of April 21, 1961, and in my exchanges with Robert Kennedy were explicitly in mind.

The language we negotiated with our colleagues in the basic security resolution included the following:

> To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual and collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino–Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

Aside from enunciating a general hemispheric doctrine, that resolution implied also that nations could work individually or in collective groups other than the OAS to defend themselves against communist security risks. The Caribbean nations thus had what they wanted; and OAS nations directly concerned would not be automatically committed to action which might be politically painful or inconvenient. This resolution was later invoked usefully in the Cuba missile crisis and was the backdrop to the Ameri-

Everyone went home reasonably well satisfied. What made the exercise work was the reality, beneath the surface of many tensions and differences, of an ultimate loyalty to the Inter-American system. No one could dictate the outcome, which, indeed, had to be created on the spot. On the other hand, there was also a sense that all the various attitudes in play had to be reconciled, in one way or another.

Rusk was the first American secretary of state who entered with depth, sensibility, and respect into the human emotions and politics that shaped Latin American diplomacy. He treated his Latin American colleagues precisely as he did his European colleagues: as mature men, working out of difficult domestic settings, trying to make some order, trying to build islands of security and progress in a dangerous world. In his dealings with Latin Americans or those from other developing regions, he wholly lacked the implicit condescension of the Atlanticist view. He took them all as fellow members of the trade union of foreign ministers; and this was a great strength at Punta del Este.

Kennedy was pleased with the result, which reconciled his objective of getting effective collective action without either splitting the OAS or putting the United States at crosspurposes with the Latin American countries which found anti-Castro measures an additional burden on their domestic political life. He did ask, somewhat wistfully, why we had not generated a better press: reporting of the conference had generally portrayed the effort as essentially an American arm-twisting exercise rather than as an effort to reconcile the interests of Caribbean and non-Caribbean states within the OAS.

Kennedy was determined to avoid in his time "another Cuba" in the hemisphere. And he quietly set in motion contingency thought on how the United States might move, if possible with others, to prevent it. The second Punta del Este meeting provided a political and legal basis for such a course; although it did not determine what could and would be done in particular circumstances.

It was the outcome of the Cuba missile crisis which lifted, for a time, the weight of communist pressure on Latin America: but that crisis arose not out of the political dynamics of a developing region but from the other dimension of the post-Sputnik offensive: nuclear blackmail and the point at which Khrushchev had chosen to test its efficacy—Berlin.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO: FILES

FROM: FREDERICK BARON

RE: WALT ROSTOW/ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION--RE ASSASSINATION ALLEGATIONS

DATE: JULY 6, 1975

WALT ROSTOW: TESTIMONY BEFORE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

(Volume 16, Page 169, May 5, 1975)

Biographical Background:

1942-1945, ROSTOW was in OSS, Research Analysis Branch (169).
1946, State Department, German-Austrian Section
1947, Teaching at Oxford
1949-51, Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva
1951-61, MIT, Teaching faculty; consultant to Eisenhower Administration
December 1961, State Department, Head of Policy Planning Council
1964, Appointed by LBJ as U.S. member, Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress
April 1, 1966 -- January 20, 1969: Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (in this position ROSTOW chaired the 303 Committee)
January, 1961: DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ROSTOW testified that he was not involved in the 303 Committee and CIA operation in his position as Deputy Assistant to President Kennedy. (171)

ROSTOW explained the division of labor between himself and BUNDY: BUNDY handled "intelligence matters, but also the crises in Berlin, the Congo, Cuba. . . . I was assigned Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia, kind of oversight of new approaches to foreign aid and planning." (171) [Note: it is unclear from the testimony whether ROSTOW continued to handle the same responsibilities after he moved in December of 1961 to the State Department.]

With regard to allegations of CIA plans to assassinate foreign leaders including CASTRO, TRUJILLO, OR LUMUMBA. ROSTOW testified that he had no knowledge at the time or subsequently of any such conduct nor did he ever hear a discussion of that kind of operation while he was in Government. (172)

April 1961: After the failure of the Bay of Pigs, ROSTOW attended his first meeting on Cuba and aided in the "post Bay of Pigs cleanup matters." (173)

January-February 1961: ROSTOW testifies that he had never heard the phrase "EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY" until it was mentioned on the phone to him by David Belin. (174)

ROSTOW recalls hearing President Johnson make vague references to assassination type activities that the CIA may have been carrying on in Latin America. ROSTOW said that "two or three times in my hearing" LBJ mentioned that "without hard evidence he had a feeling that the assassination of President Kennedy might have been carried out at the instigation of Castro" and that there might have been attempted assassinations "in which the United States might have been involved". (174-5)

ROSTOW said, "the statements included, as I recall it, on all occasions, perhaps three occasions when I heard him make it, a disclaimer of having any hard evidence and I didn't think it was my business to probe him on this matter." (175)

ROSTOW said that the most complete statement to this effect was made when LBJ was taping a CBS show. (175)

ROSTOW testified that LBJ discussed the assassination of JFK, he displayed "a very clear impulse that he had which was to leave behind him a sense of reservation about the possible connection of Oswald to Cuba and possibly U.S. action." (176) ROSTOW explained that this referred to U.S. action against CUBA. (176)

ROSTOW commented generally that "the only rule that I think livable with the international community is that . . . governments not engage in efforts to assassinate the heads of other governments." (177) ROSTOW said that "one exception that I know of in modern history which I regard as legitimate was the engagement of our people in the plan to assassinate Hitler." (177)

ROSTOW said that if the "end product of our giving arms to certain men would be the assassination of Trujillo . . . I think we shouldn't have engaged in it." (177)

TRUJILLO: ROSTOW said that "the generalized flow of intelligence at that time involved reports of plots to assassinate Trujillo . . . like once every week. And why we had to give guns to people who had access to guns in the Dominican military, I don't know. And I can't reconstruct the operation that has been described to you." (178)

ROSTOW testified that "I don't believe the United States should engage in the business of political assassination." (178-9) "What we can do is to be scrupulous in not getting the United States involved in anything which measurably increases the possibility of killing a chief of state. Now, how you draw a line in implementing that policy depends on very detailed judgments at the time and in context." (179-180)

ROSTOW testified that when he took over as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1966), which put him in control of the 303 Committee, he instituted "a procedure of reexamining the whole body of covert operations that were then in motion." (181) "Out of my experience I don't

recall an occasion when we had to review an action which might lead to an assassination." (182)

ROSTOW said that President Kennedy in 1961, sent a special letter to all ambassadors making them the head of the CIA country team in their country. (183) ROSTOW said "I don't believe we ever cleared a CIA operation which the ambassador did not approve." (184)

ROSTOW said that under the mandate that the President gave to ambassadors in 1961, an ambassador was "to be in effect the President's man on the spot, and he had the power to appeal to the Secretary of State and indeed, to the President, if he felt that any member of his country's team, from whatever agency . . . was operating in ways that were contrary to his judgment of what appropriate action was within the President's policy in that country." (184) -- Note: Does this cast new light on the actions of the ambassador in the Dominican Republic in requesting arms?

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The Organization of National Security Affairs, 1961

THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK ON MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY in the government is a subject which engages a small group of experts and students of certain branches of political science. There is only one truly important thing to be said on the subject: the work should be organized in ways congenial to the incumbent President.

When a man becomes President his working style has already been set, even if he is, by Presidential standards, young. His character and experience have already taught him how best to absorb information, hear conflicting opinions, deal with subordinates, array the alternatives, assess the impact of one course in one area on all the other areas where he bears responsibility, weigh the timing for action in one field against things proceeding in others—and, finally, to reach a decision with whose heavy consequences he will have to live, and, along with him, the nation and all mankind. Men do these things in quite distinctive ways. What matters is what they decide, not how they reach a decision which, in its essence, will always involve values and perceptions, memories and dreams they can never wholly articulate.

Under the American Constitution only one man is commander-in-chief; and he is also charged with the conduct of foreign affairs. In complex ways those powers are shared with the Congress; but within the executive branch only the President (and Vice President) have been elected. All others are appointed by the President, or are responsible to appointed officials. They are there to serve the President.

It follows that the task of the executive branch is to respond to the

President's working style as well as to his policy. Having seen and done some work in Washington under six successive Presidents, I still find it remarkable how that massive bureaucracy shifts its style, tone, and manner as Presidents come and go, while maintaining, in each of its departments, a stubborn continuity of its own.

There will always be those who believe they know better than the President what ought to be done, who believe if he were only better informed, he would agree with them. And they may postpone, deflect, dilute, even defy orders—or take their case to the press. There will always be abiding bureaucratic vested interests and habits. For example, Kennedy once, in his early days as President, wanted a sign removed which he thought inappropriate. He asked, casually, that a subordinate take care of the matter. He was told a few days later by the attorney general that it was still there. He tried again. The effort failed. He finally determined the obscure unit of bureaucracy which had responsibility, the exact point within it where power over signs lay, and personally gave the order. He concluded: "I understand now. A President must say something three times to be obeyed." And most Presidents will find something like this true, from time to time, in far graver matters.

But when all this inevitable personal proprietorship over the national interest and bureaucratic inertia is taken into account, the responsiveness of the executive branch to the single individual who leads it is a kind of minor recurrent miracle.

It took some time, but the military and foreign policy complex was reshaped by Kennedy. The heart of it lay in two men: his secretary of defense and his secretary of state.

In Robert S. McNamara he found a man to whom he was prepared to entrust extraordinary and rarely diluted authority in the Pentagon. McNamara chose his own team of civilian subordinates. And, with Maxwell Taylor's movement to the post of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 1, 1962, Kennedy had a military team with which he was comfortable.

Despite his undisputed primacy in the Pentagon, McNamara disciplined himself to a perception which greatly eased the task of both Kennedy and Johnson, as well as Rusk. He understood that military power was the servant of larger political purposes. He knew that military action, indeed, the routine day-to-day operation of a military establishment as large as America's, had profound political and diplomatic significance. The intermingling of military and political policy and action is so deep that clean lines can only rarely be drawn. He consciously and systematically deferred, therefore, to the secretary of state when Rusk took a firm position. And his formal advice to the Presidents he served was routinely in the form of draft memoranda, symbolizing his total acceptance of the decision at which the President would arrive after weighing all the

siderations bearing on the problem. In McNamara's time the Pentagon generated, of course, an ample range of differences with the State Department at working levels. These were usually quietly resolved by the two secretaries. The intimacy, ease, and mutual loyalty with which McNamara and Rusk worked was only matched in the post-1945 years, perhaps, by the Acheson-Lovett team in the Truman administration.

Dean Rusk was at least as self-disciplined as McNamara, but in a different way. He had a deep understanding of military problems, based on long and varied experience. His basic view, however, was that diplomacy had failed—he had failed—whenever resort to force was regarded as necessary. He knew also that, in the world as it was in the 1960s, force was an inescapable element in the equation of diplomacy. For example, his first request of me, between Kennedy's election and the Inaugural, was to set down the best answer I could to the thought most on his mind: How do we deal with the world while avoiding nuclear war? He often referred to "the trade union" of foreign ministers. He felt it to be a club of men whose duty it was to see if the human race could come through a terrible passage of history without destroying civilization. His evident sincerity on this point was recognized by his colleagues and often evoked an answering response.

Administratively, Rusk's problem was vastly more complex than McNamara's because Kennedy was determined to deal intimately with foreign affairs and to reshape foreign policy, piece by piece. McNamara's reorganization of the Pentagon and of the American force structure was, perhaps, even more radical than Kennedy's innovations in foreign policy; but Kennedy did not monitor that reorganization in the way he engaged in foreign policy.

For a strong President the difference was inevitable. The President is, inescapably, a major day-to-day actor in foreign affairs, as well as the architect of foreign policy. He meets and negotiates directly with an endless flow of chiefs of government and foreign ministers. On small occasions and large, he is expected to articulate foreign policy in detail not expected of him in military affairs. Therefore, many more hands were at work, in the White House and elsewhere, in foreign than in military affairs during Kennedy's time.

In this setting, Rusk drew a sharp line between his two roles: administrator of the State Department and personal adviser to the President. He deeply respected the post of secretary of state. He never forgot he was in a line stretching back to Jefferson. But modeling himself on George Marshall, Rusk kept his ego under extraordinarily tight rein. He was, I think, the least self-indulgent man I ever worked with. He was the senior adviser to the President, rendering advice on questions he believed men "should approach on their knees." He systematically avoided debate in large meetings. It was, in his view, inappropriate to his office and of no service to the President. He generally rendered his best judgment to the President directly and privately, at the President's request or when he judged the time was right. The primacy Rusk accorded his relations with the President had its cost. He could not fully brief his subordinates on all that transpired between himself and the President. The risk of leaks was always real; and a President needs and deserves private counsel, with free give and take, not promptly spread throughout the bureaucracy. But that meant Rusks's subordinates in the State Department from time to time were flying blind—a situation Rusk felt they should accept with the same equanimity as officers who execute orders without knowing all the considerations which led the commanding general to issue them. On the other hand, within the State Department Rusk encouraged at planning meetings of senior aides wide-ranging discussions, including the advancing of "unthinkable thoughts." In the more or less regular sessions we had together, usually over the weekend, when I was State Department planner, he was speculative, reflective, and candid. But advising the President was his ultimate duty, as he saw it, along with executing the President's decisions. The only show of emotion I ever saw Rusk allow himself was in a disheartened and disheveled meeting immediately after the Bay of Pigs debacle. It took place in the Cabinet Room. The President had stepped out. He pounded the arm of the President's chair and said: "It is this man we must think about."

Unlike McNamara, Rusk did not choose all or even many of his initial subordinates. He lived and worked with an array of men Kennedy wished to see engaged on one aspect or another of foreign affairs. This Rusk accepted, dealing with all in an even-handed, reserved way which did not exclude moments of sensibility and humor, as well as shrewd assessment. Like a high-ranking general in the field, he accepted the flow of subordinates that came his way as decreed by distant higher authority; although, also like a high-ranking general, he used his influence occasionally to get the key men he wanted most. The degree to which he would share his thoughts inevitably varied among his subordinates; but there were no "Rusk men" in his State Department, only fellow soldiers of the line.

The post of secretary of state in the 1960s was certainly the most exacting post in the government. It was loaded with inescapable overhead commitments: protracted ordeals before congressional committees; overseas trips to international conferences; an endless flow of meetings with ambassadors; White House and diplomatic dinners; state visits, with the need for fine-grained exchanges with foreign ministers; an intense series of bilateral exchanges at the annual gathering of the foreign ministers in September for the United Nations General Assembly—all this plus the need to administer a large department; to be fully informed on the state of a fissionable world; to be responsible for the daily flow of cables to every corner of the globe, of which a half-dozen were liable to carry heavy freight and require that every word be weighed; and then, the need to be prepared to render advice to the President at any hour of the day or night.

The ultimate burden of a President is, of course, greater. But he

does his business in his home or some other congenial place; he has greater control over his schedule and over whom he sees; he is debarred from appearing before congressional committees; and his staff is small.

Both the President and his advisers were caught up in the 1960s in a little noticed but quite revolutionary change in the scale and intensity of foreign affairs which had occurred in the period between, say, 1945 and 1961. The change in scale arose from the coming to statehood of a great many former colonial nations. Membership in the United Nations, for example, was 59 in 1949, and 112 in 1963. Even more important, however, was the growing intensity of the problems in the southern continents, as the drive for modernization accelerated and the focus of the Cold War struggle came to rest upon them.

It is only a partial exaggeration to say that the secretary of state from 1945 to 1952 was a super-assistant secretary of state for Europe. America faced difficult problems in postwar China; the Japanese occupation and the Treaty; the troubled birth of Israel; and war in Korea. But Latin America was quiet. The ferment in Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia was primarily a headache for the European colonial powers. Acheson's life as secretary of state was overwhelmingly taken up with problems along the axis from London to Moscow. His most important act in Latin American policy was, perhaps, to order George Kennan's explosive report of March 1950 to be sequestered—"locked away and hidden from innocent eyes."[1] Acheson's advice to Truman that the United States face up to the attack in Korea in June 1950 was determined rather more by his concern for the balance of power in Europe than in Asia: he viewed the attack as a direct challenge by Moscow to Washington that had to be met if nascent NATO were to emerge as viable.

Kennedy and Johnson, Rusk and McNamara dealt with a quite different world. The planet had become a single, sensitively interacting global community. From the point of view of American policy, as well as Russian and Chinese, history had destroyed the shield of colonialism; and Latin America was in a new state of ferment. In the 1960s the intensity of communications between Latin America and Washington, and the gravity of the issues, almost matched those of Europe in the immediate postwar years. Africa, the Middle East, and Asia proved capable of generating, at any moment, crises of the first order of magnitude; and this meant they required endless attention and monitoring, even in apparently quiet times. In short, the traditional orientation of American foreign policy across the North Atlantic had demonstrably ended.

It is this revolution in the world's political structure that explains more than anything else the rise in importance of the post of special assistant to the President for national security affairs.

This new dimension in the organization of national security affairs began to take shape in the 1950s, as experience unfolded with operating

the structure created by the National Security Act of 1947 and the advisory council it set in motion.

From the beginning, the heart of the matter lay in two quite distinct problems: first, how the President chose to receive advice on national security matters; second, how coordinated staff work should be generated among all the arms of national security policy at a time when diplomacy itself, in the old-fashioned sense, no longer sufficed. Intelligence, foreign aid, information projected overseas, stockpiling at home, and, above all, military policy had to be woven together with conventional diplomacy.

On the first issue, Truman, like his successors (including Eisenhower), did not use extensively the full formal structure of the National Security Council (NSC) in actually arriving at critical operational decisions. He sought the advice of the men he wanted to hear when he wanted to hear them on specific matters as they arose—notably, George Marshall and Dean Acheson, Robert A. Lovett and Averell Harriman.

With respect to the second problem, coordinated staff work was generated, based on older wartime and immediate postwar precedents, bringing State and Defense closer together; for example, the re-examination of military policy after the first Soviet nuclear explosion in 1949, called NSC 68.

When the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons, and the possibilities of a standoff in major weapons became more real, the psychological element in the struggle also rose in priority. After a protracted examination, the problem of psychological warfare came to be conceived primarily as the task of making and executing a policy that would dramatize the areas of overlap between the purposes of the United States and those of other nations.

The Eisenhower administration recognized and accepted this conclusion when in 1953 it converted the Psychological Strategy Board into the Operations Coordinating Board, whose function was to assure coordinated execution of policy decisions already arrived at by the President.

Eisenhower also elevated the formal status of the NSC and the NSC Planning Board. And there emerged, as well, a most useful Thursday lunch at the under secretary level, chaired by the under secretary of state.

As an occasional consultant to the Eisenhower administration, I was able to observe the evolution of its formalized NSC structure. I came to share a judgment arrived at also by some of the men most centrally involved. We concluded that both the NSC Planning Board and the Operations Coordination Board (OCB) had become instruments for generating papers that did not, in fact, come to grips with the heart of the problems they addressed. At formal NSC meetings the President was forced to sit through the elaborate exposition of problems that told him little he did not already know and which did not clearly pose the questions which he had to decide. One man charged with making a part of this apparatus work, late

in the Eisenhower administration, concluded: "If we make Ike sit through many more of these pointless meetings, we'll literally kill him."

The reason for this atrophy was quite simple. A strong secretary of state does not wish to place critical and sensitive issues into interdepartmental committees, especially when they expand out to include representatives of departments only marginally involved. Foster Dulles was quite capable of translating this wish into action. A strong secretary of defense may wish to lay his hands on some of the key issues of diplomacy, but does not wish his critical pieces of business spread about for general debate and advice. So, also, with a strong secretary of the treasury; and most national security problems have price tags attached to them. Thus, extremely able men were busy, day after day, drafting papers on problems where the key components were missing.

After citing the many departments and agencies involved in foreign affairs, Eisenhower's own conclusion was this:

> Policy decisions affecting these far-flung operations were my responsibility, but for daily coordination, I early organized the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Its membership included important officials of agencies which were directly in charge of specific foreign operations. It functioned fairly well. However, I came finally to believe that this work could have been better done by a highly competent and trusted official with a small staff of his own, rather than by a committee whose members had to handle the task on a part-time basis.[2]

Indeed, for this very reason, a key figure in the Eisenhower administration, Andrew Goodpaster, functioned as a personal aide. Foreshadowing tasks McGeorge Bundy and his successors would undertake, Goodpaster dealt with all manner of national security problems requiring the President's participation, on occasions when the secretary of state or defense, the director of Central Intelligence, the chairman of the AEC, etc., did not choose to take up the matter directly with the President.

All this was quite well known to Kennedy when he asked Bundy and me to go to work in the White House on national security affairs—a perspective underlined for him by a special report of Senator Henry Jackson's Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, published shortly after the 1960 election. We knew Kennedy would wish our advice on how to reorganize or dispose of the machinery and staff we had inherited. We briefly discussed the problem in Cambridge before going to Washington; agreed we would probably recommend a simpler plan, but agreed, also, that we should study the situation on the spot rather than recommend action on the basis of our existing information and prejudice.

In coming to a responsible judgment in Washington, I read a sampling of perhaps a hundred planning and OCB papers; talked with staff members

who had helped operate the machinery; and probed hard at the question of whether a reform of the existing machinery could render it vital.

I concluded that the problem of getting full cooperation from the Department of State was insurmountable, because a strong secretary of state could, would, and, perhaps, should keep out of large interdepartmental committees critical elements in the diplomatic equation. I agreed, in effect, with a dictum of C. D. Jackson's addressed to precisely this problem: "Since you can't lick 'em, join 'em." I therefore proposed that the task of interdepartmental coordination be passed on to the secretary of state, and a much smaller staff be built around Bundy to serve narrowly Presidential purposes. Interdepartmental coordination of the kind reflected in the papers I had read was an essential part of government; and such working-level papers should be available to the President. They represented raw materials which the President's senior advisers should have available; but they were not—and could not be—focused with sufficient precision on the issues the President would have to decide at a particular moment. Bundy had arrived at a similar conclusion.

We took our plan to Kennedy, who approved. But he noted that we were somewhat odd bureaucrats: here we were, handed a substantial empire—slots, budgets, and all—and our first recommendation was to liquidate a good part of it.

The essential decision was to separate two parts of the abiding NSC problem: assistance to the President in preparing for and executing his decisions; and the task of interdepartmental staff work. The latter we would monitor with our small staff, but not try to manage from day to day. The OCB was formally abolished on February 19, 1961.

In *Present at the Creation*, Acheson said: "I saw my duty as gathering all the wisdom available and communicating it amid considerable competition. The alternative we have seen in doubtful operations in the Roosevelt, Kennedy and Johnson administrations, when the President has used the White House staff as the agency for collection and evaluation of wisdom." Acheson, I believe, misjudged the matter. If he had served as secretary of state in the 1960s, he would, I suspect, have recognized the need for, and welcomed, the Bundy staff. The flow of business that only the President could, in the end, decide had become so massive and the preoccupations of the secretary of state so wide-ranging that an extra man, and staff, was required:

1. to keep the President fully informed;
2. to watch over the linkages between State, Defense, AID, the Treasury, Agriculture, and other departments increasingly involved in foreign affairs;
3. to follow closely the development of issues within the bureaucracy, so that the President would know what lay behind recommenda-

tions coming forward—notably the options rejected or washed out by bureaucratic compromise and the precise reasons why others were proposed;

4. to assist the President in his expanded personal role in diplomacy: speeches, visitors, and foreign correspondence; press contacts and trips abroad; briefings for meetings with his advisers;
5. to make sure the President's decisions were executed.

A man charged with this kind of responsibility ought to be one whose judgment the President would wish to hear, among others, before he made a decision. Kennedy and Johnson did solicit the views of their special assistants for national security affairs. But the existence of the post emerged from brute necessity, not as an effort to dilute the powers of the secretaries of state and defense.

Kennedy was, from the first, lucid about the mission of his special assistant for national security affairs. He explained it in identical terms to Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, and me. He did not wish us to substitute for the secretaries of state and defense. He was conscious of Franklin Roosevelt's technique of creating overlapping authorities and profiting from the friction, and he wanted no part of it. No decision in their fields would be taken without hearing the two secretaries and giving their advice heavy weight. On the other hand, he wanted to make sure that he had available all the possible options before making a decision. He was determined not to be imprisoned by the options the bureaucracies might generate and lay before him. It was the duty of the special assistant for national security affairs to assure that independent statement of the options.

Many other functions emerged, but those were our instructions in January 1961.

Kennedy had initially thought I might take the post of State Department planner. For good and sufficient reasons Rusk preferred an old friend and colleague, George McGhee. For ten months I functioned as deputy special assistant to the President for national security affairs.

There was plenty for both Bundy and me to do. We first split up the crises. He took Cuba, the Congo, and Berlin, although I joined in the latter from time to time. I took Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the developing world, generally, except Latin America, where Goodwin and Schlesinger operated. I also was assigned the organization of policy planning from the White House end.

It was not an ideal bureaucratic arrangement, especially for Bundy. But the urgency of the tasks, old friendship, mutual respect, and devotion to a common boss made it viable; and there was more than enough for both of us to do. I moved to the planning job at State when McGhee was elevated to the post of deputy under secretary of state, in a massive reorganization of November 1961.

Given the responsibilities borne by the United States in the 1960s, I would guess something much like Bundy's post would have had to be invented later if it had not been created in January 1961. I am inclined to think Rusk and McNamara would agree.

Bundy's mission, as it emerged, is to be understood primarily as a substantial expansion of Goodpaster's role under Eisenhower. He became a major source of advice, as well as organizer of advice, for the President. But Bundy executed his mission with extraordinary sensitivity to the prerogatives of the secretaries of state and defense. He was constantly aware of the need to bring and hold close together the three critical actors: the President, Rusk, and McNamara. What the bureaucracy saw was the vital new figure, and his lively staff, probing, questioning, voraciously gathering intelligence and cables, making sure the President's interests, outlook, and decisions were effectively communicated to the bureaucracy. What the bureaucracy did not see was Bundy's awareness of the problems confronted by Rusk and McNamara, and his quiet actions to try to lighten their burdens as well as the President's.

A word about planning. As Kennedy came to grips with the inescapable crises on the national agenda, he interested himself personally in the design of a planning program. The planners themselves met weekly for lunch at State: with Paul Nitze and Henry Rowen from Defense; Richard Bissell and Robert Amory from CIA; George McGhee and one or more of his colleagues at State (depending on the subject matter); Bundy and myself from the White House.

By February 24, 1961, Kennedy had gone over carefully and approved a list of nineteen tasks arrayed under five headings, the fourth of which was Kennedy's own innovation:

1. Problems of military force and policy; e.g., the deterrence of guerrilla warfare.
2. Certain urgent situations; e.g., Berlin, Vietnam.
3. Foreseeable problems on which planning and action should begin now in order to exploit the presently available but narrowing range of choice; e.g., reappraisal of our relations with Nasser.
4. Potential points of strength where purposeful action might be effective in consolidating or improving our position; e.g., Turkey.
5. Areas relating to possible future negotiation with the Soviet Union; e.g., scientific cooperation.

Assignments were made to named individuals, in an effort to avoid the anonymity and dilution of committee products; and target dates set for each report. The lists were revised with the flow of events, special task forces emerging, for example, on Berlin (under Acheson) and South Korea. By the end of May the list had been expanded to some fifty items with eleven subjects selected as high priority which might call for NSC

treatment or some other form of Presidential decision within two or three months.

The general image of Kennedy's first days as President is sometimes projected as one of light-hearted improvisation until the sobering experience of the Bay of Pigs. For those engaged intimately with him in foreign affairs, it was a sober—even somber—time from the beginning, although confronted with a certain visceral good cheer. He once greeted Bundy and me as we came into his office: "What's gone against us today?"

But it was also a time of planning, of looking ahead to better days. Some of the planning exercises launched then ran into the sand; others laid the foundations for major lines of action.

I recall in those early days running into a party of four late one cold night, between the White House and the Executive Office Building. The two lead characters plodding through the snow could be identified by the glow of cigars at markedly different levels. They turned out to be the President and his shorter companion, Charles Bartlett, accompanied by a pair of men from the Secret Service. Kennedy, evidently in a cheerful mood, asked why I was working so late. I told him I had a tough boss. Briefly serious, he said he wanted to make sure we in the White House got on top of planning and stayed there. Kennedy, in fact, did enter into the planning business more deeply in those early days than any other postwar President.

19

Military, Arms Control, and Space Policy

BUDGETS AND DOCTRINES

MILITARY AND SPACE EXPENDITURES LIFTED SHARPLY IN KENnedy's first year (fiscal 1962); and they continued to rise —slowly in the former case, rapidly in the latter.

	National Defense	Space Research and Technology
	(in billions of dollars)	
FY 1961	47.4	.7
FY 1962	51.1	1.3
FY 1963	52.3	2.6
FY 1964	53.6	4.2

Kennedy's first move on the defense budget came on March 28, 196 when he sent a special message to the Congress proposing changes i FY 1962 outlays. These reflected the bipartisan consensus of the late 195 (which McNamara's initial study of the military establishment confirme as well as his vigorous new civilian management of the Pentagon.[1]

The proposed net increase of $650 million reflected somewhat over billion dollars in new outlays and proposed savings for the coming year about $400 million.

McNamara moved swiftly to bring the military budget towards grea rationality by using two devices: the program packages; and cost-ben analysis applied to each major component of expenditure within packages.

To: Files
From: Frederick Bar...
Date: 7/7/75

7 July 75: ROSTOW PHONE CONVERSATION

Rostow confirmed our meeting at 4:00 at Cosmos Club.

Rostow advised that we read his book:DIFFUSION OF POWER IN the following parts:

a) pp.160-170 (Organization of National Security Affairs) esp.169-170
b) pp.208-221, including his comments on his approach to the second Punta del Este conference, which is his post Bay of Pigs approach.

On BISSELL: Rostow said he is a close social friend of Bissell's. I asked him to check his personal papers for any references to conversations with Bissell between the election and late February 1961. He said he believed that his social calendar would show that he had dinner with Bissell once or twice during that period of time. But he is sure that he did not discuss EXECUTIVE ACTION with Bissell.

Rostow said that the only professional contact he had with Bissell during this time involved asking him to write a planning paper on how to organize the government. Bissell was a part of the Organization of Planners (George McGee and other planners) with which Rostow would meet.

TRUTILLO

I saw normal diplomatic traffic — No CIA traffic.

I was simply

Don't recall any mention of Staten CIA arms to or support for dissidents

Mac handled it

I don't know what his relation was to Coordinator

TRUJILLO

Sometime I debriefed DR retrospectively the inadequacies of the DR operation.

5/29 Rush Cable is not the detailed one I remember. That one dealt w every potential successor in detailed assessment.

I was not in the contingency planning biz at this time.

Exec Actions

Frequent meetings w Bissell? Stayed at his house for several days.

But to meet w him regularly would be out across the line Mac + I drew

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Nov 15, 1961 — I was overwhelmingly involved in Vietnam — Heard no mention of the Bissell talk

My 3 Contacts w Cuba

① Mop-up of Bay of P

② Punta del Este II

③ Report to NATO Conference

④ TFK Concerned @ Russian military buildup asked me to make DG Lovedale review reflected in The 9/3 Memo

+ I did a planning paper based

SUKARNO

1961 2 visits by S – one by himself & one w head of Mali

DRM

My knowl of events leading to his death is wholly from documents – Pentagon Papers

~~Dec 1961~~

General

Assassination for JFK —
great sense of preciousness of life

Dem bothered him even tho he
knew we both do it

WR's Notes:

1) No memory
2) Thoughts as an individual
   a) personally repugnant
   b) counter-productive
   c) Vulnerability - more
3) Covert ops - not my assignment
   in an admin & lucid
   assignments.
4) Dick Bissell a) Planning branch -
   impossible that assassinations
   would be discussed at
   levels.

I dont mind to DO
That we should build
a doctrine to avoid
sending arms + men across
int'l frontiers

"Tit for tat w police state
to bad guy"

I can't testify to Wood in CIA at that time for I didn't get involved in covert ops until 1960.

CONGO No recall Congo wasn't my beat. It never occurred to me that Eisenhower's Admin would have been involved in L. ops.

As CONSULTANT to IKE ADMIN

2 Projects: ① China →
② USSR → started 1951 under Truman
financing Rand/CIA (a matter of public record)
Both resulted in books.

Ran drafted "What to do upon Stalin's death".

For Rockey: I brainstormed Re Quantico panel.

Never heard any remarks by JFK that he could

How could it have occured
1) overzealous private
2) misunderstood chance remark
3) order from Pres.

I find it hard to believe that ~~ass~~ planning would go forward w/o a definate order