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**File #:**

62-116395

**Serial Scope:**

429 only part 2 of 2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 6, 1968

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP8ALM/KW

## PURPOSE

To recommend streamlining procedures for handling Reserve Index - A and Reserve Index - B investigations.

## SYNOPSIS

Bureau responsibility in this field originated with Presidential Directives, the first one in September, 1939. The purpose of these investigations is to identify potentially dangerous individuals who are affiliated with subversive movements. This is field wide and is closely related to the Emergency Detention Program which involves plans for the apprehension and detention of potentially dangerous individuals in the event of an emergency.

The emergence of the new left and expansion of the racial militant now poses dangers which parallel the threat of communism to the internal security of the United States and we are seeking to streamline our operations to effect the greatest possible use of existing manpower to provide the increased coverage we need of the new left movement and militant racial activity. During the recent New York inspection observations were obtained and we have also secured comments of offices having a significant number of these cases for suggested procedural changes. As a result of the Inspection Division's observations and field office observations, we can streamline our procedures and the following recommendations are being made to do so:

1. The criteria for placing individuals in the Security Index (SI) and the procedures in handling the investigations of these individuals remain the same.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.*

Enclosures

Memorandum C.D.Brennan to W.C.Sullivan  
RE: Security Investigation of Individuals

2. The criteria for placing individuals on the Reserve Index - A (RI-A) remain the same. Current procedures for annual reopening and limited investigation in these cases be suspended at this time. The field office file for an RI-A subject should be reviewed by the field whenever informant information or other information is channeled to the file to determine if additional investigation is warranted.
3. The criteria for placing subjects on the Reserve Index - B (RI-B) remain the same. The current procedures for reopening of these cases be suspended at this time. The field office file of an RI-B subject be reviewed by the field whenever informant information or other information is channeled to the file to determine if additional investigation is warranted.
4. Maintenance of the RI-A and RI-B by the field office and the Bureau will remain the same.

#### OBSERVATIONS

To bring RI-A and RI-B cases up to date by investigation is desirable; however, it is felt that examination of the case file by the field when new information is placed in the file will serve as a backstop to catch those cases which have an accumulation of minor activity indicating that active investigation is required. Coverage of subversive activity through informants or other sources will reveal any activity which will require active investigation. We are streamlining our procedures without sacrificing essential controls. These changes will free manpower to handle investigations of emerging new subversives in the "new left" movement.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That attached SAC Letter incorporating above be approved.
2. That attached manual revisions be approved.

Memorandum C.D.Brennan to W.C.Sullivan  
RE: Security Investigation of Individuals

DETAILS

Presidential Directives, the initial one being issued in September, 1939, and since repeated on several occasions, charged the Bureau with the responsibility of investigation of individuals in the internal security field. We are the collecting agency of the entire executive branch for subversive information and have the responsibility of seeing that such information is distributed to those Government agencies having a legitimate interest in these individuals. The purpose of these investigations is to identify those individuals who because of affiliation with subversive organizations may present a potential threat to the internal security of the United States in the event of an emergency and the development of evidence of violation of Federal statutes on part of these individuals. If it is determined that an individual does pose a potential threat to the internal security of the United States, he is scheduled for apprehension under the Emergency Detention Program by the inclusion of his name in the SI. Close attention is given these investigations to insure that we are fully discharging our responsibility.

The emergence of the new left and the expansion of the racial militant now poses dangers which parallel the threat of communism to the internal security of the United States.

This expansion of work has put a serious strain on our manpower. During the recent New York inspection, observations were obtained recommending procedural changes to streamline these investigations. We also secured comments of offices having a significant number of these cases. In line with the field comments and our own experience, we have evaluated the standards for including or deleting individuals on the SI and Reserve Index.

The SI represents those individuals who have been determined through investigation to be dangerous or potentially dangerous because of their membership in or affiliation with or espousal of doctrines of basic revolutionary organizations and/or front organizations who will be apprehended upon receipt of instructions from the Attorney General.

Memorandum C.D.Brennan to W.C.Sullivan  
RE: Security Investigation of Individuals

The criteria for placing and retaining names in the SI is governed by the following:

No name shall be added to or retained in the Security Index unless one or more of the following situations have been established through investigation:

- (A) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- (B) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organizations within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- (C) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- (D) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the U. S. in time of emergency.

As of 1/26/68, the Security Index contains 10,109 individuals.

Memorandum C.D.Brennan to W.C.Sullivan  
RE: Security Investigation of Individuals

When the field has completed an investigation and the subject's activities meet the criteria for inclusion in the SI; a report and FD-122 are submitted to the Bureau with recommendations for inclusion in the SI. The substantive Supervisor, Unit Supervisor in Charge, Section Chief and Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division approve the field's recommendation. The employment and residence of SI subjects are verified every six months and an investigative report is submitted annually.

The Reserve Index was established in 1960 to include those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within the SI criteria but who in a time of national emergency are in a position to influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish financial or material aid to subversive elements due to their subversive affiliation and ideology. These individuals are scheduled to receive priority consideration with respect to investigation following the apprehension of SI subjects. The criteria for placing individuals in the Reserve Index is as follows.

Individuals are to be included in the Reserve Index when, following investigation, the information does not justify the inclusion of the subject's name in the Security Index when there is evidence of:

- (a) Membership in a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 1949, together with some indication of sympathy or association with such an organization or a subversive front organization subsequent to the reported membership and no reliable evidence of defection.
- (b) Investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in a revolutionary organization within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period, and no reliable evidence of defection.



Memorandum C.D.Brennan to W.C.Sullivan  
RE: Security Investigation of Individuals

- (c) The individual, within the past five years, by his associations, writings, financial support, or conduct in relation to and support of subversive organizations or the international communist movement is in a position to influence others at the time of a national emergency and no reliable evidence of defection.
- (d) Leadership or substantial activities in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within three years and no reliable evidence of defection.
- (e) Membership in a subversive front organization within the past three years and no reliable evidence of defection.

The Reserve Index is divided into two sections, Section A and Section B. If a subject does not meet the criteria for the SI or is deleted from the SI, he is considered for either section of the Reserve Index. Those individuals who are included in Section A fall within the following categories: professors, teachers and educators, labor union organizers, writers, lawyers, doctors and other potentially influential persons on a local or national level or individuals who could furnish material or financial aid. Current procedures call for investigation of those individuals in the RI-A to be reopened and brought up to date annually and considered for SI status or retention in the RI-A. This investigation is limited to verification of residence and employment, check of informants and file review to determine if additional investigation and/or submission of a report is warranted. Section B contains the names of all other individuals in the Reserve Index and is maintained only by the field office. These cases are reopened every two years. The investigation is limited to verification of residence, employment and contact with logical informants. If the results of the case are negative, the case is then closed.

Memorandum C.D.Brennan to W.C.Sullivan  
RE: Security Investigation of Individuals

As of 1/26/68, there were 1,959 individuals in the Reserve Index - A.

In order to streamline our procedures, the following recommendations are being made.

1. The criteria for placing individuals in the Security Index and the procedures in handling the investigations of these individuals remain the same.
2. The criteria for placing individuals on the Reserve Index - A remain the same. Current procedures for annual reopening and limited investigation in these cases be suspended at this time. The field office file for an RI-A subject should be reviewed by the field whenever informant information or other information is channeled to the file to determine if additional investigation is warranted.
3. The criteria for placing subjects on the Reserve Index - B remain the same. The current procedures for reopening of these cases be suspended at this time. The field office file of an RI-B subject be reviewed by the field whenever informant information or other information is channeled to the file to determine if additional investigation is warranted.
4. Maintenance of the RI-A and RI-B by the field office and the Bureau will remain the same.



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: April 30, 1968

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS  
TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SAFETY  
OF THE UNITED STATES (DETPRO)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/pw

## SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

SYNOPSIS: This is to recommend obtaining Departmental approval for amended criteria for individuals on Security Index (SI) and to set up Priority Apprehension Program based on dangerousness of individuals on SI. Present criteria for SI include individuals in basic revolutionary groups, front groups, anarchists, and those with anarchistic tendencies. Department has recently amended definition of a dangerous person in new Presidential Emergency Action Document 6, broadening it to include terrorists or persons who would interfere with Government operation and defense effort.

With Director's approval, conference was held with Departmental representatives and in view of amended definition of a dangerous person referred to above, a corresponding amendment to Item D of SI criteria was agreed upon. (Set out in details, page 7, and page 1 of memorandum to Mr. [REDACTED]) In addition, our study of the entire Emergency Detention Program suggests desirability of alterations to set up priorities for apprehension based on dangerousness of individual. Priorities would include:

1) Priority I. Top national and state leadership of basic subversive organizations, leaders of anarchistic groups, individuals who have shown greatest propensity for violence, as well as those who have special training in sabotage, espionage, guerrilla warfare, etc. Subversives in key defense facilities to be included. Present individuals designated Key Figures would, if appropriate, be in this category. Key Figure Program discontinued. Residences and employments will be verified each 3 months, and reports submitted semiannually.

2) Priority II. Second level leadership and individuals who present significant threat but are in less influential positions than Priority I. Verification of residences and employments each 6 months with submission of annual reports as now required. This majority of subjects response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Enclosure

Memo for Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: DETPRO

3) Priority III. All other individuals on SI. Made up mainly of rank and file members. Verification of residences and employments to remain at 6 months with submission of reports each 2 years.

4) Each priority will be broken down into nationalistic tendencies and organizational affiliations so that apprehensions can be made in each category on a selected basis.

5) Changes will not alter total number of individuals on SI and not materially affect SI.

OBSERVATIONS:

Implementation of program will continue to require authorization of Attorney General for any apprehensions. Priority lists will streamline effectiveness of Program to allow us to "zero in" on most dangerous and influential individuals and will permit us to "lop off" top level immediately if Program implemented. This should result in paralyzing organizations, and subjects with lesser priorities would lose top leadership and could be apprehended at later time, if necessary. Since SI made up principally of rank and file, we will save approximately 3,500 reports per year while at same time we will intensify coverage of those considered most dangerous. This presents logical and workable program while cutting back substantially on desirable but unnecessary paper work and is in line with our continuing analysis to streamline by cutting out unnecessary requirements and retaining only that which is absolutely essential.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached letter to Department setting forth above proposals be forwarded. Upon Department's approval, appropriate instructions and manual changes will be sent to the field.

Memo for Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: DETPRO

DETAILS:

The responsibilities of the FBI with respect to investigations in the internal security field have been established by Presidential Directives.

The primary purpose of the investigation of subversive individuals is to determine their identities and activities and/or whether they present a serious threat to the internal security of the country. If investigation develops positive evidence indicating that an individual presents a threat or potential threat to the internal security, his name is included in the Security Index.

The Security Index contains names of individuals who should be considered for immediate apprehension and detention in the event of a national emergency in order to safeguard the internal security of the United States by preventing sabotage, espionage, and insurrection. The list now consists of over 10,000 names. Additions and deletions are made when it is determined that the individual either represents a threat or no longer represents a threat.

A plan of action has been prepared to implement the apprehension and detention of individuals listed in the Security Index and for the seizure of specified contraband. This plan is formally known as the "Program for Apprehension and Detention of Persons Considered Potentially Dangerous to the National Defense and Public Safety of the United States." Details concerning this plan are contained in the Attorney General's Portfolio, copies of which were originally furnished to this Bureau on August 3, 1948. The proposed actions have been subject to continuous study, and revisions have been made as needed. The proposed actions under this plan will be implemented by Presidential Proclamation through Presidential Emergency Action Documents (PEAD). The PEADs provide for the arrest and detention of all persons, citizens as well as aliens, who are considered dangerous to the national defense and public safety and for the seizure of property which there is a reason to believe may be used to the detriment of national defense and public safety.

The results of our investigations are provided to the Department of Justice on a continuing basis for its concurrence and approval of the persons listed for apprehension.

Memo for Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: DETPRO

Detailed instructions are in the hands of all of our field offices for the handling of this matter in the event we are called upon to effect apprehensions of SI subjects. Plans are also in existence in seven field offices for the handling of detainees on a temporary basis by the Army, and close coordination is maintained between our offices and the military. Departmental instructions from the Attorney General to United States Attorneys, who will be the administrators of the program following implementation, and to U. S. Marshals have been furnished our offices at the Department's request for delivery to these officials. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is responsible for the detention of alien enemies, and on a quarterly basis, through the Department, the number of all aliens included on the SI is furnished to them. This list is broken down by field office and by sex.

The criteria for placing and retaining individuals was approved by the Department on April 11, 1955. They are as follows:

- A. Membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants or individuals.
- B. Membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organizations within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- C. Investigation has developed information that an individual though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

Memo for Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: DETPRO

D. Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the U. S. in time of emergency.

In November, 1967, the President ordered a comprehensive review of the Presidential Emergency Action Documents as to the desirability of modifying or deleting certain standby orders. The Attorney General served as the chairman of the committee reviewing the documents. After extensive review, in which the FBI participated, a proposal was submitted to the President that certain documents be revised. It was proposed that the Emergency Detention Program be revised to agree with the provisions of the Emergency Detention Act.

The Internal Security Division (ISD) of the Department has raised questions as to the ability to discharge the responsibilities of the Attorney General under the Emergency Detention Act of 1950. By letter dated 2/26/68 the Department requested a conference with the FBI for the purpose of reviewing the implementation of the Emergency Detention Program. The Director approved memorandum ~~to Mr. [redacted]~~ dated 3/1/68, captioned "Presidential Emergency Action Documents," designating Section Chief ~~[redacted]~~ and SA ~~[redacted]~~, Internal Security Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, to attend discussions with ISD.

One of the changes in PEAD pertains to the definition of a "dangerous individual." The document, which has been approved by the President, now states "The Attorney General, acting through such officers and agents as he may designate for the purpose, shall apprehend, and by order detain, pursuant to the provisions of the Emergency Detention Act, each person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage and sabotage, including acts of terrorism or assassination and any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of the national, state, and local governments and of the national defense effort. As used in this section, the term 'person' shall mean any citizen or national of the United States, or any citizen, subject or national of any foreign nation, or any stateless person."



Memo to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: DETPRO

The above is an all encompassing definition of a "dangerous person." This will extend the criteria for the Security Index.

During the conference of 4/22/68 with ISD, the definition of a dangerous individual was discussed, and it was decided that Item D of the SI criteria should be expanded to include the definition as stated in the new PEAD 6. It was also determined that prior to implementing the EDP under the EDA additional planning and prepositioning of necessary forms and documents must be completed by the Department.

We are continually examining our procedures and policies to eliminate everything except absolute essentials. We have made a study of the Priority Apprehension Program procedures to insure that they are both current and meaningful. We also are taking a hard look at the individuals on the SI to justify their retention.

With the emergence of the New Left and the intensification of activities by the racial militants and black nationalists, who are not affiliated with basic revolutionary organizations but because of their anarchist tendencies do present a threat to the internal security of the United States, it has become apparent that these individuals warrant inclusion on the SI.

Many individuals on the SI, because of their violent tendencies and their representation of the top leadership of subversive organizations, are scheduled for priority apprehension. The administrative procedures developed to make these apprehensions are referred to as the Detcom Program. In an all-out emergency, all subjects whose names are in the SI will be considered for immediate apprehension.

Our study indicates the necessity for establishing new priority apprehension procedures which will continue to be based on potential dangerousness of the individual. Accordingly, the following suggestions are being made:

1. That the Priority Apprehension Program be continued under the code name Detcom; that the program be divided into 3 priority levels and be named separately.
2. That the first priority apprehension list be entitled Priority I. This list should consist of hard core national and state basic revolutionary organization leaders and those leaders of other subversive organizations and unorganized groups and individuals who have

Memo for Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: DETPRO

indicated a propensity for violence and/or have received special training in sabotage, espionage, and/or guerrilla warfare. If appropriate, individuals employed in or having access to key and/or defense facilities will be included on this list. It is believed that if these individuals are apprehended as scheduled this will completely disrupt the subversive organizations and should diminish possible actions by the remaining membership. These individuals will be apprehended only when the Attorney General announces that their immobilization is in the best interests of the national defense of the United States.

3. That a secondary priority list be entitled Priority II. This group should consist of the second level leadership of basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive organizations or other individuals who present a significant threat but are in less influential positions than those in Priority I. These individuals will be apprehended only when the Attorney General announces that their immobilization is in the best interests of the national defense of the United States.
4. That a third priority list be entitled Priority III. This list will consist of all other individuals who are on the SI. It will be made up mainly of rank and file members of basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive organizations, as well as other individuals whose activities warrant inclusion on the SI. These individuals will be apprehended only when the Attorney General announces that their immobilization is in the best interests of the national defense of the United States.
5. That Item D under the SI criteria be expanded to read:

"Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the U. S. in time of emergency. Such acts could include acts of terrorism, assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of the national, state, and local governments and of the defense effort." (Amendment is portion underscored.)

Memo for Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: DETPRO

6. That certain individuals in the time of international or national crisis, because of their nationalistic tendencies, organizational affiliation, and/or anarchist tendencies, will be apprehended on a selected basis. All individuals on the SI are tabbed as to their nationalistic tendencies or organizational affiliations.
7. That the residences and employments of individuals on the Priority I list be verified every 3 months instead of every 6 months; that reports be submitted every 6 months.
8. That the verification of residences and employments of individuals on the Priority II list remain at 6 months; that reports be submitted on an annual basis.
9. That the verification of residences and employments of individuals on the Priority III list remain at 6 months; that reports be submitted every 2 years.
10. That the category "Key Figure" be deleted, since it will fit into Priority I; that the category "Top Functionary" be continued.

Each individual case will continue to stand on its own, and the decision to consider an individual for Priority apprehension will be based on his subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies.

It is believed that the above suggestions will strengthen our procedures in making priority apprehensions as well as conserve agent time without damaging the caliber of security investigations of individuals. These changes will not alter total number of individuals on the SI and will not materially affect it.

The establishment of priority lists will lend itself to accomplishing the purpose of the SI. We will be in a better position to "zero in" on the most dangerous individuals, and this will permit intensification of investigations on them, should it be necessary. This will also set them up as prime targets for immediate apprehension in a practical working vein. This will enable us to "lop off" leadership of the subversive and dangerous groups immediately. Group activity will be paralyzed by depriving them of leadership. This will also tend to nullify the total influence and activity of this type of organization.



Memo to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: DETPRO

The more strict procedure of verification of residences and employments of every 3 months instead of 6 months for Priority I list will greatly assist in maintaining knowledge of the whereabouts of these individuals, which is as it should be.

The size of each Priority list cannot be determined until a review of the SI has been completed. It is estimated that Priority I will be approximately 750-1000, Priority II 2,500, and Priority III, 7,000.

The SI is made up principally of rank and file members; therefore, the greatest effect on our work will result from the proposal for Priority III.

The adoption of the proposals will result in the saving of agent and clerical time both at SOG and in the field in preparation and handling of approximately 3,500 reports a year.

The field will promptly report any unusual or important changes concerning a subject.

This will also release agent investigative time to concentrate on those individuals deemed more dangerous and at the same time not lose control over lesser subjects.

The field will continue to be required to know the current whereabouts of all subjects.

It is believed that this program is logical and workable and is in line with our continuing analysis to streamline our work. We are substantially cutting back on desirable but unnecessary paper work by cutting out unnecessary requirements. It is believed these proposals will greatly improve the efficiency of our work.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 1, 1968

FROM : C. D. Brennan( *This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

SUBJECT: MAINTENANCE OF CANCELLED SECURITY INDEX CARDS AT QUANTICO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/pu

Under Vital Records Program a duplicate set of the master Security Index cards is maintained at the Quantico relocation site. Additions, cancellations and changes of the Security Index are made on a continuing basis to keep the Index in a current status. Under our current procedures, when a Security Index card is changed, the old card is then destroyed; when an individual is removed from the Security Index, the card is cancelled and is retained at the Bureau for a period of 3 years filed alphabetically by year. The cards at Quantico have been maintained on an indefinite basis. We now have 25,000 cancelled Security Index cards stored at Quantico. These cards are retained to serve as a ready list of individuals who do not meet the criteria for the Security Index at this time; however, because of previous activities, they could represent a potential danger to the internal security of the U. S. in time of an emergency.

In line with our continuing analysis to streamline our procedures, it is recommended that the cancelled Security Index cards over 5 years old maintained at Quantico be destroyed and hereafter be maintained for the period of 5 years filed alphabetically by year.

## OBSERVATIONS:

The destruction of these cancelled cards will release 4 file drawers of vitally needed storage space. During this 5-year period if a subject's activities would warrant, he would be placed back on the Security Index or Reserve Index. It is believed that this period of time is sufficient to determine if an individual's activities would warrant reconsideration for inclusion on the Security Index. This will serve as a backup for a ready list of individuals who could be potentially dangerous in time of emergency.

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) That the cancelled Security Index cards over 5 years old maintained at Quantico be destroyed and hereafter be maintained for a period of 5 years filed alphabetically by year.

2) If approved, this memorandum be forwarded to SAC, Quantico for appropriate handling.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley  
Assistant Attorney General

May 1, 1968

Director, FBI

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND  
DETENTION OF PERSONS CONSIDERED  
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC  
SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RW  
ON 10-12-00

Reference is made to your letter of April 11, 1955, captioned as above, which approved the criteria for inclusion of individuals on the Security Index. Reference is also made to my letter dated March 4, 1968, captioned "Presidential Emergency Action Documents," which designated representatives to discuss the implementation of the Emergency Detention Program.

This is to confirm the results of a conference between Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED] of your Internal Security Division and Section Chief [REDACTED] and Special Agent [REDACTED] of this Bureau on April 22, 1968, relative to the definition of a dangerous person. In view of this conference, the following amendment to Item D of the Security Index criteria is being submitted to conform with the language as stated in the new Presidential Emergency Action Document 6: (The amendment is that portion which is underscored.)

- "Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the U. S. in time of emergency. Such acts could include acts of terrorism, assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of the national, state, and local governments and of the defense effort."

In addition to the foregoing, this Bureau has also made a study of the priority arrest procedures relating to the Emergency Detention Program. In this connection, it is felt

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GROUP 1

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downgrading and  
declassification

~~SECRET~~

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley

that the following proposals establishing a new Priority Apprehension Program will streamline the effectiveness of the Emergency Detention Program:

1. That the Priority Apprehension Program be divided into three priority levels.
2. The first priority apprehension list will be entitled Priority I. This list will consist of hard core national and state basic revolutionary organization leaders and those leaders of other subversive organizations and unorganized groups and individuals who have indicated a propensity for violence and/or have received special training in sabotage, espionage, and/or guerrilla warfare. If appropriate, individuals employed in or having access to key and/or defense facilities will be included on this list. Reports pertaining to individuals in Priority I will be submitted on a six-month basis.
3. The second priority list will be entitled Priority II. This list will consist of second level leadership of basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive organizations and individuals who present a significant threat but are in less influential positions than those in Priority I. Reports pertaining to individuals in Priority II will be submitted on an annual basis.
4. The third priority list will be entitled Priority III. This list will consist of all other individuals on the Security Index. It will be made up mainly of rank and file members of basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive organizations, as well as other individuals whose activities warrant inclusion on the Security Index.
5. Each Priority list will be broken down into nationalistic tendencies and/or organizational affiliations so that apprehensions can be made in each category on a selected basis.

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Mr. J. Walter Yeagley

6. Individuals in each Priority will be apprehended only upon the Attorney General's authorization that their immobilization is in the best interests of the national defense of the United States.

The above proposals are submitted for your consideration, and it is requested that you advise whether or not they meet with your approval.

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~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : J. Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: June 17, 1968

FROM //: J. Walter Yeagley  
Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

SUBJECT: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION OF  
PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS  
TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SAFETY  
OF THE UNITED STATES

SECRET

In reference to your letter of May 1 last, please be advised that your proposal to establish three priorities of apprehension in relation to the Emergency Detention Program is approved. This advice is also responsive to the request made in your letter of May 8, 1968 captioned, Presidential Emergency Action Documents.

As to the matter of the security index criteria discussed in your May 1 letter, such criteria are presently under study and you will be advised thereon in a subsequent letter.

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DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2BIM/KW

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: June 19, 1968

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND  
DETENTION OF PERSONS CONSIDERED  
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC  
SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES (DETPRO)

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DATE 10-12-00 BY SPAIN/KW

## SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

With Director's approval proposals to amend Security Index (SI) criteria to conform with definition of dangerous individuals as stated in new Presidential Emergency Action Document 6 and establishment of Priority Apprehension Program based on dangerousness of individuals on SI was submitted to Department by letter 5/1/68; a proposal that we not be required to set up separate emergency plans specifically designed to be implemented in the event of a limited attack, since our current plans can be altered to fit an existing situation, was submitted to Department 5/8/68.

By letter 6/17/68 Department advised proposal to amend SI criteria under study and we would be advised accordingly; approval was given to proposal that current emergency plans are suitable in any existing situation; approval was also given to establishment of three Priority levels for apprehension of individuals deemed dangerous in time of emergency. Priorities would include: Priority I - top leadership of basic organizations, leaders of anarchist groups, individuals who have shown greatest propensity for violence. Residences and employments will be verified each three months and reports submitted semiannually. Priority II - second level leadership and individuals who present significant threat. Verification of residences and employments each six months and reports submitted annually. Priority III - all other individuals on SI. Verification of residences and employments to remain at six months with submission of reports each two years. Each Priority will be broken down into nationalistic tendencies and organizational affiliations.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

Memorandum C. D. Brennan to  
Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: DETPRO; SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS  
OF INDIVIDUALS

This streamlining procedure is a major change and will have far-reaching effects on our work. The size of each Priority list cannot be determined until a review of SI has been made. It is estimated that Priority I will be 750-1000; Priority II, 2500; Priority III, 7000. It is estimated that there will be saving of agent and clerical time both in the field and at SOG in preparation and handling of approximately 3500 reports per year.

Extensive manual changes are being made. The field should be advised immediately of the new Priority Program and the new report writing policy. Instructions are being given that the SI be immediately reviewed, placing each individual into a designated Priority.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached SAC Letter be approved and transmitted to the field.



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

# Memorandum

SECRET

TO : J. Walter Yeagley  
Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

DATE: SEPT. 9, 1968

FROM : Frank M. Wozencraft  
Assistant Attorney General  
Office of Legal Counsel

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 10-12-00 BY SP4 WJR

SUBJECT: PEAD 6: Criteria for persons to be apprehended  
and Priority Apprehension Program

This is in response to your request of May 16, 1968, for our advice concerning the continued use, under PEAD, 6, of the existing criteria for determining persons to be apprehended pursuant to that PEAD, and the acceptability of the FBI's proposed Priority Apprehension Program.

## Criteria

The criteria set forth in paragraphs (a) through (d) on pp. 1-2 of your memorandum, and the background file containing the basis upon which these criteria were approved by the Attorney General on April 11, 1955, have been reviewed. While no change appears necessary in the essential substance of the criteria, the language used is in some respects unclear and possibly inconsistent. The proposed revisions set forth below are intended mainly to clarify what we understand to be the meaning of these criteria. These revisions are, of course, subject to further change in the event that they do not accurately reflect the intended meaning.

It is noted that the present criteria do not contain (and we are informed that there do not exist) formal definitions of the terms "basic revolutionary organization", "revolutionary group", "front organizations", or "subversive organization". While more precise indications of what is meant by these terms would be desirable, we have not insisted on formal definitions at this time in view of (i) the requirement that any person actually detained will be entitled to a hearing at which time the evidence will have to satisfy the standards of § 1 of PEAD 6 and the Emergency Detention Act, and (ii) the needed flexibility and discretion at the operating level in order to carry on an effective surveillance program.

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The revisions recommended below have been drafted to correct the following problems raised by the language of the existing criteria:

(1) Paragraphs (a) and (b) use the different terms "basic revolutionary organization" and "revolutionary group," respectively, although we are informed that no difference in meaning is intended.

(2) Under paragraph (b) it would be sufficient to apprehend a person on the basis of "active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims and purposes of the front organization." Since it is one of the basic characteristics of a front organization that its announced aims and purposes may be wholly innocuous, or even praiseworthy, it is conceivable that some individuals might participate actively in (and sympathize with) only those activities of a front organization that are related to unobjectionable purposes, and have no involvement in those activities which relate to the aims and purposes of a basic revolutionary organization. The detention of such persons would not appear to be appropriate in the absence of other considerations.

(3) Paragraph (c) is made applicable only to a person who is "not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization." We have been informally advised by the Internal Security Division, however, that the type of individual intended to be reached by this paragraph is likely to belong to some form of organization, though not one that meets the standards of paragraphs (a) or (b).

(4) As it is presently worded, paragraph (d) can be interpreted as being no more than a special provision to include individuals who otherwise qualify under one or more of paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) except for the fact that they have made no overt acts or statements within the prescribed five or three year time limits. The Internal Security Division has informally advised, however, that paragraph (d) is also intended to serve as a catchall for certain individuals who do not meet the criteria of paragraphs (a), (b) or (c).

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(5) Both paragraphs (c) and (d) apply on the basis of the likelihood that the different categories of individuals that they describe will perform undesirable acts in the event of an emergency. No reason is perceived why paragraphs (c) and (d) describe differently the undesirable acts that such individuals may perform, as distinguished from the facts indicating the likelihood that they will perform them, or why such description should differ from that in § 1 of PEAD 6.

Accordingly, it is recommended that paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) be revised to read as follows (underscoring indicates new or changed language):

"(b) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a basic revolutionary organization, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of those aims and purposes of the front organization which coincide with those of a basic revolutionary organization, within the last three years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals;

"(c) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member of or a participant in the activities of a basic revolutionary or front organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to commit acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of the national, state and local governments and of the defense effort;

"(d) Although investigation has failed to establish the facts required by (a), (b) or (c) above, either as to the substance of those criteria or because there have been no overt acts or statements within the time limits prescribed, facts

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have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts of the kind described in (c) above."

Priority Apprehension Program

As we informally advised your office by telephone on June 13, 1968, we have no objection to the proposed Priority Apprehension Program as set forth in the memorandum from the Director of the FBI, dated May 1, 1968, a copy of which is attached to your memorandum of May 16, 1968.

J. Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

September 19, 1968.

J. Walter Yeagley  
Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

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DATE 10-7-88 BY SP5ALM/R

PEAD 6: CRITERIA FOR PERSONS TO BE  
APPREHENDED AND PRIORITY  
APPREHENSION PROGRAM

**SECRET**

Attached is a copy of a self explanatory memorandum dated September 9, 1968 from the Office of Legal Counsel to this Division.

As you will note, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) proposes certain changes to be made in the wording of the criteria for persons to be apprehended under the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 which revisions "are intended mainly to clarify what we understand to be the meaning of these criteria" and make no changes in the essential substance of the criteria. This Division is in agreement with the changes proposed by the OLC and the memorandum of that office is forwarded for your consideration and specific advice whether the proposed changes are acceptable to your Bureau.

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~~SECRET~~

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley  
Assistant Attorney General

September 26, 1968

Director, FBI

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY  
DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND  
PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to your letter dated September 19, 1968, captioned "PEAD 6: CRITERIA FOR PERSONS TO BE APPREHENDED AND PRIORITY APPREHENSION PROGRAM," concerning proposed changes in the wording of criteria for persons to be apprehended under the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 as suggested by the Office of Legal Counsel and indicating your agreement with the changes.

The proposed changes are acceptable to this Bureau, and we will, accordingly, be guided by these revised criteria of 1968.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RW  
ON 10-12-00

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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UNITED STATES

MENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 26, 1969

FROM : C.D. Brennan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 6-12-80 BY SP3ALM/RW

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX (SI)  
AGITATOR INDEX

The report and verification requirements regarding SI subjects have been changed with the approval of the Director and an SAC Letter has been prepared in order to advise each field division.

The SI consists of three priorities. Reports pertaining to individuals designated as Priority I of the SI will henceforth be submitted on an annual basis. Such reports were previously submitted on a semiannual basis. Verification of their residence and employment will continue to be conducted every three months. The verification of residence and employment of individuals designated as Priority II and Priority III of the SI will henceforth be verified on an annual basis. Such verification was previously handled on a semiannual basis. No other changes are being made regarding SI. Verification of residence and employment regarding subjects on Agitator Index is also being changed to a yearly basis. This was previously done on a semiannual basis.

The field is being instructed that the reduction in the frequency of reports for Priority I subjects and verification of residence and employment of Priority II and Priority III subjects should not be interpreted as meaning that security investigations should be curtailed in any fashion. In addition, the field is being reminded of its responsibility, as well as the Bureau's responsibility to be aware of the location of SI subjects so that in the event a national emergency arises requiring the implementation of the Emergency Detention Program (EDP), SI subjects can be located for apprehension and detention. Each division is being instructed that appropriate sources should be established to alert the Bureau in the event an SI subject changes his residence and/or employment. The establishment of such sources is vital in order that the Bureau's responsibilities under the EDP can be fulfilled in the manner expected.

## ACTION:

That the attached letter to all Special Agents in Charge be approved. Appropriate manual changes are being prepared.

Enclosure. This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

## SECURITY INDEX

The Security Index is designed for the purpose of maintaining a list of individuals who should be apprehended and incarcerated in the event of a national emergency, such as an attack from abroad or internal revolt. Such individuals must be proven to be a definite threat to the national security. All additions to and deletions from the Security Index are approved in each field division by the Special Agent in Charge or his designated representative; are completely reviewed by Bureau supervisors who approve or reject the field recommendation; and final approval is given by the Department. The Security Index is based upon Title 2 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and is a part of the over-all Emergency Detention Program.

In June, 1968, we thoroughly revised investigative procedures of individuals on the Security Index by setting up priorities.

Individuals designated Priority I are hard core national and state leaders of basic revolutionary groups or other subversive organizations who have indicated propensity for violence. Verification of their residence and employment is conducted every three months and a report submitted every six months. Reports concerning such individuals were previously submitted on a quarterly basis. There were 647 individuals in Priority I as of February 14, 1969.

Individuals designated Priority II fall in the second level leadership of such basic revolutionary organizations or groups who have indicated a propensity for violence. Verification of their residence and employment is conducted every six months with a report submitted on an annual basis. There were 1,738 individuals in Priority II as of February 14, 1969.

Priority III is made up of all other individuals on the Security Index. Their residence and employment is verified every six months with a report being submitted every two years. Reports were previously submitted on an annual basis. As of February 14, 1969, there were 7,816 individuals in Priority III.

The Security Index is constantly changing through penetrative review by the field, Bureau supervisors and the Department. We have been making anywhere up to 38 changes a week in this list since July, 1968.



~~SECRET~~

Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

May 16, 1969

Director, FBI

S. 1872  
91st CONGRESS, 1st SESSION -  
A BILL TO REPEAL THE EMERGENCY  
DETENTION ACT OF 1950 (TITLE II OF  
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950)  
LEGISLATIVE MATTERS

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RW  
ON 10-12-00

This is in response to your request dated May 13, 1969, for the views of this Bureau on S. 1872, a bill to repeal the Emergency Detention Act of 1950. It is felt that this bill should not be adopted.

The Emergency Detention Act of 1950 serves as a basis for the Program for Apprehension and Detention of Persons Considered Potentially Dangerous to the National Defense and Public Safety of the United States and the Security Index, both of which are operated by this Bureau under the direction of the Department. The repeal of this Act would remove the basis for these programs which could seriously hamper the internal security of this nation in the event of an extreme national emergency. The law, as it stands, contains necessary safeguards for the rights of the individual and limits action of the U. S. Government since the detention of each person under the law must be fully justified, and no mass arrests could be made merely due to an individual's nationality or race. The protection of this nation from potential saboteurs and espionage agents is provided by this law, and it should certainly be continued. Under the provisions of the Emergency Detention Act, individuals who have been trained by foreign powers to carry out acts of sabotage, espionage and guerrilla warfare would be detained prior to the commission of any act detrimental to the internal security of the nation, thus preventing additional strife.

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Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Section

Individuals have been scheduled for detention who have, by their acts and statements, indicated they desire the overthrow of this Government through force and violence, and their activities are certainly not in the best interests of the nation. The number of persons actually detained would be far less than is generally believed. Opponents of this law envision mass arrests totaling anywhere from 10,000 to 500,000 individuals. If invoked, the Emergency Detention Program, under current practice, could result in the detention of only up to 671 individuals and probably less. This has resulted from the establishment of three Priorities under the detention program.

In view of the above, it is felt that the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 is a vital and necessary part of the law of the land and should not be repealed unless some provision is insured under which the internal security of this nation can be protected from the enemies who may attempt to destroy it from within.

In accordance with your request, the copy of S. 1872 furnished with your request is being returned.

Enclosure

1 - Legislative Section  
Office of the Deputy Attorney General

1 - Department File

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W.C. Sullivan

DATE: October 28, 1969

FROM : Mr. C.D. Brennan

SUBJECT: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND  
DETENTION OF PERSONS CONSIDERED  
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC  
SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

#408-90  
SYNOPSIS:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that the Department be consulted regarding the removal of Priority III subjects from the Security Index (SI). This would in no way mean a lessening of investigative attention regarding individuals carried as Priority III SI subjects but would mean concentrating our attention in areas most essential to the internal security of the country.

These Priorities were established during the latter part of April, 1968, as it was the Department's feeling that all individuals on the SI would not be apprehended in the event of a national emergency. Only those who are top leaders of the various groups (Priority I) would currently be considered for apprehension in the event of a national emergency with follow-up consideration being given to individuals in a secondary leadership capacity (Priority II). Apprehension of rank and file SI subjects (Priority III) is extremely remote. Of the 10,786 individuals on the SI, 8,125 are in Priority III. These security subjects could be maintained on a subversive index by the Bureau and in the event of an extreme national emergency, this list would be available for whatever action is deemed necessary by the President and the Attorney General. The criteria for this subversive index would remain exactly the same as for existing Priority III SI subjects. After the initial investigation in this category, necessary information could be submitted by letterhead memorandum making the preparation of investigative reports unnecessary. This could result in considerable savings to the Bureau since routine investigation would not be required after the initial investigation. In addition, the list is, in effect, already in existence and would require no work to set up and much less to maintain than the SI.

The moratorium on security work has caused an increase in the total number on the SI since we are not currently

Enclosure

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Memorandum to Mr. W.C. Sullivan  
RE: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND  
DETENTION OF PERSONS CONSIDERED  
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC  
SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

reviewing cases to consider deletion. The removal of Priority III subjects from the SI will alleviate this situation considerably. The total number of individuals on the SI has increased 4.9 per cent since March, 1969, and is expected to increase by an additional 5 per cent before March, 1970, since very few names are being removed due to lack of periodic review. If Priority III subjects were removed from the SI, we would have a remaining SI of 2,661 individuals. This would greatly assist in making the EDP effective and workable in the event its utilization is required.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter to the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, be approved.

Memorandum to Mr. W.C. Sullivan  
RE: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND  
DETENTION OF PERSONS CONSIDERED  
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC  
SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

DETAILS:

We constantly review our operations in the internal security field in an effort to effect streamlining measures, where possible, in order that the most effective use can be made of the available manpower. Under the existing moratorium pertaining to routine Security Matter - Communist cases, as well as investigations of Priority II and Priority III SI subjects, we are not at this time conducting our normal periodic investigation of Priority III SI subjects.

In an effort to further streamline security investigations and to effectively utilize the manpower available, it is believed that we should at this time consult the Department regarding the necessity to continue Priority III designations on the SI. Priorities were established during the latter part of April, 1968, as a result of conferences with the Department. The establishment of these Priorities was confirmed by letter to Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley dated May 1, 1968. The establishment of Priority listings for SI subjects was brought about by the fact that there were at that time over 10,000 individuals on the SI, and it was the feeling of the Department that all individuals on the SI should not be apprehended for detention in the event of a national emergency requiring the implementation of the Emergency Detention Program. The Priorities were established on the basis of leadership capacity within the various organizations and groups. Priority I was made up of all hard core national and state basic revolutionary organization leaders and leaders of other subversive organizations and unorganized groups and individuals who indicated a propensity for violence and/or had received specialized training in sabotage, espionage, and/or guerrilla warfare. Priority II was based on second level leadership and Priority III was made up of all others on the SI, mainly rank and file members of the various organizations and groups.

It has been the feeling of the Department that in the event of a national emergency the Bureau will be authorized to apprehend and detain only certain individuals in Priority I. There are currently 712 individuals in Priority I of the SI.

Memorandum to Mr. W.C. Sullivan  
RE: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND  
DETENTION OF PERSONS CONSIDERED  
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC  
SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

We could conceivably apprehend as little as 10 individuals in this group or as many as the entire list of 712. The Department has indicated that individuals included in Priority II of the SI may possibly be considered for apprehension and detention, but this would be secondary and would follow by at least a short period of time any apprehension of individuals in Priority I. It is doubtful that instructions would be issued for the Bureau to apprehend anyone in Priority III of the SI. This is based on the theory, which appears to be sound, that the immediate removal of leaders would effectively paralyze the various organizations and thereby remove considerable potential for acts inimical to the best interests of the nation.

It is, therefore, believed that we can delete Priority III from the actual SI without in any way seriously affecting the Emergency Detention Program. This, by no means, indicates a lessening of our vigilance pertaining to security matters and the responsibility of this Bureau to take necessary steps to safeguard the internal security of this country. Although these individuals would no longer be carried on the actual SI, we would maintain their names on a subversive index which would contain the same information as does the SI. Investigations would be initiated on individuals concerning whom we receive information of a subversive nature and an initial report would be submitted much as we now do recommending that this individual be included on this subversive index or that no further investigation be conducted based on the results of the investigation. If the individual meets the criteria for being included on this subversive index, subsequent information could be submitted to the Bureau by letterhead memorandum rather than an investigative report which is the current practice regarding Priority III SI subjects. This would result in considerable savings to the Bureau in investigative, Agent and stenographic time if and when the current moratorium regarding certain phases of security investigations is lifted.

As you are aware, the moratorium which was placed into effect during March, 1969, affected investigations and submission of reports regarding Priority II and Priority III SI subjects and in addition, suspended routine Security Matter - Communist investigations. We are, therefore, in effect not currently investigating these Priority III SI subjects nor are reports being submitted concerning them based on the moratorium. The removal of the Priority III subjects from



Memorandum to Mr. W.C. Sullivan  
RE: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND  
DETENTION OF PERSONS CONSIDERED  
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE  
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SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

the SI will cause little or no effect on the current workload at the Seat of Government or the field. It will greatly assist the field once the moratorium is removed since the field will be able to immediately initiate investigations in the security field without having to bring up to date the 8,077 Priority III cases.

This step is also deemed necessary since the moratorium on security investigations has actually resulted in an increase in the total SI of over 500 cases. The total listing on the SI as of March 1, 1969, was 10,208, approximately 7,826 of whom were included in Priority III. The total SI as of October 15, 1969, was 10,786, approximately 8,125 of whom were Priority III. A portion of this increase is directly attributable to the moratorium since existing cases are not being periodically reviewed for removal from the SI. A study has been made and the increase in the over-all SI during the first six months of the moratorium was 4.9 per cent. Since the moratorium has been continued we can anticipate that the over-all SI will increase by approximately an additional 5 per cent before March, 1970.

The rate of increase in the SI for a similar period prior to the moratorium was at a rate of 0.72 per cent. This level was maintained since we were constantly reviewing existing SI cases for deletion.

The deletion of Priority III subjects from the SI will result in an efficiently organized SI that will be completely workable, especially under emergency conditions.

It is noted that as of October 15, 1969, there were 8,125 individuals included in Priority III of the SI. If these 8,125 individuals were, in effect, removed from the SI, we would have a remaining SI totaling 2,661.

We will continue to maintain Priority designation on the SI and the standards for the Priority designation will not be lessened to permit any widespread redesignation of Priorities. With the maintenance of the individuals currently listed as Priority III SI subjects on the subversive index a complete list would be available in the event the national emergency deteriorated to such an extent as to warrant the apprehension and detention of all individuals considered to be subversive.



Memorandum to Mr. W.C. Sullivan  
RE: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND  
DETENTION OF PERSONS CONSIDERED  
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC  
SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

The criteria for this subversive index would remain exactly the same as for existing Priority III SI subjects. This subversive index is, in effect, already set up and would require little or no work to establish and would require much less work to maintain.

It is believed that this proposal to remove all Priority III subjects from the SI should be presented to the Department for its views, comments and approval. We will indicate to the Department in submitting this proposal that this does not mean a lessening in our investigations in the security field but merely means that rank and file members will not be included on the actual SI.

There is attached an appropriate letter to Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley proposing the above and requesting the Department's views and comments.

~~SECRET~~

Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division.

October 29, 1969

Director, FBI

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND  
DETENTION OF PERSONS CONSIDERED  
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC  
SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

DECLASSIFIED BY *SPALM/ku*  
ON *10-12-00*

As a result of conferences held during April, 1968, with representatives of the Internal Security Division, Security Index (SI) subjects were categorized by Priorities based on their potential dangerousness and leadership positions. This was confirmed by letter to you dated May 1, 1968. All SI subjects have since been given a Priority designation.

The basic reason for establishing these Priorities was to provide a way to give immediate consideration to apprehending for detention only those individuals deemed most dangerous in the event of a national emergency requiring implementation of the EDP. This is limited to SI subjects designated as Priority I. Individuals in Priority II were to be given secondary consideration. It was believed that individuals designated as Priority III on the SI would not be apprehended except under extreme conditions and only if the situation deteriorated to such a point as to make this move necessary.

Under the present circumstances it is believed that consideration should be given to removing Priority III subjects from the SI. The SI would include only those individuals designated as Priority I and Priority II. This would in no way mean a lessening of investigative attention regarding individuals currently carried as Priority III SI subjects. A listing of these individuals would still be maintained by this Bureau and would be available in the event a situation arose requiring its use. Copies of investigative reports and/or memoranda concerning such individuals would be sent to the Department.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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downgrading and  
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Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

The removal of Priority III subjects from the SI would reduce the total number on the SI by approximately 8,125. This would greatly assist in making the IDP effective and workable in the event its utilization is required.

Your comments in this regard are requested.

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~~SECRET~~

**SECRET***Memorandum*

TO : J. Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: November 19, 1969

FROM : J. Walter Yeagley  
Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

SUBJECT: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND  
DETENTION OF PERSONS CON-  
SIDERED POTENTIALLY  
DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL  
DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SAFETY OF  
THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP2AAM/RW

Reference is made to your letter of October 29, last proposing removal of subjects in the Priority III designation from the Security Index (SI). In this regard you advise, however, that though removed from the SI such subjects will continue to receive investigative attention and a listing of such subjects will be maintained in your Bureau for possible use in the event of a national emergency.

The Department is in agreement with this proposal. Accordingly, it is understood that hereafter the SI will only consist of those individuals designated in Priority I and II. As in the past, the Department will continue to review the individual SI cases.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: December 12, 1969

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND  
DETENTION OF PERSONS CONSIDERED  
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC  
SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 10/12/00 BY SP8AM/RW

The Department by letter dated November 19, 1969, approved our proposal that Priority III Security Index (SI) subjects be removed from the SI. The Department also agreed that a listing of these Priority III subjects should be maintained by the Bureau for possible action in the event of a national emergency. The Department issued no instructions as to how this listing would be maintained. It will, therefore, be maintained for administrative purposes as a part of the regular SI but these Priority III subjects will be handled strictly within the Bureau. The Department will continue to make all decisions regarding Priorities I and II of the SI.

This method of handling Priority III subjects was brought about by the Department's feeling that Priority III subjects would not be apprehended in the event of a national emergency. The Department feels that only those individuals in Priority I and possibly Priority II of the SI would be apprehended for detention in the event of a national emergency. Individuals in Priority I and Priority II total 2,679. There are 8,170 individuals in Priority III. The total SI numbers 10,849.

A letter to all Special Agents in Charge has been prepared advising that henceforth Priority III subjects will be handled completely within the Bureau. The criteria for including individuals in Priority III remains the same, basically, that such individuals must be rank and file members of an organization considered subversive. All Special Agents in Charge are being advised that this should not mean a lessening of our investigative attention regarding individuals in this category but is actually a concentration of our efforts in areas most essential to the internal security of the country.

Enclosure

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

Memorandum to Mr. W.C. Sullivan

RE: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS  
TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SAFETY  
OF THE UNITED STATES

Cases on Priority III subjects will be reviewed on an annual basis and verification of residence and employment will be made at that time as is the current practice. The Bureau need be advised only in the event changes are necessary. Such information may be submitted by letterhead memoranda with regular submission of reports being discontinued.

With the establishment of this means of handling Priority III subjects, the maintenance of Reserve Index A (RI-A) will be discontinued at the Bureau. The RI-A will be maintained strictly by each field division. RI-A is made up of individuals who do not meet the criteria for the SI but have had previous connections with subversive groups and are in a position to influence others.

Since the Department has not specifically instructed the Bureau on the method of maintaining this listing of Priority III subjects, it is not necessary to advise the Department. The administrative handling of Priority III subjects is up to the Bureau and can most logically be maintained administratively as a portion of the SI with an inactive status.

This method of handling Priority III subjects is in line with Mr. ~~XXXXXX~~ desire to retain such individuals on the SI but in an inactive status.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter to all Special Agents in Charge be approved.



# Memorandum

DATE: 6/9/71

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX LISTS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2A

[REDACTED], Director, Office of Security, Internal Security Division, telephonically requested this date that we include in the list those U. S. Government employees who are on Priority III of the SI. [REDACTED] says it will be used as a check list against which the Internal Security Division will continuously review its files for any Federal violations relative to these subjects. He says such a review is done on a piecemeal basis and he wants to be sure no case is overlooked.

We prepare such a list for our own use and it will require no extra effort on our part.

**ACTION:**

If approved, Priority III listing of U. S. Government employees on the SI will be included with the lists of subjects on the SI furnished to the Department monthly.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : E. S. Miller

DATE: 9/17/71

FROM : R. D. Cotter

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT  
REPEAL; SECURITY INDEX  
PROGRAM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

News media today reports congressional repeal of the emergency detention provisions which are contained within Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950. The measure has been sent to the White House where it is expected the President will sign it.

As you know, the Security Index consists of subjects who were considered for apprehension and detention if the Emergency Detention Program (EDP) were to be invoked. Such individuals are considered to be potentially dangerous to the national defense in event of national emergency. Repeal of the Emergency Detention Act had been supported by the Department and leading congressional figures.

Although the individuals listed in our Security Index (SI) can no longer be apprehended and detained under Emergency Detention Act, we must continue to maintain the SI since the potential dangerousness of subversives is probably even greater now than before repeal of the Act, since they no doubt feel safer now to conspire in the destruction of this country.

It is therefore believed that the Security Index Program should be continued as presently constituted so that we are currently aware of the identity, location and extent of subversive activity. It is believed that the mechanics of maintaining the SI should be carefully analyzed, however, to determine how it can best be used and operated for the benefit of national defense. In this connection, it is believed that after careful consideration we should consult the Department to determine if there is any manner in which the essence of the Security Index and emergency detention of dangerous individuals could be utilized under Presidential powers.

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) If you approve, our present SI Program will be continued and a study will be made as to the manner in which it can best be maintained and used without repeal of the Emergency Detention Act.

Memorandum for Mr. Miller  
RE: EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT REPEAL  
SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

RECOMMENDATIONS: (cont.)

(2) Following such study, approval will be requested to consult the Department as to possible alternatives to the Emergency Detention Act.

airtel

9/21/71

To: SAC, Albany  
From: Director, FBI

EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM

As you may be aware, Congress has repealed Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950, commonly cited as the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, and it is expected the President will sign the legislation. The Bureau is now studying the effect it will have on our Security Index Program and you will be advised as to the future course of action to be taken relative to the Security Index. In the meantime, continue to handle the Security Index as you have in the past.

2 - To All Offices

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 07-20-00 BY SP2ALM/KW

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : E. S. Miller

DATE: 9/21/71

FROM : R. D. Cotter

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT  
REPEAL; SECURITY INDEX  
PROGRAM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP8ALM/KC

R. D. Cotter to Miller memorandum 9/17/71, captioned as above, reported congressional repeal of Emergency Detention Act (EDA) and indicated a study would be made as to how our Security Index (SI) Program could best be maintained and used without EDA. Director noted "Expedite."

## History of Security Index

Essentially, our Security Index is a list of those individuals who have been identified as subversives who represent a potential danger to the national security in time of emergency and who would have been apprehended and detained under the provisions of EDA. As a matter of fact, our SI predates passage of Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the statute containing EDA which has just been repealed. Prior to 1950, SI subjects would have been apprehended and detained under authority derived from Executive Order supported by joint resolution of House and Senate.

The Act repealing EDA, however, would apparently preclude any future use of such executive authority, since it amended Title 18, U.S. Code, to insert the language "No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."

## Need to Continue SI

Although the Government does not currently appear to have any authority to apprehend and detain subjects listed in the SI, we feel that continuance of SI is an administrative necessity to the FBI, if not to the Department also, for the following reasons:

Those listed now or included under existing criteria in the future will continue to represent a potential danger to the national defense. Should this country come under attack from hostile forces, foreign or domestic, there is nothing to preclude the President from going before a joint session of Congress and requesting necessary authority to apprehend and detain those

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Memorandum for Mr. Miller  
RE: EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT REPEAL  
SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

who would constitute a menace to national defense. At this point it would be absolutely essential to have an immediate list, such as the SI, for use in making such apprehensions. The SI, backed by our investigative files, would provide documentation of subversive backgrounds during any hearings which might be required following apprehensions.

The SI constitutes an extremely valuable list of subversives and malcontents who constantly pose a threat to the safety of the President. Secret Service is provided a constant flow of data concerning current whereabouts and backgrounds of individuals on the SI. In addition, the SI would immediately pinpoint for our own use the identities of subversives which would require intensified investigative attention to provide evidence of espionage, sabotage or the like.

Operation of SI

Currently the field makes recommendation for an individual's inclusion in the SI and the Bureau either concurs or disapproves the recommendation. It is believed this procedure should continue. However, when it has appeared that some reason exists for removal of an individual from the SI, we have sought advice in this regard from the Department. Departmental concurrence in our listing of SI subjects was based on the possibility of such subjects being apprehended under EDA. Since apprehension is not currently possible, it is believed that the Bureau should decide whether an individual should be removed or retained in the SI. We will, of course, continue to disseminate our security reports to the Department.

We have furnished the Department a monthly list of subjects on Priority I and Priority II (those subject to probable emergency apprehension) and this list was the basis for a continuing review by the Department of subjects to be retained on SI. For the above-named reasons we believe that the Department should no longer make the decision as to who is retained or removed from SI. However, the Department may desire to continue to receive the monthly list for information purposes.

Quarterly we have furnished Passport Office of State Department a list of those on Priority I (the most potentially dangerous) so that we can be advised of travel abroad by these subjects. The list is not identified in any way as SI and since it is beneficial to us, it is believed we should continue to send it.



Memorandum for Mr. Miller

RE: EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT REPEAL  
SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

Effect of Repeal on Future Investigations

Repeal of EDA raises question of what effect such repeal may have, in a legal sense, for the FBI to conduct investigations of this type. In other words, do we have statutory authority or mandates such as Executive Order as bases for our investigative authority?

A quick perusal of Section 87, Manual of Instructions indicates that EDA, which was Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950, was only a small part of our overall investigative authority. Title I of the Internal Security Act of 1950, which relates to Subversive Activities Control Board, strengthened by Executive Order 11605 dated 7/2/71, provides investigative authority as do Smith Act of 1940, Communist Control Act of 1954, Fraud Against the Government, Rebellion and Insurrection, Sedition and Seditious Conspiracy, among others. However, it is believed that Office of Legal Counsel should examine this more critically from a legal standpoint.

Observations

It is to be noted that the Department has an entire staff set up to administer emergency apprehension of dangerous subversives. It is believed that in the interest of national security the Department will make some effort or provision to implement an alternative to EDA. It is therefore felt that the Department would have a collateral interest in the FBI's maintaining the Security Index without the provisions of emergency apprehension.

It is believed that in face of the substantial Congressional sentiment which resulted in repeal of EDA, we must exercise care not to subject the Bureau and Director to unwarranted public criticism for unilaterally deciding to maintain the SI, which might appear to be an attempt to evade the will of Congress. For this reason it is believed that although we should continue to maintain the SI on a temporary basis, we

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Miller  
RE: EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT REPEAL  
SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

should submit the facts enumerated above to the Attorney General and ask for a mandate in writing to continue the SI as it is now constituted.

We should also inquire of the Department as what disposition should be made of the unexecuted warrants outstanding in each Field Office for use in effecting apprehension of EDA.

The Field has already been instructed to continue the SI pending further Bureau instructions.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That pending advice from the Attorney General, our Security Index be continued on a temporary basis as it is now constituted, except the Bureau will assume responsibility for deciding on retention, deletion or additions thereto.

(2) Upon determining that the President has signed the Act repealing EDA, a letter be directed to the Attorney General, citing the various above-mentioned reasons why the FBI should continue to maintain the SI, without provisions of EDA, in the interest of national security and administrative necessity, and request advice in this regard. Letter will also inquire as to disposition of unexecuted warrants outstanding in each Field Office, as noted above.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Miller

RE: EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT REPEAL  
SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

(3) That Office of Legal Counsel examine legal bases for security investigations of this type to see if repeal of EDA has restricted our legal basis for investigative activity. Other authority is set forth in Section 87, Manual of Instructions.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 9/24/71

FROM : D. J. Dalbey

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT REPEAL  
SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALY/RW

Memorandum 9/21/71, of same caption, from Mr. Cotter to Mr. Miller contained recommendation #3, approved by the Director, that Office of Legal Counsel examine legal bases for security investigations of the emergency detention type to determine whether repeal of the Emergency Detention Act (assuming repeal act will be signed by the President) will restrict legal basis for FBI investigation of subversives.

Our conclusion is that repeal of the Emergency Detention Act will in no way interfere with FBI investigation of subversion in its many forms. The effect of the repeal is to outlaw only summary apprehension and detention of persons alleged to be subversive and hence dangerous in a time of national emergency. The FBI did not obtain its basic investigative authority from any provision of the Emergency Detention Act and does not lose that authority by repeal.

Our basic investigative authority for this type of case is in the Presidential directive of September 6, 1939, which still remains in effect, with updatings. In addition to that there is a host of criminal statutes which are particularly applicable to the type of action-oriented subversives with whom we now deal. The principal subversives now carry guns, rob banks to get money, steal arms and ammunition, commit arson, set off bombs, incite riots, and do many other things which violate one or more criminal statutes over which this Bureau has investigative jurisdiction. From a combination of those statutes, plus the original Presidential directive on internal security, we have wide investigative authority.

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson  
Re: EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT REPEAL

It also is our opinion that elimination of the Emergency Detention Act does not prevent this Bureau from carrying in its files an assessment of each principal subversive which would be sufficient to mark him for Government attention should a need arise in a national emergency.

Bearing in mind that the Emergency Detention Act could as easily be put back in force should an emergency convince Congress of its need, this Bureau would then be expected to have on hand the necessary action information pertaining to individuals. Investigations under the Emergency Detention Act call for persons subject to possible summary apprehension and detention to be listed under Priority 1 and Priority 2. In lieu of that standard, we would suggest one called "Estimated Violence Potential (EVP)" which could be further subdivided by the numbers one, two and three. The Estimated Violence Potential would be arrived at from investigation and would be an estimated potential for sabotage; kidnaping or assassination of public officers; destruction, robbery, or theft of Government property; riot; etc. Factors entering into the judgment would be such matters as criminal offenses which the person is known or reasonably believed to have committed or planned; statements of violence planned, intended or advocated against public officials or otherwise; membership in, or affiliation with, organizations advocating forcible overthrow of, or damage to, the Government; travel performed in furtherance of any violent activity or objective; possession of firearms or other weapons of destruction, etc.

In spite of firm belief that the Bureau has adequate investigative leeway remaining to us, we strongly suggest that upon official repeal of the Emergency Detention Act, a letter should be written to the Attorney General in which this Bureau asks for a reassessment of our investigative and record-keeping authority concerning subversive matters. It would be foolish of us to continue investigation without first building a record to show that we have sought the advice of the Department in every important particular. This is good management in general and it will also tend to protect us against the anticipated challenge from some spokesmen of the extreme left in which it is claimed that repeal of the Emergency Detention Act does, in fact, eliminate our investigative authority. Such a claim logically is to be expected and we should at least be in a position to say that this question has been raised to the Department of Justice.

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson  
Re: EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT REPEAL

RECOMMENDATION:

That on repeal of the Emergency Detention Act, the Domestic Intelligence Division, with such assistance as is desired from Office of Legal Counsel, prepare a letter to the Attorney General in which the Bureau requests a complete review of our authority to investigate subversive matters and to compile records on allegedly subversive persons.



9/27/71

TELETYPE

TO ALL OFFICES

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SIGNED AN ACT REPEALING TITLE TWO OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF NINETEEN FIFTY, COMMONLY CITED AS THE EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT OF NINETEEN FIFTY. BUREAU IS NOW STUDYING THE EFFECT IT WILL HAVE ON CAPTIONED INVESTIGATIONS AND DEPARTMENTAL ADVICE IS BEING SOUGHT. UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTED, YOU SHOULD MAKE NO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONS TO, DELETIONS FROM, OR OTHER CHANGES TO THE SECURITY INDEX.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-80 BY SP2ALM/RW

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : E. S. Miller

DATE: 9/29/71

FROM : R. D. Cotter

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT REPEAL;  
(SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/Ku

R. D. Cotter to Miller memorandum 9/21/71,\* captioned as above, related facts concerning repeal of Emergency Detention Act (EDA) and effect of such repeal on Bureau security investigations.

Memorandum recommended that when Act was signed by President a letter be directed to Attorney General citing reasons why we should continue to maintain Security Index without features of emergency apprehension. Memorandum also requested Legal Counsel to examine legal bases for our security investigations to see if repeal of EDA has restricted our legal basis for investigative activity. Memorandum also recommended continuation of Security Index on a temporary basis pending advice from the Attorney General. The Director approved all these recommendations.

Dalbey to Tolson memorandum 9/24/71,\* same caption, voiced opinion that repeal of EDA will in no way interfere with FBI investigation of subversion, but recommended a letter to Attorney General requesting review of our authority to investigate subversive matters and to compile records on allegedly subversive persons.

The Act repealing EDA has been signed by the President and there is attached a letter to the Attorney General requesting advice concerning this legislation.

While there is no question concerning the need to maintain a current list of potentially dangerous persons, such as we have done in our Security Index, prudence dictates the necessity to keep any such records in a manner which would not invite charges by the Bureau's enemies that we are evading the will of Congress. In this connection, it is believed we must also get some written authority from the Attorney General, not only to keep records which, in effect, represent a workable substitute for the Security Index, but also serves as a mandate for our continued investigation of subversive activity and related matters.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and is not to be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for Mr. Miller  
RE: EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT REPEAL;  
SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

The attached letter requests concurrence of the Attorney General in our opinion that repeal of EDA does not erode FBI authority to investigate subversion and that such repeal does not preclude our keeping administrative records necessary in the conduct of subversive investigations, including a list of individuals who pose a threat to national security. The letter also requests advice as to disposition of material maintained in our field offices relating to EDA.

If the Attorney General concurs in our views concerning the keeping of an administrative index, steps will be taken to implement such index, using data wherever possible which can be salvaged from the discontinued Security Index. A detailed study will be made and criteria established for such index and necessary mechanics will be devised for its operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) That the attached letter to the Attorney General be approved. <sup>(9-30-71)</sup>
- (2) That Domestic Intelligence Division submit for approval criteria and mechanics for implementation of above-described administrative index, if approved by Attorney General.

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

September 30, 1971

Director, FBI

EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RW  
ON 10-12-00

In view of the fact the President has signed the Act repealing Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950, which was commonly referred to as the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, your views are being solicited concerning FBI authority to continue investigations of subversive activity covered, in part, by this Act.

We have discontinued all planning for emergency apprehension and detention of those subjects listed in the Security Index, which is a list of individuals whose histories show they might engage in or conspire to engage in acts of espionage or sabotage during a national emergency. We have likewise discontinued operation of the Security Index, which was an integral part of implementation of emergency apprehension.

In addition to statutory authority provided in the Smith Act of 1940, Title I of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Communist Control Act of 1954, and statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, rebellion and insurrection, sedition and seditious conspiracy, we feel that authority for the FBI to conduct investigations of subversive activity and related activity is clearly set forth in certain Presidential Directives. For example, on June 26, 1939, the President issued a confidential Directive to the heads of various Government Departments which stated: "It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice...." On September 6, 1939, the President issued a Directive as follows: "The Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice to take charge of investigative matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and violations of neutrality regulations." This Directive also pointed out that "the investigations" (by the FBI) "must be conducted in a comprehensive and effective manner, on a national basis, and all information carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion and irresponsibility."

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

On January 8, 1943, the President issued a Directive reiterating his previous Directive of September 6, 1939, and subsequently on July 24, 1950, the President issued a third Directive, reiterating previous Directives of September 6, 1939, and January 8, 1943, and broadened the scope of investigative activity by the FBI to include "subversive activities and related matters" as well as the specific matters involving espionage and sabotage. On December 15, 1953, the President issued a statement in which he set forth the language contained in the combined Presidential Directives dated September 6, 1939, January 8, 1943, and July 24, 1950, concerning the investigative responsibility of the FBI in matters relating to "espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters." The statement then pointed out the FBI is also charged with investigating all violations of the Atomic Energy Act and requested cooperation of all enforcement officers, as in the previous Directives, in reporting all information relating to violations of the Atomic Energy Act to the nearest representative of the FBI.

Based on interpretation of existing statutes and the language set forth in the various Presidential Directives cited above, we feel that the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 has not eroded the FBI's authority and responsibility to conduct investigation of subversive activities and related matters. Likewise, we feel that the repeal of this Act does not limit the FBI's authority and responsibility to keep and maintain administrative records, including various indices, which may be necessary in fulfilling such responsibility and authority.

I strongly feel that irrespective of the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act, the Federal Government must take whatever steps are necessary, within the law, to protect itself from all hostile forces bent on its destruction. We, therefore, feel that it is absolutely incumbent upon the FBI to continue investigations of those who pose a threat to the internal security of the country and to maintain an administrative index of such individuals as an essential part of our investigative responsibility. Such an index not only enables the FBI to pinpoint individuals who have exhibited a propensity to conduct acts inimical to national security, but also serves as an extremely valuable list of individuals who pose a continuing threat to the safety of the President and thereby enables us to provide current data to U. S. Secret Service concerning backgrounds and whereabouts of such individuals.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

You are therefore requested to advise whether you concur in our opinion that the FBI's authority and responsibility to investigate subversive activities and related matters has not been eroded by repeal of the Emergency Detention Act. You are further requested to advise if you concur in our opinion that the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act does not prohibit or limit the FBI's authority and responsibility to keep and maintain administrative records, including an administrative index of individuals under investigation in connection with subversive activities and related matters, which are necessary in fulfilling our investigative authority and responsibility.

In the past we have furnished the Internal Security Division on a monthly basis a current list of individuals listed on the Security Index. This has been discontinued. However, in the event you approve of our maintaining an administrative index, as described above, please advise whether the Internal Security Division desires a copy of any current list we might prepare in this regard.

You are also requested to advise what disposition should be made of warrants, sealed envelopes captioned "Department of Justice Instructions to United States Attorneys" and "Department of Justice Instructions to United States Marshals" which have been maintained in each of our field offices in connection with the Emergency Detention Program.

In view of the urgency of the matter and the critical need to continue an uninterrupted program of investigating subversive activities and related matters, you are requested to furnish a reply to the foregoing questions at the earliest possible time.

- 1 - The Deputy Attorney General
- 1 - Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

# Memorandum

**SECRET**

TO : Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: October 22, 1971

FROM : The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/2/80 BY SP5A/LM/jra

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM

This will acknowledge your memorandum of September 30, 1971 regarding the effect that the repeal of Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended, has on the FBI's authority "to investigate subversive activities and related matters."

With respect to your initial inquiry, I wish to advise you that the FBI's authority to investigate violations of the espionage, sabotage, Smith Act, Atomic Energy Act and related statutes, as well as subversive activities and related matters in accordance with its statutory responsibilities and the Presidential directives, cited in your memorandum, remains unaffected by the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act.

Furthermore, the repeal of the aforementioned Act does not alter or limit the FBI's authority and responsibility to record, file and index information secured pursuant to its statutory and Presidential authority. An FBI administrative index compiled and maintained to assist the Bureau in making readily retrievable and available the results of its investigations into subversive activities and related matters is not prohibited by the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act.

While the Department does not desire a copy of any lists that you may compile on the basis of such records or indices, the Internal Security Division should be furnished a monthly memorandum reflecting the identity of government employees who by significant acts or membership in subversive organizations, have demonstrated a propensity to commit acts inimical to our national security.

With regard to Department instructions to the United States Attorneys and Marshals and related materials maintained in sealed envelopes in each of the Bureau's field offices, it is noted that such emergency documents were prepared on the basis of authority other than the Emergency Detention Act. A study is being undertaken within the Department as to the disposition to be made of those pre-positioned sealed instructions. When such a review has been completed you will be appropriately advised.

**SECRET**

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure  
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO: Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 11/11/71

FROM: T. J. Smith

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

## SYNOPSIS:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP8ALM/RW

Following repeal of the Emergency Detention Act (EDA) the Security Index (SI) was discontinued and the Department was asked whether repeal of the EDA limits our authority to conduct security investigations or maintain an administrative index of security subjects. The Department advised that our investigative authority remains unaffected and further that we are not prohibited from maintaining an administrative index of security subjects. After careful analysis, therefore, we propose setting up an administrative index which we will refer to as the ADEX. It will contain four categories representing degrees of dangerousness of security subjects. While the SI was set up to tab individuals for arrest and detention, ADEX will be set up to establish investigative priorities. Category I, for example, will include individuals who will be under constant investigation. Category IV will include individuals who we previously investigated but now only verify residence and employment on an annual basis.

Because new emphasis is being placed on individuals without organizational affiliation who nevertheless represent a threat to the national security, overall case load in the security field will increase. It is estimated that total case load increase will be in excess of 23,000 cases the first year. We believe, however, that this increase will not be an investigative burden on the field and that the cases can readily be handled by currently available manpower since all we are doing in cases falling within estimated increases is verifying residence and employment addresses. Time consuming background investigation has previously been conducted in these cases. Some modification of our automatic data processing (ADP) program will be required; however, it is believed this will be minor in scope.

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That attached airtel to all offices initiating the new ADEX be approved.

(2) That Administrative Division take necessary steps

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for Mr. T. J. Smith  
RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED:

(3) That if instructions contained herein are approved, a copy of our airtel to the field be furnished to the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and the Internal Security Division for completion of Departmental records.

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

DETAILS:

Subsequent to the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act (EDA) the field was instructed to make no recommendations for additions to, deletions from, or other changes to the Security Index. We asked the Department if the repeal of the EDA would limit our authority to conduct investigations of those who pose a threat to the internal security of the country and to maintain an administrative index of such individuals as an essential part of our investigative responsibilities.

The Department has advised that the Bureau's authority to investigate violations of the espionage, sabotage, Smith Act, Atomic Energy Act, and related statutes, as well as subversive activities and related matters in accordance with Bureau statutory responsibilities and the Presidential Directives, remains unaffected. The Department further advised that the repeal of the EDA does not prohibit the Bureau from compiling and maintaining an administrative index to assist in making readily retrievable and available the results of our investigations into subversive activities and related matters.

Therefore, we propose setting up an administrative index which we will refer to as the ADEX. It will contain four categories which represent the degree of dangerousness a subject represents toward the internal security of the country.

A careful analysis has been made of various categories of security cases handled in the Domestic Intelligence Division, particularly those which were included in the Emergency Detention Program (EDP). Criteria for inclusion in the Security Index (SI) were based on the possibility of individuals being arrested and detained under the EDP. The Department, which concurred in these criteria, constantly reviewed the cases included in the SI and frequently removed individuals who in the strictest legal interpretation should not be considered for arrest and detention.

The Department has informed it will no longer engage in review of such cases. The Bureau, therefore, is now in a position to make a sole determination as to which individuals should be included in an index of subversive individuals. We can now make such determination based not on arrest and detention but rather on overall potential for committing acts inimical to the national defense interest.

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Our study leads us to believe that the old SI, broken down into Priorities I, II, and III in line with a theoretical concept of arresting the most dangerous subversives first, should be restructured. Instead of listing individuals in priority of arrest, we feel that the list should be set up to signify the overall threat or potential threat to the national security. Thus, instead of Priority I, we propose Category I which will list those whom the Bureau should keep under constant investigation due to their proclivity for violence and danger to the Nation. Instead of Priority II we would have Category II listing those whom we should check on at least twice a year. Category III would be those whom we check on at least once each year and Category IV would be those whose residence and employment should be verified at least annually.

It is believed, for example, that in old Priority I too much emphasis was placed on leadership capacity and organizational affiliation. The new Category I will consist not only of those in leadership capacity and organizational affiliation but any individual who has demonstrated through acts or statements that he represents a constant danger to the national security and therefore should be under constant investigation. For this reason, the new Category I will list more individuals than the old Priority I.

Likewise Category II, which will require a minimum of semiannual verification of employment and residence addresses, will also list individuals not in a leadership capacity who have adequately demonstrated they are actively participating in furthering aims and purposes of revolutionary or black extremist movements with which they are affiliated. This Category will also include unaffiliated revolutionaries who have shown a tendency for committing acts of revolutionary violence against property as opposed to persons. Thus Category II will list considerably more individuals than the old Priority II.

Category III retains much of the criteria as in old Priority III and in addition will contain those individuals without organizational affiliations who have exhibited a revolutionary ideology and during a national emergency are likely to commit acts of espionage and sabotage and interfere with the operation of national, state, or local Governments and of the defense efforts.

DETAILS CONTINUED OVER



Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Category IV will add those individuals who do not meet the criteria of Categories I, II, and III but who are in a position to influence others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense or are likely to furnish financial aid or other assistance to revolutionary elements because of their sympathy, associates, or ideology.

Category IV is not comparable to any existing component of the old Security Index, although it will be made up largely from individuals who were formerly on the Security Index. They were removed due to lack of active participation in subversive activity but who were nevertheless influential in espousing their respective philosophies. Examples might be teachers, writers, lawyers, etc. Such individuals have in the past been carried in a Reserve Index which has been maintained only in the field. No verification of addresses or active investigation has been carried on by the field concerning such individuals.

It is our belief that the criteria for including individuals in the old Security Index and for conducting investigation in the field has been membership in or affiliation with old line revolutionary organizations. However, the Nation is now confronted with a new breed of subversive individual. He may adhere to the old-line revolutionary concepts but he is unaffiliated with any organization. He may belong to or follow one New Left-type group today and another tomorrow. He may simply belong to the loosely knit group of revolutionaries who have no particular political philosophy but who continuously plot the overthrow of our Government. He is the nihilist who seeks only to destroy America.

On the other hand, he may be one of the revolutionary black extremists who, while perhaps influenced by groups such as the Black Panther Party, is also unaffiliated either permanently or temporarily with any black organization but with a seething hatred of the white establishment will assassinate, explode, or otherwise destroy white America.

We strongly feel that our investigative thrust must be directed at such individuals regardless of leadership capacity or organizational affiliation. We also strongly feel that there are perhaps thousands of individuals such as those we propose to include in the new Category IV of the ADEX who are in a position to both influence and furnish financial and other aid to bomb-throwing potential assassins which are included in the other three categories.

4  
DETAILS CONTINUED OVER



Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Based on our best analytical efforts, we believe that adoption of the four-category administrative index as described above will result in an increased case load in the field. It is believed that the total number of our overall security cases in office of origin and auxiliary offices will increase by more than 23,000 cases during the coming year. These cases will involve between 17,000 and 18,000 individuals, virtually all of whom are either now being investigated or who have been investigated in the past. It is also pointed out most of the increased case load will involve a moderate amount of investigative activity by our Agents and will not be an investigative burden on the field as may be implied by the estimated increase in case load.

We believe that the increased case load can readily be handled by utilizing currently available manpower since all we are doing in the cases falling within the estimated increases is verifying residences and employments. All time-consuming background investigation has previously been completed in these cases.

Our standards for inclusion in the ADEX will allow us much greater leeway as to the individuals to be included. The standards are tailored to fit our own needs and Bureau Headquarters will make the final decision as to those to be included.

Change from the old Security Index to the new administrative index will require some changes in automatic data processing procedures since an additional category is being added. It is believed, however, that changes will be minimal.

8  
Airtel

11/15/71

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 6/12/00 BY SP2 ACM/RW

ReBuairtel 10/8/71.

The Department has advised that the authority of the Bureau to investigate violations of the espionage, sabotage, Smith Act, Atomic Energy Act and related statutes, as well as subversive activities and related matters in accordance with Bureau statutory responsibilities and Presidential Directives, remains unaffected by the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act. The Department further advised that the repeal of the Act does not prohibit Bureau use of an administrative index compiled and maintained to assist in making readily retrievable and available the results of Bureau investigations into subversive activities and related matters.

In connection with the security investigations of individuals, the Bureau is initiating for control purposes an administrative index which will be referred to as the ADBX and will consist of four categories.

Each person who is the subject of a security investigation should be considered for one of the four categories. The criteria for inclusion in the categories are as follows:

Category I:

(1) All national leaders of revolutionary organizations whose aims and purposes include the overthrow and destruction of the Government by force and violence or other unconstitutional means, and individuals affiliated therewith who have demonstrated

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Airtel to SAC, Albany  
RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

propensity for violence against the person rather than property or have received special training in sabotage, espionage, or guerrilla warfare or have engaged in underground-type operations.

(2) Revolutionaries, though unaffiliated with any specific organization, who have demonstrated by acts or statements a propensity for violence, including acts of terrorism, assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state, and local Governments and of the defense efforts.

(3) National leaders of black extremist separatist organizations.

(4) Any individual who qualifies for the ADEX should be included in Category I if he is employed in or has access to a key facility.

Category II:

(1) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and black extremist separatist organizations. Secondary leadership would comprise, for example, regional, state, and local leaders who are involved in policy making in fulfilling anti-U. S. objectives of their respective revolutionary organizations and whose activities do not justify their inclusion in Category I.

(2) Active participants in furthering the aims and purposes of the revolutionary or black extremist separatist organization with which affiliated.

(3) Other unaffiliated revolutionaries who have demonstrated by acts or statements a propensity for violence against property rather than persons.

Category III:

(1) Rank-and-file membership in, or participation in activities of, revolutionary organizations within the last five years as evidenced by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(2) Leadership or activist position in affiliated fronts of revolutionary organizations within the last three years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

Airtel to SAC, Albany  
RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

(3) An individual who, although not a member of or participant in activities of revolutionary organizations or considered an activist in affiliated fronts, has exhibited a revolutionary ideology and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by national emergency to commit acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state, and local Governments and of the defense efforts.

Category IV:

(1) Individuals whose activities do not meet criteria of Categories I, II, or III but who are in a position to influence others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense or are likely to furnish financial aid or other assistance to revolutionary elements because of their sympathy, associations, or ideology.

Reporting Schedule

The following is a schedule which will be followed in preparation and submission of reports and letterhead memoranda (LHM) and in verifications of residence and employment addresses of subjects included in the four enumerated Categories of the ADEX:

Category I:

Reports or LHM - semiannually  
Verifications - every 90 days

Category II:

Reports or LHM - annually  
Verifications - every six months

Category III:

Reports or LHM - annually  
Verifications - annually

Category IV:

Reports or LHM - every two years  
Verifications - annually

Airtel to SAC, Albany  
RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Initial reports must be investigative summaries. Naturally, when investigative summaries have been submitted under the old Security Index, none is required now. Likewise, if a report or LHM has been submitted in accordance with Security Index requirements during the periods scheduled above, additional reports or LHM are not required at this time. LHM will be permissible when the information to be reported is brief and will consist of no more than five pages. LHM should include appropriate main and subheadings. In connection with Categories III and IV only, if there is no additional information to report since the last previous submission, FD-400 should be submitted in lieu of LHM.

Those individuals included in the former Security Index should be continued in the ADEX. Within the next thirty days those individuals in Priority II should be reviewed and where appropriate recommended for reallocation to Category I. Immediately thereafter, review the cases of all individuals in former Priority III to determine if they should be recommended for reallocation to Category I or II.

The Reserve Index is being discontinued. Following the review of individuals in the former Priorities II and III, you should review the cases of those individuals in both Sections A and B of the Reserve Index. Where appropriate, they should be recommended for inclusion in the ADEX.

It is imperative that the foregoing reviews be completed as soon as possible. Within thirty days of receipt of this letter and each thirty days thereafter until your review is completed, advise the Bureau relative to your progress in this matter. It is realized that by moving subjects into Categories I and II and from the Reserve Index to the appropriate Category of the ADEX your case load in the security field will be increased considerably. You will be expected to reallocate manpower to accomplish this review as soon as possible and to carry out the schedule for submitting reports and verifying residence and employment addresses as outlined in this communication.

Forms which were used in connection with the former Security Index should be altered for use in the ADEX until such time as you are provided new forms.

Promptly initiate recommendations relative to the ADEX and continue to submit Form FD-366 as attachment to Form FD-122.

Manual changes will follow.



Mr. E. S. Miller

1/18/72

Mr. G. C. Moore

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP8ALM/R

This is to recommend revisions to the current criteria for inclusion of individuals' names in the Administrative Index (ADEX) to cover national, regional, state and local leaders of Klan, white-hate and other white groups engaged in terroristic activities.

Following repeal of the Emergency Detention Act, the Security Index was discontinued. For control purposes, an Administrative Index, referred to as ADEX, was established with criteria for inclusion of names therein being furnished the field by airtel dated 11/15/71. These criteria are oriented toward individuals affiliated with revolutionary organizations whose aims and purposes include the overthrow of the Government through force or violence or other unconstitutional means and are not directed toward individuals affiliated with the Klan and other white-hate groups.

Questions have arisen regarding the inclusion in the ADEX of extremists affiliated with Klan and similar type organizations and the proposed revisions will permit the field to consider such individuals for the ADEX provided they otherwise meet the requirements for such. The revisions proposed will not broaden our current investigative activity in this field but will make readily retrievable and available the results of investigations in this area.

ACTION: If you agree, there is attached a proposed airtel to all offices. Manual changes being prepared.

Enclosure

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Airtel

1/20/72

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10-12-00 BY SRJA/ML

ReBuairtel 11/15/71 setting forth the criteria for inclusion of individuals' names on the Administrative Index (INDEX).

Revisions are being made in these criteria as indicated below to permit consideration for inclusion in the INDEX of national, regional, state and local leaders of Klan-type, white-hate and other groups engaged in terroristic activities such as the Jewish Defense League.

Category I:

(3) National leaders of extremist organizations.

Category II:

(1) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and extremist organizations. Secondary leadership would comprise, for example, regional, state and local leaders who are involved in policy making in fulfilling anti-U. S. objectives of their respective revolutionary organizations and whose activities do not justify their inclusion in Category I.

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Airtel to SAC, Albany

Re: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

(2) Active participants in furthering the aims and purposes of the revolutionary or extremist organizations with which affiliated.

(3) Other unaffiliated revolutionaries or extremists who have demonstrated by acts or statements a propensity for violence against property rather than persons.

Category IV:

(1) Individuals whose activities do not meet criteria of Categories I, II, or III but who are in a position to influence others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense or are likely to furnish financial aid or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements because of their sympathy, associations, or ideology.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 2/9/72

FROM : T. J. Smith

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2A/M/PI

Following the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act (EDA) the Security Index (SI) was discontinued and the Department was asked whether repeal of the EDA limits our authority to conduct security investigations or maintain an administrative index of security subjects. The Department advised that our investigative authority remains unaffected and, further, that we are not prohibited from maintaining an administrative index of security subjects. The Department advised that it does not desire a copy of any list we may compile relative to subjects maintained in an administrative index. It did ask, however, that we furnish the Internal Security Division on a monthly basis the identities of Government employees who have demonstrated a propensity to commit acts inimical to our national security. Such a list was provided by automatic data processing under the old SI and will be continued under the new administrative index.

By T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller memorandum 11/11/71, same caption, it was approved that an administrative index (ADEX) be initiated for control purposes relative to the security investigations of individuals and it sets out the criteria for the inclusion of an individual in the ADEX. Instructions relative thereto were furnished to the field by airtel dated 11/15/71.

Memorandum referred to above indicated that a copy of our airtel to the field implementing ADEX and containing general instructions relating thereto would be furnished to the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General and Internal Security Division of the Department for completion of their records.

We have now observed the successful operation of the ADEX for about 2 1/2 months and have had cause to expand slightly the criteria for inclusion of individuals in the ADEX. By airtel 1/20/72 the field was instructed to consider for inclusion in the ADEX national, regional, state and local leaders of Klan-type, white-hate and other groups engaged in terrorist activities, such

Enclosure

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Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
Re: Security Investigations of Individuals

as the Jewish Defense League. This was accomplished, for example, by broadening the criteria for inclusion in ADEX by changing the term "leaders of black extremist separatist organizations" to "leaders of extremist organizations." By omitting the word "black," Klan-type and other extremist groups would then be covered.

It is, therefore, believed that the above-mentioned instructions relating to ADEX should now be given to the Department as previously approved. However, since our airtels to the field contain a great deal of administrative data and have been slightly modified as indicated in preceding paragraph, it is believed we should set forth the pertinent instructions which would be of interest to the Department in a letter. A letter for this purpose is attached.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That attached letter to the Attorney General with copies for the Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, be approved.

(2) That monthly we furnish the Internal Security Division by routing slip automatic data processing printout of the identities of Government employees who have demonstrated a propensity to commit acts inimical to our national security.

~~SECRET~~

February 10, 1972

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ELW  
ON 10-16-00

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Reference is made to your letter dated October 22, 1971, which was entitled "Emergency Detention Program."

For the completion of your records the following instructions are now outstanding with our field offices relative to the security investigations of individuals.

"The Department has advised that the authority of the Bureau to investigate violations of the espionage, sabotage, Smith Act, Atomic Energy Act and related statutes, as well as subversive activities and related matters in accordance with Bureau statutory responsibilities and Presidential Directives, remains unaffected by the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act. The Department further advised that the repeal of the Act does not prohibit Bureau use of an administrative index compiled and maintained to assist in making readily retrievable and available the results of Bureau investigations into subversive activities and related matters.

"In connection with the security investigations of individuals, the Bureau is initiating for control purposes an administrative index which will be referred to as the ADEX and will consist of four categories.

"Each person who is the subject of a security investigation should be considered for one of the four categories. The criteria for inclusion in the categories are as follows:

"Category I:

"(1) All national leaders of revolutionary organizations whose aims and purposes include the overthrow and destruction of the Government by force and violence or other unconstitutional means, and individuals affiliated therewith who have demonstrated propensity for violence against the person rather than property or have received special training in sabotage, espionage, or guerrilla warfare or have engaged in underground-type operations.

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~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

"(2) Revolutionaries, though unaffiliated with any specific organization, who have demonstrated by acts or statements a propensity for violence, including acts of terrorism, assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state, and local Governments and of the defense efforts.

"(3) National leaders of extremist organizations.

"(4) Any individual who qualifies for the ADEX should be included in Category I if he is employed in or has access to a key facility.

"Category II:

"(1) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and extremist organizations. Secondary leadership would comprise, for example, regional, state and local leaders who are involved in policy making in fulfilling anti-U. S. objectives of their respective revolutionary organizations and whose activities do not justify their inclusion in Category I.

"(2) Active participants in furthering the aims and purposes of the revolutionary or extremist organizations with which affiliated.

"(3) Other unaffiliated revolutionaries or extremists who have demonstrated by acts or statements a propensity for violence against property rather than persons.

"Category III:

"(1) Rank-and-file membership in, or participation in activities of, revolutionary organizations within the last five years as evidenced by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

"(2) Leadership or activist position in affiliated fronts of revolutionary organizations within the last three years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

"(3) An individual who, although not a member of or participant in activities of revolutionary organizations or considered an activist in affiliated fronts, has exhibited a revolutionary ideology and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by national emergency to commit acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state, and local Governments and of the defense efforts.

"Category IV:

"(1) Individuals whose activities do not meet criteria of Categories I, II, or III but who are in a position to influence others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense or are likely to furnish financial aid or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements because of their sympathy, associations, or ideology."

As you requested, this Bureau will not furnish the Department a list of such individuals but will on a monthly basis furnish the Internal Security Division a list of Government employees who have demonstrated a propensity to commit acts inimical to our national security.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 8/29/72

FROM : T. J. Smith

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE INDEX  
STREAMLINING MEASURES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SPALY/RW

T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller memorandum dated 8/11/72, captioned "Fiscal Year 1974 Budget Policy Guidance," referred to the fact that we have been conducting a seven-month's analysis of the Bureau's Administrative Index (ADEX), and that it appears that by implementing certain streamlining measures and altering requirements for reporting and periodic verification of information, some manpower might be available for reassignment to one of the other critical areas of our work. In this connection the same memorandum pointed out that the Domestic Intelligence Division has an urgent need for in excess of 500 Special Agents to handle several areas of national security work which are not receiving attention deserved.

## BACKGROUND

By way of background, the ADEX is an outgrowth of the old Security Index program which in itself was an integral part of the Emergency Detention Program. The Emergency Detention Program in latter years derived its authority from Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (better known as the Emergency Detention Act). In the Fall of 1971 the Emergency Detention Act was repealed by Congress and we, of course, immediately discontinued the Emergency Detention Program. Since the Security Index was in actuality an extension of an integral part of the Emergency Detention Program, it was believed that the Security Index as it was structured should also be discontinued.

From an administrative standpoint, however, it was believed that the Bureau should be able to immediately identify individuals who constitute a threat to the national security, particularly during time of national emergency. The Security Index enabled us to retrieve information pinpointing such individuals. Representatives of the Department, during a meeting following repeal of the Emergency Detention Act, pointed out that even though Congress has now prohibited a program for emergency apprehension and detention, circumstances might someday be such

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Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
Re: Administrative Index  
Streamlining Measures

that the Government might have to defend itself from attack and that it would be necessary at such time to quickly identify persons who were a threat to the national security so that investigation could be intensified and if necessary the President could go to a joint session of Congress and ask for emergency legislation permitting apprehension and detention of persons who threaten existence of the Government.

The Department advised after consultation that the FBI's authority to investigate individuals engaged in subversive activity had not been eroded by repeal of the Emergency Detention Act, and that further repeal of this Act did not in any way prohibit the FBI from maintaining an administrative index of individuals who were under investigation for subversive activity. Accordingly, we devised the Administrative Index for the purpose of being able to quickly identify persons representing a threat to the national security. Since we already had the identities of such persons contained in the Security Index, we used the Security Index as a basis for setting up the Administrative Index. The major difference, of course, was that whereas persons listed in Security Index had been listed with a view of possible apprehension and detention, the persons being listed in ADEX would not be subject to detention, but would be listed for ready identification purposes.

Since persons listed in ADEX would not be subject to apprehension and detention, the requirement for Departmental concurrence in listing no longer existed. Also, since the detention factor was no longer a major issue, persons could be listed irrespective of degree of threat they may represent to the national security.

Criteria for listing in ADEX were broken down into four categories. Each category, beginning with Category I, contained a listing of persons and Category I listed those considered most dangerous to the national security, while Category IV listed those least dangerous. As of July 15, 1972, there were 15,259 individuals listed in ADEX. Of this total 1,334 were Category I; 3,452 were Category II; 8,560 were Category III; and 1,913 were Category IV.

2 CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
Re: Administrative Index  
Streamlining Measures

#### ASSESSMENT OF ADEX

ADEX has now been in operation about 8 months and we have had a chance to evaluate its operation and effectiveness. Based on discussions with field personnel as well as our own observations, we believe that several major changes should be made at this time.

(1) While ADEX has not been intended as an investigative program, it is somewhat of an extension of Security Index which was an integral part of an investigative program, and there are vestiges of the investigative program apparent in our operation of ADEX. ADEX must be clearly separated from investigative criteria and policy so that it represents a mere by-product or administrative supplement to our investigations and not as a guideline or controlling factor in the investigation itself. The very nature of the criteria for inclusion of individuals in ADEX are such to generate investigative activity which may not be necessary were it not for ADEX. Reporting procedures for a great bulk of our security cases are based on the category of ADEX or the fact that the subject is listed in ADEX. A great deal of investigative activity is created because of the requirement of periodic verification of residence and employment addresses. In other words, existence of ADEX creates investigative and reporting activity which might not be necessary otherwise.

(2) It is believed that ADEX is needlessly complex, particularly from the standpoint of criteria for inclusion of an individual in the ADEX, and is administratively cumbersome.

(3) Most important, it is believed that in light of the conditions existing today, particularly with respect to emphasis on invasion of privacy and other First and Fourth Amendment rights, the current criteria for designating individuals for ADEX are too broad and all-encompassing. As a result, there are some individuals now included in ADEX even though they do not realistically pose a threat to the national security. For example, present ADEX guidelines cover individuals who are not members of subversive or revolutionary groups but who have "exhibited a revolutionary ideology" and are likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to commit acts of espionage," etc. No time factor is included and, as can be seen, the language is subject to considerable interpretation. It is

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
Re: Administrative Index  
Streamlining Measures

believed that such broad terminology would leave us in a vulnerable position if our guidelines were to be scrutinized by interested Congressional committees, which has been threatened.

#### PROPOSED NEW ADEX CRITERIA

✓ If for no other reason but practicality, it is believed that ADEX should be a list of individuals who realistically represent an immediate threat to the national security, as opposed to individuals who might theoretically pose a threat in the future under a given set of circumstances. We recognize that anyone who has embraced a philosophy that includes an overthrow of the American form of government is a potential enemy of the Government. However, in many such instances, an individual may believe in some other form of government but would be unwilling to engage in activity more violent than philosophical discussions.

On the other side of the coin is an individual who not only embraces the philosophy of overthrow of the Government, but is actually engaged in some form of activity designed to bring about that overthrow by force or violence or other unconstitutional means. It is this latter individual who would seize upon any type of national emergency to exploit a weakness in Governmental functions in an effort to wrest control, or who would commit violent acts such as bombings of public buildings which are symbolic of our national institutions; ambush killings of police officers who are the visible symbol of our democratic system; attack water supplies, power systems, or transportation facilities in an effort to create a chaotic void into which a revolutionary force might be able to supplant the Government. This is the type of individual who should be listed in the ADEX.

It is therefore proposed that the existing ADEX with four categories representing an unrealistic concept of individuals constituting a threat to the national security be revised so that it will include only one category. This would be a list of individuals who represent an actual danger now to the national security. It is believed that such a list would embrace most of the individuals currently listed in Categories I and II of ADEX, or a total as of 7/15/72 of 4,786 individuals.



Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
Re: Administrative Index  
Streamlining Measures

To do this the criteria would be changed to read as follows:

"ADEX should be limited to those individuals whose actions or statements have clearly established that they represent a current threat to the national security.

"Included are individuals, whether affiliated with organized groups or not, who have shown a willingness and capability for engaging in treason, rebellion or insurrection, seditious conspiracy, sabotage, espionage, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, assassination of Government officials or leaders, or other such acts which would result in interference with or a threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state, or local government.

"The foregoing would include leaders of organizations whose aims include the overthrow or destruction of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by unlawful means. Individuals affiliated with such organizations who have demonstrated a willingness and capability of activity set forth under criteria set forth above would be included, but mere membership in such organization is not sufficient to justify inclusion in ADEX.

"Individuals should be considered a 'current threat' to the national security when reliable information has been developed that they have engaged in activity falling within the above-described criteria during the past two years and there is no indication that they have given up or ceased to engage in such activity."

Adoption of these new criteria will probably result in deletion from ADEX of numerous individuals who are connected with subversive organizations. For example, there were 4501 Communists in Categories III and IV of ADEX as of 7/15/72. Additionally there are members of Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor Party, etc. who will not meet the revised criteria of being dangerous now. It is believed that the Bureau should maintain a list of such individuals aside from ADEX in the event we had to quickly identify known subversives throughout the country. We will therefore submit a separate proposal to establish a "Communist Index" which will require a modicum of effort on the part of the field and Bureau Headquarters.



Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
Re: Administrative Index  
Streamlining Measures

Such a list would also be advantageous in quickly identifying extremists, who though not posing a threat to the national security, do seek to deny constitutional rights of others, or are white or black chauvinists or nationalists who thrive on race hatreds and ethnic discord. We will also propose that a counterpart to the "Communist Index" be established to be known as the "Extremist Index." Neither of these indexes will constitute a program but will merely be a listing which will be computerized for ready retrieval at any time we need to quickly identify persons of this type who were involved in activity inimical to the national interest. Details concerning these indexes will be included in the separate proposal.

#### MANPOWER SAVINGS

It is difficult if not impossible to estimate a manpower savings as result of redefining ADEX and streamlining its operation. However, based on the premise that the revised ADEX would contain primarily what is now Categories I & II, this would mean that about 10,473 individuals would be dropped. If these remained on ADEX, this many cases would be opened during a twelve-month period due to necessity to verify employment and residence addresses and to report any pertinent data developed to date. These cases would be in a closed status in the field and would be reopened on a regular staggered basis.

A canvass of ten field offices including New York, Newark, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago and Philadelphia resulted in an estimate that roughly 89% of the above-described total of 10,473 cases would be affected. These offices could not give any realistic estimate of manpower involved. However, using purely a caseload average of 40 cases per Agent as a guide; using the 89% estimate of the offices canvassed, there would be 9,311 cases opened over a 12-month period or about 776 cases per month. When revision of ADEX has been approved and the new criteria have been furnished to the field, Domestic Intelligence Division will canvass each Special Agent in Charge to determine specifically, on the basis of the revised criteria, the manpower savings which can be directed to higher priority security work. The Inspection Division, of course, will be in the best position to evaluate the impact of the revisions in their field audits of ADEX.

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
Re: Administrative Index  
Streamlining Measures

It is important to note that there will be no immediate manpower savings realized since it is anticipated that necessary review of ADEX cases will not be completed for at least 12 months. To avoid creating a sudden increase in workload in the field, instructions are being issued to review existing ADEX cases as they would normally come up on tickler during the next 12 months under the old ADEX rules. In this manner all cases now listed in ADEX can be reviewed without creating an undue burden on the field. We will know on a month-to-month basis at Headquarters from computer print-outs as to progress being made.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Attached for approval are detailed instructions in memorandum for all Special Agents in Charge. Revisions will be made in Manual of Instructions and submitted separately.

(2) If proposed revision is approved, investigative and reporting requirements now interconnected with ADEX or dependent on the existence of ADEX criteria will be revised.

(3) If proposed revision of ADEX is approved, we will furnish details to the Attorney General who has been kept informed regarding our ADEX.

ADDENDUM:

INSPECTOR J. H. TRIMBACH:bhg, 8/30/72

During the inspection, the ADEX Program was thoroughly studied and Inspector concurs in this revision and in the recommendation of the Assistant Director.

The Attorney General

September 18, 1972

Acting Director, FBI

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/R

Reference is made to letter from this Bureau dated February 10, 1972, with same caption. The referenced letter set forth for your information the instructions issued to our field offices regarding an administrative index known as ADEX, which was initiated for control purposes in connection with the security investigations of individuals. Your letter of October 22, 1971, entitled "Emergency Detention Program," had indicated that the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act did not prohibit this Bureau's use of an administrative index compiled and maintained to assist in making readily retrievable and available the results of Bureau investigations into subversive activities and related matters.

An evaluation has been made of ADEX after more than eight months of operation. Revisions have been made in the ADEX and the following instructions have been furnished to our field offices concerning the criteria to be utilized in connection with the ADEX.

"ADEX has represented a listing of individuals engaged in subversive activity who are considered a potential or actual threat to the national security. As now constituted, it is divided into four categories corresponding to varying degrees of dangerousness. The current ADEX criteria are broadly worded and allow the inclusion of individuals who, although they subscribe to subversive or revolutionary doctrines, do not necessarily represent a danger to the national security at this time.

"After a careful assessment of this matter, it is believed that ADEX criteria should be amended to provide for the inclusion only of individuals who pose a realistic, direct, and current danger to the national security. In other words, it is believed ADEX should list only persons who are regarded as dangerous now.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

The Attorney General

"In reviewing existing criteria, it is believed that essentially those individuals who are presently in Categories I and II would meet the test of being dangerous now, but that most, if not all, of those in Categories III and IV would not. It is further believed that ADEX should not be broken into separate categories, but should be a single, selective listing. It is also felt that ADEX should be strictly a by-product of our investigative activity and not in and of itself generate any investigation or govern reporting procedures.

"Accordingly, the following revisions with respect to ADEX are being placed in effect immediately:

"Revised Criteria

"Only the following individuals should be included in ADEX:

"Individuals, whether affiliated with organized groups or not, who have shown a willingness and capability of engaging in treason, rebellion or insurrection, seditious conspiracy, sabotage, espionage, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, assassination of Government officials or leaders, or other such acts which would result in interference with or a threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state or local government.

"This would include leaders of organizations whose aims include the overthrow or destruction of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by unlawful means. Mere membership in such organizations is not sufficient in itself to warrant inclusion in ADEX.

"The term 'leaders' denotes those individuals, irrespective of title, who are in a position to significantly influence the policies or direct the activities of the group.

"Individuals should be considered 'dangerous now' to the national security when reliable information has been received that they have engaged in activity falling within the above-described criteria during the past two years and there is no indication they have given up or ceased to engage in such activity.

## The Attorney General

"There may be some instances where retention of an individual in ADEX is justified even though no specific information is available during the prior two years. For example, such retention would be warranted in the case of individuals who have gone into hiding, left the country, have been imprisoned, or similar circumstances and there is no reliable information available indicating that they have renounced activities covered in the above criteria.

### "Determination of Eligibility for ADEX Inclusion

"The Bureau recognizes that anyone who has embraced a philosophy that includes advocacy of the overthrow of our form of government is a potential enemy. However, in many instances an individual may believe in some other form of government or even in the overthrow of our form of government, but without a willingness or capability of engaging in activity other than a philosophical discussion or debate. Such persons subscribe to an alien philosophy, but their activities have not gone beyond an ideological stage. This would include attendance at meetings, taking part in theoretical discussions or other activity which stops short of advocating or engaging in action to overthrow the United States.

"Examples might be members of the Communist Party, USA, or the Socialist Workers Party, or other old-line revolutionary groups which basically advocate an overthrow of our present form of government, but where the subject's activity has been ideological in nature and not oriented towards action. In this connection, however, each case must be reviewed on its individual merits, since the willingness and capability of individuals to engage in action dangerous to the national security is the primary factor in making a determination for the inclusion in ADEX.

"Under normal circumstances members of such hate groups as the Ku Klux Klan would not meet the criteria for inclusion in ADEX. There could be exceptions, however, and each case must be examined individually to determine if it meets the new criteria. These criteria can apply to persons involved with extreme right as well as extreme left organizations, or to individuals who have no affiliation with organized groups but who are anarchists and are engaged in attempts to destroy the United States.



The Attorney General

"The test is whether an individual has shown a willingness and intent coupled with a capability to engage in activity covered in the ADEX criteria and represents a current danger to the national security."

As you requested in your October 22, 1971, letter, this Bureau will not furnish the Department a list of individuals in the ADEX but will, on a monthly basis, continue to furnish the Internal Security Division a list of Government employees who pose a realistic, direct, and current danger to the national security.

- 1 - The Deputy Attorney General
- 1 - Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 6/11/73

FROM : T. J. Smith

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY ACTION  
DOCUMENT NO. FIVE (PEAD 5)

MDR-16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2ALM/R

The following is set forth to answer the inquiry of the Acting Director concerning the attached memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen dated 6/6/73, captioned "Presidential Emergency Action Document No. 5 (PEAD 5)," and classified "Secret."

PEAD 5, classified "Secret," provides for the apprehension and detention and disposition (including deportation) of enemy aliens during periods of national emergency. PEAD 5 is based on Title 50, U.S.C., Section 21, under which the President is empowered to issue a Presidential proclamation that war has been declared or a hostile invasion or predatory incursion is to be attempted, or is threatened against U.S. territories. Following such proclamation, the Attorney General would be authorized by that statute to set into motion measures necessary to effect control of enemy aliens.

The incoming from Mr. Petersen requests that the FBI discontinue furnishing information previously requested by the Department in (1) memorandum dated 6/21/72, regarding PEAD 5 and (2) memorandum dated 10/26/71 regarding the Emergency Detention Program.

The 6/21/72 memorandum requested that the FBI furnish on a regular basis a listing of aliens to be considered by the Department for apprehension and detention when deemed dangerous to the public peace and safety of the United States in conjunction with PEAD 5. The aliens identified to the Department on a monthly basis are those in our Administrative Index of individuals whose activities constitute a possible danger to the national security.

The 10/26/71 memorandum requested the FBI to furnish a monthly memorandum reflecting the identities of Government employees who by significant acts or membership in subversive organizations have demonstrated a propensity to commit acts inimical to national security. Identities of Government employees on our Administrative Index have been furnished to the Department monthly as requested.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is not to be disclosed to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
Re: Presidential Emergency Action  
Document No. Five

The caption of the 10/26/71 memorandum "Emergency Detention Program" refers to planning for the apprehension and detention of individuals, both aliens and citizens, who might engage in espionage or sabotage during times of national emergency. That planning, which included a listing of potentially dangerous individuals, had been authorized under the Emergency Detention Act (Title II) of the Internal Security Act of 1950, but was discontinued with the repeal in September, 1971, of the Emergency Detention Act. Thus, no plans exist currently for the apprehension and detention of citizens considered to be dangerous in the event of national emergency, but, as noted above, enemy aliens would be subject to restrictive measures under PEAD 5.

We will discontinue submission of the above-mentioned two lists to the Department. Response to incoming not believed necessary since the Department will readily note our discontinuance of submission of lists. If either or both lists are requested again by the Department at any time in the future, they can be compiled immediately from information maintained in our Administrative Index.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

The Attorney General

February 29, 1952

Director, FBI

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY  
DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND  
PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP2ACM/R

In my memorandum to Mr. [REDACTED] dated May 24, 1951, I pointed out that in view of the tremendous responsibility of both the Department and the Bureau with respect to the Emergency Detention Program it would be appreciated if he would cause the review of all Security Index cases to be completed as soon as possible and would advise in each separate case whether he approved or disapproved the listing of the subject thereof in our Security Index. In addition, I also requested advice as to whether the names of prominent and nationally known individuals specifically identified in our Security Index list furnished to the Department each month should be retained in our Security Index.

In addition to conferences with representatives of the Department relating to our Security Index and Security Index standards, by memorandum to Mr. [REDACTED] dated October 24, 1951, and memoranda to Mr. [REDACTED] dated October 15, 1951, and January 16, 1952, I urged that the review of all Security Index cases be completed by the Department at the earliest possible date in order that there will be Department approval of all persons listed for apprehension in an emergency, including the group of nationally known individuals mentioned above.

To date no advice has been received as to whether the Department approves or disapproves the listing of any name on our Security Index list.

In view of the fact that I have not received advice from the Department as to whether any of the prominent and nationally known individuals included on our Security Index list should be continued on that list; I am at this time removing their names from the list until such time as this Bureau receives specific instructions from the Department in each case as to whether the name should or should not be included in our Security Index.

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In view of the importance of this matter, I desire to stress that it is imperative a decision be made and I be advised whether these nationally known individuals should be included in our Security Index. I again request an early reply in each case as the review is completed and the decision is made.

The names of the following prominent and nationally known individuals were included in the Security Index list furnished to the Department on February 5, 1952:

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: March 19, 1952

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2AUM/RW

In accordance with the recommendation in memorandum dated March 14, 1952, Mr. [REDACTED], Supervisor [REDACTED] and I met with Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED], of the Department, today to discuss the proposed Security Index standards drawn up by the Department.

Mr. [REDACTED] was advised that we have not attempted to break down the proposed Departmental standards to see whether they would completely cover all individuals on the Security Index at this time; nor have we attempted to compare these standards, point by point, with the standards which have been used by the Bureau in placing individuals on the Index. He was advised that it is apparent that the Department is attempting to so interpret the provisions of the McCarran Act through the drawing up of these proposed standards that all individuals on the Security Index are brought within the provisions of the McCarran Act. He was advised that from the Bureau's standpoint it would appear that the Department is hedging on its previous stand that apprehensions would be made under the Emergency Detention Program, rather than the McCarran Act and any attempt to bring the Emergency Detention Program, as set up by the Department, within the provisions of the McCarran Act would require extremely broad interpretation of the Act. He was advised that our position is that we must be ready from an operative standpoint to implement the apprehension program under clear authority from the Attorney General and there can be no question of doubt as to whether we are operating under standards specifically authorized by the Attorney General. It was pointed out that the broad interpretation by the Department of the provisions of the McCarran Act may not stand up in the event the apprehension program is launched under the McCarran Act and that the Department's interpretation of the Act is a matter of opinion and not of fact.

Mr. [REDACTED] advised that both Senator [REDACTED] and Senator [REDACTED] had sent letters to the Department "filled with cyanide" pointing out that considerable advance action should be

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

taken under the detention provisions of the McCarran Act and inquiring whether the Department had taken such action. In reply the Department has advised the Senators that all necessary action has been taken with the exception of appointing the members of the hearing boards. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the Department's problem is to be in a position to show compliance in so far as possible with the McCarran Act and in keeping with that the Department has attempted to draft a broad set of standards for the use of the attorneys reviewing the Security Index cases, which standards are based on the McCarran Act. He advised that Mr. [REDACTED] had instructed that this be done.

Mr. [REDACTED] stated that it did not matter whether the Bureau applied one set of standards and the Department another, provided the principle was the same. It was immediately pointed out to him that any action taken by the Bureau in connection with this program requires clear authority from the Attorney General and that the Bureau will not place any phase of the program into operation without the authority and backing of the Attorney General. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that this was understood.

After considerable discussion during which we again pointed out that the broad interpretation by the Department of the McCarran Act, as incorporated in the proposed Departmental standards, would probably not stand up in court or at the hearing boards, Mr. [REDACTED] was advised that the Bureau will require specific approval of the standards we have been utilizing in placing persons on the Security Index. He was advised that while it would be desirable that the reviewing Departmental attorneys use the same set of standards that we use in placing individuals on the index, this is a matter for the Department to decide; that in so far as we are concerned, what we require is specific approval from the Attorney General to use the standards which we have submitted to the Department in the past and concerning which we have repeatedly asked for specific approval.

As a result of this discussion, Mr. [REDACTED] proposes the following:

- (1) that the Department use its proposed set of standards in reviewing the Security Index cases;

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

- (2) that the Department advise the Bureau in writing that it approves the Bureau's set of standards as the basis on which the Bureau should place individuals on the Security Index;
- (3) that after the review is completed on each Security Index case by the Department, the Bureau will be advised in writing that the Department approves the inclusion of the subject in the Security Index; and,
- (4) if there is any question as to inclusion in the Security Index, the Department will take up the specific case with the Bureau.

Mr. [REDACTED] advised that the Department will draw up a proposed memorandum to the Bureau approving our standards for the placing of individuals on the Index. He will submit it to me informally to secure our views on it before it is sent to the Bureau.

[REDACTED] stated that it is the definite intent of the Department to proceed under the Emergency Detention Program, rather than the McCarran Act. He said that if an emergency occurs, the Presidential Proclamation will be issued and brought immediately before Congress for ratification. At that time, if it has not been accomplished before that time, repeal of the McCarran Act will be sought in order that the Emergency Detention Program can be instituted. At that time the unworkability of the McCarran Act will again be brought to the attention of Congress.

OBSERVATIONS:

The important thing to the Bureau is that we must be operating under the authority and directions of the Attorney General in the various steps of the Emergency Detention Program and the Security Index. We are operating under the Attorney General's direction and instructions in the whole program, as set forth in the portfolio which covers all phases of the Emergency Detention Program. The standards being used by the

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

Bureau to place persons on the Security Index are covered in this portfolio. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the Department is hedging on the question of whether it might be necessary to go under the provisions of the McCarran Act, we should have specific authority on the standards being used by us. These standards are sound. I feel very strongly that we should not mess up this program by attempting to apply hybrid standards drawn up by the Department in an attempt to bring the program within the McCarran Act, particularly as the Department's proposed standards for reviewing these cases are based on an interpretation of the Act which probably will not stand up. Our problem will be answered if the Attorney General specifically approves the standards used by us to put subjects on the Index. This puts the Bureau in the position that regardless of under what Act or provision the apprehensions are made, the Bureau is picking up only those individuals on whom the Attorney General has given his authority. Whatever program is applied, it will then be the responsibility of the Attorney General to administer it.

If you approve, we will continue to follow the Department on the principles set forth above.

## Office Memorandum - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. F. J. BAUMGARDNER

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS  
EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM

DATE: June 17, 1952

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SPALY/KW

PURPOSE:

To advise you of the status of certain matters pending at the Department in the above-captioned matter.

BACKGROUND:

Three main items in connection with the ~~Security Index standards and the Emergency Detention Program~~ are pending at the Department, namely:

1. The Department has been requested to furnish an opinion on the Security Index standards presently used by the Bureau. You will recall that two revised lists of standards have been furnished by the Department on which there has been considerable discussion.
2. The Department has been requested to review the reports for each Security Index subject and to advise us in each instance as to whether the Department approved or disapproved the listing of each name in the Security Index.
3. The Department has been requested specifically to advise the Bureau as to whether the 34 individuals formerly carried in the Prominent Individuals Sub-division of the Security Index should be included in the Security Index.

You will recall that on March 14, 1952, a conference was held with Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED], of the Department, at which time the Department's proposed Security Index standards were discussed. At the conclusion of that conference Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the Department

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would draw up a memorandum to the Bureau approving our standards for placing individuals in the Security Index and that he would submit the memorandum to you informally to secure the Bureau's views on the matter before it was sent to the Bureau.

In addition to your contacts with Mr. [REDACTED] on April 7 and April 24, 1952, when he advised that the memorandum on the standards would be forthcoming promptly, the three items mentioned above were outlined in detail by memoranda dated May 12, 1952, for possible use by the Director in contacting the Attorney General on pending unanswered matters at the Department.

DETAILS:

For your information, Mr. [REDACTED] when contacted on another matter on June 17, 1952, advised that [REDACTED] of the Department was working on the Security Index standards and had prepared a tentative draft in the matter which was on his desk. Although Mr. [REDACTED] did not set any certain date the Department's reply will be furnished the Bureau, he did state the matter was receiving attention. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that until the matter of Security Index standards is decided at the Department, the Department could not advise the Bureau as to whether it approved or disapproved the listing of any name in the Security Index or in regard to the 34 individuals formerly listed in the Prominent Individuals Subdivision of the Security Index.

ACTION:

This is for your information. We will continue to follow the Department on this matter.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: July 10, 1952

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS  
EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAMALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 6-12-10 BY SPALM/RW

While discussing other matters with Mr. [redacted] of the Department, and his assistants, Mr. [redacted], Mr. [redacted], and Mr. [redacted], on July 9, 1952, Mr. [redacted] and I brought up two questions we have been attempting to resolve with the Department for some months; namely, the approval by the Department of the standards used by us for placing persons on the Security Index, and the review of our Security Index cases by the Department.

Mr. [redacted] advised that Departmental attorneys have reviewed approximately 1,200 Security Index cases, with the result that the Department is in tentative agreement that all of these cases are warranted for inclusion in the Security Index. He said that the reviewing attorneys have set aside not more than 2% of the cases for further review and, in the event there is any question as to whether they should be retained in the Index, the Bureau will be consulted on each individual case. Mr. [redacted] was asked whether he contemplates reviewing every case in the Index. He advised that he contemplates reviewing several thousand of the cases and if the present pattern continues, reflecting agreement by the Department that the individuals should be included in the Security Index, the remainder of the cases will not be reviewed, but the Department will approve the inclusion of the remaining cases in the Index for apprehension.

We have previously requested the Department to review the reports for each Security Index subject and to advise us in each instance as to whether the Department approved or disapproved the listing of each name in the Security Index. I think we should insist on this procedure, if possible.

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Relative to the question of standards, you will recall we have been insistent that the Department approve our standards or give us a reason to the contrary. Several months ago the Department furnished us a proposed set of standards to be used by them in reviewing these cases. These standards were a patent attempt to apply the detention provisions of the McCarran Act, in spite of the fact the Department has consistently stated the McCarran Act is not workable and that the emergency detention program would be launched under the Department's program rather than the McCarran Act. We returned these standards to the Department, pointing out they were not properly drawn, in that they did not cover potentially dangerous individuals. Since that time the Department has been attempting to work out a set of standards satisfactory to them for review purposes. Because this matter dragged on and on, we insisted that the Department give us written approval for the standards under which we are operating, and we have been pushing the Department for such written approval.

In discussing this with Mr. [REDACTED] on July 9, 1952, we again asked when this written approval would be forthcoming. [REDACTED] stated he understood we have already been given written authority to apprehend anyone on the Security Index, pending the decision on these standards. This is true, as [REDACTED] gave us such authority. Nevertheless, we told Mr. [REDACTED] we must insist on the Attorney General's specific approval of the standards under which we are operating, inasmuch as we are an investigative agency, and the policy as to whom should be apprehended under any detention program must rest with the Attorney General.

Mr. [REDACTED] advised that for purposes of review, he is thinking in terms of applying a broad general standard rather than a set of standards; that broad standard to cover individuals potentially dangerous as saboteurs or espionage agents. He said a memorandum is being prepared in this respect.

We reiterated we should have written approval from the Attorney General of the standards used by us which we have furnished to the Department, these standards to be used for the purpose of placing individuals on the Security Index to be apprehended in the event of an emergency.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) That we insist that the Department review all of the cases on the Security Index and give us clearance or denial in each case. This recommendation is made despite the fact Mr. [REDACTED] indicated that one of the reasons for not completing the entire review is the matter of expense to the Department.
- (2) That we insist on written approval from the Department of our standards for purposes of placing subjects on the Security Index and their subsequent apprehension.
- (3) That we continue to follow the Department to secure a copy of their standards for review, for the purpose of seeing whether their standards conform with ours.

The Attorney General

July 25, 1952

Director, FBI

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
 OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY  
 DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND  
 PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

During a recent conference of representatives of the Criminal Division of the Department and the Bureau the matter of the review by Department attorneys of investigative reports on subjects whose names are listed in the Security Index was discussed. The Department representatives indicated that to date approximately 1,200 Security Index cases had been reviewed and that the Department is in tentative agreement that all of the cases reviewed are warranted for inclusion in the Security Index except approximately two percent which have been set aside for further review. They indicated that in the event there is any question as to whether an individual's name should be retained in the Security Index the Bureau will be consulted in each individual case.

During the course of the discussion the Bureau representatives raised the question as to whether the Department contemplates reviewing every case in the Security Index. They were advised that it is contemplated that several thousand cases will be reviewed by the Department attorneys and if the present pattern continues reflecting agreement by the Department that the individuals should be included in the Security Index, the remainder of the cases will not be reviewed and the Department will approve the inclusion of the names of the remaining individuals in the Security Index.

It is my opinion that all cases for subjects whose names are listed in the Security Index and are scheduled for apprehension in the event of a national emergency should be reviewed by the Department attorneys. All authority for apprehensions in an emergency under the above-captioned Program flows directly from you. As you know after apprehensions are effected it will be the

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Department's responsibility to handle the appropriate hearings that will be afforded the detainees. If the Department has not reviewed a Security Index case prior to the apprehension to determine whether it approves or disapproves the action, it places this Bureau in the position of being the investigator and the prosecutor until such time as the Department takes over for the purpose of the hearings. Since this Bureau is a fact-finding investigative agency and the decision to deprive an individual of personal liberty in any matter over which this Bureau has investigative jurisdiction is the responsibility of the Department, I feel that it is essential that all Security Index cases be reviewed by the Department.

In view of this I again urge that all cases for subjects listed in the Security Index be reviewed by Department attorneys to determine whether the Department approves or disapproves the listing.

Questions relating to the standards used as a basis for including names in the Security Index were discussed at the conference. The importance of this Program in maintaining the internal security of the country at the time of an emergency and the corresponding responsibilities of the Department and the Bureau dictate that all questions relating to the standards be resolved promptly by the Department in order that there can be a complete understanding in the matter. These questions relating to approval by the Department of the Security Index standards presently utilized by this Bureau have been under consideration at the Department for some time.

During the conference representatives of the Department advised that for the purpose of the review of Security Index cases by Department attorneys a broad general standard would be used, the broad standard to cover individuals potentially dangerous as saboteurs or espionage agents. The broad standard would be used for review purposes and then the individual Security Index standards utilized by this Bureau. I cannot understand the procedure of the Department using one set of standards for review purposes and approving a different set of Security Index standards for this Bureau to use in

considering individuals for the Security Index. Unless the Department and the Bureau have common grounds for determining an individual is dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country in the event of an emergency there can never be a complete understanding between the Department and the Bureau in this vital matter. Therefore, I firmly believe that the Department and the Bureau should use the same Security Index standards.

In the interest of the national security, I will appreciate an early reply to this communication.

cc - (2) Mr. [REDACTED]  
Deputy Attorney General

cc - (2) Assistant Attorney General [REDACTED]  
Criminal Division



~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO : The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: OCTOBER 8, 1952

FROM : The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-17-06 BY SP2ALM/RWSUBJECT: Program for Apprehension and Detention of Persons  
Considered Potentially Dangerous to the National  
Defense and Public Safety of the United States.~~TOP SECRET~~

Reference is made to the several memoranda and to the conferences which have been held between representatives of the Bureau and of the Department concerning the adoption of standards for Security Index purposes for apprehension of individuals in an emergency.

As you are aware, final approval of the Security Index standards which have been used by the Bureau for a number of years has been withheld pending not only careful study of the standards themselves, but of possible alternative standards. The enactment of the Internal Security Act of 1950 which creates another standard for the enforcement of Title II of the Act has further complicated final determination of standards.

As you know, Title II of the Internal Security Act declares that when a state of Internal Security Emergency is proclaimed by the President, he shall, acting through the Attorney General, apprehend and detain each person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage or of sabotage. While it is contemplated that in the event of war other legislation relating to the apprehension and detention of potentially dangerous persons will be speedily sought, nonetheless so long as the standard provided in the Internal Security Act of 1950 remains the guiding legislative principle for the apprehension and detention of potentially dangerous individuals, the Department must consider this standard in reviewing the files of individuals who may be subject to apprehension and detention.

After careful study of the application of the standards which have been used by your Bureau in the listing of names on the Security Index list, it is my opinion that these standards can be utilized by your Bureau and by the Criminal Division in meeting the responsibilities of each under the apprehension and detention program. Accordingly, I approve the standards now in use by your Bureau, as related in the next paragraph.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

This document consists of 2 pages

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No. 1 of 3 Copies.~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION



In your memorandum to the Assistant to the Attorney General of September 16, 1949, you state that the elements going into measuring an individual's potential dangerousness or dangerousness in the event of an emergency consist of two broad elements:

(1) membership, affiliation or activity indicating sympathy with the principal tenets of the Communist Party or similar ideological groups and the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico; and (2) a showing of one or more of the following:

- a. activity in the organization, promoting its aims and purposes;
- b. training in the organization, indicating a knowledge of its ultimate aims and purposes;
- c. a position in a mass organization of some kind where his affiliation or sympathy as set forth in element one will determine the destiny of the mass organization;
- d. employment or connection with an industry or facility vital to the national defense health and welfare;
- e. possessing a potential for committing espionage or sabotage.

In your subsequent memorandum of July 27, 1950, you add thereto by stating that as a result of hostilities in Korea and the fact that the Communist Party and related groups have definitely and positively taken a stand against the policy of the United States, you are considering persons for inclusion in the Security Index who are present, active, participating members of the Communist Party or related groups or who actively espouse the line of those groups, regardless of the individual's leadership in the Party, present employment or past activities.

You have raised the further question as to prompt advice to the Bureau when a name has been approved by the Department for inclusion on the Security Index list. I am in agreement with your view that prompt notice should be furnished to the Bureau and I suggest that representatives of the Bureau and of the Criminal Division confer for the purpose of devising the most efficient method of notification consistent with the reviewing program. I have directed the Criminal Division to give priority attention to prominent and nationally known individuals whose names were removed for the time being from the Security Index list as set forth in your memorandum of February 29, 1952.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 15, 1952

SUBJECT: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY  
DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE  
AND PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

## PURPOSE:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

To analyze our position in regard to apprehensions  
of dangerous persons in an emergency and to submit for approval  
a memorandum to the Attorney General.

## DETAILS:

Security Index Standards

There is attached hereto a memorandum from the Attorney  
General dated October 8, 1952, approving the Security Index  
standards presently being used by the Bureau as the basis for  
placing names in the Security Index. The memorandum specifically  
refers to our memoranda to the Department dated September 16, 1949,  
and July 27, 1950, but no reference is made to our memorandum to  
Mr. Peyton Ford dated June 28, 1951, which more fully discussed  
our concept of the over-all detention program and the Security Index  
standards being utilized by the Bureau.

The Bureau memorandum of June 28, 1951, pointed out  
that we have sought to restrict the Security Index to those  
individuals whose past or present activities and training show  
them to be a definite potential danger to the country in the time  
of an emergency. It stated that our efforts have been directed  
toward keeping this list to the minimum number which will afford  
this country the necessary protection from sabotage, espionage and  
subversive activities rather than any effort on our part to  
place on the list all individuals who have been affiliated with  
the Communist Party or subversive groups in the past. It pointed  
out that the Bureau has conducted thousands of investigations of  
individuals beyond those included in the Security Index and were  
we to include all former members of such groups or sympathizers  
the number of persons to be apprehended would be many times the  
present number. It also stated that while the inclusion in the  
Index of all persons coming to our attention who have been  
sympathetic to subversive organizations would further reduce the  
possibility of activities inimical to the interests of this country,  
because many such persons may have foolishly and mistakenly entered  
into such an association, any such procedure would be a grave error.

## Attachment

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

In regard to the Security Index standards being used by the Bureau it was pointed out in the memorandum dated June 28, 1951, that certain individuals are included in the Security Index whose membership or affiliation with the Communist Party or revolutionary groups has not been proven but who have committed past acts of violence during strikes, riots and demonstrations, have exhibited anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and are likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety and welfare or whose associations and activities are closely affiliated with individuals or organizations having a definite foreign interest or connection contrary and detrimental to the interests of the United States such as employees and associates of Amtorg, the Tass News Agency, the United Nations and foreign legations. It also pointed out that a number of individuals are carried in the Security Index who were placed therein several years ago because they met the standards for inclusion and were considered potentially dangerous, yet concerning whom we have not developed current activity of a subversive nature. Such individuals have not been removed from the Security Index, keeping in mind the instructions of the Communist Party relative to "sleepers" and underground operations. I believe we should have a definite answer from the Attorney General as to whether or not he agrees with our position and practice as outlined in our memorandum of June 28, 1951.

#### Basis for Apprehensions

As you know, the Department has furnished the Bureau with a Portfolio containing the instructions to carry out the Department's detention program. Numerous correspondence has been received and conferences have been held regarding the instructions contained therein, their interpretation, etc. On October 8, 1951, the Department furnished the Bureau with an additional copy of this Portfolio requesting that it be maintained sealed for emergency use in a midwest office of this Bureau. It is presently being maintained by the Omaha Office.

Our entire planning and operational procedure to apprehend dangerous individuals is based on the Department's Portfolio and not on the detention provisions of Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950. The Department's program is policy as dictated by the Attorney General and does not have at this time the force of law. It was evolved by the Department after a careful study of many factors that will be present and must be promptly met if the Department and the Bureau are to fulfill the responsibilities imposed to maintain the security of the country.

In further examining our position and the basis for apprehending dangerous individuals at the time of an emergency you will recall that previously, both orally and in writing, the Department has advised that it is not anticipated the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 will supersede the Department's detention program.

The Internal Security Act of 1950 became a law on September 23, 1950. At a conference with former Attorney General McGrath on the morning of September 27, 1950, he advised the Director that he had received a memorandum from the Bureau inquiring as to whether the Internal Security Act of 1950 affected in any way the Department's detention program under which the Bureau had been working in conjunction with the Department. Mr. McGrath advised the Director he did not believe the passage of the bill should in any way interfere with the Department's detention program and that he desired us to proceed with that program as previously outlined. In answer to the memorandum referred to by the former Attorney General the Bureau received a memorandum dated October 9, 1950, from Mr. James M. McInerney, Assistant Attorney General, in which he stated that Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 undoubtedly is in conflict with the Department's proposed detention program. He stated that if Title II remains in effect at such time as initiation of the program becomes necessary appropriate provisions for its repeal will be introduced along with the proposed joint resolution as planned under the Department's program inasmuch as the statute as enacted contains many provisions which would be unworkable in the event of an emergency or outbreak of hostilities and that it is not anticipated that Title II will permanently supersede the Department's program.

#### OBSERVATIONS:

Although the attached memorandum indicates the Attorney General approves our standards it leaves the definite impression of giving more than casual observation to the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950. It appears that the Department is hedging on its own detention program and it is recommended that we request the Attorney General for a definite assurance that he intends to proceed under the Department's program under which our operational procedures are set up. If, in an emergency, the Attorney General elects to proceed under the Internal Security Act of 1950 we would be placed in an untenable position which would cause undue delays because of policy, procedural and operational matters which would then have to be



decided. Under the Act the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus will not be suspended, the subjects would have recourse to courts of law, important searches would be delayed and evidence lost and many other procedural problems will have to be resolved relating to grounds for apprehension. Such a delay would destroy the essence of the detention program, that of apprehending dangerous persons promptly and maintaining them in custody to prevent sabotage, insurrection and treason. While there is still time we should know just where we stand in this matter.

In regard to the Attorney General's suggestion that representatives of the Bureau and the Criminal Division confer for the purpose of devising the most efficient method of notification to the Bureau as reviews are completed by the Department it is recommended that a conference be promptly arranged to work out the procedures that will be used.

**ACTION:**

If you approve, there is attached a memorandum to the Attorney General requesting his assurance that the Department's detention program will be used in an emergency and his advice as to whether or not he agrees with our concept of the Security Index program and standards as outlined in Bureau memorandum to Mr. Peyton Ford dated June 28, 1951.

If you agree, I will arrange a conference with representatives of the Criminal Division to plan a method of notification to the Bureau as reviews of Security Index cases are completed by the Department.

The Attorney General

October 15, 1952

Director, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RW  
ON 10-12-00PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY  
DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND  
PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to your memorandum dated October 8, 1952, which approved the standards used by this Bureau for listing the names of individuals in the Security Index. You state that the enactment of the Internal Security Act of 1950 creates another standard for the enforcement of Title II of the Act and that while it is contemplated that in the event of war other legislation relating to the apprehension and detention of potentially dangerous persons will be speedily sought; nonetheless, so long as the standard provided in the Internal Security Act of 1950 remains the guiding legislative principle for the apprehension and detention of potentially dangerous individuals, the Department must consider this standard in reviewing the files of individuals who may be subject to apprehension and detention.

In connection with the standards used by this Bureau in placing names on the Security Index list you refer to my communications of September 16, 1949, and July 27, 1950. You will recall that in my memorandum to Mr. [REDACTED] dated June 28, 1951, I furnished additional information regarding the standards being used and outlined this Bureau's concept of the over-all approach to the detention program. On page two of that memorandum there are listed examples of individuals whose names are in the Security Index or who are being considered for the Security Index whose membership or affiliation with the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups has not been established but whose anarchist beliefs or associations indicate they will be a threat to the internal security in an emergency. On page three of that memorandum I explained that a number of individuals are carried in the Security Index who were placed therein several years ago because they met the standards for inclusion and were considered potentially dangerous, yet concerning whom we have not developed current activity of a subversive nature. It also pointed out that these individuals have not been removed from the Security Index in the absence of positive indications of disaffection or cessation of activities which caused them to be placed on the

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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Index, bearing in mind the instructions of the Communist Party relating to "sleepers" and underground activities, which require members to disaffect or disassociate themselves from outward Party activities. In cases of that type we have no assurance that these individuals are not a continued potential threat to this country in time of emergency and, indeed, have strong reason to believe to the contrary.

As you are aware a current Security Index list is furnished to the Department each month. There are approximately 19,430 names presently listed in the Security Index. Each individual listed has been investigated and the subversive activities of each individual comes within the Security Index standards. Investigative reports in each case have been furnished to the Department. All authority for this program flows directly from you and all preparations by this Bureau to effect the apprehensions in the event of a national emergency are based solely upon the planning and instructions contained in the Department's Portfolio entitled "Program For Apprehension and Detention of Persons Considered Potentially Dangerous To The National Defense and Public Safety of the United States." You will recall that I have one copy of that Portfolio in my possession and, at the Department's instructions, one copy is maintained sealed for emergency use in a midwest office of this Bureau.

The apprehension program as outlined in the Department's Portfolio does not at this time have the force of law and when operative is designed as an action of the executive rather than the legislative branch of the government to cope with an immeasurable danger to the security of the country.

It is fully realized that the Department's program as outlined in the Portfolio was evolved after a careful study of many factors and it endeavors to encompass all persons dangerous or potentially dangerous to the public safety and welfare in a time of emergency. This Bureau's entire operational plans to promptly effect the apprehension of dangerous persons at that time are set up and geared to that program.

In order that there will be a complete understanding in this matter I would like to have your assurance at this time that you intend to proceed in an emergency under the program as outlined in the Department's Portfolio and that the standards to be used are those we are now using. In regard to the Security Index standards I will appreciate advice as to whether you are

SECURITY INFORMATION - TOP ~~SECRET~~

in agreement with this Bureau's concepts of the detention program and the Security Index standards as outlined in my memorandum to Mr. [REDACTED] dated June 28, 1951.

cc (3) Mr. [REDACTED]  
Deputy Attorney General

cc (3) Assistant Attorney General [REDACTED]  
Criminal Division

SECURITY INFORMATION - TOP ~~SECRET~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: November 13, 1952

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY  
DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND  
PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATESALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/PWSYNOPSIS:

At a staff meeting on November 6, 1952, Deputy Attorney General [redacted] brought up a memorandum from the Bureau which inquired as to whether the "Security Portfolio" still controls our activities in the event of a national emergency. At the meeting it was decided that you and Mr. [redacted] would look into the matter to see whether any changes should be effected.

Our entire Security Index program and our plans for the detention of dangerous individuals in the time of an emergency have been set up in compliance with instructions furnished to the Bureau in a plan drawn up by the Department and furnished to the Bureau on August 3, 1948. After the passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950 on September 23, 1950, the Bureau felt that the Department would have to make a decision as to whether we should continue our plans to operate under the Department's Portfolio or to change our plans in order to meet the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950. This Act differs from the Department's Portfolio on several major points among which are the following:

- (1) It does not provide for suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
- (2) It is more restrictive in the standards set up for determining who shall be apprehended.
- (3) It does not provide for apprehension of dangerous individuals at a time of threatened invasion.
- (4) It provides for apprehension under individual warrants obtained only upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.
- (5) It apparently does not provide for searches or confiscation of contraband.
- (6) It provides that preliminary hearings are to be held within 48 hours or as soon thereafter

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as provision for such hearings may be made.

(7) It appears that the rules of evidence shall apply under the Act.

(8) Persons apprehended shall be entitled to judicial review in the courts.

The Bureau can discharge its responsibilities more effectively under our present plan than under the Internal Security Act. In view of the differences it is imperative that we have a definite commitment from the Department as to whether the Department will follow its own Portfolio or the provisions of the Internal Security Act. Since the passage of the Internal Security Act, the Department has consistently hedged on whether the Act can be ignored completely and the Bureau can proceed under the plans set forth in the Department's Portfolio.

The memorandum brought to your attention by Mr. [REDACTED] was our memorandum to the Attorney General dated October 15, 1952, which requested advice in this matter. It is not deemed advisable that the Bureau make recommendations to the Department concerning this matter inasmuch as the highly controversial question involving the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is included in the Department's Portfolio. Also, in the event the Department elects to proceed under the Internal Security Act in addition to revising all of our plans many people whom we feel constitute a danger to the internal security of the country will be dropped from our Security Index in view of the more limited provisions for apprehension set forth in the Internal Security Act of 1950.

Nonetheless in view of the questions which will be raised as to the necessity of the Department proceeding under a plan of its own device contrary to an existing law, it is not felt we should make any recommendations to the Department with respect to this matter since the decision is one which is solely the responsibility of the Department to make. There is attached a letter to Deputy Attorney General [REDACTED] requesting an early decision in view of the urgency of this matter.

PURPOSE:

To set forth the differences between the Department's plan for the apprehension of dangerous individuals in the time of an emergency as contrasted with Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950, and to advise you regarding the status

of our request that the Department make a decision as to whether we will proceed under the Department's plan or under the provisions of the Internal Security Act in the event of an emergency.

DETAILS:

In your memorandum of November 6, 1952, recording the Advisory Staff Meeting which took place on that date in the Attorney General's Office you advised that Mr. Malone brought up a memorandum which the Bureau directed to him inquiring as to whether the "Security Portfolio" still controls our activity in the event of a national emergency. At the meeting it was decided that you and Mr. ██████ would look into the matter to see whether there should be any changes effected. You stated that you would like to be advised as to the status of this matter together with a memorandum to Mr. ██████ as to our views.

As early as March 8, 1946, you suggested to the Attorney General that he might desire to initiate a study to determine what legislation was available or what should be sought to authorize effective action of a general and precautionary nature in the event of a serious emergency. After your original memorandum to the Attorney General on March 8, 1946, regarding this matter, we continued to follow the Department.

After a number of conferences held between Bureau representatives with Department attorneys they drew up a plan with complete instructions from the Attorney General to the Bureau, a proposed Presidential Proclamation and a proposed Joint Resolution to be passed by Congress in support of the President's Proclamation. This plan is generally referred to as the Department's Portfolio. There are only three copies of this plan in existence. The Bureau has two, one maintained at the Seat of Government and one in the Omaha Field Division, and the Attorney General maintains the third copy. The Portfolio was submitted to the Bureau by the Department on August 3, 1948. Since that time our entire planning and operational procedure to apprehend individuals contained in our Security Index has been based on the Department's Portfolio and not upon the detention provisions of Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950, which became law on September 23, 1950.

At the time the Department's Portfolio was furnished to the Bureau on August 3, 1948, there was no law in existence



which provided for the detention of dangerous individuals at the time of an emergency. After the passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950, which did provide for such action, the Bureau felt the Department would have to make a decision as to whether we should continue our plans to operate under the Department's Portfolio or to change our plans in order to meet the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950.

#### Major Differences Between the Department's Portfolio and the Internal Security Act of 1950

The reason that it is imperative that the Department make this decision is because of the differences between the Department's Portfolio under which we are now operating and the provisions of Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950. Some of the major points of difference are:

(1) Under the Department's Portfolio the Writ of Habeas Corpus will be suspended. The Internal Security Act of 1950 does not provide for the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

(2) The current standards we use in determining the names of individuals to be placed in the Security Index are based on the provisions for apprehension in time of an emergency as set forth in the Department's Portfolio. The provisions set forth in the Internal Security Act of 1950 for the detention of dangerous individuals in time of an emergency are more restricted than those contained in the Department's Portfolio. Basically, the Internal Security Act of 1950 provides for the detention of individuals who have been active in subversive organizations since January 1, 1949. Under the provisions contained in the Department's Portfolio we have included in our Security Index individuals who have not been known to be actively engaged in any subversive activities subsequent to January 1, 1949 but were active previous to that date.

(3) The Portfolio provides for apprehension of dangerous individuals at a time of threatened invasion. The Internal Security Act of 1950 restricts this to actual invasion, insurrection or declaration of war.

(4) The Portfolio provides for the apprehension of all subjects in the Security Index at the time of an emergency under one master warrant of arrest executed by the Attorney General. Under the Act apprehension



of subjects will be effected by individual warrants obtained only upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.

(5) The Portfolio provides for searches and confiscation of contraband, whereas, the Act apparently does not contain such provisions.

(6) The Portfolio provides that hearings are to be held within 45 days after the apprehension of the subjects, whereas, the Act provides that preliminary hearings will be held within 48 hours or as soon thereafter as provision for such hearings may be made.

(7) Under the Portfolio the Boards of Review to be set up to hear the cases shall not be bound by the rules of evidence. It appears that the rules of evidence shall apply under the Internal Security Act.

(8) Under the Portfolio persons apprehended will have the right of appeal only to the President. Under the Act they shall be entitled to judicial review in any U. S. Court of Appeals.

There is no question but that the Bureau could discharge its responsibilities much more effectively under the Department's Portfolio than under the Internal Security Act of 1950. As can be seen by the major points of difference between the Portfolio and the Act, it is imperative that we know as soon as possible in the event the Department decides that it will be necessary to follow the provisions of the Internal Security Act. Our entire planning and procedure relative to preparation for an emergency has been directed by the instructions contained in the Department's Portfolio. Our planning has been set up in detail for action to be taken in accordance with the Portfolio. We cannot afford to wait until an emergency is upon us and then have the Department decide that we would have to move against dangerous subversives under the Internal Security Act of 1950 rather than under the Department's Portfolio. Should this occur our entire operation would break down inasmuch as it would mean that our entire procedure would have to be altered.

Correspondence With and Advice Received From the Department Concerning This Matter

It was with these facts in mind that we called this

matter to the Department's attention at the time of the passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950. On September 25, 1950, we directed a memorandum to the Attorney General requesting to be advised whether the detention provisions of Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 would affect the detention plans previously prepared by the Department. We also requested that the Attorney General advise whether he contemplated making any changes in the program as previously planned by the Department.

At a conference between yourself and former Attorney General [REDACTED] on the morning of September 27, 1950, he informed you that he had received a memorandum from the Bureau inquiring as to whether the Internal Security Act of 1950 affected in any way the Department's detention program under which the Bureau had been working in conjunction with the Department. Mr. [REDACTED] advised you that he did not believe that the passage of the bill should in any way interfere with the Department's detention program and that he desired the Bureau to proceed with the program as outlined in the Department's Portfolio. By memorandum dated October 9, 1950, Mr. [REDACTED], former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, replied to our memorandum. He stated that Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 undoubtedly is in conflict with the Department's proposed detention program. He said that if Title II remains in effect at such time as initiation of the program becomes necessary, appropriate provisions for its repeal will be introduced in Congress along with the proposed joint resolution inasmuch as the Internal Security Act of 1950 as enacted contains many provisions which would be unworkable in the event of an emergency or outbreak of hostilities and that it was not anticipated that Title II will permanently supersede the Department's Portfolio.

In response to an inquiry by the Bureau of December 5, 1950, as to the progress made by the Department in reviewing our Security Index cases, Deputy Attorney General [REDACTED] advised on December 7, 1950, that "in the event of occurrence of an emergency which requires the use of the detention program, all of the persons now or hereafter included by the Bureau on the Security Index should be considered subjects for immediate apprehension thus resolving any possible doubtful cases in favor of the Government in the interests of the national security."

At the concluding session of the U. S. Attorneys' Conference on May 25, 1951, which was attended by Mr. [REDACTED] Mr. [REDACTED] of the Department outlined the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950. At that time he pointed out that the Act is unwieldly and unworkable.

On May 31, 1951, Mr. [REDACTED], in conference with Mr. [REDACTED] and Section Chief [REDACTED], orally advised that the standards being drawn up by the Department at that time for persons to be apprehended in an emergency were to be based principally on the Internal Security Act of 1950 but that leeway had been added to the standards specified by the Act to include persons we have on our Security Index who will meet the requirements of the Act. He stated that the Department does not consider the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 as workable and will continue to operate under the Emergency Detention Program as drawn up by the Department.

On March 14, 1952, Mr. [REDACTED] was informed in conference with Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED] that it was apparent that the Department was attempting to interpret the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 through the drawing up of the Department's proposed standards for individuals to be included in the Security Index to bring them within the provisions of the Internal Security Act. Mr. [REDACTED] was informed that from the Bureau's standpoint it would appear that the Department is hedging on its previous stand that apprehensions would be made under the Emergency Detention Program of the Department rather than the Internal Security Act of 1950 and any attempt to bring the Department's program within the provisions of the Internal Security Act would require extremely broad interpretation of the Act. He was advised that our position is that we must be ready from an operative standpoint to implement the apprehension program under clear authority from the Attorney General and there can be no question of doubt as to whether we are operating under standards specifically authorized by the Attorney General. It was pointed out that the broad interpretation by the Department of the provisions of the Act may not stand up in the event the apprehension program is launched under the Act and that the Department's interpretation of the Act is a matter of opinion and not of fact. At this conference Mr. [REDACTED] stated that it is the definite intent of the Department to proceed under its program rather than under the Internal Security Act of 1950. He said that if an emergency occurs, the Presidential Proclamation

will be issued and brought immediately before Congress for ratification. He said that at that time, if it has not been accomplished before that time, repeal of the Act will be sought in order that the Department's program can be instituted. He stated that at that time the unworkability of the Act will again be brought to the attention of Congress.

On July 9, 1952, at which time Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED] were in conference with Mr. [REDACTED] of the Department regarding getting approval by the Department of the standards used by us for placing persons in the Security Index and having them review our Security Index cases, Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the Department had already given the Bureau written authority to apprehend anyone on the Security Index pending the Department's decision with regard to the standards. The Bureau representatives insisted on the Attorney General's specific approval of the standards under which we are operating, inasmuch as we are an investigative agency, and the policy as to whom should be apprehended under any detention program must rest with the Attorney General.

From time to time the Department, while maintaining that the plan as set forth in the Department's Portfolio will be used in the event of an emergency, has intimated that the Internal Security Act of 1950 cannot be ignored. The Department last brought this fact to the Bureau's attention in a memorandum dated October 8, 1952, which stated in part that while it is contemplated that in the event of war other legislation relating to the apprehension and detention of potentially dangerous persons will be speedily sought, nonetheless so long as the standard provided in the Internal Security Act of 1950 remains the guiding legislative principle for apprehension and detention of potentially dangerous individuals, the Department must consider this standard in reviewing the files of individuals who may be subject to apprehension and detention.

We replied to this memorandum in a letter to the Attorney General dated October 15, 1952, and pointed out, among other things, that all authority for our Security Index program including all preparations and plans made by the Bureau to effect the apprehensions are based solely upon the planning and instructions contained in the Department's Portfolio. We requested, in order that there will be a complete understanding, that the Attorney General give us his assurance at this time that he intends to proceed in an emergency under the program as outlined in the Department's Portfolio and that the standards to be used are those we are now using. We requested advice of



the Attorney General as to whether he is in agreement with the Bureau's concepts of the detention program and Security Index standards as outlined in our memorandum to Mr. [REDACTED] dated June 28, 1951. The memorandum of October 15, 1952, is the memorandum which Mr. [REDACTED] brought up at the staff meeting in the Attorney General's Office on November 6, 1952.

OBSERVATION:

All of our plans for an emergency, which are extensive, in connection with the detention of dangerous individuals in time of an emergency are based upon instructions contained in the Department's Portfolio. There are contained among the 19,577 individuals listed in our Security Index the names of many persons whom we consider dangerous but who do not fall within the standards set forth in the Internal Security Act of 1950. If the Department should elect to proceed under this Act it would mean that in revising our plans many people who are now included in our Security Index as potentially dangerous to the internal security would necessarily have to be excluded therefrom.

The fact that the Internal Security Act of 1950 does not provide for suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus would prove a definite hindrance to the execution of necessary measures to be taken in the event of an emergency because of lengthy litigation which would no doubt result and presents the possibility that dangerous individuals might obtain release from confinement pending hearings in their cases. The Department's Portfolio provides that these persons shall be continued in detention until their cases are decided by the Boards of Review.

The lack of provision in the Act for measures to be taken in the event of threatened invasion precludes the President from taking action against potentially dangerous persons prior to an actual invasion, insurrection or declaration of war.

The provision in the Act for apprehension of subjects by individual warrants is a factor which would be a detrimental, time-consuming procedure as compared to the use of one master warrant of arrest for all subjects apprehended as provided in the Department's Portfolio.

The apparent lack of provision in the Act for searches and for confiscation of contraband would be a definite deterrent to our operations in that we would be unable to search the headquarters of subversive organizations as well as premises of dangerous individuals for contraband. Such contraband would, under the Act, apparently be left in the control and custody of persons who could use it against the interests of the Government.

The provision in the Act that preliminary hearings are to be held within 48 hours after the subjects' apprehension or as soon thereafter as provisions for such hearings may be made could place a restrictive time element upon the Government which would interfere with our apprehension efforts.

The fact that subjects apprehended under the Act would have the right of appeal to the courts and since it appears that the rules of evidence would apply creates another obstacle in the Government's way in that in order to obtain continued detention of persons considered dangerous we may, in many instances, have to disclose the identities of our informants and confidential techniques. This, of course, would be a fatal blow to our subsequent efforts to maintain coverage of subversive activities during the emergency.

While, for the reasons outlined above, I firmly believe that the internal security of the country could best be protected in the time of an emergency if we proceed under the plans set forth in the Department's Portfolio, I do not believe that it is desirable that the Bureau go on record with recommendations to the Department concerning this matter. The Department's Portfolio contains a plan for the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which without question will be a highly controversial subject and will undoubtedly cause considerable debate in the event it is ever openly proposed. Other questions will be raised as to why it is necessary to proceed under a plan devised by the Department of Justice when there is a law on the statute books which ostensibly covers the purpose for which the Department's plan was set up to handle. A decision as to procedure in the event of an emergency is clearly the responsibility of the Department. The Department's Portfolio has been devised by the Department and we have operated under those instructions to date. Any decision as to a method of operation whether it be under the Department's Portfolio or under the Internal Security Act of 1950 is clearly a matter to be decided by the Attorney General because it is concerned with high Government policy.



Obviously the Department does not want to be placed in a position of having stated that it is not going to pay attention to the Internal Security Act of 1950. They have hedged in this matter in the past and it is to our interest that we receive from them a positive expression of approval of our concepts of the Emergency Detention Program and our concepts of the standards for including individuals in the Security Index which is tantamount to scheduling these persons for apprehension. I believe that we should continue to call for a positive statement from the Department and that we should under no circumstances make any commitments regarding the desirability of proceeding under the Emergency Detention Program or under the Internal Security Act of 1950.

ACTION:

If you agree, there is attached hereto a memorandum to Deputy Attorney General Ross L. Malone, Jr., stating our position and requesting that the Bureau be advised of the Department's decision in this matter.

Mr. Ross L. Malone, Jr.  
Deputy Attorney General

November 14, 1952

Director, FBI

~~TOP SECRET~~

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY  
DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND  
PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/PW  
ON 10-12-00

Reference is made to my memorandum dated October 15, 1952, addressed to the Attorney General, copies of which were designated for you and Assistant Attorney General [redacted] of the Criminal Division. This is the memorandum which you brought up at the Advisory Staff Meeting in the Attorney General's Office on November 6, 1952. At this meeting it was agreed that Mr. [redacted] and myself would look into the matter.

My memorandum of October 15, 1952, was prompted by receipt of the memorandum from the Attorney General of October 8, 1952, which did not clearly indicate whether the Department is in agreement with this Bureau's concepts of the standards for inclusion of individuals in the Security Index as expressed in my memorandum to Mr. [redacted], Deputy Attorney General, on June 28, 1951. It was also prompted by the fact that in the Attorney General's memorandum of October 8, 1952, it was stated: "While it is contemplated that in the event of war other legislation relating to the apprehension and detention of potentially dangerous persons will be speedily sought, nonetheless so long as the standard provided by the Internal Security Act of 1950 remains the guiding principle for the apprehension and detention of potentially dangerous individuals, the Department must consider this standard in reviewing the files of individuals who may be subject to apprehension and detention."

In my memorandum of June 28, 1951, to Mr. [redacted], I pointed out that the Department has been fully aware of all phases of our operations and standards in connection with the Emergency Detention Program and we will not change our procedures without explicit instructions from the Department. I also pointed out that at the same time, in view of the importance and magnitude of the program, it is imperative that a clear understanding be reached immediately on the standards to be used.

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

As stated in my memorandum of October 15, 1952, all authority for action taken by this Bureau to date in preparing for an emergency has been based upon the instructions contained in the Department's Portfolio. Our planning has not been based upon the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 which differs widely with the provisions in the Department's Portfolio.

The Criminal Division has previously advised the Bureau that it considers the detention provisions of the Act as unworkable and that if Title II of the Act remains in effect at such time as initiation of the program for detention becomes necessary, appropriate provisions for its repeal will be introduced in Congress. However, in view of your memorandum of October 8, 1952, it appears that the Department may be considering the possibility of operating under the Internal Security Act of 1950 instead of under the Attorney General's Portfolio.

The program as envisaged by the Attorney General's Portfolio has been given careful study by the Department and provides a broader base of operations, standards and basis for detention than does the Internal Security Act of 1950. I should like to point out, however, that the decision as to the basis for instituting any program of apprehension and detention of dangerous individuals in a national emergency is clearly a matter to be decided by the Attorney General because it is concerned with high government policy. It is not within the province of this Bureau to recommend the adoption of any one program as opposed to another.

In view of the absolute necessity that our planning and preparations for action in the event of an emergency be complete at this time, I must have a definite and clear-cut answer to the questions proposed in my memorandum of October 15, 1952; namely, that I have the Attorney General's assurance that he intends to proceed in an emergency under the program as outlined in his Portfolio and that the standards to be used are those we are now using. Also, that the Attorney General advise whether he is in agreement with the Bureau's concepts of the program and the Security Index standards as outlined in my memorandum to Mr. [REDACTED] of June 28, 1951.

In view of the urgency of this matter, I request that this problem be afforded immediate consideration and that the Bureau be advised at the earliest possible date.

(2) cc - Assistant Attorney General [REDACTED]  
Criminal Division

~~SECRET~~  
INFORMATION

Office Memorandum • UNITED

TO : The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: November 25, 1952

FROM : The Attorney General

SUBJECT: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION OF  
PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS  
TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SAFETY  
OF THE UNITED STATES.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Reference is made to my memorandum of October 8, 1952, approving the standards used by your Bureau for the listing of names of individuals in the Security Index, and to your subsequent memorandum of October 15.

Pursuant to the questions which you have raised in the latter memorandum, I wish to assure you that it is the Department's intention in the event of emergency to proceed under the program as outlined in the Department's Portfolio invoking the standards now used. This approval, of course, indicates agreement with your Bureau's concepts of the Detention Program and the Security Index standards as outlined in your memorandum of June 28, 1951, to former Deputy Attorney General [redacted].

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-7-00 BY SP2A CM/RW

Downgrade to Secret  
UC/Baw 603248/11/10

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

(L) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -- Evaluation of Potential Dangerousness

One of the purposes of Security-type investigations is to determine the identities, whereabouts and activities of individuals who, because of their membership or activities in or association with subversive groups, are considered dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country and the consequent collection of sufficient information concerning their activities to justify inclusion in the Security Index and apprehension in the event of a national emergency.

To fulfill your responsibility for including in the Security Index the names of all potentially dangerous individuals,

8/3/54  
SAC LETTER NO. 54-39

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2 ALM/RA

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you must be alert at all times to evaluate each and every security investigation to be certain the case has been thoroughly investigated to resolve the question of the subject's dangerousness.

To fulfill your responsibility in connection with every case in which a subject's name is presently on the Security Index, you must be certain that the case receives appropriate re-evaluation so that at all times there is sufficient information developed to justify subject's detention in the event of an emergency.

On the other hand we have a definite responsibility to appraise cases fairly to be certain that names are either not added to the Security Index or are deleted therefrom when individuals no longer present a danger to the internal security of the country. Because of the underground operations of the Communist Party and the security measures adopted by the Party, it has become increasingly more difficult to evaluate certain cases because of the absence of open Party activity. Whenever doubts are raised for any reason as to whether a Security Index subject is still dangerous, additional positive, thorough and searching investigative action must be taken to resolve the question. In far too many instances you have failed to take such action and the Bureau has been forced to call individual cases to your attention. The Bureau desires to reiterate emphatically that it remains your responsibility to insure that your cases are properly evaluated and are investigated thoroughly without the necessity of repeating this basic instruction in correspondence in the individual cases.

An evaluation of dangerousness to decide whether or not a subject's name should be added to or retained in the Security Index must be made following every interview of a security subject. If a subject on interview denies in whole or in part pertinent derogatory information contained in our files and there is not incontrovertible proof in the files that the subject is untruthful in such denials, additional investigation must be conducted to resolve the matter. The investigation should include a reinterview of persons, confidential sources and security informants who originally furnished the subversive information regarding the subject in order to reaffirm the correctness of the information previously furnished and to determine if the individuals can recall any additional subversive information they failed to furnish or which has come to their attention subsequently. This is necessary in view of the subject's denial in these cases in which the evidence,

8/3/54

SAC LETTER NO. 54-39

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reasonably interpreted and analyzed, does not clearly establish the subject's dangerousness beyond doubt.

I cannot emphasize too strongly the absolute necessity that you be certain a subject has been properly identified as the person engaging in the subversive activities alleged. When there is any doubt on that point, particularly when on interview the subject denies the pertinent subversive allegations, the person, confidential source or security informant who is the source of the derogatory information should be thoroughly reinterviewed and exhibited a photograph of the subject, when available, to resolve the matter.

The above instructions are not intended to change existing policy and procedures in matters of this type but are to re-emphasize the necessity for logically resolving all questions pertaining to the dangerousness or potential dangerousness of the subject of each security investigation by reinterviewing sources and conducting additional investigation when warranted.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: 12/8/54

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
COMSAB TABBINGALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP8ACM/PWSYNOPSIS:

Although all Security Index subjects will be apprehended as rapidly as possible in an emergency in view of the size of the Index the priority of apprehension program provides that arrest efforts will be directed at the more dangerous persons first. The priority subjects are indicated by the Detcom and Comsab classifications. The Comsab classification indicates the subject possesses the potential to be a saboteur because of certain specific training or employment in key or vital industries. Other exceedingly dangerous persons are tabbed Detcom. The number of persons to be afforded priority of apprehension has steadily increased as the Security Index increased and as of November 15, 1954, of 26,174 Security Index cards 11,033 were tabbed for priority of apprehension. Present instructions require that a Special Agent be assigned to the arrest of each priority subject.

The number of priority arrests has increased to the point where the priority program will lose its effectiveness. In certain of the larger offices it will be necessary to assign three or more priority subjects to each Special Agent available for arrests. The Chicago Office has recommended that authority be granted to permit arrests of priority subjects by a police detective and a police officer. It is recommended that this not be done but that the basis for tabbing Security Index cards Comsab be changed to provide that such tabbing not be made due to military service alone as has been done in the past but rather that each case be considered separately to determine if information has been developed concerning specific previous training or violent tendencies indicating the subject possesses the potential to be a saboteur.

Attachment

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

It is estimated that the above change will reduce the number of priority subjects by over 50 per cent. This will provide a more selective basis for such tabbings and will permit a more efficient handling of the arrests. Review of such cases by the field will be done on a staggered basis, the entire project to be completed by all offices by June 15, 1955.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 1) It is recommended that there be no change in the instruction that a Special Agent be assigned to each arrest of a Security Index subject tabbed for priority of apprehension.
- 2) If you approve, there is attached an SAC Letter instructing the field to no longer consider military service alone as the basis for Comsab tabbing but that any subject should be considered for Comsab when an investigation develops information concerning specific previous training or violent tendencies indicating the subject possesses the potential to be a saboteur.
- 3) Manual changes attached. NO HANDBOOK CHANGE NECESSARY.

### DETAILS:

Due to the large number of Security Index arrests to be made in an emergency we have a priority of apprehension program set up so that efforts to arrest will be directed against the more dangerous persons first. The priority classifications are identified as Comsab and Detcom.

The Comsab classification has been set up for the purpose of providing ready identification of those Security Index subjects who, because of special training, employment in or access to key facilities or certain other factors, possess the potential of saboteurs in the event of an emergency. Specifically, the Comsab classification includes Security Index subjects who are:

(1) Employed in key facilities; (2) Veterans of military services of any country and particularly the Abraham Lincoln Brigade; (3) Veterans of O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services); (4) Graduates of the Lenin School in Russia and (5) Known to have engaged in acts of violence during industrial strikes and those who have engaged in fomenting trouble among laborers in industrial plants.

The Detcom classification includes all Security Index subjects who are considered exceedingly dangerous and should be apprehended prior to others in the Security Index. Specifically, it includes the following: (1) All Top Functionaries (subversive leaders on a national scale); (2) All Key Figures (subversive leaders on a local scale); (3) All individuals included under the Comsab classification and (4) any other individual in the Security Index who, although he does not fall in the above groups, should be afforded prior arrest because of certain elements developed in the investigation reflecting him to be exceedingly dangerous.

### Problem

The Security Index has been steadily increasing and there has been a corresponding increase in the number of Security Index subjects whose cards are tabbed for priority of apprehension. Out of 26,174 cards in our Security Index on November 15, 1954, the date of our last statistical report, 11,033 were so tabbed. The number of subjects listed for priority attention has grown to the point where the priority apprehension program may lose its

effectiveness. This is particularly true in view of the fact that present instructions require that a Special Agent be assigned to the apprehension of each Security Index subject tabbed for priority of arrest.

Observation:

The larger offices are principally affected in this matter, for although they may use police officers alone without Special Agents being present to apprehend Security Index subjects not scheduled for priority attention, a Special Agent must be assigned in the latter type of arrest. The Chicago Office has raised a question in this matter and has suggested that authorization be granted to permit a police detective and police officer to be assigned to arrests of subjects listed for priority attention. This recommendation was made because that office plans to use approximately 195 arrest teams consisting of a Special Agent and a police officer to effect the arrests of approximately 691 subjects tabbed for priority of apprehension. This means three to four such subjects to each arrest team. There are other offices in which it would be necessary to assign as many or more priority of arrest subjects to each Special Agent available for arrest assignment.

It is believed that priority of arrest subjects should continue to be assigned to arrest teams in which a Special Agent will be present because those subjects are the more dangerous and we must be certain that every effort is made to effect their arrests as rapidly as possible rather than permit police officers alone to apprehend such subjects. It is believed we should reconsider the elements upon which the priority tabbings are based.

Evaluation:

All of the reasons for the Comsab and Detcom tabbings are based on an individual's violent tendencies, subversive leadership or special subversive training except the Comsab tabbing because of employment or access to key or vital facilities and the veterans of the military services of any country.

It is definitely believed that the Comsab classification should be attached to any individual connected with a vital or key facility even though there is no known background of violent



tendencies, et cetera. The fact that the subject has access to such facilities is sufficient to warrant his prompt apprehension.

Individuals who have been tabbed for Comsab because of military service alone with no other element for the tabbing present a different situation. This group represents a large portion of the 11,033 persons now considered for priority of arrest. Although the exact number is not known it is estimated that the number so tabbed on military service alone will run over 50 per cent of the total. Although military training in most instances indicates training in the use of firearms other individuals who have had experience with firearms such as hunters, et cetera, are not considered exceedingly dangerous based on that experience alone. Of course, if an investigation has developed information concerning specific previous training or violent tendencies indicating the subject possesses the potential to be a saboteur the subject should be considered under the priority program. It is believed that each case should be considered separately on the facts developed rather than to arbitrarily list a subject for priority arrest just because he is known to have been in the Armed Services.

The recommended change in procedures to reduce the number of Security Index subjects to be afforded priority of arrest will not weaken our program. It will permit prompt and more effective efforts by Special Agent personnel to arrest the more dangerous persons due to the reduction in the number of priority arrest assignments.

The attached SAC Letter instructs field offices with a relatively small number of COMSAB subjects to review the files at this time and submit a Form Fd-122 to change tabbing when necessary. Larger offices may review the files at the time of the next verification of addresses and employment. All reviews are to be completed by June 15, 1955.

(K) SECURITY INDEX - COMSAB TABBING -- The Comsab classification has been set up within the priority apprehension program for the purpose of providing ready identification of those Security Index subjects who, because of special training, employment or past acts of violence, possess the potential of saboteurs in the event of a national emergency. The fact that the Security Index card for a subject has been tabbed Comsab is one of the reasons the subject is also tabbed Detcom to indicate the subject should be apprehended prior to other Security Index subjects whose cards are not so tabbed. As the number of Security Index subjects has increased there has been a corresponding increase in the number of subjects designated for priority of apprehension.

Under present instructions in Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions, one of the reasons for the Comsab tabbing is when a Security Index subject is a veteran of the military services of any country and particularly the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Henceforth, you should continue to tab for Comsab all veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Veterans of the military services of any country are no longer to be tabbed Comsab based on military service alone.

However, you should be certain all subjects of Security Index cards are considered under the Comsab program when the investigations have developed information concerning specific previous training or violent tendencies indicating the subjects possess the potential to be saboteurs. In that connection each case must be considered on the facts developed in the particular case.

The above amends the instruction relating to the basis for considering a subject under the Comsab program because of military service. There are no changes in the other reasons for considering the Comsab classification as outlined in the Manual of Instructions.

In order to adjust the Security Index cards tabbed Comsab in your office in accordance with the above instructions it will be necessary to review each case so tabbed in order to delete the tabbings when based on military service alone. Form FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau to delete any change necessary. Offices with a relatively small number of Security Index cards tabbed Comsab should review each case file for such subjects at this time. Offices with a large number of cards so tabbed may desire to review the case files at the time the residence addresses and places of employment are verified during the next six months. As soon as the reviews have been

12/14/54

SAC LETTER NO. 54-70

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completed you should advise the Bureau by a memorandum captioned as above indicating the appropriate adjustments have been made. In any event all offices must complete the review and advise the Bureau by June 15, 1955.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

12/14/54  
SAC LETTER NO. 54-70

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

December 23, 1954

DIRECTOR, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP2 ALM/RW*

ON *10-12-00*

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY  
DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND  
PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to your memorandum dated December 22, 1954, in which you requested that I furnish you with the general criteria or standards utilized in determining whether or not names should be included on the list of persons to be considered for apprehension in an emergency under the above-captioned program.

In compliance with your request, there are set out hereinafter the general criteria or standards which we apply in determining dangerousness or potential dangerousness. Based on our experience it is not possible to categorize all subjects of security investigations because of their varying degrees of subversive activity and revolutionary dispositions. The following criteria or standards are not relied upon as all-inclusive, but are used as guides to assist in determining whether a subject should be considered for apprehension in the event of an emergency.

- A. Any subject of a current espionage investigation.
- B. Any individual who has knowledge of or who has given or received instructions or assignment in espionage, counterespionage or sabotage services or procedures of a government or political party of a foreign country - except where such activity was obtained for lawful purposes on behalf of the United States Government or where such activity has been offset by subsequent cooperation with the United States Government.

Any individual who has participated in the past in any act of espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, or any attempt or conspiracy to commit any act of espionage, counterespionage or sabotage for a foreign power or foreign political party against the interests of the United States - except where such activity has been offset by subsequent cooperation with the Government of the United States.

Any individual who has been active at any time in the espionage, counterespionage, sabotage service or procedures of any basic

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revolutionary organization or world Communist movement - except where such activity has been offset by subsequent cooperation with the Government of the United States.

E. Membership in basic revolutionary organization (Communist Party, USA, Socialist Workers Party, Independent Socialist League, Proletarian Party of America, Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, Socialist Union of America.)

1. Any individual who is known to have been a member of one of the basic revolutionary organizations after January 1, 1949, and who is not known to have defected therefrom or his activities have not been offset by cooperation with the United States Government.
2. Any individual who is known to have been a member of a basic revolutionary organization prior to January 1, 1949, who is not known to have defected therefrom or his activities have not been offset by cooperation with the United States Government and:
  - a. Has had years of training and experience in the organization.
  - b. Has been responsible for actual execution of the organization's orders.
  - c. Has received special training in the organization or has had training in the Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow.
  - d. Has occupied one or more positions of leadership in the organization.
  - e. Has at any time been involved in the Red Army Intelligence, the MVD, or MGB, or intelligence service of any foreign country.
  - f. Has been used as a courier or mail drop by the revolutionary organization.
  - g. Has served in the armed forces of any country.
  - h. Served in the Loyalist forces in Spain during the Spanish Civil War.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- I. Served with the Office of Strategic Services during World War II.
- J. Is employed by a municipal or state government or the Federal Government.
- K. Is employed in or connected with any industry or facility vital to the national defense, health or welfare.
- L. Is employed in any position having potentialities for espionage or sabotage.
- M. Who has access to explosives, chemicals, weapons, ammunition or other material or equipment which could logically be utilized by revolutionary groups in an armed uprising.
- N. Has had experience as a picket captain, strong-arm man or has otherwise actively participated in violent strikes, riots or demonstrations.
- O. Is employed as an organizer or official of a labor union.
- P. Has held positions which determined the destiny of front or mass organizations.

F. Membership in front organizations only

Any individual who is not known to have held membership in one of the basic revolutionary organizations but who has continued to adhere to the policies and doctrines of revolutionary groups subsequent to the outbreak of Korean hostilities (June 25, 1950) by continuing activity in the affairs of one or more front organizations in a leadership capacity or by active participation in the furtherance of the aims and purposes of the front organization.

G. Espousing the line

Any individual who has not been determined to have been a member of or associated with either a basic revolutionary

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~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

organization or front organization but who has continued to adhere to the policies and doctrines of revolutionary groups since the outbreak of Korean hostilities (June 25, 1950) by espousing the line of such organizations.

**H. Independent adherence to revolutionary ideology**

Any individual who has not been determined to have at any time been a member of or to have associated with any basic revolutionary or front organization but has by statement or action declared his continued adherence to and support of the revolutionary ideology of a foreign government or foreign political party as opposed to the best interests of the United States Government, or any individual who, because of anarchist or revolutionary beliefs, is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety and welfare.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR  
FROM : CLYDE TOLSON

DATE: 1/24/55

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2 AUM/pw

I have studied the current instructions to the field relative to the Security Index and the criteria to be used in placing the names of persons on this index. The Bureau obviously is responsible for more than assembling facts for referral to the Department of Justice for its decision with respect to the persons listed on this index; since the situation now is that the FBI, from all practical standpoints, is making the decision that the person whose name is placed on the index will be taken into custody in the event of hostilities and the FBI will be held responsible for any improper arrests which cannot be justified before the administrative or judicial boards which will consider the cases of those persons taken into custody.

It is obvious to me that we must provide a more strict policy with respect to placing the names of persons on this index. The manual provisions in this respect are somewhat misleading. They state, for example "In preparing and maintaining the security index, the Bureau is acting only in the capacity of assembling the facts concerning the individuals involved for referral to the appropriate officials of the Department of Justice for their consideration and decision as to action to be taken at a time of national emergency." It seems to me that we in the Bureau must conform to the basic premise that any person to be placed on the index is considered as potentially dangerous to the internal security of the United States in the event of a national emergency and that the FBI is in possession of facts to prove this in every case in the event our action is challenged, as it will certainly be in literally thousands of cases.

Some of the factors to be considered in determining the dangerousness of the individual, as covered in the manual, seem to me to be very weak, such as Section 87C (2-D) Subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization; (2-E) Contributions to or collections of funds for the organization, and (2-Q) Refusal to furnish information or to testify regarding membership or activities in a subversive movement.

The manual, with respect to the handling of these cases in the field, merely states that the Agent handling the case in the

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office of origin should submit a form recommendation (Form FD-122.) There is no specific requirement that the Special Agent in Charge shall personally review and approve the recommendation that the person be included in the index, although the pertinent manual section contains a statement, and SAC letters provide that it is the responsibility of the individual SAC to insure that his cases are properly investigated and evaluated.

I would like to recommend an SAC Letter cautioning the field as to the seriousness of inclusions of names of persons on this list and pointing out that we are in effect making the decisions for arrests since the Department of Justice has not and apparently will not arrange for attorneys to review and approve such inclusions.

I recommend that we make it the personal responsibility of the SAC to make such recommendations and that we hold them responsible for such actions, except as to New York as indicated below.

At the Seat of Government I am advised that at present the approval of placing the name of a person on the index is made by an individual supervisor, one of many who handle this type of work. The recommendation and approval of this individual supervisor is reviewed and approved by one other more experienced supervisor in the Internal Security Section, whose responsibility it is to review and pass upon such recommendations. Questionable or doubtful cases, or cases of disagreement are then referred to the office of the Section Chief of the Internal Security Section, Mr. [REDACTED] for a decision and then if no decision is reached, or in cases of particular importance, they are referred to Mr. [REDACTED] for decision.

At the Seat of Government it is my recommendation that in the future the review and approval of the inclusion of the names of individuals be personally handled by Supervisor [REDACTED], the supervisor in charge of this work, [REDACTED], the Chief of the Internal Security Section, or Inspector [REDACTED], who is in overall charge of the Internal Security - Liaison Branch of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

In the field both active and inactive subjects on this list are checked each 6 months as to their whereabouts. With respect to inactive subjects, there is a requirement that the case be brought up to date, analyzed and evaluated annually by the submission of a field report. However, there is no specific requirement for a renewed recommendation from the field at any time for the continuance of the person on the index.

I would like to recommend an annual consideration by the field on both active and inactive subjects as to whether the person should be continued on the index and that this, in line with the above recommendation, be the personal responsibility of the Special Agent in Charge.

I am advised that in New York City there are approximately 7128 security index subjects. It is not required that the New York Office reopen their inactive cases for the purpose of bringing them up to date annually as it required of other offices. A moratorium was declared for New York in this connection because of personnel limitations. New York does have a program of reactivating the cases which are observed to be the oldest at the time they make their 6 months check on whereabouts.

In New York City, in view of the volume of work, it would be my recommendation that the responsibility for reviewing recommended inclusions on the security index be that of the Special Agent in Charge, an Assistant Special Agent in Charge, or a qualified security supervisor.

If the foregoing recommendations are approved, within a comparatively short period of time we would be able to effect a review of all security index subjects in the light of our current responsibilities, as pointed out above.

Subject to your approval, I will discuss the above recommendations with the Executives Conference to see whether there are any reasons why they should not be placed into effect.

Assistant Attorney General  
William F. Tompkins

January 27, 1955

Director, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/PW  
ON 10-12-00

~~TOP SECRET~~

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY  
DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND  
PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to my memorandum to the Attorney General dated December 23, 1954, relating to the general criteria or standards utilized in determining whether or not names should be included on the list of persons to be considered for apprehension in an emergency under the above-captioned Program.

Pursuant to the request of Mr. [REDACTED] of your Division, a conference was held on January 24, 1955, between representatives of the Department and this Bureau at which time a general discussion was held on the Security Index criteria or standards. The conference decided that there was no area of disagreement between the Department and this Bureau on the criteria or concepts regarding dangerousness. It was recognized that there are varying degrees of revolutionary dispositions and subversive activities and that the criteria or standards listed in my memorandum of December 23, 1954, are not all-inclusive but are used as guides to assist in determining whether there are reasonable grounds supported by investigation for considering a person dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country at the time of an emergency.

During the discussion of the criteria it was felt that consideration should be given to regarding item A as listed in my memorandum of December 23, 1954, for the purpose of clarification. Item A in that communication reads as follows: "Any subject of a current espionage investigation."

The matter has been considered and after A in the criteria used by this Bureau is being amended to read as follows: "Any individual known to be currently engaged in espionage activities."

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~TOP SECRET~~

*This change merely clarifies the point and in no way affects names already on the Security Index by reason of such activity since in every instance of that type names have not been added to the Security Index until the engagement in current espionage activity has been established by investigation.*

*You will be promptly advised of any consideration given in the future to changing the Security Index criteria.*

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~~TOP SECRET~~





In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

February 2, 1955

PERSONAL ATTENTION  
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-8

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RW  
ON 10-12-00  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) SECURITY INDEX -- Due to the present grave and tense international situation I am deeply concerned over our Security Index Program which in time of national emergency represents the Nation's most powerful weapon in combating espionage, sabotage and insurrection by preventing dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals from remaining at liberty.

I want you to know that the Attorney General has advised me that he does not have the funds or manpower to review the Security Index cases but that in an emergency he will direct that all persons whose names are then included in the Security Index be promptly apprehended. Therefore, the Bureau for all intents and purposes is responsible for the listing of all names included in the Security Index and for the arrests which will follow at the time of an emergency. We must be certain at all times that the listing of every name in the Security Index is supported and justified by sufficient information concerning subversive activities or revolutionary tendencies developed during thorough investigations to establish grounds for detention in the event of a national crisis.

The failure to have the names of all dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals in the Security Index at the time of an emergency means we have not fulfilled our responsibilities in the security field and we will not be in a position to prevent sabotage, espionage, sedition, insurrection and strikes or slowdowns directed by subversive elements. On the other hand it is essential that only dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals are listed for apprehension in an emergency.

In that connection I want to emphasize to you again the absolute necessity for bringing all pending security cases to a logical conclusion where investigation remains to be conducted before a determination can be made regarding inclusion in the Security Index.

In view of the importance of this matter I am holding each Special Agent in Charge personally responsible for each Security Index listing in his office to be certain that each listing is based on sound grounds.

The following instructions shall be placed into effect immediately:

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

1. Each Special Agent in Charge shall personally recommend the inclusion of each name for the Security Index and the removal of any name from the Security Index, except in those offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects in which instances the recommendations must be made personally by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge or Bureau-approved Security Supervisor.

2. An immediate review of the case file on each individual whose name is presently included in the Security Index shall be made at this time. Although the recommendations for inclusion of the names that are in the Security Index at this time have emanated from your office in most instances and under present requirements these cases are reviewed in connection with the preparation of annual supplemental investigative reports during which reviews you have been specifically instructed to evaluate each case to be certain the Security Index card is warranted, I am initiating this comprehensive review at this time to make absolutely certain that all factors in every case have been thoroughly considered by you to determine if the cases remain sound.'

Each Special Agent in Charge shall personally approve or disapprove the retention of the names of all subjects in the Security Index at this time, except in those offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects in which instances the approvals or disapprovals must be made personally by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge or Bureau-approved Security Supervisor. The approval or disapproval shall be submitted to the Bureau in an individual memorandum for each Security Index case. Each memorandum shall be submitted under the title of the individual case and shall reference this SAC Letter. Each memorandum must set forth the reasons why the subject should be retained in or removed from the Security Index in sufficient detail to clearly reflect the soundness of your decision.

The reviews must be completed within 60 days from the receipt of this communication by all offices having less than 1,000 Security Index cases. All the remaining offices must complete the reviews within 90 days from the receipt of this letter with the exception of the New York Office where the reviews must be completed within 6 months.

For your information the following offices have more than 1,000 names on the Security Index at this time: Chicago, Detroit,

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
SAC LETTER NO. 55-8

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Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia and San Francisco. In connection with the above instructions both as to adding names to or deleting names from the Security Index and the review of all Security Index cases the Bureau is making the exception in offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects because of the volume of work in those offices. The Bureau instructs that the reviews and recommendations in these matters in such offices be shared proportionately by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge and Bureau-approved Security Supervisor.

Each Special Agent in Charge must keep an accurate record of the progress of the reviews. An airtel must be submitted to the Bureau each Friday after the receipt of this communication until the project is completed setting forth: (1) the total number of cases to be reviewed during this project and (2) the number of cases in which the required data has been forwarded to the Bureau. Each airtel is to be captioned "Security Index Review."

2/2/55  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-8



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PERSONAL ATTENTION  
ST. C. CONFIDENTIAL  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12

ON

10-18-60

SP2ALM/RU

In Reply, Please Refer to.

File No.

February 10, 1955

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) SECURITY INDEX -- In view of recent developments in the international situation it has become necessary to re-evaluate the priority of arrest features of our Security Index Program. At the present time subjects who will be considered for priority of arrest at the time of an emergency are tabbed Detcom and the Detcom classification includes subjects who are tabbed Comsab.

Henceforth, it is planned that the individuals in the Security Index tabbed Detcom will be arrested first in the event of a limited but grave emergency. It is not anticipated at this time that the other subjects in the Security Index will be arrested under such a situation. (In the event of an all-out emergency all subjects whose names are included in the Security Index will be considered for immediate apprehension.)

In order that the most dangerous persons will be apprehended during a limited but grave emergency, there are set forth below the new standards to be used in deciding who should be listed for priority of apprehension and Detcom tabbing.

1. The Comsab tabbing is to be discontinued.

2. Each Security Index subject should be considered for Detcom tabbing (priority of arrest) who falls within one or more of the following categories:

- a. All Top Functionaries and Key Figures.
- b. Currently active Communists (active within the past year) or members of any basic revolutionary organization when there is evidence of one or more of the following:
  - (1) Activity as local organizers or leaders in the organization.
  - (2) Special training at the Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow.
  - (3) Experience as picket captains, strong-arm men or active participation in violent strikes, riots or demonstrations.
  - (4) Violent statements or strong revolutionary tendencies as shown by their activities.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

- c. Persons active in the Communist Party underground.
- d. Any other Security Index subject whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict the individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent or disruptionist in the event of an emergency.

Subjects who will be tabbed Detcom should comprise a hardcore of subversives. Each individual case should stand on its own and the decision to consider a subject for priority of apprehension should be based on the subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies. Employment in a key or vital facility will no longer be a reason alone for Detcom tabbing.

In evaluating each Security Index case it will be necessary to review each case file. This should be done in connection with the review of all Security Index cases in accordance with the instructions in SAC Letter Number 55-8 dated February 2, 1955. In submitting your personal recommendation for retaining a subject in the Security Index you should also submit your recommendation regarding the Detcom tabbing as indicated above along with your reasons why the subject meets the new Detcom standards in sufficient detail to justify your recommendation. If a subject is tabbed Detcom and Comsab at this time and you are not recommending the Detcom tabbing in accordance with the above instructions you should submit a Form FD-122 attached to your Security Index recommendation in order to delete the Detcom and Comsab tabbings. If you are recommending the Detcom tabbing in accordance with the above instructions and the subject is already tabbed Detcom, you should so advise the Bureau and Form FD-122 need not be submitted. In instances in which you are recommending the Detcom tabbing and the subject is already tabbed Detcom and Comsab you should attach a Form FD-122 in order that the Comsab tabbing can be deleted. Of course, if the subject is not already tabbed Detcom and you are recommending such tabbing under the new instructions, you should attach a Form FD-122 to your Security Index recommendation in order that the Detcom tabbing can be added to the Security Index card.

There will be instances in which you have already submitted your recommendations that a Security Index subject should be retained in the Security Index. In those instances it will be necessary for you to recheck the individual case files to determine whether a Detcom tabbing is necessary and to advise the Bureau in accordance

2/10/55

SAC LETTER NO. 55-12

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with the above instructions.

In order that the Security Index cards for the subjects who are to be tabbed Detcom for priority of apprehension, as indicated above, will be readily available for emergency action in your office you should be guided by the following instructions regarding the arrangement of your Security Index.

1. Each Security Index case should be considered for Detcom tabbing whether the subject's Security Index card is filed in the Geographical, Special or Unavailable Sections of your Security Index. However, there is no change being made in the instructions regarding the Security Index cards which are to be filed in those three sections.

2. The Geographical Section of your Security Index should be divided into two distinct parts. Part I of the Geographical Section shall include only the Security Index cards for subjects who are tabbed Detcom under the new instructions set out above. Part II of the Geographical Section will contain the Security Index cards for all subjects that are not tabbed Detcom.

3. In offices having a Geographical breakdown by residence and by employment it will be necessary to have two breakdowns for each of those categories in order that the cards tabbed Detcom will be separated and maintained apart from the cards not so tabbed.

4. You should continue to file one Security Index card for each subject in the Alphabetical Section in strict alphabetical order with no other breakdown whatsoever. To assist you in readily identifying Security Index cards in the Alphabetical Section that will be tabbed Detcom under the new instructions a colored metal tab shall be fastened to each such card.

For your information, in the future as Detcom tabbings are approved the Security Index cards forwarded to you will not only carry the code letters DC in the first line on the cards but each such card will be stamped Detcom in large red letters. This procedure will assist you in being absolutely certain that cards tabbed Detcom are properly filed.

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SAC LETTER NO. 55-12

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The Detcom tabbing of a Security Index subject should be afforded your personal consideration and you should submit your personal recommendations for such tabbing during this review and in the future. In handling this matter in connection with your review of all Security Index cases you should meet the deadlines as set forth in SAC Letter 55-8 dated February 2, 1955. Security Index cards presently tabbed Detcom should not be placed in the new Detcom portion of the Geographical Section of your Security Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations. There should be no changes made regarding the present Detcom tabbings in your Security Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations under the new procedure. In this manner the entire Security Index will be reviewed and reconsideration given to Detcom tabbings by the periods indicated in SAC Letter Number 55-8.

In view of the new and separate breakdown in the Geographical Section of your Security Index for Detcom subjects it will no longer be necessary to place a separate tab on such cards as you have done in the past.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

2/10/55  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

March 9, 1955

DIRECTOR, FBI

~~TOP SECRET~~

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS  
TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SAFETY  
OF THE UNITED STATES

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RW  
ON 10-12-00

I have been advised in Mr. [REDACTED]'s memorandum of December 1, 1954, that the Department will be unable to resume the general review of all Security Index cases. It was indicated that it will not be possible to contemplate such a review even in fiscal year 1956.

In my memorandum of December 6, 1954, I re-emphasized my conviction that all Security Index cases should be subjected to review by the legal staff of the Department. I pointed out that authority for the arrests under captioned Program is vested in the Department and representatives from the Department will handle the hearings relating to the Emergency Detention Program.

I have continued to study this problem in all its aspects. As you can appreciate, unless these cases are reviewed by the Department, it places the FBI in the anomalous position of being both the investigator and the prosecutor with respect to thousands of persons, most of whom are United States citizens. Under such circumstances, I am convinced that if the FBI is to continue to both investigate and pass on the soundness of these cases, it is incumbent upon us to take every step at our disposal to minimize the inevitable criticism of the dual role now assumed by the FBI. Mass arrests under this Program would have a cataclysmic effect upon the public. To minimize this reaction we propose to put into effect new criteria for placing and retaining individuals in the Security Index which, to a great extent, limits and modify the standards which have previously been made available to the Department. The basis for this action, as indicated previously, lies in the fact that the Department is unable to pass upon each case in advance of a national emergency.

The proposed new criteria are set out in the attachment to this memorandum.

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~TOP SECRET~~

I desire to call your attention to another proposed innovation with respect to the Security Index. It is felt that the hard core of subversives in leadership capacities and those subjects known to be of extreme revolutionary disposition should be designated for priority of apprehension. These particular individuals would be placed in a separate category and procedures perfected whereby they might be taken into custody under captioned Program upon a declaration of war. The remaining subjects in the Security Index would be apprehended under the Emergency Detention Program, of course, should an invasion occur.

It is respectfully requested that you advise me at the earliest opportunity if the proposed modifications in the criteria for Security Index status and the proposed priority of arrest procedure meet with your approval.

Enclosures (2)

2cc - Mr. [REDACTED] (enclosures - 2)  
Deputy Attorney General

2cc - Assistant Attorney General (enclosures - 2)  
[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

PROPOSED CRITERIA  
FOR PLACING AND RETAINING  
NAMES IN THE SECURITY INDEX

1) No name shall be added to or retained in the Security Index unless one or more of the following situations has been established through investigation:

- (a) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals;
- (b) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organization within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals;
- (c) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals;
- (d) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the security of the country in time of emergency.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RW  
ON 10-12-00

~~TOP SECRET~~

2) In evaluating interviews insofar as Security Index status is concerned you should be guided as follows:

- (a) Whenever a subject of a security investigation by a positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicates a continued adherence to the doctrines, aims or purposes of a revolutionary organization or a front organization, the positive statement shall be considered an overt act on the part of the subject in establishing continued adherence.
- (b) Other than as indicated above, interviews with Security Index subjects or potential Security Index subjects are not to be considered as factors requiring the placing or retaining of names of persons on the Security Index; for example, lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not to be regarded as such factors.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: March 22, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2ALM/RW

By memorandum dated March 9, 1955, we proposed to the Attorney General that the criteria for placing or retaining individuals on the Security Index be changed. We requested advice at the earliest opportunity if the changes met with the Attorney General's approval.

By memorandum dated March 16, 1955, to [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and the Director, the Attorney General stated he was adding this question to the agenda of the next Departmental conference dealing with Justice Department plans in event of Formosan open hostilities. In this memorandum the Attorney General states that [REDACTED] has told him that although the Internal Security Act of 1950 has detention provisions, the emergency detention program is based on the constitutional power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus rather than the Internal Security Act of 1950.

Frankly, I feel that any effort to discuss this extremely important subject at the Attorney General's conference is out of place and will merely result in delaying tactics on a matter which should be resolved at once.

Following the Attorney General's conference on March 14, I spoke to [REDACTED] and suggested that the Internal Security Division act promptly on our letter carrying the proposed changes. [REDACTED] called me back on the evening of March 18 to state informally that the Internal Security Division had looked over our proposals and agreed with them although they had not discussed them as yet with Mr. [REDACTED], and, of course, [REDACTED] division would not be replying to our proposals in view of the Attorney General's instructions that the matter be taken up at the next conference.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you desire, we can reply to the Attorney General's memorandum of March 16 by suggesting that this matter should be resolved very promptly and that it may be desirable for the Internal Security Division and [REDACTED] office, if necessary, to make an immediate study

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.



of our proposals so that the Attorney General may come to an immediate decision on this matter. If you prefer that this be done telephonically, it would probably have to be done at least on the level of Mr. [REDACTED] and either Mr. [REDACTED] or I can do this.

I do think that this should be settled at once as we are holding up our field review of Security Index subjects pending the Department's decision.



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-30

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

April 12, 1955

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3ALM/RW  
ON 10-12-00

RE: SECURITY INDEX

A. Review Project

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

As I pointed out in SAC Letter 55-8 of February 2, 1955, the Attorney General has advised me that he does not have the funds or manpower to review the Security Index cases. This means, of course, that the responsibility for the soundness of these cases rests entirely upon the FBI, placing us in the undesirable position of being both the investigator and prosecutor with respect to these subjects, most of whom are United States citizens. We must take every means at our disposal to insure that these cases are completely sound and that it is established beyond question that the subjects are potentially dangerous.

The general review of all Security Index cases in the field is being reinstituted, effective at once. This is not a continuation of the review initiated by the above SAC Letter. It is a complete restudy of each and every Security Index case in the light of newly-adopted criteria, set forth hereinafter. Be guided by these instructions:

1. Analyze thoroughly each Security Index case in your office in light of the new criteria, below.
2. Following analysis of each case, send a memorandum to the Bureau containing the following items and utilizing the following headings:

(a.) Under the heading "Reference," refer specifically to this communication.

(b.) Under the heading "Succinct Resume of Case," set out a clear concise picture of subject's activities. You must not attempt to incorporate by reference any data set out in a previous memorandum submitted in response to SAC Letter 55-8, above. The memoranda required herein must be entirely complete in themselves. I will not tolerate general statements or mere conclusions regarding the facts in these cases.

(c.) Under the heading "Recommendation," set out your recommendation in each case to either "Retain in Security Index" or "Remove from Security Index." Each recommendation must state specifically the basis for retaining subject in or removing subject from the Security Index. The specific activities bringing the subject within the revised

criteria and the fact that the information comes from reliable informants or sources must be shown.

(d.) Under the heading "Detcom Tabbing," set out these data:

(1) Present tabbing of subject.

(2) Whether or not subject has been approved for Detcom tabbing under the new criteria in SAC Letter 55-12 (A) of February 10, 1955, noting specifically whether or not Security Index cards have been received from the Bureau bearing the stamp "DETCOM" in large red letters.

(3) If not previously approved under the new criteria, set out your recommendation as to Detcom tabbing together with the specific basis for such recommendation.

Follow the procedure outlined in SAC Letter 55-12 (A), above, with regard to removal of Detcom and/or Comsab tabbings and designations for Detcom under the new standards.

3. Each SAC is being held personally responsible for each recommendation submitted. Each SAC must personally approve the recommendation submitted by his office with regard to Security Index status of each subject, excepting the larger offices under the conditions noted specifically in SAC Letter 55-8, above.

4. Submit an airtel captioned "Security Index Review" each Friday, beginning April 22, 1955, setting out (1) total number of cases to be reviewed, (2) number of cases in which data required herein have been forwarded to Bureau and (3) of the latter number, how many contain recommendations to remove subjects from the Security Index.

5. The reviews must be completed within 60 days from receipt of this communication by all offices with less than 1000 Security Index cases and within 90 days by the remaining offices excepting New York, which must complete the project within six months. All offices must start the review immediately.

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SAC LETTER NO. 55-30

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6. I want you to discuss this matter fully with both Agent and Supervisory personnel and point out to them the vital necessity of studying the Security Index cases critically and objectively. Application of the new criteria to your cases will undoubtedly result in substantial reduction in the Security Index throughout the field.

7. Under the Security Index review project, each case must be analyzed as it stands. Do not request authority to interview or any other action of the Bureau in the memoranda submitted in the review project. Interviews already authorized should be conducted and the results considered under the review project, but they must not delay submission of recommendations regarding Security Index status by the deadline date.

B. Security Index Criteria

Effective at once, the addition to and retention of names in the Security Index shall be governed by the following criteria:

1. No name shall be added to or retained in the Security Index unless one or more of the following situations has been established through investigation:

(a.) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(b.) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organization within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(c.) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon

4/12/55

SAC LETTER NO. 55-30

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the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(d.) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the United States in time of emergency.

2. In evaluating interviews insofar as Security Index status is concerned you should be guided as follows:

(a.) Whenever a subject of a security investigation by a positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicates a continued adherence to the doctrines, aims or purposes of a revolutionary organization or a front organization, the positive statement shall be considered an overt act on the part of the subject in establishing continued adherence.

(b.) Other than as indicated above, interviews with Security Index subjects or potential Security Index subjects are not to be considered as factors requiring the placing or retaining of names of persons on the Security Index; for example, lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not to be regarded as such factors.

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With regard to the new criteria, I want to make it exceedingly clear that item 1, (d), above, must be given strict interpretation. It is not to be construed as a "catchall" for cases not otherwise meeting Security Index standards, and there must be overwhelming evidence to support any Security Index case predicated upon the terms of item 1. (d). Further, during the Security Index review and on a continuing basis thereafter any recommendation for retention in or addition to the Security Index based upon item 1. (d) must note specifically those factors which bring the individual cases within its provisions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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4/12/55

SAC LETTER NO. 55-30



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: April 14, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 02-00 BY SP2AM/ku

SAC Letter 55-30 of 4-12-55 forwarded revised Security Index criteria to the field and reinstituted the Security Index review project.

The revised criteria are more stringent than those previously in effect, introducing specific time limits insofar as overt subversive acts are concerned. The application of the revised criteria will undoubtedly result in the removal of great numbers of subjects from the Security Index. In many cases the subjects will be removed from the Security Index even though there is no indication of defection on their part, if, for example, there are no overt acts within the prescribed limits. The possibility exists, of course, that some of the persons in this category are "sleepers," who have deliberately withdrawn from subversive activities. They remain potential threats and in case of an all-out emergency, their identities should be readily accessible to permit restudy of their cases.

It has been suggested that procedure be devised whereby the field may keep track of these subjects. Two possible methods may be considered: (1) By permitting the field to retain under appropriate security the cancelled Security Index cards of these subjects removed purely on the basis of application of the new criteria or (2) forwarding to the field the respective Security Index lists for each office as of March 15, 1955 (such a list is available), allowing for recourse at any time in the future to the list for reference purposes.

OBSERVATIONS:

I feel that the procedure of retaining the cancelled cards in the field is preferable. It would permit ready recourse to these cards in the event of an extreme emergency. It should be borne in mind that such procedure would be two-fold in providing for maintenance in one place of (1) the cards cancelled during the Security Index review and (2) the cards cancelled on a continuing basis when the field examines these cases in connection with periodic reports. In the latter instances, cancellations will be made when the time limits are observed to have expired.

Enclosure

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As noted above, a Security Index list, by office, could be furnished the field. For reasons of security it would require filing, rendering it more inaccessible. Further, the list would include cases removed from the Security Index because of death, permanent departure from the country, or development as sources or informants. Use of the list for future reference would involve screening out such cases. Cancelled cards of subjects in these categories would be destroyed.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, there is attached a proposed SAC Letter instructing the field to retain the cancelled cards of those former Security Index subjects who have given no actual indication of defection, in line with the foregoing. Manual changes are being prepared.

EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION:

April 18, 1955

The Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. [REDACTED], [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] for [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], on April 18, 1955, unanimously recommended approval of the attached SAC Letter.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: May 5, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2AUM/RC

SAC Letter 55-31 (0) of April 19, 1955, attached, set up procedure for the field to retain the cancelled Security Index cards previously filed in the Alphabetical Section in the field when subjects are removed solely because they do not meet the new criteria. The field was instructed to mark "CANCELLED" on each such card.

The field has two Security Index cards - one is in all cases filed alphabetically and in most cases the second is filed geographically with descriptive data and a photograph affixed to the reverse sides. In some cases the second card is not filed in the Geographical Section but is filed instead in the Special Section (if employed by Federal Government, United Nations, et cetera) or Unavailable Section (if imprisoned, out of the country, or missing).

We specified that the field retain the cancelled alphabetical card (having no descriptive data on reverse sides) on these considerations: (1) The principal purpose of the procedure is to retain administrative control over the identities of the cases and for that reason it was felt that the cancelled Alphabetical Section cards were sufficient; (2) We sought to avoid the possibility, however slight, of the use of the cancelled cards during the stress of extreme emergency, it being noted that the active cards with descriptive data will actually be handed to Agents to make arrests and (3) as times pass, the descriptive data on the reverse sides of the cards (as of the date of cancellation) will become outdated. Some of the descriptive items are subject to change, such as directions to residences and normal changes in physical appearance.

Newark and San Francisco Offices have suggested that the descriptive material on the reverse sides of the cancelled Security Index cards (those previously filed in the Geographical, Special or Unavailable Sections in the field) be retained instead of the cancelled alphabetical cards. They state that this practice will avoid time consumed in returning photographs to the case files and that recourse can be had to the cards to assist in identifying unknown Security subjects.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OBSERVATIONS:

Although our original considerations in specifying the alphabetical card are still applicable, if the procedure suggested by the above offices will actually help the field in their investigative work, then it should be adopted. There is a strong possibility, of course, that some of the subjects of cancelled cards are actually deliberately refraining from open subversive activity. They may very well turn up again as our investigations continue. On this basis, I see no objection to allowing the field to retain the cancelled cards bearing photographs and descriptive data on the backs.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you agree the SAC Letter, attached, will go forward amending procedure in line with the foregoing observations. Manual change also attached.

(O) SECURITY INDEX -- Refer to SAC Letter 55-30 of April 12, 1955. Application of the revised criteria will result in substantial reduction in Security Index cases. Some subjects will be removed from the Security Index even though there is no affirmative indication of defection from the Communist Party or other subversive groups. To allow for ready reference to such cases, the following procedure is to be followed:

1) When subjects are removed from the Security Index solely on the basis of application of the revised criteria, either during the Security Index review project or thereafter as cases

4/19/55

SAC LETTER NO. 55-31

- 7 -

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

are reviewed in the field, retain the Security Index cards pertaining to such subjects previously filed in the alphabetical section.

2) Mark "CANCELLED" across the face of each such card.

3) File the cards together in the same manner as utilized for active Security Index cards, clearly labeling the box or other suitable repository: "CANCELLED SECURITY INDEX CARDS."

4) If the subject of any of these cancelled Security Index cards (a) is subsequently developed as a source (b) becomes an informant (c) otherwise indicates complete defection from subversive groups or (d) is redesignated for the Security Index under the revised criteria, remove and destroy the cancelled Security Index card.

Disposition of cancelled cards of subjects removed from the Security Index for other reasons is covered in the Manual of Instructions, 87C 7b (10) and remains unchanged.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

4/19/55  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-31

- 8 -

(N) SECURITY INDEX - Refer to SAC Letter 55-31 (O) of April 19, 1955, regarding retention of cancelled Security Index cards. The procedure outlined therein is hereby amended to provide for retention of the cards previously filed in the Geographical, Special or Unavailable Sections of the Security Index. This will permit recourse to the data on the reverse sides of these cards for assistance in security investigations. The cards previously filed in the Alphabetical Section will be destroyed. Further, those offices maintaining two sets of geographical cards under provisions of Manual of Instructions, Sec. 87C, 7b.(6)(b) I., page 30c, should, of course, retain but one card in each instance, destroying the second geographical card as well as the card previously filed in the Alphabetical Section. The cancelled cards retained under this procedure should be filed alphabetically. It will not be necessary to affix descriptive data to reverse sides of cancelled alphabetical cards filed under terms of referenced SAC Letter prior to receipt of this communication. It is imperative that the word "CANCELLED" be marked clearly on the face of each of the cards retained under this procedure.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

5/17/55  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-35

- 6 -



(L) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS -- In response to certain suggestions made by field representatives at the Internal Security - Espionage Conference held at the Seat of Government, October 22 - 23, 1956, the following instructions are to be placed into effect immediately:

10-30-56

SAC LETTER NO. 56-56

- 8 -

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

C. Communist Index

The Communist Index, which was established a number of years ago, has grown unwieldy and is serving very little purpose today. In order that we may obtain maximum benefit from this Index, you should take the following steps, utilizing those Security Index cards which have been cancelled by application of the revised Security Index criteria since April, 1955, as a base:

1. Add Communist Index cards to the above on individuals currently under investigation when, following completion thereof, the information developed does not justify the inclusion of the subject's name in the Security Index when there is evidence of:

a. Membership in a basic revolutionary organization over five years ago, together with some indication of continuing sympathy for the communist movement within the past five years and no reliable evidence of defection.

10-30-56  
SAC LETTER NO. 56-56

- 10 -

b. Unverified allegations of such membership within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period.

c. Leadership in a substantial capacity in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity or sympathy for the subversive cause within the past three years and no reliable evidence of disaffection.

d. Current subversive front membership and/or activity, together with evidence of sympathy for the subversive cause or antagonism toward the present form of Government not warranting placing on the Security Index.

2. Review those cases opened and subsequently closed without the subject's names being included in the Security Index since April 15, 1955, and include in the Communist Index the names of those individuals falling in the above categories.

3. Include in this Index the names of individuals deleted from the Security Index in the future by application of the Security Index criteria.

This Index should represent those persons who should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view toward possible investigation, interrogation or action at some future date. It should serve as an administrative aid and working index, reflecting a central repository of the names of individuals having sympathy or affiliation with the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary groups.

Each card should contain as a minimum the following:

1. Name and aliases.
2. Office file number.

10-30-56

SAC LETTER NO. 56-56

- 11 -

3. Membership and position or association in the subversive group or groups, together with the source and date of the information.

4. Residence.

5. Citizenship.

6. Employment.

The Index card should be prepared on 5 x 8 inch plain white cards and should be maintained alphabetically. However, if you desire to utilize it as an investigative aid, it may be set up by geographical area in conformance with your integrated investigative system. This should be done only with Bureau concurrence.

When the above steps have been taken, destroy the remaining cards presently contained in your Communist Index.

Expend no investigative or administrative efforts to keep the cards in an up-to-date status. However, destroy all cards on individuals who subsequently become security informants or sources, or subjects of Security Index cards.

You should advise the Bureau when the above has been accomplished. If not completed within 60 days, submit a status letter.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: June 11, 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/ew

SAC Letter 53-30 dated 5/1/53 provided for the establishment of the Unavailable Section of the Security Index (SI) to include, among other things, a section dealing with SI subjects imprisoned. Instructions went forth that, henceforth, no SI card will be cancelled by reason of a subject's having been imprisoned regardless of the length of time he will be incarcerated. SI cards of such subjects are to be maintained in the Unavailable Section tabbed "Imprisoned." This action was in the form of an administrative device to insure that such cases were not lost, it being recognized that while imprisoned these subjects would, of course, not be subject to apprehension. The retention of these names in the Unavailable Section is, of course, supplemented by stops placed with prison officials to insure that we are advised of the imminent release from prison of these individuals and places no additional burden on the Bureau should we be called upon to institute the Emergency Detention Program as the only action required at that time would be the placing of detainers against their release. In this connection, we presently have included in the Unavailable Section tabbed "Imprisoned" 97 individuals serving sentences ranging from a few months to life.

By memoranda dated 6/5/58 in the cases concerning [REDACTED], FBI file [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], FBI file [REDACTED], Department noted that in connection with its review of SI cases the cases on these two individuals had been reviewed. It further noted that each subject is presently serving a life sentence as a result of his participation in the 10/50 Nationalist revolt in Puerto Rico and, therefore, it was believed neither presented a potential threat to the internal security as long as his confinement continued, adding that it was the conclusion of the Department that their names should be removed from the SI. Department requested to be advised of the release from prison of these individuals in order that the cases could be reconsidered for inclusion in the SI at that time.

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman  
Re: EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM

OBSERVATIONS:

The Department is not aware of our reasons for keeping the names of imprisoned subjects on the SI nor the manner in which such cases are handled administratively. We, of course, recognize that these individuals constitute no potential danger as long as they are incarcerated. The fact of imprisonment, while it makes it temporarily physically impossible for the individual to do harm, has no bearing on his subversive or revolutionary beliefs and he remains a person who will be dangerous to the security of the country upon release. Therefore, we feel that our present practice of retaining their names on the Index in the Unavailable Section is preferable to deleting their names entirely from the SI and subsequently reconsidering the cases after their release, which could conceivably cause delay in prompt apprehension of a dangerous individual at the time of an emergency.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we advise the Department of our procedure in connection with imprisoned SI subjects, pointing out that, unless the Department raises objections to such procedures, we will continue to carry the names of imprisoned subjects on the SI. If you agree, there is attached a proposed letter to the Department.



~~SECRET~~

Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

June 13, 1958

Director, FBI

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND  
DETENTION OF PERSONS CONSIDERED  
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC  
SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RW  
ON 10-12-00

Reference is made to Department memoranda dated June 5, 1958, in the cases of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], subjects of FBI files [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], respectively.

In connection with these cases, the Department noted that each subject is presently serving a life sentence as a result of his participation in the October, [REDACTED], Nationalist revolt in [REDACTED], adding that, therefore, their names should be deleted from the Security Index inasmuch as it did not appear that either presented a potential threat as long as his confinement continued.

We have continued to maintain in the Security Index the names of individuals incarcerated. This is done primarily for administrative purposes, it being recognized that the potential of these individuals for danger to the internal security is in abeyance while incarceration continues. Their names are placed in an "Unavailable Section" of the Security Index tabbed "Imprisoned." This enables us to maintain administrative control over these cases without the expenditure of any appreciable effort. In this connection, it is noted that, should we be required to apprehend all individuals whose names are included in the Security Index, no actual attempt would be made to physically apprehend all those individuals whose names are included in the Security Index, Unavailable Section, tabbed "Imprisoned." The only action that would be necessary would be the placing of a detainer against such individual's release.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

**Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division**

Further, by this means, should an emergency occur shortly after the release of one of these individuals, he could be apprehended immediately. If his name had been deleted from the Security Index because of imprisonment, some loss of time in a period of danger might occur until the mechanics of again including his name therein could be accomplished, thus delaying such apprehension.

For the above reasons and unless the Department interposes objections to such procedure, we will continue to maintain the names of imprisoned Security Index subjects as indicated above.

SECRET

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: June 19 1958

FROM : J. Walter Yeagley, Acting Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security DivisionSUBJECT: Program for Apprehension and Detention of Persons  
Considered Potentially Dangerous to the National  
Defense and Public Safety of the United States

Reference is made to your memorandum of June 13, 1958 regarding [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], subjects of FBI files [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], respectively. Both are presently serving life sentences due to their participation in the October 1950 Nationalist revolt in Puerto Rico and the names of both are included in the Security Index. Department memoranda of June 5, 1958 instructed the deletion of the name of each in view of their incarceration for life.

In view of the administrative considerations set forth in your memorandum in support of maintaining the names of incarcerated persons in the Security Index, the Department interposes no objection thereto and will be guided accordingly in the future. Further, since the same considerations would seem to be applicable to security index subjects who are physically unavailable for apprehension for reasons other than imprisonment, it would be appreciated if the Bureau would advise the Department of any other tabbed categories in the "Unavailable Section." This is desired for the guidance of the Department in the sampling review of Security Index cases.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

June 25, 1958

Director, FBI

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND  
DETENTION OF PERSONS CONSIDERED  
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC  
SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RW  
ON 10-12-00

Reference is made to Department memorandum of June 19, 1958, captioned as above.

The Unavailable Section of the Security Index contains the names of individuals falling within two categories in addition to imprisoned subjects. These categories are individuals travelling abroad and missing subjects.

When it is determined that a Security Index subject is travelling abroad, the Security Index card maintained in his case is placed in the Unavailable Section of the Security Index tabbed "Out of the Country."

A Security Index card maintained in an individual case is placed in the Unavailable Section tabbed "Missing" only by reason of information developed indicating that the subject has deliberately absented himself from his previous environment and contacts to avoid detection, has gone into hiding, or is working clandestinely in an underground capacity. Individuals in this category are, of course, under continuous investigation in efforts to ascertain their whereabouts and activities as expeditiously as possible.

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# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 30, 1958

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

Upon completion of the Security Index review in October, 1955, we had approximately 12,870 names included in the Security Index (SI). Today there are 12,924 names included therein. The initial review was deemed essential to insure that all cases were sound as the Department had advised it was unable to review these cases, thus leaving the FBI, in effect, the sole judge as to who was to be included in the SI. Consideration was also given to the fact that in excess of 98% of these individuals are citizens of the United States. Specific criteria were established at the inception of the review as guidelines to be utilized in determining a subject's potential dangerousness. These criteria continue to be used as guidelines in connection with additions to, retention in and deletions from the SI.

Every SI case is subjected to a penetrative review in the Subversive Control Section not only upon receipt of periodic reports required in these cases but in each instance that a case comes up for review on tickler or otherwise. In connection therewith, our basic objective is to insure that we have included therein those individuals who would constitute a potential threat in time of emergency and each review of a security case is approached from this standpoint. Our criteria are sufficiently elastic to permit the retention of an individual's name in the SI when facts developed depict him as a dangerous individual even though evidence is lacking of membership and activity in a revolutionary organization within prescribed periods. These cases are critically analyzed with this fact in mind in every instance.

We do not take steps to remove a name from the SI immediately upon determining that he is no longer a member of a prescribed organization. Many individuals in recent years belonging to the extreme left-wing or the right wing of the Communist Party (CP) have publicly severed connection with the Party; however, many of these individuals remain confirmed Marxists and represent a potential threat and are retained in the SI. A classic example is that of ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ and member of the right-wing faction of the CP who publicly resigned from the Party. He is a confirmed Marxist, a communist and a threat to the internal security of the United States.

Enclosure

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Memorandum for Mr. Belmont  
Re: SECURITY INDEX

Interviews with security subjects are taken into consideration in connection with these reviews; for example, a positive statement to interviewing Agents indicating continued adherence to aims and purposes of a revolutionary organization is considered an overt act within the SI criteria. A negative interview in and of itself is not considered an overt act for placing or retaining a name in the SI in the absence of other specific facts indicating such action. However, refusal to cooperate is certainly taken into consideration along with other facts in arriving at a determination of the dangerousness of an individual.

As an example of the importance we attach to the SI program and the thoroughness with which we approach this problem, each recommendation for addition to the SI is thoroughly analyzed on three separate levels of operation within the Section with the final decision being made at the Section Chief level except in borderline cases which are referred to you. Conversely, no individual's name is removed from the SI solely on review of one supervisor. Each such case is critically and carefully analyzed at more than one level. We feel that these steps are essential to insure that this Index is maintained in the best possible condition should it become necessary to institute the Emergency Detention Program (EDP). Attached are the basic criteria we utilize in analyzing SI cases. It should be noted that item (4) of the criteria is relied on heavily in analyzing these cases in the absence of evidence of overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within specific time limits.

Problems dealing with the SI and the EDP have been approached with the clear understanding that the world situation is in a most critical period and that the EDP is the basic cornerstone of our entire operations in the security field in the event of a sudden emergency. Plans for effecting the apprehension and detention of SI subjects are in a high state of readiness and geared for instantaneous action. The presidential proclamation that would "trigger" the EDP has been reviewed and approved by the President. This proclamation is contained in the "Emergency Kit" of the President awaiting only his signature should an emergency arise.



Memorandum for Mr. Belmont  
Re: SECURITY INDEX

OBSERVATIONS:

In connection with the SI and application of the SI criteria thereto, these criteria are practical and workable provided they are not accepted blindly. The fact that we adhere to the basic principle, namely, is this person potentially dangerous in the event of an emergency, is clearly reflected by the fact that we repeatedly deny requests from the field to remove people from the Index. We are able to do this by liberal interpretation and application of criterion number (4) which places weight on the past activities of a subject and his potential threat arising as a result of such past activities.

ACTION:

We will continue to afford the SI cases careful attention and will continue to critically analyze each such case with respect to addition to, retention in or deletion from the SI. Our plans for implementing the EDP have been, are and will continue to be under constant review to insure the adequacy thereof.

CRITERIA FOR PLACING AND RETAINING NAMES  
IN THE SECURITY INDEX

- 1) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- 2) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organizations within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants or individuals.
- 3) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- 4) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the U.S. in time of emergency.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: October 2, 1958

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
COMMUNIST INDEX  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C.ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 6/2/00 BY SP2 MJA/RW

SAC Letter 56-56 (L), 10-30-56, set up procedures for the Communist Index (CI). The purpose was to eliminate cases which had no substance and to establish a reservoir of subjects who, in the light of ever-changing conditions, should continually be borne in mind with a view toward possible future investigations under the Security Index (SI) Program. The Communist Index Program has been followed closely. It is now the correct time to give closer consideration to each of these individual cases because of the present international tensions coupled with the planned reconstitution of the Communist Party (CP) around newly developed issues. Analysis and investigation of each of these cases should be most productive in the development of informants; in the development of new evidence to strengthen the SI; and the identification of subjects who, while they have dropped from the CP in a bookkeeping sense on the basis of the Khrushchey revelations, still retain a militant communist attitude.

The Washington Field, Newark, and New York Offices were contacted and advised they have, respectively, 360, 670, and 4600 CI cases. Each of these three offices advised they considered this a most desirable program. The reopening and investigation of these cases will be made in equal monthly divisions for one year. We are instructing the field to submit statistics and accomplishments quarterly. This program will be followed closely and completed 10-15-59.

## ACTION:

If you agree, the attached letter to all Special Agents in Charge will be transmitted.

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. MOHR

DATE: 12/5/58

FROM : H. L. EDWARDS

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2ALM/RW

During Domestic Intelligence Division inspection the Subversive Control Section was found to have excessive administrative overhead due to the amount of supervisory time being spent in administrative type functions compared to actual supervision of investigative matters. One of the factors contributing to this condition was the review of each field recommendation concerning additions to the Security Index on 4 levels in the Section whereas 3 levels would be sufficient and, in fact, record approval existed for review on only 3 levels in the ordinary case.

The attached memorandum from the Domestic Intelligence Division sets forth the present handling of recommendations for inclusion in, continuance on, or deletion from the Security Index. Included therein is the procedure now being followed of having all field recommendations for additions to the Security Index approved by the SOG Supervisor on the substantive desk, his Supervisor in Charge, and on the Section Chief level. Prior to the inspection there was an unnecessary intermediate level between the Supervisor in Charge and the Section Chief wherein one person also passed on all such recommendations for coordination purposes whereas coordination on Section Chief level would have been adequate. Of course, in any questionable cases where such action is warranted, the recommendations are forwarded to the Branch Chief, Assistant Director and higher.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached memorandum of the Domestic Intelligence Division setting forth the mechanics of evaluating and re-evaluating Security Index cases be approved as sound and consistent with the findings of the recent inspection.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: December 3, 1958

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/ku

The Security Index (SI) today contains names of 12,838 persons who are included therein because it has been determined they represent a potential danger to the internal security of the U.S. in event of an emergency. Additions to SI are made daily as information is developed indicating such potential dangerousness on part of individuals being investigated.

The placing of an individual's name in SI does not, of course, mean that, having once been adjudged dangerous, he permanently remains so. Developments in the international situation and other factors cause change of viewpoint in many Communist Party members. It consequently is necessary to constantly re-evaluate each case to be certain the individual continues to represent a danger and to remove his name from the Index if he no longer does so.

This re-evaluation is made in each case at least yearly upon submission of the annual report and more frequently if and when the case comes up for attention on tickler or otherwise. The field is required, in submitting the annual report, to furnish its recommendation, with reasons therefor, as to continuation in or deletion from the SI. The supervisor on the substantive desk reviews the report, the field's recommendation and the entire file to arrive at his conclusion in this regard. If deletion is recommended or if facts justifying the recommendation for retention are not completely clear, the supervisor refers the matter to the supervisor in charge of his unit who makes his independent review and determination concerning the case. In those cases in which facts clearly indicate the correct conclusion as to retention of the individual in the SI or deletion of his name therefrom, the final determination is made at this level. In the event, however, there are differences of opinion as to the merits of the case or where any appreciable room for doubt exists, then the matter is passed on by the supervisor in charge for determination by the Section Chief and, in some cases, by the Assistant Director. In those instances in which the Bureau disagrees with the field's recommendation for deletion, a letter advising the field of specific reasons for the Bureau's action is sent to the Assistant Director and in cases in which special questions exist to the Associate Director for approval prior to transmittal. A letter advising field of cancellation contrary to its recommendation and reasons for such action is sent to field from Section Chief level, unless special problem exists, in which event the letter clears through the office of the Assistant Director.

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.



Memorandum to Mr. Belmont  
Re: SECURITY INDEX

Recommendations for the addition of a new name to the Security Index are handled in the same fashion as above except that final determination to include the individual's name on the Security Index can only be made at the Section Chief level or higher. Thus, recommendations for additions to the Index receive three considerations in the section. It is believed desirable and necessary that this practice be followed inasmuch as the inclusion of an individual's name on the Security Index means that in the event of an emergency, he will be immediately apprehended and detained under the provisions of the Emergency Detention Program, which provisions provide for no recourse to the courts and provide for detention without right to the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Any case being considered, whether for addition to the Index or either retention in or deletion therefrom, which presents particular complexities, is referred to the Assistant Director by memorandum for decision as to the Security Index status of the subject.

The foregoing outlines the mechanics by which consideration is given to the Security Index status of the subjects of cases. In such considerations, the criteria established in April, 1955, to measure potential dangerousness are utilized as guides in arriving at the correct answer to the essential question, "Does this individual represent a potential danger to internal security in the time of emergency." This determination is made taking into consideration all the facts developed in the individual case that would have bearing on a subject's potential dangerousness regardless of whether the evidence developed is of a legally admissible nature, or is obtained from inadmissible sources or is a combination thereof. While we make every attempt to develop legally admissible evidence in these cases, we do not insist that a determination of a subject's potential dangerousness rest solely on such evidence. In each instance in which we add a name to the Index or retain a name in the Index, the case is fully reviewed to insure that we have proof to substantiate our belief that the individual presents a potential threat to the internal security. The criteria afford practical and workable assistance in arriving at a conclusion and are sufficiently elastic so that, when applied with the necessary judgment, the complex questions which arise can be resolved. The present criteria are well devised for this purpose. They were not intended to be nor can they or any other criteria be rigid rules since the ultimate point to be determined is not whether a case fits a particular rule, but whether the subject of the case represents a danger. Copy of criteria attached.



Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

Re: SECURITY INDEX

ACTION:

If you approve, we will continue the mechanics described above in re-evaluating Security Index cases, utilizing the present criteria to arrive at the ultimate decision as to potential dangerousness of the subject.

CRITERIA FOR PLACING AND RETAINING  
NAMES IN THE SECURITY INDEX

- 1) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- 2) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organizations within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants or individuals.
- 3) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- 4) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the U.S. in time of emergency.

## Office Memorandum • UNITEL • GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 10, 1959

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST INDEXALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP3AMJRW

Bulet of 10/2/58 issued instructions to the field with respect to re-examination of cases of all individuals whose names are included in the Communist Index (CI), this re-examination to be conducted in equal monthly installments over a 12-month period. This Index is designed to represent a list of individuals who should, in the light of ever-changing conditions, be continually borne in mind with a view toward possible investigation under the Security Index (SI) program.

In connection with this program, we instructed the field to submit certain statistics on a quarterly basis. Reports from all offices are in and tangible results obtained to date from the above program are as follows:

- 1) The names of 11 individuals have been added to the SI based on investigations conducted under this program.
- 2) The field has developed four security informants or potential security informants.
- 3) 14 individuals were found to be employed in sensitive positions requiring additional investigation or dissemination on our part.

At the inception of this program, there were 17,783 names included in the CI and approximately one-fourth of this total would have been handled by the field as of 1/15/59.

In addition to the results tabulated under items 1, 2 and 3 above, there have been a number of cooperative interviews resulting from investigations conducted under this program. Cooperative interviews under this program produce additional intelligence data, provide sources of information, and provide a potential reservoir of possible witnesses in various type hearings even though interviewees may not be potential security informants.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont  
Re: COMMUNIST INDEX

Review to date of this Index has resulted in the purging of the names of 825 individuals who are either deceased, whose names have been returned to the SI, or who otherwise do not qualify for inclusion in the CI. This, in effect, insures that this Index will, upon completion of the re-examination, contain only individuals who should properly be included therein.

OBSERVATIONS:

The results obtained to date as enumerated above fully justify the time and effort necessarily involved in this re-examination of the CI.

ACTION:

Submitted for information. We will continue to pursue this program and you will be advised of additional results obtained upon receipt of the next quarterly report from the field which is due on 4/15/59.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 29, 1959

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST INDEX

Bureau letter of 10-2-58 issued instructions to the field to re-examine cases of all individuals whose names are included in the Communist Index (CI), this re-examination to be conducted in equal monthly installments over a twelve-month period. The CI is designed to represent a list of individuals who should, in the light of ever-changing conditions, be continually borne in mind with a view toward possible investigation under the Security Index Program.

The field was instructed to submit certain statistics in connection with the program on a quarterly basis. Reports received from the field offices for the period 1-15 to 4-15-59 have been reviewed and they show the following statistical results:

1. The names of 30 individuals have been added to the Security Index based on investigations conducted over this period. (During the period ending 1-15-59 11 individuals were so added)
2. The field has under development 15 security informants or potential security informants. (For the period ending 1-15-59 this figure was 4)
3. Sixty-three individuals were found to be employed in sensitive positions requiring additional investigation or dissemination on our part. (For the period ending 1-15-59 this figure was 14)

At the inception of the program, 17,783 names were included in the CI. Reviews conducted during the period 1-15-59 to 4-15-59 resulted in the purging of the names of 1,285 individuals from the CI. (This figure for the period ending 1-15-59 was 825) It has been ascertained that these individuals are either deceased, their names returned to the Security Index, or otherwise do not qualify for inclusion in the CI. Continuation of the program and consequent further elimination of unqualified individuals from the CI will assure that the CI contains the names only of individuals to be properly included therein.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont  
Re: COMMUNIST INDEX

In addition to the statistical results reported above, other advantages have resulted from the program. Cooperative interviews have been obtained in some instances. Each case opened results in obtaining as a minimum current information as to residence and employment addresses of the subject and brings up to date our information concerning the subject's activity.

OBSERVATIONS:

The results being obtained from this program justify the time and effort necessarily involved in re-examination of the CI, which lists the individuals who, next to Security Index subjects, present the greatest potential threat to internal security.

ACTION:

We will continue to follow this program and you will be advised of the results obtained upon receipt of the next quarterly report from the field which is due 7-15-59.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 30, 1959

FROM : Mr. J. F. Blahut

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST INDEX

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP2ALM/R

The Communist Index (CI) was designed to represent a list of individuals who should, in the light of ever-changing conditions, be continually borne in mind with a view toward possible investigation under the Security Index (SI) program. Bulet of 10/2/58 issued instructions to the field to re-examine cases of individuals whose names are included in the CI, the re-examination to be conducted in equal monthly installments over a 12-month period.

Quarterly reports were required of the field in connection with this program and reports received from the field for the period from 4/15 to 7/15/59 have been reviewed and they show the following statistical results:

- 1) The names of 32 individuals have been added to the SI based on investigations conducted over this period. (During the previous quarter, the names of 30 individuals were so added.)
- 2) The field has under development eight security informants or potential security informants. (For the period ending 4/15/59, this figure was 15.)
- 3) 66 individuals were found to be employed in key facilities and/or sensitive positions, requiring additional investigation or dissemination on our part. (For the period ending 4/15/59, this figure was 63.)

At the inception of the program, there were 17,783 names included in the CI. Reviews during the past nine months have resulted in the removal of 4,768 names, with the CI containing at present 13,015 names. These 4,768 individuals are either deceased, their names returned to the SI, or otherwise do not qualify for inclusion in the CI. Continuation of the program and consequent further elimination of unqualified individuals from the CI will assure that the CI contains the names only of individuals to be properly included therein.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont  
Re: COMMUNIST INDEX

In addition to the above statistical results, other advantages have resulted from the program. Cooperative interviews have been obtained in many instances. Each case opened results in the obtaining of, as a minimum, current residence and employment, thus bringing up to date our information concerning the subject's activities. For example, during this past quarter, the New York Office handled 1,369 CI cases. Of this number, it was found that 557 of the individuals had changed either residence or employment or both with an additional 46 individuals having moved to other field office territories, necessitating changes in office of origin.

OBSERVATIONS:

The results being obtained from this program justify the time and effort necessarily involved in re-examination of the CI. This Index lists individuals who, next to SI subjects, present the greatest potential threat to the internal security.

ACTION:

This program will be followed and you will be advised of the final results obtained upon completion of the program on 10/15/59.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 18, 1959

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX --  
TABULATION BY EMPLOYMENTALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 6-13-00 BY SP2AM/ku

In accordance with instructions contained in Bureau letter of 7/17/59, the field has completed an analysis of the employment of Security Index (SI) subjects whose subversive affiliations or associations are communist or other Marxist-Leninist organizations or front groups. The results of this analysis, which are set forth by fields of industry or service, are as follows:

- 1) Industrial, manufacturing and trade fields -- 5,169 -- 43.1%.
- 2) Professional and Cultural fields -- 2,676 -- 22.3%.
- 3) Labor unions (actual employment by the labor union) -- 286 -- 2.4%.
- 4) Subversive organizations and fronts -- 185 -- 1.6%.
- 5) Political and international organizations and domestic and foreign government establishments -- 93 -- .8%.
- 6) Miscellaneous (domestic service, odd jobs, housewives, individuals not gainfully employed, students, and retired persons) -- 3,573 -- 29.8%.

Attached is a chart representing a statistical breakdown setting forth specific areas of employment as obtained from the above analysis.

These statistics will not be current for any appreciable length of time inasmuch as the individuals studied in connection with this survey change employment frequently.

ACTION:

information.

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI;

~~EMPLOYMENT OF POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS~~  
~~INDIVIDUALS BY FIELDS OF INDUSTRY OR SERVICE~~

1. Industry, Manufacturing and Trade Fields

A. Basic Industrial and Manufacturing Fields

Aircraft, including parts and related material . . . . .	37
Alloy industry, not classified elsewhere.	11
Automotive manufacturing, including parts and related material . . . . .	177
Bearings and gears production . . . . .	8
Chemicals, drugs, plastics, paints, rayon and related industries . . . . .	144
Communications (telephone, telegraph, radio and television). . . . .	34
Construction equipment manufacturing. . .	12
Construction field (all types). . . . .	444
Electrical and electronic industries, including radio and radar production.	170
Engines, turbines, pumps, related material and parts . . . . .	24
Instruments, gauges and related products.	44
Machinery, tool and die manufacturing, not classified elsewhere . . . . .	127
Manufacturing industries, not classified elsewhere . . . . .	222
Metal products (fabricated), not classified elsewhere . . . . .	130
Munition production and storage . . . . .	3
Photographic equipment. . . . .	6
Railway equipment . . . . .	5
Research field, not classified elsewhere.	32
Shipbuilding and related products . . . .	18
Steel, iron and metal foundries and industries, not classified elsewhere. . . . .	124
Textile and clothing. . . . .	320
Transportation-passenger and freight (air, land and water). . . . .	232
Water-front and port facilities employment, not classified elsewhere	85
Weapon production - all types . . . . .	1

*Employment of Potentially Dangerous Individuals by Fields  
of Industry or Service*

*1. Industry, Manufacturing and Trade Fields*

*B. Basic Raw Material Fields and Related Industries*

<i>Fur . . . . .</i>	<i>.35</i>
<i>Leather . . . . .</i>	<i>.42</i>
<i>Lumber industry and wood product   manufacturing. . . . .</i>	<i>.80</i>
<i>Mining and mineral (<del>conspicuous</del>) . . . . .</i>	<i>.13</i>
<i>Paper and related products. . . . .</i>	<i>.47</i>
<i>Petroleum, including production and   distribution (except public   utilities) . . . . .</i>	<i>.15</i>
<i>Rubber and related products . . . . .</i>	<i>.13</i>
<i>Stone, clay, glass and cement . . . . .</i>	<i>.25</i>
<i>Tobacco . . . . .</i>	<i>5</i>

*C. Food Production Industries and Utilities*

<i>Farming and related fields. . . . .</i>	<i>114</i>
<i>Food and dairy production and handling,   not classified elsewhere (except   farming, retail and wholesale sales   and restaurants) . . . . .</i>	<i>211</i>
<i>Public utilities (heat, light and power).14</i>	

*D. Business and Trade Fields*

<i>Business services, not classified   elsewhere. . . . .</i>	<i>360</i>
<i>Decorating, designing and painting   fields . . . . .</i>	<i>196</i>
<i>Hotels, tourist cabins, rooming houses,   apartments, office buildings, taverns,   and restaurants. . . . .</i>	<i>213</i>
<i>Laundries, cleaners and related   businesses . . . . .</i>	<i>.96</i>
<i>Printing and engraving field. . . . .</i>	<i>215</i>
<i>Retail and wholesale sales - all types -   not classified elsewhere . . . . .</i>	<i>.1018</i>
<i>Warehousing and storage facilities. . . . .</i>	<i>.47</i>

*TOTAL -- 5,169*

*Employment of Potentially Dangerous Individuals by Fields  
of Industry or Service*

2. *Professional and Cultural Fields*

<i>Advertising . . . . .</i>	<i>.90</i>
<i>Arts and music. . . . .</i>	<i>.95</i>
<i>Educational field (actual employment - students not included) . . . . .</i>	<i>457</i>
<i>Entertainment . . . . .</i>	<i>.72</i>
<i>Financial . . . . .</i>	<i>.92</i>
<i>Hospitals, clinics and nursing. . . . .</i>	<i>207</i>
<i>Insurance . . . . .</i>	<i>135</i>
<i>Legal . . . . .</i>	<i>230</i>
<i>Medical and health services . . . . .</i>	<i>288</i>
<i>Professional and semiprofessional . . . . .</i>	<i>276</i>
<i>Motion pictures . . . . .</i>	<i>.24</i>
<i>Publishing, newspaper and writing fields . . . . .</i>	<i>417</i>
<i>Real estate . . . . .</i>	<i>.80</i>
<i>Religion. . . . .</i>	<i>.27</i>
<i>Social and charitable organizations . . . . .</i>	<i>186</i>

*TOTAL* -- *2,676*

3. *Labor Unions (Actual Employment by the Labor Union)*

<i>Labor unions (actual employment by the labor union) . . . . .</i>	<i>286</i>
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*TOTAL* -- *286*

4. *Subversive Organizations and Fronts*

<i>Subversive organizations and fronts . . . . .</i>	<i>185</i>
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*TOTAL* -- *185*



*Employment of Potentially Dangerous Individuals by Fields  
of Industry or Service*

5. Political and International Organizations and Domestic  
and Foreign Government Establishments

Foreign government and quasi-foreign  
government establishments. . . . .18  
Political organizations - all types . . . 3  
State, county and city governments or  
services (not classified elsewhere). .67  
United Nations or other international  
organizations. . . . . 2  
United States Government employees. . . . 3

TOTAL -- 93

6. Miscellaneous (Domestic Service, Odd Jobs, Individuals  
not Gainfully Employed, Housewives, and Retired Persons)

Domestic services . . . . .66  
Unemployed or not gainfully employed,  
including retired persons, house-  
wives, students, et cetera . . . . .3223  
Unknown employment (investigation  
pending) . . . . . 121  
Odd jobs and odd industries . . . . . 163

TOTAL -- 3,573

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: November 5, 1959

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST INDEX

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/PL

The Communist Index (CI) was designed to represent a list of individuals who should, in the light of ever-changing conditions, be continually borne in mind with a view toward possible investigation under the Security Index (SI) program. Bulet of 10-2-58 issued instructions to the field to re-examine cases of individuals whose names are included in the CI, the re-examination to be conducted in equal monthly installments over a 12-month period.

The field was required to submit quarterly reports concerning progress being made.

Final reports have now been received from the field in connection with this program. Such reports have been reviewed and they show that the following statistical results were achieved during the year that the program was in effect:

- 1) The names of 120 individuals were added to the SI based on investigations conducted in the program.
- 2) Initiation of the development of 28 security informants or potential security informants was accomplished.
- 3) 249 individuals were found to be employed in key facilities and/or sensitive positions, requiring additional investigation or dissemination on our part.

In addition to the statistical results set out above, other advantages have resulted from the program. Each case opened resulted, as a minimum, in the obtaining of current residence and employment data, thus bringing up to date our information concerning the subject. It was found that a considerable number of the individuals on the CI had changed either residence or employment and, therefore, as a result of the program, our information concerning them is in a much more nearly current state.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont  
RE: COMMUNIST INDEX

In addition, the names of a considerable number of individuals ascertained to have died or otherwise not qualified for inclusion in the CI, were removed from such Index. At the inception of the program there were 17,783 names included in the CI. At the present time such Index contains the names of 12,784 individuals. The program has thus been of benefit in purging the Index of individuals no longer qualified for inclusion therein, thereby resulting in making the Index a more workable one.

It is to be noted that at the recent Internal Security - Espionage Conference, 10/22-23/59, the CI was the subject of discussion. The Conference felt that a periodic re-examination of the CI would be a desirable thing to do if and when manpower commitments and other urgent matters would permit, and recommended that the matter of such a re-examination again be considered at the next Internal Security - Espionage Conference.

ACTION:

For information. We will continue to follow the status of the CI and at the time of the next Internal Security - Espionage Conference, or at such other time as conditions indicate it desirable, will again give consideration to re-examination of the CI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: June 3, 1960

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
COMMUNIST INDEXALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ADY/RW

Regarding the question of establishing a reserve index composed of those individuals whose activities in subversive organizations do not quite bring them within the Security Index (SI) criteria, the following proposals are offered.

Each field office presently maintains a Communist Index (CI) separate and apart from the SI designed to represent those individuals who should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view toward possible investigation, interrogation or action at some future date. We propose to rename this index the "Reserve Index." It is felt that this name would be more descriptive as this Index also contains the names of individuals formerly affiliated with subversive organizations other than the Communist Party (CP).

We recognize that some individuals included in this Index represent a greater potential threat than others. For example, individuals in public life who are in a position to exert considerable influence, such as professors who teach the CP line, present more of a threat than would a common laborer. A similar situation exists in connection with our SI and we have taken steps to identify such individuals for priority apprehension. Therefore, in connection with the "Reserve Index," we propose to set up two sections, Section A and Section B.

Section A

We suggest that this Section include those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within the SI criteria but who, in a time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national interests or are likely to furnish financial or material aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology. Included therein

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Memorandum for Mr. Parsons  
RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
COMMUNIST INDEX

would be individuals falling within the following categories:

(1) Professors, teachers and educators; (2) Labor union organizers or leaders; (3) Writers, lecturers, newsmen and others in the mass media field; (4) Lawyers, doctors and scientists; (5) other potentially influential persons on a local or national level; (6) Individuals who could potentially furnish financial or material aid. This section could well include the names of such individuals as [redacted] and an admitted "leftist," and [redacted] who was recently fired for praising Premier Khrushchev before his history class and stating that the pilot of the U-2 plane should be executed by the Reds.

Maintenance

A reserve index of the names of those individuals falling within Section A to be prepared at the Bureau based upon the field's nomination for inclusion of individuals' names therein with a copy of the index being maintained in the field and at the Bureau the same as is done in the case of our SI cards.

We feel that the cases on these individuals should be brought up to date annually and evaluated for SI purposes or for retention in the "Reserve Index."

Section B

This Section of the "Reserve Index" would be handled as we are now handling the present CI in the individual field offices.

Standards for inclusion of names in the "Reserve Index" would, at present, be similar to the standards for inclusion in the CI now being maintained in the field offices. Attached for information is a copy of such standards.

For additional information this Index has been scheduled for discussion at the forthcoming Internal Security - Espionage Conference on June 9-10, 1960, the discussion to cover such points as the current adequacy of our standards for inclusion in the Index and the question as to whether we should establish a systematic review on a periodic basis of the cases on the individuals listed in the Index. Following discussion of this matter at the forthcoming Conference, appropriate recommendations will be submitted concerning these problems.

Memorandum for Mr. Parsons

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
COMMUNIST INDEX

ACTION:

If you approve, the presently constituted CI will be set up along the lines set forth previously herein. It is believed that by so doing we will have a special group of individuals listed therein who should receive priority consideration with respect to investigation and/or other action following the apprehension of our SI subjects.



COMMUNIST INDEX STANDARDS

I. Membership in a basic revolutionary organization over five years ago, together with some indication of continuing sympathy for the communist movement within the past five years and no reliable evidence of defection.

II. Unverified allegations of such membership within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period.

III. Leadership in a substantial capacity in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity or sympathy for the subversive cause within the past three years and no reliable evidence of disaffection.

IV. Current subversive front membership and/or activity, together with evidence of sympathy for the subversive cause or antagonism toward the present form of government not warranting placing on the Security Index.

/ V. Membership in the Nation of Islam.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY 982 AM/BWJ

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 13, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/kuSUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - RESERVE INDEX

Your memorandum to Mr. Parsons dated 6-3-60 recommended that the presently constituted Communist Index be renamed the "Reserve Index." It also recommended a division of the Index into Section A and Section B, with Section A to contain the names of those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within the Security Index criteria, but who, in a time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national interests or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology. Your recommendations with respect thereto were approved.

The Reserve Index was discussed at the Internal Security - Espionage Conference of 6/9-10/60. The Conference recommended a review of the Reserve Index at this time to include (1) verification of residence and employment and (2) file review to ascertain whether additional investigation warranted or whether an interview with the individual should be considered. During the course of this review those individuals whose names should be included in Section A are to be selected and appropriate recommendations submitted to the Bureau. The Conference felt that if additional investigation was warranted in these cases or if the file contained unreported information, reports should be submitted. The Conference recommended that the review of the Reserve Index be accomplished over a 12-month period.

The Conference considered the present standards for inclusion of individuals' names in the Reserve Index. The Conference felt that the present standards for inclusion of individuals' names in this Index should be revised in order to insure that it fully represented a list of individuals who should be considered for investigative and/or other action following apprehension of Security Index subjects. Specific standards were recommended and are attached hereto.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

*Memo to Mr. Belmont*

*RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - RESERVE INDEX*

*ACTION:*

*If you agree, there is attached a proposed SAC letter containing instructions with regard to a current review of the Reserve Index; establishment of Section A and Section B of the Reserve Index; maintenance of this Index, and investigative attention and/or other action to be afforded individuals whose names are listed therein.*

### *RESERVE INDEX STANDARDS*

- 1. Membership in a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 1949, together with some indication of sympathy or association with such an organization or a subversive front organization subsequent to the reported membership and no reliable evidence of defection.*
- 2. Investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in a revolutionary organization within the past 5 years, and coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity, association or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period, and no reliable evidence of defection.*
- 3. The individual, within the past 5 years, by his associations, writings, financial support or conduct in relation to and support of subversive organizations or the international communist movement is in a position to influence others at the time of a national emergency and no reliable evidence of defection.*
- 4. Leadership or substantial activities in a major subversive front group over 3 years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association or sympathy for the subversive cause within 3 years and no reliable evidence of defection.*
- 5. Membership in a subversive front organization within the past 3 years and no reliable evidence of defection.*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 16, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10-12-00 BY SP1AM/R

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - RESERVE INDEX

In connection with the establishment of the Reserve Index, the division of the Index into two sections, Section A and Section B, and the current review that is being instituted of the Reserve Index, details of which were set out in my memorandum of June 13, 1960, (attached) Mr. [REDACTED] commented that he thought that personal interviews with subjects under this program should be kept to a minimum. The Director agreed with this observation.

In connection with interviews of subjects of security investigations we currently require the field to obtain Bureau authority in all instances where a delicate situation exists and a greater than usual risk is involved, such as interviews with individuals employed in the newspaper, education and religious fields, radio and television industry, publishing houses and labor leaders. This requirement would virtually force the field to seek Bureau authority to interview in every instance in which an individual's name is included in Section A of the Reserve Index. To insure that we have complete control over interviews with all individuals whose names are included in Section A of the Reserve Index, Manual provisions dealing with this subject matter, presently under preparation, will specify that during the current review and during the subsequent annual review of cases of individuals whose names are included in this Section, Bureau authority must be obtained in each instance prior to interview.

ACTION:

We will closely follow this matter and in each instance in which it appears that chances of embarrassment to the Bureau as a result of an interview with one of these subjects outweigh the possible advantages to be gained from such, authority to interview will be denied.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to any person not without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 28, 1960

FROM : MR. J. F. BLAND

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP3ALM/KWSUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
SECURITY INDEX CRITERIA

Inspector [redacted] and I conferred with Departmental Attorneys [redacted] and [redacted] of the Internal Security Division on 6/27/60. The application of the Security Index (SI) criteria (attached) to the individual cases was discussed.

From the discussion it was clear that the application of the criteria by the Bureau and the Departmental attorneys reviewing the individual cases was in accord. Particular discussion surrounded the application of item (D) of the criteria. It was the consensus of opinion that this particular point of the criteria should be utilized sparingly and with sound judgment as to the potential dangerousness of the individual subject. Among the type of cases now arising are individuals with long Communist Party (CP) history although no known membership within the past five years. It was felt that this long history in the CP should be given definite weight in retaining an individual on the SI and that usually some "plus" factor will exist in the individual case such as, training in the Lenin School, service during the Spanish Civil War, leadership training or assignments or activity during the underground period of the CP in the early 1950's.

It was recognized that the facts in each individual case must of necessity govern the decision as to the retention on the SI. However, all of the individuals participating in the discussion felt that there was a meeting of the minds between the Bureau and the Department in the broad application of all four points of the SI criteria.

## ACTION:

This is being submitted as a matter of record.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*



## SECURITY INDEX CRITERIA

(A) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(B) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organizations within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(C) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(D) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the U. S. in time of emergency.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*Memorandum*

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 20, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland *JB*ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/RWSUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
RESERVE INDEX  
*g. 200*

All necessary instructions dealing with the establishment of Section A of the Reserve Index and forms to be used in connection therewith are in the hands of all field offices. We should begin to receive nominations for inclusion in Section A of the Reserve Index in the immediate future. Plans have been completed with the Statistical Voucher Section for the handling of this matter. The mechanics insofar as the handling in the Subversive Control Section will be as follows.

1) The field's nominations for inclusion in the Reserve Index, Section A, will be reviewed by the substantive case supervisor; the unit supervisor in charge and by my office with final approval on the section chief's level except very close cases which will be referred to you for a decision.

2) The field's recommendation will then be forwarded to the Statistical-Voucher Section in order that cards may be printed. Four cards are to be returned to the Subversive Control Section and will be distributed (a) 2 to the field office, (b) 1 will be filed in Room 1256 in strict alphabetical order. The remaining card will be forwarded to the SAC, Quantico, where it will be filed in alphabetical order. These cards are to be filed by the SAC, Quantico, separate and apart from our Security Index cards, a set of which is also maintained at Quantico.

3) Recommendations for deletion from the Reserve Index will be handled similarly. However, the SAC at Quantico, when notified of a deletion from the Reserve Index, should pull the card and destroy it. The card maintained at the Bureau will be destroyed.

4) Additions to, deletions from, and changes in Section A of the Reserve Index will be handled on a daily basis as is the case in connection with our Security Index cards.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

*Memorandum for Mr. Belmont*  
*Re: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -*  
*RESERVE INDEX*

*ACTION:*

*(1) If you agree, the mechanics for the handling of Section A of the Reserve Index will be as listed above.*

*(2) This memorandum should be routed to the SAC, Quantico, in order that he may perfect arrangements for the handling of these Reserve Index cards as they are received by him.*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: 9/9/60

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
RESERVE INDEXALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP3ALM/pw

We presently disseminate to the Department copies of reports in all Security Index (SI) cases and copies of reports in other than SI cases in those instances in which it appears that information contained therein would be of interest to the Department.

In connection with the Reserve Index (RI) review presently in progress, we are beginning to receive reports in those RI cases in which unreported information is contained in the files of the field offices or when active investigation is conducted.

We are establishing from the RI, Section A, composed of individuals in public life who are in a position to exert considerable influence in time of emergency and individuals who should receive priority attention following apprehension of SI subjects, including consideration for apprehension and detention.

While the Department is not aware of the existence of this Index, it is believed that investigative reports received on individuals whose names are being included in Section A of the RI should be disseminated to the Department. Should it become necessary to take action following an emergency against this group of individuals, it would be essential that the Department be in possession of investigative reports. The logical method of insuring proper dissemination would be as the reports are received.

## RECOMMENDATION:

If you agree, investigative reports on Section A RI subjects will be disseminated to the Department as received.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*Memorandum*

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 21, 1961

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

We forward to the field quarterly an alphabetical list of each office's Security Index in order that the Security Index cards maintained in the field may be checked and reconciled with Bureau records.

There is attached a proposed letter to all field offices containing appropriate instructions regarding the handling of the list.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached plastiplate of letter to all field offices be approved and forwarded.

HEREBY IS DISSEMINATED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SPALM/RW

Enclosure

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

SAC, Albany

April 24, 1961

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 6/12/00 BY SP2AM/PU

There is attached for each office an alphabetical list of its Security Index subjects (two copies for New York) prepared from the Bureau's Security Index as of April 14, 1961.

The attached list should be used to reconcile the Security Index in your office with the Security Index at the Seat of Government by checking the names on the list against the Security Index cards.

Enclosure

- |                          |                              |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| 2 - Albuquerque (Encl.)  | 2 - Miami (Encl.)            |
| 2 - Anchorage (Encl.)    | 2 - Milwaukee (Encl.)        |
| 2 - Atlanta (Encl.)      | 2 - Minneapolis (Encl.)      |
| 2 - Baltimore (Encl.)    | 2 - Mobile (Encl.)           |
| 2 - Birmingham (Encl.)   | 2 - Newark (Encl.)           |
| 2 - Boston (Encl.)       | 2 - New Haven (Encl.)        |
| 2 - Buffalo (Encl.)      | 2 - New Orleans (Encl.)      |
| 2 - Butte (Encl.)        | 2 - New York (Encl.-2)       |
| 2 - Charlotte (Encl.)    | 2 - Norfolk (Encl.)          |
| 2 - Chicago (Encl.)      | 2 - Oklahoma City (Encl.)    |
| 2 - Cincinnati (Encl.)   | 2 - Omaha (Encl.)            |
| 2 - Cleveland (Encl.)    | 2 - Philadelphia (Encl.)     |
| 2 - Dallas (Encl.)       | 2 - Phoenix (Encl.)          |
| 2 - Denver (Encl.)       | 2 - Pittsburgh (Encl.)       |
| 2 - Detroit (Encl.)      | 2 - Portland (Encl.)         |
| 2 - El Paso (Encl.)      | 2 - Richmond (Encl.)         |
| 2 - Honolulu (Encl.)     | 2 - St. Louis (Encl.)        |
| 2 - Houston (Encl.)      | 2 - Salt Lake City (Encl.)   |
| 2 - Indianapolis (Encl.) | 2 - San Antonio (Encl.)      |
| 2 - Jacksonville (Encl.) | 2 - San Diego (Encl.)        |
| 2 - Kansas City (Encl.)  | 2 - San Francisco (Encl.)    |
| 2 - Knoxville (Encl.)    | 2 - San Juan (Encl.)         |
| 2 - Las Vegas (Encl.)    | 2 - Savannah (Encl.)         |
| 2 - Little Rock (Info.)  | 2 - Seattle (Encl.)          |
| 2 - Los Angeles (Encl.)  | 2 - Springfield (Encl.)      |
| 2 - Louisville (Encl.)   | 2 - Tampa (Encl.)            |
| 2 - Memphis (Encl.)      | 2 - Washington Field (Encl.) |

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Letter to Albany  
Re: SECURITY INDEX

In checking this list against your Security Index, the following items should be considered and handled as follows:

1) If the name of a subject on the list is not included in your Security Index, you should check that subject's case file to determine his correct Security Index status. An appropriate notation should be placed adjacent to the subject's name on the enclosed list showing the correct Security Index status for the subject. If his name should be deleted from the Bureau's Security Index, the notation should refer to the previous communication from your office which recommended cancellation. If you do not have a Security Index card for the subject and a card should be in your Index, the notation should request the Bureau to forward cards to your office.

2) If this check discloses the names of subjects in your Security Index which do not appear on the list, the names of such subjects and the Bureau file number (where known) should be set forth on a separate sheet of paper with the date that the subject was recommended for inclusion in the Security Index. Instances of this nature will occur in those cases where subjects have recently been recommended for inclusion in the Index and were not included therein at the time of printing of the list but cards have subsequently been prepared at the Bureau. Instances of this nature may also occur in those cases where cancellation of a Security Index card has recently been recommended by you and you have not yet received Bureau authorization to cancel.

Letter to Albany  
Re: SECURITY INDEX

3) In checking the Special Section of your Security Index against the list, you should be certain that the subjects are in the same subdivision as those indicated on the list. Appropriate notations should be placed on the list if there are any discrepancies between your special Section and the list.

4) To avoid an increasing number of discrepancies between the list and your Security Index due to current changes being made in the Security Index, this check must be instituted immediately and completed within ten days. Upon completion, the Security Index list and appropriate notations should be returned to the Bureau by cover memorandum under instant caption.

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: June 7, 1962

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY - ESPIONAGE CONFERENCE  
MAY 28 - 29, 1962RESERVE INDEXALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-20-00 BY SP2ALM/Ka

The Reserve Index is designed to represent those persons who in the light of ever-changing conditions should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view toward possible investigation, interrogation, or other action under the Security Index program. It represents a group of individuals who, next to Security Index subjects, present the greatest potential threat to the internal security of the country in time of an emergency. Essentially, all of the individuals included therein fall within the emergency detention provisions in the Internal Security Act of 1950 as well as the emergency detention provisions of the Attorney General's Portfolio.

This Index is divided into two sections--Section A and Section B. Section A is designed to represent a special group of individuals who should receive priority consideration with respect to investigation and/or other action following apprehension of Security Index subjects. Section A is reviewed annually, the review consisting of at least verification of residence and employment and contacts with informants. Today there are 969 cases falling in the Section A category.

The Reserve Index was discussed at the Conference. The Conference felt that it would be worthwhile to examine Reserve Index-B cases at this time, noting that the last review of these cases was initiated two years ago. The examination will include verification of continued presence of the subject within the field office territory; will enable us to explore the possibilities for the development of potential witnesses, sources, and informants from among this group; will insure that we are not overlooking any presently dangerous individuals whose names should be returned to the Security Index; will enable us to explore the possibility that there are subjects contained therein who might have come to the attention of the Soviets as being qualified for and amenable to recruitment for espionage purposes, bearing in mind recent indications of utilization by the Soviets in espionage networks of individual with communist backgrounds; and will bring our knowledge concerning this group of individuals up to date.

It was proposed that this review be accomplished over a twelve-month period. Based upon estimates presented by the Conference, it would appear that the total cases involved will approximate 10,000.

Enclosure.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

Re: INTERNAL SECURITY - ESPIONAGE CONFERENCE  
MAY 28 - 29, 1962

## RESERVE INDEX

### OBSERVATIONS:

The value of the Reserve Index is directly in portion to the attention afforded it. For example, in October, 1956, it was recognized that the then Communist Index, which had received little or no attention for a number of years, had grown unwieldy and of little value. Steps were taken to purge the Index so that it truly represented a group of individuals who should be considered for investigative attention in the future and an auxiliary to the Security Index. In one office alone it resulted in a reduction from a 12,000 card Index to an Index of 1,350 individuals. Again in October, 1958, a detailed examination of this Index was initiated to extend over a one-year period. Tangible results obtained from this review included the return to the Security Index of 120 individuals based on investigations conducted under the program, the initiation of the development of 28 security informants, and the location of 249 individuals employed in key facilities and/or sensitive positions requiring additional investigation or dissemination on our part. In addition, our knowledge concerning this group was brought up to date. In June, 1960, steps were taken again to review this Index, breaking it down into Reserve Index—A and Reserve Index—B. This review was accomplished over a one-year period.

If this Index is to adequately represent the purpose for which it was established, it is deemed essential that action be taken at this time to at least take the minimum steps outlined above with respect thereto. We have in the past conducted a much more detailed review of this Index and while such would be desirable at this time, we have taken into consideration the present heavy work load with which the field is confronted in restricting our recommendations with respect thereto.

### ACTION:

If you agree, there is attached a proposed letter to Albany, copies to all offices. The original is on Plastiplate.

SAC, Albany

June 8, 1962

Director, FBI

RESERVE INDEX

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1012-00 BY SP4AM/RWJ

Institute a review of Section B of the Reserve Index. In conducting this review, the following action should be taken as a minimum:

Verify continued presence of the subject within your field office territory.

Explore the possibilities for the development of potential witnesses, sources, and informants from among this group.

Determine whether further action under the security Index program is indicated.

Examine these cases with a view toward ascertaining whether any subject might have come to the attention of the Soviets as being qualified for and amenable to recruitment for espionage purposes, bearing in mind recent developments indicating that the Soviets have under consideration the utilization of present and former members of the Communist Party for espionage purposes.

This review may be made in equal monthly installments over a period of one year. Advise the Bureau upon completion thereof.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: December 11, 1962

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2ALM/RuSUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX --  
TABULATION BY EMPLOYMENT

An analysis has been completed of the employment of Security Index subjects. The results of this analysis, which are set forth by fields of industry or service, are as follows:

- 1) Industrial, manufacturing and trade fields -- 4,285 -- 38.4%.
- 2) Professional and Cultural fields -- 2,410 -- 21.6%.
- 3) Students -- 245 -- 2.2%.
- 4) Labor unions (actual employment by the labor union) -- 187 -- 1.7%.
- 5) Subversive organizations and fronts -- 233 -- 2.1%.
- 6) Pacifist-type and racial organizations -- 16 -- .0014%.
- 7) Political and international organizations and domestic and foreign government establishments -- 164 -- 1.5%.
- 8) Miscellaneous (domestic service, odd jobs, housewives, individuals not gainfully employed, and retired persons) -- 3,625 -- 32.5%.

Attached is a chart representing a statistical breakdown setting forth specific areas of employment as obtained from the above analysis.

These statistics will not be current for any appreciable length of time inasmuch as the individuals studied in connection with this survey change employment frequently.

ACTION:

For information

Enclosure

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EMPLOYMENT OF POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS  
INDIVIDUALS BY FIELDS OF INDUSTRY OR SERVICE

1. Industry, Manufacturing and Trade Fields

A. Basic Industrial and Manufacturing Fields

Aircraft, including parts and related material . . . . .	12
Alloy industry, not classified elsewhere . . . . .	33
Automotive manufacturing, including parts and related material . . . . .	157
Bearings and gears production . . . . .	7
Chemicals, drugs, plastics, paints, rayon and related industries . . . . .	119
Communications (telephone, telegraph, radio and television) . . . . .	45
Construction equipment manufacturing . . . . .	8
Construction field (all types) . . . . .	272
Electrical and electronic industries, including radio and radar production . . . . .	125
Engines, turbines, pumps, related material and parts . . . . .	29
Instruments, gauges and related products . . . . .	51
Machinery, tool and die manufacturing, not classified elsewhere . . . . .	70
Manufacturing industries, not classified elsewhere . . . . .	102
Metal products (fabricated), not classified elsewhere . . . . .	108
Photographic equipment . . . . .	11
Railway equipment . . . . .	11
Research field, not classified elsewhere . . . . .	60
Shipbuilding and related products . . . . .	10
Steel, iron and metal foundries and industries, not classified elsewhere . . . . .	83
Textile and clothing . . . . .	231
Transportation-passenger and freight (air, land and water) . . . . .	205
Water-front and port facilities employment, not classified elsewhere . . . . .	68
Weapon production - all types . . . . .	5

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10-12-02 BY SP2 A/cy/pw

Employment of Potentially Dangerous Individuals by Fields  
of Industry or Service

I. Industry, Manufacturing and Trade Fields

B. Basic Raw Material Fields and Related Industries

Fur . . . . .	29
Leather . . . . .	39
Lumber industry and wood product manufacturing . . . . .	64
Mining and mineral . . . . .	10
Paper and related products . . . . .	56
Petroleum, including production and distribution (except public utilities) . . . . .	17
Rubber and related products . . . . .	14
Stone, clay, glass and cement . . . . .	63
Tobacco . . . . .	7

C. Food Production Industries and Utilities

Farming and related fields . . . . .	138
Food and dairy production and handling, not classified elsewhere (except farming, retail and wholesale sales and restaurants). . . . .	146
Public utilities (heat, light and power) . . . . .	15

D. Business and Trade Fields

Business services, not classified elsewhere . . . . .	324
Decorating, designing and painting fields . . . . .	179
Hotels, tourist cabins, rooming houses, apartments, office buildings, taverns, and restaurants . . . . .	258
Laundries, cleaners and related businesses . . . . .	95
Printing and engraving field . . . . .	205
Retail and wholesale sales - all types - not classified elsewhere . . . . .	763
Warehousing and storage facilities . . . . .	43

TOTAL ---- 4,285

Employment of Potentially Dangerous Individuals by Fields  
of Industry or Service

2. Professional and Cultural Fields

Advertising . . . . .	75
Arts and music . . . . .	65
Educational field (actual employment - students not included) . . . . .	523
Entertainment . . . . .	50
Financial . . . . .	90
Hospitals, clinics and nursing . . . . .	209
Insurance . . . . .	116
Legal . . . . .	227
Medical and health services . . . . .	221
Professional and semiprofessional . . . . .	198
Motion pictures . . . . .	21
Publishing, newspaper and writing fields . . . . .	340
Real estate . . . . .	92
Religion . . . . .	25
Fraternal, social and charitable organizations. . . . .	157

TOTAL ----- 2,410

3. Students

Students . . . . . 245

TOTAL ----- 245

4. Labor Unions (Actual Employment by the Labor Union)

Labor unions (actual employment by the  
labor union) . . . . . 187

TOTAL ----- 187

5. Subversive Organizations and Fronts

Subversive organizations and fronts . . . . . 233

TOTAL ----- 233

6. Pacifist-type and Racial Organizations

Pacifist-type and racial organizations . . . . . 16

TOTAL ----- 16

Employment of Potentially Dangerous Individuals by Fields  
of Industry or Service

7. Political and International Organizations and Domestic  
and Foreign Government Establishments

Foreign government and quasi-foreign government establishments . . . . .	33
Political organizations - all types . . . . .	4
State, county and city governments or services (not classified elsewhere) . . . . .	103
United Nations or other international organizations . . . . .	1
United States Government employees . . . . .	22
<u>TOTAL</u> -----	164

8. Miscellaneous (Domestic Service, odd jobs, housewives,  
Individuals not Gainfully Employed, and Retired  
Persons)

Domestic services . . . . .	55
Unemployed or not gainfully employed, including retired persons, housewives, et cetera . . . . .	3032
Unknown employment (investigations pending). . . . .	390
Odd jobs and odd industries . . . . .	148
<u>TOTAL</u> -----	3,625