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SPECIAL QUALITIES

l.	His civilian record is impressive	• 💿 -
2.	He will be a good fighting soldier	⊕ ∘ -
3.	He will make a good organiser	+ (0) -
4-	He can command others	+ 0 O
5.	He will be popular with his associates	+ 0 B
6.	He has a personality which will impress . others	+ (0) -
7.	He is considerate of others	+ (6) -
8_	He will cooperate well	⊕ ∘ - `
9_	He is tactful	+ (6) -
10.	He has stability of temperament	· 0 -
11.	He is thoroughly reliable	↔ ⑥ -
12.	He has a good sense of discipline	<u>• </u>
13	He will retain a steady morale throughout	+ 0
14-	He has self-confidence	+ 0 =
15.	He can take decisions decisively	+ 0 O
16.	He will have enthusiasm for the work	⊕ 0· -

man or or the prostruct

SPECIAL QUALITIES

17.	He has plenty of personal initiative • 0 -
18.	He is capable of acting independently • (0) -
19.	He welcomes responsibility • (0) -
20.	He is capable of assuming responsibility + 0
21.	He is an aggressive active type 0 -
22.	He has good planning ability + 0 -
23.	He is a very practical sort of mass
24.	He is a man of the world Q 0 -
25.	He will be determined and will : persever • 0 -
26_	He is clear-thinking + 0 🕣
27.	He uses his intelligence to best advantage + 0 -
28.	He is fond of risk and adventure • 0 -
29.	He has good physical stamina + 0 -
30.	He is physically agile
31.	His motivation is sound 💿 0 -
32.	He is a man of integrity

GENERAL REMARKS

This man shows complete lack of any leadership qualifications and it is extremely doubtful whether he would develop any during training. His experience in the French Army and in France after the fall, as well as his French background, should be used in some capacity and it is suggested, therefore, that he would be more suited as a subordinate member of a coup-de-main party.

MAJOR,
D/PRESIDENT

FOR PRESIDENT
JEDBURGH BOARD.

(P.113)

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RDG/DLW

WAR DEPARTMENT Q. M. C. Form No. 486 Bertind June 30, 1963

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CONSIGNOR:

Supplý Officer 2577 Reg.

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lst Lt. Lucien A. Conein 0-

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MAS/WT/28/98.

To: Major Marten.

Prom: Capt. Mawer

SUBJECT:

Carpenter.

SENDIFG:

This has been Carpenter's weak point. From the moment he arrived here, we realised he would have to improve his sending if he was to be fit to go into the field. Every effort has been made to do this, and it is still quite impossible for Carpenter to send accurately at a speed of above 14 w.p.m.

RECEIVING:

Pairly good. Accurate at 18 w.p.m.

He has a fair knowledge of these sets sufficient to work them in the field.

> The only weak point is his sending, and in view of the importance of receiving messages accurately, it will be quite impossible to send Carpenter into the field as a Wireless Operator.

> > MUNICAPT. R. SIGNALS.

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9th August, 1944.

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APO 887 . 17 October 1944


SURJECT: Status of Sgt. JAMPS J. CARPENTER, ASM 15121222

ro : Commanding Officer, C.I. Section S. F. Detachment #12.

- 1. You will find hererith copy of original cable from SCSOP LOWDON, Mr 6521 dated 6 October 1944 requesting investigation on Sgt. Carpenter; copy of our letter to you dated 10 October 1944 furnishing all information we had collected on this case and requesting the assistance of your staff; and our cable Nr 8554 of 10 October 1944 to SCSOP LOWDON, which is self-explanatory and to which we have as yet not received a reply. The attached represent our complete file on this subject.
- 2. In accordance with instructions received from the Chief, Testern European Section, this case is turned over to you for handling to conclusion.

IRCLOSURES.

Inel 1- Cable from SOSOP, LONDON No. 6521 Inel 2- Letter 10 October to CO. CI Section, SF Det #12. Inel 3- Cable to SOSOP, LONDON No. 8554

R. B. LACOSTE let Lt., Inf Investigating Officer 

HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
FORWARD
SO/WE

APO 887 10 October 1944

SUBJECT: Sgt James J. Carpenter, 15121222

TO: CO, CI Section, SF Det #12

- n l. Upon orders received from London, this office is endeavoring to locate Sgt James J. Capenter, who was radio operator of Jedburgh Team MARK. This man left Algiers on 15 August and was to have reported to Avignon 23 September.
- 2. We are advised today by Capt Guillot who was in Avignon between 18 Sept and 8 Oct that Carpenter was not there but that Capt E. T. Allen had mentioned having seen Lt Conien, who was on same team as Carpenter, at Toulouse. Further, T/Sgt William Adams of Aube Mission advises today that he saw Carpenter in Toulouse around 15 Sept.
- 3. Capt Grell advised that two officers of S.P.O.C., Major Barbier (Br.) and Lt Bonnet, Hotel Crillon, Avignon, may possess information as to Carpenter's whereabouts.
- 4. Will you kindly check your records and give us the benefit of what they reflect on the subject of Sgt Carpenter's present location? If Sgt Caprenter or Lt Conein arrive at your Hq, please instruct them to report to this office immediately. It is further suggested that agents returning to you from Toulouse might be able to throw light on the matter.
- 5. Lt Lacoste has been assigned the mission of locating Sgt Carpenter.

Contents UNCLASSIEIED

PAUL VAN DER STRICHT Lt Col, AUS Chief, Western European Section

TO: Major Stephen C. Millett, Jr.

PROM: Lt de Roussy de Sales

Draft of Earrative for Granting of Award to:

1st Lieutenant Lucies B. Commin, Inf. 0-1322769.

Lightenart Comein coming from Algiers parachuted into France 16 August 1944 as a member of the Jedburgh Toam MARI, assigned to arm and assist the Maquis in the Gers Department, in guerrilla warfare against Gorman garrisons and convoys.

On 19 August in its first participation in a Maguis attack on a convoy at Isle Jourdain the Team captured seven prisoners.

Shortly afterwards with the general evacuation by the Germans of southwestern France the work of the Team becami largely that of intelligence and limison including trips to the Spanish border, to Agen, and to Marseilles. The most important work, however, was done in the area of Royan where is conjunction with other Jedburgh Teams this Team worked to piece together the detailed plan of the German defenses. Arrangements also were made to pass on intelligence to a squadron of French planes that made twelve successful attacks on Royan-

LT DE BOUSSY DE SALES

AWARD RECOMMENDED:

STEPHEN C. MILLETT. JR. Major, AC Chief, Western European Section

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AWARD RECOMMENDED:

STEPHEN C. KILIETT, JR. HAJOR, AC CHIEP, WESTERN EUROPEAN SECTION

NAME CONEIN, LUCIEN E HANK 151 LT ASH 0-1322769 NAME & ADDRESS MRS. Jeanne A. McBee (AUNT) 1137 15th Street San Francisco ENTERED MILITARY SERVICE FROM (CITY & STATE) KANSESC CITY KANSAS DATE OF ENTRY INTO THE FIELD 16 AUD 1944 DATE RETURNED FROM THE FIELD 24 110V 19414 ASSIGNED AREA IN FIELD GERS - TARN ET GARRONE NUMBER OF RESISTANCE PERSONNEL 8,000 WOUNDS CR INJURIES SPRAINED AURLE ON LANDING

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REPORT OF JEDBURGH TEAM MARK

1 10 August - 23 hovember 1944

1st Lt Lucien E. Conein (US)
Lt Thevenet (Fr)
Lt Raymond (Fr)
M/Sgt James Carpenter (US)

ARKA: Department of Gers

DATE OF DISPATCE: 16 August 1944

MISSION: 1. Go to Circuit WHEELWRIGHT in Tarne et Garrone

- 2. To assist in organizing the FFI and resistance
- 3. To report potentiality of these groups
- To act as liaison between resistance and EMFFI and obtain arms and supplies for the resistance.

TRANSPORT: Literator Aircraft from Blids Airport, Algeria.

DROP: Drop made on third run over the field on Ground BUFFALO BILL.

After being left high and dry for six weeks, we were finally sent to France but only after a mission came to London to get orders and briefs. We believe we were sent into the field to be out of the way and cause no more trouble.

Due to the wonderful work of Ensign Daphne Park we were briefed. We left Blida, Algeria at 2030 hrs on 16 August arriving 32 hrs later over the landing grounds BUFFALO BLLL. The ground was very well lit up and it was possible to see the bonfires from a great distance. It had been arranged before takeoff with the pilot, that containers, packages and bodies would be dropped, in that order. For some unknown reason the pilot headed with the wind instead of against it, thus causing us to land 6 kilometers from the landing ground. Except for a sprained ankle by Lt Conein the drop was successful. The injury was due to twisted rigging lines and railure of the pilot to cut the motor.

We hid in the field that night and left in the early morning.
We walked through fields and contacted an old peasant who took us by diverse routes to a group of wounded maquis where we made our first contact. We were then taken to Hilaire, a British agent, who had been in the field for two years and controlled the armed resistance in R-4.

At the initial conference with Hilaire it was apparent that it was impossible for the team to go to Tarne et Garonne inasmuch as the military situation had completely changed within the last few days.

On the afternoon of 17 August at our suggestion Ravanel alias Hexagon, alias Verdun, Regional Chief of the FFI, Rosette representing Droite LMR, Col Vincent and other leaders called a war council with Hilaire and all the Allied missions in the area. At this meeting Ravanel save orders that our maquis would not move without his personal orders. That night agents brought word that the German garrisqu at Auch was preparing to move to Toulouse and were coming through our area. Hilaire asked us to order the maquis to intercept this movement. His reason for this request was that he lacked sufficient power to countermand Ravanel's orders and as we had just arrived from London we could give orders in the name of General Eisenhower. This done, automatically cancelling all previous orders.

Declassified by Oct 711



We then called a meeting of all local leaders — Capt Parisot, Condt Cellerier, Condt Camillio of the Spanish Maquis, and all battalion leaders including the Group Franc of the Gers. Orders were issued to make contact with the Germans and to wipe them out on all roads. Like everything else in France, this took about 24 hours of argument before a decision was made.

At 0903 hrs 19 August the column under Capt Parisot moved out.

At 1000 hrs information was received that the Germans were moving out.

At 1100 hrs we left with Capt Mecin's column of 23 trucks, 8 civilian cars and o motorcycles by secondary roads to stop the Germans. It took us o are to go 100 miles due to the fact that the trucks were not running with assoline, but with charpon de bols.

At 1730 hrs the first contact was made with the Germans at a cross-road 100 yds from Isle Jourdain. Firing commenced immediately and as we were in the first car, we rushed back, malted the men and made them get off the trucks and into the ditches.

Orders from Cept Medin were fast but very confused. The 4th Company was ordered to block a bridge with one Company of Group France on the left flank and take positions on railroad track. The first shots were fired between the nature causing casualties on both sides. This was due to disobedience of orders on the part of Capt Roche of the 4th Company. Instructions were then issued to the 1st and oth Companies to surround the town blocking all roads, control points and strong points. Insediately on contact with the Germans word was sent to Ravenal acquainting him with the military position and asking for aid. The battle issted until 0100 hrs when both sides stopped firing. That evening at a meeting of battalion and company commanders, a decision was made to try to take an armistice. Jed Team MARK strongly opposed this but due to the higher rank and greater number of the French leaders, we were over-ruled.

At 0500 hrs next morning with Capt Parisot, Cmdt Cellerier we advanced down the road where we encountered all the Germans lined up in columns of four in the middle of the road. Capt Parisot advanced and began negotiations! The conversation ceing in German, we did not understand a word. After fifteen minutes the German, the Germans would continue righting. A five minute armistice was agreed on and the Germans dispersed to take up battle positions. If this armistice had not been made we could have moved down all of them in five minutes as we were now superior in numbers; their forces numbering only slightly over 300.

That afternoon an agent from kavanel brought news that the column Camillio of the Spanish Maquis was coming up on the German right: flank with one company of CFr and should arrive about 1730 hrs. immediately issued orders to Camillio and Penjadas who commanded the CFP to make an attack on the house which the Germans were using as: their headquarters. At 1840 hrs we would cease firing and make an attack in conjunction with them on both sides of the German flanks This worked very well except that Camillio never arrived, for he was celebrating in Auch and looting the tobacco stores. At 1045 we took one section of the 5th Company along the ditch in the road and advanced to a point about 40 yerds from the German trucks. When the cease fire signal was given we had arrived on the German left flank It was now that the Boone started to give up in earnest. The team! score of prisoners was the grand total of seven. The actual righting stopped about 2000 hrs. We lost nine men and sixteen wounded. This Germans lost sixty two dead and forty six wounded and how many got away I still don't know, but I learned later that we had mineteen dead and over forty wounded. Next morning soing on to the battle field I only saw election German corpses. The lost remarkable thing

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At 1100 hrs we left with Capt Mecin's column of 23 trucks, a civilian cars and 6 motorcycles by secondary roads to stop the Germans. It took us 6 hrs to go 100 miles due to the fact that the trucks were not running with assoline, but with charpon de bols.

At 1730 hrs the first contact was made with the Germans at a cross-road 200 yds from Isle Jourdain. Firing commenced immediately and as we were in the first car, we rushed back, halted the men and made them set off the trucks and into the ditches.

Orders from Capt Medin were fast but very confused. The 4th Company was ordered to block a bridge with one Company of Group France on the left flank and take positions on railroad track. The first shots were fired between the maquis causing casualties on both sides. This was due to disobedience of orders on the part of Capt Roche of the 4th Company. Instructions were then issued to the 1st and 6th Companies to surround the town blocking all roads, control points and strong points. Immediately on contact with the Germans word was sent to Ravenal acquainting him with the military position and asking for aid. The battle lasted until 3130 hrs when both sides stopped firing. That evening at a meeting of battalion and company commanders, a decision was made to try to make an armistice. Jed Team MARK strongly opposed this but due to the higher rank and greater number of the French leaders, we were over-ruled.

At 0500 hrs next morning with Capt Parisot, Cmdt Cellerier we advanced down the road where we encountered all the Jermans lined up in columns of four in the middle of the road. Capt Parisot advanced and began negotiations. The conversation being in German, we did not understand a word. After fifteen minutes the Oberst said the Germans would continue fighting. A five minute armistice was agreed on and the Germans dispersed to take up battle positions. If this armistice had not been made we could have moved down all of them in five minutes as we were now superior in numbers; their forces numbering only slightly over 300.

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about this battle was that the Germans had United States motorcycles, British Sten guns and automatic rifles and "recurerated" American 9mm annunition.

Incidents which occurred during the battle proved that the discipline among the German column, though beaten, was remarkable.

Next morning Hilaire asked me to go to Toulouse and negotiate with Ravanel for the entry of the Brigade of Armanac. When we arrived in Toulouse 23 August, fighting was going on in the streets between the French and Milice. The FTP was on the outskirts of the town waiting to make their entry after having let all the Germans escape from Toulouse. Ravanel received me very coldly and finally agreed on the entry of the Brigade of Armanac. On my way out of town one motorcycle of my escort broke down and I was left in the middle of the town. When the Milice saw the American flag flying from the car they began firing at me from the roof tops. The civilian population began to absolutely mob the car and I had to draw a gun to keep them away. I then made my first public speech. I announced in public that the American troops were 10 kilometers from Toulouse, that I was the advance guard and that we would enter the next day. At that moment I did not realize what proportions a false rumor would make. For three weeks the people were sewing American and British flags, and standing on the roads expeding the phantom column.

At this point Hilaire started using Jed Team MARK for military political work. Many secret meetings were held at which I was not present and I was sent on missions for Hilaire of which I did not have full knowledge although Lt Thevenet was fully acquainted with all the details.

On 24 August we went to Agen in an attempt to settle a political squabble between the FTPY and the FFI. While there Lt Thevenet negotiated to sack Colonel Durandel. I was informed that this move was for the good of the military situation and accordingly agreed.

Returning from Agen I informed Lt Thevenet that I would attend all future secret meetings; that I was responsible for the team; that I had an American radio operator and that under no circumstances were any telegrams to be sent without my knowledge or permission, as had been done in the past.

On 30 August we went to Besier to contact the local resistance leaders of the region and was advised they had no arms. Seeing that the situation was becoming political instead of military I advised London to prepare to disarm the civilian population who were shooting each other. This battle lasted about six days during which time our house was attacked twice by the French. Inasmuch as I had no power to disarm the civilian population I returned to Toulouse to inform Ravanel of the situation and request his cooperation. Ravanel said he would have to call a meeting of his council. I then asked for arms from London for my group of maquis. After waiting several weeks two planes arrived bringing us only four machine gums and a quantity of medical supplies.

Hilaire asked me to go to the Spanish border to check up on the situation there. I round 116 men guarding a 50 foot bridge, French officers going to and from St Sebastian, Spain. During the week over 800 Spaniards had come from Spain to France and over 1,200 Jermans had gone to Spain where they were cheered and received by the Fascists. I made a report to London about this situation and told them to inform the American Embassy and the British Foreign Office. On my return to Toulouse, these facts were reported to Hilaire.

I went to Marseilles on 8 September to see General Cochet and inform him of the general situation in the FFI and particularly on the Spanish border. The General issued orders, in my presence, to create a Zone Interdite and blackout on the frontier. He also issued orders to General Bertin to cease his functions as of 12 September. All of these orders I brought back to Toulouse and turned over to kavanel.

Several days later General De Gaulle arrived. His orders were that all allied missions would quit Toulouse and return to the UK.

As Lt Thevenet had gone to Paris on a mission and had never returned, I left Toulouse with Sgt Carpenter. I teamed up with Capt Reymond of Team MARTIN and informed London accordingly. Our mission was transferred from one of ald to one of intelligence. We organized a group of agents in the Royan Sector and established our headquarters at Port d'Enveaux.

All intelligence was passed on to the Britteny Base Section in Rennes and from there to SHAEF. We also made contact with the 94th Division Headquarters at Chateaubriant where I learned they had an escadrille of French planes at Vannes. I immediately left for Vannes and made contact with the leader of the escadrille whose mission was to harrass the enemy positions in our sector. I gave him necessary intelligence on the targets and arranged a means of communications by panels. When the plane would arrive over the panels and buzz twice that meant he would land at Cognac where he would pick up the latest intelligence and ask the pilots to bomb. Twelve of these missions had been carried out and were very successful.

As messages to London were not answered I went to Paris and contacted SHAEF who ordered me to return to the field and bring back all the latest intelligence. In the meantime General Delarminat took charge of operations on the Western Front and after making contact with him and other members of his staff we were told to leave for Paris as the Jed missions were no longer wanted. I completely understand this because the French Army has not won an important battle in France and it is necessary for the morale of the French Army that the French should lay on an operation completely French that will be successful.

I arrived in Paris on 13 November. Several days later, accompanied by Major Montgomery of Jed Team TONY, I went to 6th Army Group Headquerters at Vittel to report on the situation in my area. We were interrogated by G-2 and G-3 and returned to Paris 13 November. I left Paris on 24 November and arrived in London the same day.

MACUIS STRETGTH AND ARMAMENT:

Personnel .	On Team's Arrivel	On Team's Departure		
Colonels	0	· 1		
Lt Colonels	Ö -	2		
Majors	i .	11		
Captains	. 24	31		
Lieutenants	48	47		
Sergeants	42	46		
Corporals	16	52		
Men	1,097	1,843		

Armament	On To	eam's Arr	LVEL O	n Team's Dec	<u>erture</u>
Pistols	•	800		1,200	
Rifles	• •,	512		964	
Sten Guns	• . •	300		316	
Automatic Rifl	.es	61		7 5	
Machine Guns (light)	30	•	. 82	
	heavy)	0		4	
20mm Guns	, •	. 0		8	
75mm Guns	* .	0		4	
77mm Guns		0		. 2	
105 mm Guns		. 0		2	
Light Tanks		0		· 3	*

ENEMY SITUATION:

The enemy is strongly fortified, provided with abundant artillery amply supplied with munitions but lacking aircraft. These defences block the ports of LORIENG, ST NAZAIRE, LA ROCHELLE and BORDEAUX and comprise of 70,000 men.

In the Royan zone is a total of 11,000 men, including reinforcements of 3,000 men who arrived from Verdon 11 November. These are all commended by Admiral Michaelles.

65% are foreigners without any loyalty to the Reich (Poles, some Russians, some Czechs) and are ready to surrender. They form part of the garrisons of the block houses and of certain inner batteries in the fortified zone. They are brigaded with Germans.

35% are pure Germans, 2,000 of them SS and 2,500 Marines. The stabilization of the Eastern Front has raised their hopes a bit.

POLITICAL NOTES:

The mission of Jed Team MARK was not political. However, in France it is impossible to disassociate politics from the military.

- 1. There is no political union in France.
- 2. Most Comite de Liberation formed, are socialist and communist.
- 5. Under pressure of the CDL the FFI has, in many places, given way to the FTPF.
- 4. The Movement de Liberation National is trying to unite with the Front National; both keeping their charters and working together.
- 5. General de Gaulle is losing popularity in many corners of France. Reasons:
 - a. Food situations have not changed and in some places are worse.
 - b. Vichy laws are still enforced.
 - c. No unity.

REMARKS:

France has been occupied partially for four years and totally for two years.

The politics of Vichy have divided the country.

France has 1,000,000 prisoners, among them some of the best soldiers and leaders of France.

PERSONALITIES:

Lt Col Parisot. Killed 6 September by RAF plane landing at Francazal with equipment I had requested. A true patriot and superior leader, Col Parisot was an inspiration to all who knew him.

Lt Col Monnet. Successor to Col Parisot. Commandant of the Demi Brigade of Armagnac. Politically minded -- very pro De Gaulle.

Major Cellerier. Commander of the 6th Chasseur Alpin Bn in 1939/40, Ex 5.0.L., actual military leader of our maquis. Rendered invaluable service to Jed Team MARK. Condemned to death by the communists from the Gers.


Ravenel. Regional Chief of the FFI of R-4. A very intelligent man. Has communistic tendencies and will be appointed to the French War Ministry soon. Has said in public "The Americans and English have never had confidence in the FFI". Very anti-allied but not pro-German.

Droite. DMR R-4. A fool incapable of making decisions.

Beck. A communist who double-crossed every one around him.

Charlier. Sent from Madrid as Commander of the Frontier. Is incapable and thinks only of having a good time in St Sebastian.

Rosette. A very good man and a capable leader, can make decisions. Took over when Droite was not present. Is now assessment G-3 to the French Ministry of War.



16 August - 23 November 1944

1st Lt Lucien E. Conein (US)
Lt Thevenet (Fr)
Lt Raymond (Fr)
M/Sgt Carpenter (US)

First contact was made with the home station on the second day after landing. Communications were maintained without interruption throughout the entire mission.

No great difficulty was experienced with static and atmospherics and all wave lengths were satisfactory.

Until the last three weeks all operators at the base station gave splendid cooperation. During the last three weeks the standard of operations dropped slightly.

M/Sgt James J. Carpenter.

Declarified by April 202211

The items contained in the attached Draft of Marrative have converified as follows:

I. FEED

II. TRINGILIS

III. IMPOUT OF JEO "AVEXAMOER"

THE COMPLETE COTOR STREET

LE DE HOUSSY TELS.LES

SECULET

CITATION

I should like to bring to notice the splendid work done for the French Resistance movement and the whole-hearted cooperation accorded to the Allied military missions by Lt Col PARISOT. Col Parisot assisted Jedburgh Team MARK in many ways during the months of August and September, 1944.

While awaiting a delivery of arms for the maquis, asked for by Jed Team MARK, this brave soldier met his death by decapitation by an Allied plane which had undershot the lending field. Col Parisot's loyalty was unquestioned, his bravery was of the highest, and the esteem in which he was held by his fellow soldiers was unparalleled.

For his brilliant work and for his dauntless courage, this An has been awarded the Order of the British Empire by King George VI and has been made a Chevalier of the Legion d'Honneur by the French Government.

I propose that consideration be given to the posthumous award of the Legion of Merit by the Government of the United States.

Contents LINCLASSIFIED

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LUCIYN E. CONRIN

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