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3P

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING		
		INDEXED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
TO Chief, EE		XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO Chief, EE			NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM Chief of Station: [redacted]			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT: EDOX Provocations Against American Seamen			ABSTRACT	
ACTION REQUIRED: REFERENCES			MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED: As appropriate				
<p>1. On 5 December 1962, the Embassy Consular Section informed the Station that</p> <p><u>Marjan DEMBINSKI</u>  <u>DPOB: 6 December 1913, New Jersey, USA</u>  <u>Residence: 17 Carollyn Road, Elizabeth, New Jersey, USA</u>  <u>Profession: Chief Steward, S.S. MORVACSAGA, Moore McCormack Line</u>  <u>Coast Guard Identity Number Z-67640-D1</u></p> <p><i>do not perform the procedures by Polish officials again</i></p> <p>had come to the Embassy to report certain incidents involving American seamen and the Polish authorities. The subsequent interview with DEMBINSKI turned up the following information of possible interest to Headquarters.</p> <p>2. On 1 December 1962, when the MORVACSAGA was docked in Gdynia, Poland, DEMBINSKI was approached by a Polish official who had come onboard with two other immigration officers to issue landing cards to the crew. The official in question requested DEMBINSKI to come ashore where the two could talk privately. DEMBINSKI declined stating that they could talk just as privately in DEMBINSKI's cabin. After going to the cabin, the Polish official again insisted that DEMBINSKI meet with him privately ashore. Unless DEMBINSKI agreed, the officer threatened to refuse DEMBINSKI a landing card. DEMBINSKI became angry, said a few dirty Polish words to the official and the official departed in a rage. Later in the ship's dining room where the landing cards were being handed out, the same official once more asked if DEMBINSKI had changed his mind. When DEMBINSKI replied in the negative, the officer tore up the landing card and threw it on the deck.</p> <p>3. Later the same day, DEMBINSKI had a chance to speak with the Polish driver (name not known) of the official automobile owned by Moore McCormack. The driver informed DEMBINSKI that the official who had tried to pressure DEMBINSKI was one FNU SZYMANSKI whom the driver described as "a very rough man". The driver cautioned DEMBINSKI to be very careful with this person. The driver further pleaded with DEMBINSKI not to divulge the fact that he, the driver, had tipped off DEMBINSKI as to the name of the official. DEMBINSKI considers the driver to be friendly and pro-American. DEMBINSKI was asked to describe SZYMANSKI, but was able only to say that</p>				
Distribution: AMERICAN 2 - Chief, EE 2 - Chief, WE		DATE TYPED 6 Dec. 1962		DATE DISPATCHED 7 Dec. 1962
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER CDCA-10892		
CLASSIFICATION		HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 60-5-12		

10-201

NEW-X

he is about 5'11" in height, about 130 lbs, and circa 40 years of age. DEMBINSKI never saw SZYMANSKI until this incident.

4. DEMBINSKI noted that another seaman on the NORVACASAGA, one AB FNU WOJCIECHOWSKI, was also seen talking to SZYMANSKI. This seaman received a pass and went ashore. DEMBINSKI also mentioned that an unidentified bosun on the ADRIACZYK has had meetings with a suspected Polish security official. This bosun, a naturalized American, returns to Poland every year to spend his holidays.

5. In addition to the foregoing, DEMBINSKI stated that he at one time became quite friendly with

*10/20/51*  
*Habe*  
Stanislaw GOSIOR *aka [unclear]* *#-GOSIOR*  
*aka [unclear]*  
Current address: *Shopona 36 m 2, Krzeszow, Poland.*

*Polish*  
a former immigration/security officer in the Gdynia/Glansk area, according to DEMBINSKI, GOSIOR was fired from his job and spent some time in prison. He was later released and currently works in a radio shop. On a number of occasions DEMBINSKI befriended GOSIOR by giving him food, clothing, and cigarettes. They became friends and GOSIOR used to warn DEMBINSKI when the latter was being followed or under suspicion. To convince DEMBINSKI of his sincerity, GOSIOR once offered to show DEMBINSKI a copy of the official dossier held on DEMBINSKI by the authorities. In view of the latest incident with SZYMANSKI, DEMBINSKI is not planning to ever go ashore in Poland unless he has protection. He would, however, like to see GOSIOR again and considers him "a good man to know", but DEMBINSKI does not wish to risk his neck in so doing.

*Subject's contact with Americans see memo.*

6. There are no Station traces on any of the above mentioned persons.

*Kenneth S. Packard*  
Kenneth S. Packard

*6-5-12*

FBI

Chicago 16 Nov 62

Re: Baptist Church within  
Palace & Soviet Union

Confidential

INTELLIGENCE REPORT INTELLIGENCE REPORT

36

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WARNING: This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws.

CONFIDENTIAL

Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

COUNTRY: POLAND

REPORT NO. 155200

SUBJECT: (C) RECRUITMENT OF AGENT IN GLIWICE (GLEIWITZ)

DATE OF REPORT 12 NOV 62

DAI-1916  
2P

MICROFILMED  
FEB 1 1963  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

NO. OF PAGES 2

DATE OF INFO: 1957 - SEP 1962

REFERENCES: M-6-61:DIRMs 6E6, 6B5; 157.300; 159.300

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: GERMANY/31 OCT 62

FROM: JOE-L, 7000 SW (USAFB)  
PREPARED BY: SALVATO/SEMON

EVALUATION: F-6  
SOURCE: ROBOT

SUMMARY

(C) Personal description and biographical data of an agent of the Polish Secret Police. Recruitment methods of Polish Secret Police.

I. GLIWICE 5018N-1839E (34U-CA-338744).

II. All information contained in this report is based on statements of SOURCE's brother-in-law in GLIWICE, who personally had the experience described in this report, and discussed same with SOURCE. There seemed no reason to doubt SOURCE's reliability, who was cooperative, answered questions willingly, and no inconsistencies in his statements were noted.

III. SOURCE furnished the following information about his brother-in-law: WEIMANN, Georg, DOB: 8 Feb 1926; POS: GLIWICE, tradesman, present occupation: laborer in coal mine GLIWICE-SOSNICA, present residence: # 20 Ulica Tilna, SOSNICA, GLIWICE 3, POLAND. WEIMANN is married to a French national, WEIMANN, Leona, DOB: 1927 or 1928. The couple has two girls, 12 and 10 years old.

During 1957, while working together with two other miners in the above mentioned coal mine, WEIMANN discussed a recent uprising of the laborers of another nearby coal mine against their administration, with his two co-workers. During this discussion, he took the part of the rebels, and made several unfavorable statements about the present communist regime in Poland. When leaving the coal mine at the end of his shift, WEIMANN was arrested by the Polish Secret Police, who had obviously been tipped off by one of the two co-workers of WEIMANN. The police questioned WEIMANN thoroughly about the people who had told him about the uprising in the nearby coal mine, and finally interned him in the local jail. For a period of two months, WEIMANN remained imprisoned in the GLIWICE jail; allegedly, the security police constantly attempted during this time to gather information from WEIMANN about his contacts and about whoever might have possibly informed him about the above incident. Finally, after two months, WEIMANN was told that he could choose one of two things: he could either agree to work for the Polish secret police as an agent and would then be freed immediately, or he could turn down that offer, but would then be prosecuted in court and would definitely end up with a long-time jail sentence.

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INDEX 4

60-5-12

60-5-12

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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REPORT NO. 1524029  
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES  
FROM JOE-L, 7000 SW  
(USAFE)

37  
DAI 1/16

WEIMANN gave in, and agreed to work for the Polish intelligence. He was immediately released from custody, was given a cover name and a cover number. SOURCE was told that WEIMANN was to use the cover name "waclaw" as signature on all written reports, while the number would serve as an identification during telephone conversations. WEIMANN was to collect any kind of intelligence information, and was to submit regular reports on the political reliability of acquaintances, friends, relatives, neighbors, and co-workers, and reports about the morale of the local population. At this stage, SOURCE himself became a little afraid of his brother-in-law and kept away from him as much as possible. When discussing the subject with his brother-in-law shortly before SOURCE's departure for West Germany, SOURCE was told that WEIMANN had allegedly never submitted any reports, but had always excused himself with "lack of occasion" to gather information. SOURCE was told that therefore the secret police soon discontinued to bother WEIMANN. SOURCE did not think that WEIMANN is presently still working for the secret police.

SOURCE pointed out that WEIMANN would like to come to West Germany as a resettler. He fears that his past connections with the police might make an emigration impossible, but will most probably make an attempt to procure a passport in the very near future.

No further information.

*Sava J. Mizo*  
SAVA J. MIZO  
Captain, USAP  
Team Commander

APPROVED:

MAJOR USAP  
for MEREDITH H. SHADE  
Colonel, USAP  
Commander

(Classification)  
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60-5-12

INTELLIGENCE REPORT INTELLIGENCE REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

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Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

COUNTRY: POLAND

REPORT NO.: 1523931

SUBJECT: (C) SECRET POLICE ACTIVITIES IN BYTOM

DATE OF REPORT: 6 NOV 62

NO. OF PAGES: 3

DATE OF INFO: APR 62 - JUN 62

REFERENCES: DIRM 7A 159.100

MICROFILMED APR 3 1963 DOC. MICRO. SER.

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: GERMANY/ 1 OCT 62

EVALUATION: FS SOURCE: ROBOT

FROM: JOE-9, 7000 SW (USAFB) PREPARED BY: HILDEBRAND/RUND

(U) Location of secret police office, method of recruiting repatriate for spy work, description of secret police agent.

I. BYTOM: 5021N-1858E (QY5147).

II. In Dec 61, SOURCE had applied to the KATOWICE: 5016N-1901E Province Administration for an exit permit to West Germany. In Apr 62, still waiting for an answer, he was approached by a secret agent who tried to talk him into collaborating with the Polish intelligence service. Because the agent had invited him to the Hotel "BRISTOL" in BYTOM, SOURCE obtained reliable confirmation of the assertion by friends that this hotel was the location of the BYTOM branch office of the Polish intelligence service. SOURCE, an artist of above average intelligence and experience, soon understood what the agent was driving at, and refused on the grounds that he was completely incompetent for intelligence work. SOURCE related his experience in the desire to draw attention to the subtle methods applied by the Polish intelligence service. His statements were accepted as credible because of the honesty with which SOURCE described his own attitude and reactions.

III. The agent introduced himself to SOURCE under the name "ZAKRZEWSKI" and as an employee of the KATOWICE Province Administration. He came to SOURCE's home in BYTOM after first asking for SOURCE's permission over the telephone.

Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI was about 38 or 40 years old, stocky built, about 170 cm, dark-brown hair, black eyes, thin eyebrows, fleshy cheeks, closely shaved, unfurrowed forehead, fleshy hands with short and thick fingers. He was conservatively and elegantly dressed, his movements were lively, and he spoke a cultured Polish without any accent. His behavior and way of speaking were of a manner characteristic of the former pre-war educated Polish society.

Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI opened the conversation with many apologies for the inconvenience he was causing, and assured SOURCE that his mission was by no means intended to embarrass or otherwise discomfort SOURCE. He also showed SOURCE an identity card with his photograph which, as SOURCE observed after a casual

INDEX II

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60-5-12

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT INTELLIGENCE REPORT



CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT NO. 1523031  
PAGE 2 OF 3  
FRBY JOE O, 7000 SW  
(USAPE)

inspection, identified Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI as employee of the passport division in the KATOWICE Province Administration.

ZAKRZEWSKI then explained that he was authorized to offer SOURCE a straight deal which, if SOURCE only cared to consider it realistically, would turn out to their mutual benefit. SOURCE's personality, particularly his academic education and his reputation as a painter together with his known loyal attitude towards the state, qualified SOURCE as the ideal partner in a somewhat delicate undertaking. The personalities of influence, for whom Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI was authorized to speak, could not think of any one with qualifications better than SOURCE's. SOURCE replied that, of course, he would gladly become a partner to any efforts intended to promote the arts because they were the only things he really cared for. SOURCE had, after Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI's introductory remarks, quite correctly guessed what was meant by the "straight deal" and he, therefore, tried to avoid the subject. Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI then asked SOURCE frankly how he did with his painting. SOURCE could only truthfully reply that his art was definitely not suited to provide a living for him and his wife. This was also the reason, SOURCE emphasized, that he wanted to leave Poland because he could no longer bear to live from his wife's income.

"This is all well known to us" said Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI, "but do you in all seriousness believe that you will do better in West Germany? They have painters by the thousands and you, as a newcomer to this crowd, will only be sorry to have joined them. You will have to depend on your wife's income more than with us in Poland". Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI then continued that the aid which SOURCE would receive would enable him to better devote himself to his art because financial worries would be taken from his mind. "Is not this a straight deal?", Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI asked, "you help us and we help you, and we know that your help will be worth the money". When SOURCE asked what was meant by "us" and "we" and what kind of "help" he was expected to offer, Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI cautiously replied that, before being more specific, he would need SOURCE's agreement to the proposition. "Please try to understand", Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI said, "I represent, as you have seen, the government, and it is part of the deal that details of your mission will be made known to you the moment we know that you are willing to help." SOURCE then refused by emphasizing that, as an artist, he felt in no way competent for the mission which doubtlessly will be assigned to him in Germany. His nerves would not stand the strain and, sooner or later, he would fail, and thus ruin himself. Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI accepted SOURCE's refusal without the slightest sign of disappointment, impatience or anger. He listened to SOURCE's words with a friendly smile on his face, and commented that such a reaction was only natural and even reasonable from a man like SOURCE, and it was only further proof of SOURCE's inordinate intelligence and integrity. He assured SOURCE that there was no hurry, and important things quite naturally need some time to be carefully thought over. Inviting SOURCE to carefully reconsider the offer, he asked for permission to approach the matter a second time in a few weeks. On this occasion, SOURCE should be prepared, after Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI's telephone call, to come to the hotel "BRISTOL" on ULICA PIERSZEGO MAJA" (First of May Road), where matters could be discussed more easily. SOURCE agreed to this arrangement because he was afraid that, by a flat and uncompromising refusal, he would jeopardize his exit permit.

The hotel "BRISTOL" was an impressive four-storied building with a tavern and a night-club, which had been renovated in 1960. It was patronized by well-to-do members of the intelligentsia and tourists. He remembered having heard from fellow members of his painters' club that the secret police had rented a wing in one of the upper stories of this hotel. The rooms, number unknown, were said to be furnished as offices and club rooms.

Between above conversation in Apr 62 and SOURCE's departure on June 13th, 1962,

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REPORT NO. 1523831  
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES  
FROM JOE-9, 7000 SW  
(USAF)

Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI or another member of the secret police tried to ring up SOURCE in his home four times. In all four instances, SOURCE's wife answered the telephone and told the caller that her husband was not at home and that she had no idea where he was. The callers always asked her politely when she thought he would be at home. SOURCE's wife would then explain at great length that her husband's occupation was such that he himself could never tell when customers would show up and where he would work at a certain time. She would then give a day at random with which the callers seemed to be satisfied.

SOURCE obtained the exit permit without having seen Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI or any other member of the Polish secret police a second time.

*Anthony & Howard*  
*TSA USAF*  
for ARNOLD F. VON MARBOD  
Major, USAF  
Element Commander

APPROVED:

*Will S. Shade*  
for MAJOR USAF  
MEREDITH H. SHADE  
Colonel, USAF  
Commander

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8 Nov 62  
60-5-12

INTELLIGENCE REPORT INTELLIGENCE REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

DAI-1918

WARNING: This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws.

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Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Form with fields: COUNTRY (POLAND), SUBJECT ((C) ALLEGED SECRET POLICE OFFICIAL IN ZABRZE), DATE OF INFO (1949 - OCT 61), PLACE & DATE ACQ. (GERMANY/ 2 NOV 62), EVALUATION (F-6), SOURCE (ROBOT), REPORT NO. (1523828), DATE OF REPORT (5 NOV 62), NO. OF PAGES (1), REFERENCES (M-6-61; DIRM 6A1; 153.100), FROM (JOE-9, 7000 SW (USAF)), PREPARED BY (HILDENBRAND/WALDMUELLER)

MICROFILMED FEB 1 1963 DOC. MICRO. SER.

I. The alleged secret police official resided at the eastern outskirts of ZABRZE: 5019N-1847E (34UCA425745) on ULICA PIOTRO SKARGI (street name). The house number was possibly 15, 17, or 19.

II. From 1949 to Oct 61 SOURCE personally observed the individual about twice per month on ULICA PIOTRO SKARGI. SOURCE resided in vicinity of the individual, on ULICA GURNICZA #23. SOURCE gave information freely and no inconsistencies were noted.

III. ALLEGED SECRET POLICE OFFICIAL: OCC: UR OFFICIAL

Family name: SROKA, DOB circa 1930, 175 cm, stout appearance, dark hair, round face, erect posture, cynical face expression. SROKA was observed by SOURCE either dressed in civilian clothes or in the greenish-grey uniform of a Polish secret police officer. Time of observation was between 1700 and 1800 hours during weekdays. SROKA was usually carrying a dark-brown suitcase in his right hand. SOURCE was several times warned about SROKA by local ethnic Germans, who considered SROKA a very dangerous informer and ardent hater of Germans, although SROKA had been affiliated with some German-Nazi youth organization during WW II. Shortly after the end of WW II SROKA had joined the Polish MILICIA (militia) and advanced very rapidly due to his ruthless behavior towards the German residents of ZABRZE. After several years with the MILICIA, SROKA had joined the local secret police in ZABRZE. According to hearsay, SROKA had become a leading secret police official in GLIWICE: 5017N-1840E in 1957 or 1958. No further information.

APPROVED:

ARNOLD F. VON MARBOD Major, USAF Element Commander

for MEREDITH H. SHADE Colonel, USAF Commander

INDEX

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60-5-12

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT INTELLIGENCE REPORT

FBI

5 Nov 62 Chicago  
Re: Stefan Tulch  
no class.

10 Oct. 62 Wash. D.C.  
Re: U.S. Embassy - Poland  
Secret

AIR FORCE

5 Sept. 62 # 1508482

Re: Agent of the Polish Secret  
Police

Confidential

# FBI

- 1) 31 Aug. 62 Indiana  
Re: Andrzej Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz  
Confidential
  
- 2) 105-5708 Miami 29 Aug. 62  
105-106375 Bufile  
Re: Jan Dobrowski
  
- 3) 105-12720 28 Aug. 62 Chicago  
Re: Edward & Maria Karaliewicz - Visitors  
to Poland  
Confidential

SECRET  
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

JX-27989

24 August 1962

2/P

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE/Poland

SUBJECT: UB Penetrations of Israeli  
Embassy in Warsaw

REFERENCES: A. YT-1103, 25 November 1961  
B. YT-1251, 6 February 1962

1. During the course of investigations into the information contained in paragraph 1. a of Reference A one of Juliusz HIBNER's <sup>(101-22507)</sup> ~~(101-22507)~~ two sisters, who are living in Israel, has been contacted. She is Mrs. Rache ROSENFELD, born in 1909, who settled in Palestine in 1929 and is currently employed as a clinical psychologist in Haifa. In questioning her, she was sincerely cooperative and there is no reason to doubt her loyalty. <sup>(101-22507)</sup> <sup>(101-22503)</sup>

2. <sup>(101-22507)</sup> After World War II, Mrs. ROSENFELD went to Poland on two occasions. In 1946 she was sent there by Jewish national institutions to make arrangements for the transfer to Palestine of Jewish children who had survived the Nazi holocaust. She met her two brothers, Juliusz and Jozef HIBNER, both of whom were sympathetic and assisted her with her mission. Mrs. ROSENFELD's second visit to Poland took place in August-September 1955 when she accompanied her daughter, Tamar, and her sister. During her six weeks stay, she lived at the house of her brother, Josef, but met Juliusz HIBNER frequently.

3. Mrs. ROSENFELD is certain that she did not attend any official function at the legation building or at the home of an Israeli diplomat in Warsaw. However, she visited the legation several times and also had several talks with one of the legation employees in the latter's lodgings at the Bristol Hotel. She believes that, on these occasions, she may have mentioned certain matters of interest which she had gleaned from conversations with her brothers.

INDEX - H

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60-5-12

~~SECRET~~  
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Mrs. ROSENFELD stresses that questions pertaining to Israel, the situation of Polish Jewry and emigration were frequently discussed with her brothers who showed a keen interest in these subjects. On one such occasion, Juliusz HIBNER stated that he and other Polish leaders were in favor of Jewish emigration to Israel and intimated that official authorization to this effect was about to be given. Mrs. ROSENFELD is virtually certain of having passed on this item of information to her acquaintance at the legation. She cannot remember where the talk in question took place, but is inclined to believe that they met at the Bristol Hotel.

4. With reference to paragraph 3 of Reference A, no useful comment is available at the present writing.

*Stephen C. Millett, Jr.*  
STEPHEN C. MILLETT, JR.  
Chief, CI/SPG

~~SECRET~~  
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL



FBI

26 July 62 Penn.  
Re: U.S. Embassy - Poland  
Secret

20 Aug. 62 Michigan  
Re: Zbigniew Solarz  
no class

AIR FORCE

# 1507316 6 July 62  
Re: Officials of Polish Secret Police  
Confidential

15P

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

REPORT NO. RC-6514

DEFECTOR RECEPTION CENTER

COUNTRY : Poland

SUBJECT : Polish Border Security Troops' Operations

DATE OF INFORMATION : September 1955 to July 1961

PLACE ACQUIRED : Germany

DATE DISTR. 12 JUN 62

NO. OF PAGES 15

REFERENCES:

MICROFILMED  
 JUL 9 1962  
 DOC. MICRO. SER.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

**SOURCE:** DS-962, a Polish Border Guard lieutenant, defected in Casablanca, Morocco, on 12 July 1961 while serving as a student on the Polish Navy training ship ISKRA. His stated reason for defection was his dissatisfaction with conditions in Poland. He was born on 5 November 1936 in Szwejkow, near Monasterzyska, formerly Poland, now Ukrainian SSR. He attended elementary schools in Monasterzyska and Zlotoryja and secondary school in Zlotoryja, graduating in 1955. In 1955 he was inducted into the Border Guard Brigade. He graduated from the Frontier Security Forces Officers' School in Ketrzyn in August 1958 as a second lieutenant. From August to November 1958 he was assigned to the Baltic Border Guard Brigade in Koszalin and was sent to a counterintelligence course in Gdansk. Upon completing the course, he became assistant to the commanding officer of the Border Guard counterintelligence post at Dziwnow from November 1958 to June 1959. From July 1959 to August 1960, he commanded a Border Guard counterintelligence post at Sliwmo. From August 1960 to July 1961, he attended the Westerplatte Higher Naval School (Wyzsza Szkola Marynarki Wojennej imienia Bohaterow Westerplatte) in Gdynia as an officer student. He was a member of the Union of Polish Youth in 1955-1956 and joined the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party in June 1956. His standard score on the Army Non-Language Test indicated well-above-average native intelligence. His bona fides has been established for intelligence exploitation purposes. The information in this report was acquired by source from observation and hearsay when he served in the Border Guard.

This report was prepared by the Army unit at DRC and is circulating in the Department of the Army as Report No. 962-P-3403.

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INDEX H

CONFIDENTIAL

POLISH BORDER SECURITY TROOPS' OPERATIONS (U)

Table of Contents

	Page Nr
Introduction-----	4
A. OPERATIONS OF THE BORDER SECURITY TROOPS-----	5
1. <u>Border Area</u> -----	5
a. <u>Forbidden Strip</u> -----	5
b. <u>Border Strip</u> -----	6
c. <u>Border Zone</u> -----	6
d. <u>Coastal Waters</u> -----	6
2. <u>Criteria for Selection of WOP Personnel</u> -----	6
3. <u>Training</u> -----	6
4. <u>Duty</u> -----	6
a. <u>Border Sentry</u> -----	6
b. <u>Guard Checking Patrol</u> -----	6
c. <u>Border Inspecting Patrol</u> -----	6
d. <u>Listening Patrol</u> -----	7
e. <u>Roving Patrol</u> -----	7
f. <u>Observation Patrol</u> -----	7
g. <u>Technical Inspection Team</u> -----	7
h. <u>Ambush Patrol</u> -----	7
i. <u>Pursuit Detail</u> -----	7
j. <u>Screening Detail</u> -----	7
k. <u>Gangplank Guard</u> -----	7
l. <u>Border Convoy</u> -----	8
m. <u>Search Detail</u> -----	8
n. <u>Alert Detail</u> -----	8
o. <u>Outpost Sentry</u> -----	8
p. <u>Charge of Quarters</u> -----	8
q. <u>Duty Officer</u> -----	8
5. <u>Planning of Border Security</u> -----	9
6. <u>Password and Signs</u> -----	10
7. <u>Reporting Procedures of Border Violations</u> -----	10
B. JOINT MANEUVERS-----	11
1. <u>Participating Units</u> -----	11
a. <u>Defending Force</u> -----	11
b. <u>Attacking Force</u> -----	12
c. <u>Umpire Staff</u> -----	12
2. <u>Mission</u> -----	12
3. <u>Area of Operations</u> -----	12
4. <u>Execution of Maneuver</u> -----	12

# CONFIDENTIAL

3

962-P-3403  
RC-6514

## POLISH BORDER SECURITY TROOPS' OPERATIONS (U)

### Table of Contents (Cont'd)

	Page Nr
C. AIR AND HOME TERRITORIAL ANTI-AIR DEFENSE FORCES-----	13
Comments-----	13
Annex A-----	15

# CONFIDENTIAL

962-P-3403  
RC-6514

## POLISH BORDER SECURITY TROOPS' OPERATIONS (U)

### Introduction

Source obtained most of the information in this report from November 1958 to August 1960 while serving with the Polish Border Security Troops (Wojsko Ochrony Pogranicza-WOP) as counterintelligence officer at DZIWNOW and SLIWNO Posts of the Baltic WOP Brigade. Before this assignment, he attended a 3-year course at the Border Security Troops Officers' School at KETRZYN, from which he graduated in 1955 as a junior lieutenant. From September 1960 until his defection he attended the Higher Naval School at GDYNIA for WOP Officers.

Source's over-all knowledge of the Polish Border Security Troops' operations can be credited to his interest in the service and to his assignment as a counterintelligence officer, which gave him the opportunity to work with WOP units on all levels and with local police and security organs.

Listed below are the names, UTMs and geographic coordinates of locations used throughout this report. Coordinates are not shown for well-known locations.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UTM</u>	<u>GEOGRAPHIC</u>
BIALOGARD	54 00N 16 00E	WV 6584
DARLOWO	52 25N 16 25E	WA 9131
DZIWNOW	54 02N 14 46E	VV 8587
KARWIA	54 51N 18 15E	XA 2079
KETRZYN	54 09N 21 22E	EE 2492
LEBORK	54 31N 17 28E	XA 7847
MIEDZYWODZIE	55 00N 14 41E	VV 8024
MRZEZYNO	54 03N 15 18E	WA 1900
NIECHORZE	54 06N 15 02E	WV 0694
NOWOGARD	53 40N 15 07E	WV 0746
POBIEROWO	Unknown	Unknown
PUSTKOW	Unknown	Unknown
REWAL	54 05N 15 01E	WA 0193
ROWY	54 40N 17 03E	XA 3260
SADLOWO	Unknown	Unknown
SLIWNO	54 04N 15 01E	WV 0291
SLUPSK	54 25N 17 01E	XA 3138
TORUN	53 01N 18 36E	CD 4077
TRZEBIATOW	54 04N 15 16E	WV 1790
USTKA	54 35N 16 51E	XA 2050
WRZOSOWO	54 01N 14 48E	VV 8785
ZOLCIN	Unknown	Unknown

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

5

962-F-3403

RC-6514

## POLISH BORDER SECURITY TROOPS' OPERATIONS (U)

### Introduction (Cont'd)

Listed below are the official abbreviations, English translations, and transliterations or names in the original language of organizations used throughout this report.

<u>ABBREVIATION</u>	<u>ENGLISH TRANSLATION</u>	<u>NAME IN ORIGINAL LANGUAGE</u>
WOP	Border Security Troops	Wojsko Ochrony Pogranicza
MO	Citizens' Militia,	Milicja Obywatelska
WKR	District Military Headquarters	Wojskowa Komenda Rejonowa
PZ	Counterintelligence Post	Placowka Zwiadowcza
GPK	Border Traffic Control Point	Graniczny Punkt Kontrolny
AK	Home Army (underground during World War II)	Armia Krajowa
WSW	Military Internal Security Service	Wojskowa Sluzba Wewnetrzna
KBW	Internal Security Corps	Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego
MSW	Ministry of Internal Affairs	Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnetrznych
PKM2	14.5-mm antiaircraft heavy machinegun, ZPU-2	Przeciw Lotniczy Karabin Maszynowy Dwi Lufowy
MON	Ministry of National Defense	Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej

#### A. OPERATIONS OF THE BORDER SECURITY TROOPS

##### 1. Border Area

The border area was established by a law passed by the National Council dated 21 March 1958, which revised the existing law governing the security of the Polish frontier. Source could not recall any details of the law, except that it stated that the border area was divided into three parts: the forbidden strip, the border strip, and the border zone.

##### a. Forbidden Strip (Pas Wzbroniony)

This was a strip of land, also referred to as the border control path (Pas Drogi Granicznej), which was completely under the Border Security Troops' (Wojsko Ochrony Pogranicza-WOP) administration and control. There were no markers indicating its limits. The width varied, depending on the terrain; it was never narrower than 10 m and seldom wider than 100 m, however. The forbidden strip was an evacuated area, but by special permission the local population could enter it for a limited time to remove firewood and harvest hay.

The forbidden strip was 6 m wide and was plowed; a telephone line ran parallel to it; and wooden observation towers on it were spaced 3 to 5 km apart, depending on the field of vision. To the best of Source's knowledge, there were no physical obstacles, such as barbed-wire fences, electrified fences, and trip flares on the Polish frontier, except west of SZCZECIN.

5

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

902-P-3403  
RC-6514

In the coastal areas the forbidden strip remained off limits to pedestrian traffic from 15 October to 15 April, and from sunset to sunrise from 15 April to 15 October. There were no movement restrictions within the strip in the daylight hours during the vacation season from 15 April to 15 October.

The physical security means along the coast were the same as along the inland border except that radar towers were to replace the observation towers sometime in 1962.<sup>1</sup>

## b. Border Strip (Strefa Nadgraniczna)

Source described the border strip as an area over which the Border Security Troops exercised operational control. It extended 2 to 6 km from the border or from the coast and it was marked with a sign "Strefa Nadgraniczna." All persons desiring to reside within the border strip were required to obtain permission from their county Citizens' Militia (MO) office. Upon arrival in the border strip area, they were required to register for permanent or temporary residence with the local Registrar's Office (Biuro Meldunkowe). In the coastal area, during summer months (15 April to 15 October) tourists and vacationers were not required to obtain entry permits from their local MO; they were required to register, however. Transient passenger traffic through the border strip required no special authorization.

## c. Border Zone (Zona Graniczna)

Source defined the border zone as an area over which the Border Security Troops brigades exercised limited operational control. The zone extended up to 30 km from the border. The entrance into the border zone was not marked and no special documentation was required to enter or reside in it.

## d. Coastal Waters

The coastal waters were divided into two zones: the territorial waters, extending 3 nautical miles from the shore at low tide, and waters of the adjacent strip (Strefa Wod Przyleglych), extending into the sea for an additional 3 nautical miles. The WOP exercised complete operational control over the territorial waters only. It was within the WOP authority to enforce existing water traffic regulations; to prevent fishing within the limits of the territorial waters by foreign fishing fleets, and to search all craft for stowaways, proper documentation of the crews, and contraband.

## 2. Criteria for Selection of WOP Personnel

The WOP enlisted men came from normal conscription channels. Source did not know the criteria for selection used by the District Military Office (Wojskowa Komenda Rejonowa-WKR), but he thought that to qualify a conscript had to have only a clean police record and a minimum of 7 years of education; political reliability and membership in the Communist Party were not factors.

Conscripts with 11 years of education (gimnazjum) were selected for officer candidate training upon graduation,<sup>2</sup> and sent directly to WOP Officers' School at KETRZYN, or for NCO training, or were assigned to port battalions or to border traffic control posts.

## 3. Training

After passing the medical examination at the local WKR, early in October, the conscripts received orders to report directly to WOP Brigade

# CONFIDENTIAL

6

962-P-3403  
RC-6514

headquarters. Here, they were assigned to the Brigade Recruit Training Center, where they underwent 2 weeks of preliminary training and cursory medical examination, and were organized into training companies, platoons, and squads. Following the 2-week preliminary training they were given 14 weeks of basic infantry training and basic border security training.

The conscripts were sworn in after 8 weeks of basic training, usually on New Year's Day. Upon successful completion of the basic training in early February they were selected for specialist training and NCO training. The specialist training prepared the draftees for duty with port battalions or with border control posts. The training lasted from 6 to 12 weeks. Conscripts who were selected for NCO training attended the Brigade NCO School, which lasted 9 months.

The mandatory training in the outposts was conducted by officers and noncommissioned officers. Because of the staggered hours of border duty, the training was conducted twice daily, from 0800 to 1100 hours, and from 1300 to about 1600 hours. Garrison training was rather inefficient and the schedule was not rigidly followed because of the shortage of personnel. The main stress in garrison training was placed on border guard subjects. The men were taught the methods used by border violators, border regulations, detection and interpretation of tracks left on the plowed strip, familiarization with documents and permits used in the border zone and at border crossing points, types of patrol duties, searching and conveying of arrested personnel, and use of service dogs. All WOP personnel were required to qualify with their individual weapon twice a year.

Garrison training was suspended from September through February, during which time part of the old conscripts were discharged while the new conscripts were still undergoing basic training.

#### 4. Duty

The duty of securing the border was always assigned to a patrol (element) consisting of at least two enlisted men. There were several types of patrols, each charged with a specific duty.

##### a. Border Sentry (Wartownik Graniczny)

The patrol consisted of two or more stationary guards designated to guard a limited sector of the border, a road block, a bridge, and road and railroad barriers. The tour of duty was 7 hours every 24 hours. Their equipment consisted of an AK Kalashnikov submachinegun and 70 rounds of live ammunition; a flare pistol, PS-25, with six white, three green, and three red flares; a flashlight; an individual first aid kit; and field glasses. The equipment was considered standard for all types of patrols.

##### b. Guard Checking Patrol (Element Kontrolny)

The patrol consisted of an armed officer and one armed enlisted man or noncommissioned officer. The duty of the patrol was to check the performance of the patrols posted along the entire sector of responsibility of the outpost. The patrol was required to make one check of the sector every 4 hours. The tour of duty was 4 hours.

##### c. Border Inspecting Patrol (Element Badawczy)

The patrol consisted of two or more walking guards designated to guard a well-defined sector of the border, or the entire length of the sector of responsibility. The patrol inspected the plowed strip for tracks. In localities

6

CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

7

962-F-3403  
RC-6514

where civilian population lived close to the border, the patrol also checked documents and passes of all persons permitted to work within the forbidden strip. The length of duty was 5 hours.

## d. Listening Patrol (Podsluch)

The patrol consisted of two stationary guards designated to guard natural approaches to the border. It occupied a concealed position with a good field of observation and maintained absolute silence. A service dog always accompanied the listening patrol. The length of duty was 4 hours.

## e. Roving Patrol (Patrol Wahadlowy)

The patrol consisted of two or more guards designated to inspect a border sector area in the forbidden strip and in the border strip. Their mission was to intercept all unauthorized civilian traffic in the forbidden strip and to check documentation of all suspected persons in the border strip. The length of duty was 5 to 7 hours.

## f. Observation Patrol (Obserwacja)

The patrol consisted of two or more armed enlisted personnel, designated to observe an assigned border area from a tower or from a concealed position. The length of duty was 7 hours.

## g. Technical Inspection Team (Element Kontroli Technicznej)

The patrol consisted of two communications maintenance men designated to check and maintain wire communications, trip wires, and flares, if present, in the sector. In addition they were used to maintain observation towers, road barriers, guard booths and existing physical security means along the border. Their length of duty was 8 hours.

## h. Ambush Patrol (Zasadzka)

It consisted of five or more enlisted men, armed, with an officer in charge, designated to apprehend border violators, acting on a warning from the CI officer, who gave the approximate route of escape and time of escape. Accompanying the ambush patrol were a dog and dog-handler team and walkie-talkie radio operator with a radio, type unidentified.

## i. Pursuit Detail (Grupa Poscigowa)

The composition of the patrol was similar to the ambush patrol, except that the patrol acted on a confirmed border violation and pursued the violator until apprehended.

## j. Screening Detail (Grupa Zaporowa)

The strength of the screening detail varied, depending on the echelon of the unit to which it was subordinate. The detail was designated to seal off penetrated areas within the entire border zone. If the situation warranted, the border zone could be sealed by screening details of the whole brigade and adjacent brigades.

## k. Gangplank Guard (Wartownik Blokujacy)

It consisted of one or two armed guards designated to control leaving and entering traffic aboard ships berthing in harbors. The guard

7

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

962-F-3403  
RC-6514

was responsible for surveilling the loading and unloading of ships, for checking passes and passports of all persons boarding or leaving ship, and for maintaining a sign-in and sign-out book for all persons boarding and leaving the vessel. The length of duty was 7 hours.

## 1. Border Convoy (Konwojent)

The patrol consisted of two or more armed guards, designated to escort apprehended violators to the higher headquarters, or civilian authorities.

## m. Search Detail (Ekipa Kontrolna)

It consisted of up to 20 armed soldiers designated to search ships, fishing crafts, trucks, and trains for stowaways and contraband. The length of duty was 8 hours.

## n. Alert Detail (Grupa Alarmowa)

The alert detail consisted of about 10 men or more designated to stand by for immediate deployment as directed by the duty officer. The alert detail was always commanded by an officer. The detail used its own personnel to organize the varied patrols necessary to apprehend a border violator. The strength of the detail depended on the echelon of the headquarters to which it was subordinate.

## o. Outpost Sentry (Wartownik Straznicy)

A single armed guard was designated to guard the outpost, keeping on the alert for approaching personnel and vehicles, and reporting by telephone to the charge of quarters all unusual accidents, such as pistol flares and illumination from trip flares. The tour of duty was 8 hours.

## p. Charge of Quarters (Podoficer Sluzbowy)

The duty was performed by an extended service NCO designated to assist the outpost duty officer in carrying out the outpost operations for the day. His duties included: to wake up each guard 30 minutes before duty; to issue each enlisted man ammunition and equipment necessary for performance of duty; to assemble the patrol; to bring the patrol to the duty officer for orders and instructions; to receive the patrols returning from duty; to follow the training schedule and get the proper personnel to the proper places at the proper time; and to maintain telephone communication with the patrols on the border. The length of duty was 24 hours, beginning at 1400 hours.

## q. Duty Officer (Officer Sluzbowy)

All outpost officers and qualified carrier noncommissioned officers (podoficer zawodowy) performed the duty. The duty officer was responsible for the over-all operation of the outpost and for the security of the border sector in accordance with the operational plan for the day. His duties included the dispatch of border patrols, maintaining telephone liaison with higher and adjacent headquarters, organizing and dispatching alert details in case of border violations, reporting all border violations to the outpost commander, battalion duty officer, local WOP counterintelligence officer, adjacent outpost duty officers, and the local commander of the Citizens' Militia. The length of duty was 24 hours, beginning at 1400 hours.

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

962-P-3403  
HC-6514

A typical order of the officer of the day to a patrol being posted was as follows:

"Privates ANIOLEK and FENTELE, I designate you to safeguard the borders of the Polish People's Republic as a roving patrol. The patrol commander will be Private ANIOLEK. You will perform your duty on the right flank of the outpost from the big oak tree on the extreme limit of the sector to the first road crossing. Your duty will be to prevent unauthorized violation of the border within your sector; upon arriving at the designated border sector, to patrol its full length and to pause every half hour and observe it from concealment. Your route march: Dirt road towards the woods, then along the northern edge of the woods. At the end of the wooded area turn right and using the path along the plowed strip walk to the big oak tree. Halt all persons and identify them. In case of suspicion of any one's identity, notify the outpost by telephone. Your return route: the bituminous road to the road crossing with the bus stop. You will be there approximately 0730 hours, at which time the morning bus should arrive. Upon its arrival check documents of all passengers. Improperly documented persons escort to the outpost. Your duty on the border will begin at 0400 hours and end at 0600 hours. On your right flank until 0600 hours there will be a listening post, (names given); on your left flank until 0800 hours will be a border sentry patrol (names given); you will establish contact with both of them. Maintain communication with the outpost every hour by telephone, and in emergency by flares. Fire two green flares in case of penetration into Poland, three green flares in case of penetration out of Poland, and two red flares in case help is needed. The password for the day is 'Bayonet' ('Bytom'). When crossing the plowed strip mark your foot prints with a letter X inscribed in a circle. Do you understand your orders? Repeat your order." The patrol commander was required to repeat only the pertinent parts of the order.

## 5. Planning of Border Security

The outpost commander was responsible for the security of the border sector charged to his outpost. In preparing his plans for the safeguarding of his sector he guided himself by orders and instructions received from higher headquarters (battalion and brigade); by the analysis of the local situation by the CI officer and his recommendation; and by the terrain features existing in the sector.

The commanding officer could order normal operations or reinforced operations (sluzba wzmozniona). The reinforced operations were ordered in the event of border violation, or an expected border violation; during political unrest, such as the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and Poznan events of 1956; during national holidays, 1 May and 22 July; during Christmas, New Year, and Easter seasons; and during locally organized political conventions, bazaars, county fairs, and local celebrations in the border strip. The reinforced operations were ordered under the assumption that during the increased traffic near the border the incidents of border violations increased and the alertness of the border troops decreased. During reinforced operations the number of posted patrols was increased by 40 percent and the tour of duty was extended up to 10 hours for enlisted men and career noncommissioned officers and to 6 hours for officers.

Upon deciding on a plan of securing the border for a given time period the commanding officer entered a detailed plan of action in the outpost operations logbook (Ksiazka Operacyjna). In his plan, he decided whether normal or reinforced operation would be conducted; designated by name the various border patrols and their sector of responsibility; organized the area of patrols' responsibility so that they were overlapping and mutually supporting;

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

10

962-F-3403  
RC-6514

and prepared alert plans for border violations, fire, air attack, and in case of the outposts along the Baltic Sea, against airborne and waterborne attacks. Source had no information on the alert procedures except that troops were required to form in full field equipment in predesignated assembly areas, and that the next higher headquarters were notified about the alert,

## 6. Password and Signs

The challenge (Haslo) and the reply (Odzew) of the password for the day were fixed by the brigade headquarters. The challenge was always a component part of a weapon and the reply was always the name of a city, which started with the same letter as the challenge word. The procedure for challenging and replying was as follows:

Challenger: "Halt! Who goes there?" (Stoj! Kto idzie?)

Challenged: "Border Service." (Sluzba Graniczna)

Challenger: "Challenge?" (Haslo)

Challenged: "Trigger." (Kurek)

Challenger: "KRAKOW; thank you; free passage." (KRAKOW; Dziekuje; Droga Wolna)

There were no other means of mutual identification known to Source, except marking of the crossing of the plowed strip described in paragraph 4r, above.

## 7. Reporting Procedures of Border Violations

Whenever tracks on the plowed strip, or other indications of unauthorized movement were observed, the patrol notified outpost headquarters at once by telephone and by flares. The outpost duty officer alerted the entire outpost, the CI officer, the battalion headquarters, and both flanking outposts. He dispatched the service dog and the dog handler team to the place of violation, deployed the alert detail in the expected path of the border violator and ordered reinforced operations within the sector of responsibility.

At battalion headquarters the duty officer alerted the brigade headquarters, the CI Section and adjacent battalion headquarters; and deployed the battalion's reserve detail, paying particular attention to securing by road blocks all road junctions, bus stops, and railroad stations within a radius of 15 km of the point of border violation.

At brigade level the duty officer alerted the brigade headquarters and deployed the reserve detail in the border zone, blocking road junctions, bus stops, and railroad stations within a radius of 30 km from the point of border violation.

When it was determined that an illegal border crosser had left Polish territory, the outpost duty officer obtained through command channels permission to pursue the violator into the foreign territory. By mutual agreement of the Communist bloc countries such permissions were promptly given, and border guards on both sides of the border mutually cooperated. Simultaneously, the outpost duty officer notified the local CI officer, who, assisted by the service dog handler team, tracked back the probable route of escape in order to establish the point of departure of the border violator and to determine whether any help was rendered to the violator by a local accomplice. The CI officer also alerted his "Agentura" in order to determine whether any strangers were observed in the area, and to obtain any information on the suspect.

10

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

11

962-F-3403  
RC-6514

Border violators apprehended in the outpost area were first interrogated at the outpost headquarters by the CI officer, then convoyed under armed guard through channels to the brigade headquarters for final disposition.

In order to test and stimulate the alertness of the Border Security Troops and the confidential informant net, the chief of the CI Division at brigade headquarters dispatched a fictitious border violator every 4 to 6 months. Upon apprehension of the violator the personnel responsible for the apprehension were rewarded as if a real border violator had been apprehended, and were never informed of the true circumstances. The usual award to WOP personnel was 14 days of home leave, a radio receiver or money. Confidential informers were rewarded financially.

## B. JOINT MANEUVERS

In July 1959, while assigned to the SLIWNO PZ Post as CI officer, Source received orders to report to the Baltic WOP Brigade headquarters at KOSZALIN, to participate in joint maneuvers scheduled to take place on the coast from 25 July to 10 August 1959. Upon arrival at the Brigade headquarters, he was briefed by the chief of CI Division, Major BRZOZOWSKI, (fnu), on the general situation, then on his specific assignment. Source was assigned the duties of a CI officer in Leborg County with a mission to organize a civil observation and reporting force, alert to airborne and seaborne hostile forces.

Source recalled from the briefing on the general situation the following alignment of forces:

### 1. Participating Units

#### a. Defending Force

The commanding officer of the force was Brigadier General Wacław KOMAR, who until his retirement in 1960, was commander of troops of the MSW. Upon his retirement the position of the commanding officer of the MSW Troops was abolished. Subordinate to General KOMAR were the following elements:

Baltic WOP Brigade;

Elements of the Pomorska WOP Brigade, consisting of one or two companies and an unknown radio-telephone element;

Elements of the Lubuska WOP Brigade, consisting of at least one radio-telephone communication platoon and a battery of eight ZPU2;

A separate KBW battalion from KOSZALIN, strength unknown, but observed major items of equipment consisted of unknown number of 85-mm AAA guns, M1939, unknown numbers of 76-MM AT guns, and 82-mm mortars;

One or two company-size units from an unidentified KBW major headquarters from KATOWICE;

One or two company-size units from unrecalled KBW major headquarters;

Unknown number of KBW helicopters and fixed-wing reconnaissance planes;

Unknown number of WOP cutters and motor boats from KOLOBRZEG.<sup>1</sup>

The commanding officer of the WOP force was Colonel Jan TRAN;<sup>3</sup> the commanding officer of the KBW elements was a KBW colonel, name unrecalled.

11

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

12

962-F-3403  
HC-6514

## b. Attacking Force

The commanding officer was unknown.

One battalion of naval infantry from DZIWNOW;<sup>4</sup>

Elements of an airborne division, Commandos (Komandos), believed to be stationed in the vicinity of WARSAW, consisting of 200 paratroopers. (Source had no further information on the unit.)

## c. Umpire Staff

The chief umpire was an unidentified military colonel from MON headquarters, WARSAW, assisted by a team of military umpires.

## 2. Mission

The object of the maneuver was to test the ability of WOP CI organs to organize the population into a civil defense force with the cooperation of all local civil authorities, social and political organizations, labor and industrial enterprises; the adequacy of existing WOP SOP's; radio and wire communication means along the coastal zone in the event of a surprise enemy attack from air or sea; and the alertness and reporting procedures of the WOP outposts deployed along the Baltic coast.

## 3. Area of Operation

The limits of the maneuver area extended along a line from NOWOGARD through BIALOGARD to LEBORK in the south, and along the coast line from DZIWNOW to KARWIA in the north.

## 4. Execution of the Maneuver

The line units of the Baltic WOP Brigade remained in place and conducted their normal border security duties.

The remaining elements of the defending force were assembled in a wooded area in the vicinity of KOSZALIN.

From about 27 July to about 6 August the CI officers organized the civil defense force and radio-telephone communication net in the maneuver area; reconnoitered their areas of responsibility for possible landing beaches and air drop sites, and reported them to the chief of the CI Division at KOSZALIN; and received, interrogated and further processed captured paratroopers who were dropped in small numbers (three or four) in the maneuver area for the purpose of disrupting communications, simulating destruction of radar, radio stations and bridges.

It was established from the interrogation of the POW's that the enemy sea force, preceded by a massed air drop, would land on beaches in the vicinity of ROWY and NRZEZYNO.

A fully motorized reserve force, strength unknown, was kept in the headquarters of the Baltic WOP Brigade, and in the assembly area near KOSZALIN as mobile reinforcements to be used when and where needed.

About 8 August 1959, under cover of darkness, about 80 paratroopers were dropped in the vicinity of LEBORK. Their mission was to penetrate south as deeply as possible and destroy bridges and communication centers. An unidentified KBW unit captured the paratroopers.

12

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

13

962-F-3403  
RC-6514

On 9 August at about 2300 hours a detail of about 15 naval infantrymen, unit unidentified, landed in small pneumatic assault boats in the vicinity of ROWY. The detail was met by WOP troopers performing their normal border security duties and was quickly captured.

About 10 August at 0400 hours a battalion-size amphibious force landed in the vicinity of MRZEZYNO. The force identified as the naval infantry battalion from DZIWNOW captured MRZEZYNO, but by 1000 hours joined forces of WOP and KBW, reinforced by the reserve elements from KOSZALIN, surrounded and captured the force.

The maneuver terminated on 11 August, followed by a critique given by the chief umpire and Brigadier General KOMAR. According to General KOMAR's statement the maneuver was well executed and was a total success.

C. AIR AND HOME TERRITORIAL ANTI-AIR DEFENSE FORCES (Powietrzna Obrona Przeciw Lotnicza Obszaru Krajowego-POPLOK) (See Annex A for Source's schematic concept of the organization.)

Source could not give a detailed description of this organization, but from lectures heard at the WOP Officers' School at KETRZYN<sup>2</sup> and from briefings attended during the joint maneuvers described in paragraph B above, he described it in the following general terms:

The supreme headquarters for the organization was the headquarters of the Warsaw Pact Forces, through the Polish Ministry of National Defense. Source did not know the structure of the Warsaw Pact Forces headquarters and the Ministry of National Defense. The Minister of National Defense was Lt Gen SPYCHALSKI. Subordinate to the minister were the ground forces, the navy and the air force. POPLOK was a component element of the air force, commanded by Gen BIELECKI.

Subordinate to Gen BIELECKI was the deputy for aviation matters, rank and name unrecalled, to whom were subordinate the fighter units, the bomber units and the special aircraft units (transport, reconnaissance, and observation); the deputy for air home territorial anti-air defense matters, Col MANKIEWICZ, (fnu), to whom were subordinate the radar units, the AAA units, the rocket AAA units, the searchlight detachments, the smoke generator detachments, and the civil territorial air defense, consisting of the three military districts (Silesian, Warsaw and Pomeranian); the Fighter Pilots' School at DEBLIN; the Bomber Pilots' School at an unrecalled location; and the Officers' Radar School at JELENIA GORA.

## Comments:

1. For the description of the physical obstacle area, radar towers, observation towers, organization, equipment, and function of WOP units see Army Interrogation Unit report 962-E-3591, entitled "Order of Battle Information on Polish Border Security Troops (C)" also published as RC-6496.
2. For the criteria for selection of personnel for WOP officers and officers' candidate training see forthcoming Army Interrogation Unit report "Border Security Troops Officers' School at KETRZYN, Poland (C)."
3. Source's biographical details on this and other field grade WOP officers mentioned will be provided in a forthcoming Army Interrogation Unit report entitled "Polish Border Security Troops Officers (C)."

13

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

14

962-F-3403  
RC-6514

Comments (Cont'd)

4. For Source's additional information on the unidentified separate naval infantry battalion, see Navy Interrogation Unit report entitled "Activities of the Polish Navy" circulating in the Department of the Navy as CINCUSNAVEUR Frankfurt Report F 71-S-61, dated 25 November 1961, also published as RC-6403.

14

CONFIDENTIAL



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Annex A

SOURCE'S CONCEPT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE POLISH AIR HOME TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE FORCES (POWIEZTRZNA OBRONA PRZECIW LOTNICZA OBRZARU KRAJOWEMU)

Chief, Warsaw Pact  
(Soviet marshal, name unrecalled)


Ministry of National Defense  
(Lt Gen SPYCHALSKI)

Date of Info: July 1961

Basis of Info: Lectures at WOP Officers' School at KETKOW and briefings at Baltic WOP Brigade at KOSZALIN during joint maneuvers, July-August 1959. Source had no on-the-job contact with the organization, and had no further information on any of its components.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

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FBI

28 Feb. 62

Re. Jan Dabrowski

Confidential

22 Madison New York  
Re: Wojciech Bogawski  
Kerut

FBI

PLANT FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
ENGINEERING COMPONENTS

19

12 May 62 / 01

CRACOW, POLAND

Department of Telecommunications Engineering, Cracow, Poland  
The department is a branch of the Faculty of Technical Sciences, Cracow University of Technology.  
The department is engaged in the design, construction and maintenance of telecommunication systems.  
A total of about 200 persons are employed in the department.

PROJMS: ALL CARDS

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ZWI-Plant for telecommunication engineering components

WORKS

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PLMIS: ALL CARDS

ATM

CIT POLAND

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