

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.

RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES &
DISPOSITION SECTION, RM ~~6B-50~~ ON OR BEFORE
DATE INDICATED. 6A-50

IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER
INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4478.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(47)

	0029 11/10				
	06/EPR				
RETURN TO	CA-50				
IP/ARD	Rm 6B-50				

DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR
MUTILATE FOLDER.

78-1129
432393

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

FILE NO WASH CIA BD 37

DOCUMENT: _____

FOLDER: B 17

PAGE: _____

BOX: 2

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE


Handwritten notes: 822393

Handwritten mark: 3

Handwritten note: folder # 11


NOTE
JULY 1951-DECEMBER 1952

~~SECRET~~
Security Information



~~SECRET~~
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information



THOMAS W. ERADEN,
Chief,
International Organizations Division

Attachments: a/s
IO/TONIC:WFD/cmm
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - RI

SECRET
Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION


31 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

VIA: Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: NCFE Cooperation with CIA

The cooperation of NCFE in certain matters should be brought to your attention.



3. In addition, NCFE has done some specific research for us with skill and great speed.

THOMAS A. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

IO/TOMIC: WPD/hka
Distributions:
Orig. & 1- Addressee
~~1 cc - C/P~~
2 cc - IO/TOMIC
1 cc - C/IO
1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

P. 6450

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Chief, Cover Division, Plans/FI

19 December 1952

Chief, Contact Division, OO


HMI-591

Crusade for Freedom

The attached extract from the 12 December 1952 issue of Fifth Army's Domestic Intelligence Report is forwarded as being of possible interest to your office.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

Encl: 1



CONFIDENTIAL 7264
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

2017 1689

16 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
SUBJECT: Edward W. Barrett and NCFE
REFERENCE: Your Note Dated 11 December 1952

I'm informed by Admiral Miller that the matter of Edward W. Barrett joining NCFE as a director, was discussed at an Executive Committee meeting a month ago.

No formal decision was made because of considerable opposition so the matter has been tabled.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

15 December 1952

Dear Archie:

I much enjoyed our chance for a talk, and Bill Durkee, who assists me in the subject we discussed, is tremendously enthusiastic, as I am, about the possibility that you will consider favorably the appointment Frank mentioned.

Let me state again what seems to me most important in the facts under discussion. The job is of national and world-wide importance. It can help achieve greatness. It can endanger us all. It requires a man of imagination and ideas but also a man of deep and thoughtful responsibility to discharge it well.

I should like you to consider that I am at your service at any time to give you any facts you would like to have or any opinions for that matter. All of us here consider that we would be greatly privileged to be able to help you if you undertook the job.

Sincerely,

Thomas W. Braden

Mr. Archibald Alexander
1430 - 33rd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

C/IO

NO.

3-5808

DATE

11 December 1952

	TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
			REC'D	F.B.D.		
1.	DDCI			12/11	<i>[Initials]</i>	<p>EYES ONLY</p> <p><u>Mr Braden</u></p> <p>How much more does he want? I agree that we should do everything possible to get a strict accounting.</p> <p>This is a serious matter.</p> <p><u>Alfred</u></p>
2.	CIO				<i>[Initials]</i>	
3.						
4.	DURKEE				W.P.D.	
5.						
6.	Chp for file					
7.						
8.						
9.						
10.						
11.						
12.						
13.						
14.						
15.						

July 8, 1952

Note: Nelson please deliver this to Allen.

To: Allen Dulles

You recently asked me for our views on Yugoslavia. The enclosed memorandum is a consensus formed from all of our key staff members. It also meets with the approval of John Hughes. I think this is a fair statement of what we are doing to date and what our views are. I hope this will be of some use to you.

Leonard

Enclosure

July 2, 1952

MEMORANDUM

The National Committee for a Free Europe's policy in respect to Yugoslavs and Yugoslav exile activities may be summarized in the following statements.

1. The Committee does not now, nor does it plan to interfere, by radio or otherwise, with the domestic affairs of the Yugoslav people or of the Titoist regime.
2. In so far as our anti-Stalinist aims and activities coincide, we see no reason to obstruct such functional and mutually beneficial arrangements as may from time to time present themselves. Specifically, we have no objection to exchanging with Radio Belgrade certain types of radio materials in respect to the countries under Soviet domination which might enhance the effectiveness of our radio program or otherwise aid the work of the National Committee for a Free Europe.
3. As an anti-Communist organization dedicated to the concepts of democracy and of individual freedom we feel it is entirely consistent and proper to extend aid to democratic Yugoslavs exiled from their homelands, within the budgetary and other limitations under which we operate. To this end a total of some 69 Yugoslavs are retained by the Committee and engaged in five types of work.

a) In Radio Free Europe, which has no Yugoslav desk, 13 Yugoslavs have been engaged as information analysts, program advisors and translators because of their technical abilities.

c) In the Research & Publications Service 9 Yugoslavs are engaged in analysis of the Yugoslav press and other sources of information and in the publication of factual, non-propagandistic studies and bulletins designed to keep the emigration and interested Americans informed on domestic events.

e) Finally, the National Councils Division gives financial aid to three formerly prominent Yugoslavs in recognition of their past services to the cause of democracy.

In conclusion, the number of Yugoslavs thus supported by the Committee's various divisions represents 1.6% of the total exile staff.

SSW/bvb


Sent to State Dept. 28 July 1952

~~SECRET~~
Security Information


SECRET 1671

11 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
SUBJECT: National Committee for a Free Europe



2. As he is aware, NCFE conducts an enormous amount of research and other activity. I believe we can now say with some certainty that this record is being put to use by Washington.


THOMAS W. ERADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment

Memo from DC/O,SI dtd 26 Nov. 52

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, PP/IOD

FROM : Deputy Chief, Operations Staff, O/SI

SUBJECT: Fulfillment of Requirement

DATE: 26 November 1952

2. The material which we received met our need precisely and enabled us to close out this requirement.


HAYDEN CHANNING

CSI/JBQuigley:bm

Distribution:

Orig and 1 - Forward ✓
1 - Subject file
1 - Daily reading file
1 - Chrono
1 -
1 - Chief, SRD

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

3-5294

11 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: University of the Saar

1. The University of the Saar was created on 8 March 1947. It has four facilities -- two in Saarbrucken (Letters and Law) and two in Hombourg (Medicine and Science). Faculty members are French, German, Swiss, British and Saarois.

2. A number of "institutes" exist with undefined relations to the University though financed, as is the rest of the University, by the French Government, and include a special institute for interpreters, an institute for economic science, and a European Institute. The support of the French Government of this University, aside from its merits, is part of the French attempt to Europeanize the Saar.

3. The European Institute, devoted to European unity, is a recent creation and is largely the result of the promotions of former Deputy, Andre Philip. It was the European Institute to which the Herald Tribune article specifically refers.

4. The University participated extensively, especially the European Institute, in the European Youth Campaign. Some of the specific activities were as follows:


March 1952: The Campaign cooperated with the International Institute of the University of Sarrebruck in arranging a meeting of young professors in the Saar and another meeting of youth leaders, both to discuss European problems. Films were supplied by the Campaign for both these meetings.

By the end of April, 25 youth organizations (practically all) in the Saar were associated with the Campaign. During April, May, and June an extensive program of discussion groups was arranged in the secondary schools throughout the Saar. These groups were sponsored jointly by the Campaign and the youth groups of the Saar. The groups discussed all phases of the unity question but concentrated particularly on the Schuman

Plan due to the economic position of the Saar in this matter. Films and publications of the Campaign were used in the discussions. 7000 students participated.

During June 1952, in cooperation with the Campaign, students and professors of the International Institute formed a committee along with youth leaders to discuss the particular problems of the Saar in a United Europe.

On March 27, 1952 the Campaign held a large study group in cooperation with the European Institute of the University of the Saar. Students attended from Aix, Hambourg, Oxford, Tubingen, Leyden, Nancy, Berlin and Paris. Lecturers were provided by the Campaign.



THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

SECRET
Security Information


DD/P 1-35

10 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT : University of the Saar

1. In the Sunday November 9 issue of the New York Herald Tribune there was a rather full and very interesting account of the purposes and objectives of the University of the Saar, which I am anxious for the addressees of the original and copies of this memorandum to read. The writer of the piece has evidently been much impressed with the efforts of this institution in the field of advancing European unity, and if the account which he gives is an accurate one,



2. I should appreciate receiving from you in due course your estimate of the significance of this activity, etc.

FSW

FRANK G. WISHER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/WE (Attention: Mr.)
C/EE

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information


DD/P 1-35

10 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT : University of the Saar

1. In the Sunday November 9 issue of the New York Herald Tribune there was a rather full and very interesting account of the purposes and objectives of the University of the Saar, which I am anxious for the addressees of the original and copies of this memorandum to read. The writer of the piece has evidently been much impressed with the efforts of this institution in the field of advancing European unity, and if the account which he gives is an accurate one,



2. I should appreciate receiving from you in due course your estimate of the significance of this activity, etc.

F&W

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/WE (Attention: Mr.)
C/EE


SECRET
Security Information

Disposition Registry
3-5282


SECRET
Security Information

10 December 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)



SECRET
Security Information





7-302

W. W. Warner

December 2, 1955

Dear Allen,

When we were talking on the telephone last week you suggested that [redacted] possibly be interested in the N.C.F.E. and that he might be worth considering as President to succeed Min Miller. As you requested, I have not mentioned his name to anyone as yet and will not do so until I hear further from you. As I understand it, you are going to be talking to him some time this week and hope to ascertain then whether he himself would have some interest in this job. Whenever you do get any further information on this please let me know.

Meantime, a number of other names have been suggested and we will give them careful consideration. Naturally we will discuss them with you before taking any definite action.

Respectfully,


DWRB

CONFIDENTIAL

December 1, 1952

Dear [redacted],

The enclosed documents may be of interest to you and are sent to you for information.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted signature box]

C. J. Y

October 31, 1952

The Honorable Joseph C. Grew
2828 Woodland Drive, N.W.
Washington 8, D. C.

Dear Mr. Grew:

Attached herewith you will find a most interesting summary of the methods that have been adopted by the USSR to attract the minds of youth in the satellite states.

It has long been known that some such program was being followed, but it is only recently that detail has become available.

In contrast to these methods, efforts expended in this country to teach our young people the real meaning of freedom as represented by western democracy are feeble. It is almost safe to state that we have been relying solely on an innate, sentimental aversion to "communism", because no intelligent or systematic means have as yet been organized that will capture the minds of the young people of the United States in the same fervent manner that the communist ideology has taken hold of Russian youth.

For a little more than a year, in connection with the reorganization of the research activities of the Division of Intellectual Cooperation we have been attempting to enlist the help of American intellectuals — not the intelligentsia. There is a difference.

From the very beginning I have been amazed to discover the dearth of people who are familiar with that section of Europe which engages NCFE interest — the belt of countries extending from the Baltic to the Aegean. I was curious to find out why there were so few upon whom we could draw for help, so I started an inquiry. The results are now being computed.

We must remember that the teaching of history or of government in America has never been emphasized to the same degree that it has in Europe. The curricula of the secondary schools in that part of the world cover those subjects much more comprehensively than is the case with us. It was difficult for me to appreciate this at first, but our inquiry has verified it without any doubt. In practically all European countries now on either side of the Iron Curtain it has long been traditional to emphasize instruction in history, because the tides of war and change have ebbed and flowed across their lands for many centuries. We have been isolated and in most respects free from foreign influences as we have developed our democratic processes. Today American foreign policy faces grave

The Honorable Joseph C. Gow

- 2 -

October 31, 1952

issues, and in one part of the world it is deeply concerned with the very section of Europe about which all NCED activities revolve. Yet the American public is practically illiterate respecting this area, both its past and its present. I know whereof I speak as a result of the inquiry above referred to. When it is completed I am inclined to think the results will be startling, particularly if we bear in mind that the issues at stake must be settled; that they are a concern to this country; and that our people are practically uninformd. They know little if anything about the historical significance behind what has occurred or will occur as the next few decades unfold because they have had no opportunity to learn the historic significance of it all.

In this country today there are approximately 800 colleges and universities offering four year courses of study leading to the Bachelor of Arts degree. This figure does not include the 575 junior colleges which usually conduct non-degree-granting programs two years in length — approximately the first two years of the traditional four year program. As far as our inquiry has gone it is already apparent that there are only several dozen institutions in the former group which offer instruction in this area, and very few in the latter. Most of those which do cover this area are the larger universities where the courses are really graduate in character and thus elective. In many instances brief coverage is supplied in survey courses, but even these can not and do not develop the attention that historically this part of the world now deserves. When this survey is completed a comprehensive report of the findings will be made. It will refer to colleges included in a list compiled by the American Council on Education which is the overall representative organization in this country for higher education.

I am calling the attention of the Directors to this situation because it seems to me we must realize that the American public not only does not know what we are doing, but actually can not understand the significance of why we are trying to do it. Generation after generation has grown up in America illiterate about the outside world. What we are discovering concerning the lack of knowledge of this area will of course prove true of other parts of the globe such as the Far East or South Africa.

In our Division we feel this particularly strongly because we are dependent on help from the academic world. The plain fact is more and more evident that we can not rely on American higher education as a prolific source of assistance. The relatively few individuals who have studied this region, and who are therefore qualified to aid us in our efforts, are either too overburdened with demands made on their time because they are qualified, or they are too young and inexperienced to be relied on in an enterprise as delicate as the one which we are conducting.

There are signs that in some academic localities interest in this field is developing. However, we can not wait for another generation to emerge even though, under whatever auspices, a program of training could be implemented to

87 J
October 31, 1952

The Honorable Joseph W. Grew

- 3 -

October 31, 1952

correct the situation. The important question is what can we do about it and what shall we do.

As already stated, the inquiry above mentioned grew out of our attempts to discover people in American higher education who are qualified to help us. We suspected they were not numerous, but we are amazed at the small number. We shall continue to try to persuade them to help us, but that well has begun to run dry already.

Can those associated with us do anything to emphasize this situation strongly enough in some quarters so that something will be attempted to correct it? Obviously this is not a problem that falls within the scope of NCFE; the problem concerns all colleges, universities, secondary schools and the enormous field designated as adult education. Responsibility may even rest with the government itself.

I shall appreciate your suggestions, and will send you the final report of this survey when completed.

Sincerely yours,

Levering Tyson

Enclosure:

"Youth in the Soviet Satellite States"

10 July 1952

1. At the last Project Review Committee meeting on NCFE, you asked that the State Department be consulted on policy in respect to National Councils. A review by State has begun. Meantime, however, for your information and in order to enable you to answer questions which may be raised by Messrs. Dolbearo or Miller, I want to explain to you how the IO Division is presently handling exile affairs.



3. We have taken the following action to try to insure orderly efforts to fuse or coordinate the various exile activities conducted

a. This division has asked the concerned area divisions to initiate plans for reorganization and unification of each national council. The resultant paper is then coordinated with the proper authorities in State and a final line is agreed upon.

b. This plan is then communicated to NCFE and the organization is asked for comments, criticisms and suggestions.

c. After such are made or agreed upon, the paper becomes the policy directive which charts NCFE's course of action.

[REDACTED]

To date two such policy directives have been written. The first was a plan for the reorganization of the Rumanian National Council. It was submitted to NCFE, and their criticisms and suggestions have been incorporated. The plan is now being executed.

The second was a similar State [REDACTED] paper on the reorganization of the Bulgarian National Committee. This will be submitted to NCFE on Thursday, 10 July, and a similar course of action will be followed.

4. I realize that this will seem to you as a somewhat simple and obvious way of insuring coordination, but the fact is that it had never been done before. I hope that it results in as few flaps as possible and as few occasions when people are running off in all directions.

5. A current case where people are running off in all directions is the Polish situation. This broke at the very time we were beginning work on a coordinated [REDACTED] paper. NCFE has been operating upon the assumption that if a Polish National Council is to be formed, all groups are to be represented.

[REDACTED]

There are a good many charges and counter-charges flying about at present on this situation. The man abroad is saying he had informed NCFE of what he intended to do, and people in NCFE say he hadn't. We are trying to straighten it out, but the situation is illustrative of how the plan above outlined can prevent such flaps.

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

28 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)


SUBJECT: Proposed Visit by Robert Lang with Officials of CIA

REFERENCE: EYES ONLY Memorandum to C/P from Richard Helms, Acting Chief, Operations, DS/P, dated 25 Nov. 1952


1. After consultation with Mr. Dirke, I would like to make the following comments on Mr. Helms' memorandum. Mr. Helms is correct that Mr. Lang has had difficulty in dealing with CIA. Mr. Helms is also correct if he understood that this state of affairs is the responsibility of Admiral Miller. (To Admiral Miller's responsibility must be added that of Spencer Phenix, Vice-President and Treasurer.)

2. Within and outside NSCF, Admiral Miller's dealings with Mr. Lang are based on two attitudes:

a. Miller's desire to have control of his organization by having everything channeled through him; and



1 August 1952



~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

In addition, Mr. Phoenix acts as the German expert in WCFE, cutting out Lang. Phoenix alone has negotiated and dealt with German high officials on RFE's position in Germany. Mr. Lang and Mr. Phoenix have fundamental disputes about how RFE's German problems should be handled. Part of Mr. Lang's desire for personal talks with officials of the Department of State grows out of his wish to get backing for his position.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

necessary in the past, is not satisfactory at present. Added to this has been the theme that there must be a re-thinking of what NCFE has done, is doing, and should do in the future. Our efforts are beginning to bear fruit. We have found that these lines have struck a responsive chord among the working personnel of NCFE. In many ways, the current RFE difficulties in Germany -- unfortunate as they are -- have been helpful, for they have made it clear to everybody concerned, including Mr. Lamp, that re-thinking of objectives and techniques based on cooperative effort by NCFE and CIA as a whole is vital if the organization is to do its job effectively.

6. To reformulate our own and NCFE's ideas, the IO Division has been and is carrying on discussions with the officials and working personnel of NCFE. In some of these discussions, Mr. Francis B. Stevens of the State Department has been a direct participant. The IO Division has also been exploring these matters with officials of CIA and the Department of State.

7. These discussions have covered a wide variety of subjects which can generally be described as follows:

a. What is NCFE's place as a whole in American policy toward the satellite nations; what is American policy; what modifications are likely?

b. How can NCFE, especially the Division of Emigre Relations, contribute more effectively to psychological and political warfare, not only for effects behind the Iron Curtain but in the free world? For example: How can NCFE securely engage in further activities in the pattern of its successful actions at the United Nations Slave Labor Hearings and the International Red Cross Meetings at Toronto?

c. Should NCFE continue to support emigre councils, or should some other technique be developed which can enable it to make more effective use of emigres for psychological warfare purposes?

[Redacted]

d. Is NCFE efficiently organized? What, for example, is the effect of the Division of Emigre Relations' dealings with emigres on the position of RFE in Europe, etc.?

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

THOMAS W. BRADEN
 Chief
 International Organizations Division

IO:TONIC:WPD/eh
 Orig - Addressee (thru CPP)
 1 cc - AC/OP/DD/P
~~1 cc - CPP~~
 1 cc - IO/TONIC
 1 cc - CIO
 1 cc - RI

Bill -
And use
assessing
Security info
They are writing memo
2/1




NOV 26 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Formation of a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organization

REFERENCE: Memorandum to IO, Subject: Current U. S. Attempt to Form a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organization, dated 12 September 1952

1. The NCFE negotiations for a united Rumanian refugee organization appear to be culminating successfully. Although a number of differences have been resolved, a few controversial matters remain. These points have been discussed several times, both with the NCFE and the refugees, but are of such importance as to warrant special attention and emphasis at this moment.



Section 1

3. In regard to paragraph 4 of reference memorandum, the matter of the Council apparently has not been discussed thoroughly with the refugees. The importance of an organization for the masses of refugees, controlled by the Executive Committee of 16-17, should not be underestimated. The working commissions proposed by [redacted] (European Federation Movement, PW, publications, etc.) should be drawn from the Council rather than from the refugees at large. Further, there are many refugees for whom the Committee has no need, nor we at present, who desire to participate in a refugee organization. That the desire to belong to something is particularly strong among the younger refugees,

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. Reports that [redacted] has developed an intransigent attitude toward the new committee have been received from several sources. As Mr. [redacted] is in Europe and is a friend of [redacted], it is suggested that he attempt to obtain again [redacted] cooperation with the current negotiations.

6. It is requested that this memorandum be forwarded to the HCE so that the information may be of immediate assistance in the negotiations planned for this week.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

26 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
SUBJECT: Results of debriefing of Czech Defector
REFERENCE: Memo from Bob Joyce 17 Nov. 52, attaching State Cable
from Frankfurt #313

1. I am sure Bob Joyce will upon reflection not allow himself to be troubled by the remarks of one Czech defector to the State Department Mission in Germany.

2. These are the facts:

a. Radio Free Europe has been most careful in its handling of the subject of liberation. They have not in the past nor do they now allow anyone to speak on the air of "liberation now".

b. Attached for your information is a detailed guidance on this subject issued by Radio Free Europe -- policy which governs all of their broadcasts.

c. As an example of how careful Radio Free Europe is on this subject, RFE did not use Mr. John Foster Dulles' recent controversial campaign speech on the subject of liberation because they believed that even though it was news and a statement made by a responsible American, it might be misinterpreted behind the Curtain.

3. I think that Radio Free Europe has maintained excellent discipline on this subject. You can imagine that it is under considerable pressure from Iron Curtain emigration to take the line of early rope for liberation in the prospect that in some way American public opinion and world opinion might be thus committed to a policy of liberation by armed forces.

4. I would be glad to have you show this memorandum to Mr. Joyce if you care to do so. He should know that everyone is constantly on the alert and carefully watching the problem he raises.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment
Special Guidance
dtd 2 Sept. 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CIO:WPD-TWB/eh 1 cc - IO/TOMIC
Orig & 1 - Addressee 1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

EYES ONLY

25 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, P & F

SUBJECT: Talk with Mr. Robert Lang

1. I spent an hour and a quarter in New York on Friday, 14 November, with Mr. Robert Lang of Radio Free Europe. The major portion of this time was devoted to a briefing by Lang of the RFE structure and the position which RFE occupies in it, including the philosophy of RFE operations. Lang gave an impressive performance and struck me on such short acquaintance as an individual of ability, judgment, and energy.

2. Mr. Lang made quite a point of the fact that his operation inside RFE is virtually independent. He intimated that he receives no guidance from the President or other officers and has expended considerable effort in the past seeing to it that an iron curtain is kept between RFE and the top command of RFE. He said that if RFE had not developed and expanded according to a philosophy which it itself had originated, it would have got nowhere and would still be frustrated by what he kept referring to as the "old State Department line" as exemplified by the views of DeWitt Poole, Fred Dolbeare, and others.

As far as Mr. Braden and company are concerned, he said that they dealt largely with Admiral Miller and his immediate staff. It was clear that he would prefer to deal directly with Washington. He also feels inhibited by the fact that he has to cajole Admiral Miller into permission to come to Washington. He cited as evidence an incident recently when he felt obliged to ask a friend in the State Department to intercede with Admiral Miller to permit him to come down here for consultation.

3. There was nothing bitter or frustrated in Mr. Lang's remarks. Rather he struck me as an individual who was discussing the facts of life, be what they may.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -



5. After you have read the foregoing, I would like to talk with you and Mr. Eraden for the purpose of passing on DD/P's reactions to my suggestion.

RH
Richard Helms
Acting Chief, Operations, DDP

cc: Chief, IO ✓

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Security Information

DDP 1387

24 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT :

(Signed) FRANK G. WISHER

FRANK G. WISHER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment (1)
Letter to DDCI from
dated 15 November 1952.

cc: DDCI
C/PP

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

DF 1371

21 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT : [redacted] I&S Approval of NCFE Request.

1. This memorandum will record the understanding arrived at in a conversation today with [redacted], Chief of I&S, and reported orally to Mr. Durkee by me. Admiral Miller telephoned me today with an urgent request [redacted] Mr. [redacted] for a further period of six months in the capacity of a consultant to RFE and not as a regular employee. This was the same basis as was finally approved for the first period of six months which is about to expire.

2. In discussing this matter with [redacted] I refreshed his recollection as to certain features of the original arrangement, including the fact that [redacted] is an extremely capable individual who has attracted other good people, notably [redacted], into the effort, and who has no serious security raps against him.

[redacted]
Admiral Miller informed me and I passed on to [redacted] the fact that there have been no questions or flurries of any kind concerning [redacted] and the further fact that he has been doing a very effective job. [redacted] the continuation of Mr. [redacted] as a consultant to RFE for a further period of six months.

3. I requested Mr. Durkee to so advise Admiral Miller at the earliest possible moment. I assume he has done so.

FW
FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/PP

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
NCFE		2. RI FILE NO.			
		3. DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE Nov. 1952	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM		8. DATE OF INFO.	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION	
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN THE CONTROL
SECTION BY TS-8 1191

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 

NOV 21 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Division
Thru: FI Plans

SUBJECT: NCFE Employment of Mr. [redacted]

1. This is to advise you that, [redacted]
the NCFE has been requested to provide interim employment for
Mr. [redacted]

[redacted]

3. It is requested that the proposed employment of Subject be
discussed with the NCFE and that we be informed of the action taken.

[redacted]

4. [redacted] the proposal for such employment is requested.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

SE-5/[redacted]/xp (19 Nov. 1952)

- Distributions:
- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
 - 1 - RI
 - 2 - SE-5
 - 1 - IO

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

10200 1306


Executive Registry
3-4257

13 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. Jan Nowak

1. At your request, I had a conversation today with Mr. Jan Nowak, head of the Polish radio desk of RFE in Munich. I am sorry that you did not get to see him. Our conversation reminded me that our work is terribly important, which is a nice reminder on a busy afternoon.
2. I say "important" because Nowak reviewed with me the letters he had received from listeners in Poland and these, together with his own enormous enthusiasm for the work he is doing, reminded me that our long days in Washington have an effect on the lives and hopes of people far away. Nowak, who was in the Polish resistance during the war and who on one of his three escapes from Poland at one time spent several weeks in Switzerland where he had made contact with your representatives, later worked for the BBC and he pointed out that at no time during the war was he given to feel by the BBC the sense of responsibility and mission which he feels in his job in RFE. He said he was told when he was brought to RFE that the responsibility for the programs was his and that if at any time programs went on the air which were irresponsible, then he would lose his job. He says that when he has questions which he thinks might influence United States policy, he confers beforehand with [redacted] and the Americans in Munich, and sometimes arguments ensue, but he feels, and I am certain he feels sincerely, that he has an equal share with Americans in a great effort to carry the truth back home.
3. I say "terribly" important because Nowak, like other exiles, wonders out loud how long our work can continue to have an impact. He is himself convinced that every Polish soldier is a potential ally of the West but he wonders, and makes his listener wonder, how long we can expect this sympathy among a rising generation for which the past is inexorably fading.



SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



5. I liked him. As I say, seeing him made me proud of what we are doing.

Tom Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

NOV 4 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: DD/P's Memorandum to you 30 October 1952 entitled,
"National Committee for Free Europe, RFE, and Related
Matters"

[REDACTED]

2. I'm in entire agreement also with Mr. [REDACTED] observation on the personnel set-up within NCFE. As you know, Mr. Dolbeare is concerned about his role. He is the first to admit that his strength is ebbing, and that he should retire. I think it must be agreed also that Mr. Dolbeare has done a splendid job, a job that would have been, and will still be, difficult for a man in the prime of life.

I have discussed this problem in confidence with [REDACTED]. As a result of my inquiries about a possible successor to Mr. Dolbeare, Mr. [REDACTED] suggests that Mr. [REDACTED] is a person eminently qualified to do this job. I would be interested in knowing whether Mr. Wisner knows this man.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/TONIC

SECRET
Security Information

DDP-1111

30 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe, NCFE, and related matters.

1. This memorandum is to inform you of a number of items which have recently come to my attention and to which I think you should give consideration and take necessary action. [redacted] who is an old friend and a very helpful consultant of the Agency, came to see me the other evening and discussed certain aspects of NCFE. [redacted] has been working on both factions of the Rumanians in an effort to bring them together, and I think that his criticism is, on the whole, constructive. He states that entirely apart from the question of factionalism among the Rumanian groups and other national groups, there is the greatest amount of inefficiency at the desk level of NCFE. This results from having too many politicians and diplomats in positions of authority and too few persons of any practical experience; too much time is consumed and too much of the general effort goes completely to waste as the result of endless political discussions, much of it entirely theoretical. [redacted]


[redacted]

[redacted]


SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

- 2 -



3. I know that [redacted] is back at work but that his physical condition is not at all good and that the cause of the paralytic affect was not determined by the doctors.



cc: C/P

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

29 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. THOMAS W. BRADEN
 International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Change of name of Baltic Panels

With reference to your memorandum of October 15, 1952 concerning the desire of the Baltic Panels to change their names to the Committee for Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, respectively, I wish to inform you that the Department perceives no reason to oppose such a change.

It is suggested however, that NCFE insist that the new names for the Baltic Panels be precisely those mentioned in your memorandum of October 15. It is our feeling that if the panels were to be called National Committees, for example, confusion might arise with respect to other organizations from these countries already in existence and the impression might be created that the committees are of greater political significance than we wish them to be.

ROBERT P. JOYCE
 Policy Planning Staff
 Department of State

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

C/IO

NO.

DATE

10/2379


29 Oct 52

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. CP		8 NOV	1952 not	EMBS	acc to a matter of incidental info, Drew Pearson gave a big plug for contributions to the Crusade on his TV program last night (Nov. 9) a.c.u
2. DD/P			13 2000	JSL	
3. C-IO				JWB	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					


SECURITY INFORMATION

29 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom



2. I think there is no action to be taken here and merely pass this on for your information, but it does bring to mind again what I think is growing evidence that the Crusade is more trouble than it is worth.



Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, EE DIVISION
CHIEF, SE DIVISION
CHIEF, IO DIVISION

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

*see covering memo
+ page 2 in
Chrono 21 Oct*

Analysis of Memorandum by Mr. [redacted]

The following memorandum, I believe, discusses most of the points raised by Mr. [redacted]

1. Scripts prepared in Munich are almost never read by Americans before broadcast although the general content of each broadcast is agreed upon in programming conferences between the American and exile staffs. The reasons why the broadcasts are not read by Americans before they go on the air are as follows:

a. Because the natural inclination of Americans is to change the broadcasts, and such changes, RFE officials feel, are likely to lessen the "genuine" quality of exile broadcasts for the listeners.

b. Because the exiles feel themselves to be patriots working for their countries, and the submission of scripts to Americans before they are broadcast would be regarded by the exiles as casting doubt upon their allegiance and fervor.

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. No doubt RFE has made the mistakes Mr. [redacted] mentions in connection with the items about the weakness of the Iron Curtain and the ease of crossing it, and the Czechoslovakian currency devaluation. On the first point, Mr. [redacted] dates are in error, for RFE did not go on the air until July 4, 1950. Assuming that he means that such broadcasts were made from that date until April 1951, it should be noted that this was the very beginning of RFE when all of its broadcasts originated in New York. Such broadcasts certainly are not being continued. I assume they were the result of inexperience. The

will be discontinued when [redacted] out of existence, and they should not be reestablished. You will remember that at the hearings which considered NCFE's 1953 budget, the officials of NCFE asked for [redacted] to cover the expected loss of such privileges and because we felt that this was unjustified, we asked and were granted the right to retain this money [redacted]

5. Mr. [redacted] complaint that the Information Service of RFE has been too expensive and naive is probably correct. In part this

[redacted]

6. In sum, Mr. [redacted] criticisms and complaints seem a mixture of fact and fiction animated by a personal antagonism. His is but one of a number of such attacks by former employees. Our own approach to Radio Free Europe should be not so much an assessment of past success and failures, as an examination of future opportunities. A powerful instrument has been created, in the main successfully, in an incredibly short time. Where it goes from here, giving due consideration to criticism such as [redacted] seems to us to be our priority task.


SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

27 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division


SUBJECT: President's Committee on Immigration and Naturalization




5. I urge your rapid concern, for the presentation is due to be made tomorrow afternoon.


William P. Durkee
WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/TONIC


SECRET






change







- 6 -





SECURITY
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

[Redacted]

23 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

2 Attachments

- 1. [Redacted] article.
- 2. Suggested memo.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

*sig to
Dunbar*

13 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

FROM : Chief, ROM/OIS

SUBJECT :

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

8022

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P 807

OCT 10 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PI
FROM : C/NSW/PI
SUBJECT : Survey of the National Committee for a Free Europe

[Redacted]


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

SECRET
Security Information

ODP 72


SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION




FWIS

4 October 1952


MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division,
P & P Staff

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe's Request for

Reclamer of Admiral Miller.

1. I believe that I told Mr. Braden last evening of the telephone call which I had received from Admiral Miller and of what I had said in response to his request for



2. I should greatly appreciate a thorough staff job being done on this matter to relieve me of the necessity of thinking up all of the arguments pro and con, especially the latter. Will someone please dig up in the Congressional Records the speeches made during the last session of Congress in condemnation of the State Department's lavish approach to the educational and cultural exchange program?



3. Please -- let us sharpen up our thinking and our pencils as well. In the final analysis I shall probably have to veto this proposition, and will certainly do so unless it is much more convincingly supported than heretofore. However, I would like some help on this.

(Signed) FRANK O. WISNER

FRANK O. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)


SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: NCFE-SE Division Conference on Rumanian
Refugee Situation

REFERENCE: Memo to Chief, IO, Subject: Current U. S.
Attempt to Form a Unified Rumanian Refugee
Organisation, dated 12 September 1952.

1. It is requested that the referenced memorandum be forwarded to the NCFE for study prior to the conference (ref, para. 8) between NCFE representatives and personnel of this Division.



3. We have been informed that Mr. Visoianu has not received an acknowledgment of his letter and proposal. It is suggested that the NCFE write Mr. Visoianu, expressing appreciation for his communication, and inform him that the NCFE has been studying various proposals and hopes that within the next few weeks further discussions can be arranged.


JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

25 Sept. '52

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE: Memo to DD/A and DD/P from Comptroller 13 Sept. 52



CRS

Political and Psychological Warfare

Attachments
Reference memo with
attachments.

IO/TONI C:WPD:jp/eh
(24 Sept 52)
Distribution
Orig & 1 - Addressee
IO/TONIC - 2 cc
CIO - 1 cc
RI - 1 cc

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Library of Congress Eastern European Accessions

REFERENCE: Fund Memorandum No. 513, 2 September 1952

1. SE Division has noted with interest that effective August 20, 1952, the Washington research staff of the NCFE will begin processing books and publications received from the Iron Curtain countries by the Library of Congress. These accessions represent a very valuable source of information which this Division is presently unable to exploit, since we have no personnel with the language qualifications required to review all that is received for our specific interests.

2. Referenced memorandum indicates that the NCFE has arranged to microfilm portions of given books containing items of propaganda or informational value. One copy of the print will be mailed to the New York research desks, while the original microfilm will be sent by pouch to Munich, presumably for RFE. This Division requests that an additional copy of the print be obtained on a continuing basis by IO for further analysis by the interested Area Divisions and for pouching to our field stations which have indicated a specific interest in this material. It is suggested that the copy be broken down into sections corresponding to the Area Divisions interested in order that this material may receive immediate attention by the appropriate Area Division.

3. SE Division would appreciate receiving your comments regarding this request since we are anxious to utilize this material as soon as possible and wish to make other arrangements if these suggestions are found impractical.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

Copy to EE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

24 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT: Assignment of Mobile Radio Facility (MR-50)

1. According to Messrs. [redacted] [redacted] arrangements have been made to utilize the MR-50 in Germany.
2. The completion of the transaction is awaiting a test that is being undertaken by outside engineers through [redacted]. This test, I am told, is necessitated by the fact that there is not available a complete specification of the equipment.
3. It is estimated by Mr. [redacted] that the test will be completed in a few weeks.

[redacted signature box]

Acting Chief
Psychological Staff Division

FP/CPY:CLE:tas

Distribution:

- Addressee - original & 1
- Mr. [redacted] - 1
- ✓ Mr. [redacted] - 1
- ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ - 1
- CPY - 1
- PI/PSO - 1
- ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ - 1
- RI - 1

may file

17 September 1952


MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: Mr. W. P. Burkee, Chief, IO/TOMIC

SUBJECT: Refugee Stipendiaries of NCFE

REFERENCE: Secret Memo dtd 12 August 1952 from Chief, IO/TOMIC,
to Chief, SE; Subject: List of Stipendiaries of NCFE.

1. In compliance with your request of 12 August, the referenced memorandum was circulated to the various interested branches of SE Division.



JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

PP:CAtrans:bar

Distribution:

Addressees - Orig & 1

SE/PP - 2

RI - 2

SECRET

12 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, PSYCHOLOGICAL STAFF DIVISION
ATTENTION: Mr. [REDACTED] PY Evaluation
SUBJECT: IPDNIC Use of PY Guidance Papers

1. In discussing this subject, the following facts of DNIC operations should be kept in view:

a. DNIC prepares its own daily guidance papers, written by a special staff which has at its disposal a European-wide news-gathering apparatus.

b. State Department overnight policy guidances are regularly delivered to DNIC on the day of issue.

2. Guidance papers from PY are dispatched as soon as they are received. For instance, Special Guidance on Bacteriological Warfare, dated August 7, 1952, and Weekly Propaganda Guidance No. 9, dated August 8, 1952, were sent on August 11.

3. The value of PY guidance papers for IPDNIC was taken up with DNIC officials last May. Their observations are contained in the following quotations from their letters to this Division:

a. The Chief Programming Official wrote:

"We have received several of these papers in the past couple of months. They are extremely useful for the following reasons:

- a. They set forth clearly U. S. policy on one issue or another;
- b. They occasionally report thinking in quarters from which we hear nothing directly;
- c. They usually contain pertinent quotations of expression of views by the enemy which we can make use of (both published and other sources, such as interrogatories);

SECRET

SECRET

6. They permit us to learn what lines are being laid down for propaganda addressed to other audiences than ours (other than central and eastern Europe).

"On the other hand, when these papers deal with our targets, they sometimes reveal a sharp divergence from our thinking and our points of view. Where this is owing to the fact that they have in mind black, while we deal in white, the difference can be legitimate. But even so, we find proposals that seem to us illogical, and now and then extremely unwise."

- b. The President of the organization wrote:

"You enclosed a paper giving additional guidance material for propaganda countering Communist BW charges. All the lines therein suggested have been successively used by us since February 25 or thereabouts when the topic first arose.

"Papers of this kind are of great use, provided they arrive promptly. By promptly is meant, either in anticipation of an event, or an expression of views on the day the event occurs."

- c. The Deputy Director, Radio, wrote:

"With regard to the paper (Prop-103, dated 20 March 1952) that you enclosed, I checked Bob's department and they advise that from the beginning we have made the points specified in 6(a)3 and 5, 6(b)2, 9(a)1 and 2, 9(d), 9(e), 10.

"As a matter of information, to our particular audiences we say, instead of 6(b)1, that the Soviet Union is trying to persuade the leaders of German heavy industry, militarists, and ex-Nazis to go into partnership with it; and instead of 6(c) that the prohibition of alliances is fraudulent, Moscow intending, as in August 1939, to ally itself with a reactionary Germany against our peoples. Again to our audiences, we say instead of 9(a)2 that the German problem can be solved, and that the Western powers are attempting to solve it in the interest of the security of our audiences. We are glad to see that our line parallels that laid down in 9(d) and (e)."

4. A fair summary of the use of FY guidance papers for RFE is as follows:


SECRET

a. They are useful insofar as they contain ideas that have not occurred to TONIC's own people or in reference to events that are not a matter of public knowledge.

b. In most cases the guidance papers arrive so late that TONIC is already engaged in treating the next stage in the development of the propaganda theme suggested.

c. As PY guidance papers, therefore, are at the moment another contribution to the thinking of TONIC officials, it is not possible to point to specific uses of the material suggested.

d. To be most useful, propaganda guidance from PY should treat the development of special themes that have a specific relation to precise U. S. Government operations and objectives aside from general U. S. foreign policy goals. To be most useful to RFE, such guidance should be developed over a period of time in anticipation of the actual facts or operations making up such programs.


Acting Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/TONIC:WPD/cg

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - PI

SECRET

12 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Current U. S. Attempt to Form a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organization

REFERENCE: Memorandum to Chief, IO Division, Subject: [redacted] Plan for Rumanian Emigre Organization, dated 28 May 1952

1. In view of the considerable length of time since NCFE opened negotiations for Rumanian refugee unity and subsequent developments, a reappraisal of the situation and a delineation of final action are required.

2. It is evident that expression of NCFE interest in the Council of Political Parties (actually it has been directed primarily toward the National Peasant Party) has had the desired effect on the two refugee groups in the United States, by raising the specter of a third force developing and being recognized by the Americans. It has also made the [redacted] aware of the seriousness with which the Americans regard the division between the two groups.

[redacted]

3. Careful consideration has been given to the various worthwhile proposals and counter proposals which were advanced in the course of the recent discussions. It is hoped, in this connection, that the NCFE has made it entirely clear to all the participants that this series of discussions was undertaken purely to explore the possibilities for agreement in concert with the refugees themselves, and that after hearing all sides of the question, the NCFE will present for their consideration a "package" proposal, on the basis of which final agreement should be reached. It is believed that the revision of the original plan, set forth below and embodying certain features which have developed in the course of the last three months, can provide a solution acceptable both to this organization and to the refugees.

[redacted] the necessity for taking into account the refugee concept of democratic procedures, as well as the firm stand on size taken by the Rumanian National Committee, these are all important factors affecting the problem. The final organization should be small [redacted] sufficiently selective to attract prominent exiles, inclusive enough to contain the rank and file, and of an optimum size to carry out its functions effectively.

SECRET

4. An organizational form of a large passive Council, to which all Rumanians who meet certain qualifications could belong, but with all action vested in a small Executive Committee, offers a practical way to satisfy both U. E. and refugee requirements. The name of this overall organization should be the "Rumanian National Committee" since this would provide a sense of continuity and would facilitate acceptance of the proposal by Visolau and the King. It would be formed by an expansion of the present Rumanian National Committee into the Executive Committee of approximately twenty persons. Membership in the Council would be extended to the rank and file by means of letters announcing the new organization and inviting participation. The "Council" of the Rumanian National Committee would include members from all countries and would not meet in session. Radescu should be designated honorary president of the Council. The Executive Committee would be the functional unit of the organization. It would appoint sub-commissions and groups to perform the work of the Committee and designate representatives of the Rumanian National Committee at various refugee centers in Europe, South America, and the Near East. A membership card would be issued to all who affiliate with the Council.

A newspaper would be published and distributed in liberal quantities.

5. The Executive Committee headquarters would be in New York City and work in conjunction with the NCFE. It is recommended that the position of chairman of the Executive Committee be held for a term of one year, elective by members of this committee only. Its members should be:

Constantin Visolau, Chairman

Gheorghe Assan
Cornel Ibanu
Vintila Bratianu
Nicolae Caranfil
Edmond Ciuntu
Brutus Coste
Alexandru Cretzianu
Anton Crihan
Carlos Davila
Mihail Parcasanu
Grigore Gafencu
Emil Ghillezan
Mircea Ionatiu
Augustin Popa
Iancu Zissu

6. As the first step in achieving the organization outlined above, it is suggested that the NCFE reply to Visoianu's memo expressing appreciation and inviting him to a discussion of his proposal. At this meeting, the NCFE should present the ideas outlined in paragraph 4 as the American view of the compromise which, after careful study, appears to offer the best possible solution. In the discussion, the NCFE should indicate that this plan is the result of much thought by interested groups after discussions with many refugees, that it has attempted to aid the refugees because of its interest in them and their country's welfare, and that it is prepared to support a Rumanian refugee organization in a number of ways. Visoianu should be invited to recommend the people whom he considers desirable for the Executive Committee.

After this group has worked out details of the organization and consulted with the others suggested for the Executive Committee, the NCFE will issue invitations to a general meeting of this Committee and will assist in getting the other organizational details underway. Sub-commissions should be established immediately, using the refugees who have been participating in the recent NCFE discussions. Arrangements will be made for Visoianu and Gafencu and an additional delegation to be named later, to go to England to inform the King of the agreements reached and the details of the new organization.

8. This plan has been coordinated with the Department of State. It is requested that the details be forwarded to the NCFE and a meeting arranged to discuss the implementation.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

SECRET
Security Information

11 September 1952.

the Record
MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Conversation with Admiral H. B. Miller on Wednesday,
the 10th of September.

The following is a memorandum of my conversation with Admiral Miller in New York on Wednesday, September 10th. I would like to preface this account with the observation that Admiral Miller seems to be in a highly emotional state and generally suspicious of those around him.

(1) [redacted]

Admiral Miller reported his meetings with [redacted] in [redacted] and indicated a difference in his projected use of [redacted] and that envisaged by [redacted] which Admiral Miller [redacted]. Miller proposes to use [redacted] as one of a three man brain trust, one of whom is [redacted] and the other is still unnamed. He mentioned that he had originally considered [redacted] as an aide in administrative matters but had been informed that [redacted] was not equipped for such duties.

(2) VOA

Admiral Miller indicated that RFE was having difficulties with VOA, especially with the new Information Intelligence Unit created by the State Department, under the direction of [redacted], to provide information for VOA's broadcasts to the Iron Curtain countries. These difficulties included the preventing of RFE's information people from interviewing escapees.

(3) Information Service — [redacted]


Admiral Miller indicated that he was more than satisfied with [redacted] activities, and that with the exception of RFE correspondents in [redacted], they were satisfied with present personnel. He also stated that [redacted] had become RFE correspondent in Germany. He further indicated that he will make every effort to keep [redacted] on after the expiration of the present six-month consultative contract.

SECRET
Security Information

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

- 2 -

(4)



(5) Crusade for Freedom

Admiral Miller indicated he was going to give two days a week to the Crusade for Freedom.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Acting Chief,
International Organizations Division

AC/IO:WPD/cmm

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee (via C/FP, and DD/P)

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - IO/Tonic

2 cc - RI

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.

110 WEST 57TH STREET

NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TELEPHONE PLAZA 7-7600

CABLE ADDRESS: NATFRECOMM

September 8, 1952

Mr. Thomas Braden
2203 Foxhall Road, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Braden:

At the suggestion of Admiral Miller, I am enclosing six copies of the new Committee brochure "Weapon in the Struggle for Freedom." If you would like to have additional copies, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted Signature]

Director, Research and
Publications Service

[Redacted] bvb

SECRET
Security Information

2 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on Security Procedures [redacted]

Those present: [redacted]

1. The purpose of this meeting was to inform the Office of Inspection and Security of the security arrangements made in the [redacted]

2. As a result of the discussions, an outline by [redacted] of his security procedures, it was agreed:

a. That the present security practices were satisfactory and that the nature of the security problem does not call for the kind of security scrutiny necessary in Radio Free Europe.

[redacted]

[redacted]

William P. Burke
WILLIAM P. BURKE
IO/TONIC

CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information


ER-J-2387

8 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Plans
Acting Chief, International Organizations

FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence

1. Mr. Phenix when he was recently here advised me that the Board of NCFE desired to change its name from "National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc." to "Free Europe Committee." The purpose of this was to avoid confusion with the multitude of "national committees" for various purposes, some of them subversive.



ALLEN W. DULLES


CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

11 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Admiral Miller Letter about NCFF [redacted] mentioned at the PRC Meeting on Friday, 8 August

1. Attached hereto is Admiral Miller's answer on behalf of NCFF to numerous requests/



3. You suggested at the PRC meeting on 8 August that you might be able to give us a hand in our effort to get this information.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
C/IC/DRIC

Attachment
As stated.

IO/TONIC:WPD/ah

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - TONIC
2 cc - RI

see pink for attachment

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

7 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. THOMAS W. BRADEN *TWB*
Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Request While on Travel Orders

Please contact [] to obtain debriefing
paper of [] and to be present at further verbal debriefing
of []. [] will be available in [] from the 15th
of August to the 2nd of September.

Wpd.
WILLIAM P. DURKEE
C/IO/TONIC

SECRET
Security Information

6 Aug 52

9

PRIORITY SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM [redacted]

TO [redacted] FOR THOMAS BRADEN FROM LEA--SECURITY INFORMATION --CITE
[redacted] -3124

JOHN C. HUGHES RPT JOHN C. HUGHES SAYS:

"THE BULL-AUGUSTINE REPORT OF JULY 20 WAS PREPARED IN [redacted] AND
DISTRIBUTED BY ROYALL TYLER FROM THERE. IMMEDIATELY ON READING IT
I PROPOSED A MODIFICATION OF THE NAME FOR THE PROPOSED OPERATION SO
AS TO DEFINE MORE ACCURATELY ITS PURPOSE. I SUGGESTED WE CALL THE
PROJECT FREE EUROPE EXILE CENTERS, AND THIS NAME WAS ACCEPTED.

"IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT EVER SINCE NCFE HAS BEEN IN ACTIVE
OPERATION, INCREASING ATTENTION HAS BEEN PAID BY US TO THE PROBLEM
OF THOSE REFUGEES IN WESTERN EUROPE WHO ARE NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRIES
WITH WHICH NCFE IS CONCERNED, AND SUBSTANTIAL SUMS HAVE BEEN PLACED
IN THE HANDS OF THOSE NATIONAL COUNCILS WHICH SHOWED INITIATIVE IN
THIS PARTICULAR FIELD TO ENABLE THEM TO BUILD UP THE MORALE OF
THEIR HOMELESS NATIONALS. THE PRESENT REPORT AND ITS PROPOCALS
LOOK TO A MORE EFFICIENT PERFORMANCE ON A SOMEWHAT LARGER SCALE OF
WHAT IS ALREADY BEING DONE.

[redacted]

[redacted]

A

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

APPROVED PROGRAMS. THE BULL-AUGUSTINE RECOMMENDATIONS SHOW THAT A MORE EFFICIENT AND SOMEWHAT MORE COMPREHENSIVE OPERATION (FOR EXAMPLE POLISH REFUGEES ARE NOW TO BE COVERED) WILL CL RPT COST

[REDACTED]

"THIS PROGRAM IS NOT A NEW ONE FOR NCFE AND IT INVOLVES NO RESETTLEMENT HOUSING OR LARGE SCALE SUBSISTENCE EXPENDITURES. IT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH OR DUPLICATE ANYTHING THAT IS NOW BEING DONE BY [REDACTED] NOR DOES IT INVOLVE ANY LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS. IT REPRESENTS AN EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT NCFE REALLY IS CONCERNED WITH THE MORALE OF REFUGEES REACHING WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES. WE SEE NO REASON, THEREFORE, WHY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT NEED BE CONSULTED AT THIS TIME. PLEASE DISCUSS WITH MR. DULLES RPT DULLES."

GR-351

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

5 August 1952


MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Project TPTONIC - Budget FY 1953

1. Returned herewith as requested are the budget data for the fiscal year 1953 received by CM in the late afternoon of 2 August 1952 for review, evaluation and specific comment.

2. Only a cursory examination of such data is possible within the time presently available. While from the information submitted it does not appear that any of the estimates shown are greatly out of line, it must be pointed out that CM does not feel that it is in a position to intelligently evaluate the proposed budget with respect to the program and operational purposes contained therein.

3. It is felt desirable, however, that sufficient detailed information pertinent to the organizational and management features of the project should be made available to CM to permit a review and examination of those aspects in conjunction with the related proposed budget provisions.


Chief, Commercial Division

CM//fh

Distribution:

- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
- 3 - CM
- 2 - RI/PI

SECRET
Security Information

5 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Project TPTONIC - Budget FY 1953

1. Returned herewith as requested are the budget data for the fiscal year 1953 received by CM in the late afternoon of 2 August 1952 for review, evaluation and specific comment.

2. Only a cursory examination of such data is possible within the time presently available. While from the information submitted it does not appear that any of the estimates shown are greatly out of line, it must be pointed out that CM does not feel that it is in a position to intelligently evaluate the proposed budget with respect to the program and operational purposes contained therein.

3. It is felt desirable, however, that sufficient detailed information pertinent to the organizational and management features of the project should be made available to CM to permit a review and examination of those aspects in conjunction with the related proposed budget provisions.

Chief, Commercial Division

CM/ /fh

Distribution:

- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
- 3 - CM
- 2 - RI/PI

SECRET
Security Information

TONIC

August 5, 1952

Dear Dick:

Tom Braden, one of our friends will be coming over in your direction soon.

Please show him every courtesy and everything that we have in the way of operations. It is essential that he know our operations thoroughly, and all wraps are off.

Sincerely yours,

H. R. Miller

Mr. Richard J. Condon
Radio Free Europe
APO 407-A
c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

cc: Royall Tyler -

cc:

cc: - 635-10

AUG 6 1952


SECRET
Security Information

C
O
P
Y

SECRET
Security Information


R 3-1338(2)

4 August 1952




SECRET
Security Information

- 2 -
SECRET
Security Information



SECRET
Security Information

- 3 - **SECRET**
Security



Initialed as of this 4th day of August 1952:

/s/ A.W.D.
(Mr. Dulles)

/s/ H.H.M.
(Admiral Miller)

SECRET
Security

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL **SECRET**
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	CPP		
2	DD/P		
3	DDCI		
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	C/IO	TWB	8 Dec
2			
3			

- APPROVAL INFORMATION SIGNATURE
- ACTION DIRECT REPLY RETURN
- COMMENT PREPARATION OF REPLY DISPATCH
- CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION FILE

REMARKS:

This may interest you as evidence of the good team spirit we have among some of our operating campaigners. It was left behind by in his personal files.

TWB
TWB

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

PRIVATE
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.
CONFIDENTIAL

110 WEST 57TH STREET NEW YORK 19, N. Y. TELEPHONE PLAZA 3-7600
CABLE ADDRESS: NATFREEMM

20P 1610
11/4

August 1, 1952

[Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]

It was good to see you, if just for an instant, in Washington.

[Redacted]

My very best regards.

Sincerely,

HBM
H. B. Miller

PRIVATE
AND
CONFIDENTIAL

HBM:mlm

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Aug 1, 1952
2011

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ID Division

SUBJECT : [redacted] Rumanian Refugees.

1. In accordance with a request of Mr. John Leich for [redacted] of Gen. Redescu's League of Free Rumanians, transmitted herewith is [redacted]

[redacted]

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE Division

Encl.
List

SE/5/ [redacted] (13 August 1952)

1 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE Division
Chief, SE Division
Chief, VE Division
Chief, FY Division
Chief, Budget and Analysis Division
Chief, Operations Division

SUBJECT: TPTONIC Budget

1. Attached for your specific comments and evaluation is the TPTONIC proposed budget for fiscal year 1953.
2. It will be necessary to have your comments and initials on the cover sheet by Tuesday noon, August 5.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division


1 - EE
1 - SE
1 - VE
1 - FY
1 - AL/BD
1 - OD/CO
1 - CIO
2 - IO/TONIC
2 - RI

SECRET


July 2nd Draft not sent


MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: NCFE-CIA RELATIONS

1. When this Division was delegated the responsibility of conducting CIA relations with NCFE it was immediately apparent that a variety of problems existed which made effective action on the part of IO Division difficult if not impossible. These difficulties may be generally summarized as follows:




(2) The attitude of the responsible officials of NCFE was one largely of non-cooperation in terms of NCFE






2. In an attempt to properly discharged its responsibilities IO Division has attempted to solve the above problems by (S)




3. If IO Division is to succeed in its task, which in our opinion is well begun, two conditions are ~~in our opinion~~ essential:

(1) That there be a single point of liaison between NCFE and CIA and that



(2) That NCFE clearly understands with whom they are to deal in CIA and that those with whom they deal are responsible officials entitled to respect as such--

- 3 -



THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

14-00000

SECRET

22 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: CIA Investigation of Relations

PROBLEM

It is likely that at a meeting you will hold Monday, 5 August, with members of the Board of Directors of the National Committee for a Free Europe, [redacted]

DISCUSSION


At the time responsibility for CIA dealings with NCPE was transferred to the IO Division, a survey was undertaken by this Division with the help of the CIA administrative staff under [redacted] The following was found to be the status of relations between CIA and NCPE:

[Large redacted area]

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -



2. Financial Reporting.

a. It is unquestioned that the internal business and accounting procedures of NCFE are excellent. [redacted]

b. Security.

As the recent case of [redacted] indicates, NCFE has disregarded essential security considerations [redacted]

c. Policy Control.

In its relations with emigres through its National Councils Division and in its radio broadcasts through RFE, [redacted] and the State Department and in some instances not followed the guidance provided. [redacted]

d. Coordination of CIA Activities with NCFE.

NCFE's activities in radio broadcasting, which account for three-quarters of its yearly budget, are almost entirely transferred overseas. [redacted]

3. IO Division and Administrative Staff Proposed Actions to Solve These Difficulties.

The IO Division with the assistance of the CIA Administrative Staff has prepared a memorandum of agreement to serve as a guide in

SECRET

SECRET

the conduct of relations between CIA and NCFE. This agreement provides the following:

4. Attitudes of NCFE.

The basic attitudes of NCFE about themselves is summed up by the comments on the first draft of the above-mentioned agreement by Spencer Phoenix:

- a. "Our friends can refuse to supply funds for disapproved activities but cannot legally or properly be given the 'right to disapprove or modify any activities or require abandonment, modification, or change in emphasis, in any of the existing programs'."
- b. "Again, no agreement between our friends and ourselves can legally diminish our corporate right to spend our corporate funds . . ."

SECRET

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

5. Basic Attitude of CIA.

[Redacted]

6. Recommendation.

The PRC has reviewed this agreement and has refused to approve the budget of NCFE until this agreement or a modification acceptable to NCFE is adopted. The Director has approved this decision and it is suggested that he stand upon it.

L. K. WHITE
Acting Deputy Director
(Administration)

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - ADD/A (for DDGI)
1 cc - "
1 cc - IO/IONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - HI

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

ER-3-1369

29 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations
FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence

Attached is a memorandum which was handed me by Spencer Phenix covering a confidential report made by two NCFE people with regard to NCFE's action in connection with refugees. I have not read this in full and would like your recommendation and analysis so as to spare me this if possible.


ALLEN S. DULLES

Encl.

CONFIDENTIAL

July 15, 1952
Revised July 20, 1952

AN NCFE APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE SITUATION

- 1 -

INTRODUCTION

Reduced to its simplest terms, the European refugee problem can be resolved, saving liberation, only by the assimilation, or at least the integration of the refugees into the countries which receive them or by their emigration to countries better able to do so. National and international programs vast in scope and cost are required for these purposes, and it is obviously not within NCFE's power or interest to engage directly in them. But, in an indirect way, while paying attention only to its direct and fundamental interests, NCFE can contribute to the success of both types of programs, at least so far as they concern refugees from the ten NCFE countries.

The first step is, of course, for NCFE to analyze its position in relation to the European refugee situation and to formulate a policy accordingly. NCFE has been a constantly and rapidly growing organization, fully occupied with the immediate problems of expansion which have confronted it. NCFE has been deprived of the opportunity to pause and consider the consequences of its expansion in a changed situation, much less to deal with these consequences.

Several basic factors have combined to alter NCFE's position in relation to the European refugee situation. While IRO operated, NCFE was in a position to make a distinction between the exile elite and the mass of refugees, who were under the protection of the IRO in Europe. IRO, however, ceased to exist at the beginning of 1952. IRO's several successor organizations have yet to prove their ability effectively and completely to perform its functions. During the early years of NCFE's existence, the frontier countries, Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the intermediary receiving countries, France and Britain, were absorbed in post-war reconstruction or subjected to military occupation and hence were generally not in a position to take an active interest in the refugees as an instrument of their foreign policies. NCFE in the U.S., therefore, could afford to ignore most developments of exile activity in Europe, reassuring itself that the headquarters of most of the exile National Councils were in the U.S. under nominal U.S. control. Normally, of course, each of these countries has specific interests in Eastern Europe, which do not necessarily coincide with those of the U.S. As conditions approach the normal in each of these countries, NCFE's grounds for self re-assurance become less solid. Until its May 1, 1951 initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, which marked its appearance as an instrument actively affecting

the countries whence the refugees flee, RFE could also ignore the presence of the refugees in the west. This, however, is no longer the case.

Fundamentally, any NCFE interest in the European refugee situation is an aspect of the general NCFE relationship with exiles. In the changed European situation in which this interest is and will be manifested NCFE should reconsider its basic instruments for such relationships: the National Councils. Their exceptions, gaps, and shortcomings should be carefully analyzed and the conclusions drawn therefrom. The inadequacy of the National Councils as a basic instrument in the changed situation in Europe will be indicated in this report. Certain adaptations of this instrument and the creation of new ones will be required if NCFE is to carry out its functions and realize its potentialities.

- II -

WHY NCFE IS CONCERNED IN THE EUROPEAN
REFUGEE PROBLEM AND WHY THIS CONCERN
SHOULD BE PROPERLY AND EFFECTIVELY
SERVICED.

A. The Extent of NCFE's Concern to Date :

In the past NCFE has not directly concerned itself with the over-all problem of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain. This policy of NCFE has manifested itself in the following ways. NCFE has consistently made it clear that its chief interest lies in what it regarded as the political and intellectual elite of emigrations from the various Iron Curtain countries. Certain elements of this political and intellectual elite, however, realized the necessity and the importance of channeling some of their activities toward the mass of their respective emigrations on a national basis. This realization was dictated either by humanitarian or strictly realistic political principles, or by a combination of the two. Accordingly, these elements of the elite approached NCFE with their proposals for NCFE material and moral support of such activities. These proposals differed widely and were implemented at varying periods over the last three years, with the result that presently NCFE is indirectly supporting refugee activities on a national basis at an annual amount of [redacted] and with the further result that these activities are confused, haphazard, erratic, ill-coordinated and unjustly and inexplicably disproportionate. Some nationality groups, as for instance the Hungarians, have been receiving relatively large amounts for refugee activities, with other groups, as for example the Poles, who have a large emigration, receiving nothing.

The vehicles for the channeling of this support have also differed widely. Originally, NCFE's theory in providing support for such activities was based upon the existence of National

Councils or Committees, the idea being that the National Councils should themselves undertake such activities in order to gain for themselves the necessary standing in their respective emigrations. This was not altogether inconsistent with NCFE's policy of emphasis upon direct assistance only to the intellectual and political elite, but was a subsequent development thereof.

The most ambitious and long-lived of these National Councils' refugee projects has been the Refugee Service of the Hungarian National Council, which is the best and almost sole surviving example of NCFE's original theory. The record, however, even of this prize example, is an extremely spotty one (details to follow in a descriptive report to be submitted separately). More importantly, the reasons for the spottiness of the HNC's record are not all attributable to the HNC itself; many, indeed, are due to the situation in which the HNC's approach to the refugee problem, which has provided financial support, but little or no guidance or moral support. * *Refugee Service has had to operate and continue as it has to ACFE's*

In the Rumanian case, NCFE's support for refugee activities was originally channeled through the Rumanian National Council, which ceased to enjoy NCFE recognition in 1950. Since that time, NCFE support for Rumanian refugee activities has been given to Rumanian Welfare, Incorporated, an organization entirely outside the National Council category, and which includes Americans on its Board of Directors.

In the Czechoslovak case, NCFE has channeled its support for refugee activities through the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, a National Council, which was the victim of a political split lasting from January 1951 until July 4, 1952. The Council of Free Czechoslovakia, in turn, channeled some of this support to an organization which enjoys the status of voluntary agency, the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees. This organization, like Rumanian Welfare, Inc., includes Americans on its Board of Directors, which is chaired by Professor James Shotwell. Unlike Rumanian Welfare, however, the AFOR in Germany and Austria received from IRO or HICOG and USCOA facilities and/or financial support as did other larger organizations such as the NCWC, the Lutheran World Federation, the World Council of Churches, the American Joint Distribution Committee, etc. which shared with it the status of voluntary agency. There is no doubt that Czechoslovak refugees have been, to some extent, the victims of the political fluctuations of their leadership in the U.S., and that, in a sense, NCFE must also accept some responsibility for allowing the political situation to have had repercussions of this nature.

A/ In the case of the Albanians, no specific sums in the budget (which has been provided by NCFE) of the National Committee for a Free Albania have been earmarked for aid to Albanian refugees; although despite this the NCFE has, it is reported, due chiefly to close American supervision in Rome, managed to do more for Albanian refugees in Italy than other National Councils, as for instance the HNC and RNC in Italy.

In the case of the Poles, because of the failure of the Polish emigration to produce a united national council which could be recognized by NCFE, no financial support whatsoever has been given by NCFE to Polish refugee activities, although the Poles have one of the most sizable emigrations of all the nationality groups with which NCFE cooperates, and although the Poles have an organization, American Polish War Relief, a voluntary agency, which seems to be at least as effective, if not more so than the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees or Rumanian Welfare, Inc., organizations with which it is roughly comparable.

In the case of the Yugoslavs, which is probably the most difficult case of all, from the U.S. and the NCFE point of view as well as from the viewpoint of the individual refugee, NCFE has confined itself to contributing small amounts to the Benevolent Association of Free Citizens of Yugoslavia in London, in order that certain exiled leaders—who rendered signal services to the Allied cause during World War II, through their participation in the revolt of March, 1941, which led Yugoslavia to resist the Nazi Invasion—might receive small stipends. Although this aid is rendered through an organization abroad, to exiles residing abroad, it is in line rather with NCFE's policy of providing assistance to a political and intellectual elite than with the policy of indirect support through National Councils or other organizations of refugee activity. No Yugoslav National Council, enjoying NCFE recognition, has ever emerged due to the delicate situation of Western policy vis-à-vis Tito's government.

In the case of the three Baltic States, although NCFE has been provided, both in the U.S. and abroad, with the instruments which have most nearly proved themselves capable of efficient, just and honest use of funds for refugee activities, no such funds have been placed at the disposal of the three Baltic Consultative Panels or their counterpart committees in Germany and elsewhere abroad.

Originally, also, although the principle was never clearly defined or rigidly adhered to, and, at present, in as much departed from as observed, it was felt that NCFE-supported refugee activities should be restricted, as much as possible, to the type of assistance which a consulate would render to its citizens who found themselves in difficulties in a foreign country. Such assistance would according to this line of thinking only occasionally and in cases of extreme and immediate need, be material; essentially it would consist of advice, translation and verification of documents and direction of the refugee to the appropriate agency capable of furnishing him with the type of further assistance, material or otherwise, which might be required. It has always been recognized, however, that the various National Councils acting as consulates for their anti-Communist compatriots, who could not turn to the legally-recognized Communist embassies, legations or consulates of their countries for help, would have to provide some material assistance for those who turned to them for help, if only a tram ticket, to allow them to visit the various international and local social agencies who could help them, or

the price of a meal or a night's lodging which would carry them over the necessary period of time which it always takes until the machinery of other agencies can be persuaded to start grinding for the assistance of these people. However, as time went on, NCFE assistance was also being given, directly or indirectly, to agencies which gave particular attention to material aid, as for instance the APCR and Rumanian Welfare, neither of which has any clear and responsible relation with a National Council, yet each of which has been the victim, to some extent, of the vagaries of exile politics.

Some of the elements which seem, either consciously or unconsciously to have been operative in the development of this NCFE policy of only limited and indirect concern with the over-all problem of refugees from Eastern Europe were the following :

1. Refugees in the mass were already the direct concern of a large, well-staffed and well-financed international organization, the IRO, which meant that the problems confronting the National Councils and other organizations of the exile elite were limited in scope.

2. Until the initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia on May 1, 1951, NCFE (through RFE or any other instrument) was not itself an active factor in the refugee problem. It was not directly associated with the refugee himself, either through indirectly stimulating him to flee or through his increased value for information purposes.

3. The National Councils and Committees were considered to be a suitable instrument qualified to deal with the refugee problem in the limited manner in which it confronted them during the existence of IRO. It was felt that any credit for assistance to refugees could appropriately be given to the national councils, which would in turn reflect to the credit of NCFE, the U.S. and the Free West in general.

-III -

THE CHANGED SITUATION U.S. AND EUROPE

While IRO operated NCFE was in a position to make a distinction between the exile elite and the mass of refugees who were under the protection of the IRO in Europe. IRO, however, ceased to exist at the beginning of 1952. Even before IRO disappeared, care and maintenance of refugees in and out of camps had passed to the various local national authorities. IRO's functions of protection and care for the refugee in both legal and material aspects respectively from arrival to emigration have been divided

among these governments and two international agencies, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and PICMG, none of which has been provided with the means adequate to the performance of their tasks assigned it, and the latter of which are only just becoming fully operational. In consequence of IRO's closure the various voluntary agencies, such as NCPC, LWF and WCC, etc., have been deprived of facilities which were provided by IRO in the past, with the result that they have been compelled to curtail their activities. Neither of IRO's successors has assumed the vast and vital coordinating function performed by IRO, with the result that the present confusion is discouraging. It may develop that the New State Department - NSA program for neo-refugees will clarify this confused situation, but at present it, itself, is as yet an unknown factor and naturally rumors regarding it at the field level have thus far only served to confound the confusion.

The period of IRO's existence coincided with the period of mass emigration, whereas at present emigration possibilities are small and uncertain, with the result that to the hard core remnant, which cannot be moved, is being added to the small but steady flow of new arrivals, most of whom are unable to emigrate and who must also face the appalling employment conditions in the frontier countries of Germany, Austria, Italy and Trieste (in the other frontier countries of Greece and Turkey the situation is probably similar) and the intermediary receiving countries such as France and Britain. Out of the more slowly moving remnants, particularly in the frontier countries, the possibility exists for the formation of more stable national committees, which would hence be more susceptible of control.

During the early years of NCPE's existence the frontier and intermediary receiving countries were either absorbed in post-war reconstruction or were subject to military occupation and hence were not in a position to take an active interest in the refugees as an instrument of their foreign policies. NCPE, in the U.S., therefore, could afford to ignore most developments of exile activity in Europe, reassuring itself that the headquarters of the exile national councils were in the U.S. under nominal NCPE control. Normally, of course, each of these countries has specific interests in Eastern Europe, which do not necessarily coincide with those of the U.S. There are now strong indications that the situation is more rapidly approaching its more normal aspect and that it is still in the process of change in this direction.

In January the British-backed Central and Eastern European Commission of the European Movement held its first main meeting in London; in April the French Comité National pour l'Europe Libre emerged; and in June the Germans attempted to bring about the emergence of a central organization of refugees, which, in its composition reflected traditional German sympathies with the Separatist movements of Eastern Europe, a policy which is in direct conflict with that of NCPE and RFE. Although the authorities, particularly in the frontier countries, probably lack

special financial means to engage in activity on an NCPE-scale, they do possess, by virtue of their control of the legal and welfare framework within which the refugee must exist, the means to extend or withhold benefits so as to influence the refugee's political situation to their advantage. It seems reasonable to suppose that as these nations gain in strength and independence this process will continue at an increasing rate.

As a result of the factors described above, the refugee finds himself in an increasingly hostile environment, deprived of an effective international protector and incapable, alone, unaided and unaided clearly to see his interests and defend them from exploitation. The Czechoslovaks and Poles in Germany provide striking examples of shortsighted, aimless exile pre-occupation with sterile political maneuvering to the advantage of their German hosts. At the same time, the voluntary agencies in Germany, which, after IRO's demise, were granted certain facilities by HICOG must, after the ratification of the contractual agreements, look to the German Government for whatever facilities it may choose to grant them.

Until its May 1951 initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, which marked its appearance as an instrument actively affecting the countries whence the refugees flee, RFE could also ignore the presence of the refugees in the West. Since that time, however, the steady expansion of RFE's activity and its increasing need of refugees as informational sources have led to strong accusations that RFE is evading its responsibilities and failing to accept the consequences of its own effectiveness. Although RFE expressly refrains from specifically inciting its audiences to flee, its comparisons of life in the West with life in the East inevitably constitute an indirect encouragement to escape. These accusations and resentment are ill-concealed among the representatives of the various international and voluntary agencies.

RFE's information service men, who, of RFE's personnel, are in closest contact with the refugees, sympathize with this criticism and wish that they could do more for the refugees than they are presently able to do on their own. These RFE information gatherers are in competition with an endless series of rivals seeking this valuable commodity. They usually present the refugees who have been helpful in providing them with information with presents of food, cigarettes or money. Although they would like to be in a position to offer more than this for their informants, they cannot, for, as they explain, they are not in the welfare business. One of their special difficulties is to persuade the refugees to come to them in the first place. Almost universally they have reported that if the refugees were made to realize that Free Europe was doing something for them, they would be more willing and even eager, to come to the RFE information offices in the camps to give freely of their information. Furthermore, RFE's propaganda can be dangerously weakened by the boomerang effect of the few disillusioned refugees who return to their homelands.

In consequence of the closure of IRO and the absence of any authority capable of organizing and controlling the refugee national committees a double vacuum exists. In respect to the first vacuum, the UN High Commission, PICARE, the voluntary agencies and the State Department program have yet to prove their ability to fill it. In respect to the second vacuum, the British, the French, the Italians, the Austrians and the Germans have the possibilities of filling this vacuum. Of these, the Germans are most likely to provide the most direct and immediate conflict with NCFE-RFE interests. The fact that the Germans have demonstrated an interest in these committees and particularly in support of the Separatist elements indicates that these committees are not without political importance. Because of the political ambitions or honest desire to serve of their leaders and of the need of the refugees for spokesmen and representatives in their dealings with local authorities, such committees will always exist, whether or not they are controlled or supported. If these committees are to be controlled at all, it is obviously to NCFE's advantage that they be controlled by NCFE. It would be dangerous to assume that this control could be exercised solely through the "leaders" residing in the U.S. as the opportunity exists for these leaders and for those in Europe to play off one Western Power against another. It has already been demonstrated in one case that the branch of a national council, with headquarters in the U.S., due to the exigencies of the local situation may be obliged to follow a policy which is quite contrary to the interests of NCFE.

In addition to the major double vacuum described above, our survey has disclosed the existence of a number of minor vacuums in exile representation which have been filled by unscrupulous self-appointed national representatives whose presence has been largely responsible for the skepticism and mistrust with which exile representatives are frequently regarded by the international and voluntary agencies. This unfortunate factor may be traced to the lack of recognized accreditation for such representatives, to the absence of any responsible and consistent field supervision, control and backing of worthy and qualified representatives. In this regard, representatives of the UN High Commission and the voluntary agencies have expressed a definite interest in efforts to order the chaotic situation of the national representatives.

- IV -

RECONSIDERATION OF NCFE'S BASIC
PROCEDURE IN ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH EXILES AND REFUGEES: THE
NATIONAL COUNCILS.

As we have shown above, it is to NCFE's interest to attempt to order this confused situation, and if the attempt is to be made, careful consideration must be given to the selection of the tools which are to be used. The Division of NCFE which has hitherto dealt with NCFE's relations with the exiles, and indirectly with the refugees, has been the National Councils Division. This Division

has used as its basic instrument the National Councils and Committees which have their headquarters in the U.S. NCFE's experience over the past three years has served conclusively to modify the initial view of the National Councils as suitable instruments for the creation not only of an atmosphere of positive and constructive cooperation, but even for the effective implementation of NCFE policy and purpose.

The divisive factors of exile have resulted in:

1. The absence of any Polish National Council which can qualify for NCFE recognition;
2. The absence of any Rumanian National Council which can qualify for NCFE recognition;
3. A prolonged split (a year and a half) in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia;
4. A precariously balanced Hungarian National Council.

Other factors have produced a Bulgarian National Committee which is unsatisfactory from almost every point of view. Genuine and productive reform of the BNC will doubtless prove a prolonged and difficult process. This leaves the NCFE with a National Committee for a Free Albania, which could stand reform and which, nevertheless, has always been closely supervised by Americans and with the three Baltic Consultative Panels which were established entirely by NCFE in the first instance.

No single national council during its existence, with the possible exception of the three Baltic Consultative Panels, has demonstrated itself as being capable of even reasonably efficient and just administration of its own affairs. In each case NCFE has been obliged to step in, at first exercising only cursory supervision, but at present attempting to introduce systems of closer administrative and financial control and supervision, which, unless made sufficiently rigid, will doubtless prove as unsatisfactory as they have been in the past.

Where national councils do exist branches or sections of these councils which have demonstrated their effectiveness can and should be used where practical to implement on a secondary level NCFE projects and policies. For the primary implementation of these projects and policies, however, a more permanent, ordered and controllable apparatus must be found, one not liable to the naturally disruptive tensions of exile life. Even where unity in a national council can be produced, experience has proved that its continuity is at best tenuous and unreliable, with the result that the council becomes a delicate and cumbersome apparatus which must subordinate the achievement of practical goals to the maintenance of this temporary and elusive unity.

Further factors disclosed by our survey reinforce the conclusion that if NCFE is, as we believe it must, effective to

develop its interest in the European refugee field, a new instrument must be found. These factors also tend to indicate roughly some of the qualities which this instrument must possess.

1. No single exile organization engaged in refugee activity, including those receiving NCFE support, is consistently good in all of its local branches. This observation applies also to those organizations receiving NCFE supports which do not fall into the national council category (the ARGR and Rumanian welfare).

Conclusions :

In its activity in the European refugee field, NCFE must be completely free to select the organizations and individuals with which it may consider it practical to cooperate on any level. NCFE must therefore not be committed to support or to cooperate with any organization in all its parts and must be free to sever connections at any time with any organization or its parts (individuals or sections) with which it finds it no longer practical to cooperate. NCFE must be completely flexible in this operation.

2. The refugee in Europe is confronted with a situation which is fluid in all its aspects. He faces since the closure of IRO, a multitude of uncoordinated agencies, the continued existence of some (the voluntary agencies) is uncertain; the operations of others (the UN and UNHCR) remain to be developed fully; the scope and activity of another (the State Department Program) is in the rumor stage. He is uncertain, suspicious and fearful of the new status and intentions of the local national authorities under whose immediate jurisdiction he must live. He faces the after-effects of mass emigration, which, although it ceased some time ago, has deprived him of the most qualified of his compatriots and hence of stable national leadership. For himself, the limited, uncertain and uncoordinated emigration on an individual basis which still exists offers but faint hope for departure from the frontier countries. He faces almost impossible employment conditions, depending upon local situations and seasonal work which often requires his being shifted from place to place as the employment situation dictates. The majority, however, must stay in the camps or on the cole. He faces shifting camps which are often moved or dissolved by the local authorities. These factors combine to produce a demoralizing feeling of impermanence and insecurity. They are, in turn, aggravated by the unsympathetic attitude of the countries in which the refugee finds himself, an attitude which frequently approaches hostility and which is not improved by the presence in these countries of embittered expelled ethnic minorities who were once the citizens of the refugee's homeland. The homeland is a deplorable feeling of apathy, hopelessness, isolation and abandonment and a total lack of any sense of direction or purpose.

Conclusions :

NOF's approach to the refugee and his problems must be broad in order that it may impart a feeling of purpose, direction, continuity and security. This approach must have an attractive national flavor which will appeal to the refugee's desire to belong, without encouraging his chauvinistic tendencies, and, indeed, should provide a positive substitute for them. To implement this approach NOF's instrument in the field must again be supremely flexible but susceptible of close and rigid control. This instrument must be capable of conveying an impression of seriousness, responsibility and constructive interest, thus inspiring a feeling of confidence on the part of the authorities and agencies as well as the refugees.

3. In general it may be observed that in the frontier countries there is a notable lack of knowledge of NOF's role in support of the admittedly limited and relatively negligible refugee activities in which it is thus far indirectly engaged. RFE is, of course, widely known and almost as widely criticized for its failure to accept responsibility for its part in the refugee problem. FEUE is usually known, but only vaguely and secondarily, and in many cases the picture of its scope, activities and goals is distorted. There is a dim awareness of FEUE's connection with RFE, but a general failure to draw any conclusions therefrom.

Conclusion :

To engage in refugee activities of any nature or extent without clearly identifying and labelling NOF as the organization ultimately responsible for these activities is a needless and senseless failure to exploit a possibility in the form of enhanced NOF prestige and greater sympathy and cooperation with the work of RFE and FEUE on the part of both refugees and other active agencies. Particularly from the point of view of RFE's essential relationship to the refugees it is a serious mistake not to do so. Therefore the instrument which NOF adopts for its work in this field must be identifiable only as an NOF operation, clearly related to RFE and FEUE.

4. It has been mentioned previously that the international and voluntary agencies tend to regard the exile representatives with skepticism and tend to hold them at arm's length. This attitude seems partially to result from their ignorance of exile politics and their understandable reluctance to become involved therein. Their ignorance and disinterest has in several cases led them to choose refugee assistants and advisors of unfortunate political background and tendencies from the NOF point of view. Again, however, as mentioned above, the representatives of several of these agencies have expressed a definite interest in having these insuppressible refugee groups somehow organized and controlled.

Conclusion :

Responsible and direct American control would therefore

do much to dispel this negative attitude and would pave the way for a more positive and productive cooperation between the national refugee groups and the agencies active in their behalf. This control would also, it is reasonable to suppose, help to fill vacuums in exile representation of the kind described above.

5. Another weakness of the organizations surveyed in the frontier countries is their almost universal tendency in greater or lesser degrees to discriminate politically or personally in the distribution of assistance. There is no comparison between the extent of this weakness in the tense and unsettled atmosphere of the frontier countries and the more normal environment of the intermediary receiving countries, France and Britain. In addition to the injustice of such discrimination, definite opportunities are lost through failure seriously to attempt to win over, through less narrow assistance, elements (such as the Czech and Slovak Separatists, Hungarian extremists and the Slovaks) which now oppose or in the future might oppose the political and national structures which NCFE recognizes and supports.

Conclusion :

Again, close NCFE guidance and control are indicated so that injustices may be reduced and broader NCFE aims implemented, rather than thwarted by narrower interests of short-sighted and unenlightened refugee representatives.

- V -

HOW NCFE'S INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
MIGHT BEST BE MANIFESTED; APPLICATIONS IN THE PRE-
SENT AND PAST AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT THEM -- THE
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL REPORT (1958).

A. NCFE's approach

If NCFE is to modify its present instruments and create new ones to manifest its interest in the problem of refugees in Europe, it should first formulate a broad and comprehensive approach to the refugee as a type of person in whom and in whose problems this interest is to be shown.

This approach will, by the nature of NCFE's interest in the refugee, differ markedly from those of other organizations active in the field.

All these organizations, the intelligence agencies, the local national governments, the UN High Commissioner and the voluntary agencies, are interested in the Czechoslovak or Rumanian or Pole who crosses the border because, respectively, he might be a Communist agent or have information, he is or might be a political refugee or because he is a human being in need. NCFE is interested in him because he is a Czechoslovak or Rumanian

or Pole -- a citizen of a country whose people were promised at Yalta certain rights and privileges which they have not received because of the violent interference of a Communist Russia. This is also the fundamental theoretical reason for RFE broadcasts to the Czechoslovaks in Czechoslovakia, the Poles in Poland, etc. The fundamental practical reason is of course the interest of the United States in these nations and peoples as European political factors.

RFE obviously cannot create a military machine capable of liberating the nations of Eastern Europe. It is interested quite simply in promoting the existence of certain attitudes, interests and activities which will one day contribute to the successful fulfillment of the promises made at Yalta. RFE is interested that mothers should teach their children certain truths to counter Communist lies; that workers should react in certain ways to Communist pressures; that students should understand the fallacies of the system which they are being seduced or forced to serve. In short, RFE wishes to direct Czechoslovaks in Czechoslovakia, Poles in Poland and Hungarians in Hungary to act in the enlightened self-interest of their respective nations. The fact that this enlightened self-interest, as supported by RFE, coincides with our own and other broader interests serves only to underline its importance.

We have tried to point out in this report the extent to which the presence and activities and problems of the refugees from NCFE countries in Western Europe cannot but be of interest to NCFE. Again, NCFE need not concern itself directly with the feeding, housing, employment and emigration of these people, any more than RFE should itself undertake to raise an army.

This is not to say ^{that} NCFE may not find it advisable to continue to use limited welfare funds in its work with refugees. But its principal tasks will be to protect its interests by attempting to produce some order out of the chaos of refugee activities by giving to the refugee and his representatives a sense of direction and belonging which the other agencies active in the field are admittedly unable adequately to provide. Without it, the refugee in Europe almost inevitably sinks into a state of hopeless and isolated apathy. He belongs to nothing but the tense and quarrelsome fraternity of his fellow abandoned. Sitting unoccupied all day, his only activity soon becomes the endless intrigue of the political parties. With few books and less communication with the outside world, and particularly, without constructive leadership and guidance, the parties become almost the only organizations with a national flavor open to the refugee. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that refugee nationalisms become chauvinistic and ideas, of national interest, subordinated to the narrow and petty goals of the political parties.

The voluntary and other agencies and the local national authorities can hardly provide a constructive substitute since they only approach the refugee as such, reinforcing his apathy by their such needed gifts, unable to offer allegiance to anything other than the Churches, opposed or reluctant to undertake any

attempt at support or guidance of his national tendencies. In all fairness, it should be noted, however, that the current approach to the refugee on the part of all these agencies is a conscious and considerable improvement on the exaggerated and incentive-killing IRO dolo system.

But if NCFE approaches the new escapee, as well as the older DR, not as a needy "refugee" but as a citizen of his country who simply finds himself in a difficult position on this side of the Iron Curtain rather than on the other side, it should be possible to appeal to his desire for national continuity and then to some extent appeal to his ideas of his own enlightened self-interest in much the same way that such appeals are provided for the escapee's compatriots at home by RFE.

This approach would also take into account the significant fact that many of the new arrivals, (estimates run as high as 80%) are not real "political refugees". They leave their countries for economic reasons or because they are fed up or simply want to try out the conditions in the West which are described to them as so much superior to those in their homelands. Among these people there are of course many misfits, incompetents and undesirables. No one should delude himself with a picture of all refugees as worthy, deserving, honest people persecuted by a Communist regime and fleeing for their very lives.

NCFE interests, however, override this unfortunate reality: no individual who leaves a satellite country for any reason whatever should be allowed to fall into such a condition of disillusionment that he should consider returning or even consider sending word of his discouragement home. One such return or report of personal disillusionment can produce a most unfortunate countereffect to RFE and other Western propaganda. It is an accepted fact that there have been such cases and they are in fact regarded as one of the factors contributing to the present lower arrival rate of new escapees.

Granted this approach to the escapee and the old refugee and DR as a citizen, and the desire to promote among these people the idea of concern for their real self-interests, the idea which most adequately describes this approach is that of the "consulate".

The functions of a consulate are to protect the interests of the citizen abroad. Material assistance is provided only in cases of emergency -- the consulate's principal task is to take an active interest in guiding the citizen to those local agencies best able to satisfy his wants and to suggest approaches and attitudes most likely to benefit him during his stay abroad. The most glaring and urgent example of the need for such consular guidance may be found in the necessity for protecting the Czechoslovaks in Germany not only from the political oppression of the Germans, but from their own senseless, destructive and shortsighted political maneuverings.

B. Modifications of NCFE's present instrument.

As indicated above, it will of course be useful and desirable to incorporate in this approach and in the new instrument, (FECS), designed to implement it, features, (individuals and organizations) of the present instrument which have demonstrated their effectiveness. However, also as mentioned earlier, in order to assure the freedom of action and freedom of choice of the new instrument, certain modifications of these features of the present instrument will be required.

1. It will first of all be necessary that those features (individuals and organizations) of the present instrument considered suitable for incorporation in FECS be separated administratively and financially from their headquarters, since FECS will operate on the basis of the following procedural approach:

Such individuals or organizations will be incorporated in FECS on one primary basis -- their proved effectiveness in the past and/or their promise of effectiveness under NCFE guidance; their retention will be dependent upon their ability successfully to continue this performance. This is of course basically an adaptation of part of the approach which has enabled RFE and RFS to make effective use of qualified exile personnel for the attainment of their own goals.

2. For the undirected and uncoordinated system of almost complete lack of control which has hitherto generally prevailed in NCFE's relationship to refugee activities and exile organizations, will be substituted a system of control which will preserve at least the illusion of freedom through the incorporation of qualified exile organizations and individuals and the selection of others to fill gaps which such organizations and individuals have proved unable to fill. The fact of their ultimate responsibility to NCFE should be made abundantly clear. That this is in no way incompatible with the atmosphere of an illusion of freedom in which FECS's exile employees will be working is amply proved by the success of RFE national desks. It will be made clear to these employees that they should consider themselves to be working as consuls and consular assistants under a civil service program. They should be given the impression that the responsibility for the success of FECS in its attempts to assist the refugees lies in their hands, and that its failure for reasons of favoritism or dishonesty would constitute an evasion of their patriotic responsibility.

C. Functions and potentialities of FECS.

The underlying purpose of FECS is of course to serve the policies and basic interests of NCFE.. We have tried to indicate the extent to which its work with the refugees would be directly to these interests. Other interests which FECS would have the purpose of serving might be:

1) The prevention of misunderstandings on the part of the

refugees and other agencies active in the field regarding all phases of HCFE work, and particularly that of FEUS and RFE.

2) The attempt to keep the HCFE European Representative and the RFE Political Advisor informed of exile political developments in Europe which might affect their operations and to control and guide these developments wherever possible to the advantage of HCFE and RFE. For example, HCFE, designed to wage political warfare on a broad front, was recently almost outflanked in Germany. Some organized means of preventing such occurrences, or at least of reporting their development, should be provided.

1. The primary function of FECS is to approach the refugee as a citizen and by so doing to try and set up conditions and introduce a spirit which will make it possible for the refugee to escape from the apathy which is his traditional lot and become a positive factor in the struggle of the West. FECS will attempt to perform this function in several ways:

a. Normal consular activity. FECS will engage in the normal consular activities of interventions on behalf of refugees with the local authorities, voluntary agencies, international agencies such as the UN High Commission, or wherever else it might effectively and usefully do so. It will provide translations, verify documents, advise refugees on all relevant matters in conjunction with these other agencies and generally interest itself in all aspects of the refugee's life and problems.

b. Material assistance. While material assistance should be kept to a minimum, it must be recognized that FECS will be required to provide more help of this kind than the normal consulates, since the physical condition of the person appealing for assistance will almost invariably be poor. Other organizations are better set up to provide such material needs, and FECS should of course attempt to cooperate with their already extensive efforts to prevent duplication. But FECS must have available emergency welfare funds in order to escape the accusation that it is a feather bed or another operation to "use" the refugee.

c. Refugee morale. The fundamental practical target of all FECS operations should be the improvement of refugee morale. This morale depends on two factors: the refugee's frame of mind and the atmosphere in which he lives.

The refugee's frame of mind should be improved in several ways. The first of these is the citizenship approach which is to govern all FECS operations. It should be manifested as soon as possible after the refugee's arrival and clearance, if only in the form of a greeting and briefing from someone not interested in milking the refugee of information and asking his questions. This briefing might include a description of the voluntary agencies which might assist the refugee, a description in simple terms of his legal status and, of course, of the FECS program, including the names and addresses of its representatives in the camps or

areas to which the refugees might be sent. The refugees might also be saved considerable disillusionment if at this time he were given a carefully worded description of the difficult economic situation in which he will be obliged for some time to remain. For example in Germany, the refugees should be told of the presence of large numbers of refugees from the East Zone and of the German government's natural desire to assist them. A representative of one of the voluntary agencies suggested to us that the refugees are rarely made to understand that they are initially accepted into countries faced with unusually severe economic problems.

Secondly, the refugee's frame of mind might be improved by the installation of reading rooms containing publications in the national languages, some of them geared especially to the refugee and his problems. For example, some of the useful exile-organized refugee aid Committees such as the Anglo-Rumanian in London and the Hungarian Office in Munich produce regular bulletins containing local legal and employment news of interest to the refugees. Such bulletins should receive a wider distribution and others like them should be created. In this connection, it should be noted that RFE publications are not reaching the refugees, among whom our survey has indicated they would be most welcome and are much needed. Also in the reading rooms, radios should be provided in response to the desire, frequently expressed to us, of hearing RFE and other broadcasts in the national languages.

The organization of constructive meetings, discussions and national celebrations would provide an outlet for refugee enthusiasms if they were supervised by competent leadership. Similarly, RFECS should stimulate and possibly provide the means for self-help work projects, such as the painting of barracks, the planting of gardens and the organization of sewing circles, language courses or discussion groups, etc....

The second factor involved in the question of refugee morale is that of his environment, the atmosphere in which he lives. ~~To a large extent this atmosphere would be improved in which he lives.~~ To a large extent this atmosphere would be improved by the organization, as noted above, of constructive outlets for the energies now dissipated in chauvinistic and petty political internal and international strife, both of which have at times led to murder in the camps.

RFECS major effort in this direction, however, should be directed toward bridging the gap in a constructive manner between, on the one hand, the voluntary and international agencies and the local authorities; and, on the other, the essential national interests of the refugee. Occasionally representatives of the voluntary agencies have mentioned the fact that refugees sometimes cooperate with them best when the situation has been explained by one of their national representatives. For the reasons of suspicion on the part of these agencies cited earlier, this is not always done. RFECS could provide a responsible instrument for so doing.

The principal gap which exists at present between the various authorities and the refugees is over the question of assimilation, or, as it is usually described, "integration" and "adaptation". There is a natural feeling on the part of these agencies and authorities that in view of the restriction of emigration possibilities, the only alternative open to many of the refugees is to adapt themselves to their environment. The refugee, is, however, quite understandably reluctant to do so: He plans to return to his country when it is liberated "next year"; he is sure he will emigrate shortly; particularly in Germany, he may strongly dislike or distrust the local population. There is also of course the determining factor of employment possibilities -- one of the aspects of the refugee problem with which FECS cannot and need not directly concern itself.

Indirectly, however, FECS can contribute to its resolution. For example, in Germany, the problem of national schools, which has been a sore point, suggests a suitable compromise. The refugees have struggled to maintain full-time national schools for their children, sometimes succeeding with HCFE and other external support, while the local and international authorities have insisted that refugee children attend German schools. The refugee must be made to understand that it is to his children's interest to allow them to adapt as long as the essential elements of national culture can be preserved. This requirement could be met in some instances already being met by extra-curricular instruction in the national language, history and culture.

In the same way the refugee must also be shown that by refusing to adapt, he may make of his national group an ingrown, despised and distrusted minority. If on the other hand, he shows willingness to adapt to the situation in which he finds himself, he is much more likely to obtain not only physical but psychological benefits in the form of broader practical experience, with the possibility that this experience may one day be of use to him in his own homeland. This is a difficult point which the mass of refugees will be reluctant to grasp. Some of their more intelligent leaders, however, -- the kind which FECS hopes to employ -- might be able to explain its importance. Also, the experience of one camp director in Trieste has proved that it is not impossible to get results through healthy national competitions; if the Rumanians paint their barracks, the Hungarians feel more obliged to paint theirs. While probably ineffective among the hardened older refugees, same might successfully be used among new arrivals, as for example, "If you say you intend to return after liberation, what will you tell your friends that you did for Poland in emigration? That you helped create friends for Poland by keeping the neatest barracks in Germany --- or that you set around a pigsty all day doing nothing? That you refused to take a job in a construction company because it was beneath you, or that you helped to build a stronger and more prosperous west to hasten the day of liberation?" Arguments of this kind were not wholly without effect on strikers, and shirkers, during the war. Doubtless they have been tried by representatives of the voluntary agencies, etc., but FECS representatives should

have additional authority for such arguments by virtue of their membership in one division of an organization actively working in many ways for the liberation of the refugees' homelands.

Also, just as the presence of extracurricular schools, by their guarantee of the preservation of the essentials of national culture, encourage attendance at German schools, so the manifestations of NCFE's similar interest on the local level through FECS might liberate the refugee from the anxiety for maintaining his traditions within his smaller group and so diminish his reluctance to attempt some measure of adaptation. In this connection the citizenship approach applies particularly, since FECS must demonstrate that NCFE is not only generally and broadly interested in keeping satellite culture alive in the DIO and [redacted], but also in keeping the individual refugee living outside a camp, in touch with his compatriots and traditions not only through personal contact but by making available to him publications in his language, etc; In this way the refugee might be encouraged in his slow process of adaptation to strange and in many cases hostile environment.

This is again a vast problem affected by many factors far beyond the scope of FECS or NCFE. It is almost certainly true that if more respectable and worthwhile jobs were available to refugees, much of their apparently nationally based aversion to adaptation would disappear.

But if FECS makes emphasis on adaptation one of its major points of policy, and makes this fact clear to the local national and international authorities, and then actively implements this policy, as suggested above, it will almost certainly find itself most sympathetically regarded by these authorities.

2. These are but a few of the functions which FECS should be able to perform; anyone regularly active in the field could probably suggest many more. There are, however, certain broader potentialities for the development of this instrument which might be briefly suggested here.

In the first place, it should be possible to gain some advantage, beyond the fact that they come to us, from the presence of the refugees in the West. FECS might be able to produce such an advantage.

To brand this approach as hopelessly idealistic is to ignore the extraordinary practical results achieved at Camp Valka from July 1951 to January 1952 by the German camp commander at that time, von Homeyer. When von Homeyer, with no previous experience of these problems arrived, Valka was in terrible situation. Knifings and riots were frequent and the Nuremberg police were not only on constant alert, but a force of 28 men was maintained at the camp.

Von Homeyer began by calling the national representatives together, and it took him two weeks to get them into one room.

Finally, when they had assembled, he gave them hell and explained it would be a waste of time for them to try to alter or influence the situation in their own countries from Valka. He told them he believed the cause of many difficulties was the personal interest of many of the leaders in preparing the way for big roles at home after liberation. He then presented his idea of forming the first European community at Valka. He told the national representatives he had no support from Munich — he was on his own and asked for their help and cooperation. One by one they came to him and agreed.

Von Homeyer's technique of making friends with the people, with whom he soon acquired an excellent reputation, was an effective instrument in swinging their national committees to his side, for aware of his popularity, they hesitated not to show active cooperation. As a means of delegating self-administration of the camp to elected representatives, von Homeyer was about to establish a small parliament when he was recalled by reasons of a German administrative snafu in which favoritism played a part. Just before his departure, the Nuremberg chief of police approached him and asked that he request the withdrawal of the permanent squad, which the chief felt was no longer required due to the enormous progress in camp behaviour.

After von Homeyer's replacement by an unimaginative bureaucrat, the situation at Valka relapsed into violence. Yet his influence lingered, and delegations from the national groups visited him, begging him to return to the camp. Later, when the situation became even worse, delegates from the German administrative personnel at Valka also came to urge that he return. This was just before our talk with him, and the employees brought with them tales of the latest knitting. Obviously von Homeyer's idealistic and far-sighted approach to the refugee problem had made a profound impression not only upon the refugees themselves but on Germans associated with the problem in a practical way.

Von Homeyer's European community approach might be borne in mind in connection with NCFE's espousal of the policy of Federalism. Similarly the ERCS citizenship approach might have the potentiality of being broadened to provide grass-roots emphasis on this aspect of NCFE's policy. The idea of European citizenship for refugees is not original or new, but it might provide NCFE and RFE with a useful propaganda weapon.

Von Homeyer's realistic and productive idealism perhaps also indicates the necessity for at least trying to uncover and support more positive elements than the usual exile political leaders, even though it is believed likely that the latter will be able to regain control of their political machinery and return to power after liberation. For this reason, not to attempt the production of more constructive leaders and attitudes more amenable to NCFE and US interests is an example of infatuation with "hard-boiled" realism for its own sake.

Another potential use of FECS might be in conjunction with certain proposals advanced by individual RFE staff members. These call for the use of refugees as sounding boards for group reactions to new broadcast themes and as sample groups for testing basic satellite country attitudes. Refugees helped by FECS might be more interested in contributing to such projects; conversely, FECS efforts to restore their feeling of belonging to the struggle for liberation of their countries would be immeasurably assisted by this opportunity for them to assist in the sharpening of this potent "sister weapon".

-:-:-:-:-

NCSE and RFE exile employees who by and large form a privileged class among the refugees as a result of being relatively well paid, should be encouraged to contribute small but regular amounts of their salaries on a voluntary deduction basis to refugee welfare. Some RFE employees have already done this on an informal basis and have expressed a desire to do so on a regular deduction basis but have been discouraged by the information that this would involve a violation of RFE regulations. In view of the success of a similar welfare fund instituted by the Polish Labor Service Companies attached to the U.S. Army in Germany, it is recommended that this possibility be investigated. FECS might prove a sure means of channeling such aid to the refugee.

-:-:-:-:-

The form for refugees in Turkey established by the Gazi Khan Bessolt Committee which has an international aspect resembling Von Homoyer's approach would qualify for inclusion in the FECS program, although no specific proposal can be made until after a detailed field survey.

D. Proposed organizations of FECS.

1. FECS will be a service section of NCSE under the directorship of NCSE's General European Representative. General policy headquarters will therefore be in Paris as well as the operational subsection responsible for the administration of the FECS branches in England and France. This will have the advantages of removing the general policy headquarters from the immediate tensions and pressures of the frontier countries. The Director will have the task of general policy coordination of FECS with other NCSE divisions and of gaining on a high level the acceptance of and cooperation with FECS by the national and international authorities concerned, perhaps by emphasis on the contribution which FECS could make to their efforts to resolve the refugee problem.

2. Operational headquarters under the direction of a FECS Deputy Director will be in Munich, the point closest to the refugees' geographical center; from Munich the German refugee reception center at Völker and the Austrian equivalent at Wels are each within half a day's drive, or less.

3. The Deputy Director will be responsible for the implementation on the operational level in all areas of all the functions of FECS in line with policies established by the Director. The Deputy Director will be responsible for general operational policy coordination with the national and international authorities and voluntary agencies locally active.

4. The Deputy Director will have six Area Assistants :

- 1) North Germany, center Bonn or Hannover.
- 2) South Germany, center Munich and Vienna.
- 3) US and French zones of Austria, center Salzburg and Wels.
- 4) British Zone Austria and Trieste - possibly two assistants
- 5) Italy, center Rome.
- 6) Paris, London and Benelux, center Paris.
- 7) Greece and Turkey, probably will require one area assistant each. However, no field survey of the refugee situation in these two countries has as yet been possible.

The duties of these Assistants will be to provide guidance, inspiration and close administrative and financial supervision of the various national sections of FECS in their respective areas. These Area Assistants must have considerable administrative and financial latitude in order that FECS may possess the high degree of flexibility essential to its effective exploitation of the fluid refugee situation. They must be fully informed of all employment and emigration possibilities, projects of voluntary agencies, etc. Their cooperation and relations with local authorities and active agencies must be close and their relations with them always excellent.

4. FECS will, in each area where it is to operate, form National Sections. These National Sections will be recruited and appointed by FECS. They may or may not include individual representatives of organizations locally active. In rare cases in the frontier countries, but almost entirely in England and France, proven exile-organized refugee aid Committees will become the local National Sections. In cases where no proven exile-organized refugee aid Committees exist, the FECS Area Assistant will recruit with the help and approval of the Deputy Director a National Section Chief, who will in turn, with the approval of the Area Assistant, recruit his own paid assistant or associate where necessary, and as many as local volunteer section member-representatives as may be required by the amount of work, geographical distribution of the refugees, etc.

5. Possible organization of FECS national sections :

England

- a) Albanians : special case

- b) Bulgarians : Mrs Karastoyanova as Section Chief
- c) Czechoslovaks : Anglo-Czechoslovak Relief Committee
- d) Estonians : Association of Estonians in Great Britain
- e) Hungarians : Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
Possibly Father Henkey-M'Naig
- f) Latvians : Latvian Welfare Association
- g) Lithuanians : Lithuanian Association in Great Britain
- h) Poles : Polish Ex-Combatants Association
- i) Rumanian : Anglo-Rumanian Refugee Committee
- j) Yugoslavs : Yugoslav Welfare Committee (special case)

France

- a) Albanians : special case
- b) Association des Réfugiés Bulgares en France
- c) Comité d'Aide Sociale aux Réfugiés Tchécoslovaques
- d) Comité d'Entr'Aide Estonien
- e) Comité des Réfugiés Hongrois
- f) Association d'Entr'Aide Letton en France
- g) Association Lithuanienne de Bienfaisance
- h) Polish Section Chief and probably two paid assistants
to be recruited and appointed.
- i) CAROMAN
- j) Yugoslav Section Chief and one paid assistant to be
recruited and appointed (Special case).

Germany

- a) special case
- b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
- c) Czechoslovak Section, paid Associate and one paid
assistant to be recruited and appointed.
- d) Estonian National Committee
- e) Hungarian Office, plus Hungarian Relief Action

- f) Latvian National Committee plus Latvian Red Cross
- g) Lithuanian National Committee
- h) Polish Section Chief and two paid assistants to be recruited and appointed.
- i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
Chief
- j) Yugoslav Section/and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed (Special case).

Austria

- a) Special case-Albanians
- b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
- c) Czechoslovak Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
- d) Estonians - none
- e) Hungarian Section Chief and two paid assistants to be recruited and appointed.
- f) Latvians - none
- g) Lithuanians - none
- h) Polish Section Chief to be appointed. Possible use of APWR Salzburg representative, Mr. Knilski.
- i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
- j) Yugoslav Section Chief to be appointed. Possible use of Colonel Bojovic (Special case).

Trieste

- a) special case-Albanians
- b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
- c) Czechoslovaks - none
- d) Estonians - none
- e) Hungarian Section Chief and one paid assistant to be appointed. Possible use of Prof. Ternay as half-time Chief with full time assistant.
- f) Latvians - none
- g) Lithuanians - none
- h) Polish Section Chief to be recruited and appointed

- 1) CAROMAN Trieste delegate and staff (Mr. Di Demotrio)
- 2) Yugoslav Section Chief to be recruited and appointed (Special Case).

Italy

- a) Special case- Albanians
- b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
- c) Czechoslovakia - none
- d) Estonians - none
- e) Hungarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
- f) Latvians - none
- g) Lithuanians - none
- h) Polish Section Chief and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed
- i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
- j) Yugoslav Section Chief to be recruited and appointed (Special Case).


Note : In cases where no national section is provided due to the insignificant numbers of refugees present or probable, it is assumed that the Area Assistant could handle the needs of special arrivals or cases if existent.

E. PROPOSED ANNUAL BUDGET FOR FREE EUROPE CONSULAR SERVICE.

1) Salaries

a) Americans

- 1) Deputy Director
- 2) 5 Area Assistants at per year.
(the duties of the sixth Area Assistant, covering France, Britain and the Benelux countries might be performed by a member of the staff of the Paris office).
- 3) Executive Secretary to Deputy Director



4) Bookkeeper (possibly locally hired)

5) Quarters and living allowances

Total American Salaries

b. Exile Salaries

1) ^{24 1/2} 24 1/2 National Section Chiefs and Associates at [] per month

2) 10 paid assistants for National Sections at [] per month

Total salaries Exiles and American

2. Travel in Europe and Maintenance of cars at

3. Two Annual Round trips U.S. - Europe

4. Rent, stationery, telephone, etc. for Deputy Director's office

5. Expenses (travel, stationery, postage, etc. for 24 1/2 National Section Chiefs at \$30 a month per person)

6. Monthly subsidies to Exile-Organized Refugee Aid Committees

a. Bulgarian Refugee Committee - London (Mrs. [])

b. Anglo-Czechoslovak Relief Committee (London)

c. Estonian Consulate - Welfare Division (London)

d. Latvian Welfare Association (London)

e. Lithuanian Welfare Committee (London)


f. Polish Ex-Combatants Association (London)

g. Anglo-Roumanian Relief (London)

h. Yugoslav Welfare Committee (London) through E.A.P.C.Y.

i. Association des Réfugiés Bulgares en France (Paris)

- j. Comité d'Aide Sociale aux Réfugiés Tchécoslovaques (Paris)
 - k. Comité d'Entr'Aide Estonien (Paris)
 - l. Comité des Réfugiés Hongrois (Paris)
 - m. Association d'Entr'Aide Letton en France (Paris)
 - n. Association Lithuanienne Bienfaisance (Paris)
 - o. G. ROMAN (Paris)
 - p. Estonian National Committee (Germany)
 - q. Hungarian Office and Hungarian Relief Action (Germany)
 - r. Latvian National Committee and Latvian Red Cross (Germany)
 - s. Lithuanian National Committee (Germany)
 - t. CAROLAN (Trieste)
7. Material costs of Implementation of FECS Program (extra-curricular schools, reading room meetings, subscriptions, charts, posters, publicity)
8. Welfare Fund




Total Annual Budget for FECS

Capital Outlay in Initial Years of Operation

- a. purchase of 5 cars at [] each for use of 5 area assistants in frontier countries
- b. 10 one-way trips U.S.-Europe for transportation to job of American personnel (and wives and children where they exist at [])
- c. Furniture and equipment for Deputy Director's office

Total



-:-:-:-:-



Information

29 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Report of [redacted]
in Rumanian Refugee Unity

1. Transmitted herewith is a report which will be of interest to the NCFE in its current negotiations with the Rumanian refugees.
2. The views of [redacted] and others listed, are in agreement with those of this Division.
3. It is requested that arrangements be made for representatives of the NCFE to meet with personnel of this Division to discuss the current negotiations and utilizing this recent information.

[redacted]
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

Attachment

Orig - Bureau

SECRET

SECRET

24 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT:

2. However, it is recommended that no action be taken on their behalf until the present attempt to settle the refugee situation is completed, in order to avoid any appearance of ICPE's favoring one faction.

Deputy for Policy Coordination, SB

4 Attachments
Biographies

SECRET

orig - Burke

625-1

SECRET
Security Information July 22, 1952

To:

From:

For your information I enclose a copy of our contract letter with . I send you this because of the considerable discussion of the case.

I can't tell you how much I appreciate your consideration and help in this whole affair. It really pulled us out of a deep, deep hole. My very best.

*Attachment in TONIC
ACFE files (att'd 17 July)*

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

B.

File

22 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: National Committee for a Free Europe

Attached is a memorandum which it is suggested be shown to the Director of Central Intelligence in time for a scheduled meeting of the Director, members of CIA, and members of the Board of the National Committee for a Free Europe on Monday, 4 August.

L. K. WHITE
Acting Deputy Director
(Administration)


Attachment
As stated.

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - ADD/A
1 cc - IO/TOMIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI


SECRET

DRAFT
SECRET
Security Information



21 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: DCT



SECRET
Security Information

SECRET



13 July 1952

Dear Mr.

I would appreciate it if you would deliver
this envelope to Mr. John C. Hughes, 40 Worth Street,
New York.

Thanks,

/s/ Tom Braden

2203 Foxhall Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
17 July, 1952

Dear John:

I was glad of our meeting day before yesterday and I am looking forward to seeing you soon again.

Here is a memorandum I addressed to A. a short time ago which I would like you to read because it may give you some indication of how we are trying to get to work here. It is for your eyes only.

I talked to Min on the telephone this morning and he seemed in an extremely bellicose mood. This bellicosity, replete with references to "little people who get in his hair", "from now on I'm dealing only with the top", and "otherwise there are going to be some resignations here" is difficult for me because I am partly Irish, and as able to resign as the next man. I have succeeded, however, in maintaining my Scotch heritage to the fore so far, and since you assure me that none of this is personally directed at myself, or people like Bill Durkee whom I persuaded to come and help me or to the job that I am sincerely and honestly trying to do, I will try to keep it there. It was nevertheless awfully calming to have a chance for such a good talk with you.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

/s/ I

Mr. John Hughes
McCarrbell & Company
10 Worth Street
New York, New York

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

3-5308

~~EYES ONLY~~

11 December 1952


MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

1. Admiral Miller will call upon the DDCI soon to request more funds for the Crusade for Freedom. At the present rate of expenditure, funds will run out on 31 December.

2. [redacted] was budgeted for the Crusade this year. We have told Admiral Miller that since the Crusade was unable to live within this budget, we were certain that the Agency would appropriate more money to wind it up, although we have explained that his request was embarrassing because the PRC had expressly approved [redacted] instead of a larger amount in the belief that less money should be expended this year. We have asked Admiral Miller to provide us with a financial statement of the Crusade cost to date as well as a breakdown of the further amount needed.

3. The Crusade this year has so far cost only a quarter of last year's expenditure and half of the amount expended in 1950. Receipts are up, 140% over last year at this date. On the whole, a much better job has been done to date than we anticipated -- and purely in terms of the amount raised the performance has been superior.



~~SECRET~~
Security Information
~~EYES ONLY~~

EYES ONLY

of the people in the New York office talk about is the payment of [redacted] to [redacted] who worked for approximately one month in drawing up a Dimes for Freedom campaign which, as you recall, was rejected as a basis for this year's campaign.

5. No accounting of Crusade funds expended in the field has ever been made, and in a fund-raising campaign it is perhaps impossible to do so. Nevertheless, records involving payments for expense money to private citizens engaged for the duration of the campaign are chaotic. You will recall that Spencer Phenix, Treasurer of NCPE, refuses to have anything to do with expenditures for the Crusade.

6. Since we are winding up the Crusade this year and will attempt to place it on a more reliable basis through the Heritage Foundation, I suggest that you assure Admiral Miller that funds sufficient to wind up the Crusade will be forthcoming and that you instruct the IO Division to expedite a project granting these funds. I further suggest that in view of the allegations above, which I repeat for your private background information, you keep the position of the Agency faultless by requesting from Admiral Miller a budget in as much detail as possible for the amount necessary to liquidate the Crusade.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET

Security Information

17 July 1952



MEMORANDUM TO: Acting Deputy Director (Administration)
FROM: Acting Chief, Administrative Staff (Special)
SUBJECT: Conference with TYPONIC [redacted]
[redacted]



SECRET

Security Information

SECRET



Frederick W. Richards
Acting Chief, Administrative
Staff (Special)

Distribution:
Acting DD/A - Orig.
CCC - 1
IO Division - 1 ✓
AS/S Chrono - 1

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information


ER 3-0917

15 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe; proposed employment of Mr. [redacted].

REFERENCE: Memo from Security Officer to DCI dated 12 January, and attachments.




2. When Admiral Miller was informed today of this decision, together with the reasons upon which it was based, he and his staff immediately proceeded to re-examine the entire problem and within an hour-and-one-half communicated to the undersigned an entirely new proposition concerning Mr. [redacted] of which the following were the principal elements:



b. In lieu thereof he would be offered a contract as a "consultant and contributor of information" for a six-months term.

c. He would not be offered a salary but would be placed on a fee basis, and paid according to the amount of work and material which he contributes.



SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

- 2 -

e. Subject to [redacted] Admiral Miller and Mr. Lang will endeavor to secure the services of either Mr. [redacted] organization, or Mr. [redacted] as Chief of the information collection activity of Radio Free Europe. They are both regarded as competent and experienced individuals, and [redacted] has already indicated his interest in this position if it were open.

3. [redacted] The Admiral was so advised by the undersigned and expressed himself as being entirely satisfied and very pleased. [redacted]

4. One other aspect of this matter is worth recording for future reference: Mr. [redacted] has stated that he has been well acquainted with Mr. [redacted] for many years, having known him in college and having followed his career rather closely. On the basis of everything he knows about Mr. [redacted] is convinced that Mr. [redacted] is a loyal American citizen and that there would be no real risk in his case on the issue of loyalty as such. In the opinion of Mr. [redacted], Mr.

[redacted]

SECRET FRANK G. WISNER

Encls
References.

FRANK G. WISNER

DD/P-FCW/bja

Distributions:
Orig. - DCI, DDCI, IC - with enclosures.
cc: - C/IO - 1
Security Officer - 1
ER - 1
DD/P chrono - 1

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION


Executive Registry
3-0717

14 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Papers on NCFE Views on Yugoslavia

1. Here are NCFE's views on Yugoslavia which you asked for.
2. I am worried about item d) in particular. The other items may be justifiable on the grounds that we have to take care of people in this country, but item d) may seem to be taking unnecessary forward steps.
3. As you suggested, we have asked the State Department for a review of the entire national council policy, and I am sure we will get State's views on Yugoslavia at this time.


THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments

1. Ltr to Allen Dulles from [redacted] dtd 7 July 52.
2. Memo dtd 2 July 52 re NCFE views on Yugoslavia.

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee (thru DD/P)
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - IO/IONIC
2 cc - RI

SECRET

30/P/1752

3-5043

16 December 1952

1 Jan 53-50

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Briefing of Secretary of the Army on 17 December
on NCFZ [redacted]

1. On 17 December, I briefed Secretary of the Army Pace on the subjects of the National Committee for a Free Europe and the [redacted]

2. The briefing covered both physical assets and concepts. Secretary Pace asked many questions, for example:

- a. How did NCFZ handle the problem of Yugoslav exiles and at the same time use the Yugoslavian defection as an argument in its broadcasts to Iron Curtain countries?
- b. How much did the State Department have to say about the day-to-day operations?
- c. The duties of the President?

[Large redacted area]

AWB

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

872

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
TO: <i>Mr. [unclear]</i>		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	
REMARKS <i>Sent to N.Y. 23 July 1952</i>		
<i>To DuBois: I think the content of witness memo, sent ought to be relayed to Miller, Walsh et al.</i>		
Return to <input type="checkbox"/> for file		
FROM: <i>[unclear]</i>		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1948

16-6000-1 GPO

SECRET

Security Information

14 July 1952

For Miller

MEMORANDUM

I would certainly be inclined to agree with F&W on the importance of a dignified "worthy cause" sort of campaign. Moreover I would scrupulously avoid any activity which might cast doubt on the good faith of the Crusade (e.g., "We gave our money for balloons at Christmas — where are they?")

REL
REL

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

ER 3-0732

9 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Proposed Campaign of the Crusade for Freedom
(ER 3-0686).

1. Please note the attached inquiry from Tom Braden, in which he raises two questions with respect to balloons. The following are my recommendations on the two questions, respectively:

a. I see no objection to reference by the Freedom Crusade campaign to the use of balloons, provided this is handled with care. By this I mean that it would be all right for the Crusade to refer to its former use of balloons and the effectiveness of this use, and also to say that the National Committee for a Free Europe will, on an appropriate occasion and at the right time, make further use of balloons. It would be wrong and unwise for any reasons to make a flat statement as to the exact time and content of further balloon operations. There is no point in thus telegraphing our punch to the opposition, and it would get us into trouble if we were to be too specific about the timing and subject matter of any new messages.

b. I would be very much opposed to the stunts such as dropping Christmas leaflets out of balloons over packed football stadiums. This is the kind of flamboyant publicity which we have agreed not to undertake this year, and incidentally which makes us look as though we were in the class with commercial advertisers or irresponsible and careless student ^{propagandists} ~~propagandists~~, or both. I thought [redacted] had gone to help Ike!

F. D. Wisner
FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Encl (1)
ER 3-0686, dtd 7 July

DD/P-~~ER~~/bjm

Distribution:

- Orig. - addressee w/att
- 1 cc - ER
- 1 cc - DD/P chrono

SECRET
Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

7 July 1952

Executive Registry

3-0686

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Crusade for
Freedom Campaign Beginning 15 November may use
a Dropping of Leaflets Theme in its Propaganda.

1. Admiral Miller of NCFE has appointed a new head for Crusade for Freedom, Mr. Richard Walsh, formerly of the State Department. Mr. Walsh has submitted a new plan for the Crusade for Freedom campaign to begin November 15. The campaign will be based upon the idea of sending Christmas message leaflets behind the iron curtain with publicity that the Crusade for Freedom will use balloons among other methods for this purpose. It was originally contemplated that the Crusade would in fact send balloons as it did last year.

2. [REDACTED] the Crusade to publicize the use of balloons, to employ such stunts as dropping the Christmas leaflets out of balloons over packed football stadiums in the United States and to give the general impression that balloons will be one of the ways to carry messages from the American people behind the iron curtain, even though they will in fact not be employed?

3. You will appreciate that an [REDACTED] is essential.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

Distribution:

Original - DDCI through DD/P

cc: ADFC - 1

CIO - 1

IO/TONIC - 2

RI - 2

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

11 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. [redacted]
Office of the General Counsel

SUBJECT: Follow-up on your report of 26 June 1952 re: [redacted]
[redacted]

1. The following report of 2 July 1952, is a reply to our presentation to the Admiral of the subject reports:

"I have questioned Tom about the matter cited in your letter of 30 June 1952, File Number 6-3639. Tom states that the facts are as follows:

1. By letter dated March 20, 1952, Congressman Robert Tripp Ross requested consideration for the employment of [redacted]. The latter was interviewed on several occasions, and prospects of his employment were fully examined. After careful consideration, it developed that [redacted] was not useful in any division of our operation, and there was no job for him. He was personally so informed by Tom in a subsequent interview on May 6, 1952, in which [redacted] expressed his understanding of the situation.

2. Under date of May 23, 1952, Congressman Ross again wrote us stating that [redacted] had contacted him again about the possibilities of a job with us. I wrote the [redacted] under date of June 5, 1952, telling him that, although we had made every effort to place him, we were unable to offer [redacted] a position.

3. On or about June 25, 1952, Congressman Ross' local secretary telephoned my office inquiring about [redacted]. My secretary referred her to Tom who then talked at some length with Congressman Ross' secretary. He told the latter that we had no position for [redacted] and that we had so informed the Congressman by letter above cited. In the course of the conversation, the secretary inquired as to what suggestions we could offer relative to such a position for [redacted] as would be useful in procuring an extension of his visitor's visa. Tom stated that he might suggest to the Congressman that he might make inquiry in [redacted] behalf in various government agencies in Washington, stating that [redacted] seemed to have various useful talents which might interest someone other than us.

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

1. Tom has never talked with Congressman Ross. Tom did not state to his secretary or to anyone else that Congressman Ross' candidate might be able to get a position with you. Tom states that he knows better for obvious reasons than to make any such suggestion to anyone.

For your more complete information in this matter, a copy of an internal memorandum is enclosed.

Sincerely

/s/ H. B. Miller "

2. We should like to know if the information you obtained from CIA personnel agrees with this report.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

Encl: 1 copy

IO/TUNIC : NBV/hka
Distributions:
Orig: - Addressee
2 cc - C/IO ✓
2 cc - IO/TUNIC
2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECRET.

C O P Y

SECURITY INFORMATION

May 27, 1952

Memorandum

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

There are no prospects for utilizing

[REDACTED] services by the Fund.

I must say that I do not like the behavior of [REDACTED] in again trying to pressure us via Congressman Ross. As the attached file shows, he has been most courteously treated here; every effort has been made to place him; and he has expressed himself as being pleased with the treatment and attention accorded him. I personally informed him and explained in great detail that his background made it impossible for us to use him here. He stated to me that he thoroughly understood this and that he was quite satisfied that we had examined the proposition thoroughly.

I don't suppose that it can be told to Congressman Ross, but [REDACTED] has taken his whole story to certain of our friends to explore the possibilities of their possible interest in him since he stated to me that he is single and willing to go anywhere in the world to get into the fight.

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

7 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION/OFC
FROM: AC/RDD/OTS
SUBJECT: Evaluation of New Type of Air Leaflet
REFERENCE: (a) Memorandum for RDD/TSS Subj: Request for
Appraisal of [] proposal to ICEYE of
new type of air leaflet dtd 21 June 1952
(b) Telephone discussion between C/IOD/OFC
and AC/RDD/OTS on 3 July 1952

1. Subject proposal has been received and will be established as RDD Ad Hoc Project No. 23.

2. This project will be carried out along the lines discussed in Reference (b), which will require a number of field experiments; therefore, some additional time will be needed for the complete evaluation. Information will be forwarded to you on these trials as it becomes available.

3. It is noted that the samples attached to Reference (a) are approximately 1 1/2" by 8". It is requested that you advise whether or not this leaflet is large enough for applications you have in mind. In the event that it is not, trials will be conducted with larger size leaflets of the same pattern.

[]
Acting Chief
Research & Development

[] hmg

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

"CS" RECORD MATERIAL

DATE

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES & DISPOSITION SECTION, RM ~~6-138~~ ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED. 6-A-50
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4548.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

3.	2D24 P/NO	12/10/50	43
4.	OG/EFK		
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.	RETURN TO 6-A-50		
15.	IP/ARD Rm 6-138		

DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.

78-1129
432.393

~~78-1129~~
~~432.393~~

FILE NO. 100H CIA RD 37
DOCUMENT: _____
FOLDER: 12 #
PAGE: _____
BOX: 2

FORM 1-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED

NOFEE
January 1953-December 1953

John H. H.

RETURN TO
AMEDIA
JOB 200-211-1111
532

UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

C/IO/1

NO.

10-4-7

DATE

31 Dec 53

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. CIO				TWB	POW: I am sorry that through an oversight the 10 Dec 53 memo to DCI attached was neither routed through nor a copy sent to you. TWB DDIP <i>int'd</i>
2.					
3. DD/P		DEC 8 53	18 Jan	CBT	
4. C.I.O					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					

SECRET

6136

31 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: [redacted]

REFERENCE: Memo to DCI dtd 10 Dec '53, same subject

1. Both [redacted] were unable to persuade [redacted] to remain in the United States. He left for [redacted] 12 December 1953.

2. As a result of his own decision, [redacted] was informed it would not be possible for NCFE to continue support of him so long as he stayed in Europe, as it is now a firm NCFE policy not to give stipends to anyone overseas. Payments to [redacted] will, therefore, terminate as of 31 March 1954.

3. All the meetings between [redacted] were entirely cordial.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief,
International Organizations Division

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

100-41193

10 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VIA: Acting Chief, International Organizations
Divisions

SUBJECT: [redacted]

1. I have just spoken to [redacted] and he reports that he and [redacted] have been unable to persuade [redacted] to stay in the United States. [redacted] gave many reasons for wishing to live in Europe. He is leaving for [redacted] this Saturday.

2. As a result of his own decision, [redacted] was informed that it would not be possible for NCFE to continue support of him so long as he stayed in Europe, as it is now a firm NCFE policy not to give stipends to anyone overseas. Payments to [redacted] will, therefore, terminate as of 31 March 1954.

3. [redacted] stated that all of the meetings with [redacted] were entirely cordial.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief
IO/Branch 1

IO/Branch 1:WPD:jb
Distribution:
Addressee - orig & 1
IO/Branch 1 - 2cc
CIO - lcc
RI - lcc

[redacted]

SECRET
Security Info

LOAN
54


UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
 (SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief/IO Division		
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	Exec. Asst. to DCI	/dr	12 Jan 54
2			
3			

<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE

Remarks: The Director has noted the attached memorandum. He indicated to me that he had seen "something else on this". Do you know what he refers to?



SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

8079

Exemption Request
5-0728

30 December 1953

Noted by DLI
11 Jan 54

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

4. The Chief, SR Division, has been made aware of this report.

Thomas W. Budden
THOMAS W. BUDDEN
Chief/IO

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL **SECRET**
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	INITIALS	DATE
1 GC/NE	JRC	JAN 4 1954
2 Mr. Thomas Braden - 1028 K. R. B.		
3 Braden - Pres.		
4 Braden with me		
5 Braden 1028 K		JAN 13

FROM	INITIALS	DATE
1 GC/NE	St/1	31 Dec
2		
3		

- APPROVAL INFORMATION SIGNATURE
- ACTION DIRECT REPLY RETURN
- COMMENT PREPARATION OF REPLY DISPATCH
- CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION FILE

SECRET

30 December 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRADEN

1. Professor Richard V. Burke of Wayne University is chairman of a small team of scholars engaged in a study of the European satellites.

2. The findings of this team are being given as the content of a course on the mid-European area. They are also, I believe, being broadcast.

3. [REDACTED]

4. As yet Burke has no definite plan for the publication of his findings. Manifestly, the kind of book which would emerge from his research would have to receive some sort of subsidy.

5. In my opinion Burke is one of the most competent, if not the most competent man in the United States in this general field of investigation. Anything he turns out will be about as good as it comes. Although I have not seen any of this most recent work, my hunch is that it will be enormously valuable to the policy-maker and us estimators when the time comes for some deep thinking and critical decisions about the European satellites.

6. I thought you might be interested in the above, and with a little poking around yourself might feel inclined to give the venture whatever kind of boost seems appropriate.

Sherman Kent

SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

* P.S. The proven way to get the best work out of a scholar is to have him know that it will be published & in normal course of events submitted to the critical judgment of his peers.

SECRET
Security Information

OWP 7643

1 December 1953


MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Current activities and behavior of [redacted]
[redacted]

REFERENCE: [redacted] 0615 (IN 37959) dated 28 November 1953

1. The reference telegram from [redacted] contains a recommendation that NCFE do what it can to prevail upon [redacted] to come back to the United States and engage himself in certain activities which may be of some use and value to NCFE. The following information was obtained yesterday from Mr. Tyler who is familiar with the background of the reference message.

2. Mr. Tyler stated that Mr. [redacted] has become somewhat concerned about the activities and behavior of [redacted]



3. Mr. Hughes, as well as the [redacted], fully appreciates that NCFE is not in a position to force the return of [redacted] to the United States. At the same time, he believes that NCFE should do

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

- 2 -


all that it can to get him out of [redacted] and he recommends that a strong invitation be extended by NCPE to [redacted] to return to the United States, and that this invitation be coupled with a statement to the effect that in view of budgetary considerations and the very marginal value of [redacted] activities in Europe, it will not be possible for NCPS to continue his stipend unless he returns to the United States and engages himself in activities more useful to the program of NCPE.

FW

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Original: C/IO ✓
cc: DCI
C/WE
C/SE

P. S.



SECRET

Security Information

29 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: The League of Free Rumanians

1. Correct title: The League of Free Rumanians.
2. The League has no offices but [redacted] is using the [redacted] address at 47 East 61st Street, New York; telephone PLaza 9-5540.
3. Its officers and executive committee are attached under Tab A.
4. [redacted] is Secretary General.
5. The League now has no offices and insofar as we know has discontinued publication of its bulletin. It is generally rumored that the organization is supported by [redacted] and it is presumed by knowledgeable people that in particular [redacted]
6. Attached is a letter from [redacted] to yourself dated 2 November 1953, your memo to Chief, SE Division and his reply, which you requested, as Tab B.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachments
Tabs A and B

CIC:TMB/eh
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IC/1
1 cc - CIS
1 cc - MI

SECRET

Lang's file on this has been in NE for 3 weeks. Do you want to go ahead with Braden?

14 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Conversation with Edward W. Barrett

1. I had a conversation with Ed Barrett on Friday, 11 December, who called to tell me about recent developments in respect to an Inter-European Radio Press Committee. He described the history of [redacted] participation, with which you are familiar, and he went on to say that the two-fold objective at present is to get some sort of cooperation among European nations for broadcasting a frank discussion of foreign affairs in each other's countries, and secondly, to enlist the same sort of cooperation for a column which would appear in various countries, perhaps including this one, written by different people and discussing each week some aspect of foreign policy differences which might exist between and among countries.

2. The idea seems to me a pretty good one. Its principal asset is that it will allow the airing and discussion of issues among nations other than by diplomatic means.

3. Barrett pointed out that he is now putting [redacted] definitely in a back seat, that he will soon come to us with a good responsible board of directors and officials. He said that he had enlisted Bob Lang's support and Bob had suggested to him that NCFE give the Institute a grant. Barrett said the Institute needs [redacted] to keep it going while it finds suitable leadership. I said that I would discuss the above with you and I would look forward to hearing from Mr. Lang.

EDWARD W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

- CIO:TWB/ah
- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 cc - SCIO, C/IO/1
- 1 cc - CIO
- 1 cc - RI

SECRET

14-00000

11 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
VIA: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (CLAND)
SUBJECT: Conversation with Lee Pennington

1. On Friday, 11 December, I had a conversation with Lee Pennington, formerly of the FBI and recently appointed director of the National Americanism Commission of the American Legion.

2. Pennington was most cordial. He showed me a letter which he had written to the members of the Americanism Commission of the Legion in which he dismissed charges against AFA based principally on an attack by Kurt Blaser. The arguments he used in his letter, he had drawn from briefings by this Agency. He thinks that this will be the end of the matter and that members of his Commission will no longer press for investigation of NARA and AFA.

3. I took this opportunity to brief Pennington thoroughly on the World Veterans Federation which the Director had previously mentioned to him and about which he had had a little information, most of it false. He had been under the impression that we were something to do with it but that it was a left-wing outfit which we were investigating. At the end of our conversation he told me that he was thoroughly satisfied with the information I gave him and that he would take two steps in accordance with my request:

a. He would notify the Ford Foundation that the Legion looked upon the World Veterans Federation as a worldwide outfit and would certainly not criticize the foundation if it were to make a grant to the organization.

b. He said he would prevent any attacks on the organization coming from Legion members by giving serious consideration. He said that this could be taken care of by referring all such attacks to the Americanism Commission for study.

THOMAS W. BLASER
Chief

International Organizations Division

CIO:TSE/eh

Orig 2-1 - Addressee

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - C/10/1

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - RI

SECRET

11 DEC 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: [] Reports

REFERENCE: Memorandum from G/10, dated 17 November 1953,
Subject as above.

The appropriate SE Branches and Staffs have read the [] report for October 1953, which you forwarded to this Division as an attachment to referenced memorandum. We have found the report well prepared and useful, both for SE Headquarters and for our field personnel working on propaganda projects. We would therefore appreciate your sending this Division two copies of subsequent [] monthly reports, one of which will be retained by IS, while the other will be sent to our []

JOHN H. RICHARDSON
Chief, SE

Attachment: 2

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

4 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO DIVISION

SUBJECT: "News from Behind the Iron Curtain" - Mail
Subscription for Mr. [redacted]

REFERENCE: a. [redacted]-1632, 20 Nov 1953
b. Memorandum to WE/PP-1 from IO/Branch I, 8 Oct 53
c. Memorandum to IOD/TCHIC from WE/PP-1, 28 Sept 53
d. Memorandum to IOD/TCHIC from WE/PP-1, 6 June 53

1. A recent dispatch from the [redacted] (reference a) reports that Mr. [redacted] is not receiving Subject publication. In light of reference memorandum b, which states that he has been on the mailing list since June 1952, it is apparent that there has been some slip-up in the distribution channels of this publication. A check of address indicates that Mr. [redacted] address is the same as given in reference d.

2. It is requested that appropriate measures be taken to insure that Mr. [redacted] will receive this publication in the future. Please inform WE/PP-1 of the action taken regarding this matter.

[redacted]
C/WE

*discussed orally / not sent
sent sterile version to
Whitney*

River End, c. Roberts Lane
W. Arlington, Virginia
4 December 1953

Dear D'Arcy:

This is in reference to your telephone call of this afternoon. I have just had a full report on the matter of the seven visitors.

I am afraid you have got yourself on the hook on this one and nothing can be done about it except to go through with the bargain you made. This bargain, the documents indicate, was to bring the seven Czechs over here and take the responsibility you assumed when you signed the seven declarations of support affidavits.

Now having gotten that bad news off my chest, I hasten to add that I do not think this is going to be burdensome to you. You are doing a real public service, as I shall explain in a moment, and all of us will do our level best to help you.

I realize that you did not think you were assuming the responsibility for seven people. It is clear, however, that everyone else thought you were, and I think it is simply too late to change it now. The Czech regime is attacking the United States for its handling of emigres; it is attacking the camps which you have seen; it is pointing up the general hopelessness of an emigre's lot and the dullness and dreariness which you have noted at first hand. This little trip of our seven friends has set all the refugee circles in Germany gossiping. It is exciting news. It is undoubtedly known behind the curtain. To call it off now would make a real difference -- not just in terms of the Crusade, but in terms of what refugees think about the United States and United States citizens.

The procedure from now on seems to lay itself out as follows: The seven refugees will arrive sometime during the month of December. This arrival date is important. NISOG has made every effort to expedite it so that they can come in December, and only overwhelming reasons ought to dictate a postponement. They will go to work and do whatever you, Clyde and Robb want them to do on behalf of the Crusade. After their work for the Crusade is over, all seven doubtless will wish to remain in the United States. We will all then jointly try to find jobs and places for them. The visas are good until next April, but if they can find jobs here it will probably be possible for us to secure special legislation for them to stay an indefinitely.

Now as to the questions you raise in your letter of November 24th. The National Committee for a Free Europe should certainly look after these people when they arrive and while they are here except insofar as they are directed by you to take up certain activities on behalf of the Crusade. The National Committee should also cooperate in trying to help you in your effort to find jobs for them when their tour is over, and I am sure the people there will do their best. I am sending a copy of this note to Whitney and I know that he will cooperate to the fullest.

As to your second question, I think the expenses of all seven ought to be paid for out of Crusade funds. They are over here on behalf of the Crusade and you are the one who asked them to come.

On the third question, as I indicated above, I think it would be a great blow to United States policies in this field if they were to turn around after their duties were over and limp back to a dusty refugee camp.

I think this is the way the whole thing ought to rest now and I do most earnestly urge you not to be too concerned about your personal responsibilities. We will all be lucky if we have to tackle no tougher problems.

Sincerely,

Mr. D'Arcy Brophy
American Heritage Foundation
345 E. 46th Street
New York 17, New York

cc: Mr. Whitney Shepardon

CIO:TWB/eh
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - Mr. Shepardon
1 cc - IO/Brl
1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RJ

SECRET
Security Information


65/1053

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Rumanian Emigre Organization

REFERENCE : Memorandum to Chief, SE from Deputy Director (Plans),
dated 5 November 1953 - Subject: Rumanian National
Council

1. In agreement with Mr. William Durkee of International Organizations Division, I share your view, as stated in paragraph 3 of the referenced memorandum, that Mr. Anthony Panuch should discuss the problem of the organization of Rumanian refugees with the ECFE rather than with this Agency. We were informed by Mr. Durkee that Mr. Panuch is fully aware of the ECFE position that the refugees should resolve their own differences before presenting a solution for the consideration of the ECFE. Mr. Durkee also informed the Rumanian Branch on 13 November that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Whitney Sheperdson who concurred in the view stated above.



JOHN H. RICHARDSON
Chief, SE

cc: C/PP
C/IO/PP
IO/PP (Mr. Durkee)
General Counsel

SECRET

SECRET

Security Information

7267

5 November 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Southeastern European Division

SUBJECT: Rumanian National Council

1. The attention of the SE Division and Messrs. Braden and Durkin is invited to the attached copy of a letter which I have just received from J. Anthony (Joe) Panuch concerning certain recent developments in the Rumanian empire situation and with

2. I believe that the addressees of this memorandum will recall the significance of Mr. Panuch and the role which he has played recently, including his visit to me of about two or three months ago.


3. As regards the proposal of further conversations between Mr. Panuch and either myself or some other spokesman or representative of this Agency, I continue to be inclined to the view that these are matters which should be taken up by Mr. Panuch with Mr. Sheppardson and not ourselves. If after consultation between the SE Division and IO Division it is agreed that this is the correct position, I should appreciate it if Mr. Braden or Mr. Durkin could talk with Mr. Sheppardson about this letter and obtain his views for my benefit. I would then be in a better position to reply to Mr. Panuch's letter -- presumably telling him that in line with my earlier advice to him, I still would recommend that he raise these matters with HCFK and not CIA. I could also add that I had been troubled by the appearance of my name in the published material referred

SECRET

Security Information

- 2 -

to above and cite this as an example of why I would prefer to stay out of the matter directly.



(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment (1)
Letter to Mr. Wisner from
Mr. Panuch dated 2 November 1953.

cc: C/PP
C/IO/PP /
IO/PP (Mr. Durkee)
General Counsel

SECRET

C
D
P
Y.

Law Office of
J. ANTHONY FARUCH
60 East 42nd Street
New York 17, N.Y.

November 2, 1953

Hon. Frank Wisner
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Confidential

Dear Frank:

Re: Romanian National Council

This is to bring you up to date on the aftermath of our conference of June 17th with respect to the above. On my return to New York I took the following steps:


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Mr. Frank Winner



With best regards,

Fsithfully,

/s/ Joe Parnock

Honorary President
DR. PETER P. HLETKO

President
PHILIP A. HROBAK
P. O. Box 100
Middletown, Pa.

Vice-President
MICHAEL BINCHAK
333 Schoonmaker Ave.
Monaca, Pa.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

PAUL P. JAMRINA
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.

JOSEPH G. PRURA
205 Madison Street
Passaic, N. J.

JOHN J. SIROTHAK
610-613 Lincoln Tr. Bldg.
Scranton 8, Pa.

DR. JULIUS JANJI
311 W. King Street
Owaso, Mich.

STEPHANIE O. HUSEK
Georgian Court College
Lakewood, N. J.

Vice President
JULIA KRAJCOVIC
1645 W. 15th Street
Chicago 8, Ill.

Recording Secretary
FRANCIS HRUBOVKY
10810 Buckeye Road
Cleveland 4, Ohio

Secretary-Treasurer
FRANK J. GURCAR
4786 Baptist Road
Pittsburgh 27, Pa.

ADVISORY COUNCIL
MICHAEL J. VARGOVICH
National President
First Catholic Slovak
Union of U. S. A.

HELEN KOCAN
National President
First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Union

FRANK BOBUS
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol

STEPHEN J. TKACH
National President
Penn. Slovak Union

GARRIELA E. VAVREK
National President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union

JOHN ROZBORIL
National President
Slovak Catholic
Cadet Union

The Slovak League of America

A Cultural and Civic Federation of Americans of Slovak Descent

Organized 1937 in Cleveland, Ohio

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

PHILIP A. HROBAK
P. O. Box 100
MIDDLETOWN, PA.

October 31, 1952

Mr. Kurt Glaser
1717 - 30th St., N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

Dear Mr. Glaser:

I have read your article on Radio Free Europe - THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO "FREE EUROPE" - and I must say that it agrees with the facts as I know them. It is regrettable that such knowledge or information cannot get to the masses of the American public. I have visited the State Department and the National Committee for a Free Europe several times during the past two years to apprise them of the situation, but it seems they do not choose to do much about it. I had my information directly and indirectly from Slovak refugees in Germany and Austria...and London.

In December, 1951, the ASSOCIATION OF SLOVAKS IN GREAT BRITAIN, sent a "Memorandum" to the Nat'l Committee for a Free Europe in New York stating, in effect, the very things your article contains. The personnel of RFE in Munich was given in toto. At that time 51 program editors were employed by RFE - 29 Czechs and 2 Slovaks (renegades). Of the 29 Czechs employed - 27 were SOCIALISTS of one brand or another! The Memo mentions who they were...and I still have that list. Should you want to use it, you are welcome to it.

I have long been convinced that it is not in the ~~interests~~ interests of America or other free countries to employ pseudo-~~experts~~ experts and left-wingers in the RFE, the Voice of America or in other governmental agencies. I simply would not trust them. Your article reveals the candidates in RFE or used by the RFE and I certainly would recommend its publication. I, for one, certainly would!

Sincerely,


P. A. Hrobak

S t a t e m e n t .

I read with attention and interest the article "The 'Garcia First' boys in Radio 'Free Europe'", by Mr. Kurt Blaser. Having no documentation on hand in order to verify all particular affirmations contained in this article, I can express my entire adhesion as to its general line. I lived in Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1946 and I know the policy of the "National Front" Government in Prague at that time from my personal experience.

In order to understand the Marxist tendency of some present politicians grouped in the so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia", it is necessary to point out that the Czech National Socialist Party of Mr. Beneš, Mr. Zenkl, Mr. Ripka, Mr. Stran-sky, etc. formed, on June 25th, 1945, the "Front of Working People" with the pro-Communist Social Democratic Party of Mr. Pierlinger, Mr. Lauschman and Mr. Major and with the Communist Party of Mr. Got-twald. That "Front" constituted the closest ring of socialist solidarity and common action within the "National Front" Govern-ment composed of two more parties: the Czech Catholics and the Slovak Democrats. /See the article "Let us say the truth!", by Dr. Michal Zibrin, former Deputy of Slovak Democratic Party in Prague Parliament, published in "Jednota", on October 29th, 1952, Middletown, Pa. /This ring of the three Czech socialist parties is responsible for the evolution in the policy of Czechoslovakia until February 1946.

The Government of the "National Front", of which Mr. Zenkl was then Vice-Premier, Mr. Ripka Minister of Foreign

Congress; Mr. Secretary; Minister of Justice; Mr. Parnell; Deputy to
 the ILO, or similar agency; and labor groups in Czechoslovakia.
 In 1948, Mr. Parnell was a member of the Presidency of the Slovak
 National Council in Bratislava. I visited a great deal that year
 being created in North-Slovakia, Bratislava/Oravon. I met two of
 my friends who were working there as political prisoners and
 I managed to speak with them.

At about that time, Mr. Jan Parnell published in America
 his book, "Czechoslovakia"/International University Press, New York/
 On page 120 he says: "The so-called Bolshevik danger, a bogey for
 many nations, was taken calmly in Czechoslovakia, because the
 latter was free of every vestige of feudalism and its democracy
 was so all-embracing and successful, that there remained no class
 whose dissatisfaction could lead to the acceptance of Communism
 as a possible remedy for it."

At the very time, when the "National Front" Govern-
 ment was alluring Slovak and Czech patriots by mostly Communist
 People's Courts and by imprisoning them in "Labor camps", Mr.
 Parnell was playing in the USA the role of the White Washer of Communism.

For all these **Gentlemen** would like to change their tone.
 But the testimony of Czech Communists themselves are convincing
 them of double dealing. But the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia"
 is infected even now by "fellow-travellers", it has been proved
 by the "hearings" before the Subcommittee to investigate the
 administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal
 Security laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
 Senate, 85th Congress, First and Second Session on Espionage

activities of personnel attached to Embassies and Consulates under Soviet domination in the United States. July 9, 1951-February 5 and 7, 1952. United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1952-10.97249.

On page 7 one can read the testimony of Mr. Joseph Ignac Kolnár, agent of F.B.I. Speaking of Mr. Erwin Kunk, former organizer of Czech Red Espionage network in USA, Mr. Kolnár said:

"He /Mr. Kunk/ told me that we had a very-well-organized underground movement which was giving them a lot of headaches, more than the National Council for Free Czechoslovakia, with its political prestige and its chairman, Peter Zenzl.

"We are not afraid," he said, "of Zenzl and his organization because we have there our men who even hold higher positions and we can render them harmless whenever we wish."

The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia", against a strong opposition of anti-Communist Czechs and Slovaks, has been recognized by the National Committee for a Free Europe as a representative body of Czech and Slovak refugees. In this quality, it is a recruiting office for the personnel of the Radio "Free Europe".

Washington D.C. November 1952

Joseph A. Miličević

former diplomat of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague /1935-1939/
former Chargé d'Affaires of Slovakia in Madrid /1940-1944/
former Counsellor of the Presidency of the Slovak National Council in Bratislava 1944-1946/.

Radio Europe 'Houses Reds'

Station Got Millions From Americans

By Dr. John B. Crane

Frankfurt, Germany.

"You would do well to make an investigation of Radio Free Europe," a prominent Washington lawmaker advised me a few weeks ago as we were having tea together near Heidelberg.

"I have just returned from Munich," he continued, "where I inspected both the facilities of the Voice of America and of Radio Free Europe. I was much impressed with the Voice of America set-up and find they are doing a very good job.

"But when I called at the plant of Radio Free Europe I got such a frosty reception I could hardly believe it. They tried to be polite but were obviously delighted when I left. I figured maybe they had heard of my vigorous anti-Communist campaign when I ran for re-election."

Makes Headlines

Within the past month at least three other visiting American officials have tipped me off that I ought to investigate Radio Free Europe. The climax was reached today when a Washington investigator suddenly appeared at my apartment for a chat and casually announced he was headed for Munich. When I inquired why, he replied:

"I want to inspect Radio Free Europe."

During the past week Radio Free Europe has twice made headlines in leading German periodicals. One important weekly paper, the Rheinischer Merkur, devoted an entire page to the problem of Radio Free Europe.

70 Millions from Americans

American readers will doubtless remember with what high hopes this radio broadcasting station was started two years ago under the sponsorship of outstanding private American citizens such as Gen. Lucius D. Clay, former American Military Governor in Germany.

The purpose of the new broadcasting station was to send programs behind the Iron Curtain to Poland, Czechoslovakia and other satellite countries to encourage them to hold out against their Communist Governments.

Millions of Americans welcomed this new weapon in the cold war against communism and contributed 70 million dollars for its support, according to the German press.

Anti-German Propaganda

The money was to be spent not only for building and equipping a broadcast station, but also for financing the escape of refugees from countries behind the Iron Curtain and giving them jobs at the new station in Munich.

Now come leading articles in the German press charging that Radio Free Europe is heavily infiltrated with Communists and that pro-Communist, anti-German propaganda is being fed to countries behind the Iron Curtain.

The well-known German weekly, Christ Un Welt, states that seven members of the Czech Department of Radio Free Europe have recently been arrested on suspicion of espionage, while one member, after working for several months, was found to be a Communist agent and fled over the border into Czechoslovakia with important personal records of Czech emigrants' families.

'Saw the Light'

The German paper names names and places. For example, it charges that the executive editor of the Czech Division of Radio Free Europe, Pavel Tigríd, was editor of an illegal, Communist paper in 1937, known as Hallo Noviny.

It charges, further, that during the German occupation of Czechoslovakia Tigríd co-operated closely with an important Communist leader, Fucik, who had become editor of the Communist paper Hude Pravo. Tigríd was a contributor to the Communist Central Party organ when the war ended in 1945.

Shortly thereafter, however, he "saw the light" and fled to Germany as a refugee. Soon he was executive editor of the Munich radio station fighting communism.

Demand Shake-Up

The German paper further mentions the name five other prominent employees of Radio Free Europe who were, earlier, Communist Party members or who today have close relatives in important Communist Party posts in Czechoslovakia.

The Germans are demanding a drastic reorganization of Radio Free Europe. This seems to be on the point of being realized. It is reported that 25 employees of the organization have already resigned, and that Executive Editor Tigríd (also Paul Dietrich) has submitted his resignation.

It is to be hoped that the "housecleaning" now in progress will put an end to the many ugly rumors that have been floating around about Radio Free Europe for the last several months.

SLOVAK NEWSLETTER

[The body of the document contains several columns of text that are extremely faint and illegible due to the quality of the scan. The text appears to be organized into multiple columns, typical of a newsletter or newspaper page.]

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry should be supported by proper documentation and that the books should be kept up-to-date at all times. The text also mentions the need for regular audits to ensure the integrity of the financial data.

In the second section, the author details the various methods used for recording and summarizing financial information. This includes the use of journals, ledgers, and trial balances. The text explains how these tools help in identifying errors and ensuring that the accounting system remains balanced.

The third part of the document focuses on the classification of assets and liabilities. It describes how different types of resources are categorized based on their nature and the way they are used in the business. This classification is crucial for providing a clear picture of the company's financial position.

Finally, the document concludes by discussing the role of the accountant in providing reliable financial statements. It stresses that the accountant must exercise a high degree of care and honesty in their work to ensure that the information presented is accurate and useful for decision-making.

The second part of the document continues the discussion on the practical aspects of accounting. It covers the process of adjusting entries at the end of an accounting period to ensure that all revenues and expenses are properly recorded. The text also touches upon the preparation of financial statements, including the balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows.

The third section of this part deals with the analysis of financial data. It explains how ratios and trends can be used to evaluate the performance of a business over time. The author provides examples of common financial ratios and discusses their significance in assessing a company's financial health.

The final part of the document discusses the ethical responsibilities of accountants. It highlights the importance of adhering to professional standards and maintaining the highest level of integrity in all professional activities. The text also mentions the role of regulatory bodies in overseeing the accounting profession.



23 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 cc - IO/BrI
- 1 cc - CIO
- 1 cc - RI

D R A F T

SECRET

19 October 1953

Jamming of western broadcasts to Russia began sporadically in 1948 and was well established by early 1949, first against VOA then also against BBC. Satellite language program jamming began first from Russian stations and then from jamming stations located in the Satellites proper. When RFE transmissions began in 1950, the organization and equipment were available for the new target.

At the present time, the organization for jamming - including the transmitters, the monitoring stations to watch for the undesired programs, and the control network to direct the jammers to the target - is apparently integrated throughout the Bloc, with a certain amount of cooperation between countries. That is, programs directed to one Satellite country may be jammed not only from within the country but from Russia and from neighboring Satellites.

At least some of the jammers are closely controlled so that efforts to evade them by changes in frequency or schedules are frequently met by a prompt reaction on the part of the jammer -- within a minute or less.

The extent of integration of the total Bloc jamming system makes it very difficult to separate the effort contributed within the Satellites. However, it is presently estimated that about 900 transmitters are in the jamming effort within the Bloc, and these appear to be fairly well distributed throughout the total of the frequencies that are being used at any given time. Therefore, at times when RFE is broadcasting to the Satellite countries with a considerable number of frequencies, there are undoubtedly hundreds of transmitters jamming these frequencies.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET INFORMATION

D R A F T

19 October 1953

The effectiveness of the jamming is difficult to assess quantitatively from the few available observation locations within the Orbit and from the fan mail received. However, in general, it is apparent that jamming is most effective in large cities: approaching 100%. In rural areas, the picture varies from time to time and from place to place, but it appears that a considerable proportion of the programs to the Satellites can be received. For example, the RFE monitor in Vienna reported that, at that location, the medium frequency Czech broadcast from Holzkirchen on 719 kc was practically 100% jammed while only about 50% of the shortwave Czech programs were not intelligible. The Embassy in Warsaw reported in May that while VOA programs were unintelligible, RFE programs were "often intelligible."

SECRET
SECRET INFORMATION

15 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: [] Information []

1. Subsequent to Mr. Durkee's memorandum to you of 1 September 1953, which we discussed this morning, I learned that Mr. Dulles discussed with Mr. Shepardson the need for the information as to the []. Very likely this conversation was held pursuant to your own talk with the Director.

2. In any event, we have received precisely the information requested by the Inspector General in a memorandum of 6 October, and I have forwarded it to Win Scott.

3. I think your effort has been successful.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addresse
1 cc - IO/SrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

15 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

REFERENCE: Letter from [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] has had the following relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency and National Committee for a Free Europe:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Signed, THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment

Suggested reply
to reference. *see Chrono*

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Security Information

0074

14 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Vienna Conference with Ambassador Joseph Flack

1. On 2 September, representatives of RFE and VOA met with Ambassador Joseph Flack and solicited his comments on reported unrest in Poland, and the utility of RFE and VOA Polish broadcasts.

2. With reference to internal disturbances and partisan activities, Flack stated that there have been "absolutely none" in recent weeks, and added that earlier reports of unrest following the June uprisings in East Germany were proved to have been without foundation as a result of relatively unrestricted survey action then taken by numerous representatives of U. S., British and French diplomatic missions in Poland. He expressed his conviction that there is no significant underground organization in Poland which might be considered as an immediate asset by the West, and emphasized his belief that serious disturbances would not occur as long as the present Soviet control mechanism retains its power and the Soviet armies in Poland and East Germany go unchallenged. The bitter lessons of World War II, particularly the abortive Warsaw uprisings, and lack of confidence in the Polish emigration definitely discourage active resistance. The Poles increasingly tend to resent the action of the emigre leaders, regarding them essentially as symbols of failure, and, Flack feels, will undoubtedly develop new leaders from within the country when the time comes for action.

3. Flack carefully distinguished resistance as an immediate asset from resistance as a potential asset. He expressed the belief that the Catholic Church still offers the strongest and the best organized base of resistance in Poland as it is looked upon as the only symbol of continuity and solidarity with the past. To this he added his own appreciation for traditional Polish spirit of independence and Christian orientation, and emphasized his belief that Polish hatred of Russians and communists continues to mount. Unfortunately, similar sentiment persists with reference to Germany. Fear of German occupation or seizure of Polish territory continues to play a prominent part in Polish thought and is cleverly utilized by the Communist government in its propaganda effort.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

4. Flack expressed certain misgivings with reference to the character of RFE and VOA broadcasts, emphasizing his conviction that Western radio broadcasts should do nothing to compromise the position of the Catholic Church in Poland, always taking as guidance the attitude and statements of the Polish clerical leaders themselves. He strongly urged that all possible steps be taken to maintain the present volume of broadcasts into Poland as a means of preserving hope and belief in the inevitability of Soviet communism's collapse.

/s/
[Redacted]
Executive Secretariat, DC/P

Attachment

SECRET
Security Information

25 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT TO DCI

SUBJECT: Attached Letter from William H. Smyth

With reference to the second paragraph of the attached letter, the following information will answer the question:

Mr. Smyth's statement before the House Committee on Foreign Relations was reprinted by the National Committee for a Free Europe. It appeared in "Progled", a monthly mimeographed newsheet, which is published in Serb, Croat and Slovene, and contains statements etc. made regarding Yugoslavia by prominent leaders, reprints from articles on Yugoslavia etc. It has a limited distribution (2-300) to Yugoslav emigres in this country, and its purpose is to keep the Yugoslav emigration in this country informed. It is indicated in the newsheet that the statements reprinted therein do not reflect the views or opinions of NCFE.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
 (SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DD/P 5288
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P		
2			
3	CIO - 1028-K		
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO	TWB	25 Sept
2			
3			

- APPROVAL INFORMATION SIGNATURE
- ACTION DIRECT REPLY RETURN
- COMMENT PREPARATION OF REPLY DISPATCH
- CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION FILE

Remarks: The attached reply was received from Mr. Shepardson in response to my request for them to study prospects for broadcasts to the Baltics. Reference your letter of 30 July to C.D. Jackson.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

5788

September 14, 1953

917-1

Dear Mr. []:

A short time ago the question was asked of us whether NCFE would recommend the extension of RFE broadcasting to the Baltic states. The question was made the subject of several papers which were prepared for, and circulated to, and thereafter discussed at three meetings of the NCFE policy committee.

Following these discussions, the NCFE position is as follows:

Broadcasts of the RFE type (i.e. the type to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary), directed at the three Baltic countries, would be plainly advantageous to the United States in terms of NCFE's objectives. There are even stronger arguments for starting such broadcasts at once than there were for starting them two years ago. However, now, as during the 1951 discussions, the problem arises whether such broadcasts -- (Voices of Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) cannot -- without damage to diplomatic usage -- be handled by the Voice of America. The fact that Soviet occupation of the Baltic nations has never been recognized by the Government of the United States would appear to remove the restraints under which the Voice of America must operate where the local government has an American diplomatic mission accredited to it.

If the Voice of America can transmit Voices of Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, we would not want to compete with them and would consider it preferable that they should do the job with the whole prestige of the non-recognition policy of the United States Government behind them. If we knew for certain that the Voice was not going to handle the task (which would be a different one and in addition to what we believe to be their present transmissions in the Baltic languages) then we would add the Baltic nations to the list of unfinished business to which RFE must direct its attention whenever sufficient resources become available.

However, sufficient resources are far from being available at the present time, and, urgent as are the needs of the Baltic listening audience in the present period of fermentation of freedom throughout the satellite area, our first task must necessarily be to hold the audiences we already have in the face of the electronic war that is being waged against our transmissions by enemy jamming. RFE's original budget for 1953-54 was based on an orderly program to maintain present gains in the three main targets (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

Page 2

Mr. [redacted]

917-1

and to develop our present security capabilities in Bulgaria, and the lesser targets of Romania, and Albania. The original budget cut of about [redacted], now followed by a second cut of [redacted], make it doubtful if RFE can even maintain full audience-reaching capabilities to all of its main target areas, let alone maintaining the security capabilities to the other targets mentioned above. Indeed, the RFE Board of Trustees will probably vote on September 15th (i) not to expand Bulgarian broadcasts, (ii) to shorten Romanian broadcasts, and (iii) to eliminate broadcasts to Albania.

[redacted]


[redacted]

Conclusion:

[redacted]


Page 3
Mr. [redacted]
017-1

SECURITY INFORMATION



NCRE does not recommend the extension of RFE broadcasting to the three Baltic states.

Sincerely yours,




September 18, 1953

Memorandum for Messrs. Joseph B. Phillips
William Durkee
Thomas Braden ✓
George Morgan
Abbott Washburn

The attached memorandum is self-explanatory and was written to me by Mr. Jackson while he was away on vacation.

Could someone--perhaps Mr. Phillips--let us know when it has been decided how David will be handled?

Many thanks.


Marie McCrum
Secretary to C. D. Jackson

Attachments

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1953

Miss McCrum:

I have a feeling that no one on our side is prepared to keep a firm hand on the Jean Paul David trip.

David is himself a king-size free wheeler. Although he is unquestionably one of the French "doers," as opposed to "talkers," in this field, he is also quite a big-mouth and inclined to over-talk, over-promise and over-indulge in cloak-and-dagger stage setting. If he hasn't got a guard, armed to the teeth, with a beret and a half-burned cigarette glued to his underlip, lurking outside the dining-room, he can't enjoy his meal.



I would suggest that you show the attached to Abbott Washburn, George Morgan, Tom Braden and/or Bill Durkee, and Joe Phillips (also this note) and suggest that they work out who should consider himself responsible. I personally hope Joe Phillips will be willing to take it on.

Incidentally, 

She might conceivably be drafted as chaperone for this trip.

C. D. J.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

COPY

SECURITY INFORMATION

The following is from a dispatch written by Mr. William Tyler, dated 22 June 1953.

1. After a recent conversation with Jean Paul David, at which time he outlined his activities and ideas in connection with the mission with which he is charged by Georges Bidault, I received a letter from him.

2. It will be seen from this letter that David is most anxious that the report which he will make on his survey should represent, without committing any one country, a synthesis of the views and the resources of the Western powers allied under NATO, in the broad field of propaganda and psychological warfare designed to build support for Western defense policy and to promote the achievement of the objectives of these policies.

3. It occurs to me that a difficulty which we have to face, and which we are probably unique in having to face, is due to the organizational structure within which we operate officially in the general field under discussion. In a country like Italy, for example, it is possible for David to have exchanges of views with high officials of the government and to feel reasonably sure that even though such views are not to be taken as a commitment, they do in fact represent the disposition of the government in question, or any government likely to succeed it, toward these problems. In our case, however, it seems to me that it will require careful preparation to determine with whom David should consult and to work out a constructive position which will influence his report and his recommendations in a direction which we approve.

4. It is particularly difficult for me to make specific recommendations, since developments in Washington in the last few months are difficult to keep up with from overseas. It would, therefore, be particularly helpful to have headquarters' views at this stage on the following points, assuming that David will go to the States in late September on the last leg of his survey:

a. With whom should he meet for basic discussions. (It occurs to me that a suitable body, if still in existence, would be the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.)

b. Within what limits at this time are we prepared to discuss the problem of concerted action for the psychological strength of the North Atlantic Community.

5. As headquarters is aware, C. D. Jackson knows David personally, and it would perhaps be useful to arrange for conversations with him and any group he might have in mind. It is true that the position of David is anomalous, since the survey on which he is engaged, [redacted] is of the most official

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

kind possible. As headquarters has pointed out, his interests in his present mission in reality pertain more to the State Department and NATO than to us, and it seems to me that we should not be in the direct line of fire except in the capacity of individual observers or participants in the conversations he will have. It would, therefore, seem to be all the more important that we arrive at a clear understanding among ourselves as to how David's trip to the States will be organized and what is to be the respective role of the component elements in the psychological effort with regard to his survey.

/S/ WILLIAM TYLER

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

ATTACHMENT #1

(TRANSLATION)

Translation of Letter from Jean-Paul David

June 19, 1953

My dear Bill,

You know that - probably toward the end of September - I am to leave for the United States on a mission entrusted to me by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Bidault is concerned - and justly so, about the problems connected with the objectives of my survey; and my desire is to produce a realistic report since I wish to avoid (you know my way of thinking) the traditional phraseology which generally takes the place of action.

To date, in Italy, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway .. I have successively conferred with the Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Defense, of the Interior, of Education. I have also sometimes met with the Chiefs of Staff, and specialists of information and of psychological warfare.

To all of them, I have said:

"Mr. Bidault has requested me to make this survey and you have before you the text of the French note which speaks for itself and seems to require no further comment. I want to ask you to state, in writing and without in any way committing your Government or your particular services, what solutions seem reasonable. I wish to gather all constructive ideas on this matter. Your ideas will be useful, perhaps, to other countries - even if you think them inapplicable in your own. Then, I shall make a synthesis of the reports so assembled - adding thereto the thoughts of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in this respect. And, at the (NATO) 'Conference of the 14' at the end of October, we shall have available a program on the basis of which constructive action can be taken."

There, in telegraphic style, is my argument. I should add that everywhere I found an excellent welcome, everyone accepted this method and promised me substantial reports.

But, if in small or medium-size countries, I have encountered no major difficulties, I have no idea of the way of thinking of your compatriots on such matters. And this note is for no other reason than to ask you to express your thoughts, in view of the excellent advice you can give me.

I want to emphasize that, in my mind, the reports and suggestions gathered from all the specialists of all the ministries of any particular country will not commit any country in any way. I will name no one, compromise no one. I want to gather the sum of the ideas and resources of the Atlantic Community in this domain and add a few personal ideas which seem workable.

That is why, my dear Bill, I ask for your contribution as I would like to carefully prepare this trip across the Atlantic. Please forgive this long letter. Tell me what you think of all this.

s/ Jean Paul David

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

4-6653

16 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Whitney Sheperdson Phone Call to You of Yesterday,
15 September, Concerning Forced Labor

1. The central facts in this business are as follows:

a. NCFE had a letter sent to the President of the United States signed by various individual exiles expressing their gratification to the United States Government for its "initiative in placing as an item for the agenda of the 8th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the matter of 'Evidence of Existence of Forced Labor', . . ."

b. At this Division's direction the Department of State was asked to prepare an answer to this letter for the President's signature which NCFE could publicly exploit in cooperation with the United States Mission to the United Nations.

c. Late Friday afternoon this Division was informed by the Department that no answer could be forthcoming as the U.N. Delegation had decided not to push the forced labor matter at this time. NCFE was informed to this effect the same afternoon and again on Monday by this Division.

d. Because its letter was not being answered, NCFE erroneously assumed that the work it was doing on forced labor in cooperation with the U.N. Delegation was to be of no avail and in fact that it was the decided policy of the United States Government not to force this issue at this or any other time.

e. The net effect of this matter is as follows:

(1) The Department of State will draft an answer for the President's signature which will be transmitted to Secretary of State, Dulles for his personal approval after consultation with Ambassador Lodge. The approved answer will then be transmitted to President Eisenhower for his signature. Public exploitation

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

SECURITY INFORMATION

of the letter by NCFE will be undertaken on the guidance of the United States mission of the United Nations. In the meantime, NCFE will continue to work with the United States Mission to the U.N. but the timing and use of the materials developed by NCFE is to be determined by the United States Delegation.

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief,

International Organisations Division

SECRET

TOP SECRET
4-5514

8 September 1953

TOP SECRET
10-5755-08

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


- 2 -



Frank G. Wisner

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Encl (1)



*detached 9/11 and
filed in RTIP's files*

cc: C/PP

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

5589

11 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PP

SUBJECT: Recent conversation with [redacted]

REFERENCES: [redacted]

Acw

1. I am returning to you the original of the Reference a. memorandum for the file. Mr. Wisner asked whether you had shown your copy of this memorandum to Mr. Braden -- he thinks that both Mr. Braden and Mr. Durkee should see it.

[redacted]

BJJ
BJJ

Attached:
Ref. a. memorandum.

SECRET
Security Information

jk

SECRET
Security Information

25 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of ICFTU Developments

The attached extracts from RFE's Daily Guidance Bulletin are evidence of the day to day coverage that RFE is giving to ICFTU decisions. In addition we are setting up an arrangement whereby RFE will have continuing liaison with a member of the special committee appointed by the ICFTU. Through this channel we hope to supply RFE with documentary material on workers' conditions in the satellites and to insure also that the line taken by RFE toward labor issues is not in conflict with the ICFTU position.

CORD MEYER, JR.
Deputy Chief
International Organizations Division

DCIO:CM/mf

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee via
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - DCIO
1 cc - RI

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of ICFTU

The following extracts of RFE's Daily Guidance Bulletins indicate the general guidance around which more complete coverages are prepared for broadcastings:

Daily Guidance 554, June 30, 1953, Page 2, Paragraph d:

Concerning forthcoming conference of ICFTU, attention is called to Christian Science Monitor of June 24, reprinted in today's Information Bulletin, and to Report on America #13. "American Labor's Wide Horizons" as published on June 26.

Daily Guidance 560, July 9, 1953, Page 4, Last two lines:

Remarks by George Meany, president of American Federation of Labor, before Stockholm meeting at International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, in addition to expressing the philosophy of free workers toward less developed areas, should have a special significance to our listeners at this stage of their struggle against Soviet colonialism. Meany declared that freedom to colonial peoples and inhabitants of protectorates was something democracies must take steps to insure as soon as possible. The Federation (ICFTU) should see to it that workers in such territories enjoyed trade-union organization liberty.

Daily Guidance 573, July 28, 1953, Page 3, Paragraph c:

As far as East Germany is concerned, most significant news is vote by International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to set up a fund "to support insurgent unions in East Germany and other satellite countries in their efforts to undermine communist control". George Meany, President of AF of L, predicted that substantial sums would be made available but "declined for obvious reasons" to say how they would be spent.

Meany's announcement would seem to be an event of major significance in which all target areas should be equally interested.

Latest reports on East German purge receive most of their meaning from fact that a faction presently losing out is said to be composed of communists who - - while not at all disloyal to the Kremlin - - are not Muscovites in the sense in which the victors are Muscovites. Chances are that all communist functionaries who did not spend the last war inside Russia are in danger of their jobs or, as the case may be, of their lives.

Human interest stories on recipients of food aid speak for themselves. However, emphasis might well be on fact that recipients are either primarily or exclusively unemployed workers - - and that communists deny the existence of unemployment.

SECRET

SECRET
- 2 -

SECURITY INFORMATION

Daily Guidance 590, August 20, 1953, Page 2, Paragraph f:

Note that ICFTU followed up on its promises reported here and created special fund for support of Soviet Zone workers.

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

17 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Food Program for Eastern Europe

1. This proposed program supports a plan for limited food distribution to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.

It is generally agreed that it is highly desirable honestly to attempt food distribution through regular open channels, before utilizing any unusual method such as balloons, even though it is highly ~~desired~~ the offers to distribute food will be accepted. It is further felt that no food program of any kind should be commenced unless it is certain to culminate in actual deliveries.

2. Formal Offer: A group [redacted]

[redacted] would be formed, which would in turn make an offer of a definite amount of food to representatives of the satellite governments of Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, the Department of State would be requested to take up the food offer officially with representatives of the governments concerned. [redacted]

The food offer of the committee, taking note of the official statements indicating that a food shortage exists in each of these countries, would propose the establishment of an international commission to supervise the distribution of food to the needy children of the areas involved. This food would come from U.S. surplus stocks and through contributions made by the sponsoring organizations.

3. Delivery of Balloons: In event of refusal by the satellite regimes of the food offer, the committee might turn to the American Heritage Foundation for help. The latter would be asked to utilize its primary project, the Crusade for Freedom, both in raising public funds and delivering food by balloons.

Crusade for Freedom (MCFE)

A. Capabilities:

1. The Crusade can deliver 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 lbs. of food by way of 200,000 to 400,000 balloons into Czechoslovakia,

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Hungary and Poland over a period of two to three weeks;

2. The Crusade can deliver 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 lbs. of food in 400,000 to 600,000 balloons into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland over a period of five to six weeks;

Capabilities (1) and (2) above, are possible within the time periods indicated only if U.S. military facilities and equipment for the necessary procurement and stand-by storage

[redacted]

If such storage facilities, etc. are not available, the time periods must be revised for (1) and (2) above to two months and three months respectively;

3. First balloon launching could commence within sixty days of project authorization;

4. Each food package, suspended to one balloon, would contain five lbs. of staples. (sugar, fat, flour, coffee, chocolate) Packages will be sealed and/or wrapped with polyethylene.

B. Costs:


1. Costs of operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland would be approximately [redacted] per net pound of food delivered, or a total figure of [redacted] for each 1,000,000 lbs. delivered.

2. Costs of operation into Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and Baltic areas would be greater, due to added technical factors, necessity of shipboard launchings, etc. The unit cost figure would be [redacted] per net pound delivered.

C. Operational Considerations:

1. If delivery of food into satellite areas is considered feasibly, realistically sound, then entire operational effort must be centered at launching -- delivery of food in the shortest period of time. Counteraction to the impact of food deliveries will be immediate and sustained to include "tampering" with food packages, wholesale arrest, BW charges bolstered by staged photography.

2. Launching sites previously used by the Crusade for Freedom for balloon operations into Czechoslovakia were located [redacted] For launchings into Poland and Hungary, [redacted] [redacted] respectively, would be the most operationally satisfactory.



D. Psychological Considerations:

1. Most recent estimates indicate that the harvest in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland will be fair to average this year. Consequently, it would be a mistake to send food into these areas simply to alleviate a "desperate shortage" which might not in fact exist for workers in good standing. Rather, as a part of NFE's accompanying program exploitation, the population would be urged to conserve the packages as "iron rations" or "strike rations" against the day when they might not otherwise be able to afford absenteeism or loss of wages for other reasons.

2. One of the gravest risks to any food delivery program of this kind, especially should its launching interval be in excess of two weeks, is the systematic poisoning of food parcels by the communists. The only really effective way of safe guarding against this is by anticipating it and pre-conditioning the people, via NFE, against contaminated efforts.

3. During the time when, and at the places where the food is packaged, the Crusade should arrange for supervision of such packaging by acceptable humanitarian/religious international groups, such as the Quakers or the Red Cross, in order to neutralize EC charges and augment the longfides of the committees and Crusade for Freedom.

4. The initial private and official offers of food to the satellite areas must be accompanied with certain conditions ensuring guarantees of delivery, in order to avoid communist acceptance of a bare food offer as such, which would place us in the awkward position of having to subsequently request guarantees for proper distribution and delivery.

5. Type of KFE "running attack" during balloon operation is well illustrated by the following -- 'Czech workers would have to work 6.2 hours to earn enough money to buy one average pound of food parcels contents, whereas the American worker could earn the [] per net lb. delivered in 1.2 hours.'

D. Conclusions:

1. The operation is large and the resultant psychological gains and losses, depending on many variables, could be extensive. Needless to say, the operation should not be undertaken, even in part, as a 'gesture' or on a 'gamble'.

2. Balloons are not the most economical means of delivering food, in point of fact, the movement of items by balloon is at least twice as expensive as any regular means. However, to date, balloons are by far the most feasible way of diffusing a relatively large amount of food containers into an otherwise denied area.

3. Planning of the operation in all its phases should include the Director of RFE, in order to ensure a well coordinated political warfare program.

E. Recommendations:

It is requested that should authority be given to proceed on this balloon-borne food program, such authorization be contingent on the following recommendations:

1. That the commencement of the balloon launching be generally planned for the end of this year.

2. That no more than 400,000 balloons be released (2,000,000 lbs. of food) at a cost of approximately []

3. That the balloon launching phase of the food delivery operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, not exceed ten full consecutive days from its date of commencement.


4. That [] be made available immediately for preparatory work.

5. That food deliveries into Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and the Baltics not be considered until after the primary operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland has proved successful.

SECRET

EO 3-2117

Executive Session
4-39-20



22 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations

I had a talk with Spencer Phenix about NCFE matters and the following points were discussed.


(1) A Strategy Board to guide RFE. Spencer feels the need for some higher level political guidance than RFE is getting from their staff people and talked about getting together a board of people like George Kennan, etc. I told Spencer that I thought it unlikely that George would give very much time to this but might be willing to give them an occasional idea or suggestion.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(4) He suggested that it would be well to have a meeting here with some of the members of the Board and the Executive Committee and suggested a date around the first week in August. I told him I would do it if I had not already left the country by that time.

[Redacted]


ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

cc: DD/P

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

2001953

Executive Registry
3-6124

12 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed U.S. Aid for East German Refugees

1. Last year you testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in support of the U.S. "iron curtain escapees" care-resettlement program, and during the course of testimony I understand you stated that the program excluded aid to ethnic groups such as Germans in accordance with PSB recommendations.

2. Mr. George Warren (UNA/Refugees) of the State Department has proposed that \$300,000 be made available from his program for aid to selected East German refugee projects.

3. This proposal is being made as a gesture of aid to East Germans and has the support of HICOG, of James Reber, and of Representative Celler of New York, among other Congressmen. John Bross, CZZ, has no objection.

4. Frank Hand in my office is the liaison point; is following this closely, and will keep me thoroughly informed but I thought, in view of your testimony, you would want to know of the projected policy switch.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Security Information

22 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations/Branch 1

SUBJECT: Coordination of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation

1. As both you and Mr. Slonick agreed in your informal conversation of yesterday, the present explosive situation in the satellite periphery and the Interia Psychological Strategy Board guidance on its exploitation necessitate closer cooperation between our respective facilities and branches. I want to thank you for offering to make it possible for us to gain further access to RFE libraries and open sources and for your offering us further technical assistance. I agree that it would be desirable to exchange a Branch officer so that we may have a better understanding of our respective assets and problems. SR/1 will provide one of your associates with a desk and complete access to our files at any time.

2. It may be well for us to discuss how we can best take advantage of further demonstrations and riots in the satellite areas. Should there be an uprising in Poland, for example, it may be desirable for RFE to place broadcasting time at the disposal of Radio Liberation so that the latter may address concentrated and repeated appeals to the Red Army not to fire on Polish workers and peasants, not to interfere in the Polish struggle for freedom, and to consider the Polish people as the allies of the Soviet people in their common struggle against Communism. It was this line that Radio Liberation followed during the East German uprisings. In the event of riots in Czechoslovakia where the Red Army is not present in force and where the satellite security forces may be unable to keep order, close cooperation will be even more desirable.

3. Consideration could be given to having RFE allot Radio Liberation regular time on its broadcasts to Poland and Bulgaria where there are large concentrations of Soviet troops so that Radio Liberation can further build up the idea of a free, Soviet anti-Communist moral and political authority and to express the solidarity of the Soviet peoples with the oppressed countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Radio Liberation could also allot regular time on its transmitters so that spokesmen of free Czechoslovakia and Poland could address the Soviet troops.

4. It will, of course, be necessary to discuss the divergent approaches of the two stations. Because of its sponsorship, its identity and its mission, Radio Liberation cannot treat the Soviet oppression of the Central and East European peoples in terms of nationalist domination and exploitation. Radio Liberation always distinguishes between the people on the one hand and the Party and Police on the other, and it is our policy to identify the Red Army with the people. ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

5. He will maintain close coordination on all matters relating to Radio Liberation broadcasts to the occupation troops and solicit your comments and suggestions on our broadcasts to the USSR proper and on all other matters.

ANDRE YEDIGAROFF
AC/LR/1

2 - Addressee
1 - C/IO

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

100-221363

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: Branch One

SUBJECT: General [redacted]

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE to IO, dated 16 July 1952, Subject as above

1. Although not initially responsible for recommending that the NCFE [redacted] in referenced memorandum SE Division [redacted] the continuation of payments by the NCFE to Subject on the basis of his ability to aid in research work being done for CIA at the Pentagon, as well as of his need as a meritorious exile. We have recently been advised by Miss Stern of your office that the NCFE wishes to discontinue this payment since Subject does not participate directly in the NCFE's activities. We have been further advised that if SE Division wishes [redacted]

[redacted]

2. It is believed that termination of the [redacted] by the NCFE will result in real personal hardship to [redacted] who, at the

[redacted]

Neither can this Division justify continuation of payments on the basis of work performed for SE, since he has been working primarily for the Department of the Army during the past year. The arrangements for his work at the Pentagon are such, however, that CIA can place research requirements on [redacted] whenever desirable.

3. In reviewing the case this year, we have ascertained from the Department of the Army that Subject has worked diligently and contributed materially to the work of his office. He has been particularly commended for his adaptability and readiness to work, which have shown themselves in his efforts to learn English and typing.



4. It is the opinion

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

- 2 -



Acting Chief, CS

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

4805

7/23 F.G.W. saw
but decided
to take no
action.
Bjm

22 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Message from Whitney Shepardson

1. Whitney Shepardson cabled the following to his office with the request that they immediately give it to C. D. Jackson. This information and message was given to us today by Spencer Phenix.

Condon asks that if such theme is used "Give our boys a break so they can prepare and push home with background and variation."

Signed: THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division



SECURITY INFORMATION

21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Meeting with PSB

1. I understand that two of the matters that have come up before your PSB luncheon are:



CIO:TWA/eh
Orig - Addressed
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - W.


SECRET


THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief


International Organizations Division


STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL


July 21, 1953











MESSAGE ON LEAFLET

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS! HEAR THE MESSAGE WHICH COMES TO YOU TODAY FROM THE FREE WORLD!

THE SOVIET UNION IS GETTING WEAKER!

THE PEOPLES OF THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES ARE GROWING STRONGER!

The Soviet Union is getting weaker. The struggle for Stalin's heritage shakes the entire Soviet empire and fear creeps through the Kremlin. Who will fall with Beria and who will fall after Beria? How many millions will fall victims to the new purge which is now going to begin - the biggest purge which the Soviet Union has ever known?

How many victims will fall in the Soviet Union and how many in the occupied countries? Who will fall with Beria in Prague and who will be dragged down by his fall in Bratislava? Who will be the new Slansky and who the new Clementis? And when the purge spreads and broadens, down from the Politbureau to the lands and districts, to the offices and the factories - how many functionaries will safely survive?

Only those will survive who detach themselves from the sinking Communist boat in time. Only those who join the people and help the people's struggle against the oppressors.

The Soviets have trapped themselves in a blind alley. If the Moscow boot weighs even heavier on the necks of the oppressed people and if Moscow's demands upon the frightened puppet governments become more pressing, the resistance of the people will only grow: for the people will not return into submission. If the Communist regimes, in order to appease the wrath of the people, try to bribe their subjects by promising concessions - as in Hungary and in Eastern Germany - they will get nowhere: for the people will no longer be deceived by pious concessions.

The people are growing stronger. The first flames of revolt have flared out in Czechoslovakia and in Eastern Germany. From Pilsen, from Moravska Ostrava, from Oslavany, from Berlin, Dresden and Magdeburg the echo of this revolt has roared throughout the world and deeply shaken the entire Soviet realm: the people showed their strength.

The Communist regimes recognized the menace and became afraid. They started apologising. They started self-criticising. They started giving promises. In Germany the anti-labor decrees had to be revoked. In Czechoslovakia the frightened government was forced to desist from applying the penal laws concerning absenteeism. In Moscow, under the influence of the news of the peoples' revolt in Czechoslovakia and Germany, the internal struggle became sharper. Beria and his all-powerful police fell as victims. Your resistance has helped

to alter the course of history: new forces made their appearance on the battlefield, the people won their first major victory in their fight with the regime.

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS!

The more your oppressors are shaken by uncertainty, the greater is the certainty of your victory. The regime is afraid of you, it knows that power is fundamentally on your side. This is the time when people's unity, common agreement, and unity of purpose are capable of winning concessions. Your battlefield of labor is in the factories and in the fields. On this battlefield of labor you have the advantage of numbers. On this battlefield you cannot be vanquished. You will not be content with bribes, you will ask more and more from the exploiters. Do not presume to give you orders nor to give you advice. You and your new leaders who are being born in the struggle know best how and where to strike. But we want you to know that you are not alone: Among the masses of people behind the Iron Curtain the fire of revolt is smoldering and its sparks are flying from country to country. Everywhere in the free world your friends are with you. Their help will grow as your determination grows.

FREE EUROPE!

14-00000

MESSAGE ON BANKNOTE

On one side:

Czechoslovaks, know this:

The regime is weaker than you have dared to think!
Power lies with the people and the people stand opposed.
With unity and courage, organize your strength: Down
with the collective! Insist on workers' rights! Today
demand concessions; tomorrow - freedom!

On other side:

Men call this the hunger crown - gift of the Soviet
Union. It is the symbol of regime desperation, of
five-year failure: It is a challenge to fight, to meet
weakness with strength, to resist as you know best.

The other captive peoples are uniting and will join you
in your struggle.

The free world is with you!

All power to the people!

RFE LS 7-24-53

CAESAR INFO WALKER BY MICHIE

OUR VIENNA BUREAU YESTERDAY REPORTED FOLLOWING BALLOON REACTION:
QUOTE SEVEN MEN FROM PARDUBICE SAID THAT ALL LAST WEEK PEOPLE
WERE JUMPING LIKE FROGS TO CATCH THE LEAFLETS AS THEY CAME DOWN.
MANY PEOPLE WORE THE COINS AROUND THEIR NECKS. MANY SOLDIERS
WERE CHECKED OUT FROM THEIR ARMY UNITS TO COLLECT THE LEAFLETS.
SOME REFUGEES SAID ALSO THAT IN PILSEN BIG PLANES TOOK OFF EVERY
HOUR FROM THE AIRPORT TO SHOOT DOWN THE BALLOONS. THERE WERE
NO REPORT NO LEAFLETS AND NO REPORT TO BALLOONS IN THE BUDENOVICE
AREA IT WAS REPORTED. NEVERTHELESS ALL THE GENDARMERIE INTERVIEWED
THE POPULATION TO SEE IF THEY HAD SOMEHOW OBTAINED ANY. ALSO THE
POSTMEN HAD ORDERS FROM THE GENDARMERIE TO ASK EVERYBODY ALONG
THEIR POSTAL ROUTES IF THEY HAD ANY LEAFLETS. UNQUOTE

TO CAESAR FOR WALTER M. MICHELLE

RADIO WARSAW JULY 20 0700 HOURS QUOTE BALLOON ACTION. AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS HAVE LATELY LAUNCHED IN WESTERN GERMANY A CAMPAIGN AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA - THE DAILY RUDE PRAVO STATED IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED QUOTE A CAMPAIGN CONDEMNED TO FIASCO UNQUOTE. FROM AUSTRIA SMALL BALLOONS CONTAINING DENOUNCING LEAFLETS HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED IN THE DIRECTION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE ACTION - AS ANNOUNCED BY THE MUNICH SLANDER-STATION FREE EUROPE - WAS LED BY AMERICAN EXPERTS WHO CAME TO WESTERN GERMANY FOR THAT INTENTION. IT IS A FACT SAYS RUDE PRAVO THAT BALLOON EXPERTS HAVE NOT SPAVED THE LEAFLETS. DURING TWO DAYS TIME CZECHOSLOVAK CITIZENS HAVE BROUGHT HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF LEAFLETS TO SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND NATIONAL COMMITTEES. CZECHOSLOVAK WORKING MASSES ARE DEEPLY INDIGNANT AT THIS DISHONEST PROVOCATION OF WARMONGERS UNQUOTE.

RADIO WARSAW JULY 22 0700 HOURS QUOTED THE NOTE SENT BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY. THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT SENT A NOTE TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN PRAGUE IN WHICH IT PROTESTS VIOLENTLY AGAINST SPREADING ON CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORY SOME LEAFLETS, CALLING FOR ANTI-STATE ACTIVITY. THE NOTE STRESSED THAT THE PROVOCATIONS HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND CARRIED OUT BY AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO ARE STAYING IN THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION ZONE IN WESTERN GERMANY UNQUOTE

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS SERVICE

July 26, 1953

The following report is one of the first full attacks on the recent "Prague Operation" in Czechoslovakia. The text was read over Radio Prague on July 18, 1953:

We are going to read to you now an article from today's Radio Prague. The article is called "An Action Doomed to Failure". What is the peace policy of the Soviet Union and of all the countries of the camp of peace, the conviction that a war can be prevented grow stronger among the people all through the world. Naturally, this evolution creates a great concern with those for whom war constitutes a source of immeasurable gains and of a luxurious life. Therefore the warmongers do their best to put obstacles in the way which leads towards the lessening of international tension. In Korea the part of the provocateurs and saboteurs of the peace effort was given to Syngman Rhee. In Germany recruits were used, recruited from the ranks of Nazi war criminals in the democratic sector of Berlin as well as in some other parts of the German Democratic Republic. And after the failure this much heralded day, there comes the hypocritical and demagogical offer to help to the population of the DDR, which was made for obvious propaganda reasons which, in fact, was admitted by the Western bourgeois press.

Into this chain of provocations which are aimed against the strengthening of peace there also belongs the American propaganda action which was started in the last days in Western Germany against Czechoslovakia. In a similar way in which two years ago the ill-famed "Crusaders for Freedom" were doing it, today again balloons dispersing inflammatory leaflets over our territory are being sent from the Bavarian side.

The Munich transmitter Free Europe, financed by Ford and similar "institutions" speaks boastfully of the propaganda balloon action which, allegedly is the biggest action of this kind which ever has been attempted and for the direction of which there came to Western Germany specialists from America.

We can indeed certify that the balloons specialists did not spare the leaflets in the first two days tens and hundreds of thousands of those leaflets are with our police and our national committees where they are being brought by our citizens after having been discovered. The farmer Hajek from Doubravice, district of Cesky Brod, brought an entire parcel of leaflets which came down in one piece. Josef Korinek from Zatec brought an entire balloon which fell down. The leaflets are being brought by the workers of the Vladimir Lenin works as well as other factories, by farmers, railwaymen and children. Yet even if the balloon action was not only four times bigger - as Free Europe says - but hundred times bigger than the Crusade action of 1951, it will bring to its initiators the very opposite of what they had in mind.

With words of justified anger our citizens came with the leaflets and they are especially offended by the fact that one of the leaflets is some kind of a facsimile of the new Czechoslovak crown stamped on both sides by inflammatory words. Our citizens hold in esteem the new crown which is firm and valuable and has a great purchasing power which helped us to get rid of rationing and, therefore, with sharp and often crude words they criticize that its image had been misused as the basis for printing big lies concerning the government of our republic and the USSR.

The second leaflet is propagating the Fascist provocations which took place on seventeen June in the German Democratic Republic. When those provocations ended by failure, their organizers ordered that they should be used at last for the printing of leaflets with pictures, demonstrating the bandits of Berlin in action; as they are starting fires or indulging in provocations, etc.

Those pictures belong into the series of the photographs which the Nazis throatcutters used to take while they were starting fires in the occupied countries, in the Ukraine, in Cracow, in Lidice. It is quite natural that this, too, can only create disgust towards those who have started this criminal action. Besides, the pictures of the Fascist provocations in Berlin are no sensational news for us, as the directors of the balloon action obviously imagine. Similar pictures were published not long ago in our Svet Prace. It demonstrates the absolute political shortsightedness which when people mentioned it is described as stupidity of the organizers of the balloon action who think that they could influence our people by leaflets one side of which constitutes a glorification of hatred and of the attack against peace which was to take place on 17th June in Berlin.

In vain is the part of the defender of Czechoslovak working people - and this will always be the same - assumed by those, from whose actions there emanates the wish to start a new murderous war which is not wanted by any honest working citizen whatever be his political or his religious opinion. This provocation clearly demonstrates how the USA reactionary circles plan the lessening of international tension.

It is a gross heresy just at the time when the people of the entire world are looking forward with hope towards the possibility of a truce in Korea, when with confidence they are following the peace policy of USSR, aiming at the peaceful settlement of all disputed international questions.

Therefore, the balloon action was met with sharp condemnation on the part of our people. The balloon specialists would certainly not like to hear what the people say when they bring the leaflets to the SNB and to the National Committees. It is worth noticing that even such people who so far did not find an active attitude to the socialist development express their surprise about the means the West is employing. And all our people are deeply offended by the latent violating of the independence of our State territory. They are surprised by the great amount of stupidity of the people

who thought that they will achieve anything by the balloons. True, the Crusaders of Freedom in the West are losing more and more possibilities for conducting enemy activity on the territory of our Republic. On the frontiers of our country there stands a vigilant guard which breaks all the attempts of their agents and so they must be contented with the balloon action which our people overtly laughed at and which they condemn.

They openly say that the entire action was a kind of jesterism which not even Hitler dared to commit at the time of the greatest hatred campaign against Czechoslovakia. When they are bringing the leaflets which they had found to the security organs and to the administrative organs, they ask that the action should be publicly condemned.

This spontaneous disgust concerning the balloon action demonstrated in which complete isolation, lack of information and ignorance of the real thinking of our working people do live the mercenaries of Free Europe which is the patron of this action. Free Europe even broadcast, while propagating the balloons, some kind of poor poetry in which one says, that "Always all the good things were coming from above" and that our people knew this".

Yet our people have got a longer memory than Free Europe believes. They will remember what good came to them from above from the West; that it was the bombs which on the eve of the end of the war were murdering women and children in peaceful residential quarters of Prague and Pizen and which destroyed the Pizen Skoda Works and the Prague Kolben Works in order to make our reconstruction more difficult. Later we were getting from above, from Western Germany a flood of the Colorado beetle which was supposed to bring us misery and starvation, and they know very well what American pilots are bringing from above to the women and children of Korea.

And one more coincidence: One of the boxes with leaflets which was found near Brezce in the Pizen Region carried the inscription Munchen and also with the name of Munich are connected for every citizen the memories of the worst time of our nations: the memories how in reality looks the love of the so-called friends of our people.

In fact the organizers of the ridiculous and stupid balloon action spent their dollars for balloons, paper and metal stamps carrying the emblem of Free Europe which are also being spread. They can hardly expect any thanks on the part of their employers because the result is exactly the contrary of the expected. True, a few business men finally got their pockets full but otherwise the action was doomed to failure from its very beginning. This action blown up by Free Europe deflated soon just as its balloons.

413 / 7-

RFE / 7-21-53

PRENIX LANG WALKER GRIFFITH FM CONCOR
FOLLOWS RADIO PRAGUE ANNOUNCEMENT 0510 TODAY RE NOTE ON BALLOONS.

"THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS SENT THE FOLLOWING NOTE TO THE
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES ON JULY 20, 1953:

DURING THE PAST DAYS BALLOONS WERE SENT TO CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORY
WITH LEAFLETS OF A NATURE DESIGNED TO INCITE DISCONTENT OF THE
POPULATION AND TO ENCOURAGE ANTI-STATE ACTIVITIES. THIS NEW ATTEMPT
TO INFLUENCE THE CZECHOSLOVAK WORKING PEOPLE WITH PROPAGANDA MEANS OF
SO PRIMITIVE A LEVEL, UNDERSTANDABLY MET WITH INDIGNANT RESISTANCE,
THAT THE ENTIRE ACTION
WAS PREPARED AND CARRIED OUT BY AMERICAN CITIZENS SENT FOR THIS
PURPOSE TO GERMANY, TO GERMAN TERRITORY UNDER US OCCUPATION ADMINIS-
TRATION. IT IS THEREFORE A NEW INSTANCE WHERE THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT ABUSED ITS POSITION AS AN OCCUPATION POWER TOWARDS ENDS
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FOUR POWER AGREEMENT ON GERMANY, WHICH BINDS
THE UNITED STATE TO CARRY OUT THE OCCUPATION ACCORDING TO THE BASIC
TENET THAT GERMANY IS NEVER AGAIN TO BECOME A THREAT TO WORLD
PEACE AND ITS NEIGHBOURS.

14-00000

A
ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACT WHICH MAKES THIS DEVIATION OF BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PARTICULARLY OBJECTIONABLE IS THE FACT THAT IT TOOK PLACE AT A TIME WHEN THE NATIONS OF THE ENTIRE WORLD ARE INCREASING THEIR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE PEACE AND ASSURE PEACEFUL COOPERATION.

THE AIM OF THIS PROVOCATIVE ACTION, ORGANIZED UNDER THE PROTECTION OF US OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES IS TO INCREASE THE POLICIES OF THE SO-CALLED COLD WAR AND TO PREVENT A LOOSENING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION.

FOR THESE REASONS THE GOVERNMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA DECISIVELY PROTESTS AGAINST THIS ACTION AND ASKS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO FURNISH INFORMATION ON THE STEPS TAKEN TO PREVENT SIMILAR PROVOCATIONS AIMED AGAINST PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OF NATIONS, REPRESENTING CRUDE INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL CZECHOSLOVAK AFFAIRS."
END NSC

14-00000
Czechoslovakia July 25, 1953

Czechoslovakia

Balloon operation

The "Continuity of the Week" quotes an article from "Radio
Pravo" dealing with the preparation for "Y-Day". It lies
broadcast from abroad, no balloon operation can deny the
fact that the plan for "X-Day" which had been prepared for
5 years failed with the Berlin plot.

The weekly program "Uncle from Slovakia" tells to ridicule
and underestimate the significance of the balloon operation.
This program was broadcast by Radio Bratislava in Slovak
dialect. It tells the story of the "Uncle" who found some
of the crowns which had been put into the balloons on the
real and of course immediately recognized that they were
only the imitations of the real crowns. Next day he entered
the tobacconist's shop and when paying said to sales girl
accident the crown he had found on the table. She only laughed
and told him he could not get anything for that crown but
has to pay with real Czechoslovak currency.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs' Note to America Legation

REFERENCE: Memo dated 21 July 1953 - Subject: "Czech Reactions to Balloon Operation"

1. The Czech Desk of the Department of State is preparing an answer to the Czech note which will generally disclaim any U.S. Governmental responsibility for the balloon operation. The VOA is being instructed to brush off the Czech note and to cite it as another example of the regime's attempt to prevent the Czech people from getting the truth.

2. RFE will not comment on the note except to report the U.S. reply as a news item, but will comment on the *Ilumina* editorial taking the line the Czech Government can't let its people know the truth and also speculating on how many Czechs did not turn in their pamphlets.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief,
International Organizations Division

C-IO/Branch 1/WPD/mhj

Distribution:

Addressee - orig & 1
C-IO/Branch 1 - 2
CIO - 1
RI - 1

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (FIASO)

SUBJECT: Czech reactions to balloon operation

1. Attached are Czech reactions to the balloon operation including the text of a note from the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered today to the American Embassy in Prague.
2. Radio Free Europe has been instructed not to comment upon this note until directed.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment: 2/3

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Follows Radio Prague announcement 0510 today re note on balloons:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent the following note to the Embassy of the United States on July 20, 1953:

During the past days balloons were sent to Czechoslovakian territory with leaflets of a nature designed to incite discontent of the population and to encourage anti-state activities. This new attempt to influence the Czech working people with propaganda means of so primitive a level, understandably met with indignant instance, that the entire action was prepared and carried out by American citizens sent for this purpose to Germany, to German territory under U.S. occupation administration. It is, therefore, a new instance where the U.S. Government abused its position as an occupation power towards ends incomparable with the four power agreement on Germany, which binds the U.S. to carry out the occupation according to the basic tenet that Germany is never again to become a threat to world peace and its neighbors.

Another important factor which makes this new violation of basic principle of international law particularly objectionable is the fact that it took place at a time when the nations of the entire world are increasing their efforts to strengthen the peace and assure peaceful cooperation.

The aim of this provocative action, organized under the protection of U.S. occupation authorities is to increase the policies of the so-called cold war and to prevent a loosening of international tensions.

For these reasons the Government of Czechoslovakia decisively protest against this action and asks the Government of the U.S. to furnish information on the steps taken to prevent similar provocation aimed against peaceful co-existence of nations, representing crude interference in internal Czech affairs."

SECRET

C O P Y

MUNICH RFE 20 - JULY 20, 1953

PLEASE NOTE THAT TODAY'S PRAVDA CARRIED REPRINT OF MAJOR PORTION OF RUDE PRAVO BALLOON EDITORIAL, INCLUDING MENTION OF RFE, UNDER TITLE: "LEADER OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE TO THE PROVOCATORS AND SLANDERS". UNITED PRESS CARRIED STORY OF RUDE PRAVO EDITORIAL UNDER VIENNA DATEDLINE JULY 18.

END

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS SERVICE

July 20, 1953

The following report is one of the first full attacks on the recent "Balloon Operation" in Czechoslovakia. The text was read over Radio Prague on July 18, 1953:

We are going to read to you now an article from today's Ruce Pravo. The article is called "An Action Doomed to Failure". Thanks to the peace policy of the Soviet Union and of all the countries of the camp of peace, the conviction that a war can be prevented grew stronger among the people all through the world. Naturally, this evolution creates a great concern with those for whom war constitutes a source of immeasurable gains and of a luxurious life. Therefore the warmongers do their best to put obstacles in the way which leads towards the lessening of international tension. In Korea the part of the provocateur and saboteur of the peace effort was given to Syngman Rhee. In Germany bandits were used, recruited from the ranks of Nazi war criminals in the democratic sector of Berlin as well as in some other parts of the German Democratic Republic. And after the failure this much heralded day, there comes the hypocritical and demagogical offer to help to the population of the DDR, which was made for obvious propaganda reasons which, in fact, was admitted by the Western bourgeois press.

Into this chain of provocations which are aimed against the strengthening of peace there also belongs the American propaganda action which was started in the last days in Western Germany against Czechoslovakia. In a similar way in which two years ago the ill-famed "Crusaders for Freedom" were doing it, today again balloons dispersing inflammatory leaflets over our territory are being sent from the Bavarian side.

The Munich transmitter Free Europe, financed by Ford and similar "institutions" speaks bombastically of the propaganda balloon action which, allegedly is the biggest action of this kind which ever has been attempted and for the direction of which there came to Western Germany specialists from America.

We can indeed certify that the balloons specialists did not spare the leaflets in the first two days tens and hundreds of thousands of those leaflets are with our police and our national committees where they are being brought by our citizens after having been discovered. The farmer Hajek from Doubravice, district of Cechy Brod, brought an entire parcel of leaflets which came down in one piece. Josef Korinek from Satec brought an entire balloon which fell down. The leaflets are being brought by the workers of the Vladimir Lenin Works as well as other factories, by farmers, railwaymen and children. Yet even if the balloon action was not only four times bigger - as Free Europe says - but hundreds times bigger than the Crusade action of 1951, it will bring to its initiators the very opposite of what they had in mind.

14-00000

-2-

With words of justified anger our citizens come with the leaflets and they are especially offended by the fact that one of the leaflets is some kind of a facsimile of the new Czechoslovak crown stamped on both sides by inflammatory words. Our citizens hold in esteem the new crown which is firm and valuable and has a great purchasing power which helped us to get rid of rationing and, therefore, with sharp and often crude words they criticize that its image had been misused as the basis for printing big lies concerning the government of our republic and the USSR.

The second leaflet is propagating the Fascist provocations which took place on seventeen June in the German Democratic Republic. When those provocations ended by failure, their organizers ordered that they should be used at last for the printing of leaflets with pictures, demonstrating the bandits of Berlin in action; as they are starting fires or indulging in provocations, etc.

Those pictures belong into the series of the photographs which the Nazis throatcutters used to take while they were starting fires in the occupied countries, in the Ukraine, in Cracow, in Lidice. It is quite natural that this, too, can only create disgust towards those who have started this criminal action. Besides, the pictures of the Fascist provocations in Berlin are no sensational news for us, as the directors of the balloon action obviously imagine. Similar pictures were published not long ago in our Svet Frace. It demonstrates the absolute political shortsightedness which when people mentioned it is described as stupidity of the organizers of the balloon action who think that they could influence our people by leaflets one side of which constitutes a glorification of hatred and of the attack against peace which was to take place on 17th June in Berlin.

In vain is the part of the defender of Czechoslovak working people - and this will always be the same - assumed by those, from whose actions there emanates the wish to start a new murderous war which is not wanted by any honest working citizen whatever be his political or his religious opinion. This provocation clearly demonstrates how the USA reactionary circles plan the lessening of international tension.

It is a gross heresy just at the time when the people of the entire world are looking forward with hope towards the possibility of a truce in Korea, when with confidence they are following the peace policy of USSR, aiming at the peaceful settlement of all disputed international questions.

Therefore, the balloon action was met with sharp condemnation on the part of our people. The balloon specialists would certainly not like to hear what the people say when they bring the leaflets to the SMB and to the National Committees. It is worth noticing that even such people who so far did not find an active attitude to the socialist development express their surprise about the means the West is employing. And all our people are deeply offended by the latent violating of the independence of our State territory. They are surprised by the great amount of stupidity of the people

who thought that they will achieve anything by the balloons. True, the Crusaders of Freedom in the West are losing more and more possibilities for conducting enemy activity on the territory of our Republic. On the frontiers of our country there stands a vigilant guard which breaks all the attempts of their agents and so they must be contented with the balloon action which our people overtly laughed at and which they condemn.

They openly say that the entire action was a kind of provocation which not even Hitler dared to commit at the time of the greatest hatred campaign against Czechoslovakia. When they are bringing the leaflets which they had found to the security organs and to the administrative organs, they ask that the action should be publicly condemned.

This spontaneous disgust concerning the balloon action demonstrated in which complete isolation, lack of information and ignorance of the real thinking of our working people do live the mercenaries of Free Europe which is the patron of this action. Free Europe even broadcast, while propagating the balloons, some kind of poor poetry in which one says, that "Always all the good things were coming from above" and that our people knew this.

Yet our people have got a longer memory than Free Europe believes. They will remember what good came to them from above from the West; that it was the bombs which on the eve of the end of the war were murdering women and children in peaceful residential quarters of Prague and Plzen and which destroyed the Plzen Skoda Works and the Prague Kolben Works in order to make our reconstruction more difficult. Later we were getting from above, from Western Germany a flood of the Colorado beetle which was supposed to bring us misery and starvation, and they know very well what American pilots are bringing from above to the women and children of Korea.

And one more coincidence: One of the boxes with leaflets which was found near Eperce in the Plzen Region carried the inscription Munchen and also with the name of Munich are connected for every citizen the memories of the worst time of our nation: the memories now in reality look the loss of the so-called friends of our people.

In fact the organizers of the ridiculous and stupid balloon action spent their dollars for balloons, paper and metal stamps carrying the emblem of Free Europe which are also being spread. They can hardly expect any thanks on the part of their employers because the result is exactly the contrary of the expected. True, a few business men finally got their pockets full but otherwise the action was doomed to failure from its very beginning. This action blown up by Free Europe deflated soon just as its balloons.

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft Note to Czechoslovak Government

Verbatim Text

Following is text note for transmission FOMONY in reply to its note July 20.

Begin text. The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with reference to the Ministry's Note of July 20, 1953, concerning the release of balloons from the US Zone of Germany has the honor, upon instructions of the US Government, to make the following reply:

The balloons apparently in question were not released by any official agency of this Government but by the Crusade for Freedom, an organization established by private American citizens. The US Government has ascertained that the balloons were released for the purpose of communicating with the people of Czechoslovakia.

It is a fundamental conviction of the American Government and people that free communication between peoples constitutes a principle upon which the very life of the international community should be founded. If any government attempts to erect a wall sealing off its people from contact with the outside world, it is inevitable that ways will be found both by the people inside that country and by the peoples of other countries outside to penetrate that artificial barrier and maintain some line of contact with one another. The use by those outside of such media as balloons confirms that the Czechoslovak Government has created a barrier interfering with free communication. The US believes that the best assurance that this means of communication will not be used is to obviate the need for it by permitting what is natural and necessary in the modern world, namely, free contact between nations and the free exchange of information and ideas.

As for

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

As for the content of the message carried to Czechoslovakia by this medium, it is understood that they contained information on current developments in Central and Eastern Europe and in addition various statements focusing on the idea of "freedom". There would be no reason for a government to be disturbed about the principle of freedom in a message to its people, if conditions of freedom actually existed in that country. One cannot readily believe that the Czechoslovak Government would even raise this issue with the US Government if the fundamental freedoms were observed in Czechoslovakia and if the Czechoslovak Government were not now especially concerned about the attitude of the people toward the absence of those freedoms.

The US Government cannot agree that the transmission of these messages to the people of Czechoslovakia from the territory of the US Zone of Germany by the Crusade for Freedom Committee involved any misuse of the position of the US as an occupying power. Such communication is clearly not contrary to any quadripartite agreements affecting Germany. Nor does such communication violate any other international agreement to which the US Government is a signatory.

With reference to efforts to strengthen world peace the US, as is generally known, has endeavored in every practicable way to work step by step, in accordance with the deep interests of the American people in permanent peace and in cooperation with other countries, toward building an enduring structure of international peace and stability. The US seeks to help bring about a relaxation of international tension wherever there are genuine possibilities of doing so. It is recognized at the same time that true international tranquility presupposes conditions which assure human rights and fundamental freedoms for the people concerned. End text/

Cable soonest intended date delivery so press release may be issued here.

SECRET
Security Information

Follows Radio Prague announcement 0510 today re note on balloons:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent the following note to the Embassy of the United States on July 20, 1953:

During the past days balloons were sent to Czech territory with leaflets of a nature designed to incite discontent of the population and to encourage anti-state activities. This new attempt to influence the Czech working people with propaganda means of so primitive a level, understandably met with indignant instances, that the entire action was prepared and carried out by American citizens sent for this purpose to Germany, to German territory under US occupation administration. It is therefore a new instance where the US Government abuse its position as an occupation power towards ends incomparable with the four power agreement on Germany, which binds the US to carry out the occupation according to the basic tenet that Germany is never again to become a threat to world peace and its neighbors.

Another important factor which makes this new violation of basic principle of international law particularly objectionable is the fact that it took place at a time when the nations of the entire world are increasing their efforts to strengthen the peace and assure peaceful cooperation.

The aim of this provocative action, organized under the protection of US occupation authorities is to increase the policies of the so-called cold war and to prevent a loosening of international tensions.

For these reasons the Government of Czech decisively protest against this action and asks the Government of the US to furnish information on the steps taken to prevent similar provocation aimed against peaceful co-existence of nations, representing crude interference in internal Czech affairs."

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
 (SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P		
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO	TWB	4 June
2			
3	<i>file NCFE</i>		

- | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL | <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION | <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ACTION | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN |
| <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT | <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE | <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION | <input type="checkbox"/> FILE |

REMARKS:

see 2 June Chron

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
Security Information

4237

20 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/AC
SUBJECT: Zygmunt Nazoraki; Free European Press Service;
International Federation of Free Journalists.
REFERENCE: Memo to D/W/P fr C/AC dtd 19 June, same subject.

1. I have read with interest the reference memorandum which concludes with recommendations against the utilization of Nazoraki and his "organization" in connection with PR operations, including dissemination activities. It is my recollection that there had been a previous recommendation against the use of this individual and his colleagues and associates as sources of information. It is my further recollection that in part as the result of a recommendation which we received from C. D. Jackson, we recently granted a very modest (\$3500 per month) subsidy to cover a try-out period of a few months' duration.

2. Will you please advise me if I am wrong on any of my points of recollection as indicated above. If, on the other hand, my recollection is accurate, will you please prepare for my signature a brief communication suitable for transmittal to Mr. C. D. Jackson and stating, in effect, that whereas we did in fact go forward with a modest subsidy for a three (3) month period, we have now had an opportunity to re-examine this entire situation in detail, including the identity and character of Nazoraki's sources and associates, and have reached the conclusion that we have no interest or desire to continue our support and relationship with Nazoraki beyond the conclusion of the trial period.

(S) [Signature]

FRANK C. LINDSAY
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/A
C/IS ✓

Attachments:
Ref. memo and tabs.

SECRET

Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

IO, Attn: Mr. Durkee
VIA : Chief, EE
EE/EE/P

20 July 1953

Proposed Balloon Campaign in Event President Offers Food to Poland

1. With reference to our discussion of 17 July, attached hereto is a sample of the coupon which it is recommended that the Crusade for Freedom distribute by balloon from Germany in the event that a Presidential offer of food for Poland is refused by the Polish Government. This coupon reads as follows:

The bearer of this coupon is entitled to receive from the food supplies donated by Americans:

(food listed will be those specifically offered)

Stamped across the coupon are the words, "Invalid due to the rejection of the offer by The Polish 'Peoples' Republic".

2. We are advising the Frankfurt mission of this plan and requesting their estimate of the number of leaflets which they could release by balloon from the Baltic. Please advise us whether or not your printing facilities can supply the German mission with whatever number of leaflets they undertake to distribute. We, on the other hand, will advise you soonest of the number of balloons we will require from your stocks and the address to which they are to be consigned.

3. In the event that the Crusade desires to include a printed message on the reverse of the leaflet, it is requested that the text of the message be cleared either with this desk or with the German mission prior to printing.

Attachment:

ALFRED DAVIS
Deputy Chief



*see Duke's
reply 29 July
Chrono*

EE/P:EGH:ar:ms
20 July 1953
2 Addressee
1 RI
2 EE/P

16 July 1953


MEMORANDUM FOR: IO/PP
ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Braden
SUBJECT: Mr.

In January of this year I discussed with your office the



~~SECRET~~
Security Information

- 2 -



[Redacted]
Chief, EE/FI

Attachment: [Redacted]

*Read by Wiener
7/17/53*

SECRET
Security Information

16 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: RFE Report on recent [redacted]
[redacted] Meeting

1. Attached herewith, I am forwarding you a cable which has just been received in [redacted] from Munich.

[redacted]

[redacted]



Signed: THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment: a/s

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET



SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

43527
Noted by [initials]
8 August 1953

15 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Purge of Beria

Attached herewith is a guidance received by
REE on the purge of Beria.

C. L. Meyer Jr.

COLE MAYER, JR.
Deputy Chief,
International Organizations Division

Attachment

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE: PURGE OF BERIA

I BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS:

(THIS WILL BE ISSUED LATER IN MORE DETAIL AS SOON AS TIME PERMITS.)
THE FOLLOWING FACTS, HOWEVER, STAND OUT IMMEDIATELY:

1. NO PERSON OF BERIA'S RANK IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS FALLEN SINCE BERIA HIMSELF REPLACED YEEHOV IN 1938; THE PURGE COULD NOT BEING AT A HIGHER LEVEL. THE CHARGES AGAINST BERIA (OF BEING A BOURGEOIS RENEGADE IMPERIALIST AGENT WHO TRIED TO OVERTHROW THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, DESTROY THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND RE-ESTABLISH CAPITALISM IN THE USSR) ARE OF A MAGNITUDE COMPARABLE ONLY TO THOSE AGAINST THE TROTSKYITES AND THE RIGHTISTS IN THE 1920'S.

2. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION TO STALIN IS DEVELOPING MUCH MORE RAPIDLY THAN AFTER THE DEATH OF LENIN. IT TOOK FOUR YEARS FOR STALIN TO REMOVE THE RIGHTISTS. FURTHERMORE, CONSIDERING THE SHIFT TO THE RIGHT IN THE EAST GERMANY AND HUNGARY, AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS LATE AS A WEEK OR SO AGO OF "PRO-NATIONALIST" CHANGES IN TADJIKISTAN, THE DECISION IN THE STRUGGLE MUST HAVE HAPPENED ONLY WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS. BERIA'S ABSENCE (WHEN ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO WERE PRESENT) AT THE BOLSHOI THEATRE ON JUNE 28 WAS ONE OF THE FIRST PUBLIC INDICATIONS OF HIS APPROACHING FALL; THE JULY 8 EDITORIAL OF IZVESTIA, THE SECOND.

3. THE FORCES WHICH DESTROYED BERIA ARE CERTAINLY A COLLECTIVE GROUP, NOT SIMPLY MALENKOV HIMSELF. MALENKOV'S NAME APPEARS ONLY ONCE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL EMPHASIZES COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP MORE THAN EVER BEFORE.

4. THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL MARKS A NEW REVERSAL IN THE GENERAL LINE--AWAY FROM RIGHTISM AND TOWARD LEFTIST EXTREMISM, OR PERHAPS MORE ACCURATELY AWAY FROM MODERATION AND TOWARD;-- FASCIST EXTREMISM. THE SHIFT TO AN EXTREMIST COURSE IS BASICALLY IN TWO QUESTIONS:

- A. THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION
- B. AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION

IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT BERIA WAS PRO-NATIONAL MINORITY AND ANTI-INTENSIFICATION OF COLLECTIVIZATION. THE GROUP WHICH HAS REMOVED HIM IS PRO-GREAT RUSSIAN AND PRO-COLLECTIVISATION. IT IS RETURNING TO THE STALINIST LINE. WILL THE DOCTORS' PLOT BE REVIVED? THE SLANSKY TRIAL? SLANSKY-TYPE TRIALS IN THE SATELLITES?

5. NOT ONLY BERIA HIMSELF HAS FALLEN BUT THE WHOLE APPARATUS OF THE SECRET POLICE IS DENOUNCED, WILL LOSE MUCH FACE AND IMPORTANCE AND WILL BE SUBJECTED TO A TREMENDOUS PURGE, WHICH MUST SHAKE THE WHOLE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE TO ITS FOUNDATIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

5. THE PEACE OFFENSIVE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE-- BUT WILL BEYOND NOW A PURELY PROPAGANDA CHARACTER; NO GENUINE CONCESSIONS (E. G., SURROUNDING OF EAST GERMANY) WILL NOW TAKE PLACE. ON THE INTERNAL SCENE IN THE SOVIET SPHERE THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE TALK OF IMPROVING THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE PEASANTS BUT IN ACTUALITY THE COURSE WILL BE TOWARD INCREASED CAPITAL INVESTMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF CONSUMER GOODS--PARTICULARLY IN THE SATELLITE STATES.

II. GUIDANCE:

CAUTION: AS BEFORE, WE SPECULATE ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KREMLIN AND THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES BUT WE DO NOT ACCEPT ANY ONE PARTICULAR THEORY. THIS IS THE FIRST ACT OF THE POWER STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION, BUT ONLY THE FIRST ACT; THERE ARE MANY MORE AND ELUCIDATE ACTS TO COME. THE COALITION WHICH DESTROYED STALIN IS JUST AS SUBJECT TO INTERNAL DISSENSION AS WAS THE MALENKOV-BERIA-BULGACHEV COALITION FORMED AFTER THE DEATH OF STALIN. THE BASIC ANALOGY HERE IS TO STALIN'S TACTICS AFTER THE DEATH OF LENIN. FIRST HE ELIMINATED TROTSKY AND HIS LEFTISTS (THE NEW COALITION NOW ELIMINATES BERIA); THEN HE ELIMINATED THE RIGHTISTS (PROBABLY THE NEXT ACT IN THIS PRESENT DRAMA WILL INVOLVE ELIMINATION OF THE BEST OF THE COALITION BY THE WINNING ELEMENT IN IT).

A. TO THE PEOPLE:

AS THE REGIMENS BATTLE EACH OTHER EVER MORE FEROCIOUSLY, OUR PEOPLES CAN LOOK ON WITH PLEASURE AND ASSISTANCE WHILE THEIR OPPRESSORS ARE MAKING THEMSELVES WEAKER AND THEY (THE EASTERN EUROPEAN PEOPLES) ARE BECOMING STRONGER. WHEN THE KREMLIN IS WEAKENED BY DISSENSION THE SATELLITE REGIMENS ARE EVEN MORE WEAK AND PARALYZED. AND OF COURSE THE FUROR HAS JUST BEGUN. LOCAL SATELLITE COMMUNIST REGIMENS WILL BE TOO OCCUPIED WITH SAVING THEIR OWN SKINS TO BE AS TYRANNICAL AS BEFORE. THERE COULD NOT COME AT A BETTER TIME FOR THE PEASANTS AND WORKERS OF EASTERN EUROPE: AFTER EASTERN GERMAN REVOLTS AND CZECHOSLOVAK DEMONSTRATIONS, THEY NOW KNOW THEIR OWN STRENGTH AND THEIR OWN POWER. AS THEY ARE MARSHALLING THEIR FORCES, THEIR TYRANTS' STRUCTURE OF CONTROL IS CRACKING. THE EVENTUAL FATE OF COMMUNISM HAS NEVER MORE CERTAIN THAN NOW. THE REGIMENS WILL CERTAINLY TRY, AS THE KREMLIN IS TRYING, TO PRESENT A FACADE OF "MONOLITHIC UNITY." BUT YOU KNOW, AS THEY KNOW, THAT THE FACADE IS HOLLOW AND THAT THE REGIMENS, CONFUSED AND REND WITH INTERNAL DISSENSION, WILL PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE ANY ONE CLEAR AND DECISIVE POLICY. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD WARN THE PEOPLE THAT THIS SLIFT TO EXTREMISM MAY BE (IN HUNGARY IN PARTICULAR) THAT THE KREMLIN WILL ORDER ITS PUPPETS TO TAKE A MORE EXTREME COURSE THAN BEFORE (BUT HERE ALSO WE MUST WAIT AND SEE--CONFUSION NOW REIGNS EVERYWHERE). NOW IS THE TIME, IN THIS PERIOD OF CONFUSION, FOR THE PEOPLE TO SECURE THE GAINS THEY HAVE ALREADY MADE AND PRESS ON FOR MORE. IN A VERY REAL SENSE, THE PEOPLE ARE MORE THAN EVERY ACTORS ON THE STAGE RATHER THAN SPECTATORS IN THE AUDIENCE. LED BY YOUR NEW LEADERS, YOU THE PEOPLE MUST CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS IN THE COLLECTIVE FARMS AND IN THE TRADE UNIONS, IN THE WAYS YOU KNOW SO WELL, TO FORCE THE REGIMENS TO MAKE ACTUAL CONCESSIONS TO YOU.

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

D. TO THE COMMUNISTS:

THE KREMLIN IS RIGHT IN ONE POINT--THIS IS AN EVENT OF IMMENSE SIGNIFICANCE. IT PROVES ONCE MORE, AND MORE DRAMATICALLY THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE THIRTIES, THAT NO COMMUNIST CAN EVER BE SAFE. THOSE OF YOU LIKE ZAPOROZKY WHO TRIED TO HEDGE IN HIS BRATISLAVA SPEECH ON THE NATIONALIST ISSUE; THOSE OF YOU LIKE NAGY, GERG AND BATA WHO BECAME THE SYMBOLS OF THE RIGHTIST COURSE--YOU ARE SUITABLE OFFERINGS FOR THE NEW SLAUGHTER. AND THOSE COMMUNIST LEADERS WHO HAVE NOT BECOME PREMATURE RIGHTIST DEVIATIONISTS WILL NOW UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO BECOME EXTREMISTS AS FAST AS POSSIBLE--NO MATTER HOW MANY OF THEIR COMRADES THEY MUST DRAG DOWN IN A NEW PURGE. AND WHAT IS THE POINT OF TRYING TO BECOME AN EXTREMIST AGAIN? YOU KNOW THAT THE NEW SOVIET DICTATOR (REMEMBER WE CANNOT BE SURE WHO HE WILL BE, HAVING ELIMINATED BERIA, WILL NOW TRY TO ELIMINATE BERIA'S OPPONENTS. AS COMMUNISTS (SEE CZECHOSLOVAK GUIDANCE NUMBER TEN) YOU HAVE ONLY TWO CHOICES. YOU CAN AID THE PEOPLE AND SABOTAGE THE REGIME, THUS CROSSING THE "GOLDEN BRIDGE" TO SAFETY, OR -- YOU CAN FLEE. THERE IS NO OTHER CHOICE.

C. TO THE SECRET POLICE:

YOUR TURN HAS NOW COME. IF ALL THE PEOPLE THAT BERIA PROMOTED AND ALL THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE KVD IN THE USSR ARE TO BE PURGED, AS IS NOW ANNOUNCED, WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO YOUR POOR MARIONETTES IN THE SATELLITES? YOU HAVE EVEN LESS CHANCE TO SURVIVE THAN THE ORDINARY COMMUNIST. AGAIN, YOU CAN MAKE YOUR PEACE WITH THE PEOPLE OR YOU CAN FLEE. OTHERWISE, YOUR DOOM IS CERTAIN.

NOTE:

AS YOU WILL SEE FROM THE ABOVE, OUR PRESENT LINE (THE INCREASING STRENGTH OF THE PEOPLE, THE INCREASING WEAKNESS OF THE REGIME) REMAINS INTACT. CZECHOSLOVAK GUIDANCE NUMBER TEN IS ALMOST COMPLETELY INTO THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES AND MUST NOW BE IMPLEMENTED (WITH APPROPRIATE CHANGES FOR HUNGARY AND POLAND) WITH RENEWED VIGOR.

END MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

15 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Purge of Beria

Attached herewith is a guidance received by
RFE on the purge of Beria.

CORB MEYER, JR.
CORD BAKER, JR.
Deputy Chief,
International Organizations Division

Attachment

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE: PURGE OF BERIA

I BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS:

(THIS WILL BE ISSUED LATER IN MORE DETAIL AS SOON AS TIME PERMITS.)
THE FOLLOWING FACTS, HOWEVER, STAND OUT IMMEDIATELY:

1. NO PERSON OF BERIA'S RANK IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS FALLEN SINCE BERIA HIMSELF REPLACED YEZHOV IN 1938; THE PURGE COULD NOT BEING AT A HIGHER LEVEL. THE CHARGES AGAINST BERIA (OF BEING A BOURGEOIS RENEGADE IMPERIALIST AGENT WHO TRIED TO OVERTHROW THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, DESTROY THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND RE-ESTABLISH CAPITALISM IN THE USSR) ARE OF A MAGNITUDE COMPARABLE ONLY TO THOSE AGAINST THE TROTSKYITES AND THE RIGHTISTS IN THE 1920'S.

2. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION TO STALIN IS DEVELOPING MUCH MORE RAPIDLY THAN AFTER THE DEATH OF LENIN. IT TOOK FOUR YEARS FOR STALIN TO REMOVE THE RIGHTISTS. FURTHERMORE, CONSIDERING THE SHIFT TO THE RIGHT IN THE EAST GERMANY AND HUNGARY, AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS LATE AS A WEEK OR SO AGO OF "PRO-NATIONALIST" CHANGES IN TADJIKISTAN, THE DECISION IN THE STRUGGLE MUST HAVE HAPPENED ONLY WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS. BERIA'S ABSENCE (WHEN ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO WERE PRESENT) AT THE BOLSHOI THEATRE ON JUNE 28 WAS ONE OF THE FIRST PUBLIC INDICATIONS OF HIS APPROACHING FALL; THE JULY 8 EDITORIAL OF IZVESTIA, THE SECOND.

3. THE FORCES WHICH DESTROYED BERIA ARE CERTAINLY A COLLECTIVE GROUP, NOT SIMPLY MALENKOV HIMSELF. MALENKOV'S NAME APPEARS ONLY ONCE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL EMPHASIZES COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP MORE THAN EVER BEFORE.

4. THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL MARKS A NEW REVERSAL IN THE GENERAL LINE--AWAY FROM RIGHTISM AND TOWARD LEFTIST EXTREMISM, OR PERHAPS MORE ACCURATELY AWAY FROM MODERATION AND TOWARD; - FASCIST EXTREMISM. THE SHIFT TO AN EXTREMIST COURSE IS BASICALLY IN TWO QUESTIONS:

- A. THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION
- B. AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION

IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT BERIA WAS PRO-NATIONAL MINORITY AND ANTI-INTENSIFICATION OF COLLECTIVIZATION. THE GROUP WHICH HAS REMOVED HIM IS PRO-GREAT RUSSIAN AND PRO-COLLECTIVISATION. IT IS RETURNING TO THE STALINIST LINE. WILL THE DOCTORS' PLOT BE REVIVED? THE SLANSKY TRIAL? SLANSKY-TYPE TRIALS IN THE SATELLITES?

5. NOT ONLY BERIA HIMSELF HAS FALLEN BUT THE WHOLE APPARATUS OF THE SECRET POLICE IS DENOUNCED, WILL LOSE MUCH FACE AND IMPORTANCE AND WILL BE SUBJECTED TO A TREMENDOUS PURGE, WHICH MUST SHAKE THE WHOLE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE TO ITS FOUNDATIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

6. THE PEACE OFFENSIVE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE-- BUT WILL HAVE NOW A PURELY PROPAGANDA CHARACTER; NO GENTLE CONCESSIONS (E. G., SURRENDERING OF EAST GERMANY) WILL NOW TAKE PLACE. ON THE INTERNAL SCENE IN THE SOVIET SPHERE THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE TALK OF IMPROVING THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE WORKERS BUT IN ACTUALITY THE COURSE WILL BE TOWARD INCREASED CAPITAL INVESTMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF CONSUMER GOODS--PARTICULARLY IN THE SATELLITES.

II. GUIDANCE:

CAUTION: AS BEFORE, WE SPECULATE ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KREMLIN AND THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES BUT WE DO NOT ACCEPT ANY ONE PARTICULAR THEORY. THIS IS THE END OF THE FIRST ACT OF THE POWER STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION, BUT ONLY THE FIRST ACT; THERE ARE MANY MORE AND BLOODIER ACTS TO COME. THE COALITION WHICH DESTROYED BERIA IS JUST AS SUSCEPTIBLE TO INTERNAL DISSENSION AS WAS THE MALENKOV-BERIA-KOLOTOV COALITION FORMED AFTER THE DEATH OF STALIN. THE BASIC ANALOGY HERE IS TO STALIN'S TACTICS AFTER THE DEATH OF LENIN. FIRST HE ELIMINATED TROTSKY AND THE LEFTISTS (THE NEW COALITION NOW ELIMINATES BERIA); THEN HE ELIMINATED THE RIGHTISTS (PROBABLY THE NEXT ACT IN THIS PRESENT DRAMA WILL INVOLVE ELIMINATION OF THE REST OF THE COALITION BY THE RISING ELEMENT IN IT).

A. TO THE PEOPLE:

AS THE BOLSHEVIKS DEVOUR EACH OTHER EVER MORE PROMPTLY, OUR PEOPLES CAN LOOK ON WITH PLEASURE AND ASSURANCE WHILE THEIR OPPRESSORS ARE MAKING THEMSELVES WEAKER AND THEY (THE EASTERN EUROPEAN PEOPLES) ARE BECOMING STRONGER. WHEN THE KREMLIN IS WEAKENED BY DISSENSION THE SATELLITE KREMLINS ARE EVEN MORE WEAK AND PARALYZED. AND OF COURSE THE PURGE HAS JUST BEGUN. LOCAL SATELLITE COMMUNIST HIGH SHOTS WILL BE TOO OCCUPIED WITH SAVING THEIR OWN SKINS TO BE AS TYRANNICAL AS BEFORE. THIS COULD NOT COME AT A BETTER TIME FOR THE PEASANTS AND WORKERS OF EASTERN EUROPE: AFTER EASTERN GERMAN REVOLTS AND CZECHOSLOVAK DEMONSTRATIONS, THEY NOW KNOW THEIR OWN STRENGTH AND THEIR OWN POWER. AS THEY ARE MARSHALLING THEIR FORCES, THEIR TYRANTS' STRUCTURE OF CONTROL IS CRACKING. THE EVENTUAL DOOM OF COMMUNISM WAS NEVER MORE CERTAIN THAN NOW. THE REGIMES WILL CERTAINLY TRY, AS THE KREMLIN IS TRYING, TO PRESENT A FACADE OF "MONOLITHIC UNITY." BUT YOU KNOW, AS THEY KNOW, THAT THE FACADE IS HOLLOW AND THAT THE REGIMES, CONFUSED AND RENT WITH INTERNAL DISSENSION, WILL PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE ANY ONE CLEAR AND DECISIVE POLICY. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD WARN THE PEOPLE THAT THIS SHIFT TO EXTREMISM MAY MEAN (IN HUNGARY IN PARTICULAR) THAT THE KREMLIN WILL ORDER ITS PUPPETS TO TAKE A MORE EXTREME COURSE THAN BEFORE (BUT HERE ALSO WE MUST WAIT AND SEE--CONFUSION NOW REIGNS EVERYWHERE). NOW IS THE TIME, IN THIS PERIOD OF CONFUSION, FOR THE PEOPLE TO SEIZE THE GAINS THEY HAVE ALREADY MADE AND PRESS ON FOR MORE. IN EVERY REAL SENSE, THE PEOPLE ARE MORE THAN EVERY ACTORS ON THE STAGE RATHER THAN SPECTATORS IN THE AUDIENCE. LED BY YOUR NEW LEADERS, YOU THE PEOPLE MUST CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS IN THE COLLECTIVE FARMS AND IN THE TRADE UNIONS, IN THE WAYS YOU KNOW SO WELL, TO FORCE THE REGIME TO MAKE ACTUAL CONCESSIONS TO YOU.

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

B. TO THE COMMUNISTS:

THE KREMLIN IS RIGHT IN ONE POINT--THIS IS AN EVENT OF IMMENSE SIGNIFICANCE. IT PROVES ONE MORE, AND MORE DRAMATICALLY THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE THIRTIES, THAT NO COMMUNIST CAN EVER BE SAFE. THOSE OF YOUR LIKE ZAPOTOCKY WHO TRIED TO HEDGE IN HIS BRATISLAVA SPEECH ON THE NATIONALIST ISSUE, THOSE OF YOU LIKE NAGY, GERO AND BATA WHO BECAME THE SYMBOLS OF THE RIGHTIST COURSE--YOU ARE SUITABLE OFFERINGS FOR THE NEW SLAUGHTER. AND THOSE COMMUNIST LEADERS WHO HAVE NOT BECOME PREMATURE RIGHTIST DEVIATIONIST WILL NOW UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO BECOME EXTREMISTS AS FAST AS POSSIBLE--NO MATTER HOW MANY OF THEIR COMRADES THEY MUST DRAG DOWN IN A NEW PURGE. AND WHAT IS THE POINT OF TRYING TO BECOME AN EXTREMIST AGAIN? YOU KNOW THAT THE NEW SOVIET DICTATOR (REMEMBER WE CANNOT BE SURE WHO HE WILL BE, HAVING ELIMINATED BERIA, WILL NOW TRY TO ELIMINATE BERIA'S OPPONENTS. AS COMMUNISTS (SEE CZECHOSLOVAK GUIDANCE NUMBER TEN) YOU HAVE ONLY TWO CHOICES. YOU CAN AID THE PEOPLE AND SABOTAGE THE REGIME, THUS CROSSING THE "GOLDEN BRIDGE" TO SAFETY, OR -- YOU CAN FLEE. THERE IS NO OTHER CHOICE.

C. TO THE SECRET POLICE:

YOUR TURN HAS NOW COME. IF ALL THE PEOPLE THAT BERIA PROMOTED AND ALL THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE MVD IN THE USSR ARE TO BE PURGED, AS IS NOW ANNOUNCED, WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO YOUR POOR MARIONETTES IN THE SATELLITES? YOU HAVE EVEN LESS CHANCE TO SURVIVE THAN THE ORDINARY COMMUNIST. AGAIN, YOU CAN MAKE YOUR PEACE WITH THE PEOPLE OR YOU CAN FLEE. OTHERWISE, YOUR DOOM IS CERTAIN.

NOTE:

AS YOU WILL SEE FROM THE ABOVE, OUR PRESENT LINE (THE INCREASING STRENGTH OF THE PEOPLE, THE INCREASING WEAKNESS OF THE REGIME) REMAINS INTACT. CZECHOSLOVAK GUIDANCE NUMBER TEN IS ALMOST COMPLETELY INTO THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES AND MUST NOW BE IMPLEMENTED (WITH APPROPRIATE CHANGES FOR HUNGARY AND POLAND) WITH RENEWED VIGOR.

END MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

IO/branch 1

NO.

DATE

15 July 1953

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. C/P		15 JUL 1953	17	CTB	<p>Tom -</p> <p>Thanks - This suits me great. What does State think? The messages are stronger than what I thought State would buy - BUT -</p> <p>Good -</p> <p>Tracy.</p> <p>How was your trip - let's exchange early next week.</p> <p>Tracy</p> <p>4-26-53</p>
2. C/10				TRB	
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

SECRET
Security Information

Executive Registry
4-3475

15 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: RFE - Balloon Operation

Attached herewith is the story of the balloon operation and an early report of what happened.

Carl Meyer, Jr.

CARL MEYER, JR.
Deputy Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment: a/s

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

FOLLOWING RELEASED LOCALLY TODAY: RELEASE FROM PARIS FREE EUROPE;
DEPARTED UNTIL 11:30 GMT - JULY 14, 1953

MUNICH, JULY 14, 1953-- THOUSANDS OF HIGH ALTITUDE BALLOONS CARRYING
MESSAGES OF HOPE TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE WERE RELEASED ON THE CZECH BORDER
LAST NIGHT BY THE CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM.

CARRIED BY STRONG WINDS AT ALTITUDES UP TO 30,000 FEET, THE BALLOONS WERE
EXPECTED TO REACH AS FAR AS THE INDUSTRIAL CENTER OF OSTRAVA ON THE POLISH
BORDER, WITH PILSEN, PRAGUE, MOST AND SOKOLOV AS SPECIFIC TARGETS.

THE "BALLOON BARRAGE"-- THE SECOND AIMED AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY THE CRUSADE
FOR FREEDOM -- WILL CONTINUE FOR SEVERAL DAYS. A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 12,000,000
MESSAGES, OR ONE FOR EVERY PERSON IN THE COUNTRY, WILL BE SENT.

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM LAUNCHED A SIMILAR BARRAGE AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON AUGUST
23, 1951, AND ANOTHER AT POLAND ON AUGUST 28, 1951. HOWEVER, THE PRESENT
OPERATION IS FOUR TIMES AS LARGE AND BELIEVED TO BE THE BIGGEST EVER ATTEMPTED.

MESSAGES CARRIED BY THE BALLOONS RELEASED LAST NIGHT AND TODAY WERE OF
THREE TYPES: A REPRODUCTION OF A NEW ONE-CROWN NOTE, BEARING A PLEA TO OPPOSE
THE COMMUNIST REGIME; A PAMPHLET EXPLAINING THE RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN
EAST GERMANY AND THE FALL OF SOVIET POLICY CHIEF LATEVITY BERIA; AND AN ALUMINUM
COIN STAMPED WITH THE "FREEDOM BELL" AND THE SLOGAN "ALL CZECHS AND SLOVAKS FOR
FREEDOM--ALL THE FREE WORLD FOR THE CZECHS AND SLOVAKS."

THE BALLOONS USED IN THE OPERATION CALLED "WINDS OF FREEDOM" ARE OF TWO
TYPES, A RUBBER SPHERE WHICH EXPLODES AT HIGH ALTITUDES, SCATTERING ITS
MESSAGES OVER A WIDE AREA, AND A PLASTIC BALLOON WHICH DESCENDS ON THE TARGET.
BOTH TYPES ARE FILLED WITH HYDROGEN.

THE FULL TEXT OF THE MESSAGE PRINTED ON THE ONE CROWN NOTE FOLLOWS:

ON ONE SIDE --

CZECHOSLOVAKS, KNOW THIS; THE REGIME IS WEAKER THAN YOU HAVE DARED TO
THINK; POWER LIES WITH THE PEOPLE AND THE PEOPLE STAND OPPOSED. WITH UNITY

SECRET
Security Information

- 2 -

AND COURAGE, ORGANIZE YOUR STRENGTH: DOWN WITH THE COLLECTIVE! INSIST ON
WORKERS' RIGHTS! TODAY DEMAND CONCESSIONS; TOMORROW - FREEDOM!

ON THE OTHER SIDE --

WEEN CALL THIS THE HUIZER CROWN - GIFT OF THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS THE
SYMBOL OF REGIME DESPERATION, OF FIVE-YEAR FAILURE: IT IS A CHALLENGE TO
FIGHT, TO MEET WEAKNESS WITH STRENGTH, TO RESIST AS YOU KNOW BEST. THE
OTHER CAPTIVE PEOPLES ARE UNITING AND WILL JOIN YOU IN YOUR STRUGGLE. THE
FREE WORLD IS WITH YOU! ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

THE FULL TEXT OF THE PAMPHLET ABOUT EVENTS IN EAST GERMANY: CZECHS AND SLOVAKS!
HEAR THE MESSAGE WHICH COMES TO YOU TODAY FROM THE FREE WORLD:
THE SOVIET UNION IS GETTING WEAKER! THE PEOPLES OF THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES ARE
GETTING STRONGER! THE SOVIET UNION IS GETTING WEAKER. THE STRUGGLE FOR STALIN'S
HERITAGE SHAKES THE ENTIRE SOVIET EMPIRE AND FEAR HAS CREPT INTO THE KREMLIN.
WHO WILL FALL WITH BERIA AND WHO WILL FALL AFTER BERIA? HOW MANY MILLIONS WILL
FALL VICTIMS TO THE NEW PURGE WHICH IS NOW GOING TO BEGIN - THE BIGGEST PURGE
WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS EVER KNOWN?

HOW MANY VICTIMS WILL FALL IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW MANY IN THE OCCUPIED
COUNTRIES? WHO WILL FALL WITH BERIA IN PRAGUE AND WHO WILL BE DRAGGED DOWN BY
HIS FALL IN BRATISLAVA? WHO WILL BE THE NEW SLANSKY AND WHO THE NEW CLEMENTIS?
AND WHEN THE PURGE SPREADS AND BROADENS, DOWN FROM THE POLYBUREAU TO THE LANDS
AND DISTRICTS, TO THE OFFICES AND THE FACTORIES - HOW MANY FUNCTIONARIES WILL
SAFELY SURVIVE?

ONLY THOSE WILL SURVIVE WHO WILL DETACH THEMSELVES FROM THE SINKING COMMUNIST
BOAT IN TIME. ONLY THOSE WHO JOIN THE PEOPLE AND HELP IN ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST
THE OPPRESSORS.

SECRET
Security Information

- 3 -

AT ANY RATE, THE SOVIETS ARE IN A BLIND ALLEY. IF THE MOSCOW BOOT WILL WEIGH EVEN HEAVIER ON THE NECKS OF THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE AND IF MOSCOW'S DEMANDS UPON THE FRIGHTENED PUPPET GOVERNMENTS OF THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES WILL BECOME MORE PRESSING, THE RESISTANCE OF THE PEOPLE WILL ONLY GROW: FOR THE PEOPLE WILL NOT RETURN INTO SUBMISSION. IF THE COMMUNIST REGIMES, IN ORDER TO APPEASE THE WRATH OF THE PEOPLE, WILL TRY TO BRIBE THEIR SUBJECTS BY PROMISING CONCESSIONS AS WE HAVE SEEN IN HUNGARY AND IN EASTERN GERMANY, THEY WILL NOT GET ANSWERS: FOR THE PEOPLE WILL NOT BE DECEIVED ANYMORE BY PITONY CONCESSIONS.

THE PEOPLE ARE GROWING STRONGER. THE FIRST FLAMES OF REVOLT FLARED OUT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND IN EASTERN GERMANY. FROM PILSEN, FROM MORAVERSKA OSTRAVA, FROM BERLIN, DRESDEN AND MAGDEBURG THE ECHO OF THIS REVOLT PEARED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND DEEPLY SHOCK THE ENTIRE SOVIET REALM: THE PEOPLE SHOWED THEIR STRENGTH.

THE COMMUNIST REGIMES RECOGNIZED THE MENACE AND BECAME APPAID. THEY STARTED APOLOGIZING, THEY STARTED SELF-CRITICISING, THEY STARTED GIVING PROMISES. IN GERMANY THE ANTI-LABOR DECREES HAD TO BE REVOKED. IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA THE FRIGHTENED GOVERNMENT WAS FORCED TO DESIST FROM APPLYING THE PENAL LAWS CONCERNING ASSEMBLY. IN MOSCOW, UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE NEWS OF THE PEOPLES REVOLT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND GERMANY, THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE BECAME SHARPER. BERIA AND HIS ALL-POWERFUL POLICE FELL AS VICTIMS. YOUR REVOLT HELPED TO ALTER THE COURSE OF HISTORY: NEW FORCES MADE THEIR APPEARANCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD, THE PEOPLE WON ITS FIRST MAJOR VICTORY IN ITS FIGHT WITH THE REGIMES.

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS: THE MORE YOUR OPPRESSORS ARE SHAKEN BY UNCERTAINTY, THE GREATER IS THE CERTAINTY OF YOUR VICTORY. THE REGIME IS APPAID OF YOU, IT KNOWS THAT POWER IS FUNDAMENTALLY ON YOUR SIDE. THIS IS THE TIME WHEN PEOPLES UNITY, A COMMON AGREEMENT AND A UNITED PURPOSE ARE ABLE TO WIN CON-

SECRET
Security Information

- 4 -

CESSIONS. YOUR BATTLEFIELD IS IN THE FACTORIES AND IN THE FIELDS. ON THIS BATTLEFIELD OF LABOR YOU HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF NUMBERS. ON THIS BATTLEFIELD YOU CANNOT BE VANQUISHED. YOU WILL NOT BE CONTENT WITH PROMISES, YOU WILL ASK FOR DEEDS. YOU WILL NOT BE CONTENT WITH BRIBES, YOU WILL ASK MORE AND MORE FROM THE EXPLOITERS. WE DO NOT PRESUME TO GIVE YOU ORDERS NOR TO GIVE YOU ADVICES. YOU AND YOUR NEW LEADERS WHO ARE BEING BORN IN THE STRUGGLE KNOW BEST NOW AND WHERE TO STRIKE. BUT WE WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT YOU ARE NOT ALONE: AMONG THE MASSES OF PEOPLE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN THE FIRE OF REVOLT IS SHOULDERING AND ITS SPARKS ARE FLYING FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. EVERYWHERE IN THE FREE WORLD. YOUR FRIENDS ARE WITH YOU. THEIR HELP WILL GROW AS YOUR DETERMINATION GROWS.

SECRET
Security Information

The following was received from Conden, Munich

Have report early afternoon that Czech fighter plane attempting shoot down balloons. In only instance so far reported, planes shot down two out of ten that were in air at moment. Also have report that attempts being made shoot balloons down from ground, but no success. This shooting occurred at 1410 local time, which is only report so far. Will inform you of any developments.

SECRET

Secret
Security Information

The following received from Condon, Munich

Following is full story as of 1700 local time on shooting. At 1400 two possibly three jet aircraft, presumably MIG, which kept well within Czech territory, managed after considerable moving to shoot down two repeat two balloons. Aircraft departed area and have not returned since. Small arms fire during most of afternoon accounted for total of three repeat three balloons. Small arms fire effective only during periods when weather conditions did not permit rapid rise of balloons crossing border at height within range of submarine guns and carbines.


- - - - -
Walker's report - Temper⁴⁵ of residence in launching area calm and unworried.

End of Message


SECRET
Security Information

8 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO
FROM: ES/Czechoslovakia
SUBJECT:



SECRET
Security Information



SECRET
Security Information


Executive Registry
4-3-54

7 July 1953

Noted by OSI
-7/13 K

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: Proposed Balloon Operation

1. The following message was received from Whitney Shepardson on the proposed balloon operation.



Shepardson will send further word after these talks.

Carl Meyer for

THOMAS W. HUDNUT

Chief

International Organizations Division

SECRET
Security Information

CONFIDENTIAL
Secret

7 July 1953

100-4559

H. H. ...

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Conversation with Congressman Kersten

1. On 6 May Congressman Kersten addressed a letter to the State Department, enclosing a letter dated 6 May 1953, which he had received from Mr. Creighton Scott, a former employee of Radio Free Europe at Munich, Germany. This letter was highly critical of certain personnel in RFE, particularly as regards allegations of pro-communist attitudes. On 6 July I discussed these criticisms with Congressman Kersten in detail, conveying to him orally the material contained in the memorandum of 17 June 1953 from the Director of Security; Subject: Inquiry by Congressman Kersten; which the Director of Security had noted should be utilized in this meeting with Congressman Kersten.

2. The Congressman noted the difficulty in evaluating the type of criticisms which Mr. Scott had made but appeared willing to accept our explanation.

3. Congressman Kersten then turned to certain criticisms which he had heard expressed regarding RFE from several sources, including Scott. One such criticism is that RFE is not doing the best it should on religious programs. He feels that this aspect of the broadcasts could probably be considerably strengthened, particularly among Catholic elements.

4. Mr. Kersten cited the opinion of Count Tarnowski (sp. ?), a well known Pole, who told the Congressman that any fourteen year old Soviet citizen would be so well briefed on Soviet philosophy as to turn up their noses at the RFE material. The Count (and Kersten appears to agree) feels that the Soviet population has more sophisticated philosophical material thrown at them by their own Government, and that it should be an important function of RFE to counter with an attempt to destroy the Soviet philosophical material and shake the Soviet faith in their theoreticians.

5. Congressman Kersten realized that it is difficult to capture a wide audience with philosophical arguments, but he feels that if these arguments reached a segment of important leaders behind the Iron Curtain, it would help to destroy and counter the philosophical teachings of Marx, Lenin, et al. The Congressman feels that many of our broadcasts deal with economic matters, and, while these are important, RFE should go

CONFIDENTIAL
Secret

CONFIDENTIAL
Secret

deeper and hit harder on religion and philosophy.

6. While Congressman Kersten is aware that many of the captive population are not interested in rightist movements, it is his opinion that RFE cannot beat communism with socialism. In particular, he felt (and Scott bore this out in their conversation) that we were making too much use of Czech socialists, and we were using socialists from the Benes Government which had sought to compromise with the communists. While he recognizes the popularity of Benes and Masaryk in Czechia, he feels they are not effective in Slovakia, where there is a heavy Catholic population.

7. Congressman Kersten plans to go to Europe, probably in September. While he did not say so, I believe he would welcome an invitation to visit RFE, Munich. Furthermore, as the author of the Kersten Amendment and of several resolutions on the enslaved peoples; at least one of which may receive Congressional approval at this session, consideration might be given as to whether it would be advisable to request the Congressman to utilize RFE facilities to broadcast while he is abroad.

Walter L. Pforzheimer
Legislative Counsel

OGC/WLP:jps

*Mr. Kirkpatrick gave
the original of this to the
ACI, who read it and
took a copy for NCFE -*

CONFIDENTIAL
Secret

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

3 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: D'Arcy Brophy and Louis Novlas' Trip to Europe



THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

CIO:TWS/eh

- Orig - Addressee
- 1 cc - IO/Br I
- 1 cc - CIO
- 1 cc - RI

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION


1 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT:



SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION




THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

JUN 30 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: for Balloon Operation



15/ A.W. Dulles

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

IO/BrI:WPD/eh
(30 June 1953)

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 cc - Finance
- 1 cc - Budget
- 1 cc - IO/AD
- 1 cc - CIO ✓
- 1 cc - RI
- 1 cc - DCI

JUN 29 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PP

SUBJECT: Recent Developments in the Rumanian Refugee Situation

1. In a verbal report to the Rumanian National Committee upon his return from a trip to Europe to secure former King Michael's approval of a proposed refugee committee, Mr. Visoianu stated that the King did not reject the proposal advanced for the reorganization and enlargement of the present Committee, although he indicated no interest in having the plan put into effect immediately.

2. In his last conversation with Mr. Visoianu, the King requested that the members of the present Rumanian National Committee should send him, either jointly or individually, their opinions in writing about the following points:

a. On what grounds does the Rumanian National Committee consider that it cannot continue in its present form?

b. What are the criteria for choosing the members of the new committee and who are the persons who should belong to it?

c. Who are the Rumanian exiles and Rumanian organizations in exile which could be consulted by the King to advise him in the matter of forming a new National Committee?

3. The Rumanian National Committee members plan to send a joint resolution to the King requesting that he entrust Visoianu with the formation of a new committee to be comprised of members whose names were submitted to the King. Should Michael refuse this request, the Committee intends to tender its resignation.

4. Visoianu reported that he had conversations in Paris with Gafencu, Gherna, Venianin and Antoniaie, to whom he proposed membership in the new committee. At that time, which was before the death of General Radescu, Gafencu refused because of the exclusion of the General in the new organization. Since Visoianu was unable to return to Paris after his conversations with the King, a meeting with Gafencu subsequent to Radescu's death has not been possible. Gherna did not refuse to

0000

become a member of the new committee, but wished to be accepted as a representative of the Socialist Party. This would be difficult because of Cherman's affiliation with the left-wing faction which seceded from Petrescu's Party in 1946, subsequently joining with the Communist Party. Antoniadu and Verigain have agreed to become members of the new committee.

5. In a letter to the Fund on 26 May 1953, Gafencu stated that an attempt should be made to give support to a new committee through a large national council in order to establish unity of the leaders and of the Rumanian colony abroad. He said that on the day of General Radescu's death he had received a letter from the General asking him to take over "his task" to assure the unity of the Rumanians abroad. Gafencu also wrote that friends in Paris and abroad had asked him to take over the leadership of a small "ad hoc" committee with the support of all the Associations of Free Rumanians, which he stated he will do if the New York group assures him of their support. After that, he indicated he would see if there would be a possibility of an understanding with the Visoianu group.

7. It would appear that there is little reason to believe that the Rumanian refugees will set aside their factional differences and personal ambitions to form a representative committee at this time.

Acting Chief, SE

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION


25 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of Stockholm ICFTU Congress

1. At our request RFE is going to give full coverage to the ICFTU Meeting in Stockholm. It has arranged to have the meeting covered by three desks. The Hungarians are using a Stockholm stringer, while the Poles and Czechs are each sending editors. In addition, there will be overall coverage to the central newsroom by RFE's information correspondent, Dreifuss. Messages from the labor leaders of the free world will be broadcast to the Czech people, in line with our recent guidance.

2. A copy of the UN Slave Labor Report was delivered to the box of Col. Mullany's friend yesterday afternoon prior to departure.



WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/Branch 1

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
 (SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Miss Tisthammer	—	—
2	<i>C/IO</i>		
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO		
2	<i>C/D C/L</i>		<i>6/30</i>
3			

- | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL | <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION | <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ACTION | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN |
| <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT | <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE | <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION | <input type="checkbox"/> FILE |

Remarks:

Alice:

Please insure that Mr. Dulles sees this before the NCFE people come in, and that they don't get their hands on it. *TWR*

TWB

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED


SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Reference Agency
4/28/54

23 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with NCFE with afternoon.



TWB

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

SECRET
Security Information

30 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Jesse McKnight,
Department of State

1. Mr. [] called to report that Mr. [] from the UN Public Affairs Office is very disturbed about the conduct of "some RFE man" in New York, who is approaching members of the US Mission to the United Nations and asking them all sorts of questions, for example, their views on the recent Doctors' Trial.

2. Mr. [] feels that this practice should be discontinued, especially in view of the fact that the new members of the US Mission are not yet fully informed about, or sympathetic, to RFE. He feels that any questions concerning US policy on particular issues should be cleared with Mr. [], the NOA Policy Chief in New York.

3. I think this matter ought to be discussed with Bob Lang. Would you let me know whether you will take it up with him, or whether you wish me to do so.

*You do so.
JWS*

[]
IO/TWYC

SECRET
Security Information

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

2 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Meeting to Discuss State Department Proposals on how to Counter-Check Items on UNGA Agenda.

1. I attended a meeting on Wednesday, 28 January 1953, to discuss paragraphs 6 and 7 of the attached paper prepared by the Department of State. It calls for the establishment of "a commission of independent members to study the nature and extent of this escapee problem, with the view of determining the reasons and circumstances impelling these people to escape" and suggests that "this inquiry could follow the pattern of the commission on forced labor. The Commission would hear refugees in such places as Western Germany, Geneva, etc., and its eventual report to the assembly would, in fact, be a report on the entire communist system, the denial of basic human right, etc."

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

IO/TOMIC: ES/hka

[REDACTED]
IO/TOMIC

Distributions:

Orig. - Addressee
2 cc - IO/TOMIC
1 cc - C/IO
1 cc - RI
1 cc - Mr. Braden
1 cc - Mr. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

23 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECURITY OFFICER, CIA

SUBJECT:

1. Pursuant to my conversation with Mr. , I have talked with the Director of RFE and he has agreed to terminate subject's present job.

2. He intends to bring subject to New York and make him his personal consultant in the New York office. He assures me of his full intentions to carry out this plan and further assures me that he has no intention of giving subject administrative or authority of any kind.

3. Is this arrangement satisfactory to you?

THOMAS W. BRADEN
CHIEF

International Organizations Division

CIO:WAS/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - IO/Br I
1 cc - IO/Security Officer
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

22 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

In response to our request from the Fund, we are forwarding
herewith the general information available concerning [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(Signed) Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachments: (5)

Ltr. to [REDACTED] dtd 1/20/53

Personal biography by [REDACTED]

Excerpt from Congressional

Record for 2/9/52

Booklet by [REDACTED]

Article by [REDACTED]

IO/Branch 1:WPD:jb

Distribution:

Addressee - orig & 1 via CPP

IO/Tonic - 2cc

CIO - lcc

RI - lcc

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Collège de l'Europe Libre

CHATEAU DE FOURTALÈS - STRASBOURG-ROBERTSAU (Bas-Rhin)

BOITE POSTALE 61, STRASBOURG R. P.
TÉLÉPHONE DIRECTION: 832.08 - INTENDANCE: 832.06
ADRESSE TÉLÉGRAPHIQUE: EXILUNIVER STRASBOURG



Paris
April 4th, 1953.

Dear Tom:-

You should have this, or leave word
to send to be relayed by the same report.

Dean meets with our Ex. Committee on the 9th.
I hope they handle that situation firmly. Hope, too,
Frank has been made aware of what has been up
against.

Sincerely,
T. J.

COPY


COPY

April 1, 1953

No. 26 Dear Adolf,

A day or two before I sailed for Europe in January, 1953, I received a typed manuscript copy of the "Progress Report on the College de l'Europe Libre", which has now appeared in mimeographed form under date of February 27, 1953, over the signatures of Royall Tyler and Richard Sears.

I admit to considerable curiosity when this document appeared. In the covering letter Royall Tyler merely stated, "It comes from Dick Sears". I rather wondered why this report should be compiled when it was known I was coming to Europe presumably to examine into conditions and it seemed to me immediately that this might be a counter foil to what it was expected I would find. In reply to a direct inquiry from me, Sears now states it was prepared "to reinforce the German language unit project by supplying information that was apparently lacking.



So, while the factual material in this report can not be questioned — I mean the statistics and the historical portions — the interpretation of them does not reflect the disappointing results. This pertains to the work of the Committee on Awards on the one hand and

me [redacted] When I asked Sears how widely this report had been distributed he told [redacted] to the members of the Association du College

COPY

Dr.

Page 2 of No. 26

April 1, 1953

de l'Europe Libre and to Messrs. Thomas Braden, John C. Hughes, C. D. Jackson and Whitney H. Shepardson". I assume, therefore, that the members of our Executive Committee, to whom I am sending copies of this letter, have received it.

The sentence (bottom of Page 9 and going over to top of Page 10), "These were men of advanced education, expert in their knowledge of their own countries but also, most of them, having studied in French institutions and so capable of forming a bond for the students between their training at home and in exile.", is not an accurate description of the caliber of the tutors.

On Page 11, second line, I would question definitely the phrase "well organized administration". Also on that page, sixth line, the sentence, "Special French courses were being given to those who still showed weakness.", is misleading. Such courses were announced, but the program for teaching the French language is only now being outlined with the help of the French language staff I called for this purpose.

On the same page again, fifth line from the bottom, the phrase "the severity of the action taken in the autumn has had a salutary effect in imposing firmer discipline and setting higher standards" simply is not so. The manner in which the action was taken, and the inaccuracy of some of the judgments, which had to be reversed, called forth protests from staff and students alike and did as much as anything else to cause present low student morale.

On Page 16, the last sentence in the first paragraph reads, "A fresh start in life combined with exposure to Western thought and practice will, we are encouraged to hope, produce a full return." Instead of what the statement implies, the students have witnessed a cleavage between the European staff and the Americans, -- and the "exposure to Western thought and practice" has been anything but inspiring or unifying.

The distribution of this document can be and will be very misleading by its implications that success has been achieved to an extent that warrants our proceeding on our present path. That will be unfortunate. We have acquired a fund of valuable experience and we have made mistakes. The net result is the present situation. Fundamental changes must be made, which are bound to be unpleasant, but they are essential, unless we are going to continue a more

Sincerely yours,

LT:ECK

Dr.
70 Pine Street
New York 5, N. Y.

Levering Tyson
President


6 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Information reported by Bob Lang, RFE

Bob Lang has had reported to him the following:

- 1. Epstein, an investigator for Senator McCarthy, has just turned into the Senator a 150-page anti-RFE report.



THOMAS W. BRADEN
 Chief
 International Organizations Division

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

- Orig - Addressee (thru CPP)
- 1 cc - IO/BrI
- 1 cc - CIO
- 1 cc - RI

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SLIDER - FULL CIRCLE CL .TION TOP AND BOTTOM)
 10-3-1106
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Spec Officer, DDIP	CDH	9/2/55
2			
3	PP - 2042	WMB	11/10/51
4	IO-CIO	TWB	
5	RP		WJ
FROM	SP-10 (retain or destroy)		
1	Spec Officer, DDIP	CDH	4/19/55
2			
3			

- | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL | <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION | <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ACTION | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN |
| <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT | <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE | <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION | <input type="checkbox"/> FILE |

REMARKS: Mr. Wisner suggested this be circulated as indicated for information.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED



OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON

Executive Order
9-8728


April 3, 1953

My dear Mr. Wisner:

I want you to be informed of the action which I am taking in regard to international broadcasting facilities in this country.

I have sent a letter to the companies concerned along the lines of the enclosed which gives a full explanation.

Sincerely yours,


Robert L. Johnson
Administrator

Enclosures

Copy of letter to broadcasting
companies terminating contracts.

Mr. Frank Wisner,
Central Intelligence Agency.

4/9/53 ce- EA File

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20540

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is a copy of the report of the Board of Contract Administration and Administration of the Voice of America, Inc.


The study of this complex operation should be continued and it is suggested that you should be kept advised of any developments in this matter. It is suggested that you should be kept advised of any developments in this matter.

However, from the standpoint of effect on operations and the view of the recent activities of the Board of Contract Administration and Administration, it is suggested that you should be kept advised of any developments in this matter. It is suggested that you should be kept advised of any developments in this matter.

It is my obvious duty, in order to protect the Government, to give at this time through 90 day notices of termination of a number of these contracts to avoid any possible liability thereunder continuing into the next fiscal year. However, I feel that it is due to your Company and to the circumstances mentioned to accompany these notices with the present frame of reference of the reasons for them.

Last Fall there was a reduction of personnel. If you want more by the Voice of America in the field of radio broadcast originating in the United States, this is not an option. Aside from the administrative, to correct this condition, consideration is being given to decentralizing to points outside the United States some of the personnel and originating here. This would result in a requirement to be met in the United States.

In my judgment, protection of the Government's interests requires that a notice of termination be given of these contracts.



When the contract for the construction of the Voice, Inc. station in Wayne, New Jersey, this station, in connection with the contract with General Electric for the construction of the station will also be terminated.

I personally must take the responsibility for the decision in this regard to the termination of the contract for the construction of this station to be effected by the termination of the contract for the construction of the station. I have also taken the responsibility for the termination of a management engineering survey which has been completed for all domestic facilities used by the station, having been based on my decision regarding the same. I have obtained all necessary and an acting upon, arrangements for the termination of the contract with competent persons in private industry to continue the identification with the operations of the Voice.

The decision to terminate these contracts has been taken with full realization of the policy of Public Law 402 relative to private enterprise in the broadcasting field. Very recently I acted to terminate construction contracts for two large Government transmitting stations in this country.

This present action is not intended to prejudice a continued or increased participation or a private firm in international broadcasting by these licenses. I shall cooperate to this end.

This action is taken with genuine regret particularly because you and your Company have rendered in many ways services of great value to the United States, and because I know that this has been done in a highly patriotic spirit.

Sincerely yours,

Robert L. Johnson
Administrator

6 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] NCFE

1. Now that [REDACTED] is working for NCFE, I know that there will be a strong tendency on the part of all of us to deal with NCFE through [REDACTED]

3. I hope that higher authority will bear this in mind.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWA/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru CPP)
1 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

~~Secret~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

C/M 3067

3-9241

3 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADMINISTRATION)

SUBJECT: Request from the NCFE for the release of [redacted] from
the CIA held reserve for the [redacted].

1. Mr. Spencer Phoenix, on behalf of the NCFE, upon authorization of the Board of Directors, has requested the release of [redacted] from the CIA held reserve for [redacted] capital construction for the following purposes:

(a) "Alterations to the main building"

[redacted]

(b)


[redacted]

[redacted]


~~Secret~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION


- 2 -



(c)




Total



(d)

(e)



SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 3 -

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

THOMAS W. BRANTER
Chief

International Organizations Division

IO/Branch 1:WPD:jb

Distributions

Addressec - orig & 1 (DD/P)

1 cc (DD/A)

CONCURRENCE: 1 cc Corp.

1 cc CIO

(cc) [Redacted] cc IO/Br. 1

1 cc [Redacted] (Plans)

[Redacted]
Comptroller

1/5/29 WRW
Deputy Director (Administration)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Security Information

DD/P 3098

2 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Good news concerning William Heimlich.

1. I have just received through Mr. Durkee a report from the RFE people in Munich to the following effect.
2. Mr. Heimlich has visited the premises and talked to some of the key personnel of RFE-Munich. He was cordially received and shown around. At the conclusion of his visit, Mr. Heimlich stated that whereas he was not primarily or particularly interested or concerned with NCFE/RFE activities and operations (presumably meaning that he was more concerned with the State Department information project -- and presumably FIA), he had been very much impressed by what he had seen. He was satisfied that this was a hard-hitting operation; that there was no "fat" on it; and that he would so report to the Senate Committee upon his return.

FRANK O. WISNIE
Acting Deputy Director.

cc: C/IO - information.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Reference: 14
3.2822

2 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

VIA: Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: Points raised by you in connection with Mr. Burkee's conversation with [redacted] on 11 March 1953 and Whitney Shephardson on 16 March 1953.

The following answers to Mr. Wisco's comments on subject memo have been prepared by Mr. Burkee:

1. "Mr. Lang does not intend to put [redacted] in official charge of Munich operations. My remark was intended to indicate that apparently with Lang's consent."

2. "The original 'ice-box' statement was indeed passed on by us. My reference was to our approval of an alternate 'ice-box' statement entitled, 'OSMA Policy Statement', which Shephardson proposes to use in place of the original."

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
 (SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	EIOD		
2	<i>[Signature]</i>		
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	PP/c/admin	<i>[Signature]</i>	26 Mar
2			
3			

- APPROVAL INFORMATION SIGNATURE
- ACTION DIRECT REPLY RETURN
- COMMENT PREPARATION OF REPLY DISPATCH
- CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION FILE

REMARKS: CPP asks that you prepare a reply to the two points raised by F.G.W. and send same to F.G.W. via CPP.

SUSPENSE 2 APRIL

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

2863

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

10/Branch I

NO.

10-3-841

DATE

16 March 1953

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWU'D		
1. CVO				TWB	<p>Tom:</p> <p>Frank W should see this at least to prevent of conversation as it continues (lib. started with him)</p> <p>WPD</p> <p>2 To 4 and 5 -</p>
2. C/PP			19 Mar	CTB	
3. D/DP		20 Mar		JSW	
4. Mr. Barner			26 Mar	CTB	
5. Mr. Bradley					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH [REDACTED] ON 11 MARCH 1953 AT RAY
AMEMB WASH. - 9:30 P. M. TO 12:15 P. M.

During the course of our conversation Mr. [REDACTED] stated that he was pleased to have had the opportunity to meet here and to clear up his status. He also stated that:

a. In his opinion Mr. Lang is indispensable to the operation of RFE, but that it was necessary for Mr. Lang to be in Munich more often. He feels that in spite of Mr. Lang's over-all comprehension that developments in Munich have out-run Lang's or anyone's capacity to understand it without closer contact with its day to day operations.

b. He has a high regard for Mr. Richard Condon, whom he feels is doing an excellent job. It is [REDACTED] opinion that Condon needs a competent administrative assistant and that [REDACTED], RFE correspondent in London, could fill such a position. Lang agrees with him. [REDACTED] feels it remarkable that during his considerable time with RFE that he has never heard a bad word about Mr. Condon.

c. He has a very high regard for Mr. [REDACTED] and the role he plays in RFE's operations, however, it was his feeling that it is impossible for Mr. [REDACTED] to adequately take care of RFE's outside relations in Germany because: (1) [REDACTED] does not have the time and; (2) He is not particularly effective in dealing with Germans because of his youth and rather pedantic manner. He informed me that there is a possibility of getting [REDACTED] for employment with RFE and that he felt [REDACTED] could excellently undertake the job of dealing with the German government and German public because of [REDACTED] language facility, his familiarity with Germany and his prestige.

d. He is reorganizing the News and Information Service of RFE because the drying up of escapees has increased the need for top rank correspondents with depth of European experience and political knowledge, so that significant ideas and contributions to RFE propaganda can be developed. He also feels that a reorganized news gathering service will lead to more effective American leadership because of the respect the exiles will have for its American personnel. Such procedures, in his opinion, are necessary in order to properly integrate the various free radio desks, their use of information resources and to professionalize pro ran content. He says he intends to have his News and Information Service prepare scripts to be used by all desks. In addition, [REDACTED] pointed out a news gathering service of top rank correspondents will allow him great operational flexibility, for personnel can be interchanged at will.

SECRET
Security Information

- 2 -

e. [] also made a strong plea for [] who is a personal friend.

COMMENTS:

[] is a strong person who is taking over IFE Munich, apparently with Lang's consent. I suspect Lang gives his consent because he has been unable to dominate either [] or Condon. Lang has presumably heretofore dealt with this problem by insisting upon U.S. policy control and by keeping an inordinately large Czech, Polish and Hungarian program desk in New York.

I am sure there is merit in many of [] observations but suspect that real trouble is brewing between New York and Munich, especially among exile personnel as this becomes more a []

William P. Durkin
WILLIAM P. DURKIN
CAGS, IC/TCHIC

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI, FROM MR. SHEPARDSON - 16 MARCH AT 9:00 AM

1. Mr. Shepardson said that he had gone over Erwin Fearsen business with his entire staff and that they had all agreed that a policy of silence was clearly indicated, — that this was not a time to release the "ice-box" statement which he referred to as "ice-box" statement number 1 and number 2. Shepardson said he would feel out G. B. Jackson in his meeting with him today to determine whether G. B. thought any approach to Fearsen should be made and whether he himself would be the one to do it. He agreed that such an approach to Fearsen should be made by none else.
2. When I queried him about the "ice-box" statement number 2, he said he referred to the NSPE Policy Statement which states the fact of US Government support. He said that it was his understanding that it had been cleared down here. I replied that to my knowledge this was not so. I told him all we had ever had was a draft statement which had been discussed informally. He agreed that if this was in fact the case, he would immediately send the policy statement for our formal approval.
3. During the course of our conversation he indicated that Abbot Washburn had arranged for RFE to appear before the Jackson Committee on March 26 and also had arranged for the rest of NSPE to make a presentation some time in April. I asked whether Mr. Dulles was informed of this and he said he was not aware that he was. I suggested that some problem existed here for NSPE is Mr. Dulles' responsibility and that no-one denied that NSPE/EE should make such a presentation, it was still a fact that such a unilateral presentation might lead to some difficulties. I therefore suggested that we make a joint presentation whether written or oral, to which Mr. Shepardson agreed.
4. I discussed the problem of security in RFE, Munich, and our concern that a [redacted] security of RFE be placed in Munich. Shepardson immediately agreed that this should be done and we agreed that I would prepare a paper for him outlining what we thought our problems are. In the meantime, [redacted] will not be informed of our discussions on this subject. He also agreed that the matter of working out the placement of such a person in RFE would be a matter of joint study, but that it was largely a problem for him to work out with such assistance as we can give.
5. We discussed the question of [redacted] and Shepardson agreed that he would talk with Spencer Fenix in order to arrive at an over-all estimate [redacted] before submitting an official request for funds. It was agreed, therefore, at this time we would not take any action on Fenix's request dated 17 February 1953.
6. I stated that I was anxious for a thorough review of Albanian-Rumanian emigre questions and we agreed that after Shepardson had time to give personal attention to details of these matters, we would have a full discussion here.


SECRET
Security Information
William F. Wickes
Chief, IC/Tonic


Security Information


1 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: 

1. Spencer Phoenix, Treasurer of NSPZ, has submitted a request
for the sum of 



Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment: Ltr. Fr. Phoenix dtd
3/23/53

CONCURRENCE:

Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET
Security Information

Security Information

23 March 1953

Dear Nelson:



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

SECRET
Security Information

Security Information



Sincerely,




SECRET
Security Information

DD/P 3787

11 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, PP

SUBJECT: Letter from



Richard Helas
Chief of Operations, DD/P

Attachments

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

9 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: [redacted] Project

Attached is an accounting signed by [redacted] of the [redacted] Project for the period August 15, 1952 to May 27, 1953. This is for retention in your files.

(Signed) THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
As stated.

CIO:TWS/ah

- Orig - Addressee
- 1 cc - IC/TONIC
- 1 cc - CIO
- 1 cc - RI

SECRET
Security Information

2 June 1953



MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Remarks for meeting with Spencer Phenix et al
on Thursday, 2:30 PM, 4 June 1953

1. At a PRC action on Friday, 29 May, as an interim action pending a full review in August of NCFE's total program and budget the Division recommended:

- a. NCFE be given three months operating expenses - - the current rate of expenditures;

2. In its action the PRC:



[Redacted]

We have, however, the responsibility of making a detailed review of the

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DCI		
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO	TWB	8 May
2			
3			

<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE

REMARKS:

This is the letter which Whitney Shepardson sent to about which you are aware.


TWB

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

4-1139

May 5, 1953.

20 May 53 SS



WZ3:IRH

Orig to IO/Br I

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

MAY 4

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: IO/BRANCH ONE

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Acting Chief, SF.

Tab A -
Tab B -
Tab C -
Tab D -

[Redacted]

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

*orig given Burke
Rec'd 31 Mar 1953*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Reported Financial Support of
[Redacted]

REFERENCE: Memorandum (IO-3-682), dated 2 March 1953

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
ACTING CHIEF, SE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

MAR 27
1953


MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF OF DIVISION


SUBJECT : Proposal for Establishing a Microfilm Library
of Rumanian Reference Material

1. The attached paper outlines a project which may be of interest to your division. A Rumanian emigre, interested in propaganda and cultural activities, prepared the paper after consulting with a number of refugee scholars.
 2. Although the results of such a project would be of great value to [redacted] implementation is considered beyond the scope of the activities of this Division. Further, it appears more practicable for a project of this type to be undertaken by a research or cultural organization, rather than an intelligence agency, in order that the results may be more widely used.
 3. It is suggested that the NCSE, which is concerned with worthwhile employment of refugee intellectuals, may be interested in this project [redacted]. If the NCSE is not in a position to finance such a project, it is possible that a privately endowed foundation would be interested. The emigre has discussed this project with [redacted] of the Library of Congress and with [redacted] of the Russian Institute of Columbia University. He has reported that both agencies appear interested.
-

SECRET

SECRET



5. If further information is desired, please contact , extension 195.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

Attachment: As stated above

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

*Orig to Lumbel
Starn
Recd: 4/2/53*

26 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE: Secret Memo from Chief, IO, Subject: Information on located in Frankfurt dated 19 March 1953



JOHN E. BAKER
CHIEF, SE

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 25 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

SUBJECT:

(Signed)

**Assistant Chief
Political and Psychological Warfare Staff**

cc: C/IO

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
Security Information

16 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Memorandum dated 13 March 1953, Subject: "Notes on
[redacted] Trip"

1. C. D. Jackson wrote the Boris Luke Foundation on Cochrane's behalf, asking that he be granted \$10,000. He was granted this amount.

[redacted]

[redacted]

pls discuss with me

[redacted]


[redacted]

5. I knew nothing about the [redacted] matter and moreover my impression is that financial procedures now followed in the unity projects, to which I presume you refer, and which are not in this Division, have been arranged at

SECRET
Security Information

- 2 -

the direction of administrative and finance people. [redacted] who is as scrupulous and thorough as any man can be, made all such arrangements and I would accept his recommendations of what needs to be done, if anything.


WILLIAM P. BURKE
Chief, IO/TOMIC

SECRET

25 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT:

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment

C
O
P
Y

25 March 1953

Dear

I have given a lot of thought within the past few days to the question of your immediate future which you raised with me. I find on checking into our rules and regulations that I simply can't help you here. I am sorry about this because you are an impressive man to talk to.

I wish you good luck elsewhere.

Sincerely,

Thomas W. Braden

Security Information

*orig given
TONIC 10 March*

7 March 1953



*what has
Tonic done
about this?*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO/PP
ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Braden
SUBJECT:

7/10/53

1. Reference our conversation sometime ago, I would like to give you the results of our Registry checks on

Security Information



3. I should appreciate your keeping me advised on the possibility of keeping as the RFE representative.



SECRET

Security Information

257

5 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

ATTENTION: Mr. Durkee

VIA: C/PP

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe. Miscellaneous matters;
conversation with Mr. Lang.

1. This is a brief report for the benefit of Mr. Durkee and for the information of Messrs. Barnes and Braden, concerning certain aspects of my luncheon conversation with Mr. Robert E. Lang of 4 March.

2. I believe that I was successful in covering in one way or another all of the points raised with me by Mr. Durkee prior to my conversation with Mr. Lang. I will not attempt in this memorandum to recapitulate the entire conversation, but I will comment on certain aspects thereof and state that, in general, the conversation seemed to me to be quite satisfactory.

3. I received the impression that there are still "wheels within wheels" and much internal friction within the NCFE set-up. This is very regrettable, but it seems to be a fact of life which I think should be brought to the attention of Mr. Shepardson at a very early date, and he should be urged to bring the warring factions together on a more amicable basis. The personalities involved are all important to the success of the operation and it is a great shame that they spend so much of their time and energy trying to out-manuever and checkmate one another. I would not "give up" Bob Lang on this in talking with Mr. Shepardson -- but simply make this as a general observation of ours.

4. I came down quite hard on Bob with respect to the [redacted] which Mr. Durkee handed to me and which I return to you herewith. I pointed out that this thing struck us as quite bad, and for three good and sufficient reasons, to wit:


[redacted]

SECRET


Security Information

SECRET

- 2 -




Bob Lang had no ready or very satisfactory explanation of this matter -- said that he had not known about it or had not seen it -- and that he could only interpret it as an effort on [redacted] part to personally rehabilitate himself. I said that I had no objection to a program of self-rehabilitation on [redacted] part, but that he simply could not do so at the expense of the organization for which he works. Lang appeared to agree.



FRANK C. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Encl (1)



SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

SECRET

*Rec'd 6 March 52
sent to Stern*

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/IO

ATTENTION : Miss Stern

SUBJECT : Material for Transmittal to RFE.

[Redacted]


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -




JOHN K. BAKER
Chief, SE

Attach_ment (1)

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information



SECRET
Security Information

Suspens 6 March

26 February 1953

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : [redacted]

1. This is in response to your request for our views regarding the attached letter from [redacted]

[redacted]

3. I would suggest, therefore, that in acknowledging [redacted] letter we advise him not to make a special trip to Washington. Instead, we might suggest that if he is here on other business at some future time he should get in touch with Mr. [redacted] at Sterling 3-5520. ([redacted] is with the Contact Division, Office of Operations).

JOHN A. BROSS
Chief, Eastern European Division

5 Mar 53


Note on cover sheet returned to EO/DD/P states:

"IO/TONIC concurs in subject memo - ES per WPD

SECURITY INFORMATION


sent to DD/P

5 March 1953



114-4

February 25, 1953



Sincerely,


SECRET
Secret

*Out of Green
Ellen 13 Feb*

FEB 12 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO DIVISION

SUBJECT: Attempts of [redacted] to Secure Employment
with RFE Munich.



2. It is requested that RFE be informed of the above information.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SS

SECRET

764-6

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12 February 1953

Dear Oliver,

Would you be kind enough to pass on
the enclosed memorandum to

Many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

Enc. 1

*sent to 2433 Holmes Run Drive
Falls Church, Va.*

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

C
O
P
Y

12 February 1953
110 W. 57th Street
New York City

Dear Ed,

I saw your name on a piece of paper today written in
recommendation of one [redacted] stationery
no less.

We are considering him for a job with the Rumanian
desk and would be grateful for your comments. He seems, so
far as we have been able to determine, to be well equipped
but a difficult personality.

Hope to see you sometime soon.

Sincerely yours,


/s/ Bob

Robert E. Lutz

(For [redacted])

CONFIDENTIAL

12 February 1953




SECRET
Security Information

20 February 1953

DIRECTOR GENERAL: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADMINISTRATION)

VIA: General Counsel

SUBJECT: Reimbursement of Fr.



THOMAS W. BRADEN
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Approved:

General Counsel

Deputy Director (Administration)

Attachment: 1 (a/s)


IO/Dr.1:MR:jb
Distributions
Addressee - orig & 1
Gen.Counsel - lcc
IO/Er.1 - fcc ✓
CIO - lcc
RI - lcc
IO/AD - lcc

2159

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

FEB 6 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: NOPE Support of
REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of 12 January 1953 (ER #3-6149),
same subject.



B. R. H.

RICHARD HELMS
Chief of Operations, DD/P

APP/ACU/cvm
31 January 1953

- Distribution:
- Addressee - Orig & 1
 - Chief of Operations, DD/P - 1
 - ~~Executive Registry - 1~~
 - CPY - 1
 - CIO - 1 ✓
 - APP - 1
 - RI - 1

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

From: Security
3-6-55

(ASP 2042)


3 February 1953

My dear Mr.

I appreciate your letter and your interest. I recall with pleasure our acquaintance during the war and have noted your desire to serve the "democratic cause".

Very sincerely yours,


(Signed) ALLEN W. DUBOIS



CIO:TWB/mf (19 January 1953)
retyped O/DDCI:REL/lob (23 January 1953)
retyped O/DDCI:AWD/man (3 February 1953)
Dist:

- Orig - Addressee
- 1 cc - DDCI Chrono
- 1 cc - ER
- 1 cc - CIO ✓
- 1 cc - RI
- 1 cc - TONIC


SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division


FROM : Chief, SE

SUBJECT :




SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION




SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION




SECRET

SECRET

2 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: IC/TONIC

SUBJECT: Call from Admiral MOTT



763



SECRET

28 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Agenda for discussion with M [redacted]

BACKGROUND:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]


AGENDA:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]




(signed) Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Draft Memo of Understanding


IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig - DCI (TAPU OO/P)
1 cc - IO/Br I
1 cc - IO/Br II
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI
1 cc - CPP



Date

Date




HOURLY BROADCASTING BREAKDOWN


<u>Language</u>	<u>Original Programming Hours</u>		<u>Total Broadcast Time</u>	
	<u>Weekdays</u>	<u>Sundays</u>	<u>Weekdays</u>	<u>Sundays</u>
Czechoslovakia	11	11 3/4	19 7/12	16 7/12
Hungarian	9 1/2	10	16 3/4	16 7/12
Polish	6 5/6	6 5/6	16 5/6	16 3/4
Rumanian	1 1/2	1	3	3
Bulgarian	1 1/2	1	2 3/4	2 3/4
Albanian	1/2	1/2	1 1/4	1 1/4
	<u>30 5/6</u>	<u>31 1/12</u>	<u>60 1/3</u>	<u>56 11/12</u>

Program Dept. Personnel - N.Y. (Total) -111
 Munich (Total) -468
 -579

(Free Lance not Included)



Mr. Braden:



SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 60px; width: 100%;"></div>		2. RI FILE NO.			
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM		8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION	
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN THE TOP SECRET CONTROL
SECTION BY TS # 85300-B

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

- 2 -

between the various refugee elements but would also have the full support of all Germans, Booker added."

Incidentally, I think you are doing an awfully good job on this kind of thing. The other night I actually read through an entire copy.

The article on music for the masses and the general expose of the attack on the arts is particularly significant, I think. Until the recent anti-Semitism, this field of culture is the one field of Soviet activity in which they were vulnerable before neutralists and fellow-travelers everywhere. The tendency of the intellectual to swallow the Soviet line on culture, to fall for the Stalin Prizes, the high status accorded the obedient intellectual in Soviet society, and pseudo-scientific appeal of the Marxian dogma of equality is dangerous. In a free society, the intellectual is the origin of ideas.

Anything we can do to show the fact that every aspect of Soviet culture has been transformed into an instrument of the State, that the intellectual's role is important only so long as he is obedient, that in fact the product of the Soviet artist would not hold a candle to the standards set by fellow-traveling circles in Western Europe, and that the Soviet has corrupted the principles of equality on which it presumes to stand is terribly important.

I am sure you are aware of all the above but I thought of it when I read the piece in the last issue, and my comment is just another way of telling you what a good job I think you are doing.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

CIO:TWB/ah
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - [Redacted]
1 cc - TONIC
1 cc - CIO
1-cc - RI

14-00000
The Dallas is signed the
project was very small amount.

SECRET
Security Information

27 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Exploitation by RFE of Physicians (Plot)

1. Attached herewith the January 17 Washington Post Editorial on "Communist Antisemitism", which you requested.

2. This editorial has not been previously sent to New York. However, I should like to call your attention to the fact that the material covered in this editorial has already been exploited by RFE, as evidenced in their guidances of 13, 14, and 15 January.

IO/TONIC

Attachments:
As stated above

JWB wrote letter to Lang 30 Jan 53

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

26 January 1953

TO : Deputy Director (Plans)
FROM : Comptroller
SUBJECT: Additional Funds for Crusade for Freedom

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The Crusade officials have estimated that in addition to the above a further amount of [Redacted] will be required for expenses to close out the 1952 campaign.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Funds approved for release

[Redacted]

Acting ADP

SECRET 27 January 1953.

Security Information

UNCLASSIFIED (RESTRICTED) CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
 (SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLA ACTION TOP AND BOTTOM)

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO	INITIALS	DATE
1		29 Jan
2	C-IO	
3		
4		
5		
FROM	INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief, PWD	29 Jan
2		
3		

- APPROVAL
- ACTION
- COMMENT
- CONCURRENCE
- INFORMATION
- DIRECT REPLY
- PREPARATION OF REPLY
- RECOMMENDATION
- SIGNATURE
- RETURN
- DISPATCH
- FILE

REMARKS:

This distribution is made to DD/P; DD/I; Chief, PI; Chief, FI; Chief, Intelligence Control Branch, OOI; AD/OC; General Counsel; and Col. I & S.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

- HU 4 -

HUNGARY
Jan. 26, 1953

'JOINT' ONLY ONE OF U.S. SPY TENTACLES

Budapest, Hungarian Home Service, Jan. 23, 1953, 1900 GMT--L

(Commentary by Pal Lendvai)

(Summary with Quotations)

In the report carried by an "American bourgeois weekly" the name of the banker Warburg was included among several philanthropic U.S. businessmen. Warburg was described as one of the most zealous among them. The adjective would have been truly apt if applied not to Warburg's philanthropic activities but to his business activities.

"In the history of American capitalism we have heard of many a shrewd and bone businessmen, but few have been more cunning or more ready for any and every wickedness than Warburg. By profession he is a banker--and not just any second- or third-rate speculator, but a member of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, the second largest banking firm in the United States. At the same time, he is also chairman of Joint, the Zionist Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization.

"It will be remembered that the Joint has been, to the accompaniment of the eulogies of the bourgeois press, acting for years under a philanthropic disguise and with the alleged purpose of providing financial aid to Jews in Europe and other countries.

"In reality this organization--as revealed by the Slansky trial and the case of the group of doctor-wreckers unmasked in the USSR--has served as a forward base of American imperialism and has carried out, under the direction of the U.S. espionage service, spying, terrorist, and sabotage activities against the USSR and the People's Democracies.

Birds of a feather flock together: Joint is given away by the identity of the man heading it. Mr. Warburg, donning the robe of the philanthropist and placing himself in the role of savior of the Jews, has been the bosom friend and business partner of the West German banker Pfordmengen, one of Hitler's former financiers and advisers, one of the wickedest Nazi war criminals.

"Warburg, the Zionist leader, and Pfordmengen, the Hitlerite, have jointly founded with vast initial capital a banking firm in Hamburg, the most important investment in West Germany of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company.

RESTRICTED

- HM 5 -

HUNGARY
Jan. 26, 1953

"This same Warburg who, with one hand, scribbles humanistic and charity appeals has pocketed with the other--as a chief shareholder of I.G. Farbenindustrie--rich dividends resulting from the manufacture of poison gas for the Auschwitz death camp, where several million people, including many hundreds of thousands of Jews, were killed. This same Warburg who preaches about helping the victims of the war is one of the main architects of the cold war and, with the golden rain of dollars he helps to set on its feet again the bloodthirsty and money-hungry German imperialism.

"Such is the likeness of philanthropists for whom every life extinguished, every bomb dropped means the clinking of gold. Under the expert direction of Mr. Warburg, the principal task of Joint has been spying and the organization of sabotage for the overthrow of the People's Democratic regimes. This was the organization which directed the base activities of the doctor-wreckers and gave instructions for the extermination of the leading cadres of the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, it does not look with contempt upon currency deals and black marketeering or smuggling. Spying and sabotage have proved excellent business also. Through the illegal emigration movement in Czechoslovakia, for instance, Joint made a profit of 9 dollars for every dollar invested. The damage which these criminals have caused the Czechoslovak People's Republic would have covered the costs of 20,000 room flats or 177,000 car loads of wheat."

Joint, though important, is by no means the only espionage and terror organization of American imperialism. The U.S. Government long ago made an institutional and an official governmental activity of the organization of assassinations and acts of terror. The Mutual Security Act provides 100 million dollars for the recruitment into armed formations of "war criminals and other criminals who fled from the USSR and the People's Democracies," for action against their countries of origin.

"Since the end of the World War Two the war incendiaries have been tenaciously and systematically building up their interwoven and world-embracing espionage network." The sum total invested for the purpose is far in excess of the amount stipulated in the Mutual Security Act.

"The Swiss paper DIE TAT estimates the annual operating costs of the Central Intelligence Agency, employing 6,500 permanent and tens of thousands of temporary spies, at 300 million dollars.

RESTRICTED

- III 6 -

HUNGARY
Jan. 26, 1953

"That agency was recently given a new chief, following the resignation of Gen. Padell Smith, with the appointment a few days ago of Allen Dulles, the brother of the new Secretary of State, the immediate director of the secret war against the USSR and the People's Democracies, the recruiting officer of the Rajka, Szonyia, Slanekya, and other traitors of the same brand.

"The central espionage organization embraces several bodies active in spying and diversion and camouflaged with impressive names, the espionage organization known as the National Committee for a Free Europe being one of the many maintained with U.S. dollars and directing its own branch organizations all over Europe. That committee, too, has been headed by Allen Dulles, and its members have included President Eisenhower, Gen. Clay, and representatives of the yellow trade unions and of "all Street."


That committee has been the motive force behind the various national committees, including the one led by "proven traitors like Forens Nagy, Mikolajczyk, and their associates." In Strasbourg and other places espionage has been given a scientific standing at universities, together with various methods of incendiarism and assassination. The "Green International" is also one of the committee's branches, allied to the gang of the international team of landlords deprived of their estates.

"It is but a few months ago that the Czechoslovak State Security organs unmasked a terrorist group belonging to the international espionage organization. The outbursts of fury of the imperialist lie-manufacturers, their walling, the salvos of rage coming from the bourgeois politicians, are proofs in themselves that the exposure of the undercover Joint agencies, the recent liquidation of American spy and terrorist groups in Bulgaria and Poland has touched the organizers of a new war to the quick.

"According to data not quite complete, in the past year alone 41 American spy groups and terrorist organizations have been liquidated in the USSR and the People's Democracies. We must be prepared for the time when the enemy, precisely because of the new blow suffered by him, will try to harm us by even viler means.

"We must always remember Stalin's wise words to the effect that so long as there is capitalism around us, there will be wreckers, diversionist spies, and terrorists sent by foreign countries to stab the Soviet Union in the back. Let us therefore fight with even greater vigilance, let us fight even more implacably against the enemy's attempts to prevent, by sabotage and subversion, the building of Socialism. The frustration of his plans depends upon us and upon our vigilance."

1953 BUDGET



SECRET

Security Information

26 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Meeting of Poles to be held here in February

REFERENCE: Memorandum on same subject from CIO to IO/Branch I, dated 23 January 1953

1. NCPE has confirmed that a meeting of ambassadors and diplomats of the Polish Government in Exile is to be held here in the middle of February.

2. The following individuals are scheduled to attend the meeting:

a. Ambassadors

Papac.....Ambassador to the Vatican
Potocki.....Ambassador to Madrid
Zenczykowski.....Ambassador to Lebanon

b. Agents

Morawski.....Paris
Raczynski.....London
Rabinski.....Ottawa
Lipski.....Washington
Arciszewski.....Buenos Aires
Ezbiniski.....Cuba

c. Others

Ruzer.....Montreal
Librach.....Secretary-General of the Foreign
Office of the Government in Exile,
coming from London
Ciechanowski.....Former Ambassador to Washington
(until 1945)
Wszelaki.....Former Consul to the Embassy in
Washington (until 1945)

3. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss and decide matters concerning the foreign policy of the Government in Exile. NCPE has heard rumors, but does not know for a fact, that the Poles intend to pay their respects to the new Administration. If this should be done, General Sosnkowski (who is returning from Canada at the end of this week) would be the spokesman, since he knows Eisenhower personally.

4. NCPE is in no way involved in sponsoring or financing this meeting. The Polish Government in Exile has funds of its own which should enable it to send delegates.

SECRET

Security Information

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/TONIC

23 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO/BRANCH 1 - Miss

SUBJECT: Meeting of Poles to be held here in February

1. John Bross telephoned me late today to inquire whether KCFE knows anything about a meeting of a group of Poles in the Polish Government in Exile to be held in February. Sokolowsky (?) was mentioned as a member of this group, and it is their intention to meet with Poles from South America, and pay their respects to the new Administration.

2. The Embassy in London is concerned about visas for these Poles and Bob Joyce has asked John Bross whether we are giving any encouragement to this proposed meeting.

3. Will you find out from KCFE what they know about this?

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

TWB/eh

2012 - Addressee
1 cc - CIO Tonic file

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

23 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO BRANCH I

SUBJECT: Use of RFE

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - C/IO/Br2
1 cc - CTO


SECRET

Mr. Brown

*P. memo to @10 for file
12-6706
+ issue
20 Jan*

27 January 1953
(Haller)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO
FROM: Chief, PI/Plans/Cover
SUBJECT: Comments concerning Crusade for Europe



SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Security Information /

22 January 1953

*sent to DGP
22 Jan*

TO: SAC, NEW YORK, INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Statements [redacted]

1. Our friends in New York have informed us that [redacted] gave a talk at the Women's Athletic Club in Chicago on 13 January 1953 on the subject of psychological warfare.

[redacted]

2. Our friends are sending down a complete report of this speech. They feel that some sort of action should be taken to stop [redacted] from continuing to make such remarks.

Chief, [redacted]

*duplicate memo 13 Jan sent to
DAPC, see Chrono.*

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

26 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PL/NO)

SUBJECT: Draft NCFE Policy Statement

1. Attached is a draft NCFE Policy Statement which has been reviewed and accented by the Executive Committee of NCFE, but which was sent to us without the knowledge of Admiral Miller and therefore should probably not be commented on by you to any of our friends in New York unless you have also received a copy from another source. Admiral Miller probably intends to send us this statement after it has been approved by the Board of Directors.

2. You may wish to compare it with the old ice-box statement now in effect, also attached.

3. You may also wish to note Part I, paragraph 2 in which mention is made of government support. It is apparently the intent of NCFE to make this statement not an ice-box statement, but a public document and if so, I think you ought to make particularly certain that you approve this part of it.

4. Finally, I think you will want to note the general tenor of Part III. Perhaps I am quibbling, but it seems to me a trifle full-blown. I realize that NCFE is a separate government agency just under cabinet status, but this reads a little bit as though it were putting on the trappings of national sovereignty.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachments
As stated.

CIO:TWB/mf

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee (CPP)
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI
1 cc - IO Br1

SECRET

For Bill Durkee

APR 24 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: PRC Meeting



CONFIDENTIAL

1952

4/8 of report in April
+ they had 200 in bank,
so we will report this
total.

They now say they need
261 thousand more.

1951

expenses	2,132,478	(79000)
receipts	2,011,421	

1950

expenses	1,170,000	(40,000)
receipts	1,210,000	

4811
12/1/50

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

21 January 1953

DATE

TO:

Mr. Braden

BUILDING

K

ROOM NO

1030

REMARKS:

Mr. Durkee asks "to have you ask Joan to tell Dorkis"

Trust you know what this means!

FROM:

IO/Tonic

BUILDING

K

ROOM NO

1402

EXTENSION

8080

FORM NO. 38-8
SEP 1948


SECRET
Security Information

21 January 1953

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

Per telephone conversation from Mr. *Dorke* on 21 January 1953, the following was stated:



Security Information

8 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: Additional Funds for the Crusade for Freedom

A. Funds requested for termination of 1952 campaign.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

- 2 -



Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

SECRET
Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

December 23, 1952

SUMMARY OF FUNDS NEEDED

778
A

Total Cash Received

Less Payroll Revolving Account

Expenses April 1, 1952 thru 12/20/52

Available Cash -

1952 Field Budget

Spent - November

 " - December

Advances to Field

1952 Field Commitment

Ad Council "

Campaign Printing "

Payroll last half of December Commitment

Telephone Charge November "

 " " December "(outside)

Airline " November "

 " " December " "

Miscellaneous Hdq. Exp. " "

Funds Needed -


[Empty box for Total Cash Received]

[Empty box for Spent - November and December]

[Empty box for 1952 Field Budget and other expenses]


SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

December 29, 1952



Security Information


December 10, 1952



Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

Page 2 - Cont'd.



secret
Security Information

~~SECRET~~
SEC. PLAN OF ORGANIZATION
FOR ADDRESS FOR ELECTION FOR 1952

On November 13, 1951, General Clay and Campaign Chairman Starns wrote to state chairmen for the 1952 campaign requesting their opinion and suggestions on the basis of continuing the Campaign throughout the year. They in fact had unanimous agreement favoring a year-round educational program followed by a fund drive in the Fall. Experience shows this continues this work.

This would require the development of a field organization of a nature to bring into the Campaign as many citizens as possible and to continue the influence that leadership which was achieved for the 1952 campaign. These objectives may be attained in two ways.

The first way is to secure at the national level the endorsement and cooperation of national groups in all fields of activity, with the ultimate idea of securing volunteer leadership on the state and local level.

The second way is to work directly in the state from the city and county level.

We are presently staffed to carry out the method necessary in the first approach on the national level. However the second method requires a more concentrated effort. For organizational purposes the country should be divided into four regions with a national representative in charge of each region. This national representative should at all times be regarded as a member of the national staff and should be of service to the states within his region on a year-round basis. His functions generally are:

1. To interpret national policy to the state chairman.
2. To facilitate the flow of material, news releases, etc., from the national office to the units within the various states.
3. To assist the state chairman in securing from the national office assistance of all kinds.
4. To aid the state chairman in perfecting his organization.

At the time of the campaign the various state chairmen would, with the consent of the national representative, secure the assistance of individuals or agencies at the state level to carry on the intensive phase of the campaign effort, within budgetary limitations.

Experience in the field in voluntary organizations over the years indicates that this method of regional representation is effective and economical for the following reasons.

1. The national representative is the full-time employee of the organization, with a knowledge of the broad phases of the work of the organization. He is therefore equipped to interpret policy and exercise judgment as rapidly as required.

TAB
B

SECRET
Security Information

-2-

2. As an employee of the national organization he is directly responsible to the national organization, and is by the fact under its control, and subject to its supervision within a general framework of action.
3. Working the year-round with state chairmen and state committees, the national representative is in an excellent position at campaign time to secure the type of temporary personnel and help that the chairmen and the state situation require.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TABLE OF PERSONNEL
CREATED FOR [REDACTED]

Executive Vice Chairman
Secretary

Campaign Director
Secretary
Assistant to Campaign Director
Clerk Stenographer

National Representatives -- Headquarters in New York
A. Labor, Veterans, Federal Employees
B. New York City operation and special assignments
C. Management Groups, Corporate Appeals and special assignments
two stenographers

National Representatives -- in Field
Five National representatives will be assigned on a regional basis to
work with state chairmen and state committees.

Assistant Treasurer's Office -- Accounting Department

Assistant Treasurer
Secretary
Chief Accountant
Assistant Accountant
Stenographer

Telephone Operator
Stock Clerk and Messenger

Publicity and Public Relations Director
Secretary
Assistant Director -- Features, Magazines, House Organs
Stenographer

Director -- Speakers Bureau

Radio and TV Director
Secretary

Director Women's and School Groups

National Representatives for assignment on a Regional Basis
New England and Middle Atlantic (Out of New York Office -- 1 man)
South
Midwest
Far East



Munich Operation -- Public Relations

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM

1953 Budget



CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

1991 CONTRIBUTIONS




*orig returned
to Tonic*

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

January 20, 1953


Dear




SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -



Sincerely yours,



SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Supersent

W. A. G.

10281

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P 1917

15 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Eastern European Division

SUBJECT :

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

WPD seeing Security on this man.

3. I am also furnishing a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Braden in view of the possibility that [Redacted] might be of some use to Radio Free Europe, [Redacted]

4. In any case, I should appreciate your suggesting a suitable reply to Mr. [Redacted] bearing in mind the fact that he has been helpful to us in the past and does seem to be well disposed.

[Redacted]

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosures (2)
As specified.

cc: C/IO
C/FI
C/WE

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

CPP

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. C/IO					<p>Tom - I would definitely get this dope to Archie.</p> <p>Tracy 12-22-50</p> <p>No, it wasn't written at the time. I however explained verbally the Crusade & she used her samples of liberation etc.</p> <p>Bill: Let's send it to him then. It's a good excuse for getting in touch with him again which I want to do. Can you draft one & settle?</p> <p>this please send white copy & return</p>
2. Bill - did you show him this?				VD	
3.					
4.					
5. Return to C/IO file					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					


attachment to Crusade memo.
TWB gave this to [redacted]

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

15 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Briefing Paper



TWB

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments
TS 85308
TS 85340

RECEIVED

Secret

TOP SECRET



~~SECRET~~

~~35960~~

... 4 COPY OF 3 ... COPIES

SECRET
Security Information

NCFE has, from small beginnings, for purposes only generally defined, grown into a large institution organized as follows:

NCFE is a non-profit membership corporation, organized under the laws of New York State.

The Committee's major divisions, functions and budget for 1953 are as follows:

a. Division of General Administration - Budget for fiscal year 1953 -

This is a headquarters administrative unit in NCFE's New York headquarters. It is not an over-all administrative unit, as each subdivision has its own administrative organization.

b. Division of Emigre Relations - Budget for fiscal year 1953 -

The Division of Emigre Relations is the political center of NCFE. Through this Division, support is given to the various emigre organizations and to individual emigres.

In the past two years, this Division has attempted -- with conspicuous lack of success -- to create unified refugee groups. It is at present in the process of reviewing and revising its relations with individual emigres and emigre organizations. It is attempting to exercise closer financial control over these organizations and to develop a program using emigre groups and individuals in a way which will contribute more positively to psychological warfare efforts. This Division of NCFE is the most responsive to guidance.

c. Division of Intellectual Cooperation - Budget for Fiscal Year 1953 -

The activities of this Division are principally directed to the building of intellectual resources which will ensure continuity with the past and which can be used when the satellite countries are liberated. The Division's activities consist of:

1. The East European Inquiry, an outgrowth and enlargement of the Danubian Inquiry, which was created by Woodrow Wilson in 1918. Its aim is to prepare basic materials in order to meet the minimum needs of those who will be charged with the reorganization of the Danubian area.

2. Other Studies of a miscellaneous nature useful to the other divisions of NCFE and to students of Central Europe.


SECRET
Security Information

3. Scholarships to American universities this year will be 80-85 to highly qualified exiles who have signed a pledge to return to their homelands after liberation.

4. Textbooks to replace Communist textbooks are being prepared in stockpile and manuscript form.

5. The Mid-European Law Project, which digests and annotates current legislation from the Iron Curtain countries.

6. The East European Accessions List, which publishes a monthly annotated bibliography of current published material from the satellites received in the Library of Congress.



e. Research and Publication Service - Budget for fiscal year 1953 -

The Committee for Research and Publications was created in November 1951 to make available in currently useful form information about the satellite countries. It gathers information from four basic sources:

1. The analysis of 270 Communist newspapers and periodicals;
2. RFE's overseas information-gathering network;
3. Monitoring reports from all major satellite radio stations. The analysis of the 10,000 publications from the satellite area received annually by the Library of Congress. The compiled information is used in the following ways:
 - a) Within NCFE - Daily digest of all Iron Curtain information. These are prepared for the use of RFE's New York language desk;
 - b) Weekly trend meetings by RFE -- RPS desk heads to discuss the interpretation and use in radio programming of events in the Iron Curtain countries;

SECRET

Security Information

- 3 -

- c) Research projects on specific targets for RFE's New York and Munich language desks. Daily monitoring highlights summarize major events in all satellite countries;
- d) RFE also makes available its information files to the Divisions of Intellectual Cooperation and Empire Relations;
- e) A "Black Book" prepared every six months, contains communist attacks against RFE/RFE;
- f) To the general public - "News from Behind the Iron Curtain, a monthly magazine of source material about the target area, is issued to some 5,000 people in the field of communications. 142 research studies have been distributed outside the Committee to a total of 11,900 people. Foreign language bulletins in each of the major tongues of the satellite countries, are distributed to some 5,000 exiles in 52 countries outside the Soviet orbit. These bulletins, which average 100 pages each, are the only complete and unbiased source of information about their captive homelands available to those who have escaped.

f. Radio Free Europe - Budget for fiscal year 1953 -

Radio Free Europe's main broadcasting studio and equipment is located in Munich, Germany. Broadcasting facilities are maintained also in New York and there is a relay station in Portugal. RFE broadcasts an average of about 1,000 hours per week. Of this broadcasting time 187 1/2 hours are original programming, directed mainly to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Broadcasts to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania are prepared and relayed from New York. New York exercises policy control over RFE broadcasts through daily guidances and a tele-type system between Munich and New York.

Radio Free Europe has its own information section to provide its broadcast materials. It has correspondents and offices in London, Paris, Stockholm, Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Salzburg, Vienna, Linz (Austria), Wels (Austria), Graz (Austria), Rome, Trieste, Athens and Istanbul. These offices produce an average of over one thousand reports per month. In addition, material for broadcasting comes from: 1) satellite press publications; 2) RFE's monitoring service of satellite and Russian broadcasts; 3) information from the Division of Empire Relations, private letters, news service, the BBC, VOA and others.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

- 4 -

II

The foregoing is a cursory outline of NCFE and a brief record of our attempts to solve administrative problems. To complete the picture, the following is a brief outline of the major psychological problems we face with NCFE.

NCFE is not what it should be -- an integral and balanced part of the total U.S. program for dealing with the satellite nations of Eastern Europe. The top officials of NCFE have no detailed comprehension of U.S. policy, nor any understanding of how they can contribute to its development and operation. They give only lip service to the idea of obtaining policy guidance from Washington. Their apparent attitude has been that they can make a trip to Washington, determine what "high policy" is, and return to New York with the job done. This push-button mentality, added to their deep-seated suspicion of Government interference, has led them to resist our efforts to study their role and to develop new ideas, or reexamine old ones.

As a result of these attitudes, there has been considerable difficulty in gaining information about NCFE activities, problems and plans. For example, we do not receive any regular communication from Admiral W. B. Miller; we have received no list of NCFE personnel, nor any minutes of meetings of the Staff Executive Committee, or the Board of Directors. Even more important than this is the fact that the heads of divisions are prevented from having contact with us, except on occasions when Admiral Miller is out of town. As a result, for instance, Mr. Lang, the head of RFE, who has considerable problems and is anxious for the closest liaison, is prevented from dealing with us personally. Conversely, every attempt to deal with NCFE personnel individually is looked upon with suspicion and carried on by NCFE personnel with some apprehension. The reasons for Admiral Miller's attitude are two-fold: (a) In his organization he wants everything done through him; and (b) He does not wish any outside "control" over his activities. (Admiral Miller's manner of conducting affairs within the Committee is resented by Mr. Spencer Phenix and other members of the Board of Directors, but Mr. Phenix and NCFE Directors support Admiral Miller in his reluctance to deal outside the Board.

This lack of consultation and common study has clear reflections in the organization itself. NCFE is not an integrated organization. Each division operates separately, without any real relation to other divisions. Added to this, the lack of a clear understanding of the Committee's purposes and of its place in the total psychological warfare efforts of the United States has led to real dissatisfaction among the Division heads. They are anxious to know what they are doing, to integrate their own efforts and to cooperate to the maximum.

To formulate our own and NCFE's ideas, we have been and are carrying on discussions with the officials and working personnel of NCFE. In some of these discussions, Mr. Francis B. Stevens of the State Department, has been a direct participant.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

- 5 -

These discussions have covered a wide variety of subjects which can generally be described as follows:

- (1) What is NCFE's place as a whole in American policy toward the satellite nations? What is American policy? What modifications are likely?
- (2) How can NCFE, especially the Division of Empire Relations, contribute more effectively to psychological and political warfare, not only for effects behind the Iron Curtain, but in the Free World? For example - How can NCFE securely engage in further activities in the pattern of its successful actions at the United Nations, the Labor Hearings and the International Red Cross Meetings at Toronto?
- (3) Should NCFE continue to support empire councils, or should some other technique be developed which can enable it to make more effective use of empires for psychological warfare purposes?
- (4) How can the Research and Publications Division, the Division of Intellectual Cooperation, and the Free University best contribute to these efforts?
- (5) Is NCFE efficiently organized? What, for example, is the effect of the Division of Empire Relations' dealings with empires on the position of NCFE in Europe, etc?
- (6) How can we give specific guidance to NCFE? What kind of information is wanted, for example, by NCFE? What studies and means of overcoming jamming can be made available to NCFE? How can American and British legations in the satellite best provide guidance and information for NCFE?

III

There are, in addition, some specific current problems that should be mentioned. They are:



- (1) RFI's position in Germany. The position of Radio Free Europe in Germany is becoming increasingly difficult. The political situation in Germany has developed so that the German expellees, numbering some 9,000,000 voters, have joined with the extreme nationalist elements, some of whom are non-German extremists, such as Slovak separatists. This group holds a potential possible balance of power between the CDU and the SPD. As a result, both parties, but particularly the SPD, are becoming more vociferously nationalistic. RFI, as an American operation in Germany, including the Voice of America, will be the subject of pressure. RFI is most vulnerable of all because of its Eastern European personnel and the nature of its broadcasts. RFI's problems are the subject of careful study at the present time by NCFE, and others.

SECRET

Security Information

- 6 -

Should RFE be forced out of Germany -- its facilities in Portugal can be expanded to take over the job. Programming can be moved to London and Paris. In addition, RFE has asked us to consider the feasibility of their locating a station in Turkey to enable them to program full time with a strong signal into Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania.



SECRET

Security Information

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM

1950 CAMPAIGN

1. The Crusade was launched by General Dwight D. Eisenhower on a nation wide broadcast.

2. The symbol of the Crusade, a ten ton World Freedom Bell, inscribed with a quotation from Lincoln, "This World under God shall have a new birth of freedom", toured the United States from coast to coast. The "Freedom Bell" was sent to Berlin to become part of a "Freedom Shrine", and tolled there over an international radio hookup.

3. Freedom Scrolls signed by 15,000,000 contributors were taken to Berlin to become a permanent part of the Freedom Shrine.

4. In the United States, local committees were established throughout the country. General Lucius Clay was appointed chairman of the fund raising campaign of the Crusade for Freedom. Mr. Abbott Washburn, Chief, Public Relations for General Foods Corp. was appointed as the director. Assisting companies were: Fund raising - John Price Co., Inc. - Advertising - Hewitt, Ogilvy, Benson & Mather Inc. Small mass contributions were solicited. Contributions from large individual donors were solicited later, in order to afford the fund raising campaign a broader continuity. Literature (samples attached) of all kinds, explaining Radio Free Europe were distributed.

5. Financial results were as follows:

Expenses;

Contributions

--

1951 CAMPAIGN

The 1951 Crusade Campaign was begun by the launching of balloons into Czechoslovakia and Poland containing pamphlets of encouragement to the people of these countries. Copies of the message and samples of the balloons were used to solicit contributions in the United States. Publicity dealt largely with Radio Free Europe. Free magazine advertising was widely used for the first time. A coast to coast telethon was used.

Inadvertently, through mistakes of the staff and the failure to adequately brief community leaders, the Crusade mistakenly implied that the Voice of America was ineffective -- that only Radio Free Europe, the privately supported radio broadcasting station, could do an effective job.

After conferences with the State Department, it was agreed that VOA and RFE were complimentary activities and that in the future the Crusade:

(1) Would not put out anything which might be interpreted as a criticism of the Voice. To that end, an attached leaflet was inserted as an insert in the January 1952 "Crusader", a newsletter which was sent out to the 8,000 regional chairmen of the Crusade for Freedom. It was intended to acquaint the regional Crusade organizations with the facts about the Voice of America and to offset any criticism or unfortunate comparison between Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America.

Financial results were as follows:

Expenses;

Contributions;

1952 CAMPAIGN

The 1952 Crusade Campaign was begun by General Eisenhower, Adlai Stevenson and Henry Ford, II, the 1952 Campaign Chairman. The Campaign was endorsed in a letter from President Truman:

"I understand that on the success of the 1952 Crusade rests the plans of the Crusade for Freedom to build more radio stations in Free Europe and Asia. If this can be done, and I believe that it will be done, the Free world can more effectively get the truth behind the Iron Curtain.

"It is essential that the people everywhere know that we are working for peace, freedom and prosperity for all mankind."

The assistance of the Advertising Council was enlisted and for the first time outdoor billboard advertising was used. Records were made containing 2 fifteen minute programs on "The RFE story" and spot films were arranged for television with narration by Henry Fonda.

For the first time, fund raising letters seeking large contributions were sent to all leading corporations.

The Campaign was highly organized on the local level with state chairmen in almost every state. The Post Office Department permitted the use of a local post office address for receipts.

For fund raising

- 3 -

purposes on a mass scale -- a freedomgram to be signed by contributors has been distributed. These freedomgrams, translated into six languages will be broadcast over Radio Free Europe.

SECRET
Security Information

13 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STAFF

SUBJECT: Request by the Directors of NCFE for a statement from

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief


International Organizations Division

Attachments:
As stated above

SECRET
Security Information


CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

Registration Registry
221




Please specify to
12 January 1953

Walter Nis



MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director Central Intelligence
FROM : Chief, International Organizations



THOMAS W. BRADEN

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

SUMMARY OF FACTS ON RADIO FREE EUROPE

Radio Free Europe (RFE) was established as a separate division of NCFE when the latter was incorporated on May 11, 1949. RFE has been on the air since mid-July 1950. At the close of 1950, RFE broadcasts were totalling 7 1/2 hours daily, programs of 1 1/2 hours each being addressed to the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. The total cost of this earliest period, from 17 May 1949 to 30 June 1950, was \$1,237.57, operating and capital costs being roughly even. The next year was to see these same costs rise in the same ratio - capital to operating - to a total of

Today, RFE broadcasts to all the above mentioned countries, with the addition of Albania, at a weekly total rate of 1066 hours, of which 190 hours are original programming - some 5% of the total free world broadcast hours directed at the Orbit. The original program broadcasts are directed mainly to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Broadcasts to Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania are prepared and relayed from New York.

The estimated expenditures of RFE for the fiscal year 1953 are capital [redacted] operating expenses, \$1,236,100 [redacted] for a total [redacted]. Estimated operating expenses (only) for the same period are [redacted]. A summary of RFE expenditures to date is as follows:

For Period 17 May 49 to 30 June 50
For Period 1 July 50 to 30 June 51
For Period 1 July 51 to 30 June 52
For Period 1 July 52 to 30 June 53

TOTALS TO INCLUDE 30 JUNE 1953

RFE INSTALLATIONS

RFE's principal installations are its main broadcasting station and production equipment, located in Munich, Germany; broadcasting facilities maintained in New York City and the major relay center at Lisbon, Portugal.

In Germany, transmitters are in operation at Holzkirchen and Eiblis, while monitoring, recording and receiving functions are at Langfischstein and Loosburg. In Portugal, the 50 and 100 kw transmitting complex is at Gloria, while receiving/monitoring facilities and production/editing are at Laxoqueria and Lisbon, respectively.

Original capital investment in Germany as of 30 June 1950 amounted to [redacted]. Original capital, for Portugals as of 30 June 1950

SECRET
NO FORN DISSEM



SECRET
NO FORN DISSEM

SECURITY INFORMATION

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM

RFE is in part supported by the Crusade for Freedom, a radio broadcasting mechanism. From September 8, 1950 to date, the Crusade has been responsible for some 47 million dollars in contributions to RFE and RFE. Expenditures for the Crusade, over the same period, amounted to some 2 1/4 millions. All monies raised, except expenditures, or a total of 1 3/4 millions have been spent directly and solely on RFE's capital installation, i.e., transmitters, receivers, supporting equipment.

PERSONNEL

RFE in July 1950 employed 127, of whom 110 were Americans, 27 of whom were employed in Germany. At present, RFE has a total staff of 1770, of whom 252 are American. In New York, the policy and administrative headquarters, the staff number 195. In Munich, which is the programming headquarters, there are 1209 employees. In Lisbon, the technical relay headquarters, there are now 34 individuals. These figures include only staff employees on the regular payroll.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

WAVE OF CONTRIBUTIONS

RFE is a major instrument in total U.S. political and psychological warfare efforts directed at Central and Eastern Europe. It has contributed in the following ways:

RFE made an intensive campaign of Stalin's death and linked this event with the death of Gorkovsk and the illness of Fleck. During the intensive period of the Stalin story, RFE was on the air 24 hours with all its 21 transmitters on a single frequency, which was switched continuously from country to country. It beat all Western press agencies by 2 1/2 hours in announcing Gorkovsk's illness and is usually about 2 hours ahead of VOA and BBC in announcing events of major importance.

Radio Free Europe was the first to inform the Agency of the recent riots in Pilsen, the reshuffle of the Hungarian Communist Government, etc.

RFE has contributed in the launching of two balloon operations: one in the summer of 1951, when barrages of balloons were hurled at Czechoslovakia and Poland, another on 18 July 1953, when thousands of balloons were launched into Czechoslovakia.

[REDACTED]

RFE gives hope to those behind the Iron Curtain and its broadcasts have provided incentives to escape: e.g. escape of two Polish pilots, Freedom Train.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

7 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: RFE in Turkey

ACTION NECESSARY: Will you please decide or cause to be decided the following question: Should the National Committee for a Free Europe in its approach to Turkish authorities exploring the possibility of creating an RFE station in Turkey contact Turkish authorities as a

Background

1. The State Department has asked that RFE not approach Turkish authorities until VOA's attempt to get into Turkey has been accepted or refused by the Turks. The Department has now given the Voice of America until 15 January to conclude its negotiations with the Turkish Government. These negotiations appear to be leading nowhere and, on the assumption that VOA will not gain entrance to Turkey, the Department has authorized RFE to begin negotiations on the above date.

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION