

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

US RECORD MATERIAL

USE DATE

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES & DISPOSITION SECTION, RM 0755E ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED.
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 2257.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(47)

3	2024	12/10/73	aut
4	CA/HQ		
5	OG/CR		
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14	RETURNS TO GA-50		
15	FORWARD		

DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.

78-1129
432393

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE NO 78-1129-432393

DOCUMENT: _____

FOLDER: 9

PAGE: _____

BOX: E 2

FORM 179a

610

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

12/10/73
AFTER 1:30
CORDS CENTER

Johnson

21 March 1952

UNION Conversation at the Department of State on 21 March 1952.
Present were Messrs. Joyce, Fritzman and Mosier from
State and Messrs. Lloyd and Braden from CIA.

Mr. Fritzman had just returned from a trip abroad and said
that he had three civvies to make about USSR. In order they were
as follows:

1. He said that in the Greek tobacco, etc. list and others
complained of the activities of the writers of CP. These
writers, he said, sometimes posed as government employees and
went to consulates of other countries getting in touch with refugees
without clearing with the U.S. Consuls. He said that Mr. Mosier
spoke strongly, saying that he had told the press on many several
times that the CP reporters must not be in line. He said that he
would repeat these warnings and that the views of CIA and of V&A
were identical on the problem. He also said that the discussion began
that of the two reporters in Greece who were involved -- Sandowki
and Gant -- whereby he had now tried to get to the specific
problem, if not the case, was solved for the moment.

2. Fritzman also said that he had heard from several sources
around Europe increased reports that there were communists and fascists
within the USSR. He referred to the official views of our security.
The manner in which the Soviet security system was outlined to
Mr. Fritzman and the way he would be instructed. Mr. Mosier,
however, instructed Mr. Lloyd to contact all the news and to instruct
him to warn the press, the press, etc. He also mentioned the
tactics to get them out of the USSR and to infiltrate
the press again.

3. Mr. Fritzman said that he had recently met Mr. Harry Gold
and had in the past had conversations to give them some policy
guidance, at least they said they had. He mentioned whether it
would be in order for them to have some policy guidance. He would

replied that in fact RFE did receive constant and frequent policy guidance but that the members of the top staff of RFE were looking for the type of policy guidance which did not exist -- a kind of overall global strategy covering specific incidents and eventualities, a kind of policy guidance which probably neither would nor could be written. Specifically he had no objection to showing the top people V A policy line.

Finally, Mr. Kohler questioned the advisability of putting the new Russian Committee under the Crusade. He pointed out his fear that, what with RFE and RFA already under the Crusade, the Congress would soon believe there was nothing left for VOA to cover. Mr. Joyce rose to this question explaining the necessity of helping Admiral Kirk to find some cover. He pointed out that Eugene Brown and Devine had been detailed to assure that Crusade publicity did not give the impression that RFE and RFA and any new "private" radio would obviate the necessity for the Voice, and assured Kohler that all Crusade publicity, posters etc. would avoid this possibility. Wisner mentioned his desire to find better cover for the new Committee and there was some talk of Foundations. No better cover had, however, been found at the moment and it was apparent that Admiral Kirk must have some answer to questions which are submitted to him. Mr. Kohler answered this argument by reiterating his fears.

THOMAS W. BROWN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TB/eh

Orig - DDCI (thru AIS C & P/A.)
1 cc - DD/Y
1 cc - FT (Mr. Poor)
1 cc - FY
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : S/P - Mr. Joyce

DATE: February 19, 1952

FROM : S/P - Mr. Harbour 

SUBJECT: Fund Memorandum No. 462 of December 31, 1951 attaching copies of documents regarding the activities of the Central and Eastern European Conference (Slavik-Kajer Group)

Your attention is invited to subject memorandum which quotes a speech by Jerzy Lerski, Vice Chairman of the Polish Political Council's Working Committee in the United States, proposing the formation of a domestic political pressure group of American residents of Eastern European stock. In the course of his speech, Mr. Lerski repeats and endorses the official statement of Aims and Principles of Federation of Americans of Central and East-European Descent. This statement, particularly in its paragraph 3, proposes that their objectives should be obtained through "unified political action."

The Department is obviously in complete support of their basic objective, namely, the overthrow of Communism. However, we do perceive real harm in the utilization of NCFE funds to promote domestic political pressure groups; especially, when such groups will self-avowedly engage in political and election contests in the United States in order to further their objectives abroad.

Accordingly, we would suggest that steps be taken to ensure that groups which are sponsored by or supported through affiliation with NCFE be restrained from participating in or assisting such domestic political pressure groups as is proposed in subject Fund Memorandum. Such groups should be cautioned, in any event, to avoid any public declarations of intent to intervene in domestic American politics.

WMA: Bell:lc

2/19/52 *HW*

FUND 1 P HAT US NO. 102

SECRET

C-22

C-22

PRIVATE

December 31, 1951

~~23~~

~~DO~~
~~HW~~
~~ML-1/16~~

Attached to this memorandum are copies of documents regarding the activities of the Central and Eastern European Conference (Slavik-Majer Group).

(Peraki)

SECRET

JAN 5 1952

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

On behalf of Mr. A. Gretsionu, Chairman of the last conference, and Mr. Constantine Cotich, Chairman of the Serbian National Committee, Chairman of the next meeting of the Central and Eastern European Conference, I am inviting you and your political friends to a meeting of the CECE, which will be held on Tuesday, December 10, 1951 at the Hotel Willard, Executive Room, Pennsylvania Ave. and 14th St., Washington, D.C., at precisely 3 P.M.

The Agenda of the meeting will be:

1. Report of the Secretary General on the meetings of the General Committee on the action of the CECE on deportations, in Washington, New York, Paris, about the press conference in Washington, etc.
2. Report of Mr. Jerzy Lerski (Vice Chairman of the Polish Political Council, Working Committee in the U.S.) on collaboration with Americans of Central and East European Descent.
3. Report of Mr. V. Stanka on World University.

The report of Mr. Lerski is attached to this invitation.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) Mr. Juraj Slavik
Secretary General

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

(On Americans of Central and East European Descent)

From Jerzy Lerski, Vice Chairman of the Polish Political Council's Working Committee in the U.S., 618 A Street, N.W., Apt. 15, Washington 3, D. C.

The last three decades of the past century and the first two of the present one, mark the period in which millions of the impoverished peasants of central and eastern Europe came to the happy shores of free America. There are now at least twelve million U.S. citizens of Central and East European descent. This is, of course, a most careful estimate. Congressman Kenneth W. Keating of Rochester, N. Y., in his

Extension of Remarks in the Journal of Commerce on September 15th, 1941, gives the total number of these "Loyal Americans" as 20,000,000.--I think it is rather too high an estimate. Even if we would include all Jews from those areas the number could hardly be higher than 15 millions; this would be 17% of the total population of the United States. This work seeking, economic emigration from our countries was mainly concentrated in the big cities and the great industrial or mining areas, of the sixteen East and Mid-Western states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin and Minnesota. In some of those states these Europeans comprise about one third of the population. This applies especially to big cities such as Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Toledo, Pittsburgh, Scranton, Buffalo, Wilkes Barre, Trenton, Newark, Camden, New Britain, etc. We should also mention that not less than one fifth of this big emigration managed to find work on farms--in such states as Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska, Massachusetts, and New York.

The political importance of this great segment of American population is steadily increasing in the last twenty years. Nearly all the respective groups were concerned about the homelands of their fathers and grandfathers and became very active during World War II. Although, with the succeeding generations, third or even fourth, this interest has waned, due to the natural weakening of ties with the "old countries"--these new Americans, the sons and grandsons of the poor Central and Eastern European peasant emigrants are conscious of their ancestry. Educated in American colleges and universities, they are gradually emerging in American public life; their old inhibitive inferiority complex is rapidly disappearing. Let us study the Washington Telephone Directory. It is astonishing that at least every twelfth name is of Central Eastern European descent. I am not as familiar with other national groups and their achievements, but as far as Poles are concerned, we are proud to have Mr. Szymczak as one of the Governors of the Federal Reserve, Peter Bukowski the newly appointed Deputy Director of RFD, Mr. Bruk the Mayor of Buffalo and Mr. Szolista Mayor of Toledo. I am sure similar successes can be claimed by other groups of our Central and Eastern European bloc. Most of these Americans are very helpful if properly approached. We have heard recently at a reception of General Bronkowiak a statement made by Major Alfred S. Slesinski a Democratic Congressman from New Jersey who offered his willingness to help the exiled leaders of all of our groups, in our efforts to liberate our part of the world. Similar statements have been made by other non-residents of Polish descent.

The social advancement of our American brethren is visible nearly in all spheres of American life, with the sole exception of propaganda i.e. press, radio, television, Hollywood, though even there some progress is to be noticed. In such fields as church, universities, and politics the process of advancement is remarkable. Americans of Central and Eastern European descent have proved to be a first class reliable element as soldiers and citizens of the United States during the two world wars and the present most dangerous ideological struggle with Communism.

There are about six million Americans of Polish descent in the United States. They consist approximately one half of the estimated total of the Central and Eastern European group. Slovaks and Ukrainians compete for second place, having about one million each, in the United States and Canada, Lithuanians and Hungarians seem to be next in line. It may be taken for granted that all of our national groups have at least a hundred thousand American brothers in this country. It is, and it should be a tremendous asset in our struggle for liberation. To take my own Polish group for example it is encouraging to know that there are already ten congressmen of Polish descent (seven Democrats, three Republicans). Tadousz Pachowicz Democrat of Michigan, speaking at the Polish rally in Detroit declared a few weeks ago that "all congressmen of Polish descent, regardless of party affiliations, are united in so far as the cause of free Poland is concerned." According to him, as reported by the Polish American Journal No. 47--Vol. XI of November 24th, 1941--"the Polish American solons are working together to invalidate the Teheran and Yalta agreements and to persuade the United States Government to go on record favoring the present western boundaries of Poland." Of other groups Slovaks have one Congressman of their descent--young and prominent Mr. Nisznik from the fourth district of Minnesota. Our Czech friends can claim an old experienced member of the Foreign Affairs Committee Mr. Sabbath--Democrat from Illinois, born in Prague, and another Congressman Mr. Stefan died recently. Up to now there never was any U.S. Senator who could claim Central or Eastern European ancestry, although Senator Langer was born of Czechoslovak German parents. Former Governor of Mass. claims Czech ancestry and Governor Lausche Slovenian ancestry. There are several congressmen of Jewish extraction who were either born in our part of the world or are of the Eastern European parentage. Some of them may be also considered as potential friends of our cause.

A typical organization in which we should be interested in our work is that of Polish American Congress, established early in 1944 with the main purpose to help Poland in regaining her liberty and at the same time to serve in the best way the long range interests of the United States by pointing out the dangers of Communism and Russian imperialism. By taking such a determined stand at the time when the close friendship with the so-called great Eastern Ally was preached in Washington, they have rendered a valuable service to this country. Polish American Congress is a sort of federation of all types of Polish American organizations, most of them being of course insurance companies with Polish National Alliance (1,000,000 members and 70 million of capital) as the most powerful. Others are cultural, educational, or church and veteran groups. They joined together in a struggle for Justice for Poland. Polish-American Congress has the cooperation of about 50 Polish-American newspapers in this country.

Studying the problem I found that there exist parallel organizations of other national groups. Their structural basis are also very similar. I became better acquainted with the American Hungarian Federation. Though organized as long ago as 1903 at Cleveland Convention, it now has among its principal aims and purposes: "To support--within the Constitution and laws of the United States--with all its influence movements aiming to bring about independence for Hungary as well as liberty and well being for its people and to do everything possible to protect the human rights and citizenship of the Hungarian displaced persons outside of Hungary." As the Polish organization is

dominated by the vigorous and colorful personality of Charles Koszarek from Chicago so is the Hungarian Federation by its energetic executive secretary Stephen E. Balogh from Washington, D.C. The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America is another very active body under the chairmanship of young economist Dr. Lev Kobriansky from Georgetown University.

The above mentioned three organizations together with the Byelorussian - American Association, American Carpatho-Rus Congress, United American Rumanians, and the Slovak League of America are sponsoring a Federation of Americans of Central and East European Descent, with the Headquarters at 1424 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., which is at the same time the Home of the American-Hungarian Federation. It is a young organization in its initial period of ambitious activities. Its officers elected on April 1951 at the Hudson Hotel - New York Conference are Stephen E. Kratoch (Carpatho-Ruthenian)--President, Dr. Lev Kobriansky (of Ukrainian descent)--Vice President, Charles Koszarek (of Polish descent)--Treasurer. Members of the Board of Directors: Stephen E. Balogh (of Hungarian descent), John Michayonack, Philip Hrebak--Recording Secretary, Mr. Liggins (of Latvian descent), Rev. Milvije Trubisic (of Croatian descent) and Stephen J. Skubik (of Ukrainian descent)--Bureau Manager. Joseph A. Jackovics (of Slovak descent) was Federation's Secretary General but accused by other officers for his tendency to turn the Federation into a mere tool of Republican Party machine he was forced to resign. It is not to be overlooked that the Federation is at the moment under strong Ukrainian influence. The officers of the Board of Directors complain that Mr. Koszarek never attended a meeting of theirs and that Mr. Charles Burke from the Washington Office of the Polish American Congress deputizes only in the character of an observer. His absence de facto of the Polish-American Congress apparently hampers to a large extent the Federation's activities. (The reason for this absence will be explained orally).

According to an official statement of aims and principles of Federation of Americans of Central and East European Descent adopted at the Board of Directors Meeting held in Washington on August 17, 1951 there are as follows:

1. To exert every effort to defend the Constitution of our American way of life. To engage and exercise every measure of effort and resource toward the decisive defeat of Russian Communist imperialism which in its venomous essence poses a mortal threat to the moral and intellectual Christian foundations of western civilization in which is posited our priceless American way of life.

2. To coordinate and implement the common and mutual activities of the numerous member organizations represented herein within the scope of a unified political action oriented toward the systematic realization of this basic objective and the simultaneous world-wide extension of the spiritual and hence, any continuation of the serving of complaints will be simply a gesture of denatorial blessings engendered in our Bill of Rights, the formula of self-determined freedom and the Atlantic Charter.

3. To serve and assist through such unified political action the appropriate agencies of our Government and various collaborating American anti-Communist organizations in the dissemination of authentic information on Soviet Russian tyranny and atrocity behind the iron curtains of Central Europe and Asia, in the promulgation of necessary steps aimed at the formation of a global network of anti-Communist alliances, notably within the Soviet empire, in the formulation of political objectives adapted to the historic requirements and aspirations of the peoples available as our natural allies, and in the persistent counteraction of sinister Communist and other anti-democratic influence and groups in our domestic environment.

4. To promote the security and welfare of the United States by insisting upon policies which are shaped in terms of a scrupulous and forthright observance of the sacred principles embodied in the aforementioned monuments to the liberal human spirit and which will insure lasting peace to all the nations of the world, including those of Central and Eastern Europe, numbering approximately 150,000,000 people.

5. To urge our Government to seek the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to the nations which have been forcibly deprived of them and to secure the exercise of the fundamental right of self-determination for those nations which have not in the past been accorded this right, particularly in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

6. To impel, on the happy occasion of the liberation of all peoples from the yoke of Soviet Russian imperialism, governmental action to fulfill the guaranty of free and unfettered elections in these countries under the supervision of the United Nations and with strict regard for conditions of population distribution existing prior to the institution of the Russification policy bent on the extinction of the national identities of the respective enslaved countries.

7. Recognizing the twofold need, viz: ridding all countries involved of implanted Soviet influence, together with ultimate solution of territorial boundary disputes, it is urged that strict priority of action be extended to the former consideration.

8. To abet forcefully the realization of the preceding objectives and concomitantly contribute to the prevention of a generally disastrous world war III through the vigorous advancement of psychological warfare, with particular emphasis on substantial improvements in the status and function of the voice of America, resounding proclamation of American friendship and support of the liberating movements everywhere throughout the wide peripheral European and Asiatic area of non-Russian peoples imperialistically subjugated in the Soviet empire, and demands for true representation of these enslaved peoples in the councils of the United Nations.

9. To secure maximum and unflinching aid on the part of our Government for the manifold operations and the potentially unlimited expansion of the underground movements behind the iron curtains of Europe and Asia.

Though many of the proclaimed aims seem to be identical with

those of ours there are also at the moment several serious obstacles for our close cooperation between our CAC and the Federation. Our two bodies consist of different national groups. Some of the nationalities present in CAC have not their counterparts in the Federation as is the case of Czechs, Slovaks, Rumanians and Serbs. The efforts are made to bring these national groups within the scheme of the Federation. On the other side Ukrainians, Carpatho-Ruthenians, Byelorussians, and Slovak autonomists are not represented in our Committee. It should be stressed also that some of the corresponding new emigration groups, of the last mentioned nationalities are being considered by our friends from CAC as uncooperative due to their separatistic tendencies. I realize that the thorny problem of the independence of the some of the mentioned nationalities could hardly be at the present moment introduced in CAC. I would be inclined to suggest that as many of our immediate aims are similar to those of the Federation, regardless of some substantial differences we should take advantage of such a large body of organized American friends eagerly interested in the liberation of our respective countries within the whole area of Central-Eastern Europe. The same would apply of course to all component national organizations of the Federation such as for instance Polish American Congress which is not yet closely linked with the Federation. I would suggest that as all our groups have already established their liaison officers to appoint a liaison to the Federation of Americans of Central and East European Descent in order to be informed about their activities and to represent there our point of view. Such a cooperation may be of a great importance in many fields. I am sure that all these American organizations would be willing to help us in rising before the free world the problems of deportations and forced labour in our part of the world, as our Polish American Congress was very helpful in bringing the Katyn Forest massacre into the light of the free opinion. Let us use our American brothers not only in such otherwise vital services as sending millions of food and clothing parcels behind the Iron Curtain or signing tens of thousands of affidavits and job assurances for Displaced Persons. Let us cooperate with them as close as possible in the most important political problems of our struggle for freedom.

The principal political issue facing us in that respect is that of pressing for a "Liberation Policy" of the United States and other western powers. With the approach of November 1952 elections it is becoming obvious to all of us that it will be of extreme importance for the cause of our free who will be elected as the new legislators of the United States. As Aliens we are not allowed to interfere into American domestic politics, as representatives of our countries we are deeply interested in whose hands the fate and the future of the world events is going to lie in the years to come. It is now a commonplace to state that Soviet Russia and the United States will decide the fundamental, universal issues in which our countries are so much concerned--liberty or slavery. We believe deeply that this should be a matter of common interest to us and to the citizens of the United States. It would be more than just a shortsightedness not to realize that in this decisive struggle for the very existence of our nations we are lucky to possess here powerful and understanding Allies in at least 10 million American voters of Central-Eastern European descent. They are equally eager as ourselves in bringing

freedom back to our part of the world. As good American citizens, tax-payers, soldiers and workers they are fully entitled to sustain us in our efforts to liberate our countries. Regardless of party affiliations we should support our faithful friends and to watch our enemies. Such a policy was applied mutatis mutandis by American Labour Unions in the case of the Taft Hartley Act, when all candidates for the seat in the House of Representatives or Senate and state Governorships, regardless of their party competency, have been asked for their stand in that matter and their record of voting was checked from that point of view. Such is the basic technique of the pressure policy in this country. Applied to foreign affairs it won't be either a new thing in the United States. It is a well known fact that the organized Jews of New York and other big American cities have mostly contributed to the miraculous re-emergence of the free state of Israel. Irish-Americans sustain vigorously the national claim for a United Ireland. The three "hyphenate" groups of American-Germans, Irish and Italians are mainly responsible for the eventual abolition of Wilsonian League of Nations policy. But, in our case,--we do not want to destroy anything; our aim is constructive. We need our American friends and relatives to cooperate with us for a positive purpose of liberation. This may be in the United States the most powerful way of changing the catastrophic trend of American policy in respect of Eastern-European problems. I see no reason why millions of Americans of Central-Eastern European descent should not demand openly from their future legislators what stand have they taken in regard of liberation of our countries; (are you for, are you against, or are you just neutral)--what have they done to materialise such a liberation in their past activities, what and in which way do they intend to do in future? Such a questionnaire way is very useful in reviving our issue before American political circles and the wide public opinion. To some of us it may seem too bold an initiative. However if we really are of the opinion that without the speedy liberation of Central-Eastern Europe--this significant country of the United States cannot survive either as a happy and free land then by the raising of the liberation cause we are in this respect not only fulfilling our duties towards our respective countries but also a worthy service for the free people of America.

*... has they admitted
 ... leading to ... ? ...*

20 March 1952 W

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Southeastern Europe Division
Chief, Eastern Europe Division

SUBJECT: Future of Strasbourg Free Europe
University Students

1. Attached hereto is a copy of a letter I am forwarding to Mr. Tyson on this subject.

2. Chief EE is on record as having advised the former case officer of TPT/NIC that EE should be afforded an opportunity for evaluation and covert screening of students of E origin for future potential operational use, on the understanding that no student would be approached for this program during his scheduled term at the university. EE probably has a similar interest in this matter.

3. This memorandum is to ask that you keep us informed on a continuing basis of your views on this subject, and also to let you know that you can expect from us the information which shall come to us in reply to the attachment.

4. Any comments which you now have on this subject and would give to me either informally or by memorandum, by 15 April, would be appreciated.

Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment

CIO/NAV:bjj

Distributions:

Orig & 1 - Addresses

1 - CIO

2 - RI

1 - Project file

In reply refer W-1927
to:

20 March 1952

Dear :

I have read with much interest the account you recently sent to Mr. [redacted] on the University in Strasbourg.

I have also noted that in a recent Fund Memorandum (No. 385), the question was raised as to what should be done with the Strasbourg students after they have completed their studies, should no opportunity present itself for their return to "liberated" countries of their origin.

In any case, this question will be of continuing concern to both your organization and ours, and I hope that we may be mutually helpful in planning how we can make use of these students after the completion of their studies in Strasbourg. Towards this effort we should appreciate receiving from you a list of the present student body at Strasbourg together with biographical data and expected completion of study dates for each. We should also like to have a statement as to the type of contract entered into with the students and as to any obligation imposed upon those who enroll. I should like to discuss this question with you from time to time and particularly after receiving the information herein requested.

My continued best wishes

Sincerely,

CIO/N 17614

Distribution:

Addressee - Addressee - 1

1 - CIO

2 - RI

1 - Project file ✓

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
 (SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TO: AND BOTTOM)

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Miss 		
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO	TWB	18 Mar
2			
3			

<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE

REMARKS: Are any of the officers of this organization on our cleared consultants list? I believe you understand the situation, which is that it may be a good thing to try a direct approach to this group on behalf of NCCE.

Mr. Busby
No, Sir

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
INFORMATION

19 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom and National Information Bureau

1. On January 10th I called your attention to the fact that the National Information Bureau, a reputable investigation agency which conducts inquiries into charitable organizations and advises large donors, had given an adverse recommendation on the Crusade for Freedom (see Attachment 1). This matter has now risen again. It may be that it would be wise to undertake a high-level approach to the Bureau through yourself or General Smith, for the following reasons:

According to an agreement with us and with the State Department at our recent meetings, Crusade for Freedom will bank heavily this year on donations from corporations. They have now discovered that these corporations rely to a great extent on the National Information Bureau's advice. Several corporations have indicated that, according to their practice, they cannot give to the Crusade unless it has the blessing of the Bureau, and you will note in Attachment 2 that one such corporation -- Barnes Manufacturing Company of Mansfield, Ohio -- has written to the Crusade citing its doubt.

2. Meantime, members of the Crusade have had conversations with D. Paul Reed, Executive Director of the National Information Bureau (see Attachment 3) and he has insisted that he cannot report that the Crusade has met the basic standards in philanthropy until his Standards 7 and 8 are met. These are the publication of an annual audit and of a detailed annual budget, the prime requirement being the disclosure of totals.

3. You may want to read this Attachment 3 with care but I cannot myself see any manner in which we can meet these standards. Therefore, I believe that it may be necessary to make the approach to the National Information Bureau described above.

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

4 The officers of the National Information Bureau are as follows:

Board of Directors

Allen Wardwell, Honorary Chairman
Paul L. Feiss, Honorary President
Valentine E. Macy, Jr., President
Ralph H. Blanchard, Vice-President
Randall J. LeBoeuf, Jr., Vice-President
Craig R. Smith, Secretary
Ellis Russell, Treasurer

Edward K. Bachman
James G. Blaine
Mrs. Sidney C. Borg
Allen T. Burns
Harry M. Carey
Homer Folks
Maxwell Hahn

Mrs. John B. Henneman
Edward J. Keyes
Hugh Knowlton
Alexander Lindsey
Arch Mandel
Miss Adela W. Morrison
John B. Niven

John M. Shaw

D. Paul Reed, Executive Director
B. D. Burhoe, Research & Advisory
Mrs. E. R. Goodwin, Research & Advisory

Do you know any of them?

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee (thru ADPC & DD/P)
1 cc - CIC
2 cc - RI

3 Attachments

- 1- NIP recommendation on Crusade.
- 2- Ltr from Barnes Mfg. Company.
- 3- NCFE memo on NIP.

SECRET

SECRET

2-4902

10 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: National Information Bureau, Inc.

1. Attached are two surveys from the National Information Bureau, Inc. The National Information Bureau is a reputable investigation agency conducting inquiries into American organizations which request funds from the public. It advises donors on whether the organizations are worthy of support.

2. The attachments contain the results of an investigation into the Crusade for Freedom and the [redacted] Note that the Bureau's recommendation in respect to the Crusade is adverse. The [redacted] on the other hand gets the Bureau's blessing.

Thomas W. Bladen

THOMAS W. BLADEN
Chief
International Organizations Branch


SECRET

NATIONAL INFORMATION BUREAU, Inc.

IMPORTANT

This report is a privileged communication and is strictly for the confidential information of the person or organization to whom it is addressed.

April 27, 1951



14-00000

NATIONAL INFORMATION BUREAU, Inc.

IMPORTANT

This report is a privileged communication and is strictly for the confidential information of the person or organization to whom it is addressed.



14-00000

NATIONAL INFORMATION BUREAU, Inc.

IMPORTANT

This report is a privileged communication and is strictly for the confidential information of the person or organization to whom it is addressed.

NATIONAL INFORMATION BUREAU, INC.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

LETTER OF CONFIRMATION

In reply refer
to: W-1923

13 March 1952

Dear Fred:

Thank you for your report of 5 March 1952 on Horvat. Attached hereto are copies of the original correspondence.

We should appreciate your making a direct acknowledgment to Horvat on behalf of Mr. Dewey as requested in his 20 February letter. We have acknowledged the receipt of Mr. Dewey's letter and have indicated to him that we were referring the matter to appropriate hands.

We should appreciate receiving a copy of the reply which you send to Horvat.

Yours sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Attachment

Attachment was handed to John on 12 March 1952.

CIO/MS (Memo from ADPC to DD/P of 13 March 1952)

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee
- 1 - PY/Ex Asst
- 1 - CIO ✓
- 2 - RI

March 5, 1952

HORVAT, Pavle

Pavle Horvat is of Slovenian origin, about 50 years old and was born in the Prlekija district near the Hungarian border (formerly a part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy).

Horvat became known during the thirties through his numerous manifestos and posters by which he attempted to organize his own political movement. This "movement" was labeled various names at different times. At one time it was simply referred to as a "peasant movement," at another time as the "Slovenia Section of the Croatian Peasant Party," and still later as an "independent Slovenian peasant movement." He never had, however, any following and never set up his own electoral lists. On the other hand, it is true, that the Croat Peasant Party of Dr. Tacek considered him as one of its trustees in Slovenia for a short period.

He earned his living as a farmer. He also had a small village grocery shop and occupied himself in his district with "interventions," that is, performing all types of secretarial services for the peasants of the area. Among other things, he undertook to organize the transportation of the seasonal workers who went to France and Germany during the harvesting months. He had difficulties with the home authorities and police in this respect and had to appear before the courts on a number of occasions.

At the beginning of the war he fled to Zagreb, Croatia, at that time the Independent Croat State (Nazi puppet regime) of Dr. Pavelic. There he set up a small office for the relief of Slovenian refugees but it never reached any large proportions. He was not connected with the Refugee Committee which handled the main relief work (One source pointed out that the mere fact that he was able to establish an office and function in Zagreb during the period meant that he was at least passively acceptable to the Nazi regime.

As far back as 1935 he is known to have misrepresented himself as a "peasant leader."

After the war Pavle Horvat fled to Austria where he again claimed to be a Slovenian peasant leader and attempted to whip up propaganda for the creation of a special "peasant group," among the Slovenian refugees; he failed completely. He was unable to find followers in a single camp to form such a group, and the refugees refused to attend his meetings. In addition he is known to have boasted that he was acting on behalf of Dr. Tacek and the International Peasant Union, though he was mandated by neither. The Allied authorities were finally forced to intervene and bring a stop to his activities since they were causing discontent among the refugees and disorders in the DP camps.

14-00000

In July 1949, Horvat wrote the Honorable Joseph C. Grew in care of the National Committee for a Free Europe introducing himself as the Representative of the Democratic Slovenes and President of the International Peasant Union for Europe, and suggesting that he join forces with the Committee in the common struggle against Communism. In return for a trip to the United States he offered to bring a large confidential report on his activities to date and present a scheme for successfully suppressing communism and delivering the subjugated nations in the shortest possible time. He was informed that the Fund was confining its activities to refugee leaders already residing in the United States and that the proposed visit was impossible at that time.

Horvat has recently announced his forthcoming arrival in the United States. Several Slovenian and Croatian newspapers in this country have received articles (which he wrote himself) glorifying his past and present activities. None of them, so far, have taken any notice of these articles with the exception of the Croat separatist (pro-ustashi) paper, "DANIJA," published in Chicago. Supposedly Dr. Racek was highly amused on reading the article describing the great "Slovene peasant leader."

Nobody in Slovenia in pre-war days would have considered Pavel Horvat as a person to be taken seriously in public life. He is considered by a number of sources a political impostor and as personally unethical. Neither the International Peasant Union for Europe, of which he claimed to be president, nor the Democratic Slovenes, of which he is a representative, is considered a legitimate organization. The Director of the Fund's Yugoslavian Research and Information Desk was the editor of a daily paper in Slovenian for eleven years before the war. He never met Horvath, seldom heard of him and his paper, as far as he knew, never took notice of him or his activities.

FOR THE RECORD: This report (on Pavle Horvat dated 5 March 1952) was forwarded to us by Mr. John Leich, assistant to Mr. Dolbeare, Director of the National Councils Division of NCFE.

NBV

SECRET

Security Information

SR-2-6809

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCFM/PY/OPC
VIA: CFY/OPC
FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: Attacks on the Soviet Myth of "Prior Inventions"

1. I understand that your office has already addressed itself to the opportunity which was offered by the increasing absurdities of Russian claims to have been the inventors of a list of discoveries, explorations, and inventions which by now comprise the bulk of such discoveries and inventions important to modern life. This is, of course, an extremely vulnerable series of claims and one which exposes itself to ridicule so readily as to render it an excellent target for attack. There has been some play on this seen in the American press but I feel that it would be more effective if the European press and Radio Free Europe should handle the job.

2. In the Sunday edition of the Washington Post, there was a very good summary of the Russian "firsts." The article was written in just the right vein, although a more dead pan approach would perhaps be more effective in certain places. If you do not have this article, I suggest that you get someone to clip it for you--as well as I recall, it is to be found in the magazine section or the editorial (news review) part of the paper. I heard one on the radio this morning which would fit in nicely with this general line. I do not know the author of the crack, but it is certainly a "first" that the Russians should surely be given all the credit for. The crack was that "the Kremlin was the first to put peace on a war basis."

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER

cc: AR/PC
Chief, BR
CIC/OPC ✓

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

In reply refer
to: W-1592 W-1904

128 March 1952

Dear Tom:

With reference to the Stephen Mainczyk case which was discussed with you during your recent visit, several questions have arisen concerning the broader aspects of the type of activity Mainczyk was undertaking in addition to his RFE duties.

Specifically, we would like to know what sort of employment contract RFE employees enter into with RFE. If possible, we would like a copy of a typical contract. We are interested in knowing what restrictions, if any, are placed on employees' outside interests or activities while employed with RFE, particularly as they would apply to a case such as Mainczyk's. We would also like to have information on the type of security agreement presently in use between RFE and its employees.

There are attached several papers bearing on the Mainczyk case, forwarded with a report on the matter, which was prepared for our friends across the street. This report was to the general effect that the American manager of the Salzburg office of Radio Free Europe has been deeply concerned over events arising from Mainczyk's recent death. While looking through the personal effects of the deceased, he found evidence that Mainczyk had accepted money for the purpose of assisting individuals to escape from behind the Iron Curtain to the U.S. zone of Austria. The RFE manager was further disturbed to find that the entrusted funds were not listed among the assets of the deceased or deposited with the American Express Company at Salzburg.

Sincerely,

*+ A. Council of ... 1102 ... 1115 ...
SHE ...
1 - CIO*

Three enclosures
CIO/NEV:blj
Distribution:
2 - RI
Orig - Addressee
1 - FY/Asst
1 - CIO

SECURITY

COPY

January 21, 1952

American Consulate
Munich
Germany

Gentlemen:

The undersigned, Dr. Bela Gyorky of 21 East 92nd Street, New York City and Mr. Alexander A. Back of the above address wish to request your assistance in connection with consequences resulting from the sudden death of Mr. Steven W. Mainczyk of Radio Free Europe in Salzburg, Austria.

The said gentleman was holding our money as a trustee, which money was sent to him to be paid out under certain conditions; we were trying to save our family from behind the Iron Curtain and we were negotiating with different people who were willing to undertake this task and we needed someone who would pay these persons the agreed amount in question when the operation was properly concluded. Through the said gentleman's secretary we received word that Mr. Mainczyk was seriously ill for the past few months and suddenly passed away, and to make certain that our interests are properly protected we are taking the liberty of writing you this letter in connection with the above matter.

The total amount sent to AMFICO, Salzburg was \$3,800. - out of which Mr. Mainczyk paid altogether \$300. - thus leaving \$3,500. - in Mr. Mainczyk's name. Of course, if it is necessary we would both be glad to furnish additional proof to support this present letter and we would greatly appreciate your kind assistance. We would also thank you to advise us as to what additional steps you deem it necessary for us to take in this matter.

We thank you in advance for your kind assistance and courtesy and remain

Very truly yours,

Alexander A. Back

Dr. Bela Gyorky

AAB/mak

SECRET

SECRET

BACK EXPORT & IMPORT CO.
215 Fourth Avenue
New York 3, N.Y., U.S.A.

COPI

Member of Commerce & Industry
Association of New York

Cable Address
"Backexport"
Telephone
ORchard 4-5507

January 22, 1952

American Consulate
Salzburg
Austria

Gentlemen:

We just received the following cable from Dr. Eml Rha, secretary
of the deceased Mr. Steven Mainzcyk:-

"MAINCZYK DIED INTESTATE ESTATE IN CUSTODY OF AMERICAN CONSULATE
SALZBURG SUGGEST CONTACT THEM LETTER FOLLOWING. DR. EML RHA"

It so happens that yesterday we erroneously wrote to the American
Consulate in Munich, Germany and we are enclosing herewith a copy
of the said letter from which you will see all particulars of our
problem.

Your prompt attention and kind assistance in this matter will be
greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

Alexander A Back

Dr. Bela Gyorky

AAE/rak

American Consulate,
Salzburg, Austria
February 7, 1952

Mr. Alexander A. Beck,
Mr. Bela Gyorky,
Back Export & Import Company,
215 Fourth Avenue,
New York 3, New York.

Sirs:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 22, 1952 together with a copy of the letter addressed to the American Consulate General in Munich regarding certain private transactions you appear to have had with the late Mr. Terhen Mainczyk, an American citizen who died in Salzburg on January 1, 1952.

In accordance with its standing instructions and pending the decision of the appropriate local authorities, the Consulate is acting as provisional conservator of the effects of the deceased. It would appear that Mr. Mainczyk died intestate and the Consulate has been endeavoring to obtain instructions from the deceased's brother, Mr. Charles Mainczyk, 4119 Sedley Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, the nearest known kin for advice concerning his interest in the estate.

Under these circumstances you will recognize that the Consulate has no authority to take cognizance of any claim you may have against the estate excepting to bear in mind your interest and to refer you to the Court that will have jurisdiction over the matter when the estate will have left our hands.

At such time as an executor is appointed, you will be informed and requested to address yourself to that party.

Sincerely yours,

Robert G. McCreger
American Consul

24
R1100regarigw

To } 6 Mar 52

1. I have discussed this with Myers who asks that he receive the full report.

Therefore suggest that you prepare: 1) a sterile letter to be sent to Tom Myers giving all essential facts and a copy of the unclassified letter. On this basis, he will cable Munich and info us of results for our transmittal to State.

2. Think interim reply to State should say: the matter is being investigated at source in connection settlement Maruyk estate via RFE.

NB

What sort of employment
~~contract~~ RFE employees
enter into with PFE

- specifically any
restrictions on their
outside interests

while employed with
RFE. pls particularize

this in regard to

M., if his case his
is particular

Type of security
agreement which PFE
employees sign.

LETTER TO SAM

W-1792

Dear Tom:

Sam

With reference to the Stephen Mainczyk case which I discussed with you recent during your visit, several questions have arisen concerning the broader aspects of the type of activity Mainczyk was undertaking on his own in addition to his RFE duties.

Specifically, we would like to know what sort of employment contract RFE employees enter into with RFE. If possible, we would like a copy of a typical contract. We are interested in knowing what restrictions, if any, are placed on employees' outside interests or activities while employed with RFE, particularly as they would apply to a case such as Mainczyk's. We would also like to have information on the type of security agreement presently in use between RFE and its employees.

There are attached several papers bearing on the Mainczyk case, which are of interest to you. They were forwarded with a report on the matter, which was prepared for our friends across the street. This report was to the general effect that the American manager of the Salzburg office of Radio Free Europe has been deeply concerned

of Stephen Mainczyk. While looking through the personal effects of the deceased, we found evidence that MAINCZYK had been in contact with individuals to arrange for passage to the U.S. zone of Austria. The RFE manager was further disturbed to find that the entrusted funds were not listed among the assets of the deceased or deposited with the American Express Company at Salzburg.

Sincerely

3 enclosures



11 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Photostats in re International Center of Free
Trade Unionists in Exile, Paris

The attached photostats were made from accounting documents, while they were in transit through us from a TONIC representative, Paris, to TONIC headquarters. They are forwarded, as indicated below, to provide information as to individuals associated with the subject organization.

WILLIAM W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment (6 pages)

CIO/RBY:blj

Distributions:

- Orig - bE (Mr. [redacted], E/3-Mr. [redacted]) (with attachments)
- 1 - FE (Mr. [redacted], SE (Mr. [redacted]) (with attachments)
- 1 - IO (Mr. [redacted], Mrs. [redacted]) (with attachments)
- 1 - Project [redacted] file (with attachments)
- 2 - RI (with attachments)
- 1 - C/IO (without attachments)

① NCFE

SECRET



SECRET

No.	Name	B. V. P. L. (1941)		Signature
		1001	1002	
1	<i>B. ...</i>
2	<i>...</i>
3	<i>...</i>
4	<i>...</i>
5	<i>...</i>
6	<i>...</i>
7	<i>...</i>
8	<i>...</i>
9	<i>...</i>
10	<i>...</i>
11	<i>...</i>
12	<i>...</i>
13	<i>...</i>
14	<i>...</i>
15	<i>...</i>
16	<i>...</i>
17	<i>...</i>
18	<i>...</i>
19	<i>...</i>
20	<i>...</i>
21	<i>...</i>
22	<i>...</i>
23	<i>...</i>
24	<i>...</i>
25	<i>...</i>
26	<i>...</i>
27	<i>...</i>
28	<i>...</i>
29	<i>...</i>
30	<i>...</i>
31	<i>...</i>
32	<i>...</i>
33	<i>...</i>
34	<i>...</i>
35	<i>...</i>
36	<i>...</i>
37	<i>...</i>
38	<i>...</i>
39	<i>...</i>
40	<i>...</i>
41	<i>...</i>
42	<i>...</i>
43	<i>...</i>
44	<i>...</i>
45	<i>...</i>
46	<i>...</i>
47	<i>...</i>
48	<i>...</i>
49	<i>...</i>
50	<i>...</i>
51	<i>...</i>
52	<i>...</i>
53	<i>...</i>
54	<i>...</i>
55	<i>...</i>
56	<i>...</i>
57	<i>...</i>
58	<i>...</i>
59	<i>...</i>
60	<i>...</i>
61	<i>...</i>
62	<i>...</i>
63	<i>...</i>
64	<i>...</i>
65	<i>...</i>
66	<i>...</i>
67	<i>...</i>
68	<i>...</i>
69	<i>...</i>
70	<i>...</i>
71	<i>...</i>
72	<i>...</i>
73	<i>...</i>
74	<i>...</i>
75	<i>...</i>
76	<i>...</i>
77	<i>...</i>
78	<i>...</i>
79	<i>...</i>
80	<i>...</i>
81	<i>...</i>
82	<i>...</i>
83	<i>...</i>
84	<i>...</i>
85	<i>...</i>
86	<i>...</i>
87	<i>...</i>
88	<i>...</i>
89	<i>...</i>
90	<i>...</i>
91	<i>...</i>
92	<i>...</i>
93	<i>...</i>
94	<i>...</i>
95	<i>...</i>
96	<i>...</i>
97	<i>...</i>
98	<i>...</i>
99	<i>...</i>
100	<i>...</i>
Total	<i>...</i>

No.	Name	Age	Sex	Height	Weight	Signature
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
Total				3000	12000	

(3)

NAME	HOURS		TOTAL	REMARKS
	IN	OUT		
1. James J. ...	12	10	22	...
2. ...	11	10	21	...
3. ...	10	10	20	...
4. ...	9	10	19	...
5. ...	8	10	18	...
6. ...	7	10	17	...
7. ...	6	10	16	...
8. ...	5	10	15	...
9. ...	4	10	14	...
10. ...	3	10	13	...
11. ...	2	10	12	...
12. ...	1	10	11	...
13. ...	0	10	10	...
14. ...	0	10	10	...
15. ...	0	10	10	...
16. ...	0	10	10	...
17. ...	0	10	10	...
18. ...	0	10	10	...
19. ...	0	10	10	...
20. ...	0	10	10	...
21. ...	0	10	10	...
22. ...	0	10	10	...
23. ...	0	10	10	...
24. ...	0	10	10	...
25. ...	0	10	10	...
26. ...	0	10	10	...
27. ...	0	10	10	...
28. ...	0	10	10	...
29. ...	0	10	10	...
30. ...	0	10	10	...
31. ...	0	10	10	...
32. ...	0	10	10	...
33. ...	0	10	10	...
34. ...	0	10	10	...
35. ...	0	10	10	...
36. ...	0	10	10	...
37. ...	0	10	10	...
38. ...	0	10	10	...
39. ...	0	10	10	...
40. ...	0	10	10	...
41. ...	0	10	10	...
42. ...	0	10	10	...
43. ...	0	10	10	...
44. ...	0	10	10	...
45. ...	0	10	10	...
46. ...	0	10	10	...
47. ...	0	10	10	...
48. ...	0	10	10	...
49. ...	0	10	10	...
50. ...	0	10	10	...
51. ...	0	10	10	...
52. ...	0	10	10	...
53. ...	0	10	10	...
54. ...	0	10	10	...
55. ...	0	10	10	...
56. ...	0	10	10	...
57. ...	0	10	10	...
58. ...	0	10	10	...
59. ...	0	10	10	...
60. ...	0	10	10	...
61. ...	0	10	10	...
62. ...	0	10	10	...
63. ...	0	10	10	...
64. ...	0	10	10	...
65. ...	0	10	10	...
66. ...	0	10	10	...
67. ...	0	10	10	...
68. ...	0	10	10	...
69. ...	0	10	10	...
70. ...	0	10	10	...
71. ...	0	10	10	...
72. ...	0	10	10	...
73. ...	0	10	10	...
74. ...	0	10	10	...
75. ...	0	10	10	...
76. ...	0	10	10	...
77. ...	0	10	10	...
78. ...	0	10	10	...
79. ...	0	10	10	...
80. ...	0	10	10	...
81. ...	0	10	10	...
82. ...	0	10	10	...
83. ...	0	10	10	...
84. ...	0	10	10	...
85. ...	0	10	10	...
86. ...	0	10	10	...
87. ...	0	10	10	...
88. ...	0	10	10	...
89. ...	0	10	10	...
90. ...	0	10	10	...
91. ...	0	10	10	...
92. ...	0	10	10	...
93. ...	0	10	10	...
94. ...	0	10	10	...
95. ...	0	10	10	...
96. ...	0	10	10	...
97. ...	0	10	10	...
98. ...	0	10	10	...
99. ...	0	10	10	...
100. ...	0	10	10	...

MEMBERSHIP LIST

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

No.	Name	Room	Phone	Address
1	<i>Kenneth Straub</i>	215	3-1000	
2	<i>James W. ...</i>	215	3-1000	
3	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
4	<i>Bud ...</i>	215	3-1000	
5	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
6	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
7	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
8	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
9	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
10	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
11	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
12	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
13	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
14	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
15	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
16	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
17	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
18	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
19	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	
20	<i>...</i>	215	3-1000	

INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE

1919



NO.	NAME	FUNCTION	AMOUNT FRANCS	SIGNATURE OF REPORT
1	Alfred F. Sauer	French corresp.	40,000	<i>Alfred F. Sauer</i>
2	Volmar Sachs	Swiss corresp.	40,000	<i>Volmar Sachs</i>
3	Cherman J.	Treasurer	40,000	<i>Cherman J.</i>
4	Robert W. Z.	Chief of Distribution	40,000	<i>Robert W. Z.</i>
5	Foresti G.	Italian corresp.	40,000	<i>Foresti G.</i>
6	Corucci V.	Argentinian corresp.	40,000	<i>Corucci V.</i>
7	Samuel A. Shunkerman	American corresp.	40,000	<i>Samuel A. Shunkerman</i>
8	Gojaroff	Bulgarian corresp.	40,000	<i>Gojaroff</i>
9	Mitar-Bosco	Rumanian corresp.	40,000	<i>Mitar-Bosco</i>
10	Nickelsson	Estonian corresp.	40,000	<i>Nickelsson</i>
11	Davidson Newman	English translator	40,000	<i>Davidson Newman</i>
12	Gaska Ann	Swiss corresp.	40,000	<i>Gaska Ann</i>
13	Popalovich F.	Serbian corresp.	40,000	<i>Popalovich F.</i>
14	Wintner	Swiss corresp.	40,000	<i>Wintner</i>
15	Talco G.	Polish corresp.	40,000	<i>Talco G.</i>
16	Soldobyl	Hungarian corresp.	40,000	<i>Soldobyl</i>
17	Preradovic G.	Croatian corresp.	40,000	<i>Preradovic G.</i>
18	Maricic J.	Slovenian corresp.	40,000	<i>Maricic J.</i>
19	Levi de Saurin	Rumanian corresp.	40,000	<i>Levi de Saurin</i>
20	Prattino S.	Italian corresp.	40,000	<i>Prattino S.</i>
21	Wright James	English translator	40,000	<i>Wright James</i>
22	Wildeblom	Swedish corresp.	40,000	<i>Wildeblom</i>
23	Wintner	Swiss corresp.	40,000	<i>Wintner</i>

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

21 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Admiral H. F. Miller on 21 March.



CO:TBreh
Orig - A/PC--DD/P--DPCI
1 cc - TD
2 cc - FI

100A. n. FRANKS
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET


~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
- 287

Noted by O/DGI
4 10/6

21 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD



Tom Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

- Orig: DD/P (thru ADPC)
- 1 cc: EE (Mr. Poor)
- 1 cc: C/IO
- 2 cc: RI

20 March 52

Mr. Braden

Miss [] today
asked Mr. []

to send a copy of
the reply to her
and also to give
her any background
on this he can
obtain. JBV

Mr. Brodeur:
[] said he had an "explanation"
of this letter which he will mail today.
Also will report after he has had dinner.

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1			
2			
3			

- APPROVAL INFORMATION SIGNATURE
- ACTION DIRECT REPLY RETURN
- COMMENT PREPARATION OF REPLY DISPATCH
- CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION FILE

REMARKS:

3000
with Naps [unclear] [unclear]

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

10/52

Mr. Wisner --

an information copy of letter sent
by Mr. Jackson today. Mr.
is receiving a copy via regular channels.

9-6811

March 10, 1952

Dear Monsignor Vargas:-

As I wind up my year with the National Committee for a Free Europe, I thought it appropriate to send you a letter -- not a letter of farewell, but rather some thoughts on the Hungarian National Council as I have observed it during the year.

In the first place, I would like to congratulate you and your associates on having done an extraordinary job of holding a very volatile situation together. In fact, it was a unique job, and one whose value we may never fully appreciate because so many of the benefits are intangible.

I hope, therefore, that you will continue to work with undiminished will to hold the Council together, as it would present a very serious problem to Admiral Miller if the Hungarian group were to fall apart.

I would also like to congratulate you on the effective work the representatives of the Hungarian National Council have done abroad, particularly in France and Germany. You know how important I consider this work. It seems to me that the real task and duty of a National Council is to help the exiles, and the front lines of this work are in Europe.

Aside from the obvious necessities of food, clothing, shelter, the most important aspect of the work is what I would call a "consular" service, as these poor people do not know where or how to turn. In this consular-type work, I think that General Henney and Mr. Auer have been doing an excellent job, and my personal feelings in this matter are completely confirmed by reactions I have received from the International Refugee Organization and the official foreign and American administrations in these countries.

To my way of thinking, exile political matters in New York and Washington should take a definitely second place to helping human beings in distress, and although there are some who do not agree with this order of priority, I am delighted and grateful that the work of the Hungarian National Council indicates that you share these ideas.

Since this is an honest letter, and not just pro-forma appreciation by a retiring President, I must also, unfortunately, include some observations that are not so pleasant.

I remember very early in my work with NCFF, that you taught me the political meaning of the word "polarization", and since then I have had ample opportunity in the Hungarian National Council to see polarization at work.

NCFF has grown in the past year into a large organization engaged in serious work, and frequently proving its effectiveness behind the Iron Curtain. To put it another way, during the past year NCFF has evolved from just a hope into a professional weapon in the war against the enemy. Therefore, activities which a year ago were deplorable but pardonable, are today inexcusable and intolerable.

Admiral Miller agrees with me completely on this point, and intends to take such action from time to time as may be necessary to curtail such activities when they occur.

However, I recognize that it is not enough for NCFF to take unilateral action. We must be assisted by you and those of your associates who understand who the real enemy is, and are willing to subordinate fratricidal strife, polarizing attempts, and disloyal activities.

* * *

I fully realize that these are nothing but big words unless I can illustrate them more specifically.

I have in my possession enough illustrations to fill a volume, but I would like to select three in particular to mention in this letter, not because I have any particular desire to single out the individuals concerned for censure, but rather because what they have done not only illustrates the point I am trying to make, but also reveals an attitude of mind which is practically incomprehensible to an American working for a great cause.

The first case that I have in mind is that of Mr. Ferenc Nagy.

Last February, Mr. Nagy wrote a letter to Mr. Frank S. Land of Kansas City, Missouri, complaining bitterly about the National Committee for a Free Europe, accusing it of "supporting

outmoded and old-fashioned reactionary political ideologies", and asking Mr. Land to advise him as to how this situation could be brought to the attention of President Truman in order to have him do something about it. As a result of that letter, Mr. Land wrote to the White House, and in the normal course this full correspondence came to me.

I asked Mr. Nagy to come to the office, and tried to explain to him that what he had done was not only a bad, but a very silly thing. It was bad in the sense that he had violated our hospitality by secretly attempting to conspire against the organization which was supporting him. It was silly in assuming that he could carry on this kind of intrigues without my knowing about it -- in fact, without having the White House check with NACW, an American organization, as to what action should be taken.

Mr. Nagy seemed to understand what I tried to explain to him, and with what I considered complete honesty and sincerity, expressed his regrets and said that it would not happen again. In return for this frank understanding on his part, we shook hands, and I promised that the correspondence would be put away in our files and never referred to again. And as you know, I have never even mentioned it to you.

Mr. Nagy has once again written to President Truman -- this time directly. And once again the White House has sent me the memorandum.

I consider that Mr. Nagy has broken his pledge, and therefore I am free to tell you about the incident.

This time, although the words of Mr. Nagy are more temperate, the melody is the same -- dissatisfaction with what ECNE has done; dissatisfaction with the Hungarian National Council. Let me quote a passage:-- "The existing National Committees are not in themselves suitable for this task, partly because of the general intra-Committee controversies between Democrats and reactionaries, and partly because these Committees are not considered by the peoples behind the Iron Curtain as international guarantees that promises would be carried out."

I cannot help commenting at this point that in the Hungarian National Council there is probably no one who has

- 1 -

contributed more to "inter-Allied controversies" than Mr. Nagy himself. Furthermore, an analysis of Mr. Nagy's definition of "democrats and reactionaries" would be extremely interesting. It will have been more accurate had he said "people who supported my Government in 1947 and everybody else".

As to the matter of my exile committee, whether the Hungarian National Council or Mr. Nagy's Central Eastern European Committee, being able to "guarantee" to the people behind the Iron Curtain that freedom would be carried out, Mr. Nagy's statement is either atrocious or preposterous.

Mr. Nagy winds up with a request that the President give his blessing to Mr. Nagy's proposed super-committee -- the Central Eastern European Committee -- which represents "a total majority of 70 to 80% of the entire population of Central Eastern Europe."

I am frankly fascinated by the processes of Mr. Nagy's mind. I cannot believe that all he thinks about is the promotion of Leftish Hungarian politicians in exile. I cannot believe that as a human being he does not feel some sense of responsibility toward Hungary and the Hungarian National Council, who have stood after death helped him. I do not wish to sound dramatic, I do not ask for thanks, and I am not suggesting that in return for our help we have an obligation of a quid pro quo. But I do say that the question of loyalty does arise, and the question of responsibility is very real.

Furthermore, Mr. Nagy has been in this country long enough now to understand that this kind of intrigue is a distressing irritation to everyone, including the White House.

* * *

My second illustration also concerns Mr. Nagy. Mr. Nagy recently sent a telegram to Mr. assessory, of which the following is a translation. I have seen original Hungarian if you care to see it:

THE ENVI. SUBMITTED TO THE CHAIR OF THE NEW YORK RADIO FREE PRESS HUNGARY HAS BEEN IN A STATE OF EXCESSIVE
 HUNGRY: ALREADY CALLED, STARTED HUNGRY ABLEAS, LAZOS
 BALIST, KISSO SALT, HUNG STRIBALIS, YES I VARTA
 STOP COLLIDING AND NEW FEAT HILL, AMIO STARTED
 HEADLOCKS IN THE NAME OF EVILUANTIC HUNGARIAN
 FEELS, I AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE HUNGARIAN FEDERATION
 CALL THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE TO
 IMMEDIATELY FOR HUNGARY TWO SOLUTIONS IS ACCEPTABLE
 TO US.

Again I would like to know what is going through Mr. Nagy's mind.

ECVE, an American organization, hired Mr. Deesserffy to be the responsible head of its Hungarian Desk in Munich. Mr. Deesserffy was a very careful choice after weeks of consultation on both sides of the Atlantic. His specific instructions were that the Munich Desk should be staffed by people selected for functional competence, excluding, of course, Communists and fascists.

At the same time, it was felt that the ECVE had permitted political affiliation to overshadow functional competence in the New York Hungarian Desk, and the New York Desk simply wasn't any good. Therefore, the New York Desk and the Munich Desk had to be brought into alignment. So Mr. Deesserffy was sent to America and was given the responsibility of hiring the necessary personnel -- and in New York was instructed to apply the same yardstick that he applied in Munich.

When Mr. Deesserffy had fulfilled his New York task, again after the most serious consideration of all the angles involved in each one of his choices, Mr. Nagy sent him the telegram quoted above as though Mr. Nagy were in the position to control, or at least to veto, the membership of the Desk.

Does Mr. Nagy really believe that he is in that position? Or is this pure polarization. As we all know, this is a move directed against Mr. Gellert, who does not happen to have the same political coloration as Mr. Nagy. In a recent conversation with Mr. Nagy, I asked him if the telegram would have been sent if Mr. Gellert had not been selected, and he admitted that it would not have been sent.

There is an additional interesting element in this, in that Mr. Nagy calls for a vote as the President of the Hungarian Peasant Union. Doesn't Mr. Nagy know that the Hungarian Peasant Union does not exist as a viable political party; it only exists in the individual persons in exile who happen formerly to have been members of the Hungarian Peasant Union. Mr. Nagy is not a member of a government-in-exile, or even of a parliament-in-exile, so that this action of his is totally unreal, indicating unwillingness to recognize the world as it exists.

Doesn't Mr. Nagy realize that the only way that exile politicians can achieve political reality is through national and international unity in order to bring about the liberation

of their countries, and therefore the day when they can once again start legitimate and real party rivalry to appeal to a free electorate?

The third case I would like to mention concerns Mr. Zoltan Pfeiffer.

After Mr. Desseuffy made his selections for the New York Desk, Mr. Pfeiffer got in touch with him to protest against the fact that in selecting Mr. Gallart, Mr. Desseuffy had been unfaithful to the Smallholders Party, which because Mr. Desseuffy had formerly been a member of that party, expected a clean sweep of the New York Desk, irrespective of functional competence. Mr. Pfeiffer further stated -- and this is the really important point -- that because of the appointment of Mr. Gallart, Mr. Pfeiffer would have to "attack" Mr. Desseuffy from now on, wherever and whenever possible; in short, a declaration of war.

Again, I would like to understand Mr. Pfeiffer's mental processes. Who does he think he is? Where does he think he is? This is a very serious world, and not a half-holiday opera. Mr. Pfeiffer is not in Budapest conducting a political campaign against a ward member of a left-wing party. Mr. Pfeiffer is in New York, an associate of NCFL, with every opportunity to have his opinion heard and his influence felt. But after a decision has been made, in good faith and after long consideration, to employ a man because of his competence to do a job, it is Mr. Pfeiffer's responsibility as an associate of the same organization to help that man do his work, and not to indulge in declarations of war in order to disrupt the operation.

I am sorry to have had to go into this unpleasant detail, but after a year of patiently observing and listening, I feel that I have earned the right to speak plainly.

I hope that somehow or other, it will be possible for you to explain to your membership that NCFL does not intend to be harassed or sabotaged by exile political maneuvering.

I also hope that you will be able to persuade your compatriots that insofar as NCFL can interpret U.S. policy,

- 7 -

it believes that the Government of the United States, looking forward to the eventual liberation of Hungary, will not permit any political group or individual in exile, to set up a monopoly for himself, his group, or his party.

With renewed thanks for your highly successful work in the past, and the fervent hope that you will be equally successful in the future, I am

Sincerely yours,

C. D. Jackson

Honorable Bela Varga
227 East 72nd Street
New York, N. Y.

SECRET

7 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION


SUBJECT: NCFE


1. For quite some time the staff officers of this division concerned with utilizing the facilities of the NCFE and with exploiting the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian emigrations have been aware of a lack of adequate coordination between our own activities and those of the NCFE staff. In conjunction with those NY Division officers responsible for handling our relations with that organization, we have attempted to explore the problem in order to find a solution which could be considered realistic and practical.

2. The difficulty lies not only in the communication system between OPC and NCFE, which does not always transmit, at exactly the right time, the right ideas from one organization to the proper individuals at the right level on the other. Although we have maintained very close contact both informally and through formal channels, only too often we have not been in a position to learn why NCFE staff officers have made a given decision in regard to some emigre organization in which we had an interest; and on the other hand, our desires and needs have not always been fully understood or accepted in New York. Again, it has happened that we were ignorant of developments that closely affected our operations until it was too late for us to make our influence felt, and, correspondingly, it must be admitted that we have ourselves pushed ahead with courses of action without adequately briefing the NCFE. The most extreme case in point known to us concerns the Rumanian emigration, where we and NCFE are now pursuing conflicting policies. The upshot of this has been the gradual development of a situation wherein OPC is supporting an organization, the NCFE, which is not fully responsive to it.

3. This situation is not regarded by us as reflecting any fundamental inadequacy in NCFE, or as presenting any insoluble difficulty. There exists a problem in staff interrelationship which can and should be resolved by a reform in our organizational approach. The goal toward which we believe we should work is one where OPC communication with NCFE would be channelled directly along a single high-level line which would firmly tie in ADPC's office with that of the head of the other organization. Ideas, suggestions, information, etc. would flow, in the regular channels, up from the OPC working level to ADPC's office for review and transmission to the top office of NCFE, and flow down from there through NCFE's usual channels to the proper individuals in its operational machinery. Personal contacts between individuals at a lower level in the two organizations would frequently occur to supplement this usual channel, when security permitted, but should be in the hands of responsible personnel who understand the OPC policies involved.

L. As the first




Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

SE/PC/DC4:ej

Distribution:

Addressee - Orig. 1

SD/RS - 2

SE/PC - 2

✓ PY - 1 (77- Bualov)

1. Intricacies of Balkan politics
 2. CIA's failure to provide continuing policy guidance to the Exce. Com. in N.Y.
 3. No final focus of responsibility for National Council policy in Wash.
 4. An office in N.Y. which is poorly staffed has made itself virtually independent of CIA guidance.
- mature
 savoir-faire
 broad background in Balkan politics.
-

Policy Recs.

- a. Maintenance of National Councils
 - b. Expansion of NCFE activities in Paris
 - * c. Support of Horizontal Groups.
 - IPU
 - CDU
 - Leitner-Mayer / Nagy Groups etc.
-

Admin. Recs. : Emigre Affairs

- a.) formulate policy on emigre matters w/ view of CIA line divisions Dept of State
- b.) provide direct ^{other US Govt} policy guidance & control over NCFE offices.

Rel. w/ other CIA offices

Adviser. Adv. -

Office of I. S. should be kept informed of all transactions undertaken between the line divisions & NCFE

w/ Dept. of State

- a. close contacts w/ area desks of Dept. of State
- b. Meet jointly w/ members of Dept. in a C/A - State Coord. Com. to formulate policy on emigre matters.

w/ NCFE

close supervision & control over NCFE in U.S. & Paris.

Purpose

Discussion

Orig. Objectives

Status of Coms

Reasons for Failure

Possible Courses of Action

Recs

Security Information

SECRET

7 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas W. Braden

SUBJECT: Relations with National Councils

1. Attached hereto is a study concerning the National Councils, with certain conclusions and recommendations.

2. I have deliberately delayed submitting this study because I wanted to be sure of the validity of my criticisms and recommendations. To this end, I discussed this paper at several stages of its development with various officers in the line divisions concerned and also with individuals who have been in close touch with the National Councils Division of NCFE. As a result, I feel that what is submitted in the attached study reflects not only my own views, but also those of the responsible area experts.

3. I feel you will agree that, under existing conditions, it is impossible to carry out effectively any of the functions related to national council matters with which we are charged. The recent "Nagy Affair" and the resultant embarrassment serves as a good illustration.

4. In view of the interest that has been demonstrated in this paper by SE and EE-2, it is suggested that copies of the study be sent to them.

5. This whole matter, I believe, is of such importance as to warrant further discussion, and I should appreciate having the opportunity of talking to you.



Attachment
As stated above

cc: DCFY

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING RELATIONS
WITH NATIONAL COUNCILS

PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to 1) review briefly the accomplishments of the National Councils Division of NSCF, 2) attempt to point out the reasons why the National Councils have not accomplished what they set out to do and 3) make certain recommendations with respect to policy and administration to remedy the present unsatisfactory and unworkable situation. This last assumes that CIA must continue to sponsor the National Council complex. However, it can do so only if certain basic changes are made and if it is recognized that it is incumbent on CIA to [redacted] of the important personalities of the Eastern European emigration.

DISCUSSION

I Original Objectives of National Councils Division

The National Councils Division of the National Committee for a Free Europe was created on 3 April 1950 by resolution of the Board of Directors. The underlying principle, as stated in the Declaration of Policy in June 1950, was to aid the "non-Fascist and non-Communist leaders in their peaceful efforts to prepare the way toward the restoration in Eastern Europe of the social, political and religious liberties in which they and we believe." The councils were to function as "representative, harmonious and effective groups" and, as such, to play a part in the struggle against Communism in Eastern Europe. They were not to be considered as governments in exile nor as ends in themselves.

National Committees and Panels,* as supported by NSCF, were to fulfill a two-fold function: as 1) [redacted] they were to a) serve as a symbol of unity both in this country and abroad, b) provide a reservoir of "name" manpower for propaganda use, c) supply general propaganda policy advice, and d) supply NSCF with both general and specific intelligence with respect to homeland activities and personalities. [redacted]

*These are: the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Panels, which were set up with the help of NSCF and which function well.

SECRET

SECRET

II Status of Committees

During the course of the past year, it has become increasingly apparent that national committees have failed to operate as "representative, effective and harmonious groups." Out of the six groups of emigres supported financially by NCFE,^{*} only three have any sort of a working council (the Albanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian) and only one--the Hungarian--operates with any degree of harmony. The Czech and Rumanian Councils have split into two opposing factions. The Czechs have recently effected a reconciliation which, to date, is merely a paper "agreement" and is still awaiting implementation. No attempts at bringing together the Rumanian Association and the Rumanian Committee have succeeded. The Bulgarian Committee, while not split, has been handicapped by the dictatorial methods of its Chairman, Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, and has therefore been of little value as an organization. Attempts to offset this situation by an enlargement of the Committee are now under way. An enlargement of the Albanian Committee is also considered to be necessary, but here disagreement with [redacted] is a complicating factor. The Poles, after long years of dissension, finally seem to have agreed on the formation of a Council of National Unity. Additional information regarding each of these committees is appended hereto.

III Reasons for the Failure

The reason for the failure of the national councils to fulfill the stated objectives has often been attributed to intrigue, rivalry and jealousy among emigre politicians. While this is certainly a contributing factor, it is one which should be expected in any dealings with leaders reared in the intricacies of Balkan politics. A more important and far more basic cause for the present shortcomings of the national councils has been CIA's failure to provide continuing policy guidance to, [redacted] the Executive Committee of NCFE in New York. This failure has in large part resulted from the lack of a clearly defined mechanism within CIA through which to perform these functions.

At present a situation exists in which there is:

1) No final focus of responsibility for national council policy in Washington. Various individuals throughout CIA and the Department of State are meddling in national council and related emigre matters owing to the vacuum which CIA has permitted to develop and because no one is charged with final responsibility. Furthermore, members of the

^{*}The six groups are: the Albanian, Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Rumanian.

SECRET

Executive Committee in New York often confer, and reach certain agreements, with high ranking individuals in CIA and the Department of State without consulting, or even informing, anyone else. This has led to a great deal of confusion, duplication of work and, of course, embarrassment.

2) An office in New York which is poorly staffed and which has made itself virtually independent of CIA guidance. (Due probably to the lack of proper guidance [redacted] in the past, there is at present a great amount of free wheeling in the New York office. The members of the Executive Committee seem to feel that they are an autonomous unit rather than agents of their sponsoring office.) Furthermore, dealings with the experienced politicians in exile from the satellite states require a staff which is mature, has savoir-faire and a broad background in Balkan politics. This is not presently the case.

3) A feeling among emigres that the promises and threats made by NCFE are meaningless and that money will be forthcoming under almost any conditions.

IV Possible Courses of Action

Confronted with the situation sketched above, it would appear that insofar as CIA is concerned, the following alternative courses of action are possible: 1) Keep the present set-up; 2) withdraw support from emigre affairs; 3) ask the Department of State to take over; or 4) make certain changes along lines recommended below.

Since the present set-up is unsatisfactory for the reasons indicated above, obviously the first alternative may be immediately dismissed. The second alternative is not feasible because the peoples of the satellite countries are important allies of the United States in the cold war and it is to our interest to afford assistance to the principal Eastern European refugees and their major organizations. The State Department cannot take over relations with the emigres because of the official recognition given by the United States to the "Democratic Republics" of Eastern Europe. The logical, indeed inescapable course for CIA to follow, therefore, is to continue to deal with the most important Eastern European emigres on the basis of ~~certain~~ ^{the} ~~promise~~ ^{the} which follow:

1) NCFE is an organization, set up by [redacted] CIA, charged with emigre affairs [redacted]

2) The emigre groupings in this country do not constitute governments in exile, but merely units useful for the following functions:

a. Prestige Use

To serve as a symbol of resistance to the subjugated peoples behind the iron curtain. To provide speakers

SECRET

at various meetings in this country and at gatherings, such as the European Movement, abroad.

b. Psychological Warfare

To engage in all sorts of activities which will encourage the spirit of resistance of the peoples of Eastern Europe and keep the story of Eastern Europe's struggle for liberation before the people of the West by appropriate publicity.

c. Research, Analysis and Planning

To organize and carry on long-range research analysis and planning projects which will utilize the talents of the Eastern European refugees. This area includes the Library of Congress and other research projects and the activities of the horizontal international organizations, such as the Slavik-Mayer/Nagy Groups.

3) National Councils Will Not Control RFE. Notwithstanding the State Department's views, it is wise at present to maintain the separation between the national councils and RFE. While emigres should continue to have an opportunity to speak to the peoples behind the iron curtain, they should do so as individual patriots and not as representatives of a council or of a political party. RFE, if it is to be an effective "voice" to the satellite peoples, must necessarily keep free from petty intrigues and political "empire building" currently being exhibited by the national councils. Should the national councils become the real symbols they were intended to be, they could then play a significant role in RFE.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following policy and administrative recommendations are submitted as essential to the successful operation of emigre affairs:

1) Policy Recommendations

a. Maintenance of National Councils

During the foreseeable future, the structure of the national councils will have to be maintained. It is suggested, however, that their activities in this country be limited to the functions mentioned above.

on P, I'd like to
see this potential
assessed further.
For instance, do we
have collected information
on the reservoir of
emigre manpower in
Paris — or do we
have to rely on
independent W.F.3
for this
on C. How?

SECRET

3 b. Expansion of NCFE Activities in Paris

It is further recommended that a greater degree of US [] be effected over the vast reservoir of emigre manpower now concentrated in Europe. The expansion of, and tightened supervision over, the NCFE office in Paris would provide this [] It would additionally 1) provide a much-needed outlet for the younger elements of the emigration, 2) offset the attempts made by the French and the British to use these elements, 3) be useful from the psychological warfare aspect and also in long-range planning of the liberation of the satellite states.

Consent

4 c. Support of Horizontal Groupings

It is recommended that the activities of horizontal groupings, such as the International Peasant Union, the Christian Democratic Union, the Slavik-Wayer/Naet Groups, etc. be encouraged. Constructive work on the part of the exiles from the satellite states that would cut across national lines should be viewed favorably and may well become the most constructive element in the emigre political complex.

2) Administrative Recommendations.

There should be, in CIA, an office charged with the responsibility for all emigre matters. While it is recognized that this entails a vast amount of administrative work (budget, personnel, security, etc.), the discussion that follows will be devoted only to the political aspects of the work.

The terms of reference of this office for "Emigre Affairs" should be, inter alia, to 1) formulate policy on emigre matters, soliciting and bearing in mind the views of the CIA line divisions, the Department of State and other offices of the United States Government, and 2) provide direct policy guidance [] over the NCFE offices.

a. Relationship with Other CIA Offices

The office for "Emigre Affairs" should act as an advisory body and serve as a functional link providing the necessary liaison between the CIA line divisions and the National Councils Division of NCFE. The office of "Emigre Affairs" should likewise be kept regularly informed of all transactions undertaken between the line divisions and NCFE.

SECRET

b. Relationship with the Department of State

The office for "Emigre Affairs" should 1) maintain close contact with the area desks of the Department of State and 2) meet jointly with members of the Department in a CIA-State Coordinating Committee, (see chart attached) for the purpose of formulating policy on emigre matters.

c. Relationship with NCFE

The office for "Emigre Affairs" should maintain close contact with the [redacted] the NCFE office in New York and in Paris. [redacted]

Detailed recommendations on the structure of the Office for "Emigre Affairs" is appended hereto.

[redacted]

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PROPOSED OFFICE FOR
"EMIGRE AFFAIRS".

I. Organization

Chief
Deputy Chief
Two Staff Assistants
Two Secretaries

II. Functions

The overall function of the office for "Emigre Affairs" should be the formulation and coordination of policy on national council and other emigre affairs and the transmittance of such policy to NCFE.

1. Liaison and coordination with other CIA Offices.

- a. Transmission of material from NCFE offices to line divisions.
- b. Transmission of material from line divisions to NCFE.
- c. Coordination with the line divisions on all emigre matters in which they have an interest. If the office for "Emigre Affairs" is kept informed on the needs of the line divisions, the NCFE should be able to perform functions useful to the divisions.
- d. To facilitate the dealings between the Office for "Emigre Affairs" and the line divisions, there should be one person in EE-2, S2 and WE-3 designated as liaison officer on emigre matters.

2. Liaison and coordination with the Department of State.


- a. There should be a CIA-State Coordinating Committee, which should meet regularly to discuss matters pertaining to the national councils and emigre affairs.
- b. Although a member of the NCFE may occasionally be present at a meeting of the Coordinating Committee, regular sessions should be attended only by members of CIA and the State Department. The system, which has been in effect during the last four months, under which bi-weekly meetings have taken place between a representative of the NCFE in New York and the Department must be discontinued.

3. of the activities of the NCFE.

- a. The office for "Emigre Affairs" should be charged with the of the NCFE office in New York and in Paris.

SECRET

b.




There should be regular contact between the HOPE offices and headquarters.

4. Handling of all other work related to emigre matters.

- a. Sterilizing and distributing Zinnia reports.
- b. Preparing memoranda on emigre matters.
- c. Coordinating action cables with line divisions.
- d. Maintaining extensive files on national council and related emigre affairs.

Think we should
superimpose NCFE as a
whole and fit this "office
of emigre affairs" into the
picture, as one arm.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA, STATE AND NCFE



6 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Herman Moschner - Convicted Spy

1. Pursuant to our conversation, you are advised that the captioned individual was convicted in the U. S. Court at Nurnberg on 31 January 1952 on a charge of espionage. U. S. Attorney developed information which was turned over to us indicating that among other things Moschner had been directed by the Czech intelligence service to procure information about Radio Free Europe, especially bearing on the guarding of the installations and the consequences of an act of sabotage. Moschner was not an employee of RFE and the basis of the espionage charge against him was that he had endeavored to obtain information concerning personnel and activities of the CIC.

2. Through the courtesy of a friendly U. S. agency, we have been provided with a copy of the targets which Moschner had been given by the Czech intelligence service. I am attaching a copy of the list of such targets and you will note that the activities of this individual clearly reflect the interest of Czech intelligence in possible sabotage of the physical installations of RFE in Munich. Further information is being developed in this matter and I will advise you when I receive same.

STRICTLY PRIVATE

COPY

APPENDIX "A"

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION REGARDING RADIO FREE EUROPE
ISSUED BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

The following are essential elements of information:

1. Plans of all RFE buildings and RFE transmitter stations.
2. Dimensions of antenna used and distance between antenna towers.
3. Phone numbers of transmitter stations.
4. Plans of all telephone lines, specifically ~~leat-ins~~ and terminals.
5. Relationship of one RFE building to another in an operational sense.
6. Addresses and telephone numbers of all individuals connected with RFE.
7. Details of functions and operations of each transmitter.
8. The number of guards at each RFE installation, nationality of such guards, and duty assignments and locations, whether accompanied by police dogs.
9. Number of civilians usually in RFE buildings at night.
10. How and what transmission operations are conducted at night.
11. Complete plans of electrical power lines and power supply at each transmitter station.
12. How many rural policemen are located in the area of each transmitter station, addresses.
13. Addresses and details concerning guard personnel at each transmitter station.
14. Number and identity of persons working in all of RFE and their addresses.
15. Distance of transmitter stations from rural police headquarters.

NOTE: A certain amount of repetition in the above essential elements of information may exist. However, they were submitted to me only as notes taken from a highly classified report and therefore may not be as exact as given by Moschner during his interrogation. On Monday we shall attempt to get the entire report of Moschner's statements regarding RFE and shall submit further pertinent details.

2/15/52

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL **SECRET**
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P	<i>ll</i>	
2	DDCI		
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO	TWB	24 Apr
2			
3			

- APPROVAL INFORMATION SIGNATURE
- ACTION DIRECT REPLY RETURN
- COMMENT PREPARATION OF REPLY DISPATCH
- CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION FILE

REMARKS:

This story of the Nagy affair as it was related to OO by Contact is pretty old hat, but you might nevertheless find material of interest in it.

TWB
TWB

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Executive Registry
7-8541

SECURITY INFORMATION

Chief, Operations Division, GPC
Attention: Mr. W. F. Rowland
Chief, Contact Division, OO

29 February 1952

HH-196

Hungarian Exile Activities

1. A Hungarian Government-in-Exile which feels that it can "awaken the spirit of resistance and result in piercing the Iron Curtain and liquidating the Communists in Hungary" has been formed under the direction of Ferenc Nagy. This group came to our attention when Louis Goldstein, a New York Jeweler, suggested that a representative of this Agency call on Paul Weiss and Leo Weiner, New York lawyers, who had been approached by Ferenc Nagy regarding the organization of this group. Mr. Weiss furnished our New York office with information regarding Mr. Nagy's organization.

2. Members of this group other than Nagy are Geza Teloki, Karolyi Peyer, Zoltan Pfeiffer, Dezso Sulyok, Zoltan Bay, Istvan Barankovics, Albert Bartha, Paul Auer and Aladar Szegedy-Maszak. The objective of this group is to form a government-in-exile which would combat Communism in Hungary, strengthen resistance, develop the underground, ship radio parts and transmitters as well as arms, revive a good propaganda campaign, raise troops and fan resistance in the event of war, and set up a temporary de facto government in Hungary if the West wins. This group, which claims to represent 83 per cent of the Hungarian people as of the last free elections, would hold free elections as soon as possible and let the people choose a new government. They want official recognition as a government-in-exile and US Government financial support with the control of funds handled by the US Government. (Our representative comments that: "This is the first of many groups probably being formed in the hope of getting some of the Mutual Assistance \$100,000,000.")

3. This group says that Radio Free Europe is a joke and a travesty on the term "democracy", and that something should be done about it. Members of the organization claim that Communist propaganda is beamed out by RFE and that the Munich office is staffed with the following Nazis: Laila Csonka; (fnu) Maori (phonetic); Aladar Kovacs; Laszlo Baroi; Andras Szekely; (fnu) Zalaberi (phonetic); Mejo Poharnak and his wife. Also, the following Communists are on the Munich staff: Josef Keneni (phonetic); Zoltan Szabo; (fnu) Mikos; Laszlo Szabo.

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

"Hungarian Exile Activities" - 2 -

4. The Hungarian group hopes to be a member of the Central and Eastern European Committee which will be something of a coordinating committee for the various yet-to-be-formed satellite governments-in-exile. A partial list of the members of this large Committee (all of whom also seem to claim that RFE is rotten) follows:

- Ferenc Nagy, President
- Istvan Barankovics
- Josef Gerry
- George Dimitroff
- Hanan Lestli
- Cornel Fila
- Mihai Krek
- Vlatko Kasek
- Stanislaw Mikolajczyk
- Stefan Gsuzki
- Augustin Popa
- Vaclovas Tsidsikaukas
- Constantin Visoianu

5. Mr. Weiss is getting the political plans of the Hungarian Group and the Central and Eastern European Committee and will give them to us when he receives them. Once he has given us this material, he hopes to let our [redacted] men deal directly with the national group leaders. These leaders hope to sell themselves and their ideas to CIA and have expressed their willingness to supply CIA exclusively with intelligence information. (We assume that this group's cooperation will be commensurate with the amount of financial support which CIA gives them).

6. Our [redacted] representative has commented that this group may also try to discredit RFE although "...most of these buzz would be starving if it were not for RFE help. They already have Lawyer Weiss believing that RFE is one of the most evil things going." ...We told these two /Mr. Weiss and Mr. Weiner/ that we were interested in getting all possible information on these groups and impressed upon them the fact that we could guarantee no favorable action. It was also necessary to persuade them that Radio Free Europe is not supported by our agency."

7. Paul Weiss maintains a New York law office at 369 Lexington Avenue. He was born on 29 November 1911 in New York City and served in the Infantry during World War II. Later, he was in Military Government in Korea. His partner, Mr. Weiner, was born 20 April 1913 and attended Harvard Law School.

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Hungarian Exile Activities

- 3 -

8. We shall follow up on this and shall keep you advised.
If you have particular points which you would like us to discuss
with Mr. Weiss, please let us know.



cc: AD/O (1)
Chief, [redacted] OFC (1) ✓
Chief, [redacted] PLANS/OSO (2)

SECRET

cc: Mr. Jackson
Mr. Lang

EXCERPT FROM LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 1952, FROM SPENCER
FRENCH TO CLAYTON BISHOP

Second, my own plans; until I know when we are to see Dr. Lenz and what the consequences of that interview may be, I can of course make no definite travel arrangements. I should like to go to Strasbourg and talk with them there about the enlargement plans for the College de L'Europe Libre; I want to have a few days in Paris, if possible, to catch up on developments in Royall's area; and I feel it important to have about a week in Lisbon. Forgetting the question of dates my itinerary would probably be Strasbourg, Paris, Lisbon, New York, and if there is to be any considerable delay before we can see Dr. Lenz I shall plan to go to Strasbourg from Frankfurt, then return to Frankfurt and then go direct to Paris. It would please me if I were able to go back to New York in time to go to New Hampshire to vote in the primaries on March 11, but this may be an idle hope.

Third, our Frankfurt negotiations; as I cabled C.D. we reached complete agreement on the technical basis, covered by the draft licensing-agreement. Throughout our discussions we were treated with the utmost courtesy and consideration. The original draft submitted for our study contained several ambiguities and specific provisions which, if literally construed would defeat the purpose which both sides seemed to have in mind. Our suggestions for changes and modifications were accepted after a minimum amount of discussion. Whenever we made a valid point, the fact was recognized at once by the others. Lick agrees with me that one could not expect to receive any more courteous or considerate treatment, and we were all very much pleased by the atmosphere at the ministry. You realized, of course, that the technical side of the question is by no means the complete picture, and it remains to be seen how rapidly we can clear up the non-technical aspects. If we can have our Bonn appointment again tomorrow, I ought to be able to have a cable in New York for your opening Monday, indicating the prospects, but if our appointment is delayed until some time next week - one of the local handicaps we are encountering - is a carnival-period or "Fasching" which reaches its climax Monday. Fasching is much more of a celebration than George Washington's birthday, so Lick and I are willingly sacrificing our holiday tomorrow (strike out Lick from the preceding clause because he tells me that the German operation does not recognize G. Washington's birthday. When I asked him if they had selected Fasching instead because it lasted longer, he avoided a direct answer.) so as not to get involved in a possibly long post-Fasching leave-over period. Seriously, very little work is done in Germany the day after the principal Fasching celebration and we hope we can get matters more or less cleared up tomorrow, but I shall not know until I get a telephone call this evening after return to Frankfurt.

RECEIPT FROM LETTER MAIL FEBRUARY 21, 1952, FROM SPENCER
DREYER TO CLAYTON LICKER:

P.S. The Bonn telephone message came through. Lens cannot see us tomorrow, or Monday or Tuesday--or, perhaps, anytime. Frits got on the war path and said we could not take that kind of brush-off and Lens, through his assistant Herr Dr. Whippersnapper finally said he had turned full responsibility over to a Foreign Office official, a Min. Dr. Strohm whom Frits knows. Frits then tried to reach Strohm but he was allegedly unavailable; Frits demanded that word be got to him and finally it was, Strohm remarking, "Why, there is no hurry about this, is there?" Strohm told Frits he couldn't see us before Thursday. An appointment has therefore been made for us at the Foreign Office in Bonn at 10 A.M. next Thursday the 28th. I haven't worked out my schedule between now and then but shall probably do Strasbourg and Paris and then proceed from Frankfurt to Lisbon assuming that to be possible which I don't yet know. Please inform C.L. of the foregoing and Bob Lang will ask to see this letter as Lick has just telephoned to Munich a teletype message for Bob referring to this letter.

I am, I confess, rather concerned about these recent developments. The "agreement" we reached with the Bundespost on technical points has no significance without a parallel political clearance in Bonn, so speed with the former has no meaning in the face of delay in the latter. Tell C.L., therefore, that my ten-watt green light has gained no wattage.

cc: Mr. Jackson
Mr. Lang

SECRET

February 1952

SECURITY INFORMATION

DRAFT: TELEGRAM FROM THE HONORABLE JOSEPH C. GREN
TO CONGRESSMAN O. K. ARMSTRONG.

I keenly regret to inform you that, upon further reflection and upon the basis of information which has recently come to my attention, I consider it inadvisable for me to address your Psychological Strategy Conference, and that I find it necessary to ask you to release me from speaking at your meeting on Saturday. When I was first asked to speak about the significance of National Committee for a Free Europe and the activities of Radio Free Europe, I understood that the Conference would discuss propaganda and psychological warfare. I ~~wrote~~ ^{NOTE} from the release issued by your office, that among the purposes of the conference are the presentation of definite plans of action to increase resistance movements, and to aid the peoples of the Soviet nation and the Satellite States to overthrow their regimes, as well as to establish a continuing organization to carry out the programs developed at the conference. This release also indicates that there will be full and open discussion of such matters and that persons purporting to represent underground movements in Poland, the Baltic States, Russia, China, Korea, etc., will take part in discussions.

It is my personal view that it would be unwise to discuss matters of this sensitive and provocative character in open meetings, particularly where programs of specific action are considered. It seems to me that public discussions of such matters and revelations of plans and programs would not only expose and thus jeopardize the existence of any resistance movements which may be identified and described, as well as the lives of the people participating, but would also provide quantities of adverse propaganda material for use by Soviet and satellite propaganda machines. It is my conclusion that my position and responsibilities as Chairman of the National Committee for a Free Europe make it inappropriate for me to speak before or lend my name to such a gathering because of the significance which might be attributed to such appearance. I want to express my full sympathy with the motivation of yourself and your co-sponsors, and to point out in this connection that the aims and objectives of the National Committee for a Free Europe, of which I am Chairman, are to keep hope alive among the prisoner peoples of the slave states and to provide assistance to fugitives from Soviet tyranny. I especially desire that my decision against appearing shall not be a cause of embarrassment to yourself or the others concerned. I therefore suggest that you inform those who you believe should know, that due to unforeseeable circumstances I have found myself unable to attend.

Orig:

DC/PI - for files ✓
DD/P - chrono - 1
LF - -1
Henry Poore - for use as guide.

Mr. Wesner read to
Mr. Gren over long-
distance telephone
today and the
latter said he would
send me the message from
Princeton.

SECRET

Bjm

14-00000

For Prelim. text license negot. between
NCFE and Bundespost subj. to Ger. polit. approval ,
see: Bonn to State 1688 of 25 Feb. '52, C VR-265,
Confic Sec. Info., copy being retained by DCPY.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION


18 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: "The 'Voice' and Radio Free Europe Complement Each Other"

1. The attached leaflet was inserted as a supplement in the January "Crusader", a newsletter which is sent out to the 8,000 regional chairmen of the Crusade for Freedom organization. It was prepared with the cooperation of the Voice of America officers in New York and was reviewed by the P Area of the Department of State.

2. It is intended to acquaint the regional Crusade organizations with the facts about VOA and offset any criticism or unfortunate comparisons that may have sprung up during the 1951 campaign.



Deputy Chief
Psychological Staff Division

Attachment:
As described above

Distribution:
Addressees - Original
DD/P - 1
ADPO - 1
C/EE - 1
C/SE - 1
C/WE - 1
CIO - 1
DCPY - 1
RI - 2

SECRET

THE "VOICE" AND RADIO FREE EUROPE COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER

Both Are Indispensable

"What's the difference between the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe?" "Why is it necessary to have both the Voice and Radio Free Europe?" These are frequent questions asked of General Clay and the other leaders of the Crusade for Freedom.

The Voice and Radio Free Europe are both vitally needed if we are to win the Cold War.

They are completely separate organizations. Each performs a distinct function in the fight against the gigantic Soviet propaganda machine.

The Voice speaks with the authority of the U. S. Government. It is financed by Government funds.

Radio Free Europe was set up by private citizens. It is financed by millions of individual contributions to the Crusade for Freedom.


Voice is World Wide

The Voice is a worldwide network, broadcasting in 46 languages over 75 transmitters. It is the only American voice heard in the Soviet Union. Its 120 individual daily programs of news, music, roundtables, commentaries, documentaries, service programs, etc., have a potential audience of 300,000,000 listeners.

Radio Free Europe is much smaller. It concentrates on the captive countries behind the Iron Curtain: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania. Its transmitters are in Western Europe.

The Voice speaks for the American people, spreading the truth about democracy, giving a true picture of life in the United States, and spiking Moscow's lies about us. It reports in full on official American acts and documents, presents news and world developments from our point of view.

But Voice is not limited to Government pronouncements; it regularly reflects American opinion as expressed in our press and radio. In a friendly way—with programs of information and service—it promotes a better understanding of the United States in Europe, in Latin America, the Far East and the Near East.



This visualization of the world, on Mercator's Projection, aims to show at a glance how a vast array of transmitters and relay stations carries Voice of America programs in 46 languages to listeners everywhere.

For European countries the programs are transmitted from stations in the United States located near New York City, Boston and Cincinnati, via directional antennas and with transmitters ranging in power from 20,000 to 200,000 watts.

The transmissions are beamed toward Europe, where a network of relay stations picks up and rebroadcasts the programs within dotted areas on the map. Shortwave relay stations are located at Tancier, North Africa, and Woofferton, England, while medium-wave transmitters are located in Munich, Germany, and Salonika, Greece.

Latin American programs are transmitted from shortwave stations located near New York, Boston, Cincinnati and San Francisco to all countries south of the United States.

To Far Eastern countries the programs are broadcast from high-powered transmitters near San Francisco, then relayed by shortwave transmitters at Honolulu, Manila and Ceylon (Ceylon) and by a medium-wave transmitter at Manila.

The map indicates a considerable overlap of radio coverage from the various transmitters. Sometimes the overlapping areas indicate different language programs, and sometimes they indicate a single language program is broadcast on several wavelengths, in order to give listeners a clear signal in a locality. Vertical lines indicate Time Zones, with GMT at Noon International Date Line as a dotted line.

Exiles Speak Over RFE

Radio Free Europe, on the other hand, does not portray America. It concentrates largely on what is taking place within the slave countries. Over its transmitters Poles speak to Poles, Hungarians to Hungarians, etc. They speak as "the voice of Free Poland," "the voice of Free Hungary," etc. They look at their people's problems through their own eyes.

RFE programs specialize in identifying and denouncing Communist informers and collaborators, sending back messages from escapees, and exposing the corruption and crimes within the Red regimes.

In their broadcasts to behind the Iron Curtain, the Voice and Radio Free Europe have essentially the same aims: to keep alive the hope of liberation; to let listeners know that they have not been forgotten; to stiffen their resistance against their Communist oppressors; to expose the fraudulent basis of authority upon which the Moscow-dominated regimes rest.

Both combat Communism and the persecution of religion and denial of human rights. Both report the superior industrial power and fighting potential of the free world over the Soviet-enslaved world.

1951 Year of Progress for "Voice"

During the past year the Voice of America:

1. Stepped up daily programming from 30 to 50 hours daily.
2. Made progress in overcoming Soviet jamming.
3. Increased its broadcasts to behind the Iron Curtain, adding the "splinter" languages of Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Tatar, Turkestani, Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian.
4. Inaugurated programs to Albania, Finland, Israel and Portugal in their respective languages; to China in two additional dialects, Swatow and Amoy; to Japan and South and Southeast Asia in Hindi, Urdu, Thai, Burmese and Malayan.
5. Became more outspoken and hard-hitting. One of the principal themes was the support of the UN effort to repel the Chinese and North Korean Communist aggression in Korea. Major attention was given to exposing the fraudulent Soviet "peace" drive.
6. Began work on the "Ring Plan" approved by Congress, which calls for a network of powerful relay bases girdling the globe.
7. Created "Vagabond"—a ship equipped with a transmitter, so that radio broadcasts may be relayed from shipboard.
8. Received 318,000 letters from overseas listeners—an increase of 35% over 1950.
9. Needled the Communists so successfully that Radio Moscow and Soviet regional stations doubled their attacks against the Voice.


RESTRICTED

In reply refer to W-1951
R

15 February 1952

Mr. Abbott Washburn
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.
110 West 57th Street
New York, New York

Dear Abbott:



PY/IS/AGL:cve
Distribution:
Addressee - Orig.
DCPY - 1
CIO - 1
PY/Lx- 1
PY/IS- 1
SD/RE- 2

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION


COPI

Confidential

January 24, 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Tom Braden



URGENT TELETYPE
COPY

CONFIDENTIAL - 5-2 14
SECURITY INFORMATION

A TRUE COPY OF
THE SIGNED ORIGINAL
[Signature]

ACT 119

CONTROL: 2805

WZA

FROM: Ankara

Rec'd : Februar 7, 1952
1:12 a.m.

INFO

TO: Secretary of State

SL

NO: 717, February 6, 8 p.m.

G

E

P

DCH

DCR

In view well-known Turk sensitivity (DEPTEL 642, Jan 31)
EAB doubts that RFE proposal wld be favorably acted upon
by Turk Govt.

We also believe any such approach as contemplated by RFE
might seriously jeopardize possibility Turk acceptance
VOA relay base proposal.

Regret delay in reply caused by garble in DEPTEL requiring
service.


DCR:EE

TT:RO

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION


CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED


7 February 1952




RESTRICTED


d.









1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100




SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL




SECRET




SECRET



SECRET





11

TOP SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

January 29, 1952

To:
From:

The enclosed letter copy is self-explanatory. It confirms, in my mind, all the worst suspicions that I have had regarding this public relations firm in connection with the Crusade for Freedom. That is one thing.

The fact that they would proceed, even if they had been commissioned to call this meeting for the Crusade for Freedom, without consulting the National Committee office, on whose behalf they are supposed to act, is, in my opinion, assuming alarming proportions.

Either the Crusade for Freedom works on behalf of the National Committee, or it does not.

This is the sort of thing that will really kill the Crusade for Freedom in this city, and is the finale on a whole series of similar incidents.

W.P.

SECRET

JAN 31 1952

January 29, 1952

Dear Abbott:

I have just been informed over the telephone that Earle Rogers, of Counsel Services, Inc., has called a meeting of the Crusade for Freedom Committee in this city, and has failed to consult me in any way in this matter.

This has resulted, as usual, in causing utter confusion in the minds of everyone, and bodes no good for the Crusade in this city nor for the sponsoring organization - the National Committee for a Free Europe, for which the Crusade is operating. In your letter of December 7, 1951, to Mr. Hulbert T. Bisselle, Chairman of the Crusade for Freedom in the District of Columbia, you designated me as, Director of the Washington, D.C. office. As I have received no instructions from you to the contrary, I have presumed this situation to be continuing.

The fact that Mr. Rogers would proceed in a matter of this kind without consultation with this office, and without being commissioned by you to undertake such a meeting, is most disturbing. This is the sort of thing that will really kill the Crusade for Freedom in this city.

I shall hope to discuss this matter with you when in New York on Thursday.

Sincerely yours,

Robert J. Moore

Mr. Abbott Washburn,
Executive Vice-Chairman
Crusade for Freedom,
1 West 57th Street,
New York, N.Y.

SECRET

1/1/45

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Exempt to Registry

2-7786

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

C10

NO.

DATE

3 April 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECD	FWD D		
1. WP/PM			1 Apr. 52		<p>Coordination to be indicated in greens. (Incoming ltr 28 Jan. attached). Original of attachment (ltr to Min Miller) will not be dispatched until notification that John Hughes letter has been signed.</p> <p>Has been signed. Itz has been sent to "Min."</p> <p>9. BV</p> <p>10 April 52</p> <p>See Chrono reply 9 Apr.</p> <p>76197</p>
2. EE		1 Apr.			
3.					
4. ADPC					
5. DDIP		8 April	8 April		
6. DDCT			8/4/52		
7. C10					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

Executive Registry
2-7786

Lang

January 28, 1952

Dear Allens:

This letter concerns the matter which I discussed with you briefly last week.

For some months past both the officers and directors of the NCFE have been concerned as to what protective steps could be taken in behalf of foreign nationals working for Radio Free Europe in Germany under conditions which might arise in certain eventualities.

I attach copy of a letter bearing on this matter which was written by Lang to Gates Lloyd on November 5, 1951. It gives a concise outline of the problem and suggests a solution of the same. To date, as far as I know, we have not been able to secure any assurances that this is being taken care of. If, as we have been informed, the Army authorities in Germany are willing to help upon receiving clearance from the Department of Defense, we feel every effort should be made to implement this promptly.

Apart from the very real present and potential future value of the foreign nationals in the group, the Committee feels that it has a definite moral obligation to seek the same degree of assistance and protection for them as would be afforded United States citizens under the conditions referred to.

Personally, I feel this obligation is a broader one which extends to this Government as well.

Last Thursday when we were discussing this question in New York, Joe Grew was much interested and said he would be glad to assist in any way possible. We all felt, however, that this is not a matter which the Committee can take up direct with the Defense Department or other Government agencies here and that it can only be brought to a proper solution through action on the part of the Director or yourself.

Please be good enough to take this matter under consideration and give us the benefit of your advice.

Yours,

[Redacted signature box]

STRICTLY PRIVATE

5 November 1951

Dear Mr. _____

As you know, RFE has, at the present writing, some 1000-1100 people in Germany. They are largely concentrated in Munich and its environs, although some are scattered in and around the Frankfurt and Heidelberg region. The staff is composed of Americans, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles (at an early date), large numbers of German housekeeping and engineering personnel, plus a few French, Swiss, Belgians, British, etc. Full details on the disposition of the staff are available in Munich and have been turned over to EUCCOM in an effort to interest EUCCOM in the most serious problem which faces us today - that of evacuation in the event of a move by any of the Russian armies.

Through Lt. Col. Ciccolella we have been fortunate enough to have our American personnel included in the evacuation plan of the Munich Post Command. At this writing, however, we stand to lose our extraordinarily capable, well trained and completely western-oriented foreign staff.

EUCCOM, on its own, has done all that it can but needs a directive from the Department of Defense in Washington to the effect that the RFE staff is to be considered a "war asset" and given a high priority on the evacuation schedule. This priority should include the foreign nationals who have been trained into the RFE effort since without them whatever agency which would take over the RFE staff would be completely lost.

Our investigations, and very considerable work done in the field on this subject, prove that EUCCOM is more than willing to take upon itself this additional evacuation burden if so directed by the Department of Defense.

This is a matter of extreme importance not only to us but to whoever will inherit the task of influencing the satellite areas when and after the Russian armies have moved into western Europe. RFE has proved that it is the Czechs, Hungarians and the Poles who can best do a psychological warfare job. Without their complete participation we would be lost in this "peacetime" effort, and without their future participation whoever inherits our task in time of war would be equally lost.

STRICTLY PRIVATE

STRICTLY PRIVATE

-2-

May I therefore request that this matter be given your immediate and urgent attention. So far as we can tell, and we have gone into this subject very exhaustively, all that is needed from this side is a declaration of interest in the entire staff on the part of the Department of Defense.

Mr. F. J. ...

EE-3.

2004K

13 Nov 52

Evacuation Problem

- ① RFEA 1100 in terms as many people as rest of CPA.
- ② Get break down of employees into various nationalities - at least as to ① US Nats ② ^{author} Eastern ③ Independent Germans -
- ③ What sort of method for issuing passes on A-224? Will not be sent out ahead -
- ④ Will need some sort of priority - what order of departure?

Page 123
 C. H. ... for civilians - some numbers ... U.S. Civs ... State Chiefs of Mission

WCT Paper thru Tomorrow -
Reassure Hughes - they are
on track -

Get plans up -

Cut down number.

Get

[redacted]

-

7 March '52 - [redacted] - Plans Dir -

N.S.C. paper has been passed - Directive 123
Take up with EE to have our people included in their Plans -
Coordinate is under Plans Dir.

EE - [redacted] or [redacted] are things to see -

Get them on who should be included - US, Emly + Gen - + they report to the [redacted]

Weeks Examination 13 Dec

N.S.C. Junior Section has
accepted paper &
its going to Senior
Section where no

10 Jan 52 trouble is anticipated -

[redacted] - ~~will call back~~
~~20 Jan~~

Paper ran into an ag at last NSC
meeting & will take 2 to 4 weeks to
get back on the agenda (Not many)

[redacted] 3251

knows more about this -

Saw [redacted] 10 Jan - He will
keep us posted

Mil Evac Order ^{bill breaks}

(1) NEO

Non-essential Evac Order

(2) J. (essential) A. (evac) O. (order)

Efficient at SMO.

OPE has special passes - red white blue
for Am personnel - can
Officers + everybody with them

Adaptation of that Pass - or
the pass itself - might do -
But - this is in Combatant
columns -

Everybody in CPO. is concerned with this
problem - But must be essential people -
irreplaceable - & do they have to be there - or

Every consideration should be
given to how our jurisdiction
could be performed further
back from frontiers

S.P.

Phone

28 Nov 51

Evacuation Plans

John Taylor ITC - is in Paris -
unemployed -

S.P. thinks he would be a good man
to plan evacuation procedures - as soon
as we get green light on

Curriculum vitae of:

JOHN S. TAYLOR, JR.
95 rue de la Paisanderie,
Paris XVI. France
Phone number: TROcadero 08-66

43 North Linwood Avenue
Pittsburgh 5, Pennsylvania

Date and Place of Birth: 28 October 1912, Wilkesburgh, Pennsylvania
USA Passport No: 453792 Carte d'identite No: AH 62011

Marital Status: Married (no children)

Height: 6'3" Weight: 210 lbs

Health: Good

Education: Grade School 8 years

College 4 years

High School 4 years

Degree B.A. (Liberal Arts)

The Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pennsylvania

Important Civilian and Military Experiences:

Employer: US Army

Position: Entered on Active Duty as Second Lieutenant, Infantry-Reserve

Length of Employment: June 1937 - March 1939

Employer: Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc., Kansas City 6, Missouri

Positions: Traffic and Reservation Sales Representative
Representative Traffic and Sales Manager, City Office) at Pittsburgh, Pa.

Length of Employment: May 1939 - February 1941

Employer: US Army

Position: Entered on Active Duty as First Lieutenant, Infantry-Reserve

Stationed at: New York, N.Y.

Noumea, New Caledonia

Washington, D.C.

Norfolk, Virginia

Honolulu, T.H.

Le Havre, France

Separated from Active Duty as Lt. Col., Transported on Corps-Reserve

Length of Employment: February 1941 - February 1946

Employer: Transcontinental and Western Air Inc., Kansas City 6, Missouri

Positions: Assistant to Traffic Manager, Int'l Division, New York, N.Y.

Assistant to Traffic Manager for France, Paris, France

Length of Employment: February 1946 - August 1946

Employer: US Army

Position: Entered on Active Duty as Lt. Col., Transportation Corps, US Army

Stationed at: Paris, France

Bremerhaven, Germany

Antwerp, Belgium

New York, N.Y.

Cardiff, Wales

Washington, D.C.

Resigned from Active Service with same rank

Other Information:

Speak French moderately well.

Have lived in France a total of three (3) years and am now a resident.

Practically all of my experience in civilian and military life has been office management and direction in outside activities.

References:

Mr. Alexandre de Bondini

Mr. Philippe Hottinguer

Monsieur Jean Monnet

Vice-President, Int'l

Hottinguer et Cie.,

Commissaire General

Automatic Electric Corp.

Banque, 38 rue de Provence

au Plan de Modernisa-

of Chicago, 2 rue Chartran

Paris, IX.

tion et d'Equipement

Neuilly-sur-Seine

Telephone: TRI 28-84

18 rue de Martignac,

Telephone: MAI 76-22

PARIS VI

Telephone: INV 75-70

25 Jun 52

Mr. Braden:

In collating these 2 reports, I find some slight differences. The only one which seems significant is marked in red below, but, I've listed some others for your possible convenience. Does point 4 require a memo or is it carelessly written - or is the method of collaborating understood?

Devine

Braden

- 1. page 1, line 2
"but in a considerably lower key"
- 2. page 3, para beginning "Mr. Dulles..."
"in close coordination with UOA"

1. not included as an agreed item - committed, instead.

- 2. page 3, last para page 5, para beginning "Dulles..."
"to include the Committee of the Voice"

- 3. page 3: the points "Point 2:" and not last more than 2 weeks"

page 5
pt 2. "of short duration"

Point 3: "an explanation of USA-UK relationships"

Pts 3 or 4
Pt 3: "including the work of the Voice"

* Point 4: q. v. different pt 5 q. v. names

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

18 January 1952

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Present were Messrs. Jackson and Washburn of NCFE, Messrs. Barrett, Joyce, Devins, Sargeant and Kohler from State, and Messrs. Dulles, Wisner, [] and Braden from CIA. The meeting was held in Mr. Barrett's office on 17 January at 4:30 pm.

CONCLUSION: That the Crusade for Freedom organization should continue.

The following is a transcript of Mr. Braden's notes of the meeting.

C. D. led off, admitting the frustrations that a long campaign on the Crusade for Freedom caused to the State Department and suggested the following programs:

1. A 1-day bell-ringing campaign in all cities.
2. Direct mail to corporations.

At this point, Mr. Washburn interjected to say that he would need about two weeks of "low drums" promotion before the 1-day campaign. Jackson went on to say that under such a scheme there would be no time on the part of the chairman for a build-up of invidious comparisons in the press. At Jackson's request, Mr. Washburn passed around a Crusade publication entitled "The Voice of America - 1951 - A Year of Progress". This brochure, which in four pages praises highly the work of the Voice of America, is to be mailed by the Crusade to its chief contributors.

Mr. Barrett then made the following points:

1. The National Committee for a Free Europe grew out of the idea of helping refugees and of giving them a voice. It has changed over the years to a huge operation with many new ideas, and the Crusade for Freedom came along as a [] necessity.

2. He asked whether the demands of fund-raising had not begun to make less effective the primary job of helping refugees, whether

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

the tail -- Crusade for Freedom -- is not wagging the dog. He remarked that in a conversation with Alan Valentine he had found that Valentine is inclined to agree with him.

3. Against Mr. Washburn and the Crusade for Freedom, he had only one complaint. They were too good, too big-time. They made such an effective appeal that the recipients could not avoid running down the competitor. He stated as his opinion that the Crusade was jeopardizing a multi-million dollar operation -- the Voice of America -- and might even be jeopardizing another multi-million dollar operation -- Radio Free Europe -- for the sake of raising three million dollars.

4. He thought balloons and some other operations done by the Committee were best done by private means.

5. He leaned toward going back to the beginning and looking at the Crusade as purely [redacted] and not an attempt to raise large funds and making a lot of hoopla. He suggested that the Crusade should raise only enough money and make only enough of a campaign to provide [redacted]. He suggested mail solicitation, magazine advertisements, the publicizing of two or three large anonymous gifts, all without high-pressure. Then he said, "Let's get on with the main job of radio and refugees."

Mr. Dulles asked whether this danger to the Voice was so great. "Didn't you get more money this year?" Barrett's answer was "No" and he pointed out that there was no damage done to the Voice by the Crusade this year insofar as funds were concerned but he feared the future. Dulles asked whether we couldn't work out the timing of the Crusade so that there would be no interference on the hill. Mr. Barrett did not directly answer the question. He said [redacted] Too many people already know the truth about the Crusade and he is worried about it. He said it surprised him that it worried him more than it worried Mr. Dulles. A large campaign raises the question, he said, of how all the work is done on such a small amount of money. He thought the Crusade called attention to itself [redacted].

Howland Sargeant asked Jackson to answer this question, "If what various uses are the Crusade?" Jackson listed them as follows:

[redacted]

2. It brings in money.

3. It educates and interests Americans in the whole problem of psychological warfare and propaganda and does so more than anything else that is managed by the Government or by private funds. He thought this was greatly important and said that although he

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

realized that mistakes had been made and the Crusade had criticized the Voice, strategically the Crusade could be of enormous help to the Voice by publicizing the need for communicating to people in slavery.

Sargeant thought point 3 was the most important. He asked whether the Crusade couldn't be tied in with this point. Jackson said, "Yes, and we are starting with this issue of the Crusader publicizing the Voice." Washburn added that 25 million contributors, counting this year's and last year's contributions, may prevent cutting down the operation as Barrett suggests. They will raise a lot of questions. Barrett disagreed and repeated his suggestion of a one-month operation confined to magazine advertising and direct mail. Jackson asked about the magazine advertising. He said you had to write copy for magazine advertising and the copy would have to advertise Radio Free Europe. Barrett answered, "You can control the copy on magazine ads. There is a lot of time allowed for going over them carefully before they get into print."

Washburn repeated several times that it would be a great shame to let the Crusade go. Jackson said the Crusade gave a real lift to exiles not only here but abroad.

Kohler said he had been thinking about the problem and had two suggestions to make:

1. Could we exhort people to give a dollar to Radio Free Europe and at the same time to write a letter to their Congressman backing up the Voice of America?
2. Could the Radio Advisory Committee of the Voice of America team up with the Crusade to help with general publicity?

Jackson answered the first question "No". He thought that would be dangerous. To the second question, he said "Yes". He again outlined his idea for a campaign calling for education on a general psychological warfare program with a final request to contribute to the Crusade.

Mr. Dulles again asked Mr. Barrett about his financial problems and the timing of his request to the bill. Barrett said he would have the most difficulty from January to July. Washburn said, "Then we'll run a campaign in September only and there'll be no horn-blowing until then."

Dulles said that he thought that if the Crusade could be limited to September he doubted that it would interfere with Mr. Barrett's fund-raising problems. That, coupled with a better degree of coordination, with the use of Mr. Kohler's private advisers, and with a great effort on the part of the Crusade toward psychological warfare education would give the Voice such invisible support. Sargeant said he agreed

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

with Mr. Dulles' view of the Crusade giving invisible support and wondered whether we could not make the invisible aspects visible. He thought that to hold the whole Crusade organization together for a year merely to conduct a two-week campaign would waste many good men's time. Barrett agreed that a two-week campaign wouldn't keep the organization alive.

Sargeant asked if there were not other ideas which could be fed through the Crusade machinery, thus making more constructive use of it.

Barrett raised the question of internationalizing the Crusade effort. Jackson replied that there was an abortive French project which he thought would shortly fall flat on its face. The British, he thought, would shortly make a final decision as to whether to go ahead with an exile program or not. He seemed dubious that they would decide to do so. He mentioned Jean Paul David and Raix et Liberte as the only foreign operation in this field which had any spark to it. Barrett agreed but asked whether or not some Europeans couldn't be put on the Board of Directors. Dulles replied that this was very difficult, that they couldn't attend meetings for one thing. Barrett said, "Couldn't there be an annual meeting simply as a front, as camouflage?"

Jackson said that NCFE did get involved in European organizations, that they had close affiliations with the European Movement, with the Free Trade Union Committee in Exile, with the International Journalists, with Strasbourg University, and all the radio programs were reaching the point where they were thought of as programs belonging to the people to whom they were broadcast. NCFE had, he thought, internationalized a great deal and in a very natural way. A board of foreign directors would spoil that natural process by setting up an obvious prony.

Washburn again raised the argument of timing the campaign to take place only in September. There was no direct response to this suggestion.

Sargeant, referring again to the use of the invisible assets mentioned by Dulles, thought that if the Crusade continued it should be planned not primarily to raise funds [redacted] Attention should be focused on:

1. The development of understanding; the battle for the minds of men.
2. Two or three concrete things which private citizens could do in this battle.

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

Barrett took this up at once and mentioned letter writing. Turning to Washburn he said, "Abbott, put your mind to work." He thought we should be able to find something. He suggested we ask Washburn to look into other projects like the letter-writing campaign that was done for Italy. He mentioned the Common Council for American Unity and Mr. Dulles suggested the Friendship League run by Christian Porter.

Dulles asked for agreement of the group to do the campaign on a modest basis for the month of September only, to keep the organization together, to include the Committee of the Voice, to assure full coordination of all publicity and to work hard on the specific ideas mentioned by Sargeant. Devine asked if such a campaign would not mean playing Radio Free Europe down to, say, fourth place? Jackson said, "No, it would not mean that; Radio Free Europe would simply be one of the themes that was played, sometimes at the top of the ladder and sometimes down the ladder, it would depend."

Barrett again raised the [] problem and his dissatisfaction with the Crusade []. Dulles explained that this was a problem that had to be lived with.

Jackson once more attempted to get agreement of the group on the following points:

1. The Crusade to continue.
2. To begin not earlier than September and to be of very short duration.
3. The whole organization to devote itself to education in psychological warfare, including the work of the Voice.
4. To study means of civic action on local and national levels.
5. That everybody agree to this program and work out the details as soon as possible.

Barrett asked first Joyce and then Devine whether they agreed to this program. Both did agree.

Barrett said that he could not commit himself to this program. He said he was leaving shortly and felt that he could not commit the Department of State under these circumstances. He said he would agree on one point only -- that the Crusade should not disband -- but he reiterated his conviction that it ought to be of a much lower pressure than the discussion so far outlined seemed, and he again mentioned magazines and direct mail. Jackson said that it was all very well to tell the group that they were not to disband but he

SECRET

SECRET
- 6 -

said the first question the group would then ask is "What shall we do?" He said that question had to be answered. Barrett said, "We have a coordinating committee of Braden and Devine to work this problem out."

There followed some discussion of the balloon project which is the subject of a separate Memorandum for the Record by

TOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief, International Organizations Branch

FY-CIO:tbB:eh

Orig - DCI (thru ADPC and DD/P)
1 cc - FY
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - EI

SECRET

TOMIC

SECRET

17 January 1962

[Redacted]


Enclosed please find six copies of pamphlet entitled "Unconquered". As you requested, they are being forwarded to you for delivery to Teelove.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

JAN 17 1962

SECRET



Social worker, lawyer, humanitarian,
enemy of dictatorship, devoted to social justice
and equal rights—Milada Horakova fought
... and died ... for a better way of life for all.
Her resistance to the Nazis and the
Communists has already become part of
the history of the Czechoslovakian
fight for freedom.
This is the story of her fight.

Copyright 1951 by
NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE, INC.



National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.

330 FIFTH AVENUE • ROOM 301 • NEW YORK 1, N. Y. • TELEPHONE SEVANT 9-2100

CABLE ADDRESS: NATFCOM

OFFICERS

Joseph C. Coey
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
LeWitt C. Poole
VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
John C. Hugan
MANAGING DIRECTOR
C. D. Jackson
PRESIDENT
Victor E. Duffner
VICE-PRESIDENT
Spencer Packer
VICE-PRESIDENT
Frank Alford
VICE-PRESIDENT AND TREASURER
Therese C. Angarone
SECRETARY AND ASST. TREASURER

MEMBERS

Charles L. Adcock
Raymond Price Alexander
Leah Bell
A. A. Berlin, Jr.
Francis Boudie
Robert Woods Bliss
Robert F. Bradford
Harry A. Bulfin
James B. Carey
Harry Woodrow Chase
Lucian D. Clay
William L. Clayton
Clark M. Clifford
Cecil B. DeMille
Frank R. Loomis
William J. Donovan
Hugh A. Evans
Allen W. Dulles
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Mark F. Ewing
James A. Farley
Virginia C. Gaidarova
William Green
Charles R. Hask
Palmer Hays
Arthur Hays Lane
Henry B. Luce
Joseph V. McKee
Webb Madison
Frederick C. Ogden
Arthur W. Page
Robert F. Patterson
Burden B. Ransome
John A. Riley
Spyros Skantzos
Charles P. Tate
DeWitt Wallace
Abner Washburn
W. W. Warrenton
Walter H. Waudin, Jr.
Matthew Weil
Mrs. Quincy Wright
Darryl Zanuck

October, 1951

The National Committee for a Free Europe is happy to send you a copy of its illustrated booklet, UNCONQUERED, the story of the outstanding Czechoslovakian patriot, Milada Horakova.

Milada Horakova was unbelievably courageous during her imprisonment under both the Nazi and Russian-dominated Communist dictatorships in Czechoslovakia. She was a true defender of democracy, and sacrificed her life for those principles of liberty which all free men everywhere hold dear.


I cannot urge you strongly enough to read UNCONQUERED and learn the story of this brave woman who dared to oppose the Bolshevik conspiracy to destroy democracy in Czechoslovakia.

I ask you to join us in working to preserve peace with freedom for all mankind. If you wish further information about the National Committee, please write me.


Sincerely yours,

C. D. Jackson
President

Additional copies of UNCONQUERED, while available, are 15¢ per single copy; bulk shipments of 100 copies or more are 12¢ a copy.



The courtroom in Prague had a festive air. Jammed with spectators — rare in Communist Czechoslovakia — it seemed more like a celebration than a monster trial of 15 of Czechoslovakia's freedom-loving patriots. Chief defendant in this mock trial was Milada Horakova. It was the liquidation of Czech democratic leaders by the Communist regime.




Doctor of Law, former worker for the municipal administration of Prague. Member of Parliament . . . the 48-year old Czech patriot stood firm against the verbal lashings of the Red prosecutor. "Milada Horakova, you are a traitor to the Peoples' Democracy of Czechoslovakia. What is your defense?"

Defense? Milada smiles. There is so much to say. But where to begin? Almost 25 years ago . . .

ILLUSTRATED BY THE MERRILL HOWARD COMPANY


Though graduated with a Law degree, Milada Horakova's love for people brought her to head the Children's Bureau of the Public Welfare Department in Prague. Here she established a system of foster homes and proper adoption procedure. Her legal training assisted her in solving juvenile delinquency and the establishment and administration of homes and hospitals for orphans and mentally retarded children.



Her fight for freedom and social justice found expression through the National Council of Women. Happily at work in social welfare and the Council, she devoted her energies towards helping others.


During the next 15 years, Milada worked tirelessly in the preparation of important legislation for the Czechoslovak Parliament. She worked on the laws regulating the work day to 8 hours, suppressing prostitution, protecting home workers, restricting child labor . . . and much other social legislation.





Executive Secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council of Women, she was a member of the International Women's Organization, too. She travelled to many countries representing the Czechoslovakian women. And thus she foresaw the threat of the Hitler dictatorship's greed and power.


...of her countrymen that Hitler could not be trusted. She was right. While Hitler talked peace, the Nazi war machine rolled across the border into Czechoslovakia on March 15th, 1939. When the Germans occupied the country and raped the leading democracy of Europe, Milada pledged to help destroy the German...



...organized the Women's Social Movement Popular with many social welfare groups. This Horakova was known and respected. Thus she was able to recruit an underground army of former social workers to fight the Nazi aggression.



She organized an underground that baffled the Germans. Instead of large meetings, she set up a chain of small groups. Only the head of each group knew the other members. These group heads would meet in different homes or in a doctor's office. Thus, when the Gestapo arrested a woman underground worker, they would be unable to make a mass arrest.



Milada and her resistance workers constantly embarrassed the Nazis. They arranged hiding places and led the partisans, helped Jews to escape the clutches of the Gestapo, set up an intelligence spy network and distributed pamphlets to stoke the resistance.


At the same time, Milada helped to write a new constitution to be used when the Nazis were destroyed. She was in constant contact, via secret radio, with the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London. Thus she transmitted the progress of her work on the post-war constitution.





The Nazis had long wanted to arrest Milada. Having learned of her work on the new constitution for a liberated Czechoslovakia, they hoped to catch her with this evidence. One afternoon, three Gestapo agents burst into her country home and arrested her and her husband.




But Milada had hidden the notes for the proposed constitution in a box of her daughter's candy. While kissing the child goodbye, she slipped the secret to the youngster, who later burned the notes.



Milada and her husband were separated, and she was taken to the Gestapo's investigations center, Petubek Palace. Here, even brave men broke under the ruthless questioning. But, though she was questioned often, she was not frightened. Her answers — all lies — seemed so logical to the Gestapo, that she did not betray even one of her co-workers in the resistance.



For 15 months the Gestapo questioned her, shipped her from one prison to another. Never once did she give them the slightest shred of evidence. Not until 1941, when Hitler's armies defeated France and arrested some of her escaped co-workers, did they associate the escape with Milada.




Though forced to work in a munitions factory underground, labor in a mosquito-infested and clean house for the Gestapo... Milada never complained. Her ready courage was a constant annoyance to the Nazis. Her optimism and hope was a source of encouragement for her fellow prisoners.

...prison at Terezin, she spent 16 months in solitary confinement, another 6 months in
 ... Never permitted to get fresh air, worried by her clothes gnawed by cam
 ... two main meals of soup and water. Milada, nevertheless, refused to buckle under



The many months in solitary confinement shattered Milada's health. But, when finally released to the prison proper, without regard for her own safety, she bathed and cared for sick, elderly prisoners. Her uncomparable spirit was a shining example for other less stalwart prisoners to carry on.



Finally, brought to the stand trial before a military court, she faced death penalties. But her eloquent appeal to the Germans' fear of a further military sentence of hard labor.



After a year in the German concentration camp, she was freed by the victorious Americans. When leaving to return to Czechoslovakia, Milada pledged herself to continue the struggle for human rights and social welfare, and to help those who suffered under the Nazis.



Returning home after 5 horrible years of prisons and concentration camps and torture chambers . . . Milada was joyously reunited with her invalid husband and grown daughter. Both had miraculously lived through the German tyranny.



Apprehensive of Czechoslovakia's new-won freedom and to guard against another imperialistic power's conquest of her country, Milada successfully ran for Parliament. After organizing a fund for political prisoners, she introduced a bill providing pensions for the families of Nazi victims.

"I believe in freedom and equality for all. Does that make me a traitor?" A whisper runs through the crowd watching the trial. Milada Horakova now has stood up to the Communists and the new masters of Czechoslovakia.




The Communist prosecutor is in a rage. He knows that Milada has bested him. Furi-ously he screams, "You are a traitor to the Peoples' Democracy of Czechoslovakia." "I will prove that Milada Horakova was paid by the capitalists; a spy for the Western powers; a war-monger; bombardment of Prague was her aim; she wanted death for women and children; she wanted the Germans to rule Czechoslovakia." There were many other ridiculous charges. The trial continues . . .




She told her friends that a new-fangled Czechoslovakia - Russian communism was infiltrating into the Government and though they made fine promises to workers and . . . intended to "take over" and finally destroy the rights of free-


Running for reelection, Milada campaigned on a platform of freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and all other individual freedoms. She warned the people of the treachery of Stalin-ists . . . who are motivated only by the interests of Russian imperialism.



The Communists realized that the people had for Milada Husakova. And so they approached her asking her to join them in their quest for social welfare legislation. Strong through her convictions, she refused.




Those in Parliament who had fought for human rights and social welfare were appalled by the new regime's tactics. They asked Milada for advice. She replied, "I have resigned. I shall not give in. I have chosen a straight path, and this I shall follow."



Having infiltrated into the cabinet, and after gaining control of important labor unions as well as the police and Army, the Communists staged a coup. In February of 1948, with the threat of the so-called Soviet Army, they successfully overthrew the democratic government in Czechoslovakia. For the second time in less than a decade, the Czechoslovaks lost their freedom.



Returning to a subordinate job in the Social Service in Prague, Milada never less continued to fight Communism. At every opportunity she talked to people, comparing the "People's Democracy" with Germany. Found no difference in their drive for world power. Both form dictatorship, do not hide behind slogans, peace, and prepare war.



To suppress opposition and strengthen their grip on the people, the Communists resorted to nighttime arrests, without warrants or legal charge. Their campaign of terror struck horror in the hearts of all.




When she refused to compromise, the Communists marked her as their #1 enemy. Though friends warned her to flee the country, Milada refused to leave. Her telephone conversations were listened to. Her servant was actually a spy. She was threatened and arrested.




Since they were unable to get evidence against her, the Communist Secret Police brutally tortured an innocent man, forced him to sign a "confession" which would implicate Milada Horakova.

One afternoon, the Secret Police arrested Milada, brought her to their headquarters, questioned her unceasingly for 56 hours. Though they refused her food and water, she would not talk in her plea of innocence. Finally she was drugged, and forced into a false confession of guilt.




Now, after six months in prison — beaten and tortured — Milada bravely faces the Communists. Fearlessly, she concludes: "I oppose the so-called Peoples' Democracy in the Czechoslovak Republic, for I hold that it not be democratic. I have worked against it. Should the miracle occur and the court find me not guilty and I be released, I should work against it anew."



The "fixed" judges sentenced her to death. All Czechoslovakia is horrified. A wave of revulsion sweeps the free world. Protest meetings are held and petitions directed even to Stalin.

The Communists did what the Nazis never dared to do. On June 27th, 1950 Milada Horakova was hanged.





THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE, INC., is a group of private citizens who have drawn together to carry out concrete and direct action to restore and strengthen man's most valued possession—freedom.

The Committee has as its active allies numerous exiled democratic leaders who have found haven in the United States from the Communist tyranny of Eastern Europe. Radio Free Europe, of the National Committee for a Free Europe, is setting up facilities that will enable these trusted patriots to be heard again by their own people. Not only does Eastern Europe hear the exiles' impressions of the United States, but American messages of hope and encouragement are transmitted, and, above all, the truth which totalitarian governments forbid their enslaved peoples to hear.

Freedom or the enslavement of men's minds and souls, is the vital issue. What shall we pass on to our children—their rightful heritage of freedom, or the spiritual devastation of Communism? At this very moment the kind of world they will inherit hangs in the balance. The issue is for you to decide. In the vital conflict for the preservation of freedom, the National Committee for a Free Europe offers every single citizen the opportunity to throw in his weight.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE, INC.

301 Empire State Building

350 Fifth Avenue

New York 1, N. Y.

10

SECRET

January 23, 1952

MEMORANDUM

To: [redacted]

From: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Report of meeting at State Department, Washington, January 23, 1952.

PRESIDENT: [redacted] representing [redacted] in his absence,
Mr. Harold G. Vedler
[redacted]
Mr. John Campbell
Mr. Robert Larr, Radio Free Europe, New York
[redacted]

CZECHOSLOVAK AFFAIRS

[redacted] reported that the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia, composed of 17 and 13 persons respectively, had signed an agreement in New York City on January 15, 1952, which bear the signatures of Messrs. Holdrich, Klizek, Lettrich, and Zenkl.

(Copy of this agreement is herewith attached).

[redacted] advised that Mr. Klizek had represented Mr. Papnek in signing the agreement. The agreement, [redacted] pointed out, sets up a provisional management of Czechoslovak affairs consisting of two administrators - one from each group. Mr. Holdrich represents the 17 of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, and Mr. Papnek will represent the 13 of the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia. The provisional management also consists of a body of 26 persons - 12 from each side and which, [redacted] reported, might be called a "caretaker body".

[redacted] also presented another document which is a protest of the Council's 17 against the Committee's 13, insisting on the exclusion of Dr. Ousky from any major function. However, at a subsequent meeting of the Committee with representatives of both groups, Mr. Zenkl categorically advised that he and the Committee of 13 had no question whatsoever over the

inclusion of Dr. Causky, or any other person, as one of the 12 representatives of the National Council, who, together with the 12 representatives of the National Committee are to carry on the discussions leading to the formation of a permanent body to represent Czechoslovak exiles.

Further, Mr. Zenkl stated that when a final program had been agreed to, in his opinion, the only bar to holding any office in a unified organization would be the unwillingness of any individual to accept the over-all program to which the agreement had been accorded through democratic procedure. Apparently, he also advised that he considered this policy to apply to himself as well as to any others. Agreement was accorded on this point by the representatives of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia.

[redacted] also presented the rules which have been adopted for the discharge of the administration of Czechoslovakian affairs in exile. She called the attention of the meeting particularly to Items #3 and #5 of these rules wherein it is stated that:

3) The Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia make available to the provisional administrators the requisite financial resources.

5) The provisional administrators deposit the funds made available to them in a joint account which they handle jointly and prior to the cessation of the provisional administration, they shall jointly account for the use of said funds.

After the meeting [redacted] made available the following two lists of 12 persons, from each group, in accordance with the final agreement for the provisional administration:

Japanese:

Zenkl
Ripka
Kocvara
Blaho
Maska,
Tucek (middle class)
Sair (National democrat)
Petraberd
Klizek
Firt

Taborsky

Buma
Cory
Frunak
Heidrich
Leidrich
Major
Hanus
Causky
Proclasha

Silva
Peroutka
Clavik

At this time, [] advised, the Czechoslovaks are still meeting in separate groups, but that the merger is expected to take place very shortly. She further advised that Mr. Zenkl had announced his Committee's indebtedness to the tune of 2 to 3,000; whereupon Mr. Vedeler advised that he had received no confirmation of the allegation that the Zenkl Committee had disposition of independent funds in Switzerland.

[] advised that IFFF's Subcommittee will continue in existence, and that it will be available for advice and assistance to the Czechoslovak provisional administrators, and the body of ZL.

[] also advised that the new financial arrangements were left to the decision of IFFF's Subcommittee, and that no new move in this regard would be made by the Subcommittee until an accounting of all funds had been given, and that financial aid will be allocated on the merits of the case at that time.

Mr. Vedeler raised the question of the individual stipends, and the meeting was informed that unless there is some further change of policy, these stipends are continuing and will continue as in the past.

The meeting was informed that the so-called Czechoslovak Middle Class party representatives have been excluded from the provisional body of ZL, and advised that the exile lawyer, Mr. Cv. stka, was likely to raise a good deal of noise about the whole thing. [] suggested that, as a member of the Knights of Malta, he was more or less expected to stir up the whole hierarchy.

[] raised the issue as to the duration of the provisional agreement, and questioned as to whether any time limit had been set within which the administrators and the body of ZL would settle their differences and establish a permanent organization. [] replied that it was

the opinion of the National Councils division that this issue should not be forced at this time, but further developments would be allowed to crystallize, and that we should wait to see what actual progress is made.

RUMANIAN AFFAIRS

[] reported that Messrs. Cafencu and Visolani had met and had retained earlier views on the type of organization to be established for the representation of Rumanian affairs in exile; their agreement appears not to be within the realm of possibility at the present time. []

also made known to the meeting the contents of a letter written by Mr. Cafencu to one of his friends in which he charged that Mr. Visolani desired only one political and national body which should represent the Rumanian cause abroad, and that this body should be the present National Committee, under Mr. Visolani's presidency. Mr. Cafencu's letter also advised that Mr. Visolani is opposed to a large National Council, although he would agree to setup a special commission composed of persons outside the Committee. Mr. Cafencu on the other hand claims that he seeks an organization in exile within a wide framework, which would have a representative character, and be headed by an elected chairman. Mr. Cafencu indicated that he was not opposed to the King's cause and that, in fact, he wished to see the Royal question intimately bound to that of the whole exile community. Cafencu charged that Visolani and his group, by negotiating only on the basis of the King's approval, instead of reaching agreement prior to the King's approval, invited criticism not only of themselves, but places the King's position in jeopardy.

[] herself also advised that the meeting of January 23 between Visolani and Cafencu was such as Cafencu had indicated; i.e., with regard to the chairmanship, Cafencu would be the honorary chairman, Visolani the chairman, and perhaps Cafencu the vice-chairman. Visolani had also offered

unification of the two groups on a 7 to 5 basis - the 7 coming from Visolani's Rumanian National Committee. No reference was made of the funds which had been one of the main bases of contention at the split.

[redacted] advised of a meeting between Mr. C. F. Jackson and General Radescu in which, among other things, the General complained that he was being excluded from Rumanian discussions in NYE circles, and questioned the advisability of sending Visolani to London along with Căfencu. Radescu claims that his Free Rumanian League is having great success. The General was informed that the invitation to go abroad to Visolani and Căfencu had emanated from the European Movement Conference itself, and that, in NYE conversations with representatives of Rumanian groups, there had never been any question of eliminating Radescu. The importance of unity among exiles was pointed out to Radescu, and he was informed that something had to be done about the situation of the Rumanians-in-exile.

[redacted] advised the meeting that due to circumstances, Visolani and Căfencu had found themselves scheduled to fly on the same plane to London; Căfencu had protested this arrangement bitterly, on the ground that Visolani would represent this situation as one in which he (Visolani) had been able to bring Căfencu along, on the former's insistence.

Mr. Campbell raised the question as to what can be done about this. He pointed out that in this Rumanian split Visolani considers that his friends are in the State Department, and goes to State for advice and support, whereas Căfencu sends in letters to State, but carries his cause to NYE in New York, where he believes his friends to be.

[redacted] interjected that he considers some very stringent action must be done about this whole Rumanian situation, and that unity somehow must be achieved. He suggested that with the coming into office of Admiral Miller

as the new President of IFT, it might be the time to take up the matter again with a new personality fresh on the scene, and that in such a way it could conceivably be possible to get over the hump of the present deplorable situation. Mr. Campbell assented thereto.

THIRD AFTERNOON

Mr. Foderer advised the meeting that the original resolution regarding the future of the Baltic Broadcasting unit stands, and that it was out of the question that we should become involved in any further proposals regarding IFT's involvement in that area. This was explained to Mr. Long, who has had some definite reservations on IFT's broadcast to the Baltic countries.

Mr. Foderer pointed out that he considered the Baltic problem, however, must be maintained and that to proceed now with the dissolution of these parallels would have a most serious effect on our Baltic friends.

Mr. Campbell raised the question as to what should be told the Baltic diplomats, and what had already been told them. After raising this subject around for some time it was agreed that the Baltic would be told simply that the Policy of America is going to accept full responsibility for broadcast to their country, and try simply that IFT had agreed that this is the way it should be done.


FOURTH AFTERNOON


[redacted] advised that [redacted] would shortly be back from Europe, and could be able to report firsthand to the meeting of developments at the Polish conference in England. She advised that the Polish Socialists had adopted a broad resolution wherein the principal of cooperation with the Polish Political Council was acquiesced, and wherein the door had been left open to work with Mikulajczyk.


[redacted] advised that Dr. Lurids had contrary to the original plan, finally been sent to the Conference of the Polish Political Council.

BUM/RE:

Finally, it was agreed that if Mr. Neocognol's reorganization plan of the Nigerian National Council was ready, it would be presented at the next meeting.







COPY

The delegation of the Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia, aware of the great importance for the Czechoslovak cause of a united political leadership of the Czechoslovak democratic exile, have discussed in a number of meetings a complex of political and organizational matters and have agreed unanimously on the following:

1) the statutory organs of the Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia respectively will suspend all their activities by January 15, 1952

2) effective the same day, a provisional two-member management of the affairs of the united Czechoslovak democratic exile will be established

3) simultaneously, a body will be set up with the duty to discuss and prepare, on the basis of the results of deliberations between the two delegations, the formulation of the political program and the organization of the united Czechoslovak democratic exile. This said body will be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia respectively;

4) the function of the delegations of the Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia respectively will cease with the establishment of the provisional management of the united Czechoslovak democratic exile.

New York, N.Y., January 10, 1952

Signed by: Boudlín, Zetvick,

Klusk, Zinkl

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

S/P. Mr. Tolson
Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear] A-88

DATE: January 25, 1952

SUBJECT: Question of RFE Broadcasts to the Baltic Countries

PARTICIPANTS: Lithuanian Minister Povilas Zaucikis
Mr. Anatol Dinberga, First Secretary of the Latvian Legation
Mr. Harold C. Vedeler - EE
Mr. Willard Allan - EE

COPIES TO: P - Mr. Bargeant
Mr. Devine
OIB/NY - Mr. Kohler
S/P - Mr. Joyce ✓
EE - Mr. Harboure

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-51120-2

In accordance with the conclusions reached at the meeting of Messrs. Kohler, Devine and Vedeler on January 18, an effort had been made earlier this week to call in the Lithuanian Minister and the Latvian Chargé d'Affaires at the same time. Since the illness of the latter prevented, it was finally necessary to have the First Secretary of the Latvian Legation to come rather than Mr. Feldmans.

It was explained that the visitors had been asked to come to the Department so that the matter of Baltic language broadcasts might be discussed in response to their recent notes (Lithuanian note No. 2433 dated December 31, 1951; Latvian note unnumbered dated January 3, 1952, and Estonian note No. 772 dated January 8, 1952) and oral representations on this subject. Mr. Vedeler said that the problem had been reconsidered from every standpoint by all officers with a direct interest in it and the various points raised by the Baltic diplomatic representatives had been carefully studied. As a result of this review the Department could see no other course but to reaffirm its previous position. The Department therefore had reached the definite conclusion that in the interests of the most efficacious overall effort so far as broadcasting to the Baltic countries with which Americans were connected was concerned, it should be confined to a single operation in VOA. The reasons for this conclusion were reviewed and the painstaking efforts of the

Department

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-

Department to proceed fairly and in the best interests of the common struggle against Communism in the Baltic countries were stressed. It was indicated that since the NCFE had asked the Department for its opinion on the advisability of proceeding with plans for NFE broadcasts, the Department had conveyed these views to NCFE. It was our understanding that NCFE had also come to this conclusion.

Minister Zadelkis expressed his regrets and those of the Baltic Panels that this was the decision reached. He was still concerned that the Baltic exile leaders would have no opportunity to speak to their homelands and that this denial in view of the availability of NFE facilities to exiles of the satellite countries of Eastern Europe represented a change in US policy toward the Baltic states. Mr. Vedeler strongly emphasized that our policy toward the Baltic countries remained unchanged and that no political significance whatsoever could justly be read into the Department's desire to see the Baltic language programs carried only by VOA in the endeavor to make the broadcasting activities for the Baltic countries as forceful and effective as possible. It was suggested (in accordance with the possibilities pointed out by Mr. Kohler in the meeting on January 18) that there would be opportunities for Baltic exile leaders to speak over VOA.

Minister Zadelkis asked what provision had been made or might be made for the employment of persons already engaged for NFE radio work and for the use of radio material already prepared by the Baltic Panels. In response to direct questions it was suggested that probably something could be done to take care of these matters through discussions between NCFE and VOA representatives in New York. The question of cooperation between VOA and exile leaders and between VOA and the Baltic Panels was discussed at some length. VOA's sincere desire to receive and make use of helpful comments and suggestions, to the extent that these might fit into the planned programs, was reiterated. It was agreed that these various questions could best be pursued further if the Baltic representatives took them up directly with the VOA in New York.

A letter has also been sent to Mr. Kiev, Acting Consul General in charge of Legation at New York, informing him of our wish to discuss this matter on the next occasion when he comes to Washington.

EUR:22:HCVedeler/ml
January 28, 1952

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

70-4181

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

PY-CIO

NO.

DATE

31 January 1952

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. RF - <input type="text"/>			13 Feb.	V.L.P.	Henry: You will remember that, as <input type="text"/> points out in his transmittal slip that Lang agreed to the use of facilities. I take it that somebody didn't do a very good job of explaining to the Executive Committee of NC&E precisely what was wanted, and you may wish to be certain that a little preparatory work is done by <input type="text"/> or others before a formal request is made. Will you send the enclosures back to me. <i>TWB</i> TWB
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8. PY-CIO				JWB	Tom - Returned per our phone talk today. Unless I hear to the contrary, I will assume that our Russian Committee is free to proceed as agreed with the use of the Langenstein site and other RFE facilities as individually negotiated, except short of use of similar facilities - <input type="text"/>
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
29 Jan 52 DATE		
TO: T. W. Braden		
BUILDING	ROOM NO	
REMARKS: Re FP 2 - Amcompac - <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 15px; display: inline-block;"></div> agreed with <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 15px; display: inline-block;"></div> in my presence that Amcompac could have R.F.E. 10KW station at Lampeterham, no longer useful to R.F.E. — it could use some other R.F.E. transmitter provided the frequency was changed + R.F.E. not identified with Amcom. Perhaps it. P. or shall see this —		
FROM: JH		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

SECRET
Security Information

ER-2-5236

24 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)
FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : N.C.F.E.

1. I attach a letter I have just received from John Hughes, Chairman of the Executive Committee of N.C.F.E., with regard to certain decisions of the Executive Committee which he felt were of interest to their sponsors.
2. After you have read this, will you kindly pass it on to and Tom Braden?

ALLEN W. DULLES



Attachment (1) Letter to Mr. Dulles
from John Hughes dtd 18 Jan 52
(2 pages)

SECRET
Security Information

January 18, 1952

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
P. O. Box 1513
Main Post Office
Washington, D. C.

Dear Allens

At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board of N.C.F.E. held on January 3rd last, the members felt that two of the subjects discussed at that time should be called to your attention so that you might know the views of the Committee in the event these matters were brought before you at a later date.

The first concerns a suggestion which apparently came informally from McCluney and others in Amcomfree, that if means could be found to do so, they be allowed to use some of the R.F.E. facilities in Germany for certain of their broadcasts. Since this matter was not brought up as a formal request, no action was taken by the Committee, but the individual members unanimously expressed the opinion that this would be most inadvisable and that they would be opposed to the use of R.F.E. facilities for this purpose even if time and frequencies were available, which is not at all certain. Since Amcomfree is an organization [redacted] it seems advisable to acquaint you with our feelings in the matter should you or your organization be approached by McCluney or others on this subject. Without going into details at this time as to the reasons for our feeling in the matter, our main concern is that Amcomfree's targets are entirely different from those in which we are interested, and from the standpoint of operation from German soil they are far less likely to be agreeable to BONN. We are fearful of putting in jeopardy a presently successful operation and four to five million dollars of equipment by the introduction of a project which we feel should be kept separate and apart.

The other matter which came up for formal action involved the advisability of undertaking Polish programing in Germany, and the Executive Committee unanimously agreed that R.F.E. should proceed with the plans presented. In brief, such plans call for the origination of from three to four hours daily of Polish programing from Munich beginning on or about May 1, 1952, and the introduction of some 50 to 60 Poles into the city of Munich for work with R.F.E. to carry out this schedule.

Since this is a major step in the development of R.F.E. programing and more particularly because of the forthcoming negotiations between representatives of N.C.F.E., HICOG, and BONN, it was felt that you should be formally advised of this decision. The Executive Committee also wanted to go on record to the effect that while they realized the risks involved, affirmative action was taken as a result of opinions given by Messrs. Byroade, Kellermann and Strauss of the German Desk, Department of State, and by Messrs. Stone, Lewis and Boerner of HICOG. In answer to the specific question "Would in your judgment the introduction of Polish broadcasting with all of its


Page #2

Mr. Allen W. Dulles (continued)

political implications, in any way harm the current Munich operation of R.F.E. or the BONN contract negotiations in the eyes of the BONN government", we were assured by all that it would not.

For your further information, the operating officers of R.F.E. in charge of the project for this Polish programing, have been directed to proceed slowly in implementing the action of the Executive Committee and watch the situation most carefully until such time as Phenix and Kempner have had time to receive proper assurances that negotiations with BONN will progress satisfactorily.


Sincerely,



JCH:EM

SECRET
Security Information

Executive Registry
2-5272




January 23, 1952

Dear Allen:

At the Crusade Board Meeting last Friday, C.D. reported in detail on our meeting in Ed Barrett's office.


This was followed by a general discussion of the nature and scope of the 1952 Crusade program. Briefly, there was agreement that the program in 1952 should be considerably reduced in scope, that the emphasis should be taken off publicity and placed on fund-raising with the promotional period being reduced from two months to two or three weeks. It was felt that a direct mail campaign to our present list of givers -- plus a thorough solicitation of corporations -- would be desirable.

There was discussion also of a one-night house-to-house canvass, nation-wide, on Constitution Day next September. Mr. Poole suggested that, in addition to Radio Free Europe, the 1952 Crusade might place emphasis on the newly formed Free Europe University in Exile at Strasbourg, France. General Clay recommended that the Advertising Council's assistance in the new campaign be sought at the earliest moment.



Best regards,

Sincerely,



SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
<i>Meeting to Discuss the Committee for Freedom held in Mr. Barrett's office 17 Jan 52</i>		2. RI FILE NO.			
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE		
		<i>Dept. of State</i>	<i>21 Jan 52</i>		
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.
---------------------------------	--------------------------------

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN THE CONTROL SECTION
SECTION BY TS 168189

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 

2-1372

January 21, 1952

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

Dear C.D.:


Following up our meeting, we are going to name John Devine to represent us in discussing further plans for the Crusade of Freedom.

As I understand it, all parties feel that the Crusade should be continued, that the next campaign should be of a low-pressure and short duration type, and that joint efforts will be made to find other useful activities that the Crusaders can perform for the total U.S. propaganda effort.

It was good seeing you the other night, and both Mason and I enjoyed that long talk. Please remember me to Min Miller and tell him I wish him the best in his difficult but fascinating assignment.

All the best to you.

Cordially,



cc: Mr. Wisner
P - Mr. Devine
S/P - Mr. Joyce

Edward W. Barrett

P.S. As I understand it, it is tentatively proposed that the two individuals working with John Devine will be Jim Lambie and Tom Braden.

Mr. C.D. Jackson,
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.,
350 Fifth Avenue - Room 301,
New York 1, New York.

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

P:EWBarrett:abv

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

FREE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS.—Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: ID/COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION BRANCH	NO
	DATE 10A

TO--	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. W3	Knott	<i>[initials]</i>		SB LK	
2. EE/S	MAR	1952		AG	
3. EE-2	MAR 3-1952			<i>[initials]</i>	
4. EE/IS				ma	
5. EE/PW				VP	
6. SE/PC	11 MAR 1952			<i>[initials]</i>	alcania Bulgaria Rumina youyalemo
7. Pyl U				ts	
8. Pyl POC				new	
9. Pyl Buf				A.W.B.	
10. Pyl 10					
11. U in Exile File (over)					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

NOTE: ID/CD does not retain this document on file. Any interest in retention should be noted on this routing and it will be returned to you.

Lacking request for return, THIS DOCUMENT IS TO BE DESTROYED BY THE LAST DATED EQUIPMENT.

→ do not get 20 (HBY) return this in file - HX

RESTRICTED

(Classification)

FORM TYPE IN THIS SPACE

940.../11-1551
IR 740.00

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM AmConsulate, Strasbourg.

134

November 15, 1951

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

AIR POUCH

692312

REF None.

SUBJECT Founding of "Le Collège de l'Europe Libre" at Strasbourg by the National Committee for a Free Europe.

25
For Dept
Use Only
NOV 19
C
D ACTION
A EUB
C
T INFO
I DOR
O OLI
N IS
I
N
Y
USA
USOH

As the Department is aware, the National Committee for a Free Europe has founded at the Château de Pourtales, Strasbourg Robertsau, "Le Collège de l'Europe Libre" (College of Free Europe) in which students of nine different nationalities, all of them from the Satellite countries, are lodged and fed. All of the students are taking courses in the University of Strasbourg and in future there will be additional courses at the "Collège de l'Europe Libre" conducted by professors-in-exile in the languages of the various countries represented. The purpose of the College is to train political leaders, doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc., for service in the Satellite countries when and if these countries are ever liberated from Soviet Russian domination. So far there are no students from Russia or East Germany in the College.

On November 12 Mr. Roudybush and I attended the opening ceremony of the College, which was informal but impressive; other persons attending included Mr. C. D. Jackson, President of the National Committee for a Free Europe, three officials of the Council of Europe, Professor Robert Rodslob, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Strasbourg (representing the Rector of the University, who was ill), personnel from Radio Free Europe at Munich, and the student body. Speeches were made by Mr. Malcolm Davis, Dean of the College, Monsieur Rodslob, and Mr. C. D. Jackson.

There follow tables showing the distribution of the students by nationalities and by ages, as of October 20, 1951, (8 men and 1 woman students have been enrolled since then, but their nationalities and ages are not known):

Nationality	Men	Women	Total
Czechoslovak	20	2	22
Polish	14	5	19
Rumanian	13	1	14
Yugoslav	11	2	13
Hungarian	7	0	7
Lithuanian	3	1	4
Bulgarian	4	0	4
Albanian	2	0	2
Latvian	2	0	2
Totals	76	11	87

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

OF TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

OFF :
SUBJECT:

DEPT. NO. DATE

PRIORITY

For Dept. Use Only

2 Strasbourg 196

Age	Men	Women	Total
18	2	1	3
19	0	0	0
20	2	2	4
21	3	1	4
22	8	0	8
23	5	0	5
24	6	0	6
25	9	3	12
26	8	0	8
27	12	1	13
28	11	2	13
29	4	0	4
30	3	1	4
31	1	0	1
Totals	76	11	87

Average Age 25.5 24.9

R
E
C
D
A
C
T
I
O
N
I
N
F
O

As of possible interest there are enclosed copies of the first two pages of the interim report of the Committee on Awards and Placements to the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, The Free Europe University in Exile, New York, N. Y., which was furnished to me confidentially by Mr. Malcolm Davis.

George D. Andrews

George D. Andrews
American Consul

Enclosure: As Stated

Distribution:
Ambassy, Paris

RESTRICTED

REPORTER(S)

PREPARATION TIME

INFORMATION COPY

RESTRICTED

(Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM :

DISP. NO.

DATE

TO :

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF :

For Dept.
Use Only

SUBJECT:

Enclosure to
despatch 136 from
American Consul,
Strasbourg,
11/15/51 - p. 1

R
E
C
D
A
C
T
I
O
N

COPY

Paris, October 29, 1951

To the Chairman of the Board of Trustees,
The Free Europe University in Exile,
New York, N. Y.

Interim Report of the Committee on Awards and Placements

The Committee, having sent out 3530 application forms to individuals and organizations, first examined applications duly completed by candidates for Strasbourg and set aside those, out of 626 received, that had been filed by persons who turned out to be ineligible, e.g. as being over 32 years of age (with a few exceptions), or already having university degrees and needing to finish elsewhere, or wishing to study a subject not taught at Strasbourg, or not possessing qualifications required by the university, or not knowing enough French to profit by the Strasbourg university courses, or not having refugee status. Candidatures which appeared eligible were then shared out between the members of the Committee for personal interview, mostly in Paris, visits however being made for this purpose to England, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Turkey, and Switzerland.

With applications and notes on interviews before it, the Committee then held numerous meetings, at which the cases of all eligible candidates were examined and discussed. Mr. Royall Tyler, as President of the Association for the College of Free Europe, also attended most of the meetings held by the Committee and assisted it by his advice. The records showed that a high percentage of the candidates, and especially some of the more promising ones, did not wish primarily to go to Strasbourg but hoped instead to obtain scholarships enabling them to remain in Paris (in most cases), or at some other university. Certain problems arising in this connection will be dealt with below, together with recommendations.

Selections for Strasbourg

To date, 87 candidates wishing to go to Strasbourg have been accepted: 76 men and 11 women. (Note: 8 additional men and 1 woman have been enrolled.)

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

(Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM :

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF :

SUBJECT:

Enclosure to
despatch 136 from
American Consul,
Strasbourg,
11/15/51 - p. 2

For Dept.
Use Only

R
E
C
D
A
C
T
I
O
N
I
F
O

making a total, as of Nov. 12, 1951, of 84 men and 12 women). Notification of acceptance is being sent to 349 candidates. The Committee has had in mind the advance estimate that five women were to be accepted for Strasbourg, and that five theological students might be accepted for the Collège des Clercs. However, only one theological student has qualified for a scholarship, and suitable arrangements can be made to lodge as many as 10 or 11 women, possibly even 13. (Note: total accepted 12, as of Nov. 12), either in the Student Home for Girls or in a pension (for the older girls). In view of the quality of these women candidates, the Committee feels justified in selecting a number larger than that originally contemplated, and after consultation with Mr. DeWitt Peale and Mr. Royall Tyler does so unanimously.

The grand total of male students already accepted for Strasbourg, and accordingly notified, is thus 76 to date, as against 100 originally contemplated. The Committee has thought it preferable to maintain a high quality, rather than to make filling a quota the first consideration, especially as applications are still coming in and some promising applicants remain to be seen. Since the French university year begins only in the first week of November, a good many students were away when the application forms were sent out and their addresses unknown to anyone who could be reached. Arrangement can be made to enter late-comers for the Strasbourg university courses, and so it seems wise to allow for the probability that some high-quality candidates will still appear, none of whom could be accepted if the quota had been filled up in a hurry regardless of the advisability of maintaining a standard. Applicants can be received and registered in the university as late as Nov. 21.


It is of interest to note that all candidates so far submitted to deans of faculties at Strasbourg have been considered acceptable.

... *JWB*


1/15/52

211 (M-1000)

17 January 1952



SECRET



14-00000

The RI Copy of TOP SECRET
document 62962
dated 15 Jan 1952
which was removed from this
file, is filed in the RI
TOP SECRET CONTROL SECTION
1305 "L" Bldg.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE				
SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
Meeting at Mr. Barrett's Home on Tues. Ev. Apr. 20, 1951 to discuss US/E & O/C Relations		2. RI FILE NO.		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	6. DATE	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	8. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION				
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.		
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
14. THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT FILED IN THE CONTROL SECTION BY <u>TS# 67871</u>				
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		➔		

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

17 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Devine
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting at Mr. Barrett's
Home on November 20, 1951 to discuss USIE and OIC
Relationships

1. Your memorandum of conversation of November 20, 1951, was mentioned to me by Mr. Dulles this morning with particular reference to paragraph 2 of the conclusions.

2. Mr. Dulles does not believe that the meeting was quite so definite on this point as you indicate, and I suggest, therefore, an amendment as follows:

"2. That possibilities for toning down the Crusade for Freedom to a somewhat less high-pressure and spectacular campaign be carefully explored by all concerned."

THOMAS W. BRADEN

FY-CIO:TWB:ch

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - ED/ED/P (Mr. Hulick)
1 cc - FI/IS
1 cc - FY
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - HI

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

January 16, 1952

#6
10/11

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Report on Slavik-Hajer Conference as outlined by [redacted] at January 9, 1952 meeting with State.

From: R.J. Moore

[redacted] advised that the Slavik-Hajer Conference had been placed on the Agenda, as a result of Mr. Vedeler's comment (made at a meeting during December, 1951) to the effect that it would be desirable to give encouragement and moral support to the Slavik-Hajer group.

[redacted] explained that Nagy had received some encouragement from NPT when (during January 1952) he initially broached his plan for the establishing of an over-all international grouping of exiles from Central and Eastern Europe. However, when it became clear to NPT that Nagy's group was to be formed on exclusively political party lines, and would be dominated by Agrarian (Peasant) Party leaders and thus, in effect, a duplication of the International Peasant Union and other such organizations already in existence who are already receiving NPT support, that it could not, therefore, be broadly representative. NPT, therefore, indicated to Nagy that it could not provide financial support for an organization set upon such a basis. Nagy's reaction to NPT's policy was consequently strong and critical.


At about this same time the Slavik-Hajer group (now known as the Central and Eastern European Conference) began to emerge and to become active. It was composed officially of the so-called "bureaucrats", "diplomats", and "nonpartisan personalities" which were so despised by Nagy and his colleagues from the Agrarian parties and other political party leaders who took their cue from the Peasant Party politicians. This new group began actually to meet and to perform genuine work.

SECRET

Apparently, as the result of the emergence of the Slavik-Majer Conference, as an embryo but functioning body, the Nagy group sprang into action, and leaving the planning and organizational stage behind, launched itself finally into a big press conference and much fanfare. This Nagy group, just to confuse an already confusing situation further, is known as the Central-Eastern European Committee, [] advised.

MOPT was disquieted by this almost simultaneous emergence of two potentially competing organizations and made it clear to both groups that financial support was out of the question until a merger or some clear and acceptable agreement between the two groups, which would bar their competing with each other, should be effected. The Slavik-Majer Conference, [] [] indicated, agreed to seek no large amount of publicity for a time in order that the unfortunate and undesirable aspect of competition might be played down as much as possible in the hope that a merger or acceptable agreement might be forthcoming.

After its initial plunge into the publicity spotlight, the Nagy Committee seemed to become completely quiescent, while the Slavik-Majer Conference became increasingly active, performing some genuinely useful work.



Originally, [redacted] pointed out, the Slavik-Majer Conference had approached NCFE with a proposal that NCFE arrange and finance a luncheon or a dinner to which various representatives of influential American organizations, labor, church, educational, etc., would be invited, and at which the exiles would have an opportunity to present the facts and their views regarding deportations. NCFE had at first agreed to this, in principle, [redacted] [redacted] advised, but in view of the probable recriminations from the Mary group (which would, in fact, have some basis of justification) and also in view of the propaganda approach suggested by Williams, the Committee had dropped this idea and was working instead along the lines suggested by the U.S. Mission.

[redacted] agreed that in the absence of a merger, or an agreement, regarding division of fields of competition (the Mary Committee, concentrating on long-range planning and post-liberation problems; the Slavik-Majer Conference focusing its efforts upon the immediate problems confronting exiles in the pre-liberation period) NCFE had steered clear of providing financial support on any continuing basis.

Mr. Harbour inquired as to the prospects for merger, and whether it had been made clear to all exile groups involved that the withholding of NCFE support was predicated upon the lack of any unified and broadly representative grouping.

[redacted] advised of two recent conversations she had had with Sidislauskas, and said that when pressed by him for the reason why the luncheon plan had been dropped, she had at first tried to put this on a practical basis and on Mr. Wright's Paris conversations and the consequent change of tactics. However, when pressed further, and told by Sidislauskas of the rumors of drastic changes of NBT policy, etc., which would attend the abandonment of this plan, [redacted] advised that gentleman unofficially that, along with the practical reasons, we had been motivated by a desire to avoid the inevitable recriminations from Nagy, and that the lack of a merger or satisfactory agreement between the two groups would continue to prevent our material support of their activities on any consistent or permanent basis. [redacted] added that very recently Sidislauskas had informed her briefly of a meeting of the Nagy Committee held within the last few days. This meeting was attended by, among others, Visciani, Sidislauskas and Consky, who have sat on the fence between these two groups and have attended the meetings of both groups. Sidislauskas believes that agreement to divide fields of competition, rather than a merger, is shaping up.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

In reply refer to W-1771
S
11 January 1952

Mr. C. D. Jackson
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.
110 West 57th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear C. D.:

As promised at our last meeting, here is the text for a new paragraph 3 of the Minutes of the Meeting Held in Washington on 14 December 1951. This was dictated by [redacted]

"3. Jackson advised that he had a tentative date to call on the Ford Foundation people in Pasadena on January 8th.

[redacted]

[redacted]

"It was also agreed that this discussion of refugees and IRC could include the plan worked up by Perle and Delbeare to turn over to IRC ECPE "non-productive exiles at a cost to ECPE of approximately \$1,000 a head."

Sincerely yours,

[redacted signature]

SECRET

DCPY/HQL:ml
Distributions:

Addressee - Original; DCPY - 1; PY/PXI - 1; PY/CVO - 1. PV - 1

SECRET

January 20, 1952

3.
TONIC

SECRETARY GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

To: [redacted]

From: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Report of meeting at State Department, Wednesday, January 9, 1952.

PERSONS: [redacted] Mr. Fulbright Harbour,
Mr. Harold C. Vedeler, Mr. John Campbell, [redacted]
[redacted]

NOTE: [redacted] represented the [redacted] office at the meeting in the absence of [redacted] who is in Europe attending the European Movement Conference.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

It was recalled that at the meeting on December 26, 1951, discussion of the Czechoslovak problem had ended on a note of optimism. [redacted] advised that this optimism had been obliterated due to certain unfortunate circumstances which had developed in negotiations between the Czechoslovak Council majority of 17 and the Tsekl minority of 13. [redacted] indicated that one of the principal stumbling blocks in the Czech situation is the question of the co-equal chairmanship in the new setup of two persons, one appointed from each group. She further advised that a body of 20 persons divided equally between the two opposing groups would act as an ad hoc committee to establish a new Czechoslovak National Council, and that, whereas the 13 wished to appoint Dr. Tsekl as one of the two chairmen, they had at the same time expressed their opinion that Dr. Coussy would not be acceptable to them as the other co-chairman, or indeed, that he should not exercise any major function. Such an ultimatum appeared unacceptable to the 17 who contended that negotiations could not be carried on under these circumstances.

Upon receipt of this news, [redacted] pointed out, Mr. Fulbright of EITF advised the Czechoslovak delegation that she would place the whole problem before the Board of Directors of EITF. This was done, and a

JAN 15 1952

SECRET

subcommittee was appointed to examine the situation; this committee is composed of Mr. F. H. Dolbeare, Dr. Levering Tyson and Mr. Frank Altschul. The subcommittee was informed by the Board of Directors that, should the Czechoslovaks fail to overcome their differences by the end of January, all payments to the Czechoslovak National Council would cease as of that time. The Board had agreed, however, that a credit of \$25,000, appropriated to the Council, would remain with it and could be used for support during the course of the following month. It was considered that these funds would act as a hedge against other outside funds to which Dr. Zenkl appears to have access.

The subcommittee met on January 8 with Messrs. Lettrich, Heidrich and Osusky, at which time the principle of the co-equal chairmanship appears to have been dropped in favor of a system of referrals, including Messrs. Fapanek and Heidrich - one from each group. [redacted] advised that the subcommittee was to meet on January 10 with Dr. Zenkl and company, and on Friday with the delegation from both groups. [redacted] advised that of the three members of the subcommittee only Mr. Altschul appeared to carry any opinion as to the outcome of the negotiations. [redacted] informed the meeting of Mr. Dolbeare's opinion that, should negotiations fail:

- a) all financial ties would cease with organized Czechoslovak exile groups,
- b) NCFE would be obliged to select individuals as advisers in various functional capacities.

[redacted] made reference to a 22-page Czechoslovak memorandum which had recently been presented on the whole situation of Czechoslovakia, past and present. She advised that Messrs. Casaky and Franek had not signed the document and that NCFE's analysis of the memorandum had been unfavorable.

Mr. Vedeler interjected that should current negotiations fail some consideration should be given to allotting financial aid to both the

Czechoslovak groups in the controversy.

Mr. Barbour int. posed that should the negotiations indeed fail, and we be faced with a Czechoslovak situation in which there would be no Czechoslovak Council, the whole situation of the National Councils and NCFE might well need to be reviewed. He pointed out that the NCFE was based very much on the National Council idea, and that it is constituted to work on this basis. Therefore, should this concept fail, it might be expedient to have a system of some kind of national panel whose members would be appointed by NCFE to work on the problems of their respective nationalities (presumably within the dictates and needs of American foreign policy). Mr. Barbour advised that such persons would have to be chosen on the basis of their ability to work together, thus avoiding the issues of political strife and partisan interests.

Mr. Moore suggested that the meeting might wish to consider the procedure which should ^{immediately} follow in the wake of the possible breakdown of Czechoslovak negotiations.

Mr. Lloyd proposed that the matter be referred to Washington for consideration by his office and the State Department before the Czechoslovaks were formally advised of the drastic action contemplated by NCFE's Board of Directors and the subcommittee. There was general agreement that this should be the case.

BALTIC BROADCASTS:

[redacted] reviewed the situation of the Baltic panels in New York as regards broadcasts by Radio Free Europe. She advised that the Baltic countries would be represented at the European Movement Conference by heads of the New York Baltic panels, and specifically - Messrs. Massens, Sidzikauskas and Walter - and that thus funds had been found to carry out the original plan of sending a representative from each Baltic country to the Movement Conference.

Mr. Vedeler indicated that he considered this move to be fortunate and appropriate, in view of the upheaval which has occurred in the matter of the Baltic broadcasts. He indicated his belief that if RFE is to continue, it is necessary that some form of Radio Free Europe broadcasts to Baltic countries be considered. He advised that the Baltic countries considered there had been discrimination against them, and they feel that it is only through RFE broadcasts that they can really speak to their own people; he advised that he considered the general situation most regrettable.

[redacted] indicated that in New York there was considerable hope that once the Baltic broadcast question was straightened out, such situations be avoided in the future, as it has been most embarrassing to all concerned, and has placed the good faith of RFE towards the Balts in jeopardy.

Mr. Barbour advised that we must consider the Baltic broadcasts to be currently ruled out. However, he advised further that the matter will be taken up on the basis of the formal protests lodged with the State Department by the Baltic diplomatic Missions in this country. He inferred that the whole situation had become confused due to the unfortunate light in which the Voice of America broadcasts had been thrown, as a result of Radio Free Europe's activities. He made reference to the Crusade for Freedom on behalf of Radio Free Europe, and indicated that the Crusade in this instance had done a great deal to stir up the public's mind in favor of RFE, to the discredit of the Voice of America. Finally, he advised, however, that the merits of the case for broadcasts to Baltic countries by RFE would be reconsidered.

ROMANIA:

[redacted] advised that there was not a great deal to report on the Rumanian situation, but that Mr. Cafencu had received advice that Mr. Visolara would meet with him prior to the latter's departure to attend the

- 5 -

European Movement Conference. It was hoped that the meeting would actually take place, but that assurances could not be forthcoming. However, it seemed reasonable that Mr. Visolani might make the move before going to London where he would have further consultations with the King. Messrs. Visolani and Casanu were reported to have come to some basic agreements for the purpose of reaching an understanding between the two factions. Advice was given that General Radescu would be brought into the consultations eventually.

[redacted] advised of the opinion held by the National Council division of NCF that the Rumanians should avoid bring^{ing} the King into the negotiations, and rather that an agreement in the form of a fait accompli should be presented to the King for his approval.

Mr. Campbell interjected that he had an appointment at that time with Mr. Visolani, and that in the light of this information, he would advise that gentleman not to try to pull "any contemplated schemes which might disrupt the efforts so far taken". Mr. Harbour requested that Mr. Visolani be informed, in strong terms, to avoid further intrigue or unnecessary protracted discussions. In other words "read him the riot act".

HUNGARIAN AFFAIRS:

[redacted] advised the meeting that it had been necessary to make some drastic changes among the Hungarian personnel working for Radio Free Europe in New York, as their output was considered to be inadequate. She advised that efforts were being made to reestablish the Hungarian desk on a more effective basis.

BULGARIAN AFFAIRS:

[redacted] advised that Mr. Dimitrov is departing for Europe to join the European Movement Conference, and that he was being obliged to come to NCF headquarters to pick up his check for the purpose of the trip.

Mr. Barbour advised that he had met with Mr. Dimitrov and had given the Bulgarian the impression that State did not consider his conduct of affairs to be in the state of perfection which the gentleman himself so claims. Mr. Barbour further advised that he recognized the feeling against Dimitrov among others working on Bulgarian affairs, and that he understands the basis for this criticism. However, he advised that he does consider Dimitrov to be the representative of an important peasant element in Bulgaria, and that he did not consider this fact should be ignored.

[redacted] advised that there appeared to be some difficulty with Mr. Shipov's papers, a fact which is retarding his arrival in this country. She further advised of the need for a quorum on the Bulgarian National Council, in order to deal with the political situation which has developed there.

The meeting received a visit from Mr. Keckragal who advised that he was working on a new plan for the reform of the Bulgarian National Committee. He advised that he expected to have the report ready at the time of the next meeting and requested that the members of the meeting consider the Bulgarian question in the meantime, and should they have any specific ideas which they should wish to present, they should contact him in the interval. He advised that he was attempting to draw up a plan whereby membership in the Bulgarian Committee would be established on an elective basis, and suggested that this might be a good time to teach them some of the concepts of democratic procedure.

Mr. Barbour advised of his interest in the Bulgarian political leader known as Tushanov, and suggested that some consideration be given to bringing this man into Bulgarian exile affairs.

SLAVIC-MAJOR CONFERENCE

Mr. Vedeler advised that FCI should consider the Slavic-Major Conference organization within the light of its own activities and purposes.

[redacted] outlined the history of the Slavik-Major Conference and the conditions which are currently existing therein. A copy of [redacted] [redacted] report will shortly follow this report of the meeting with State).

In reply to [redacted] statement that she understood Mr. Vedeler to believe IC/E should give support to the Slavik-Major Conference, Mr. Vedeler advised that he considered this support should take the form of assistance to special projects, but that he did not advocate that assistance should be given to the Conference on an all-out basis.

Mr. Harbour advised of his approval of this procedure, and requested that precautions be taken in order that they not be aroused.

POLISH AFFAIRS:

[redacted] advised there was little to report on Polish affairs, other than to advise of a cable which had been received in New York to the effect that General Anders had solicited the aid of Count Mackynski to assist in the formation of the Polish Council of National Unity.



SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

9 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe Operations

REFERENCES: Memorandum dated 15 November 1951 from
T. H. E. Hesbitt to Robert Hoeker

1. Regarding the project mentioned in the referenced memorandum to transfer approximately 100 Polish exiles to Portugal for the purpose of conducting Polish programs from that country, Mr. Robert E. Lang, Director of Radio Free Europe, has advised us that on 3 January 1952, the Board of Directors of the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. decided that at least for the present, it would be advisable to do all Polish programming in Munich. He stated that on Mr. C. D. Jackson's last trip to Portugal, the authorities there advised him that any Polish exiles brought in under the above-mentioned circumstances would have to live under conditions approximating "house arrest," since the Portuguese government would not tolerate their circulating freely within the country.


2. Later Mr. Spencer Phenix stated that he and Mr. Gregory Thomas believed that some few Poles could be brought in without such drastic action by the Portuguese authorities. He also expressed concern that the short wave communications between Munich and Lisbon were not 100% satisfactory for transmitting the Polish programs, which are then relayed out of Lisbon to Poland. He felt that programming in Portugal would be the best way to handle the problem but admitted that approximately 100 people would be needed, and, under the circumstances, he agreed that it was better to keep the entire program staff all in one place.

3. We are asking

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

3. We are asking Mr. Lang to keep us posted on any future plans that may develop to send any of these people to Portugal so that we may advise the Department of State in advance of any such project.



DCPY/HOL:ml

Distributions:

- Addressee - Original and 1
- DCPY - 1
- CIO - 1
- RI - 2

in NC7E file

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

In reply refer to: W-1764
8
January 9, 1952

Mr. Frederic R. Wolbeare
350 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Fred:

I am enclosing, for your confidential information, a translation of a letter received by the Austrian Minister in Washington, which has been brought to the attention of our friends. In discussing this matter the Austrian Embassy pointed out that Austria was an occupied country in which were stationed, among others, Soviet troops and expressed the hope that NCPE would refrain from taking any action which might put Austria in an embarrassing position.

I am confident that we can count upon your cooperation in preventing the development of any situation which would embarrass the Austrian Government.

Sincerely,

Travis A. Albery

Attachment 1
As stated above

cc: Miss

SECRET

5 January 1952

W-1761

Dear Abbott:

Thank you for reminding me that Ed McHale may soon be available. As you say, I know him, though slightly, but I have always heard excellent things about him.

I have made an attempt to find out who expressed interest in him to [] but cannot do so. Perhaps, therefore, you would pass this note on to [] and ask him to let me know sometime soon who expressed the interest. That would help me ascertain whether we will want to try to bring him down here.

My very best wishes to you for the New Year.

Sincerely,

Mr. Abbott Washburn
National Committee for a Free Europe
808 - 7th Avenue
New York, New York

FY-CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - FY/Exec Asst.
1 cc - FY
1 cc - CIO ✓
2 cc - RI

Mr. [redacted]

5 Jan 52

Card hesitates to express any interest in this man ("an operator"; "a friend of Col Harrison's"; a person whom Card knew on Am Vets Com) until overall situation is settled. His interest, in any case, is only mild. No one else, so far as I can determine, is interested.

Routine would be to refer to personnel through [redacted] and on basis of his report as to personnel's interest, let [redacted] know whether or not we are trying. (There is clearly no effort being made now and the procedure I see us bound by, could involve considerable time and unpredictable results.)
But here is a draft. [redacted]

SECRET

472-4

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

Pg/Elc

NO.

DATE

28 Dec 51

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FILED		
			<i>12/28</i>		
<i>Bradley</i>			<i>1/2</i>	<i>TWB</i>	<p><i>For action or advice as to your present slant on matters of this kind</i></p> <p><i>Could Meyer might like to have him in mind. I'd like to write A what & say we're trying.</i></p>
<i>Bradley</i>					

December 19, 1951

Dear Tom:

As mentioned to you last Friday, our mutual friend Ed McHale has done a good job here on the New York City Crusade campaign in spite of numerous handicaps and obstacles.

The present clean-up operations will be completed next month, and in view of the somewhat uncertain future of the Crusade I have had a little talk with Ed so that he can be thinking about moving to another assignment.

At the time Ed joined us, [] indicated that your shop had expressed considerable interest in him. Would you be good enough, Tom, to see whether such interest still exists or whether there are any other slots that might be filled by someone of his ability and forcefulness.

Many thanks,

Yours,

Alcott

DEC 19 1951

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)

FROM

EXTENSION NO
DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE
RECEIVED FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom Draw a line across column after each comment)

1.			
2.			
3.	2D24	12 MAR 58	B
[Redacted]			
5.	OG/EFR		
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.	RETURN TO CA-56		
15.	IP/ARD	Re: 02-58	

PLEASE INITIAL AFTER REVIEWING
DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.

78-1129
432313
~~81-1116-718~~
~~3006-11-3-589~~

FILE NO. WASH CIA AD 37

DOCUMENT: _____

FOLDER: 10

PAGE: _____

BOX: 32

FORM 3-57

610

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

March 1952-June 1952

REF

Handwritten signature

Handwritten notes and scribbles

30 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SUBJECT: Preparation and Distribution of a Newsletter in the Serbian Language by Mr. Lazar Radivojevič.

1. This office is interested in a project of facilitating Mr. Lazar Radivojevič, a beneficiary of the NCF, to prepare (mimeograph) and distribute a small newsletter in the Serbian language, among the former Serbian Officer prisoners of war, who were detained in the camp at St. Johann i Pongau, in Austria, of which camp Mr. Radivojevič was the chief, elected by the members of the camp. About 300-400 members of this camp are now in the United States, having emigrated under the provisions of the Displaced Persons Act.
2. Aside from bolstering the morale of these people and assisting them to adjust themselves to their new surroundings, the newsletter is calculated to make it possible for Mr. Radivojevič to maintain contact with them so that this office may be in a position to know their addresses and be informed of their whereabouts at all times. For your information, this office believes that, under certain circumstances in the future, this group or members of it might be useful, and desires to see it maintain its ties through Mr. Radivojevič.
3. The newsletter would have no political character whatsoever. It would contain social and personal news of interest to the group; new arrivals of former colleagues; news of the whereabouts and doings of members of the group; questions and answers for the emigration; something about the history and customs of the United States, and such other items as might help them orient and adjust themselves in their new surroundings.
4. The Deputy for SE/PC has presented this project to Mr. Campbell of the State Department and secured his approval.
5. We believe this project should be implemented under the sponsorship of the NCF; and, to this end, we request you to be good enough to take the matter up with them. This office will be glad to

cooperate with the NCFE with a view to establishing means for control of the contents of the newsletter.

6. To set up this project Mr. Kadiwojovich would need a typewriter with Cyrillic letters, a hand press and a masthead for the paper, which would represent a total investment of approximately \$198. He figures that he could then print his newsletter twice a month, about 400 copies of each edition, for a monthly amount of \$180.

Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

26 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO/TOMIC

SUBJECT: Stanislaus Oskierka

1. Walter Pforzheimer called me to say that a Congressman with whom he is in touch had asked whether we were taking on a Mr. Stanislaus Oskierka. He was informed by the Congressman that [] told him that there was no job for him in NCPE but that he might be able to get a job in CIA in Washington.

2. This is the kind of thing [] shouldn't do, and I think he should be called on it.

3. I find, incidentally, that Oskierka has not requested employment through [] to John Salsids and I will tell Mr. Pforzheimer that he should check with CIA Personnel.

TWB

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief


International Organizations Division

CIO:ME/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - Mr. Pforzheimer
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECRET



SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

25 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Complaint of Yugoslav Counselor

1. Wally Barbour told me today that the Counselor of the Yugoslav Embassy had called upon him to complain about the presence of Yugoslav delegates at the NCFE Williamsburg Conference and the signing of the Williamsburg statement by Yugoslav delegates.

2. Mr. Barbour said that the Counselor prefaced his remarks with a statement that he knew Mr. Barbour would reply that he had no influence over NCFE and no connection with it. Mr. Barbour said that that was what he had said and that his statement was received by the Counselor with a polite shrug.

3. Barbour did not seem unduly worried, but I told him that we would shortly ask him for a review of State policy in respect to the national councils and exiles with whom NCFE is dealing and he said he would welcome the opportunity to make such a review.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division


CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - DDCE (thru ADFG & DD/P)

1 cc - EE - *returned to C/IO 9 July & destroyed. Initialed by [redacted]*
1 cc - DDICG [redacted] *have seen RHM -*
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET





SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

23 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, WE

SUBJECT: Debriefing of Harry Sperling by
L. de Neufville

1. L. de Neufville recently cabled that H. Sperling, who is to be relieved as Chief of RFE information gathering in Munich, was talking freely of his removal and making comments about his replacement.

2. De Neufville suggested that Sperling be sent back to Washington for a debriefing. For many reasons, including our relations with NCFE, we would prefer it to be done in the field.

3. I therefore suggest that de Neufville be allowed to do this for us and would appreciate your approval of my sending him the attached message.


THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment 1
As stated above.

SECRET

14-00000

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

SECRET

TO:

Regarding Sperling. His debriefing for many reasons should not be done here. Would appreciate your doing with object of getting as complete a story as possible but with special attention to:

1. Method of programming, control exercised in Munich and control of Munich by New York in as detailed form as possible.
2. What emigre groups are favored if any.
3.
4. What is set-up of news gathering?
5. What security procedures are followed in Munich.
6. What has been or is being done to determine effectiveness of programs from all angles (1) technical, (2) content, (3) audience reaction, etc.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP *90/731*

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	MR. BRADEN		
2	MR. 		
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND		6/17/52
2			
3			

<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE

REMARKS: DDCI has asked to see copy of the paper we have for use in the event something of this nature happens.

JSE

2-9306

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
3-0387

21 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Statement on NCFE

1. Here is my proposal for the final draft of the NCFE emergency statement. It is the result of changes suggested in my own second draft by Frank Wisner, yourself and Spencer Phenix.

2. Note that not all of the changes suggested by you have been adopted. All changes were considered by Wisner, Phenix and myself, and I would be glad to tell you the comments that were made and the reasons why we felt the attachment should be approved.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

4 Attachments
Final statement and
Drafts 3, 4 & 5

CIO:TWE/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - DD/P (thru ADPC)
1 cc - IO/DMIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

PROPOSED STATEMENT

The National Committee for a Free Europe is an organization of private American citizens whose purpose is to encourage the spread of freedom behind the Iron Curtain in Europe. It is a membership corporation, chartered under the laws of the State of New York.

In spreading the doctrine of freedom and combatting Soviet totalitarianism, the Committee operates radio stations which pierce the Iron Curtain; in close cooperation with the French authorities and the University of Strasbourg, it operates an educational centre at Strasbourg for young men and women who have escaped from behind the Iron Curtain; it attempts by other means than radio to carry messages of hope and of the possibility of eventual liberation to the nations which are now enslaved; it conducts studies of the laws, customs and cultures of these nations as they existed prior to Soviet occupation; and it documents the changes which have been imposed by the Soviet so that if the time should come when the people rise against their conquerors, they may more easily establish continuity with their past.

In all of this work the Committee draws information and support from many sources -- from those who have escaped and who must remain anonymous for fear of reprisals on their families at home, from those in this country who wish to work voluntarily for the cause of freedom abroad, from the American people at large, and from government agencies which, in the American tradition, give all possible aid to private citizens engaged in a worthwhile public cause.

Fund raising for the Committee is done by a subsidiary, the Crusade for Freedom which, in the course of raising money, also helps to keep before the American people and people throughout the world the need for spreading the idea of freedom. For example, the Freedom Bell, which now rings regularly over the city of Berlin, was the gift of sixteen million Americans who contributed to the Crusade for Freedom. All in all, signatures and voluntary donations from more than twenty-five million Americans have come to the Crusade for Freedom to date. Generous contributions have also been made to the Committee by private foundations; and at the request of Government agencies, certain specific research and other projects have been undertaken and carried on with the assistance of funds provided by the departments or agencies concerned.

A Board of Directors consisting of prominent American citizens from all walks of life pass upon the policies and supervise the

operations of the Committee. The work of the Committee is carried forward under the direction of its President, Rear Admiral Harold B. Miller, USN Retired, who is on leave of absence from the American Petroleum Institute. On March 1, 1952, he succeeded Mr. C. D. Jackson, who has returned to resume his position with TIME-LIFE, Inc.

CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
(Attachment)

June 25, 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Braden
FROM: Jesse MacKnight *JM*
SUBJECT: 1952 Crusade for Freedom

Please see that the attached memo
gets to Mr. Walsh through secure channels.


Attachments
Memo to Walsh from
MacKnight dtd. 6/23/52
Copy of this Memo for
Mr. Braden

CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information

June 23, 1953

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Richard Walsh

FROM: Jesse L. Macnamer, et al 

SUBJECT: 1954 Crusade for Freedom

Your memorandum of June 21 has been reviewed and the following comments represent a consensus of our opinion:

1. Phase One - The balloon idea as a fund raising device is satisfactory, provided substantial emphasis is also given to the use of LRB and other vehicles as methods of delivering the messages behind the Iron Curtain.
2. Phase Two - The idea of a message based on the Christmas theme is satisfactory subject to agreement on the precise text.
3. Phase Three - Subject to review, in light of any future developments in Europe which might affect the tentative decision, there is agreement on the use of a small number of balloons as a symbolic operation.
4. Phase Four - The gift idea as part of a balloon project is considered undesirable.

CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

17 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Braden, FY/IO

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe

1. For your information the following report on Radio Free Europe Hungarian broadcasts was received here recently, although the information was obtained last March:

"a. Radio Free Europe broadcasts from MUNICH, Germany, are more popular than the Voice of America programs and its news coverage is considered both current and based on authentic sources. However, its commentaries on foreign politics are severely criticized and allegedly the general opinion in Hungary is that whoever writes this program has not the slightest idea either of the conditions in Hungary or of the general needs of the people.

"b. There are also objections to the program of News Briefs (ROVAT ADASOK). This program is considered a nuisance and isn't even listened to by those for whom it is intended. By scheduling 15 and 30 minute programs specifically beamed to different segments of the population, such as: the women's program, the church program, the farmer's program, book and movie reviews, etc., Radio Free Europe reduces its listening audience to those who might be interested in the specific program, while the majority of the listeners are forced either to cease listening to their radios or change to another broadcasting station. As a result, Radio Free Europe has been losing its audience and the decline is especially noticeable during the program of News Briefs when the majority of the listeners allegedly change over to the BRC program.

"c. The workers are particularly interested in political news and are in an excellent position to spread the news throughout the factories. Again the BRC appears to be the most popular station. Informant learned of the fate of one Imre HORVATH, a group leader in a Textile Mill in SZEGED. HORVATH passed on some news concerning the activities of the "Political Police" of SZEGED which he had originally heard on one of these foreign broadcasts. This resulted in HORVATH being immediately transferred to DUNAPENTESE and his "group" was disbanded.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION


SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

"d. The necessity for special programs beamed at the youth of Hungary is very acute. The youth of today which has passed its 16th year of age does not listen to children's programs any longer but is interested in broadcasts on the subject of anti-Communist ideologies. This is the age group that the Communists are especially interested in and on whose education in the Communist spirit special emphasis is placed. All of this age group, without exception, attends Communist Party schools and Marxist seminars and also receives pre-military training. To aid in this thorough indoctrination in Marxism as presented to them, special newspapers and magazines full of Communist ideological material are being published. It is therefore highly desirable that special programs aimed at this youth group be prepared so that they will be able to judge for themselves the true conditions in comparison to the propaganda that is fed to them by the Communist regime of Hungary."

2. The comment accompanying this report states:

"An effort is being made to ascertain the basis of the above critique of foreign radio broadcasts by asking Informant if this critique represents his own opinions or the opinions of one or more friends or casual contacts, and whether it is an observation of the programs which were heard during his short visit in BUDAPEST or based on a longer period of time. Inasmuch as Informant cannot be contacted directly, we have no assurance that this information will be forthcoming in the near future, and it is deemed best to submit the above critique as is, for the time being."

Handwritten mark




EE/PC/R/GV/rwp
Distribution:
1,2 - Addressee
3,4 - EE/PC/H
5,6 - RI/PI

sent to N. Y. 26 June 1952

SECRET

Return to
ER-20





SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.



FROM:


Io/Tonic

NO.


DATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FILED		
1. <i>C/TO</i>				<i>JWB</i>	
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					
16.					






Vertical text on the left side of the page, possibly a page number or reference code.




SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



SECRET

SECRET
- 2 -



10 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

ATTENTION: [REDACTED]
Operations Division

SUBJECT: MB 50 Transmitters

1. This is to confirm our conversation to the effect that both TPFILLAR and TPTONIC are interested in the MB 50 mobile transmitting equipment. Both feel that they can use that equipment profitably in their radio operation. We shall need a little time to reach a judgment as to which of these projects should receive the equipment and to determine its best utilization.


2. We should like to request that this equipment be transferred to the IO Division for later determination as to whether it may best be utilized by TPFILLAR or TPTONIC.

3. It is our understanding that this will be transferred to us without reimbursement and that this will not involve the IO Division in the so-called M 50 project which has been discussed at length with [REDACTED] and others of your staff.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/EBB:blj
Distribution
Orig - Addressee
1 - IO/ExO
1 - CIO
2 - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION




5 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Truman Speech to American Action Committee
Against Mass Deportations in Romania

1. May I urge you to read the attached commentary by RFE on President Truman's statement the other day to the Romanian exiles, which was the subject of considerable concern to RFE and to VOA.
2. Please note the manner in which RFE handled this job. The President spoke words which RFE has for months urged that it be allowed to speak. Because the President had departed from his text, it was not possible to give RFE any guidance to say they should play the President's words strongly or that they should play them down. The State Department at first gave orders to the Voice to play the speech up, and only later was this countermanded. Meantime, however, RFE, acting without guidance from us, broadcast the attached which I think might well be shown to Mr. Joyce and others in State as an example of RFE responsibility and judgment.


THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

Attachment

International Organizations Division


CIO: TWB/eh


Orig - Addressee (thru ADPC)
1 cc - IO/TOMIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET


SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION


2-9795





The RI Copy of TOP SECRET
document 63466
dated 21 Oct 1952
which was removed from this
file, is filed in the RI
TOP SECRET CONTROL SECTION
1305 "L" Bldg.





SECRET
Security Information



SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

C
O
P
Y

27 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Statements by Ronald D. Jeancon, RFE, London

REFERENCE: My memorandum to you dated 23 April 1952

1. On 23 April 1952 I wrote you stating that Admiral Miller was going to discuss with Ronald D. Jeancon statements accredited to Jeancon which appeared in an interview in the London Daily Worker, and that I would let you know the results of this conversation.
2. Admiral Miller, after an interview with Jeancon, informs me that a correspondent for the Worker interviewed Jeancon and that subsequently a story appeared in the Worker which was completely unfactual, the fact of the interview being used as a peg on which to hang Jeancon, and RFE.
3. The charges made against Jeancon have therefore been dropped.

THOMAS W. HADEN

CIO;T:EB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - DD/T (thru AFPC)
1 cc - IO/TWIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

Carbon copy of above returned by
State - Mr. Joyce on 4 June with
comments:

"Why did he get mixed up with a Daily
Worker man? Such naivete makes one
wonder about his usefulness.

RPJ

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
SECRET INFORMATION

23 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Statements by Ronald D. Jeancon, RFE, London

REFERENCE: Letter 9 April 1952 Robert G. Hooker, Jr. to
Robert P. Joyce

1. Frank Wisner passed on to me the note from Bob Hooker about the article in the Daily Worker on Wednesday, April 2, quoting Mr. Jeancon.

2. I had learned of Mr. Jeancon's outburst within a few days after he made it and I passed the information on at once to Admiral Miller of NSAF. Admiral Miller was greatly disturbed by Jeancon's remarks and corroborated Hooker's suggestion that he had done this type of thing before.

3. Admiral Miller promised to put the Jeancon affair high on his agenda for his present trip abroad. He will discuss the incident with Jeancon and he contemplates dismissing him. I will let you know the result of Admiral Miller's conversation with Jeancon as soon as I get word.

THOMAS W. BRADEN


Enclosure
Reference letter and
newspaper clipping.

CIO: TWR/eh

- Copies 1 & 2 - Addressee
- Copy 3 - DD/P (thru ADPC)
- Copy 4 - CIO
- Copy 5 - IC/TW/C
- Copy 6 - IC

EX-111
RIS/SCO
~~SECRET~~
SECRET


SECRET



SECRET

SECRET

22 May 1952



SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

21 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Statement on NCFE

I feel that Attachment A, the statement handed to us by Admiral Miller, is apologetic in tone and I have drafted Attachment B which I believe is more positive and would be a better press release for NCFE in the unwhoped for event that a press release is called for.

2 Attachments

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - DDCT (thru DD/P)
1 cc - IO/IOHIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

PROPOSED STATEMENT
(Draft #4, 20 May 1952)

The National Committee for a Free Europe is an organization of American citizens whose purpose is to encourage the spread of freedom in Europe. It is a membership corporation, chartered under the laws of the State of New York.

In its attempt to spread the doctrine of freedom and consequently to combat Soviet totalitarianism, the Committee operates radio stations which pierce the Iron Curtain; it operates a university at Strasbourg for young men and women who have escaped from behind the Iron Curtain; it attempts by other means than radio to carry messages of hope and of the possibility of eventual liberation to the nations which are now enslaved; it conducts studies of the laws, customs and cultures of these nations as they existed prior to Soviet occupation; and it documents the changes which have been imposed by the Soviet so that if the time should come when the people rise against their conquerors, they may more easily establish continuity with their past.

In all of this work the Committee draws information and support from many sources -- from those who have escaped and who must remain anonymous for fear of reprisals on their families at home, from those in this country who wish to work voluntarily for the cause of freedom abroad, from the American people at large, and from government agencies who, in the American tradition, give all possible aid to private citizens engaged in a public cause.

SECRET

SECRET
- 2 -

Fund raising for the Committee is done by a subsidiary, the Crusade for Freedom which, in the course of raising money, also helps to keep before the American people and people throughout the world the need for spreading the idea of freedom. For example, the Freedom Bell, which now rings regularly over the City of Berlin, was the gift of sixteen million Americans who contributed to the Crusade for Freedom. All in all, signatures and voluntary donations from more than twenty-five million Americans have come to the Crusade for Freedom to date. Generous contributions have also been made to the Committee by private foundations, and payments have been received from interested government agencies for which the Committee has undertaken special projects.

A Board of Directors consisting of prominent American citizens from all walks of life determine the policies and supervise the operations of the Committee.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

ER-2-8556

30 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations
FROM: Deputy Director Central Intelligence

Attached is the proposed statement to be issued by
NCFE I am not
very happy with it and suggest that we try to improve it.
I have sent a copy to Frank Wisner.


ALLEN W. DULLES

Encl.


CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION




SECRET

17-234



SECRET
Security Information



19 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

You will be interested in the attached letter from Matthew Well resigning from NCFE. We were forewarned of this some weeks ago by Jay and others.

We will be in touch with NCFE with respect to the form of their answer if they decide to make one.

ALLEN W. DULLES

Encl.

cc: DD/P
C/IO

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

FREE TRADE UNION COMMITTEE
Labor League for Human Rights
Box 65, Radio City Station
New York 10, N. Y.

May 13, 1952

Admiral H. B. Miller, President
National Committee for Free Europe, Inc.
110 West 57th Street
New York City

Dear Admiral Miller:

Your Committee has decided that "its interest and work lie in labor relations chiefly in Europe and not in the United States."

We disagree with your policy which we are convinced is wrong.

You have translated your new policy into action by dismissing our active representative, Henry Kirsch, whose work had won your own as well as general hearty acclama and brought great credit to your organization. I might add that this dismissal came after an agreement in Paris by your former President and now Vice-Chairman with our European representative, Irving Brown, and your own European representative, Leon Damon, to have Mr. Kirsch head your Labor Division.


Furthermore, we had been assured by Mr. Berlo that Mr. Kirsch would not be dismissed without first giving us an opportunity to study specific complaints and cause for said discharge. This promise has likewise not been kept.

In view of the above, there can be no point in my continuing membership in your body. I, therefore, herewith tender my resignation to take effect immediately.


Sincerely yours,

SIGNED
MATTHEW MOLL, Chairman
International Labor Relations
Com. and Free Trade Union
Committee, AFL

SECRET
Security Information



Security Information



SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

14 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe

The following may be helpful in today's briefing of Mr. Hedden.

1. RFE is presently broadcasting about 135 hours a week to Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

a. A technical operating survey of these facilities was recently conducted by Westinghouse radio and technical experts. They evaluated as excellent both the facilities and the operating program. A copy of this report is attached.

b. The effectiveness of broadcasts from a psychological warfare point of view is considerable, as far as can be determined with interviews with escapees, State Department officials behind the Curtain, and Soviet attacks including jamming. RFE has also been surveyed by a key official of the Psychological Strategy Board with the conclusion that it is one of the most effective U.S. psychological warfare efforts and should without question be continued.

c. The risk taken to invest several million dollars in capital facilities in Germany is a calculated one -- fully recognized and discussed at length at a recent PRC meeting. It is considered a reasonable risk under the circumstances. The understandings reached with representatives of the German government are considered to be as good as can be worked out at this time.

4. [redacted] Chief of the National Committees Branch/IO, plans to make an inspection trip to Europe leaving May 23 to visit RFE facilities. On his return it is expected that we will have additional first hand information to report to you.

[redacted]
Executive Officer
International Organizations Division

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT F. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Communist Infiltration of RFE

REFERENCE: Confidential Memorandum dated 24 October from
Al Freeman to Voy Kohler

1. On 2 November 1951 you told us of certain charges you had heard that RFE was being infiltrated.

2. Similar charges have been made by others. We therefore asked NCFE to investigate these charges and we also turned them over to our own Security Officers. I am attaching for your information a letter which contains the results of the investigation made by NCFE. You will observe that the specific charges made against Ingenieur Malik and Kristina Kazlerova are not answered but we believe the enclosed constitutes an answer to the general charge of infiltration of the Czechoslovakian desk, as the major figures involved are dealt with fully.

3. If, subsequently, our own investigation in which Malik and Kazlerova will be dealt with brings to light any new facts or fails to corroborate any of the facts stated in the enclosure, we will take action immediately and will also keep you informed.

FRANK G. WISNER

Enclosure

Ltr 25 Apr with
Exhibits from NCFE

CIO:TWB/eh
(8 May 1952)

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TOMIC
2 cc - F.R. (1 for DD/r)
1 cc - EE
1 cc - I&S (Mr. Cotter)
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

10 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO/TOMIC -

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Reorganization of Bulgarian
National Committee dated April 23, 1952

1. I am disturbed by the fact indicated in this memorandum that the State Department, namely Campbell, is attempting to lay down the line almost to the precise language which Admiral Hiller uses with the political refugees.

2. It seems to me at some time or other that somebody will have to tell Campbell that while it is the State Department's job to make policy, the only way NCFE can possibly conform to Campbell's ideas is to appoint Campbell to deal with exiles and ask him whether he wants a job.

3. I have a feeling that this is going to come to a head one of these days and I wish you would build up a little file on Campbell and his efforts in this direction.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Subject memo.

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
2 cc - CIO

6470

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

9 May 1952


MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Letters of Mr. C. D. Jackson Concerning
Possible Communist Disturbances Among
Hungarian Emigres.

REFERENCE: Your memorandum, above subject, 25 April 1952.

1. In compliance with your request, the allegations contained in Mr. Jackson's letters pertaining to Az Embor and Ferenc Gondor have been forwarded to the FBI.

2. On the Henryey case,




OSO is now in process of preparing a reply to a query from the Immigration and Naturalization Service on him. OSO is, therefore, at a loss to offer an explanation of Henryey's visa difficulties.

LSU:ld

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
Assistant Director
Special Operations

SECRET



2-9187

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
708 Jackson Place, N.W. May 7, 1952
Washington 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PRESENT: Mr. W. J. Scripps, Detroit News
Dr. Allen



After arranging an appointment through his cousin, Senator Moody, Mr. Scripps called on the Director to discuss his proposal for a "Friendship Balloon Lift." Certain materials relating to this proposal had previously been transmitted to the Director by Mr. Allen Dulles.

In reply to questioning, Mr. Scripps asserted that he was well acquainted with the NCFE winds of freedom campaign, in which he had participated, but that he had not discussed his present proposal with NCFE. He said he had talked to many American business men, who were all enthusiastic and were prepared to donate the variety of products which he proposes should be included in the payloads. He said that his father was an ardent supporter of the project, along with a Mr. Fletcher, Vice President of the Caterpillar Tractor Company and Dr. Barnett. Mr. Fletcher spent some time in Russia, he said. When asked whether Caterpillar was in the balloon business, Mr. Scripps said no.

Other names mentioned by Mr. Scripps as being familiar with his proposal included Nick Haradi, identified as an ex-minister of the Hungarian Government; Frank Jewitt of General Mills (which holds a balloon research contract with the Office of Naval Research), who has given him a letter to an admiral; an Admiral Miller; and a [redacted] of CIA. (see below) Mr. Scripps also mentioned a Psychological Equipment Development Office located in the old Post Office building. (see below)

Mr. Scripps was troubled by security problems. It was apparent that he felt he had obtained confidential information from certain government sources which he could not disclose. At the same time, he stated that in order to work out his proposal in any detail, he would need access to information presently denied him. Therefore, he suggested that he be cleared for security by the appropriate agency.

As a result, it proved impossible to nail down the technical aspects of Mr. Scripps' proposal. In his formal presentation, he had described a balloon capable of carrying a 40-pound payload and costing \$5. In his conversation, he mentioned a vehicle capable of carrying 300 to 800 pounds, together with a staggered release mechanism--without

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

price. To questions as to whether either type was in existence, Mr. Scripps replied that he was bound by confidences. In general, however, he did not foresee any technical barriers.

When asked how he would finance his proposal, Mr. Scripps said that he would begin with private contributions, with the thought that eventually the program would be taken over by the government. He laid stress on the need for early organization (e.g. fund raising, balloon stockpiling, crew training, selection of launching sites) in order that operations could be started immediately following a decision as to their desirability. He stated that 90 days would be sufficient to prepare for operations, once he got the "green light".

Dr. Allen expressed his personal interest in the proposal, but reminded Mr. Scripps that PDB's field was strategic rather than operational, and that in an operational proposal of such complexity, PDB could only give the matter a cursory review. Therefore, Dr. Allen stated his intention to forward the proposal to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, which was the proper body to give the project the detailed screening to which it was entitled. Dr. Allen also suggested that Mr. Scripps see C. D. Jackson.

Mr. Norberg then suggested that as an additional aid Mr. Scripps prepare a brief but fairly specific description of what he personally was prepared to do, along with an outline of the organization which would be needed to carry out the project. Mr. Scripps said that he would do so within the next week.

COMMENT

[redacted] when asked about Mr. Scripps, said he had met him several times between December 1950 and February, 1951. During this period of early planning for balloon operations, [redacted] said that Scripps proved quite helpful by quieting certain private enthusiasts, in addition to maintaining a discreet silence himself. [redacted] did not know for a fact that Mr. Scripps participated in the August operation, but judged that it was likely. In [redacted] opinion, Scripps is a capable person with valuable connections in the business world and sufficient financial independence to be able to devote most of his time to good works. [redacted] thinks it would be a good idea to have him cleared as a consultant.

The Psychological Equipment Development Office mentioned by Mr. Scripps is believed to be the Physical Security Equipment Agency, a military development agency operated by the Air Force under an OSD charter. Its director is Col. H. M. McCoy. This agency is prepared to talk with anyone who has been cleared for security; otherwise individuals are asked to approach the services first.


Distribution:

Dr. Allen

C:\NAKornans

Recording Facility
2-8852


SECRET
Security Information



SECRET
Security Information



600.000000



~~SECRET~~
Secret

Orig to Durkee 5 May



SECRET
Security Information

1229553

McCAMPBELL & COMPANY
INCORPORATED
Forty Worth Street
New York N.Y.


April 28, 1952

Dear Frank,

I found the attached memorandum of real interest as providing a clear-cut explanation of a matter relating to N.C.F.E. which you are doubtless asked about from time to time. It occurred to me that you might like to have this as covering the basic policy used in the selection and employment of exile personnel for various branches, particularly for the work of Radio Free Europe. To my mind it provides an answer to inquiries which come to us and others as to how and why such personnel is chosen.

Since Min Miller is away and won't be back for several weeks I am taking the liberty of sending this copy to you in his absence. He and others at 57th Street read it before he went away and endorsed it.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,


14-00000

NCPE EXILE PERSONNEL SELECTION IN RELATION TO
(1) EXILE POLITICS,
(2) RFE BROADCAST POLICY, AND
(3) EXTERNAL CRITICISM

- I -

INTRODUCTORY HISTORY

A. Formative Stage

At its inception, the National Committee for a Free Europe believed that its Iron Curtain broadcasting operation, Radio Free Europe, could and should be developed and pursued through the medium of "National Councils" or "Committees of Liberation" composed of exile groups from the target countries. It was considered that prominent exile leaders and personalities of each nationality group could express to their captive countrymen, entirely without American advice and guidance, the message of hope which NCPE proposed to send. This concept was not fulfilled. Experience in attempting to weld a talented, dedicated group of exiles into a non-partisan broadcasting operation early demonstrated that without American control the mission of RFE would be lost in the jungle of exile-world politics. It soon became evident that the leadership among the exiles was neither sufficiently strong nor personally willing to rise above the political cross currents, factional rivalries, and splinter-group weaknesses characteristically reminiscent of the political affairs of all Eastern European countries. These factors militated against the original plan of permitting

exiles, through their loosely organized Councils or Committees, to wholly develop, manage, and control RFE broadcasting.

Since the advent of RFE was the most important development affecting the exiles which had occurred since their flight from home, they quickly understood and applauded its implications and potential effect on their futures. Through this instrument they could once again become prominent and powerful in the affairs of the homeland; once more they could contend for place and power.

Selection of personnel for the purpose at hand quickly became a political football of rival leaders, personalities, and groups. Rightists, Leftists, Centrists, Labor Elements, and Splinter-groups argued with us for advancement of their particular personal or political views. Sponsorship of their own adherents as RFE employees through whom such views would be broadcast to their captive countrymen became the pattern of their pseudo cooperation. This pattern was followed to such an extent that ordinary progress and sensible development of our basic purpose of truly free broadcasts under exile control soon appeared to be not only impracticable, but dangerous. For example, the National Councils Division attempted to inaugurate broadcasts to Czechoslovakia under the auspices of a Czechoslovak National Council. The Council was and is made up of exile personalities of differing political views and parties. Its factions proceeded to engage in endless disputes and irreconcilable claims for control of script production and program content. Slovak "Separatists" arguing for the total independence of Slovakia

sought that objective, while Czechs desired opposite views to be aired and advocated the rebirth of pre-war Czechoslovakia. Each group sponsored and insisted upon employment of its own more or less qualified adherents upon the assumption that its special views would be thereby expressed to the captive Czechoslovak audience of RFE. Similar activities were pursued by Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Poles until the futility of permitting the exile Councils to control the destiny and broadcasting policies of RFE was made clear beyond refutation. It became tragically obvious that uncontrolled exile-world Councils and professional politicians could not agree on personnel selection or program content.

In spite of every effort to induce harmony in and obtain proper cooperation from the "Councils", "Committees", and individuals, RFE was confronted with an impasse. The alternative theory and present policy of American selection of non-political exile personnel was the only way out. It has worked. Technically qualified personnel produce properly oriented programs -- and have been doing so with documented success since July, 1950. Disappointed exile politicians, professional exile camp followers, disturbed American special pleaders, and alarmed Communist Agents all scream, snipe and snivel -- but RFE programs are doing the job.

NCFE-RFE records of this stage can be supplied by Frederic R. Dolbeare, Vice-President, National Councils Division, and Robert E. Lang, Director, RFE. The current policy has the complete endorsement of these officers and of the Board of Directors of NCFE.

14-00000

B. Development Stage

Upon the collapse of the original concept of broadcasting under exile auspices, RFE necessarily utilized some exile personnel endorsed and recommended by the leaders of the various nationality groups. As technical radio facilities came into being, exiles with radio background or writing talent were required for the production of programs. This involved using individuals eminently qualified by experience to do a radio job of script writing, announcing, acting, etc. without regard for the fact that such individuals might be at odds with one or another political faction or leader of an exile "Council". It also involved elimination of proven inefficient, inept or unworthy individuals without regard for their exile "Council" sponsorship. In either instance criticism of RFE was predictable and indeed was always forthcoming -- often in virulent and dishonest form.

The day to day operation of RFE developed new techniques and long range plans which made it impossible to employ non-entities of no political color or conviction. The best people to produce programs in harmony with NCFE-RFE purposes and policies necessarily were persons known in their own countries for their views on domestic political affairs and their anti-Communist activities. Hard-hitting propaganda required hard-hitting personalities whose known association with RFE and its programs would add validity and significance for our captive audiences. Gradually, therefore, the nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich were staffed with tested, qualified exiles who had been

14-00000

identified publicly with domestic political philosophies at issue in their own countries. Many, in fact most of the staff people are controversial figures among their own countrymen in exactly the same way that prominent Americans are controversial in our political arena. Many indeed are members of the Councils, but are men of sufficient stature to give their primary allegiance to the non-partisan policy of RFE. The decisive factor is that there be no controversy or question about their anti-Communist convictions and records.

At this point, it must be noted that our target countries have been subject to repetitive political ferment prior to and following World War II, as well as the successive occupations of Nazi and Communist Armies.

The temper of the times, therefore, in which these exiles have lived for the past fifteen years has been one of excitement, bitterness, recrimination, rivalries, and personal turmoil -- all stemming from both domestic and foreign struggles for power. The times have produced a bumper crop of refugee traitors, collaborators, and opportunists and at the same time have developed pure Western style democrats, true national patriots, and unselfish honest men. The exile who stood by placidly through the era is not much good, however talented, as a militant messenger of hope via RFE; exiles who were honorably active in public affairs at home and who had radio talent were, therefore, the only kind of personnel suitable for RFE purposes.

As the necessity for American operational control of nationality desks became self-evident, the only feasible personnel policy was to

employ properly qualified individuals, regardless of exile politics. In the execution of this policy individuals who were useless were eliminated without regard for political sponsors. This process still goes on. Similarly, talented exile personalities recruited from any source were employed wherever needed. This process still goes on. Both processes are in vogue with a healthy disregard for exile political nuances and protests. Neither process is satisfactory to self-styled exile leaders, since it follows that the appointment of an individual sponsored by one faction as a representative of its views inevitably will evoke howls of rage and criticism from the opposite faction. This is an accepted fact of exile life. We have to live with it and get on with the job.

C. Summary

Our formative and development experiences evolved the present and continuing exile personnel policies of RFL. Exile desk employees, whether at New York or Munich, must respond to three tests:

- (a) Security clearance,
- (b) Endorsement of technical proficiency,
- (c) Sufficient stature to eliminate exile partisan interests from program content.

- II -

CRITERIA AND METHODS OF PERSONNEL SELECTION

A. Recruitment -- General Principles

The best source of exile personnel is referral by "non-professional" exiles themselves. Among all nationalities there are

many talented refugees who need employment and who can supply RFE's need for script writers, actors, announcers, etc. Accordingly, desk staffing has been accomplished by examining the qualifications of duly recommended individuals, whether the recommendations come from political personalities or otherwise. Selection is based on the ability of the individual to fill a need efficiently in turning out or participating in planned programs. Recruitment is determined only by ideological security, independence of exile politics, and personal ability. This is not to say that many individual exiles having decided personal convictions and well-known political records are not employed, but a positive statement is made that those exile employees now produce RFE programs reflect the policies and guidance of RFE rather than promotion of partisan objectives and personalities.

B. Recruitment -- Detailed Procedures

The personnel complement of each RFE nationality desk is founded on a hard core of dependable individuals, usually two or three people, including the chief of the desk. "Dependability" is established by exhaustive inquiry at all available sources to establish the desirability, reliability, technical proficiency and security of the working core of the desk. Sources used are:

- (a) Exile political personalities in the United States,
- (b) Exile references of high standing and known impartiality in the United States and Overseas,
- (c) Overseas contacts and personal knowledge of our American representative in Europe (Royall Tyler-Paris),
- (d) Checks and balances of our political advisor at Munich (W.S. Griffith),

- (e) British Broadcasting Corporation, where applicable,
- (f) Voice of America, where applicable,
- (g) Special confidential sources.

These tests having been applied, confidence is placed in these initial personalities, and particularly in the Desk Chief, to carry forward recruitment of additional personnel as needed in collaboration with the American Director of RFE (Robert E. Lang, New York) and his associate officials. The leading personalities of each desk know what is expected of them and since they respond to the established criteria, the resulting full personnel complement is a group of exiles who, notwithstanding their personal political views, are suitable and capable program production people. They meet our basic requirement of daily production of truly free and properly constructed propaganda broadcasts capable of evoking the widest possible audience response in our target countries.

In brief, the mission of RFE being conceived as a marketing problem, the best available salesmen are procured, trained, and utilized to sell the market.

C. Recruitment -- Special Security Measures

Since RFE, although a private enterprise, is by extension a collateral instrument of American national policy, special precaution is exercised to insure the ideological security of all employees, including exiles. In the case of exile personnel specifically, the

additional approval of the Personnel Director of NCFE is required before employment either at New York or Munich. Thus, even if a proposed exile employee meets all the described criteria, he may not be employed without this ultimate approval.

The Personnel Director of NCFE utilizes appropriate and dependable sources of information to determine the acceptability of personnel from a security standpoint. His sources are investigative in nature and are conclusive as to the ideological record and security acceptability of the proposed employee. In doubtful cases the Personnel Director consults with the Vice-President in Charge of the National Councils Division and with the Director of Radio Free Europe. These three officers of NCFE jointly follow a policy of rejecting candidates about whom there is the slightest doubt. It is to be clearly understood that in making decisions of this kind the conflicting interests and frantic representations of politically-minded exile leaders and groups are ignored. Acceptance or rejection of candidates is wholly based on ideological security and talent value.

D. Summary

- (1) All nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich are staffed by individuals who have passed all tests described above.
- (2) All programs produced and aired by the nationality desks are checked and scrutinized by American supervisory personnel for ideological content, audience acceptance and conformity to basic NCFE-RFE policies.
- (3) These conditions have been progressively in force since July, 1950.

III

RFE POLICY GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL

A. General Comment

The programs aired by RFE are not left to whim or chance. All programs and the personnel responsible for them are controlled by a written policy manual. The manual sets forth in minute detail the position and policy of RFE on every topic beared to our target countries. The manual is the daily guidance of all employees, both American and Exile; deviation from its rules is not permitted. Continuous scrutiny of manuscripts and resultant broadcasts is maintained by American employees to insure that there are no deviations.

The policy manual of RFE represents the considered views of the responsible officials, including the Board of Directors, of NCFE. It is a statement of the principles and purposes of NCFE expressed in operational form. It is considered and maintained as strictly confidential document, but it is of course available for examination by any proper authority.

The policy manual is in strict conformity with current American national policies as evidenced by the following quotation from Article One:

"As a non-governmental radio station responsible to the millions of American citizens who support it, RFE cannot take a line contrary to United States Government policy or to the beliefs of the American people reflected in the Constitution of the United States and in American Institutions."

The above quotation is understood by exile personnel particularly to be a solemn injunction against ideological program content which in any way violates the letter and spirit of American policy and ideals. It is a guarantee to the American people and to our captive listeners that RFE and the men who make its programs are uncompromisingly opposed to the Communist regimes now in power in Soviet Russia and the satellite countries.

B. RFE Policy Defined by Handbook (Direct Quotations)

1. The purpose of RFE is to contribute to the liberation of the Nations imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by sustaining their morale and stimulating in them a spirit of non-cooperation with the Soviet-dominated regimes by which they are, for the time being, ruled.

2. The central characteristic of RFE is that it is the instrument of men who are engaged in fighting for freedom and justice. As such, it encourages resistance to every tyrant, great and small, in the countries it addresses. Its speakers speak -- as men of good will who seek to contribute to the elimination of old enmities and the building of an enduring European democratic order.

3. As a free forum in which exiles speak to their own people RFE is particularly dedicated to arguments by which exiles seek to persuade their listeners of all devouring ambitions of Soviet Imperialism, the cruelty and unworkability of Communist Institutions,

and the proven advantages of the democratic way of life for the worker, and the peasant, the administrator, and the business and professional strata of society.

4. RFE takes counsel with exile leaders and is respectful of their views, but its policy is not designed to further the aspirations of any single exile leader or party.

5. RFE policy is further based upon acceptance of the principle that each of the liberated peoples shall be free to determine for itself the political and social institutions under which it will live once it has been liberated.

6. Finally, the following summary in the nature of a specific limitation on program content is quoted:

"It is indispensable that all concerned grasp clearly that RFE is a multi-national station established to contribute to the liberation of all the peoples it addresses, and not merely of one of those peoples. RFE policy is therefore commanded by the limitation that nothing may be said over its facilities to one national audience which will destroy the confidence in RFE of its other audiences or which is likely to induce any of its audiences to prefer communist rule to a liberation which might appear to promise domination by a neighboring people."

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

28 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed NCFE Support on the Exile Organized
Refugee Aid Committee in France

REFERENCE: Letter Dated 20 March 1952 from [redacted]
Enclosing 27 January 1952 Report on the Exile
Organized Refugee Aid Committee in France.
from [redacted]

1. The reference, recently forwarded to us by NCFE, recommends NCFE support for organized refugee relief committees in Paris. As a follow-up, [redacted] of NCFE's New York staff, is currently surveying refugee organizations in Western Europe. When the results of this survey have been given to us, we plan—in conjunction with the interested area desks—to prepare a study with recommendations concerning the utilization of exile committees in Europe.

2. In the meantime, the reference is forwarded for your information.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment 1
As stated above

Distributions:
Addressees - original
CIO - 1
IO/TJNIC - 1
RI - 2

~~SECRET~~

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

20 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT F. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Future Balloon Operation

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from [redacted] in which he suggests the necessity of coming to a definite decision in respect to a future balloon operation.
2. Will you advise me as to (a) whether you wish to have a balloon operation in August or at any subsequent date, and (b) whether you want us to set aside funds and materials now for a future balloon operation at some unspecified time?

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Ltr from [redacted]
dtd 1 Apr 52

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TXIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

In reply refer to: W-2016

28 April 1952

Dear Spencer:

Here is a brief of the material that is wanted in respect to the slave labor issue.

This is of great importance, as you can well imagine, but for your information we find ourselves in something of a box on this because having pressed for the hearings, it is essential to gather good evidence and not be embarrassed by something we have fought to obtain.

I hope, therefore, that you will give it your top consideration and let me know if you can come up with anything. In addition to the kinds of evidence listed here, you will note that private organizations may testify.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Enclosures

2 Memoranda 14 Apr 52

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Spencer Phenix
1 cc - IO ExO.
1 cc - IO/TONIC
2 cc - CIO ✓
2 cc - RI

see chrono for 2d enclosure

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

14 April 1952

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Gathering Evidence on Slave Labor Issue - to be presented
Ecosoc Hearings

A. Type of evidence that is desired:

1. Scholarly studies - Laws, administrative regulations showing the de jure and de facto application of laws pertaining to labor.
2. Documentary evidence - Passes, identity cards, ration cards, release papers, etc. Anything indicating the place, name of camp, administrative documents, etc. Photostatic copies accepted if the original is unavailable for retention. Seals, stamps, and signatures desirable.
3. Testimonial
 - a. Written testimony - probably in the form of answers to a questionnaire. These testimonials may be either:
 - (1) Anonymous. (As few as possible)
 - (2) Authorized use of the name, either confidentially, for release only before the court, where many sessions will be closed to the public, or the name may be released to the public.
 - b. Tape recordings - Some excellent testimonials could perhaps be tape recorded.
 - c. Statistical form - The bulk of this testimonial can also be reduced to a statistical form.
 - d. No hearsay testimony is wanted.
4. Witnesses - A few of these should be presented by each group. However, the witnesses should be most carefully chosen to insure that they are really genuine, really were in a concentration camp, and not in some internment or intermediate camp, and that they spent a considerable amount of time there, without having been convicted by due process of law. Furthermore, these witnesses should be of high caliber, highly literate, capable of presenting their story clearly, and standing up to close cross-examination, without having to alter their story.

SECRET
CURTAIN INFORMATION

- 2 -

B. Principal targets to hit: State is especially anxious that we assist by reaching those persons, and those areas hardest to reach, and on which there exists the least evidence.

1. Individuals: The persons that present the greatest interest are civilians, who have been in Soviet Concentration Camps since the last war. Soldiers are considered secondary evidence, as with them a difference must be made and clearly drawn between PW camps, and concentration camps, where soldiers and civilians both were put to work at hard labor. Well known persons who have testified before should not be used. The effort must concentrate on new evidence of recent date.
2. Areas: In order to establish clearly that the concentration camp forms an integral part of the Soviet Communist political and economic system, it is vital to prove conclusively the existence of concentration camps in all countries which have fallen under Soviet domination. Thus evidence is especially needed on the following areas:

Poland
Baltic nations
East Germany
Hungary
Rumania
Bulgaria
Albania
China
N. Korea
Russia (Material on Russia, if gathered, should be of very recent date.)

The areas in which to operate most successfully, are the followings:

Sweden (Balts, Poles, Russians)
Germany (All kinds)
Trieste area (Central European refugees)
Northern Greece (Bulgarians, Rumanians)
Yugoslavia??? (They have evidence - will they cooperate?)
Eastern Turkey???

Iran (Reportedly, there are a good number of escapees, from Soviet Russia. These might be Azerbaijani, Armenians, Georgians, even Persians, providing an entirely new source of evidence.)

Hong Kong
Formosa (Reportedly a groups of former inmates here)
S. Korea (N. Korean PW's, Chinese PW's - might locate existence of camps in Korea and China).
Japan (Former PW's. Some were in Siberian Slave Labor camps.

C. Organizations which should do the work: These organizations need not have any special qualifications just so long as they are bona fide organizations. State recommends that we try to get a diversity of

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 3 -

such organizations to present evidence. Twenty different organizations would be an optimum to aim for. They should represent different interests, such as labor groups, veterans organizations, emigre organizations, church groups, and several of them should have an international character.

- D. *Your capabilities:* What type of organizations do you have that could organize interrogation teams, draw up lists of persons to interview, and go out and gather the material for presentation to the hearings?

What areas could the organizations you have in mind, work in?

What national groups could they concentrate on?

How much operational support would they require from us? (Money, intelligence support)

How large are their capabilities: types of material that they can present, how thoroughly can they be expected to cover the field they are assigned? How many former inmates can they contact? 100? 200? 500?

Do they have U. S. State Department representatives in their areas to which they can turn, who would assist them in complying with all the regulations and requirements, which must be met to be accepted by the Economic and Social Council as a group which will present testimony. (It might be best if we obtained a sort of form application, which we could disseminate to the field, where necessary.)

The choosing of the organization must be done at an early date. Applications were to be in on the 31st of March, but State is certain that if they are submitted without undue delay (by mid-May) they would be accepted.

SECRET
SECRET

25 April 1952


MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division
SUBJECT: Continuance of Project FJSCOPE

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 21 April 1952 regarding the desirability of continuing Project FJSCOPE, which provides a monthly allotment of \$75.00 to [redacted] for services rendered to this division.
2. Although [redacted] is used as a consultant for SK, he is called upon from time to time to furnish information outside his capacity of consultant which would not justify the payment of consultant fees.
3. It is felt that the monthly stipend of \$75.00 covers these extra activities, and we should like to have Project FJSCOPE continued.

[redacted]
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

orig to [redacted]
2 May 1952

SECRET



SECRET



SECRET

SECRET

24 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contact Division, OO

SUBJECT: Your Memorandum 29 February 1952 on "Hungarian
Exile Activities"

I was interested in your report on Nagy and his efforts to set up a Hungarian Government-in-Exile. I note in paragraph 5 that you say your contact is hoping to receive more information from them. Since I think this situation has been cleared up by other events, I would not want you to press your contact to stir Nagy to further action by a request for more information. If, however, Nagy does give you more information, we should very much like to see it.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

OW:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - OOD/OPC
1 cc - IO/DMIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALTER D. DODD
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: State Department Paper on "The Functions of RCFE
and RFE"

1. Thank you for forwarding to us the State Department memorandum on the functions of RCFE and RFE. I am sorry that there has been a delay in replying to it. The chief reason has been our efforts to obtain a written statement of position from the RCFE Executive Board, and particularly from Robert Lang, the Director of RFE. After long considering the matter, Lang has expressed a desire to talk personally with you about the subject, and I understand that since the elapsed time he has had one opportunity for a conference with you on the problem. I agree with the view you expressed to him -- that there ought to be further conferences -- but nevertheless want you to know our own views without further delay.


2. I think that there is a basic element of misunderstanding in the State Department paper. That is the idea which seems to me to be implicit in it that the exiles do not broadcast. In fact, the exiles do all the broadcasting. By and large, these men are not political figures but technicians, writers and newsmen having somewhat the same training and point of view as those who do similar work for American companies. Frequently, also, exile leaders from within the National Councils are asked to make personal broadcasts. This practice will continue. All in all, so great is the exile domination of RFE broadcasts that in many instances these broadcasts have taken on the tone and coloration of indigenous radio in the countries to which they are aimed. Wherever possible, that is the aim of RFE -- to compete within each country as an indigenous national station.

3. In addition, even allowing, however, for this misunderstanding, as I believe it to be, the State Department paper presents a point of view with which I cannot agree. This is that the National Councils could in practice be placed in charge of RFE. I am almost

SECRET

certain they could not be. No statement made by RFP, no line of policy that RFP could pursue, no suggestion or propaganda line that RFP could follow could be done in the name of the National Councils so long as the members of each Council are incapable of reaching a group decision or of reaching a majority decision which the minority would not attempt to subvert. It seems to me that there is only historical value in talking about what the original concept of the National Councils was. The concept has changed, and the change was necessary to correspond to the fact. The fact is the inability of each National Council to speak as a single voice.

b. Without further discussion, therefore, I am unprepared to ask RFP to make a major change in its policy such as the State Department paper suggests. I understand that you and Mr. Gorden have agreed with Admiral Miller and Mr. Long to discuss this problem thoroughly with the people who are concerned in the State Department and I hope that after these discussions we may reach an agreement on the matters which the paper raises.



CIC:Tab/eh
(24 Apr 52)

Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 cc - S.R. (1 for EU/1)
1 cc - ADM C
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/EDMIC
1 cc - IT/ORG
1 cc - SE/CIC
2 cc - RI

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert V. Joyce
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Testimony of Adolph A. Berle, Jr.
on behalf of Nicolas Kalaza

1. Thank you for your memorandum of 14 March 1952 transmitting to us Mr. Campbell's memorandum of 13 March regarding the testimony of Adolph A. Berle Jr. on behalf of Nicolas Kalaza. This is to inform you that we are in complete agreement with the views which you and Mr. Campbell have expressed.

2. We feel that it is indeed most regrettable that Mr. Berle in his testimony made certain remarks offensive to the Cretzianu-Vissianu group. In March, Mr. Grew received Mr. Cretzianu in an attempt to disclaim any responsibility on the part of W.P.A. for Mr. Berle's statements and also to persuade Mr. Cretzianu that Mr. Berle had spoken in a private capacity and as attorney to Mr. Kalaza. This interview was followed by a letter from Mr. Grew to Mr. Cretzianu on 26 March, in which these same views were set forth.

3. We shall make a serious attempt to prevent the occurrence of such incidents in the future. We are returning your file as you requested.

THOMAS W. BRYEN

Enclosure

CIO/T-2/H V:113 (17/4, re-typed 21/4)

Distributions:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CIO
1 - IO/DTO
1 - AEC
1 - W.P.A.
2 - RI
1 - CIP

15 March

NBV

Mr Dallas told me this am
that Critzmann sent a copy of this
testimony to Mr Brew together
with a letter inquiring "how come?" -
Brew & Alvo dined yesterday
& agreed that Beale was way off
base and Brew is preparing a
letter to Critzmann telling him that
Beale had no right to attack C.
as he did; a ^{draft} copy of this letter
will go to Beale prior to mailing
for his comments.

As Alvo put it to me - "It's
in the books & there's nothing more
for us to do about it at this time" -

[Have in Ashburne the above]
by H. me.

1. March 52

[redacted] C/SE/PC5
X 3091, X 495 brought this
in today. He said that the
DD/P is concerned about it.

[redacted] was not in, but called
in at 5 and was transferred
to [redacted].

[redacted] stated that


Malaya is a Rumanian industrialist,
a crook and an opportunist, who
cooperated with the Communists
and supported the Nazis. (Said) OEO
files is in progress and will be in
[redacted] hands.) Berle's
unilateral action (~~at~~ identifying
NCFE with this cause) involves a
violation of state policy, will stir up the
evils who will think this does

represent US policy—and is generally very bad.

What appears needed is:

- (a) High-level rapping of Berle's knuckles
- (b) Official denial or
- (c) NCFE denial of this as NCFE position

P.S. Berle is wrong in identifying Malaya as a partisan of Radescu.



17 March

Mr. Braden:

This is another example of interference and partiality on the part of NCFE.

Mr. Berle had 1) no right in testifying in this case and 2) no business endorsing the Radescu faction as against the Cretzianu-Visolianu Group.

[redacted] would like the document back today, room 1201 J.

[redacted]

SECRET

Security Information

2-7043

MAR 20 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Testimony of Adolph A. Berle, Jr., on behalf of
Nicolae Malaxa; Complaint of the State Department.

1. Please note the attached memoranda from Bob Joyce and John Campbell, dated March 14 and March 13, respectively. Will you please prepare a brief memorandum for Messrs. Joyce and Campbell informing them that we are in complete agreement with their views concerning Adolph Berle's statements, and moreover that action has been taken to inform the Cretsianu-Visoianu group that Mr. Berle had no right whatsoever to make remarks of this kind in his capacity as a member of the Board of NCFE. You can obtain the details of what has been said from [redacted] and Mr. Dulles in order to strengthen and round out your memorandum to Messrs. Joyce and Campbell. (It is my understanding that [redacted] received Mr. Cretsianu for the purpose of denying any responsibility on the part of NCFE for Mr. Berle's remarks, which he made in his private capacity and incidentally as attorney for Malaxa.) Will you please let Mr. Horton see the memorandum which you write to Messrs. Joyce and Campbell.

2. For your information, I have recently been informed by a very knowledgeable Rumanian that, in his opinion, some good has resulted out of this highly improper and messy business of Berle's. This Berle attack on Cretsianu was partially responsible, in the judgment of my informant, for Cretsianu's sudden turn-about and agreement to shake hands with and sit down beside Messrs. Gafencu and Davila. "It's an ill wind ...", etc.

Although the following question may not be entirely in your field, I should appreciate your getting up a statement for my information concerning the present status of and our proposed future use, if any, of [redacted]. I have just heard through the grapevine that he considers his usefulness to us at an end and that he is severing all connection with this Agency. This disturbs me, as I consider Mr. [redacted] to be an intelligent and able man who has already gained enough experience in our line of endeavor to be of value to us. If my information is by any chance correct, then I do not understand why we so lightly cast him aside. I hope that I am wrong and that he may be severing official connections only to continue his work in a more subtle manner.

(SIGNED) FRANK G. WIMMER

SECRET

Frank G. Wimmer

cc: DRY
ADPC
C/SX

Attachment: Described memoranda and transcript of Berle testimony.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

In reply refer to: W-2003

18 April 1952

Dear Min:

When you were here Wednesday, you handed me a letter from Michael E. Thompson about General Henryey.

I have looked into this and find that Thompson promised on his last trip to Washington that he would give us certain facts about Henryey's new visa application which were necessary when the old visa application expired on 21 March. We never have received these facts from Thompson.

Will you kindly, therefore, ask Thompson to get together for you the facts on the new visa application -- its number, where it was made, etc. -- and we will go ahead and act as we said we would. We can't act without them.

Sincerely,

CIO/TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/Exec Off.
2 cc - CIO
2 cc - HI

TWB Mentioned above to Adm. Miller by
telephone on 17 Apr 52.

eh

SECRET

April 15, 1952

Dear Oliver:

When I last saw you, I spoke of the General Hennyey matter explaining the great importance that the Fund places on expediting the arrival of General Hennyey in this country for Fund purposes. I later mentioned this matter in detail to one of your liaison associates who has these matters in hand. I explained that it is considered imperative that all possible assistance be developed looking toward the sponsored arrival of General Hennyey in the shortest possible time. I now refer you to our letter of March 2, 1952, which I delivered in person to Mr. Abramson. That letter contains all of the necessary data for action in the case.

We have just been informed that the unconscionable delay in the processing and approval of General Hennyey's entry presently will be made the subject of public protest by elements of the Hungarian National Council. The details of this situation will be more fully explained by Leonard L. Stamm who will hand you this letter. For your convenience, I am attaching a copy of our letter of March 2 above cited, and I would further state that we believe that extraordinary action should be taken to affect the immediate processing of General Hennyey by entry permit or otherwise. Our representatives in Munich are in daily contact with General Hennyey and can be of particular assistance in the event you desire to use extraordinary means to expedite his departure for the United States.

Sincerely,

Michael E. Thompson

COPY

March 2, 1952

Dear Mr. Minetti:

General Gustav Henney is Representative of the Hungarian National Council in Western Germany and a person in whom the Fund places trust and confidence in its dealings with the problems of the Hungarian National Council. The Fund has been desirous for some time that General Henney come to the United States, and believes that his visit here would be most helpful to the present activities and future of the Hungarian National Council.

An opportunity presented itself last fall for General Henney to emigrate to the United States as a displaced person. He was granted a visa by the Consul General in Munich on November 21, 1951, EC Number 25611, D.P. Commission Validation Number A-7037, Sponsor Mr. Louis Rado, 182 Main Street, Poughkeepsie, New York. Subsequent to the issuance of his visa his file was sent by the local representative of the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Services in Munich to the Office of the Attorney General in Washington for special consideration under No. 3-CFR 17557. Neither General Henney nor the National Council have been able to determine why his case has been held in suspense, by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Indeed, in response to one inquiry General Henney was told that the file in question had been lost. As stated above, the Fund attaches great importance to General Henney's visit to the United States, and considers this visit to be of high operational importance, since it will deeply affect the work of the Hungarian National Council. We shall be very grateful for any assistance which you can render in the expedition of the decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. I may add that General Henney's visa will expire on the 21st of this month, and he also will lose his rights owing to the expiration of the Displaced Persons Act in the near future should he not be able to emigrate promptly.

Sincerely yours,

Abm. Miller


Notes:

1. Liaison associate is
Bill Knott, Alien
Control Chief. —
Security Branch.

2. 92:
Bela Fabian of the
Hungarian Nat. Council
is about to write a
rough letter to the
NY Times.

Thm.

SECRET



SECRET

Executed by [redacted]
28530

17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Conference at Princeton Inn

You asked me to remind you of Admiral Miller's request that you speak to [redacted] about his attendance at Admiral Miller's proposed conference at the Princeton Inn on Saturday, 10 May at 10:30 AM. You will recall Admiral Miller's mention of the fact that the idea of the conference is attributed to [redacted] dating back to a luncheon conversation that he had in Paris with C. D. Jackson and the Admiral.

Tom Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

CI0:TB/en

Orig - DDGI
2 cc - CI0
2 cc - ZI

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

SUBJECT: Bulgarian National Committee

1. This is to confirm our oral report to you of the President of NCFE's report to us of his 15 April 1952 conference with Dimitrov on this subject.

2. Admiral Miller reported that he had presented the agreed upon plan to Dimitrov, ~~without~~ threatening to cut off funds. Dimitrov's first reaction was that the plan was a maneuver to oust Dimitrov. The end result, however, was that Dimitrov was to think the plan over and give his views on it in return. It was further suggested that a council meeting would be held on 30 April or as soon thereafter as possible. However, Admiral Miller stated that this meeting would probably not occur before mid-May, since the two members coming from Paris would probably not arrive before that time. A quorum would not be possible without them.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO/NBV:bw

Distributions:

Addressee - original
CIO - 1
IO/DOO - 1
IO/Ex.Asst. - 1
RI - 2

SECRET

17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Reports of [redacted]

1. Almost without exception, the [redacted] reports, of which thirteen have been examined to date, duplicate reports already received, but do not contain as much information as the reports being obtained from other sources or from the same sources as those used by [redacted]. Of the reports, only one has been disseminated. The Department of State's comment on that report was that a similar one had been received.

2. For your convenience, a brief analysis of the thirteen reports is presented below:

Hungary

1. Csapl Arsenal in Hungary

Comment: This report, consisting of a list of names of directors or top officials in various Hungarian industrial enterprises, was considered of marginal value. The persons listed were identified with overt positions and have been mentioned in a number of overt Hungarian publications.

2. Report on the Activities of the Hungarian Embassy and Consulate in Paris.

3. Report on Hungarian Socialist Group in France.

Comment: Information is thin and overt. These reports duplicate in part reports already received in greater detail.

This material probably comes from persons who have contact or knowledge of the Hungarian Legation, but who have not actually "penetrated" the Legation.

4. Survey of Political Conditions in Hungary from 1951 through the Early Part of 1952.

Comment: Frankly overt material, obtained (or could have been obtained) from a close reading of published material. Of marginal value as representing the viewpoints of former Hungarian industrialists.

Note to DDCI: I just talked to Min Miller about the [redacted] situation. He would like to withdraw his objections to his overt use of [redacted].

SECRET

5. Hungary's Productive Capacity in Relation to Hungarian Plan for 1952.

Comment: Report was thin. Information on mines and factories was already known.

Overall Comment: Continuation of reports similar to the above is not recommended.

Poland

1. Polish Industry Gears for War Production.
2. Polish Coal Production.
3. Poland is Preparing Reserve Industrial Staff with Knowledge of Languages.
4. Report on Poland.

Comment on the 4 reports:

Most, if not all of this information, had been previously received through our regular channels.

The material is not disseminated to customer agencies who have overt access thereto.

5. WIN Report

Comment: A verbatim extract (42 pages) of a 100 page report which we had already received. (In this connection, please note CIE's memorandum of 28 January 1952, which is attached).

Rumania

1. Admiral Cadre School in Bucharest

Comment: Evaluation here F3. Evaluation by State A2, but State had previously received the information.

Estonia

1. Elections of People's Judges and Lay Assessors in Estonia.
2. Some More Important Developments in Soviet Estonia in 1951.

Comment: These reports duplicate information we have received. This is true, primarily because [redacted] is the source. [redacted] is also used by Mr. Angleton, and is on [redacted] payroll.

SECRET

Sweden

1. Soviet Propaganda in Sweden

Comment: This report is also a duplicate. (See preceding comment).

THOMAS W. IRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Distributions:

Addressee - original

NE - 1

EE/SO - 1

EE/TC - 1

SE - 1

GIO - 1


IO/DOO - 1

RI - 2

7 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT:



2. On 2 April, Admiral Miller stated that work was absolutely worthless as far as NCFE and RFL were concerned.

intelligence reports have been evaluated as having practically no usefulness; and, as you know, in his intelligence "gathering", he has crossed some of EE's wires. In both OFC and OSO, there is such suspicion of that no one has been willing to give him direct guidance for fear that it would merely enlarge knowledge of our operations.

3. When returns, my recommendation is that we tell him that while we may discontinue support to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, we feel that, since we have a Paris NCFE representative, we should use this channel—or some other channel not involving additional expense.

4. Meanwhile, since the ICFTU in exile is of primary interest to EE, and of some interest to SE and WE, I have asked Mr. Brose, Mr. Horton, and Mr. Scott their views on continued support to the organization and, after a go-round with them, I will send up a further report to you.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO/KSV:bw

Distribution:

Addressee - original

CIO - 1

IO/DOIO - 1 ✓

RI - 2

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET


In reply refer to: W-1999
S
16 April 1952

Dear Min:

We have a 2 April report from our friends across the street documenting certain criticisms which Mr. Visoianu has made of NCFE. Some of this criticism stems directly, I believe, from his reaction to Mr. Ferle's testimony in the Malaxa case. Another of his complaints stems from the appointment of Comarnicuiu to a position with the Free Europe University at Strasbourg.

This report raises several questions with me. I should consider it a great favor if you would have prepared for me a review of the whole Rumanian National Committee as to factions, alignments and with recommendations regarding what might be done to improve the Rumanian Committee.

Sincerely,



CIO/NBV:bw

Distributions:

Addressee - original
CIO - 1
IO/Admin. Off. - 1
IO/DOTO - 1 ←
RI - 2

SECRET

April 2, 1952

Mr. Visoianu called at his request to inform us of the highlights of his recent trip to Europe. He had first attended the meeting of the Eastern European Section of the European Movement in London, then visited France, Germany and Italy.

Mr. Visoianu said that in Germany he had talked with Chancellor Adenauer, Secretary of State Hallstein, and other officials of the Bonn Government, as well as with Mr. Rober and other Allied officials. He said that the Germans were sympathetic to his discussion of Rumanian affairs and showed some interest in the problems of Eastern Europe. They, emphasized, however, that Germany's present position did not enable them to speak in terms of any positive policy at this time. Mr. Visoianu got the impression that the Germans were now, and would be in the future, even more actively interested in Rumania and other Eastern European countries than were France and Italy. Mr. Visoianu felt that France had completely abdicated its position in Eastern Europe and was entirely wrapped up in its own domestic problems and relations with Germany.

Mr. Visoianu also discussed in Germany the question of Rumanian refugees there (most of whom are Iron Guardists) and of the rather large community of Volksdeutsche who came to Germany from Rumania at the close of the war. He said that the German authorities would like to have this group returned to Rumania at such time as the country might be liberated, both because they contributed to Germany's over-population problem and because they would represent, as they have in the past, a possible instrument for German policy in Rumania. As a Rumanian, Mr. Visoianu was not over anxious to add to the numbers of the German minority but felt that a free Rumanian Government would not deny the right of return to those who wished to do so.

Mr. Visoianu talked at length with Mr. Tyler in Paris. He retains his distrust and dislike of the NCFE, which he says can never assist effectively in bringing about unity in the Rumanian emigration since it supports one group 100% and persecutes the other group 100%. He was particularly incensed about Mr. Barle's recent intervention in the Malaxa case. He said that he regarded the situation as having very serious implications not only for the emigres but also for the future of the country itself. He denounced Radescu's conduct, giving numerous examples, as detrimental to the true interest of Rumania. One of his more specific complaints against the NCFE was the appointment of Comarniciu as head tutor (or some such title) at the Free Europe University in Strasbourg. He said that Comarniciu had no education and no qualifications for the post but was there merely because he was of the Radescu faction which NCFE favored.

Mr. Visoianu saw King Michael in England but he did not indicate whether there were any new developments with respect to the King's position toward the present disunity in the Rumanian emigration.

STATE OF
MISSISSIPPI



In reply refer to: W-1984
15 April 1952

Dear Min:

One of your employees, Miron Esterin, prior to accepting employment with your firm, was interviewed by us. With your permission we should like to continue processing papers for his employment. If you wish to keep him, we should like to know that so that we can close out the case.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

CIO:NBV/eh

Orig - Addressee
2 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/Ex.Off.
2 cc - RI

SECRET

COPY

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

SE/PC

NO.

DATE

10 Apr 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RCD	FWD		
1. CIO			12 Apr	TWB	Forwarded per your request of 2 April 1952.
2. DD/P			16 Apr	CVH	TWB
2. ADPC				CDGB	Noted - I hope we have heard the last of complaints about this lovely handled affair from RFE, NCFE, Embassy Attache etc. etc. etc. I regret what I have said before -
4. CIO				TWB per NBV	
5. SE/PC					
6.					
6.					FGW 12 April 52
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

Tom: 10 April


I think if I
were you I would
forward this to
DDP with a note
on cover sheet:

Forwarded per
your request of
9 April 1952
JWB done 12 Apr 52

Note para 10. FGW will
investigate the main trouble.
n.


SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

13 APR 1969



SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

10 APR 1962




SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION


Distribution:
Addressee - Orig. & 1

SECRET


SECURITY INFORMATION




SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



ATCUDOTY HCFBAMAMAM




SECRET



SECRET




SECRET




SECRET



SECRET



SECRET



SECRET 3147

P-582

L-217

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

2-7861

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

20/959

FROM:

CIO

NO.

68829

DATE

8 April 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECD	FWD		
1. DD/P Col. Taylor.		10 April		WJF	_____
2. SECRET					_____
3. ER				AG	_____
4. CPY/OPC					_____
5. DCPH		17 April	18 April	JMK	_____
6. C-20					Mr. Brewer: George: FBI asks that you attempt to get from State the information which Tom Braden asks for. He asks that I bring to your attention the following 2 points: a. The Director does not feel it would be advisable to launch any balloon operations until after the Ph campaign has died down a bit.
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					TD P. Taylor, 3rd
13.					566- Co for m tk - JMK
14.					I will call O'Neave
15.					

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Report
2-7861

8 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Letter from Admiral Miller

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Min Miller in which he suggests the necessity of coming to a definite decision in respect to a future balloon operation.
2. Can you take the time to get a policy decision from the State Department as to (a) whether they wish to have a balloon operation in August or at any subsequent date, and (b) whether they want us to set aside funds and materials now for a future balloon operation at some unspecified time?


Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Ltr from Adm Miller 1 Apr 52.

CIO: TSB/eh

Orig - Addressees
1 cc - ADPC
2 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET



SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

28 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, KE-2

SUBJECT: Future Balloon Operation

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Min Miller in which he suggests the necessity of coming to a definite decision in respect to a future balloon operation.
2. Will you advise me as to (a) whether you wish to have a balloon operation in August or at any subsequent date, and (b) whether you want us to set aside funds and materials now for a future balloon operation at some unspecified time.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Ltr from Min Miller
dtd 1 Apr 52.

CIO:TWB/eh


Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TOMIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET



14-00000
C
O
Y

Jim Bart



SECRET

Security Information

ER-2-7715

5 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

FROM : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : National Committee for a Free Europe - Radio Free Europe - Miscellaneous Recommendations for Action

REFERENCE : Memorandum from C/IO to D/DCI, DD/P and ADPC dated 27 March 1952

1. I have read the reference memorandum which I note contains quite a number of recommendations for action, some of which apply to the undersigned.

2. I would like to participate in the Princeton bull session but believe it unnecessary for CIA to be represented by so many people. If Mr. Dulles is going I should prefer to drop out. A further reason for reluctance on my part to attend this meeting is that I have already passed on to the NCFE people interested all of the ideas and information which I have on the principal theme of this discussion. I therefore feel that,

[Redacted]

[Redacted] I would have nothing new to contribute. However, if Mr. Dulles is unable to attend and you feel that I should go, I would be willing to do so.

3. Concerning your report of Frank Altschul's feeling of grievance, I should be glad to sign a letter to him if Mr. Dulles agrees that I am the proper person to do this. Pending Mr. Dulles' consideration of this matter, will you please prepare in draft form for my signature a friendly letter to Mr. Altschul in which you might comment upon the fact that NCFE-RFE now represents one of the most potent weapons in our entire arsenal, and following with an acknowledgment of the very important contribution which Mr. Altschul made toward the development and shaping of this instrument.

*1 - will
you do
this -*

*Overlooked & belatedly sent by
Mr. Dulles' letter 31 March 52
a copy of which
you have.*

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

4. I am somewhat confused by the contents of the action paragraph following paragraph 3, in which you indicate that we

[Redacted]

Perhaps this paragraph of the reference memorandum has been overtaken by events. —

yes.

[Redacted]

1 N.B.V.

Done
Frank G. Wisner
FRANK G. WISNER

cc: DDCI (with reference memorandum)

SECRET
Security Information

This comes up
at PRC - or
is scheduled on
Friday. After
that, we need
to advise Admiral
to apply to 1848
- if PRC
approves, that is

M.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
PROCEDURE
FOR
TPEMEDIC TRANSFERS

2 APRIL 52

- Step 1.
- a. Facility (TPTONIC, PILLAR or what have you) sends letter of request to MEDIC.
 - b. Facility sends certified true copy of request (1a.) to IO (via area division involved if not for TPTONIC as set forth in Step 2 below).
- Step 2. FOR TPTONIC only (Includes BGCAREBOX)
- a. IO prepares letter for ADFC's signature, addressed to MEDIC, authorizing MEDIC to transfer funds requested by TONIC to TONIC on basis of 1a. above if request is in order.
 - b. MEDIC receives letter of authority (2a.).
 - c. MEDIC transfers funds to TONIC on basis of 2b. and at the same time prepares a letter of transmittal addressed to TONIC, copy to IO.
 - d. TONIC, upon receipt of funds from MEDIC (2c.), prepares a letter of acknowledgment addressed to MEDIC, certified true copy to IO.
 - e. IO prepares letter addressed to CFD, signed by IO, transmitting receipts 2d. together with certified true copy of letter 2a. (See 2f below).
 - f. IO prepares letter addressed to CFD, signed by CIO, requesting CFD to reimburse MEDIC for the total amount of receipts 2e. Note: Letters 2e and 2f are hand carried to CFD together.
 - g. CFD, on basis of 2f transfers funds to MEDIC.
 - h. MEDIC acknowledges receipt of 2g by letter to IO.
- Step 3. FOR OTHER THAN TPTONIC and BGCAREBOX (after Step 1)
- a. Area division authorizes CFD to transfer funds from "XXX" Project to MEDIC for transfer to facility by letter, signed by appropriate area division chief. (Note: This letter comes to IO whose responsibility it is to determine that funds are available in "XXX" Project).

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Step 3. FOR OTHER THAN TPTOMIC AND BGCARBOX (CONTINUED)

- b. IO prepares letter to CFD with letter 3a attached for ADPC's signature requesting CFD to transfer funds to MEDIC. (See 3c. below).
- c. At same time letter 3b. is prepared, a letter for ADPC's signature is prepared by IO authorizing MEDIC to transmit the funds to facility (addressed to MEDIC).
- d. MEDIC receives letter of authority 3c.
- e. MEDIC acknowledges receipt of funds which CFD transmits (3b)
- f. MEDIC transfers funds to facility on basis of 3d and at the same time sends letter of transmittal to facility, copy to IO.
- g. Facility, upon receipt of funds from MEDIC, prepares a letter, addressed to MEDIC, acknowledging receipt of funds 3f., certified true copy to IO. (See 1b.)
- h. IO upon receipt of letter 3g. prepares letter addressed to CFD and transmits same together with copy of letter (certified true copy) 3c.

NOTE: It will be the responsibility of the Administrative Office/IO to verify that funds are in fact allotted for each project before preparing the above papers.

PAM

Distribution:

EXO/IO - Original
Adm O/IO - 1 copy
FY/ - 1 copy

SECRET

Provisions of Proposed Agreement Between NSAF and CIA

It is proposed that an agreement which will include the following be entered into by NSAF and CIA.

1. A statement to the effect that subject to the security, program, budgetary, and policy controls with the veto authority of CIA set forth below, NSAF has administrative and operational responsibility for the conduct of its operations.
2. A provision that NSAF will submit to CIA an annual operating plan and supporting budget for the programs which it plans to undertake during each fiscal year. The approval of such operating program and budget by CIA will include authority to NSAF to proceed as necessary in their judgment to accomplish the objectives set forth in the approved program, subject to controls set forth below.
3. A provision that NSAF will maintain adequate accounting and fiscal controls.
4. A provision that NSAF will undertake only those programs which have been approved by CIA.
5. A provision that CIA will provide funds to NSAF for approved programs.
6. A provision that CIA will furnish national policy guidance to NSAF for the conduct of such programs and that NSAF will conform to such policy.
7. A provision that NSAF will conform to security regulations to be prescribed by CIA. These will include the security clearance of necessary personnel, obtaining of security agreements from all visiting personnel, and necessary physical security measures.
8. A provision to the effect that the general organizational structure and salary scales including allowances will be approved by CIA.
9. A provision that the president and vice-presidents of NSAF will be employed subject to the concurrence of CIA.

SECRET INFORMATION

SECRET

10. A provision that CIA will have veto authority over activities to be undertaken by NCFE which are contrary to other CIA or national policies. *(as reported that this would allow CIA to veto)*
11. A provision with respect to the termination of operations under this agreement.
12. A provision with respect to indemnification of NCFE directors, officers, and employees by CIA.
13. A provision that defines the liability of NCFE to each director, officer, and employee of NCFE.
14. A provision to the effect that NCFE will provide CIA with regular progress and financial reports.
15. A provision that CIA will have authority to conduct such surveys and audits of NCFE activities as it deems necessary.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE

Problem

To clarify the relationship of NCFE to CIA and the respective responsibilities and authorities of each for the conduct of NCFE operations.

Background

There is no currently effective clear statement as to the respective responsibilities and authorities of NCFE and CIA for the conduct of operations. This has resulted in a number of misunderstandings and problems with respect to the administration of this project by CIA.

Discussion


In order to define the respective responsibilities and authorities of NCFE and CIA, it is proposed that an agreement be entered into between NCFE and CIA which will in effect provide for:

- a. Policy, program, budgetary, security control, and veto power by CIA.
- b. Subject to such general controls direct administrative and operational control over its operations by NCFE.
- c. The working out of machinery for submitting annual operating programs and supporting budgets by NCFE for approval by CIA (and major subsequent additions thereto)
- d. Adequate progress, financial, and other reports by NCFE to CIA.

An outline of the principal provisions of such an agreement is set forth in Attachment A.

It is the consensus of all concerned in CIA that something like the above is essential. There is one technical point of difference, however, between the ID Division and the Administrative Staff Council. This is the matter of a CIA regulation (Memorandum for All Staff and Division Chiefs

SECRET



The office of the General Counsel, CIA, has indicated informally that there is no legal objection to such an agreement between NSP and CIA. He also concurs informally that one contract between NSP and CIA is preferable

Recommendation

1. It is therefore recommended that the IO Division be authorized to negotiate an agreement with NSP in coordination with the office of General Counsel and other CIA units which will incorporate the substance of the provisions in Attachment A.




SECRET

Mr Broderick —

At Post - here's the answer to the Staff Paper on RFE. Sorry for the delay. Please let us know if it's OK w. you —

I do think that our differences w. State on this is very basic — and that we can't continue to operate on 2 different premises. Maybe this should be flushed out in a high level policy meeting.



SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

C
O
P
Y

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Joyce

January 23, 1952.

FROM:

EE -

The Functions of NCFE and RFE

In our experience with NCFE and RFE two interpretations of their functions, between which the pendulum swings from time to time, have developed. One which is set forth in the paper in the mission of NCFE and RFE, gives dignity and importance to the National Councils as the leadership organs of the Eastern European peoples in their struggle against the respective Communist dictatorships and defines the principal function of RFE as providing a way of communication between these councils and the homelands in conducting the liberation struggle. In the other view, which tends to govern RFE operations at the present time, the RFE is apparently considered a predominantly American enterprise with the objective of achieving a bigger, better, more hard-hitting, and more publicized propaganda program than the VOA but not differing fundamentally from the character and course that VOA has already marked out. The latter interpretation reduces the position of exiles connected with the RFE to that of professional employees engaged by the Americans, and the National Councils are given no direct responsibilities.

As between these two theses, EE agrees generally with the first. If RFE continues along its present course it will in our opinion become in the end simply another VOA (in fact the programming of the two organizations tends already to seek a common denominator) and disappoint the exiles and the peoples in their homelands. This will lead to competitive issues with VOA as is already the case with the Baltic language programs. If RFE is to achieve its first promise and full justification it must become the Voice of Eastern European freedom speaking through the mouths of the Eastern European leaders themselves.

EE believes that unless the RFE broadcasts are made in the name of the National Councils and the free exile leaders of Eastern Europe can speak regularly to their people by this medium the National Councils will never become more than creatures of arrested development and, deprived of the possibility of realizing one of their most important functions, will preoccupy themselves with sterile partisan rivalry and internal differences.

As the reference memorandum points out, if the National Councils are to assume this important responsibility in relation to the RFE they must become effective organizations. EE likewise agrees that the

SECRET

- 2 -

Hungarian National Council, being the only National Council which is active in any degree as a unified and effective leadership group, should be given the proposed RFE responsibilities at once and that as soon as the other national groups become effective organizations RFE facilities should be made available to them.

Such a course raises two problems which do not seem sufficiently treated in the reference paper, namely (1) the means of bringing about the formation of unified and effective National Councils, and (2) the extent and character of supervision to be exercised over National Councils once they undertake RFE activities.

EE concurs that NCFE should devote itself as a priority and primary function to fostering the creation of effective National Councils. The reference paper suggests that to this end NCFE give more attention to the problem and take more positive measures in the nature of intervention in assisting the national groups to solve their difficulties. It seems to EE that by the very nature of the arrangement whereby the National Councils operate in the American milieu and receive financial assistance from the NCFE intervention is inevitable and that the NCFE has not refrained from intervening. The problem apparently is not whether the NCFE should intervene in the affairs of the National Councils but what kind of intervention should prevail. EE continues to believe that the ideal situation obtains when a National Council operates effectively with the least possible intervention, and that a national group should be encouraged to achieve effective organization and operations through its own efforts. Excessive intervention and certain types of intervention can produce such harm as to defeat the very purpose we seek to realize, that is, the development of strong, dignified, and important leadership organizations to conduct the national liberation effort from abroad. The wrong types of intervention inimical to this objective include actions which are widely construed as (1) being in favor of, or in opposition to, one candidate or party as against another in the organization of a National Council, (2) representing an attempt to impose a policy with respect to the future constitutional organization of a state or in relation to foreign states or foreign population groups, or (3) relegating exile leaders to a subordinate position of being employees of the Americans. Intervention of the foregoing types must be avoided by all means, yet on the other hand it is essential to assure, by intervention if necessary, that no National Council falls under dictatorial rule and that individuals are held to accountability so that our undertaking does not degenerate into simply a pensionary system for subsidizing the conduct of party politics.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

The strongest force in inducing the national exile groups to pull themselves together into some kind of unified and active councils may well be our insistence that until they do so they will not become eligible to take over the proposed RFE responsibilities. If one National Council receives access to RFE facilities this should prove an incentive to the others without our intervention to put themselves in order so that they may do the same.

As to the supervision to be exercised over the National Councils which have taken charge of the broadcasting efforts to their respective homelands, it is obvious that they will need extensive professional assistance, whether by Americans or by their own nationals, in preparing the day-to-day programs. The councils will probably wish of their own initiative, after they have discovered what daily programming involves, not to go beyond (a) policy determination as to type of programming, (b) utilization by the political and intellectual exile leaders of the opportunity to speak from time to time to their people, and (c) decision on selection of certain program items. If this assumption is correct then our controls might properly be limited to (1) providing each group a recorded outline of American foreign policy for guidance if they discuss any phase of this subject or its implications, (2) preventing partisan abuses such as the disproportionate use of the RFE by one party although making sure that the representatives of each may have access to RFE facilities if ~~not local representatives wish to take advantage of~~ party representatives so wish, and (3) conducting an ex post facto review of programs in avoiding abuses of any type. In general it would be desirable to allow the councils the maximum scope of activity and responsibility in the RFE effort they are capable of undertaking in order to nurse the health and vitality of these councils as leadership organizations in the liberation struggle.

FR:EE: [] ml
January 23, 1952

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONF TIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION AND BOTTOM)

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Mr Braden	JNB	
	WATONIC - Personnel		
3	File our office		
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1			
2			
3			

- APPROVAL INFORMATION SIGNATURE
- ACTION DIRECT REPLY RETURN
- COMMENT PREPARATION OF REPLY DISPATCH
- CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION FILE

REMARKS: Toew: Adm Mr. left this with us. We have all read. Also [] has read. He suggested that we keep - instead of his retaining it in his file. [] O.K. It's a good paper.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

April 1, 1962

MEMORANDUM

TO: Admiral Miller

FROM: Mr. Myers

Attached is presentation describing our exile personnel policy. This paper is prepared in two parts, the second part of which is not yet in type. The part delivered herewith is, I feel, a precise rebuttal of any overall uninformed criticism to which we have been subjected.

In every instance where there has been specific criticism involving individuals employed at New York or Munich we are in a position to rebut charges of Communist infiltration and to defend every member of the staff thus attacked.

Upon the impression that it is an adequate statement in writing, it can be delivered, if you so desire, to Mr. Ehrans for a study and contrast with the supposed allegations he presumably has under scrutiny. Should Ehrans ask for information of a specific nature, Part Two of this paper can then be furnished him if you wish to do so.

JEM.

NCPE EXILE PERSONNEL SELECTION IN RELATION TO
(1) EXILE POLITICS,
(2) RFE BROADCAST POLICY, AND
(3) EXTERNAL CRITICISM

- I -

INTRODUCTORY HISTORY

A. Formative Stage

At its inception, the National Committee for a Free Europe believed that its Iron Curtain broadcasting operation, Radio Free Europe, could and should be developed and pursued through the medium of "National Councils" or "Committees of Liberation" composed of exile groups from the target countries. It was considered that prominent exile leaders and personalities of each nationality group could express to their captive countrymen, entirely without American advice and guidance, the message of hope which NCPE proposed to send. This concept was not fulfilled. Experience in attempting to weld a talented, dedicated group of exiles into a non-partisan broadcasting operation early demonstrated that without American control the mission of RFE would be lost in the jungle of exile-world politics. It soon became evident that the leadership among the exiles was neither sufficiently strong nor personally willing to rise above the political cross currents, factional rivalries, and splinter-group weaknesses characteristically reminiscent of the political affairs of all Eastern European countries. These factors militated against the original plan of permitting

exiles, through their loosely organized Councils or Committees, to wholly develop, manage, and control RFE broadcasting.

Since the advent of RFE was the most important development affecting the exiles which had occurred since their flight from home, they quickly understood and applauded its implications and potential effect on their futures. Through this instrument they could once again become prominent and powerful in the affairs of the homeland; once more they could contend for place and power.

Selection of personnel for the purpose at hand quickly became a political football of rival leaders, personalities, and groups. Rightists, Leftists, Centrists, Labor Elements, and Splinter-groups argued with us for advancement of their particular personal or political views. Sponsorship of their own adherents as RFE employees through whom such views would be broadcast to their captive countrymen became the pattern of their pseudo cooperation. This pattern was followed to such an extent that ordinary progress and sensible development of our basic purpose of truly free broadcasts under exile control soon appeared to be not only impracticable, but dangerous. For example, the National Councils Division attempted to inaugurate broadcasts to Czechoslovakia under the auspices of a Czechoslovak National Council. The Council was and is made up of exile personalities of differing political views and parties. Its factions proceeded to engage in endless disputes and irreconcilable claims for control of script production and program content. Slovak "Separatists" arguing for the total independence of Slovakia

sought that objective, while Czechs desired opposite views to be aired and advocated the rebirth of pre-war Czechoslovakia. Each group sponsored and insisted upon employment of its own more or less qualified adherents upon the assumption that its special views would be thereby expressed to the captive Czechoslovak audience of RFE. Similar activities were pursued by Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Poles until the futility of permitting the exile Councils to control the destiny and broadcasting policies of RFE was made clear beyond refutation. It became tragically obvious that uncontrolled exile-world Councils and professional politicians could not agree on personnel selection or program content.

In spite of every effort to induce harmony in and obtain proper cooperation from the "Councils", "Committees", and individuals, RFE was confronted with an impasse. The alternative theory and present policy of American selection of non-political exile personnel was the only way out. It has worked. Technically qualified personnel produce properly oriented programs -- and have been doing so with documented success since July, 1950. Disappointed exile politicians, professional exile camp followers, disturbed American special pleaders, and alarmed Communist Agents all scream, snipe and snivel -- but RFE programs are doing the job.

NCFE-RFE records of this stage can be supplied by Frederic R. Delbeare, Vice-President, National Councils Division, and Robert E. Lang, Director, RFE. The current policy has the complete endorsement of these officers and of the Board of Directors of NCFE.

14-00000

B. Development Stage

Upon the collapse of the original concept of broadcasting under exile auspices, RFE necessarily utilized some exile personnel endorsed and recommended by the leaders of the various nationality groups. As technical radio facilities came into being, exiles with radio background or writing talent were required for the production of programs. This involved using individuals eminently qualified by experience to do a radio job of script writing, announcing, acting, etc., without regard for the fact that such individuals might be persona non grata with one or another political faction or leader of an exile "Council". It also involved elimination of proven inefficient, inept or unworthy individuals without regard for their exile "Council" sponsorship. In either instance criticism of RFE was predictable and indeed was always forthcoming -- often in virulent and dishonest form.

The day to day operation of RFE developed new techniques and long range plans which made it impossible to employ non-entities of no political color or conviction. The best people to produce programs in harmony with NCFE-RFE purposes and policies necessarily were persons known in their own countries for their views on domestic political affairs and their anti-Communist activities. Hard-hitting propaganda required hard-hitting personalities whose known association with RFE and its programs would add validity and significance for our captive audiences. Gradually, therefore, the nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich were staffed with tested, qualified exiles who had been

identified publicly with domestic political philosophies at issue in their own countries. Many, in fact, most of the staff people are controversial figures among their own countrymen in exactly the same way that prominent Americans are controversial in our political arena. Many indeed are members of the Councils, but are men of sufficient stature to give their primary allegiance to the non-partisan policy of RFE. The decisive factor is that there be no controversy or question about their anti-Communist convictions and records.

At this point, it must be noted that our target countries have been subject to repetitive political ferment prior to and following World War II, as well as the successive occupations of Nazi and Communist Armies.

The tempo of the times, therefore, in which these exiles have lived for the past fifteen years has been one of excitement, bitterness, recrimination, rivalries, and personal turmoil -- all stemming from both domestic and foreign struggles for power. The times have produced a bumper crop of refugee traitors, collaborators, and opportunists and at the same time have developed pure Western style democrats, true national patriots, and unselfish honest men. The exile who stood by placidly through the era is not much good, however talented, as a militant messenger of hope via RFE; exiles who were honorably active in public affairs at home, and who had radio talent were, therefore, the only kind of personnel suitable for RFE purposes.

As the necessity for American operational control of nationality desks became self-evident, the only feasible personnel policy was to

employ properly qualified individuals, regardless of exile politics. In the execution of this policy individuals who were useless were eliminated without regard for political sponsors. This process still goes on. Similarly, talented exile personalities recruited from any source were employed wherever needed. This process still goes on. Both processes are in vogue with a healthy disregard for exile political nuances and protests. Neither process is satisfactory to self-styled exile leaders since it follows that the appointment of an individual sponsored by one faction as a representative of its views, inevitably will evoke howls of rage and criticism from the opposite faction. This is an accepted fact of exile life. We have to live with it and get on with the job.

C. Summary

Our formative and development experiences evolved the present and continuing exile personnel policies of RFE. Exile desk employees, whether at New York or Munich, must respond to three tests:

- (a) Security clearance,
- (b) Endorsement of technical proficiency,
- (c) Sufficient stature to eliminate exile partisan interests from program content.

- II -

CRITERIA AND METHODS OF PERSONNEL SELECTION

A. Recruitment -- General Principles

The best source of exile personnel is referral by "non-professional" exiles themselves. Among all nationalities there are

many talented refugees who need employment and who can supply RFE's need for script writers, actors, announcers, etc. Accordingly, desk staffing has been accomplished by examining the qualifications of duly recommended individuals, whether the recommendations come from political personalities or otherwise. Selection is based on the ability of the individual to fill a need efficiently in turning out or participating in planned programs. Recruitment is determined only by ideological security, independence of exile politics, and personal ability. This is not to say that many individual exiles having decided personal convictions and well-known political records are not employed, but a positive statement is made that those exile employees who now produce RFE programs reflect the policies and guidance of RFE rather than promotion of partisan objectives and personalities.

B. Recruitment -- Detailed Procedures

The personnel complement of each RFE nationality desk is founded on a hard core of dependable individuals, usually two or three people, including the chief of the desk. "Dependability" is established by exhaustive inquiry at all available sources to establish the desirability, reliability, technical proficiency and security of the working core of the desk. Sources used are:

- (a) Exile political personalities in the United States,
- (b) Exile references of high standing and known impartiality in the United States and Overseas,
- (c) Overseas contacts and personal knowledge of our American representative in Europe. (Royall Tyler-Paris),
- (d) Checks and balances of our political advisor at Munich (W. E. Griffith),

- (e) British Broadcasting Corporation, where applicable,
- (f) Voice of America, where applicable,
- (g) Special confidential sources.

These tests having been applied, confidence is placed in these initial personalities, and particularly in the Desk Chief, to carry forward recruitment of additional personnel as needed in collaboration with the American Director of RFE (Robert E. Lang, New York), and his associate officials. The leading personalities of each desk know what is expected of them and since they respond to the established criteria, the resulting full personnel complement is a group of exiles who, notwithstanding their personal political views, are suitable and capable program production people. They meet our basic requirement of daily production of truly free and properly constructed propaganda broadcasts capable of evoking the widest possible audience response in our target countries.

In brief, the mission of RFE being conceived as a marketing problem, the best available salesmen are procured, trained, and utilized to sell the market.

C. Recruitment -- Special Security Measures

Since RFE, although a private enterprise, is by extension a collateral instrument of American national policy, special precaution is exercised to insure the ideological security of all employees, including exiles. In the case of exile personnel specifically, the

additional approval of the Personnel Director of NCFE is required before employment, either at New York or Munich. Thus, even if a proposed exile employee meets all the described criteria he may not be employed without this ultimate approval.

The Personnel Director of NCFE utilizes appropriate and dependable sources of information to determine the acceptability of personnel from a security standpoint. His sources are investigative in nature and are conclusive as to the ideological record and security acceptability of the proposed employee. In doubtful cases the Personnel Director consults with the Vice-President in Charge of the National Councils Division and with the Director of Radio Free Europe. These three officers of NCFE jointly follow a policy of rejecting candidates about whom there is the slightest doubt. It is to be clearly understood that in making decisions of this kind the conflicting interests and frantic representations of politically minded exile leaders and groups are ignored. Acceptance or rejection of candidates is wholly based on ideological security and talent value.

D. Summary

- (1) All nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich are staffed by individuals who have passed all tests described above.
- (2) All programs produced and aired by the nationality desks are checked and scrutinized by American supervisory personnel for ideological content, audience acceptance and conformity to basic NCFE-RFE policies.
- (3) These conditions have been progressively in force since July, 1950.

III

RFE POLICY GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL

A. General Comment

The programs aired by RFE are not left to whim or chance. All programs and the personnel responsible for them are controlled by a written policy manual. The manual sets forth in minute detail the position and policy of RFE on every topic beamed to our target countries. The manual is the daily guidance of all employees, both American and Exile; deviation from its rules is not permitted. Continuous scrutiny of manuscripts and resultant broadcasts is maintained by American employees to insure that there are no deviations.

The policy manual of RFE represents the considered views of the responsible officials, including the Board of Directors, of NCFE. It is a statement of the principles and purposes of NCFE expressed in operational form. It is considered and maintained as a strictly confidential document, but it is of course available for examination by any proper authority.

The policy manual is in strict conformity with current American national policies as evidenced by the following quotation from Article One:

"As a non-governmental radio station responsible to the millions of American citizens who support it, RFE cannot take a line contrary to United States Government policy or to the beliefs of the American people reflected in the Constitution of the United States and in American Institutions".

The above quotation is understood by exile personnel particularly to be a solemn injunction against ideological program content which in any way violates the letter and spirit of American policy and ideals. It is a guarantee to the American people and to our captive listeners that RFE and the men who make its programs are uncompromisingly opposed to the Communist regimes now in power in Soviet Russia and the satellite countries.

B. RFE Policy Defined by Handbook (Direct Quotations)

1. The purpose of RFE is to contribute to the liberation of the Nations imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by sustaining their morale and stimulating in them a spirit of non-cooperation with the Soviet-dominated regimes by which they are, for the time being, ruled.

2. The central characteristic of RFE is that it is the instrument of men who are engaged in fighting for freedom and justice. As such, it encourages resistance to every tyrant, great and small, in the countries it addresses. Its speakers speak ... as men of good will who seek to contribute to the elimination of old enmities and the building of an enduring European democratic order.

3. As a free forum in which exiles speak to their own people RFE is particularly dedicated to arguments by which exiles seek to persuade their listeners of the all devouring ambitions of Soviet Imperialism, the cruelty and unworkability of Communist Institutions

and the proven advantages of the democratic way of life for the worker, the peasant, the administrator, and the business and professional strata of society.


4. RFE takes counsel with exile leaders and is respectful of their views, but its policy is not designed to further the aspirations of any single exile leader or party.

5. RFE policy is further based upon acceptance of the principle that each of the liberated peoples shall be free to determine for itself the political and social institutions under which it will live once it has been liberated.


6. Finally, the following summary in the nature of a specific limitation on program content is quoted:

"It is indispensable that all concerned grasp clearly that RFE is a multi-national station established to contribute to the liberation of all the peoples it addresses, and not merely of one of those peoples. RFE policy is therefore commanded by the limitation that nothing may be said over its facilities to one national audience which will destroy the confidence in RFE of its other audiences or which is likely to induce any of its audiences to prefer communist rule to a liberation which might appear to promise domination by a neighboring people."

SECRET



SECRET



SECRET



New York
10 December 1951

Mr. James Claxton
Radio Station Continental
Panama City

Dear Sir,

Following up our talk of last summer, I believe I am now in a position to assist you in your activities to combat international communism in the Panama area. During the past few months I could not help but think of your experience with the French Unemployment after you were shut down and of how you no doubt have a personal interest in helping people in Panama whose what must be done to keep the western world free.

Unfortunately, Radio Free Europe, by the very nature of its charter, cannot engage in activities within this hemisphere. But in the course of our operation, I have been approached by a group of persons, representing an international religious denomination and several large business firms, who would like to invest in keeping our hemisphere free of the communist menace.

I am, therefore, writing to this group that they need you the sum of \$500.00 per month for an indefinite period of time which I have you submit any proposition of cost that you consider effective in explaining and working for the freedom of freedom in the area. Finally, a radio station run by a local organization would accept this contribution.

There is no reason why such a local organization should not get credit for this program, but, of course, if need arises there would be no objection to your explaining the source of the funds.

In order to satisfy its auditors, the group would appreciate receiving a monthly accounting indicating station costs, wave lengths, broadcast time, hours, costs of operation, and salaries of personnel.

Please let me hear from you, Sir, that I am not being misled in my matter which is being handled individually, and that in behalf of Radio Free Europe with which I am affiliated.

By the way, I met but better recently. He has quit a long time ago.

Let me hear whether you will be able to take this on.

Yours,

(All names except that of
Claxton are fictitious.)

12/10/51

Join: 11 April 52

Mr. Dulles has taken care of para 3. Assume we are relieved of this one. -filed BV

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED VTIAL SECRET			
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)			
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Deputy Director, Plans	<i>ASW</i>	
2	Chief, International Org.		
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	Deputy Director	A.W.D.	4/9/52
2			
3			

APPROVAL INFORMATION SIGNATURE
 ACTION DIRECT REPLY RETURN
 COMMENT PREPARATION OF REPLY DISPATCH
 CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION FILE

REMARKS: To Mr. Boardman -
This was done in
line with one of your recent

31 March 1952

Dear Frank:

I have been hoping to see you here in Washington or in New York for some time past as I want to take the opportunity to tell you how much we all appreciate the outstanding work you did in connection with NCFE. When we get together, I shall have an opportunity to express this appreciation more fully.

Meanwhile, please let me know if you plan to come to Washington and I will do the same if and when I get up to New York. Unfortunately, recently I have been tied down here with very little opportunity to see my friends in New York.

Sincerely,

Frank Altschul, Esq.
40 Wall Street
New York, N. Y.

AWD:leb
Distribution
Orig. - Add.
1 cc - Chrono
1 cc - Pers
1 cc - NCFE file

EX —

COPY

FRANK ALTSCHUL
730 Fifth Avenue
New York 19, N. Y.

Room 1701
Tel. Judson 6-5526

April 3, 1952

Dear Allen,

Thank you for your letter. I have no present intention of coming to Washington as for the past week I have been knocked out by this virus infection that has been going around. However, I look forward to seeing you whenever you find it convenient to drop in.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Frank

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
1308 - 29th Street, N.W.
Washington 7, D.C.

SECRET
Security Information

9-7715

5 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: National Committee for a Free Europe - Radio
Free Europe - Miscellaneous Recommendations for
Action

REFERENCE: Memorandum from C/PO to D/DCI, DD/P and A/PS
dated 27 March 1952

1. I have read the reference memorandum which I note contains quite a number of recommendations for action, some of which apply to the undersigned.

2. I would like to participate in the Princeton bull session but believe it unnecessary for CIA to be represented by so many people. If Mr. Dulles is going I should prefer to drop out. A further reason for reluctance on my part to attend this meeting is that I have already passed on to the NCFE people interested all of the ideas and information which I have on the principal items of this discussion. I therefore feel that,

[Redacted]

[Redacted] I would have nothing new to contribute. However, if Mr. Dulles is unable to attend and you feel that I should go, I would be willing to do so.

3. Concerning your report of Frank Altschul's feeling of grievance, I should be glad to sign a letter to him if Mr. Dulles agrees that I am the proper person to do this. Pending Mr. Dulles' consideration of this matter, will you please prepare in draft form for my signature a friendly letter to Mr. Altschul in which you might comment upon the fact that NCFE-RFE now represents one of the most potent weapons in our entire arsenal, and following with an acknowledgment of the very important contribution which Mr. Altschul made toward the development and shaping of this instrument.

✓

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

4. I am somewhat confused by the contents of the action paragraph following paragraph 3, in which you indicate that we

[Redacted]

Perhaps this paragraph of the reference memorandum has been overtaken by events.

[Redacted]

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER

cc: DDCI (with reference memorandum)

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

31 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe

1. As of April 1st, this Division plans to discontinue its routine informational support to Radio Free Europe. This support, which has been carried out by a staff of about fourteen people, originated in the necessity for RFE to have access to Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Summaries, State Department information, and other overt information which came into CIA. It became apparent sometime ago there was not enough of this material to fill out RFE broadcasts and, as you know, RFE hired the so-called stringers to do the chief news-gathering job. The information sent RFE by us has for some time been accessible to RFE directly from the agencies which publish it. Our decision to cut out this service has the concurrence of RFE and makes possible the assignment of fourteen people elsewhere.

2. To take the place of this staff, IO Division proposes to have one or two people concentrate on developing ideas and policy and theme guidance for RFE along the lines which the DDCI has suggested in conversation with us. One good man of necessary talent and experience will concentrate on this full time, pulling together matters from IY Division, State and other sources. He will continue to give RFE such intelligence summaries as can be made sterile

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressed
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/MSO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

COPY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON, W.1.

29 March 1952

Dear Allen:

This is a somewhat belated acknowledgment to your note of 7 March. I expect to be back at 15 Broad around the middle of May.

C. D. wrote me about going back on the Board of the National Committee several weeks ago, and I have told him that I am favorably disposed, but would like to defer decision until I get back and have a chance to talk with him and see what my general commitments promise to be. This is one which I should like to stay with because of my early association with you and the others in setting it up. I also was very much impressed by the layout in Portugal, which I went out to see after the Lisbon meeting.

I hope all goes well with you.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Chuck

Allen W. Dulles, Esq.
1308 29th Street, N. W.
Washington 7, D. C.
U. S. A.

Copy of this given to Nancy 14 Apr 52


14-00000
Tom: 3 Apr 52


Suggest you tel
Adm Miller in
re 28 March letter
on Eng Baker to say
there's no difficulty in
getting approval of funds
for expenses incurred
or committed


Is this right? However,
full explan of Expenses
paid as of 21 Mar 52
and of Commitments as
of 21 Mar 52 would
be helpful. (In later cases,
P.O. nos. do not identify
entries)


~~As for rest we will take
on that~~


As for the rest, we'd
be willing to work
on it, if we had
def. estimates. We
would have to
have these from
you.




































Vertical text on the left side of the page, possibly a page number or reference code, which is mostly illegible due to the scan quality.



















SECRET

SECRET

Mr. John C. Hughes,
c/o McCampbell & Co.,
40 Worth Street,
New York 13, New York.

Dear John:

My promised thoughts on a matter of our mutual concern, raised in your 28 January letter, are given in the enclosed copy of a letter being sent concurrently to Min Miller. You will note from the enclosure that Min knows we are forwarding you a copy of the letter to him. Min will certainly welcome your advice in planning the approach to the Defense Department. While the Director and I should, of course, like very much to assist in the effort to obtain the directive from Defense which Eucom explained to Lang was necessary, we feel that, for reasons of security, we should not do so initially and, for the same reason, we would rather have you carry the ball all the way, if possible.

Min will undoubtedly keep us both advised of such efforts as he and Lang shall plan, and if in the course of their negotiations, an opportunity presents itself for either the Director or me to be of assistance, you know that you may count on us to do so. A copy of this letter is also attached, in case you have an opportunity to hand it to Min.

My kindest personal regards to you.

Sincerely,

Allan W. Dulles

Attachments 2
As stated above

CIO/NEV:tw (date ?)

Distributions:
Addressee - original and 1
DDCI - 1 ✓
ER - 1
CIO - 1
RI - 2

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

34-350 FREE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS.—Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

SAR/ [redacted]

NO

DATE

27 March 1952

TO—	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. SPC/ [redacted]	R 2044		29 MAR	VK	<p>29 March 52</p> <p>[redacted] phoned me about this case a day or so ago and it seems that there is considerable pressure abuilding on the part of Mr. Scripps to be allowed to use the large balloons overtly. He is hoping to be able to get an answer to these people prior to the April 2nd meeting. Whether this is possible or not, I do not know.</p> <p>It may be that this question must be raised again with the POC since they were in on it at the beginning. Actually this may be an opportunity to have some overt agency do a job for us and the request should be evaluated on that basis.</p> <p>VK</p> <p>Uses discussed info. mail, at PSB Luncheon on March 27th. Basis: Dulles, Wisler - Faith - Sergeant Brown, Barnes - Allen</p> <p>Planned,</p> <p>EXT 765</p>
2. C-PY					
3. CIO				TWB	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

27 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPC

SUBJECT: Leaflet Balloons for use in Psychological Warfare

1. On at least four occasions Mr. William Scripps, Detroit News, directly or indirectly has approached the Government with proposals for utilization of balloons for psychological warfare. Following is a list of the dates and method of these approaches:

a. 12 October 1950 - Letter from General W. J. Donovan to DCI enclosing "Operation Ballast." On 1 November 1950 William H. Jackson responded to this memorandum to the effect that this suggested operation was being referred to the appropriate persons and suggesting a subsequent meeting with Donovan to discuss this and other matters.

b. In November 1950 as we were undertaking planning for development of balloons with General Mills, we were informed that Mr. Scripps planned a general meeting to be held in Washington to discuss balloons. Through the General Mills Washington Representative Mr. Scripps was persuaded to keep his meeting general and was informed that the various agencies of the Government had the matter under consideration and considered that it would not be in the public interest at this time to disclose the nature of their findings. Consequently, Mr. Scripps forwarded us on 1 December 1950 a proposal "The Use of Free Balloons for Load Carrying Purposes" which we acknowledged on 11 December 1950.

c. On December 26, 1950 General Smith received a letter from Blair Moody summarizing a suggestion from Mr. William Scripps for encouraging defection of Chinese Communist troops. A routine response to his letter was sent 6 January 1951 from Mr. Jackson. I believe also Mr. Moody called upon the Director in early February of 1951 to discuss use of balloons for psychological warfare. ADPC addressed a briefing memorandum to DCI on 12 February 1951, Subj: Balloons for Carrying PW Material to Soviet Areas.

2. In September 1950 the NPSB requested that CIA should represent all interested agencies of this Government and should accordingly take steps to develop, procure and stockpile an appropriate number of scientifically designed balloons for future propaganda use in conditions of international emergency. At meetings of the NPSB on 13 February 1951 and 11 June 1951 it was agreed that OPC would procure and stockpile 1,000 large leaflet balloons for use by the appropriate agency when and if such use was authorized. The Board also agreed that inquiries which the various govern-

mental agencies

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

mental agencies might receive concerning use of balloons would be answered to the effect that the matter is under continuous study by agencies of the Government but disclosure of results at this time would not be in the public interest."

3. A perusal of the NPSB minutes since June 1951 did not indicate further consideration by that group of the subject of balloons. From this we must infer that CIA still bears the responsibility of the commitment made by Mr. Wisnor for procurement.

4. For your information this research and development has been conducted for CIA by General Mills with ONR [redacted]

[redacted] continued along with ONR's program of cosmic ray research. We are obligated to ONR to deny a newspaper access to these drawings, specifications, movies and reports which bear a SECRET classification.

5. I might make one small suggestion that since Mr. Blair Moody is now a Senator and running for re-election in the next election, it might be possible to solicit his aid in bringing Mr. Scripps in line with adopted policy regarding balloons should it become necessary.



- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

601 7357

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

RDD/TSS

ACCESSION NO.

DATE RECEIVED IN S.A.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
[Redacted]	2044 K	MAR 26 1952		VK	Attached is the Memorandum for the Record mentioned in our telephone discussion 25 March 1952. Drawings and specifications of this item are in the possession of RDD, although the information is also on hand at General Mills. It carries a SECRET classification under our contractual arrangements with the U. S. Navy. Questions:
SAR				Rometh	
[Redacted]					
[Redacted]					
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					
11					
12					
13					
14					
15					

cc: C. D. England

3/18/52

TELEPHONE CALLS, WILLIAM SCRIPPS, DETROIT NEWS

CONFIDENTIAL

On 7 March, William Scripps of the Detroit News, called and asked for price estimate in lots of 100,000 of a carrier balloon system which would carry 300 pounds great distances. On discussion, it appeared that he was interested in something equivalent to our interim system, so I told him we had made a quotation on such a piece of equipment in quantities for prices in the range of \$350 a unit. This piece of equipment under the expected wind condition, should carry 150 pounds 1500 miles and deliver it with the best possible accuracy from a balloon vehicle.

I asked him if he wanted specifications, but he said he would get these later. He was working with a group who would use them to carry propoganda, and he would see us in two weeks, and then would discuss and obtain exhibits. It was pointed out to him that this equipment and polyethylene were well controlled by the government. This appeared to be no problem to him.

Scripps called again on 18 March, and asked if we could attend a luncheon in Detroit Wednesday noon, the 2nd of April, and then go on to New York for a luncheon Thursday noon. He asked that we bring along data, cost estimates, exhibits, and all sales data, as well as movies, to this meeting. I asked if this had been cleared with Abbott's friends, and he didn't appear to know what I was talking about. I told him that some clearance would have to be obtained before either the gear was shown, or before it would be permitted to leave the country. Scripps is most enthusiastic about support forthcoming to carry such an operation forward, and felt that the State Department would interpose no objections for the program planned.

Scripps asked that we confirm on 19 March whether or not you and I would be able to attend. This I promised to do. I would also like your guidance as to what course should be pursued in this. It is believed that certainly [redacted] or [redacted] should be made aware of this effort, so that we may deport ourselves accordingly. Incidentally, [redacted] will be at both meetings, in New York and Detroit. Upon asked if we had any objections, I said, "Of course not."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

20 EB
44

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

2-7693

Classified by D DCI

27 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Deputy Director (Plans)
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Conversation with Admiral Miller

I shall make a practice of bringing to your attention current matters for discussion between Admiral Miller and me, the first of which took place today and covered the following items:

1. At the suggestion of Bob Lang, seconded later by NCPE's Chairman, Joseph Grew, Admiral Miller wants to hold at the Princeton Inn on the 10th and 11th of May a general discussion of United States policy toward Iron Curtain countries, with particular emphasis upon what new lines, if any, Radio Free Europe should take. The background of this, according to Admiral Miller, is that Lang and others within RFE feel that the time is running out behind the Iron Curtain, that the people are ready for revolution and that we cannot continue much longer the "hold everything" line. They want to gather a group of experts, including Messrs. Wisner and Dulles, to discuss what policy we should now adopt.

Action

I see no reason why we shouldn't have such a general bull session and I will not attempt to discourage it unless instructed.

2. Admiral Miller recently had a talk with Frank Altschul who complained somewhat of his treatment at the hands of NCPE and CIA, saying that he had never even had so much as a word of thanks for the work he did. Miller suggested that the DDPI might want to write such a letter and that, if so, a similar letter should go to Dewitt Foote.

Action


[Redacted] I therefore suggest that the DD/P, when he finds an early opportunity to write to Altschul on some matter, mention his gratitude.

Dave
Al

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -




?

SECRET

6. On 28 January John Hughes wrote a letter to Mr. Dulles asking CIA's view of the problem of the evacuation of RFE employees in Munich and elsewhere in the event of war. He said he thought this problem was extremely important and there had been no answer to the letter.

Action

This Division received this letter last week and we are working on it. Meantime I suggest Mr. Dulles sign the attached note to John Hughes.


THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division


Attachment

Draft ltr to John Hughes.


CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - DDCI (thru DD/P & ADPC)
2 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



SECRET



SECRET

Executive Registry
2-7486

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: CIO
NO. 65441 Q-1 7347
DATE: 27 March 1952

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FORW'D		
1. ADPC		MAR 29 1952	1 April	PA 6-73 CWS	I am attaching a memorandum which I received today, the subject of which may be of general interest to you. RWB RWS
2. DD/P		2 April			
3. DDCI		4/4		Noted by O, DCI 4/4/52	
4. CIO →					Thayer for comment / clear Mr. Dulles suggests sending this to Thayer for comment REL + RAY 52
5. CIO					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Executive Summary
2-7310

25 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: EE-2
WE-3

SUBJECT: Establishment of a "Propaganda Section" in
SHAPE under Control of an Hungarian Refugee.

Summarized below is a report [redacted]
[redacted] with regard to the reported establishment under the control
of an Hungarian refugee of a "propaganda section" in SHAPE:

"The first rumors are somewhat vague with regard to a new propaganda service which will be established in Eisenhower's Headquarters. It is a Supreme Direction of propaganda as was the case during the last war. This service will comprise military sections for propaganda on the other side of the Iron Curtain including parachute activities; also sections for classic propaganda.


"According to source's information, the head of the section for the countries of Eastern Europe will be Mr. Mihaly Zoldhelyi, an Hungarian who is a Colonel of the Reserve in the French Army. Mr. Zoldhelyi, about 50 years old, has had an interesting career. He left Hungary after the first revolution, he lived several years in the United States, he enjoyed, as a socialist, support of American labor, and it was at their initiative that he joined the front in Spain. Of the left, but anti-Communist, he was one of the chiefs under the pseudonym of General Santiago. Returning to France he was interned, then liberated from the camp at the personal intervention of Jules Moch, a leading French socialist politician (recently Minister of Defense). Under the pseudonym of Major Michel, he was one of the heroes of the anti-Nazi resistance in Southern France. He appeared to be the only officer in the French Army who did not have French nationality. He is married to a Frenchwoman and has one child. He now works in Paris in the office of the Force Ouvriere. He appears to be a man of confidence to both the Americans and the French."

[redacted]

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION



SECRET

Executive Registry
2-7187

Noted by D/DCL
11/4/52 - P.B.


In reply refer to:

25 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Deputy Director (Plans)
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Attached Letter from Spencer Phoenix

Attached is a letter from Spencer Phoenix to Bob Lang in which Phoenix details the story of his efforts to reach agreement with the German authorities on the status of IGE under the new post-HQG government. I would judge that Spencer has done a wonderful job to date and that things are on the track, but I think you would be interested in reading his letter and the second attachment, which is the memorandum of understanding with the German Government on which he is now working.


THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment
Ltr 3 Mar 52 to Bob Lang.

SECRET

Paris, March 3, 1952



Dear Bob,

I have not done much reporting on our German negotiations for several reasons; first, there was not much to report and, second, whatever there was Dick Condon undertook to forward from Munich. I did write C.D. a couple of letters outlining our delays and some of our uncertainties, and last week I cabled him that I would send a more detailed narrative when I got to Paris. As he is now technically no longer President of NCFE, and as Admiral Miller may not have been completely informed of all that we are trying to do, I am addressing this to you, with copy to each of them.

In the first place, let me say that progress during the last half of last week was surprisingly speedy and encouraging. There are still many opportunities for the well known "slip 'twixt the cup and the lip", and local German political considerations could rear their ugly heads at any moment. I think it must also be understood that, as Dick Condon puts it, no matter how many nor how good written agreements we may have covering our operations, the whole RFE enterprise in Germany will have to be played pretty much by ear once the contractual agreements take effect. I regard this, however, as an inescapable risk, and I mention it now only to emphasize the paramount importance of the utmost care in programming and in conduct to avoid a borer which could upset our entire apple-cart. The very favorable report which your friend Asher Lee made after his hurried inspection of Munich underlines the need for regular spot check on program output to avoid howlers, and the need for this once our relationship with the Germans is no longer through the Occupation Authorities or HICOG is even more imperative.

Dick Condon sent you from Munich the text of the proposed Bundespost license which we agreed on with Dr. Schuster on February 19, 1952, and this should long since have reached you.

Our Bonn negotiations resulted in the acceptance of this text, with two exceptions:

- 1) Sub-clause 2 of Article II is eliminated. You will remember that the Bundespost wished to insert a provision authorizing license cancellation if RFE should broadcast anything which "it will be the opinion of the Federal Government that the transmissions will prejudice

the interest of the Federal Republic". We objected to this on two grounds:

- a) that such provision had no logical place in a technical license, and
- b) that it made our position far too precarious since it exposed us to license cancellation practically at the whim of any German bureaucrat,

and we persuaded Dr. Schuster to leave it out of the license and let us discuss the problem at Bonn. At Bonn, we were fortunately able to persuade the Foreign Office officials that such a provision had no technical place in the license, and that whatever should be said on the subject should be said in an exchange of letters, or the equivalent, between the Foreign Office and ourselves. Accordingly, Article II now contains but one clause.

2) Question was raised by the Foreign Office officials at Bonn regarding the length of the license. The text Dick sent you provides for validity until August 31, 1960. The reason I chose that date was that it is the expiration date of our lease on the Holzkirchen transmitter site, and I thought that if an arbitrary term were to be fixed that tying it in with the Holzkirchen lease gave it a plausibility which would help acceptance - and that proved to be the case so far as the Bundespost was concerned.

The Foreign Office people told us, however, that numerous questions had been asked in the Bundestag regarding RFE and its programs, and that for the Government to give us a license for as long as eight years would cause serious criticism. We are a peculiar sort of animal, anyway, and for our irregular activities to be blessed with such long term approval would, they thought, be unwise for both their and our points of view. Accordingly, they suggested a four-year period; I countered with five, dating from the date of license issuance which (since it cannot take place before the contractual agreements become effective, may well be late in 1952) will give us considerably more than five years life expectancy. My own feeling is that if we have not done our job within five years, we might as well pull down the shade and go home. In any case, my counter proposal was, as I said, accepted, and Article III of the license will now read:

"This license shall be valid for a period of five years commencing with the date of its issuance and will be automatically extended thereafter from year to year unless written notice of termination is given by one party to the other not less than 90 days prior to the next expiration date."

- 3 -

So much for the license, the terms of which were shown to our HICOG friends and regarded by them as highly favorable.

Our political discussions suffered from a variety of frustrations. We agreed on the license terms with the Bundespost on February 19th, and an appointment was made for us to see Dr. Lenz - the official to whom Doctor Adenauer had referred our problems - at noon on Thursday, February 21, 1952. Dick and I, therefore, took an early train from Frankfurt and were met at the Bonn station by Fritz Kempner who told us that the appointment had been cancelled as Dr. Lenz had been called to the Chancellery on an urgent matter. Fritz said that he had been told that if we went to Dr. Lenz's office, his assistant would make a definite appointment for us later. We did this, and were received by a smooth and non-committal individual, who said he would not be in touch with Dr. Lenz until nine o'clock that evening, and could not make any definite date until after he had spoken with Lenz.

I had the very uncomfortable feeling that we were being given a run-around, and Fritz was very much annoyed. We finally got the young chap to agree that he would try to reach Lenz before evening, and that we would telephone him during course of the afternoon to know what information he had been able to obtain. We telephoned repeatedly, but the answer was always the same; "nothing to report". Dick and I, therefore, took the train back to Frankfurt, while Fritz stayed in Bonn and, in the evening, he telephoned that he had finally got some information from Lenz's young assistant that Lenz had turned the entire matter over to a regular Foreign Office official named Strohm, and that we were to make arrangements to see Strohm. Fritz said that he had endeavored to do this, but had been told by Strohm's office that he could not be sure to see us until Thursday, the 28th, although Wednesday, the 27th, was a slight possibility.

As I think I wrote C.D., the Fasching celebrations were reaching their climax over that weekend, and the first two days of the next week, and I have no doubt that Strohm's unavailability was, to a certain extent, related to Fasching. Fritz said that during his visit to the Foreign Office building he noticed that the rooms were all decorated with Fasching decorations, so that even the highest officials apparently take Fasching seriously. Not wanting to make another fruitless trip to Bonn, I decided we would accept Strohm's appointment for Thursday, February 28th.

At 10.30 AM on Thursday, February 28th, Dick, Fritz and I presented ourselves at Strohm's office. We were met by a sober and not too effusive individual, named Bruckner, who informed us that, unfortunately, Dr. Strohm had been called away from his office, that he would return as soon as

he could and that, meanwhile, he - Bruckner - would be glad to start preliminary discussions.

Again, I placed a somewhat sinister interpretation on what appeared to be a chronic tendency on the part of the German officials authorized to negotiate with us to be absent whenever we put in an appearance for the purpose of negotiating with them. My pessimism was increased by the very rigid and uncooperative attitude of Bruckner, although I realized that having no authority and probably having been insufficiently briefed he was, naturally, keeping his neck well within the protection of his caller. In any case, he brought up some of the stickiest questions connected with our operation, talked of parliamentary interpellations, of the responsibility of the German authorities for anything broadcast from German soil, of the importance of German participation in determining program content, of the dangers of arousing refugee antagonism, and so on and so forth.

After an hour of this, I was ready to call it a day and suggest that we come back when we could talk to Strohm but, fortunately, at that moment Strohm came in and the entire atmosphere changed. He apologized profusely - and apparently sincerely - for the delay, expressed himself anxious to cooperate in every possible way to meet our requirements, brushed aside some of the technicalities raised by Bruckner, and got down to the essentials very rapidly. We went over the ground we had previously gone over with Bruckner, we explained our purpose and kept our feet fairly firmly planted on the principles which we regarded as basic. The result of our long discussion was substantial agreement on the two things that mattered most:

- a) license term of five years, and
- b) no unqualified cancellation right of the kind first suggested by the Bundespost, and more or less insisted upon by Bruckner.

The area of agreement was so broad that we suggested an adjournment to permit us to put in writing the agreement we had reached, return with it to the Foreign Office, and agree upon a final text.

Fritz was a little too optimistic regarding the task that lay before us, and it was clear an hour or so before the time fixed for our afternoon appointment that we would not be ready, so we telephoned to Strohm and postponed the appointment until the next day at noon. We worked all afternoon at HICOG, and until after midnight in our Cologne hotel. We had talked about an exchange of letters as the vehicle for the agreement, but it became difficult to determine who was writing what to whom since the Germans could not

very well offer to give us something we had not asked for, and we, the New York State Corporation, could hardly demand certain rights from the German Government.

Nothing that we were able to compose satisfied my requirements until shortly before midnight the use of a new formula, namely, a memorandum of understanding between me, representing NCFE, and Dr. _____ (whether Strohm, Lenz, or Hallstein - which I do not know) representing the German Government, could be initialed and made the basis for agreement. This formula broke the mental log-jam, and we did a paper, a copy of which is enclosed.

Friday morning, we went back to HICOG, Dick typed the manuscript which Fritz and I had prepared, and we took a copy in to Sam Reber. Sam raised a few questions which we were easily able to answer, made one suggestion, namely, the insertion of the word "basic" in the 8th line on page 3, then expressed himself as completely satisfied. He attached the very greatest importance to getting from the Germans the endorsement of RFE's objectives, which they had given to us orally and which we expressed in the paragraph commencing at the bottom of page 2. He thought we would have accomplished the almost impossible if we obtained such written endorsement.

From HICOG we went direct to Dr. Strohm's office, showed him the memorandum (Fritz had not had time to prepare a German translation and we were afraid this might delay matters, but Strohm said he found the text entirely clear) and got from him immediately a practically complete approval. Bruckner joined us a little later, and he followed Strohm's lead. There were only two points of difference between us, and neither of them did I regard as substantial. You will see that on page 4 I asked for agreement that the German Government would cooperate with us to the fullest possible extent in respect of three items, only one of which, namely, (c) was within the competency of the Foreign Office. Strohm and Bruckner argued very logically that the Foreign Office could not bind the Finance Ministry or any other Ministry of the German Government and advised very earnestly against seeking in advance to obtain the approval of the Finance Ministry. I recognized the validity of both these points. I incorporated items (a) and (b) in the paper because I did not know who would sign on the part of the German Government. Had it been Adenauer or, by his instructions, Hallstein, it could be argued that their signatures did in effect bind the entire Government. If, however, it was to be Strohm, as he indicated it would be, then, obviously, he was without power in the premises. It was agreed, therefore, that (a) and (b) would be omitted, and that instead thereof Strohm would draft a general clause binding the Foreign Office to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with NCFE in reaching satisfactory solutions of any problems arising between NCFE and any

Ministries of the German Government.

Item (c), obviously, was intended to cover particularly the question of visas for Poles now in London who had been recruited for program work in Munich. In our talks on Thursday, Strohm had promised to facilitate the entry of these Poles, and said that if Dick would send in their names, birth dates and any other identifying information we had he would instruct the German Consul in London to issue the visas, and that general instructions would, if we wished, be sent out to the effect that possession of an employment letter from NCPE would be sufficient justification for the issuance of a visa, subject only to the security question. On that point, Strohm expressed the wish that our recruits be screened for us by CIC. We pointed out the impracticability of this.

I call your particular attention to the language of the two full paragraphs on page 3. This was very carefully devised, and I am convinced that it is more favorable to us than we had any reason to expect. As I told you, Reber accepted it with the single change mentioned above. Nelson and Thurston thought it excellent, and Charley Lewis, to whom I showed it Friday, said it was "the optimum".

The Germans had indicated a desire for some kind of a pre-scrutiny of our programs to avoid political conflict. This would, of course, have fatally crippled our effectiveness, so the language that I drafted was drafted for the purpose of emphasizing the post-broadcast nature of any German scrutiny. In order to avoid frivolous complaints from any German official, I stipulated that any protest must reach NCPE through the Foreign Office. This, also, places NCPE in a position to put any such controversy before the State Department, and if the issue involved is a substantial one to have the State do the necessary vis-a-vis the Foreign Office. If, notwithstanding the German protest, and notwithstanding the intervention of the State Department, should the latter wish to become involved, RFE continued to violate the German request, I phrased the next step as involving the surrender by us of the license rather than its cancellation. This may be a fine point, but I felt it interposed one more step between the fall of the guillotine axe and the dropping of the head in the basket. I found, to my relief, that the use of the Portuguese formula, namely, the filing of the broadcast tapes for thirty days to permit examination by the Germans was a completely acceptable device, and you will note that I based this procedure on the desirability of providing a "factual basis for the consideration of any question".

We left with Dr. Strohm a copy of this memorandum of understanding, and he undertook to prepare and forward to me in Paris a draft of a letter incorporating our agreement as set forth in the memorandum, with the modifications outlined above, which the Foreign Office could be prepared

officially to address to NCFE immediately upon the coming into effect of the contractual agreements, and which would have attached to it a copy of the license which would be granted by the Bundespost as of the date of the coming into effect of the contractual agreements. This letter, when acknowledged and accepted by NCFE, would constitute, with the license, the agreement between the parties. Dr. Strohm promised to have the draft in Paris by Wednesday or Thursday of this week.

Fritz is in London this week in connection with the German debts negotiations, but will return for the weekend at which time he and I will go over the draft together. It seems to both of us unlikely that we shall be able to accept Dr. Strohm's draft without any change whatsoever, and it will, therefore, probably be necessary for us to go back to Bonn for one or perhaps two days to iron out any remaining difficulties to agree on a final text and to initial such text with the Germans for the purpose of recording our agreement.

Both Fritz and I are astonished at the apparent ease with which our negotiations progressed. We were able to reach agreement on the most important questions concerned, but we are both cautious and we both realize that between last Friday's agreement and next Thursday's draft letter there may be some vital divergencies, but certainly if the spoken word can be relied upon, and if a friendly, cooperative and even generous attitude on the part of the principal German officials of the Bundespost and Foreign Office to whom we spoke is significant, the German authorities are genuinely anxious to make it possible for RFE to continue to operate effectively. I think that we are all justified in feeling very much encouraged by what it has been possible to accomplish in the past two weeks.

If the above time schedule can be observed, and if not later than Tuesday of next week we can have the documents in final shape and duly initialed, I plan to leave Paris for Lisbon, via Panair do Brasil, on Thursday, the 13th, stay in Lisbon not more than one week, and be back in New York around the 21st.

I enclose a copy of the English translation of the proposed Bundespost license as signed upon on February 19th, with the new Article III referred to above, and a copy of the draft Memorandum of Understanding dated February 29, 1952, so that you may have before you all the relevant papers.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Robert E. Lang,
Director, RFE,
110 West 57th Street,
New York 19, N.Y. - U.S.A.

cc Mr. C.D. Jackson, Admiral Miller, Mr. J.C. Hughes,
Mr. F.C. Kempner

I. The Bundesminister fuer das Post- und Fernmeldewesen hereby grants to the NCFE, a membership corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York (USA) recognized in the Federal Republic as a foreign "Verein", a licence to operate the radio installations listed and specified in the Annex as foreign radio station on German territory on the following conditions.

1. In operating the radio installations the NCFE will use only the frequencies and call signs allocated to it from time to time by the competent authorities of the USA, and duly notified by said authorities to the competent organs of the International Telecommunications Union.
2. The radio installations may be only operated for broadcasting purposes (Radio Regulations Chapter I Article I Section II n. 21 and 22) * of the NCFE; international point to point connections for broadcasting purposes are also permitted subject to the consent of interested foreign administrations; for purposes of third parties the radio installations may not be used without prior written consent of the BPFMin.
3. Without prior written consent of the BPFMin NCFE is not permitted to change the technical specifications of the above mentioned radio transmitting installations or to put additional radio transmitting installations into operation; changes in frequencies and call signs ^{used} must be notified to the BPFMin in advance.

* Broadcasting Services

- 21 a) A radiocommunication service of transmissions to be received directly by the general public.
- 22 b) This service may include transmissions of sounds or transmissions by television, facsimile or other means.

4. The radio installations will be operated in accordance with the provisions of the International Telecommunications Convention presently in force (Atlantic City 1947) and the Radio Regulations annexed to said convention and any conventions or Regulations, to which the Federal Republic is a party which may take their place.
 5. In the event of interference by NCFE radio installations with German radio services NCFE in consultation with the DBP will take necessary measures to eliminate the interference as rapidly as possible.
 6. Duly accredited representatives of DBP shall be accorded free access to all technical installations of NCFE's radio stations in Germany during office hours as well as outside office hours, the latter only upon prior notification.
 7. NCFE shall reimburse DBP for all sums which DBP is obliged to expend as a result of accidents suffered by any of its employees in the performance of their duties on the premises of NCFE.
 8. The license fee for the above-mentioned radio installations is fixed at \$ 10,000.-- per year, payable in advance in quarterly instalments on the first of each quarter by remittance to Bank Deutscher Laender in favor of the Generalpostkasse of DBP, except that as^d first installment there shall be paid an amount computed pro rata temporis from the date of the license to the first of the next following quarter.
- II. This license is not transferable. It can be revoked at any time without notice if

- 1) one of the conditions of the license (I) should be violated and such violation should continue despite request to desist;

- III) This license shall be valid for a period of five years commencing with the date of its issuance and will be automatically extended thereafter from year to year unless written notice of termination is given by one party to the other not less than 90 days prior to the next expiration date.

- IV) In the event of revocation (II) or of expiration (III) of the license the operation of the radio installations shall be discontinued at once.

Draft

29 Feb 1952

Memorandum of understanding between Mr. Phenix, representing the NCFE and Dr. _____, representing the Federal German Republic

Mr. Phenix stated that the NCFE had been founded in 1949 by a group of private American citizens animated by the desire to encourage by positive measures the eventual liberation from the communist yoke of the peoples of the enclaved countries of Central and Eastern Europe. He explained that with the help of endowments and public contributions to the Crusade for Freedom, the Committee had undertaken, among its other activities, the operation through Radio Free Europe of radio broadcasting installations through which it disseminated to listeners in the Iron Curtain countries programs especially prepared by the Committee for the furtherance of its objectives. He pointed out that Radio Free Europe had constructed and was presently operating transmitter stations at Holzkirchen and Eiblis, had erected a large studio and office building in Munich and maintained a large monitoring establishment at Schleissheim and that its programs were prepared with the help of leading scholars, journalists, administrators and economic experts, and men of letters who have escaped from the communist control of their native land.

Mr. Phenix explained that the installation of RFE facilities in the United States Zone of Germany had been effected by the NCFE during the occupation of that Zone

by the U.S. Army and that the operations of RFE had been, and were being facilitated by the U.S. Army authorities because of RFE's status as an accredited American information agency. He observed that the NCFE was concerned lest the termination of the Occupation Status would, in the absence of specific agreement with the Federal German Republic, result in hampering the work of RFE and impairing its effectiveness, and that, with the approval of the Department of State, negotiations had been carried on with the BPMin which had resulted in agreement as to the terms of a license which would be granted by the BPMin to NCFE immediately upon the termination of the Occupation Statute. A copy of that license is appended hereto.

Mr. Phenix called attention to the fact that this license dealt with the technical aspects of RFE's radio broadcast operations and that there were several non-technical matters which required clarification before the NCFE would feel justified in undertaking the long range program it has under consideration.

Dr. _____ stated that the objectives and purposes of NCFE, in the realization of which RFE was engaged, were objectives and purposes to which the Federal Government itself was unalterably committed. The negotiations for a BPMin license had been conducted with his full knowledge and approval. He was well aware that by licensing RFE's operation in Germany, fully cognizant of the objectives and purposes of that operation, the Federal Government was on the one hand encouraging the expenditure by NCFE for that operation of large sums of money contributed by the American public and on the other

was giving NCFE an assurance that RFE's operation in Germany would not be interfered with, but on the contrary, would be facilitated and helped by the Federal Government.

From his viewpoint there was only one reservation he had to make: RFE would be expected to refrain from using its broadcast facilities on German soil for the purpose of advocating and promoting political ends which the Federal Government considered in conflict with its own basic policies. Hence, the Federal Government would have the right, officially to notify NCFE through the Foreign Office of any such conflict. Should the German stations of RFE thereupon not refrain from advocating and promoting the policies to which the Federal Government had objected, the Federal Government would have no choice but to require the surrender by NCFE of its license and the discontinuance of its broadcast operations from German territory.

Mr. Phenix stated that he understood the reasons for the views expressed by Dr. _____, accepted his reservation, and agreed to the procedure outlined, and that to provide a factual basis for the consideration of any question which might arise in respect of RFE broadcasts the latter would keep on file for a period of 30 days from the date of use all tapes recording programs broadcast from RFE transmitters in Germany so that any questioned program would be available to the appropriate German authorities when requested by them. Mr. Phenix then emphasized the importance attached by NCFE to certain other aspects of the operating problems of RFE, for example:

4.

(a) that property of NCFE brought into Germany prior to the termination of the Occupation Statute be recognized as legally within Germany and subject to the free disposition of NCFE.

(b) that NCFE be recognized as a non-profit organization of public interest and that in respect of its operations in Germany it and its employees are entitled to no less favorable treatment than any comparable German non-profit corporation or entity.

(c) that the non-German personnel now employed by NCFE in Germany be permitted to remain in Germany while so employed and that additional non-German employees be permitted to enter Germany for such employment subject only to the right of the competent German authorities to deny entry to any individual whose presence in Germany would in their opinion prejudice German internal security.

Dr. _____ stated that he recognized the importance of these elements in the operation of NCFE in Germany and that the Federal German Republic would cooperate with NCFE to the fullest possible extent in meeting its requirements with respect thereto.

RECEIVED
NATIONAL ARCHIVES FOR FREE
MAY 1 1966