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Note: DATE: 11-14-2017

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
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FBI

Date: 12/3/63

Transmit the following in _____ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: INSPECTOR D. E. MOORE

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK ((134-9899)) (S)

SUBJECT: MITER (S)
IS - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

2-894
Classified by 05-FMB/muk
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

Re NY airtel, 11/22/63.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF [NY 4216-S*] (S)
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING INFORMATION SET
OUT IN THIS COMMUNICATION AND NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN WHICH
WOULD POSSIBLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE OR REVEAL
HIS IDENTITY.

(S) [NY 4216-S*] was interviewed on 12/2/63, [under secure (S)]
conditions at the Manger Vanderbilt Hotel, 34th Street and Park
Avenue, New York City, between 12:15 PM and 3:35 PM. During the
interview, the informant furnished the following information:

- 3 - Bureau (RM)
 - 1 - Washington Field (INFO) (RM)
 - 2 - New York (INV)
- LCK:htc
(8)

(105-56502-3) (S)

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
DEC 4 1963	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

[Handwritten signatures and initials over stamp]

Approved: _____ Sent _____
Special Agent in Charge

1M Per _____

8/4/88
CLASSIFIED BY 5668-SW/mak
DECLASSIFY ON: (S) (JFK)

[Handwritten signature: Jones]

[Handwritten signatures: Kierman, Wootch, etc.]

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(213,6)

AIRTEL

NY (134-9899) (S)

Assassination of President KENNEDY

He stated at the outset that he wished to express his deep sympathy over the assassination of President KENNEDY and that he was very disturbed by the news of the assassination and he found most Soviet nationals that he had come in contact with to have also been concerned over the death of President KENNEDY. He felt that President KENNEDY was sincerely admired by most of the Soviet nationals and that the usual cynical attitude toward such an event was not present in this instance.

The informant advised that [he had visited the Soviet Mission several times during the days] immediately following President KENNEDY's assassination. He stated the immediate reaction was that the arrest of LEE HARVEY/OSWALD as the assassin was wrong because if OSWALD had been connected with the Communist movement in any way his act of assassination could only seriously harm American-Soviet relations. It was believed [at the Soviet Mission] that the Dallas Police Department was covering up for someone else by arresting OSWALD, and that this cover-up was an attempt to protect a "right wing group". The informant related that by Monday or Tuesday following the assassination, the belief had developed [at the Soviet Mission] that the assassination was a plot or conspiracy aimed at a take-over in American politics by some group rather than an individual act of revenge. [Officials at the Soviet Mission] did not believe OSWALD was involved but had been intentionally arrested by the real conspirators due to his leftist background. He indicated these conspirators knew all about OSWALD, including his employment and possession of a rifle.

The informant further related that as of the weekend of 12/1/63, a belief had developed [at the Soviet Mission] that OSWALD had been involved more directly in the assassination and that he was part of a right wing movement. This belief was enhanced by certain revelations that OSWALD was anti-Soviet, had intended to publish an anti-Soviet book and had been

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AIRTEL

NY (134-9899) (S)

disappointed in his previous Soviet experience and inability to obtain another Soviet visa. This theory maintained that OSWALD was not alone in the assassination and that others, more influential and stronger than OSWALD, were involved. The informant added that it is now felt (at the Mission) that (S) the attempt to make the assassination appear to be a Communist plot has failed.

Concern Over Future
Policies of President JOHNSON

(S) (NY 4216-S*) stated that there is general concern regarding what attitude President JOHNSON will take in the future toward the various leftist revolutionary movements in the world, including those in Latin America, South Vietnam and Cuba. He related that everyone (at the Soviet Mission) is (S) obliged to attempt to determine the potential and direction of American politics under President JOHNSON. He stated that no specific directive has been issued regarding this but that it is generally understood to be important. He added that there had not been much interest in President JOHNSON previous to the assassination of President KENNEDY. The informant related that any information that is developed in this regard would be furnished directly to (Moscow either by Soviet UN Ambassador NIKOLAI T. FEDORENKO or by the KGB.) (S) (u)

He stated that they felt that President JOHNSON was a likely candidate for the Democratic convention for President in 1964, but that he was vulnerable on several domestic issues and he was also vulnerable from the international standpoint. He stated that as far as domestic matters were concerned, President JOHNSON projected the image of a Texan and that the voters in the rest of the country would subconsciously take this into consideration; that he was in some way in the public mind connected with the "BOBBY BAKER case" and that generally speaking, his image was that of a Southern conservative.

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AIRTEL

NY (134-9899) (5)

When questioned concerning his international vulnerability, informant stated that he foresaw that Red China prior to the election in 1964, might start a smear campaign against President JOHNSON. He stated that Red China could be anticipated to describe President JOHNSON as a Southern reactionary who attained power through an ultra-right wing conspiracy against KENNEDY and that JOHNSON was the intended beneficiary of this killing of President KENNEDY. He stated that Red China would label President JOHNSON as a racist and even though this would be the technique of the "big lie", it still would gain wide circulation throughout the world and even though most people would disbelieve it, this allegation would still be in the back of their minds in appraising JOHNSON.

Informant also stated that the Soviets are concerned about the 1964 election with regard to whom the candidates will be for both political parties. Informant took for granted that President JOHNSON would be the Democratic candidate for President in 1964, and expressed a great interest in who his possible Vice-Presidential running mate would be.

The Cuban Situation

The informant advised that Russia is deeply committed in principle to the defense of Cuba and would take appropriate steps in this regard if confronted with a direct attack upon Cuba. He stated that it is Soviet policy that Cuba cannot be permitted to be defeated and the KENNEDY administration had been aware of this Soviet attitude. He stated that it had been the policy of the KENNEDY administration to attempt to destroy CASTRO by economic and political means. He added that while Moscow was not happy with this policy of the KENNEDY administration, it appreciated these methods as opposed to American military intervention in Cuba.

The informant stated that the Soviet Government is now much concerned over what policy President JOHNSON will

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develop toward Cuba. The informant then digressed into an explanation of Soviet policy toward Cuba prior to and since the Cuban crisis of October, 1962. He explained that the number of Soviet troops in Cuba has been reduced since the Soviets feel that there is no danger now of CASTRO being overthrown from within. Also, Soviet troops were originally dispatched to Cuba to train the Cuban Army and to protect Cuba from internal revolution during the period that the Cuban Army was being trained in the techniques of operating modern military equipment. As an example, the informant related that initially there were only four trained Cuban pilots who could fly Soviet aircraft. The informant stated that Soviet troops in Cuba had never been intended to protect Cuba from outside attack since the number of Soviet troops in Cuba would never have been able to withstand a strong US military action against Cuba. He stated that Soviet rockets were introduced into Cuba to establish a bargaining position with the US and to provide moral support to CASTRO. He remarked that many of these rockets were so stationed that they could be clearly observed by US reconnaissance. He explained that the Soviet Union hoped to obtain a Soviet-Cuban-US treaty of non-aggression against Cuba in return for Soviet removal of these rockets. He added that the primary objective had always been in one way or another to secure a US pledge of non-aggression against Cuba. When the above treaty was not realized, the Soviet Union obtained a promise from President KENNEDY through an exchange of letters with Premier KHRUSHCHEV to the effect that the US would not undertake an attack against Cuba; thus the Soviet Union gained its objective, namely, no US attack or intervention in Cuba. Soviet officials still believe that the US is under obligation not to attack Cuba but that this commitment was mainly a personal one and thus the Soviets feel strong concern over what attitude President JOHNSON will adopt toward Cuba.

The Latin American Situation

The informant related that the situation in Latin America is very explosive. While some progress has been made

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in Latin America, the economic situation is very poor and thus the basic cause for revolution exists in Latin America. The informant related that it is impossible to foment revolution in a country where the economy is strong such as in the US. He stated that the Soviets believed in the principles of Communism with almost "religious fervor" and that they felt that it was inevitable, perhaps in 50 years, perhaps in 100 years, perhaps 500 years, that the whole world will go Communist, but that the trend is inevitable and the seeds of collapse are planted in all the Latin American countries. He stated that these Latin American countries would go Communist without the need of any outside revolutionary intervention. He stated that the Soviet Union does not believe or support the shipment of arms to the Latin American countries. They have found CASTRO to be very independent and he does not share all their viewpoints. He stated that it is Moscow's policy not to support a revolutionary movement if such support would endanger the international peace movement.

SUSAN L. FREIBERG(S)

Informant stated that he was still very concerned about the status of SUSAN FREIBERG and hoped that she would never be involved in any investigation over his activities. He stated that she is at present very upset over the cessation of their relationship and that he would like to comfort her but he had been concerned over what our attitude would be if he were to resume contacting SUSAN FREIBERG to the extent of taking her out to lunch or taking her home. He stated that he did have a deep concern for her. Informant was advised that his relationship with SUSAN FREIBERG was a personal matter for him to decide.(S)

A summary of all political information that the informant has furnished to date is being prepared in a form suitable for outside expert evaluation of the information furnished by the informant. This memorandum will be furnished to the Bureau this week.

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