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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11-12-64

FROM : W.A. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE  
ON THE WARREN REPORT

- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - DeLoach
- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - Baumgardner
- 1 - Bland
- 1 - RWSmith
- 1 - Wannall
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Branigan
- 1 - Whitson

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Baumgardner \_\_\_\_\_  
Bland \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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(10/21/97) (JFK)

Memo from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Tolson 11-5-64 pointed out that neutralization of persons who constitute a danger to the President is a Secret Service function. However, there may be some few sensitive cases where action by the Secret Service would destroy an FBI operation of value to this country. The question was raised as to whether in these few instances the FBI would prefer to handle the subjects itself, rather than to have Secret Service neutralize them during a Presidential visit. The Director noted, "I am opposed to accepting this responsibility."

The 16 Espionage Agents: For the Director's consideration it is pointed out that of approximately 18,500 names given by the FBI to Secret Service, the "sensitive cases" to which Secret Service referre involve 16 espionage subjects. Two of these are Yugoslav agents, whose identities were supplied by four Yugoslav defector-in-place. Three are Czech agents, who were identified by four Czech defector-in-place. Six are agents of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), identified through FEDORA, a Soviet defector-in-place. Four are agents of Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU), identified through TOPHAT, another Soviet defector-in-place. One is a Castro-Cuban intelligence agent who represents an important penetration of Cuban clandestine communications.

In no instance have the original sources indicated that any of these espionage agents has ever had an assignment of assassination or terroristic activity. These people are collectors and transmitters of information.

These cases are of varying importance from an intelligence standpoint, but in all of them we have an obligation to protect the original sources. These original sources may be in a position at some future date to furnish us with the identities of communist terrorists or assassins who would be of immediate interest to the Secret Service.

LW:mhw  
(11)

CONTINUED - OVER

79 FEB 2 - 1965

64 DEC 8 - 1964

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DEC 7 1964

SECRET

Memo Branigan to Sullivan  
re: PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE  
ON THE WARREN REPORT

We cannot adequately protect our sources when these 16 names are out of our possession, and may even be furnished by Secret Service to the local police for "neutralization."

Dangers in Handling by Secret Service and Local Police:

Consideration should be given to getting these 16 names back from Secret Service. These cases are all pending active investigations of intelligence (espionage) agents. Should a leak occur in the Secret Service, the lives of our defectors-in-place would be in jeopardy.

For example, take the case of [Josef Ulver, a Czech illegal agent,] operating as a [traveling salesman of religious articles.] He [S] was identified to us by our defector-in-place, [GIMME, who is now in [S] Czech intelligence headquarters in Prague,] and who has [just recently [S] furnished additional information, [through CIA] regarding [Czech agents [S] in the U.S. If [Ulver's] name leaked out, [GIMME] would be under [S] immediate suspicion. [S]

[S] Another example is [Alexis von Volborth, a Soviet KGB [X] illegal] whose very existence is known to only a limited number of persons in the New York KGB Residency, including our defector-in-place, FEDORA, who reported him to us. If his name leaked, FEDORA would be in a precarious position. [The head of the KGB in New York [X] is already of the belief, from review of testimony in the Butenko-Ivanov trial, that the FBI has an informant within the KGB. [X] FEDORA furnished us with information on five other persons in this list of 16. If their names were leaked, FEDORA could be easily identified by the KGB as our source.

The same situation would prevail if the Secret Service gave the names to the local police and the names were leaked by the police. The effect would be the same if the local police attempted to restrain these persons and the latter reported this to their intelligence principals. In the case of local police action looking toward "neutralization," we would not only have placed our informants' lives in jeopardy, but we would have surrendered control of the investigation of these sensitive espionage cases to the local police.

Re-evaluation of the 16 Cases: On 10-29-64, the Director met with the President's Committee on Presidential Protection. The Director pointed out that we disseminate to the Secret Service on subversive individuals, even where there is no indication the individual has threatened the President; that these are the type of people we would pick up in the event of a war emergency.