

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)  
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are  
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages  
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth** at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

DATE: 11-14-2017

JFK Assassination System  
Identification Form

Date: 6/17/201

---

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI  
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90158-10040  
RECORD SERIES : HQ  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-80787-1533

---

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI  
FROM : MM  
TO : HQ  
TITLE :

DATE : 02/10/1972  
PAGES : 32

SUBJECTS :  
CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
LUIS POSADA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : Secret  
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C  
CURRENT STATUS : Redact  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 12/08/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE

COMMENTS : LHM

DATE: 11-14-2017



~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to

File No. ~~105-1998~~ (u)

Miami, Florida

NOV 10 1972

IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
KP 11-17-97

#211326  
Classified by SP6BJA/GCL  
Declassify on: OADR 12/19/84  
(SP6mke/GCL)  
8/17/94 JHC

RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~  
~~INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA~~ (u)

Source, a Cuban defector, was interviewed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the presence of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer from January 18-21, 1972. (S) (u)

Source is a former member of the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), who has been active in security and intelligence affairs for the past ten years. He acquired knowledge of some of his information through personal experience and the rest directly and indirectly through contact with other DGI officers. (S) (u)

Source furnished the following information:

~~OBJECTIVES OF CUBAN INTELLIGENCE~~  
~~ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES~~ (u)

Cuban intelligence objectives in the United States are divided into two major categories. One concerns political and economic matters of the United States. The second is counterintelligence, which has as its primary concern the operations of the CIA and counterrevolutionary activity of Cuban exiles in the United States. (S) (u)

The major objective of intelligence officers at the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) is to gather information regarding the political viewpoints and foreign policy of the United States Government. This is considered (S) (u)

8/21/97  
CLASSIFIED BY [unclear]  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (u)

~~12/29/81~~  
~~SP6BJA/GMS~~  
~~2/10/92~~  
~~21,488~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~Group 1~~  
~~Excluded from automatic~~  
~~downgrading and declassification~~

OFFK 1 9/10/98  
CLASSIFIED BY SP68 SLO/GCL  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (u) (u)

~~105-80787-1533~~ (u)

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~

~~(S)~~(U)

political intelligence and has priority in the United States over the other intelligence activity which is classified as counterintelligence. The majority of the officials at the CMUN are concerned with the collection of political intelligence. This is of much more importance to Cuba than the counterintelligence information obtained. ~~(S)~~(U)

The intelligence operations in Miami are only vehicles to obtain information regarding CIA and counter-revolutionary operations of Cuban exiles. The importance of DGI officers at the CMUN who are in charge of the collection of counterintelligence information is subordinate to that of those who are in charge of collection of political intelligence. The latter have priority in their task. ~~(S)~~(U)

This order of priority may be reversed in other countries of the world where the politics of the country affects the Cuban situation to a lesser degree. Regarding the Cuban mission in Canada, its purpose is to support the activities of the Cuban Intelligence Service (CIS) in the United States in all aspects, including financial, logistics, and administrative. In the past CIS has not engaged in the collection of intelligence data concerning United States military installations, however, plans are being formulated to seek the collection of such information in the future. The DGI has established a new desk which has as its function the gathering of information concerning United States military operations. ~~(S)~~(U)

~~CUBAN AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES~~

~~(S)~~(U)

The CIS has expended a considerable amount of time recruiting and training individuals to serve as collectors of intelligence information in the United States. The CIS has recognized that the United States intelligence agencies would counter these efforts by the CIS. In order to place agents of value in an operating capacity in the United States, the CIS considered it worthwhile to expend ~~(S)~~(U)

2.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RE: [CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES]  
[IN THE UNITED STATES] ~~(S)~~ (U)

efforts to attempt to confuse the United States intelligence agencies. In this regard, the CIS established, in about 1962<sup>(S)</sup> or 1963<sup>(S)</sup> what it termed its "Plan Piloto"<sup>(S)</sup>. This plan was to recruit almost every Cuban who was leaving Cuba to travel to the United States to [be agents of CIS]<sup>(S)</sup>. This was a massive plan to have numerous persons travel to the United States as refugees in the [hope to cause untold amounts]<sup>(S)</sup> of work for the United States intelligence agencies and to confuse United States efforts to [identify those agents sent by CIS] whom they hoped to be of value. [These persons]<sup>(S)</sup> were trained briefly in matters of utilizing lemon juice for secret writing and given instructions to obtain information concerning anti-CASTRO activities. They were furnished accommodation addresses in Cuba and warned to be very secretive in their activities in the United States and to never divulge their recruitment to United States authorities. It was expected that they would immediately divulge such [recruitment and] cause confusion and concern for United States intelligence agencies. It was expected that this type of activity would help [cover those agents]<sup>(S)</sup> who were seriously trained and sent on missions to the United States. ~~(S)~~ (S)

The CIS did not keep track of the identities of these people on the whole and were not concerned with the results of their efforts. Source cited one instance wherein a [letter was received by the DGI offices]<sup>(S)</sup> in Havana with a secret-writing message saying that the writer had made contact with an anti-CASTRO organization. The DGI was unable to identify the [author of the letter]<sup>(S)</sup>. About six weeks to two months later, a second [secret-writing letter]<sup>(S)</sup> was received by the [DGI offices] from the same author. This [letter]<sup>(S)</sup> advised that [the author] had certain information about the anti-CASTRO organization and asked for instructions as to what to do with his information. The [DGI] could never determine who [the author]<sup>(S)</sup> was and disposed of [the letters]<sup>(S)</sup>. ~~(S)~~ (S)

Another method used by DGI officers to confuse United States intelligence agencies was to send form letters ~~(S)~~ (S) (U)

3.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~ (S)(u)

to various Cuban exiles in the Miami area. The DGI never expected to receive much of value from these letters. However, if they were fortunate enough to obtain someone through this tactic who would eventually develop as a valuable agent, the DGI felt that nothing would be lost. These letters were prepared in the DGI offices and requested the recipients to make contact in some way with DGI officials. Often they were instructed to make contact with officials of the CMUN. Source said he knows of no Cuban agent of value who was ever developed in this way (S)(u)

Most of the efforts outlined above were intended for the purpose of neutralizing the counterintelligence efforts of United States intelligence agencies. In the meantime, however, CIS recruited, trained, and sent agents to the United States. The most important agent sent by CIS to the United States, who was believed to still be operating as late as the beginning of 1971, was known to source only as G-11. (S)(u)

CUBAN AGENT G-11 (S)

Name (S)(u)

Source does not know the name of G-11. He believes that he saw the name in G-11's dossier on one occasion and believes that the first name is short and the last name long. The name JOSE CARBONELL was suggested to the source who said he did not recognize that name but this would be a good example of the length of G-11's name which he observed in the file. (S)(u)

Recruitment (S)(u)

G-11 was believed to have been recruited by CARLOS ENRIQUEZ RODRIGUEZ (DGI code name JACOBO), a section chief at DGI headquarters. This recruitment probably occurred sometime prior to 1967, however, source is unable to pinpoint the exact time of the recruitment. G-11 was not compelled to serve in the capacity of an agent. There is (S)(u)

Cuba

4.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

RE: [CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES] x (u)  
[IN THE UNITED STATES]

no hostage situation case, and he is apparently serving as an agent because of his ideological values and on a voluntary basis (s)

~~Training~~ (s)(u)

(s) [G-11's] training was carried out under the overall supervision of [JACOBO] (s). His case officer, however, was [AUGUSTO CESAR VEGA HERNANDEZ (DGI code name OCTAVIO)] (s). Case officers were prohibited from giving the actual training. Therefore, [OCTAVIO] would have been in charge of insuring that [G-11] received all phases of the training necessary to be an agent in the United States. [OCTAVIO] would have seen to it that [G-11] received the proper number of hours in each phase of his training and insuring that all of his needs were cared for during this training period. The actual training given to [G-11] as well as other agents, was given by technicians, and others trained for this purpose. For example, [G-11] probably received several hours of training in radio operation, several hours of training in secret writing, and several hours of training in photography until his entire training was completed. None of this training would have been done directly by his case officer, [OCTAVIO] (s)

N.Y.  
Cuba

~~Departure from Cuba~~ (s)(u)

The source does not know for sure how [G-11] left Cuba to make his way to the United States. He could have come to the United States by any of several methods. However, since [G-11] was under the control of [JACOBO] (s) it is source's belief that he probably came illegally because of [JACOBO's] penchant to send his agents out in this manner. The source speculated that [G-11] was also probably sent out this way. He feels he could have possibly come to the United States by small boat or some other illegal means. (s)

~~Reporting Assignments~~ (s)(u)

Originally [G-11] was scheduled to spend at least (s)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~ (u)

six months in the United States, acclimating himself and collecting routine information concerning Cuban exile activities. Sometime early in 1969, G-11<sup>(s)</sup> began to branch out, and he furnished the DGI a detailed and comprehensive study which he had made concerning several anti-CASTRO organizations in the United States with emphasis on their capability to mount attacks on Cuba. The DGI was very pleased with this information furnished by G-11<sup>(s)</sup> and instructed him to become more aggressive and attempt to determine the United States Government's position concerning anti-CASTRO activities originating in the United States. In this regard, G-11<sup>(s)</sup> was instructed to attempt to obtain information concerning certain Cuban persons in the employ of President RICHARD M. NIXON and persons associated with President NIXON<sup>(s)</sup> including CHARLES "BEBE" REBOZO<sup>(s)</sup> and EDGARDO BUTARI<sup>(s)</sup>, prominent in the Cuban colony in Miami. (S) (u)

It was generally understood by DGI officials in Havana<sup>(s)</sup> that President NIXON<sup>(s)</sup> as well as Mr. REBOZO<sup>(s)</sup> and Mr. BUTARI<sup>(s)</sup> surrounded themselves with Cubans who worked in such capacities as butlers, chauffeurs, and maids<sup>(s)</sup>. The DGI had generally received information that persons of Cuban extraction worked for President NIXON<sup>(s)</sup>. It was understood that President NIXON<sup>(s)</sup> was associated with Mr. REBOZO<sup>(s)</sup> and possibly lent him money. President NIXON and Mr. REBOZO<sup>(s)</sup> were reportedly very close friends. The DGI officials felt that G-11<sup>(s)</sup> could learn the identities of these Cubans and determine whether they could be utilized in the future to obtain whatever piece of conversation they might have overheard between President NIXON<sup>(s)</sup> and his friends. The ultimate purpose for obtaining data concerning persons close to the President<sup>(s)</sup> was to learn from them the political policies of President NIXON<sup>(s)</sup> regarding the Cuban situation. The DGI officials felt<sup>(s)</sup> that these persons could not work around President NIXON<sup>(s)</sup> without hearing something which he might say to Mr. REBOZO<sup>(s)</sup> or his other associates. (S) (u)

G-11<sup>(s)</sup> sent information concerning one chauffeur<sup>(s)</sup> of President NIXON<sup>(s)</sup>. The source does not know whether this (S) (u)

6.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~



DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~ (u)

(s) [chauffeur] was employed in Miami. The information concerning this [chauffeur] was biographical in nature and included his name, a short description, and an address, which later proved to be erroneous. Similar information was provided concerning Mr. REBOZO's chauffeur, caretaker or butler, (s) and a [maid] (s) (S-1) (S)

To the best of source's knowledge, there was never any indication that any plan existed whereby persons associated with [the President] would be utilized to cause physical harm to [President NIXON] or his associates. No significant information regarding [President NIXON] was ever received from [G-11] (s). No information was ever received from any of the people surrounding [President NIXON] (s) and there was no indication these people were ever approached to furnish such information. (S-1) (S)

The DGI hoped to receive information from [G-11] (s) concerning ["BEBE" REBOZO] for the same purpose. The DGI hoped to receive information which might have been overheard during conversations between [the President and Mr. REBOZO] (s) or what [REBOZO] might say about conversations with [the President] (s) (S-1) (S)

The DGI expected [G-11] (s) to furnish information concerning [EDGARDO BUTARI] (s) and his activities in the Miami area. It was also hoped that bits of information from [BUTARI] (s) concerning [President NIXON's policies] might be obtained. [G-11] (s) was expected to determine whether [BUTARI] (s) had any connection with CIA or whether he was furnishing any financial aid to [JOSE DE LA TORRIENTE, well-known] (s) Cuban exile leader. A great deal of biographical information was received concerning [BUTARI] (s) Fla. Cuba (S-1) (S)

The source believes that [G-11] (s) was personally acquainted with [Mr. BUTARI and Mr. REBOZO] (s). It is his belief that [G-11] (s) knows [Mr. REBOZO] quite well on a personal (S-1) (S)

7.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

RE: [CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES]  
[IN THE UNITED STATES] (u)

basis and that he also knows [BUTARI]<sup>(s)</sup> but not so well. He believes he knows [JOSE DE LA TORRIENTE]<sup>(s)</sup> but only very slightly. The information that DGI received concerning [Mr. REBOZO]<sup>(s)</sup> came almost totally from [G-11]<sup>(s)</sup>. The information concerning [BUTARI]<sup>(s)</sup> came from several sources although a great deal of it came from [G-11]<sup>(s)</sup>. There is much more information in the DGI files regarding [BUTARI]<sup>(s)</sup> than there is about [REBOZO]<sup>(s)</sup> but it has come from different sources. The file on [BUTARI]<sup>(s)</sup> covers a long period of time in reporting and is very comprehensive. (S)(X)

A concerted effort was made to obtain background information concerning [Mr. BUTARI]<sup>(s)</sup> and to determine his associates, activities, and connections within the Cuban colony in Miami. Efforts were concentrated on [Mr. BUTARI]<sup>(s)</sup> because of his position and remote possibility that he might in some way be recruited to work on behalf of the Cuban Government. Source emphasized this was considered a goal to strive for, but there was no known basis for believing [Mr. BUTARI]<sup>(s)</sup> would ever cooperate with the Cubans. (S)(X)

Source believes that [G-11]<sup>(s)</sup> once reported on the activities of [ROLANDO MASFERRER]<sup>(s)</sup> former Cuban [Congressman]<sup>(s)</sup> and prominent Cuban exile. Source believes he remembers having seen reports submitted by [G-11]<sup>(s)</sup> concerning [MASFERRER]<sup>(s)</sup> activities in Miami but cannot remember specifically. (S)(X)

Reports which were furnished by [G-11]<sup>(s)</sup> were sent to the various DGI officers in final form. The DGI officers never saw the original reports which were furnished by [G-11]<sup>(s)</sup>. All reports containing biographical information on individuals was sent to one DGI official. Information concerning Cuban exile anti-CASTRO activity was sent to other DGI officers. The various officers would periodically have meetings where their analyses of the information furnished would be discussed. In this way the officers became aware of information furnished by [G-11]<sup>(s)</sup> even though it was not routed directly to them. (S)(X)

8.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

RE: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES X (U)

Health and Age X (U)

Cuba

In recalling that he had on one occasion seen the file of [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup>, source remembers that there was a very limited amount of background information and description. He does not recall whether there was a [photograph of G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> in the file. He does not remember exactly, but it is source's impression that the file indicated [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> to be between [46 and 48] years of age. To substantiate this impression concerning [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup>'s age, source related the circumstances of a meet with [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> made by DGI officers in New York. This meet was believed to have taken place in early [1968]<sup>(S)</sup>. On this occasion [JUAN JOSE MULKAY GUTIERREZ (DGI code name MENENDEZ)]<sup>(S)</sup>, a DGI officer, and [OCTAVIO]<sup>(S)</sup> traveled to New York City. Ordinarily an official as high as [MENENDEZ]<sup>(S)</sup> would not make a meet with an agent such as [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup>. It would be a normal matter for [OCTAVIO]<sup>(S)</sup> to make such a meet. Source knows of no serious problem or unusual circumstance in relation to this meet. This meet was probably pre-planned for at least a year in advance so there was probably no emergency connected with it. [MENENDEZ and OCTAVIO]<sup>(S)</sup> traveled to New York by way of [Nassau]<sup>(S)</sup> X (U)

After their return from this trip, several DGI officers were in the office of [CRESCENCIO PALENZUELA PAEZ (DGI code name CANDIDO)]<sup>(S)</sup>, discussing the possible recruitment of [ALFREDO CORDERO PERNIA]<sup>(S)</sup>, who is also known as [TOBITA]<sup>(S)</sup>, a Cuban exile living in Miami. [MENENDEZ]<sup>(S)</sup> walked into the room, and the conversation changed to his recent trip to New York. [CANDIDO] asked [MENENDEZ]<sup>(S)</sup> about the trip, if he had been surveilled by the FBI, and other personal matters. Source believes that both [MENENDEZ] and [OCTAVIO]<sup>(S)</sup> participated in the meet with [G-11]. [CANDIDO] asked [MENENDEZ]<sup>(S)</sup> if he saw "EL VIEJO" (the old man). [MENENDEZ]<sup>(S)</sup> said, yes, and that it was interesting because the meet, which was made on a bridge or an overpass, had been under pressure because of a surveillance by the FBI. According to [MENENDEZ]<sup>(S)</sup>, the surveillance car proceeded ahead and [MENENDEZ]<sup>(S)</sup> had followed behind. [MENENDEZ]<sup>(S)</sup> said he made a couple of turns and evaded X (U)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~ (u)

the surveillance, then doubled back and met with [G-11] CANDIDO asked about [G-11's] health. MENENDEZ said [G-11] looked very good and seemed quite happy. DGI officials had often talked about [G-11's] health as though he suffered from some [type of ailment]. Source had heard officials talk about the need of [G-11] for some type of [medicine] and whether [G-11] had obtained his [medicine] on one occasion. Source does not know the nature of [G-11's] health problem but believes he has some type of [affliction]. It is source's impression that [G-11] has to take [medicine] regularly although he cannot specify the nature of this [medicine or the sickness]. (S) (S) (S)

From the above story and from his recollection of [G-11's] file, source believes that [G-11's] age is between 46 and 48. Source said that it is possible that [G-11] could be an [older man]. Source also noted the possibility that the official who made up the file for [G-11] could have inserted a false age in order to better conceal the identity of the agent. Also, the file could have been several years old and the age noted correctly. (S) (S)

Source pointed out that it is a normal thing for Cuban agents to send a message to their principals saying that someone is [sick] if they believe they are about to be detected by the FBI. Source does not believe this is the case in the matter of discussion of [G-11's] health. He believes that [G-11] has an actual [health] problem. (S) (S)

\*Residence (S) (S) (u)

Source does not know the exact residence of [G-11]. However, source feels quite sure that [G-11] has established his residence in the [Miami, Florida] area. Source said he makes this conclusion because [G-11] has an extremely wide circle of acquaintances in [Miami]. He circulates very well. (S) (S)

10.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

RE: [CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES] ~~(S)~~ (U)

in [Miami] <sup>(S)</sup> and appears to be able to obtain any type information which he is asked to acquire. [G-11] <sup>(S)</sup> seems to have a good facility to become knowledgeable of the activities of the anti-CASTRO groups in [Miami] <sup>(S)</sup> and has furnished precise information concerning them in the past. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Possible Imprisonment ~~(S)~~ (U)

Source does not know for sure whether [G-11] <sup>(S)</sup> has ever been imprisoned in the United States. Source does recall that during the time he was active in the DGI in Havana there were two or three cases in which Cuban agents were jailed in the United States. The circumstances surrounding these Cuban agents' imprisonment never had anything do with their CIS involvement. These periods of detention have always been for short periods of time. For example, source pointed out, [EPIFANIO ROMERO DELGADO] <sup>(S)</sup> *Cuba*, who operated until late 1969 as a Cuban agent, was in a United States prison for about six months. Source cannot definitely recall whether [G-11] <sup>(S)</sup> was thus detained. Source said, however, that it is his impression that in addition to [ROMERO, G-11] <sup>(S)</sup> was possibly imprisoned for a short period of time, but not for intelligence activities. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Principals ~~(S)~~ (U)

In addition to the individuals who first recruited and assisted in the training of [G-11], JACOBO and OCTAVIO, G-11 <sup>(S)</sup> was handled by personnel from the CMUN. Among those who handled [G-11] <sup>(S)</sup> were:

JESUS JIMENEZ ESCOBAR  
(DGI code name JULIAN)

LAZARO EDDY ESPINOSA BONET  
(DGI code name ESTEBAN)

PEDRO LUIS PINERO EIRIN  
(DGI code name ALEJANDRO)

*Cuba*

11.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

RE: [CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES]  
[IN THE UNITED STATES] ~~(S)~~(u)

[JORGE REYES VEGA  
(DGI code name JOAQUIN)] ~~(S)~~(u)

*Cuba*  
[JOAQUIN] ~~(S)~~ was probably used primarily as an emergency contact for [G-11] ~~(S)~~. Additionally, source has previously noted that [G-11] ~~(S)~~ made a meet with [MENENDEZ and OCTAVIO] ~~(S)~~ during a trip to New York in [1968] ~~(S)~~. The source believes that [G-11] ~~(S)~~'s current principal is VICTOR MANUEL GONZALEZ VALDEZ (DGI code name BAUDILLO) ~~(S)~~ and his alternate principal is [ALFREDO G. PILA DE ARMAS (DGI code name PAULINO)] ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

[Reporting and Method of Contact] ~~(S)~~(u)

In the event the DGI wished to send instructions to [G-11] ~~(S)~~ the normal method utilized is by [radio messages] ~~(S)~~. Source recalls that sometime late in 1969, OCTAVIO ~~(S)~~ prepared a [radio message] ~~(S)~~ for [G-11] ~~(S)~~ in which he authorized [G-11] ~~(S)~~ to purchase a [city directory of the Miami, Florida, area] ~~(S)~~. OCTAVIO ~~(S)~~ was concerned at the time whether the [directory] ~~(S)~~ was worth the [\$80.00] ~~(S)~~ cost. This message was sent to [G-11] ~~(S)~~ by radio with the instruction that he should purchase the [book] ~~(S)~~ and make it available to the DGI. Apparently [G-11] ~~(S)~~ had already described the [book] ~~(S)~~ and its value and had told OCTAVIO ~~(S)~~ of the cost. These [radio transmissions] ~~(S)~~ are sent in code. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

Subsequently [G-11] ~~(S)~~ obtained a [city directory of] ~~(S)~~ Miami. Source believes he either carried [the directory] ~~(S)~~ to New York City or sent it by mail. [The directory] ~~(S)~~ reached the DGI in Havana sometime in 1970. This directory ~~(S)~~ contained the [names, addresses, and occupations of residents] ~~(S)~~ in Miami. It also contained a [cross reference section of telephone numbers] ~~(S)~~. Source believes [the directory] ~~(S)~~ was titled "Polk's City Directory. This directory ~~(S)~~ proved extremely useful to the DGI. Subsequently the DGI received a second [city directory] ~~(S)~~ of a [later edition] ~~(S)~~, which source believes was also obtained by [G-11] ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

12.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~ SECRETRE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
IN THE UNITED STATES ~~(S)~~

Source explained that [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> could have carried [the directory] or any other report, to New York to be delivered during a meet with a DGI officer. The possibility also exists that he could have sent it to a P.O. box in New York City. The DGI maintains just such a P. O. box solely for the use of [G-11's] reports. This P. O. box is serviced by a well-trusted person in the New York City area. If any material is received in the P. O. box, this person notifies the CMUN by a pre-arranged signal and an official picks up the material. This is the most important and best P. O. box maintained by the DGI. ~~(S)~~

At this point in the interview, the source was asked if he recognized the name [EUSEBIO VALDES]<sup>(S)</sup> and he advised that he did not. The source advised that an agent who utilized such a P. O. box can mail his reports without notification to the case officer if the report contains nothing urgent. If the report has material which is considered important and urgent, the agent notifies his case officer at the CMUN by coded telephone call. No calls are made by agents directly to the CMUN nor do the DGI officials at the CMUN call from the CMUN to the agent's home telephone. Any telephone calls between principal and agent are conducted through the use of public telephones and are pre-arranged. These plans are carefully coordinated. If the DGI in Havana gives instructions to [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> it will coordinate these instructions by notifying the CMUN. Also, if the CMUN gives instructions to [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> this is coordinated with Havana. The only time this plan would not be utilized is in the event of an emergency and in that case, the notification is given to the other office as quickly as possible. ~~(S)~~ *No loc.*

[G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> has been instructed to utilize a coded system of putting [chalk marks] or other simple [signals on sidewalks]<sup>(S)</sup> for the DGI officers, signifying that all is ready for a meet to take place or if danger exists. The exchange of ~~(S)~~

13.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

RE: [CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES]  
[IN THE UNITED STATES] (U)

information in [New York between G-11] (S) and his principal is done either through a [dead drop or a brush meet]. (S) At least two officers are utilized in making the meet. One is used to make the actual meet and the other to watch for FBI surveillances. Additionally, the second officer accompanies the principal in order to provide protection to the principal. This is especially true if the agent is not well known or trusted, as in the case of [EPIFANIO ROMERO]. (S) When dealing with such a person, the officers arm themselves. [G-11] (S) of course, was completely trusted and was often met alone by a principal but the usual practice was to use a second man to detect surveillances. Sometimes the second officer who accompanies the principal is going along for training and orientation in this type of work. (S) (S)

Source said in the past [no equipment to detect FBI surveillances] has been utilized [by DGI officers in New York City, but he understands that recently, the DGI has planned to [utilize sophisticated equipment] to detect possible surveillances. He does not know if it is currently in use. (S) (S)

In order to send routine reports directly to Havana, [G-11 types an enciphered] (S) message, [photographs] (S) the message, and through the use of an [enlarger, reduces] (S) the message to its [smallest possible size. G-11] (S) continues this [process] (S) for a second and third time with the resulting product becoming a [positive print. This positive print] (S) is [affixed] (S) to a [small stamp dipped] (S) in a [chemical solution] (S) and the [stamped impression] (S) put on a [specific page in a] (S) [magazine] and then mailed to an accommodation address in (S) Havana. The [type of film] (S) used in this operation is furnished to [G-11] (S) from Havana since the [film] (S) is only used by experts and purchase of it would call unnecessary attention to [G-11]. (S) (S)

14.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

SECRET

RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~ ~~(S)~~ (U)

(S) When this [stamped impression] arrives in Havana, the [process] is reversed and the DGI is able to produce the [enciphered message]. These messages are then prepared in final form and sent to the appropriate DGI official. ~~(S)~~ (S)

In order to receive the coded [radio messages] sent from Havana to [G-11], the source said he believes [G-11] has a [radio] with a [short-wave band] capable of receiving [transmissions] from Cuba. [G-11] apparently follows a regular schedule of [transmissions] and the messages are probably numbered. ~~(S)~~ (S)

Contacts with [G-11] made by CMUN officials are planned well in advance and various methods to avoid detection by the FBI are utilized. [Ninety percent of] meets with [G-11] which will involve exchanging a considerable amount of information or giving instructions are made in hotel rooms. For example, one contact with [G-11] lasted almost an entire day in a hotel room. ~~(S)~~ (S)

One instance which is often talked about in DGI offices in Havana concerns a meet made with [G-11] by ALEJANDRO. ALEJANDRO reported that prior to the meet he was concerned that he would be detected by the FBI. In order to avoid detection, [ALEJANDRO] got inside a large box which had contained a new [air conditioner] unit purchased by the CMUN. Other CMUN officials loaded the [box with ALEJANDRO] in it in a vehicle and took him to the house of the Cuban Ambassador. Inside the house, [ALEJANDRO] got out, left the house, and made his meet. He then returned to the [Ambassador's] house and got back [in the box]. The other officials then [loaded the box] in the [S] vehicle and took [ALEJANDRO] back to the CMUN. ~~(S)~~ (S)

\*Payments to G-11 ~~(S)~~ (S)

Source knows of no situation where an agent receives a regular salary. In the case of [G-11], all his expenses for ~~(S)~~ (S)

15.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

RE: ~~[~~ CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ~~]~~  
IN THE UNITED STATES ~~(S)~~(u)

trips, materials, etc., are paid. If [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> asks for money or says he needs a certain amount of money, this money is given to him. ~~(S)~~(S)

~~[~~ Trips to New York City ~~]~~ ~~(S)~~(u)

Source does not know whether [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> travels to New York by plane or automobile. [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> would probably utilize more than one method and alternate them. The mode of travel would probably depend on the urgency of the situation. When [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> does travel to New York, his expenses usually amount to approximately \$150.00<sup>(S)</sup>. He is reimbursed for the cost of these trips. ~~(S)~~(S)

~~[~~ Confidence in G-11 ~~]~~ ~~(S)~~(S)

<sup>(S)</sup> The DGI considers [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> to be [its most important agent] in the United States. It has the highest confidence in him. His information is always very exact and can be relied upon. Source does not know the basis for this great confidence which is placed in [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup>. He does not know whether [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> belonged to the old Cuban Communist Party. [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> has always furnished precise information in contrast to other agents like [EPIFANIO ROMERO]<sup>(S)</sup>, who would send a great deal of information some of it accurate but mostly erroneous. Source does not know whether [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> is still operating in [Miami]<sup>(S)</sup>, but he assumes that he is. ~~(S)~~(S)

<sup>(S)</sup> To illustrate the kind of confidence placed in [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> by the DGI, source related that the DGI on one occasion desired to have [a letter]<sup>(S)</sup> which had been prepared in the DGI offices, [placed in the car of MIGUEL ROCHE MONROY]<sup>(S)</sup>, a Cuban defector who was residing in the [Washington, D. C.,]<sup>(S)</sup> area prior to his death. [G-11]<sup>(S)</sup> was picked for this mission because he was [the most important and most trusted agent in]<sup>(S)</sup> ~~(S)~~(S)

16.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~ (u)

the United States. The DGI considered this a matter of great importance and absolutely did not want anything to go wrong. [EDUARDO ARAOZ AGEDO (DGI code name AGEO)]<sup>(s)</sup>, a DGI official, told the source that it was [G-11]<sup>(s)</sup> who had put the letter on ROCHE MONROY's car<sup>(s)</sup> and just as he had placed it inside the door handle<sup>(s)</sup>, he observed a policeman leaving [ROCHE MONROY's] house. Apparently the policeman did not observe [G-11]<sup>(s)</sup> (S)

\*Significance of [Symbol G-11]<sup>(s)</sup> (S)

Source explained that the DGI assigns [code numbers]<sup>(s)</sup> and/or [code names]<sup>(s)</sup> to all investigative and agent matters. This is handled by the [Code Name and Number]<sup>(s)</sup> Section of the DGI. Neither the "G" nor the "11" has any significance concerning the agent's place of work, his level of development, or his background. This [code number]<sup>(s)</sup> is picked indiscriminately and it is, therefore, impossible to identify an agent from the [number]<sup>(s)</sup> assigned. The [Code Symbol Section]<sup>(s)</sup> utilizes all [letters]<sup>(s)</sup> of the alphabet and numbers up to 300<sup>(s)</sup>. No particular [letter]<sup>(s)</sup> is used for agents. Source pointed out that the [symbol] for EPIFANIO ROMERO was C-5<sup>(s)</sup> and his [code name]<sup>(s)</sup> was GATO. C-6 and G-10<sup>(s)</sup> may refer to agents or these [numbers]<sup>(s)</sup> may refer to other matters of interest to DGI, such as an exile organization, an individual in Miami, or some student group in New York City. These [numbers]<sup>(s)</sup> are strictly for internal use. The agents do not know [their symbol numbers]<sup>(s)</sup> and these [numbers]<sup>(s)</sup> are never changed or given to another person or matter. (S)

The [names and photographs]<sup>(s)</sup> of various persons who have been under investigation by the FBI as possible agents of CIS were brought to the attention of source. The only [photograph] which source recognized<sup>(s)</sup> was that of [EPIFANIO ROMERO]<sup>(s)</sup>. The names of other individuals were recognized by the source. Although source said he does not know the name of [G-11]<sup>(s)</sup>, he believed that none of these individuals could be identical with [G-11]<sup>(s)</sup>. However, he said it would not be possible for him to definitely eliminate [JOSE CARBONELL]<sup>(s)</sup> (S)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~ (S)(U)

These individuals, with source's comments, are set forth below: (S)(U)

~~EPIFANIO ROMERO DELGADO~~ (S) a

(S) ROMERO sent a letter to the CIS in 1967 while he was in prison in Florida, offering his services to the CIS. ROMERO became an agent of the CIS and was given specific training in the handling of information and reports. He was handled by JULIAN and ESTEBAN at the CMUN. Although ROMERO was considered to be extremely capable and was able to obtain information concerning numerous exile groups and their activities, his information was never relied on because of the great deal of erroneous data provided by him. The DGI did not trust ROMERO and it was its conclusion that ROMERO had been doubled by the FBI. ROMERO was given, on occasions, tasks which were not part of the DGI intelligence plan for the purpose of attempting to detect whether he was being operated by the FBI. (S)(U)

Following the persona non grata action taken against JULIAN and ESTEBAN by the U. S. Department of State, the DGI concluded that ROMERO was responsible, in part, for this action, and determined to bring him to Cuba and execute him. ROMERO did travel to Cuba in late 1969, was captured and imprisoned. Because he has been cooperative with the DGI and furnished information that he had been connected with CIA and the FBI, it has been decided not to execute him but to keep him in prison indefinitely. Source doubts that ROMERO will ever be considered for use as an agent in the future. (S)(U)

~~CLAUDIO MEDINA HERNANDEZ~~ (S) a Fla

(S) MEDINA was recruited to be an agent for the CIS at about the same time as ROMERO. He was given the code name PILOTO. He was also believed to have been doubled by the FBI and was never trusted. He was handled by officials from the (S)(U)

18.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

RE: ~~[CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES]~~ (u)

~~[CMUN, possibly ALEJANDRO. MEDINA]~~ (s) was instructed to obtain information concerning ~~[President NIXON's]~~ (s) residence at ~~[Key Biscayne]~~ (s) Florida. He never obtained any such information and because DGI was convinced he was working for the FBI, he was discontinued. Source has seen the file of ~~[MEDINA]~~ (s) and described it as an old file. He believes ~~[MEDINA]~~ (s) was previously connected with Cuban aviation. (S)(X) (s)

~~[ALFREDO CORDERO PERNIA]~~ (s)

This person was generally known to DGI officials as ~~[TOBITA]~~ (s). The DGI attempted to recruit ~~[CORDERO]~~ (s) through his ~~[sister]~~ (s) in Cuba. They instructed him to meet with an official in New York. ~~[CORDERO]~~ (s) advised that he had no money to travel to New York and was advised that his expenses would be paid. ~~[CORDERO]~~ (s) met with ~~[ALEJANDRO]~~ (s) in New York. He did not appear to be fully cooperative or have potential as an agent. This matter was not pursued further by the DGI, and he was discontinued. (S)(X) (s)

~~[JOSE CALIXTO SANTIAGO VALDES]~~ (s)

Source observed ~~[the photograph]~~ (s) of this individual and said he is sure he has ~~[seen this person or his photograph]~~ (s) previously but he cannot remember exactly when or where. (S)(X) (s)

~~[MARIO ANDRES ROMERO ARIAS]~~ (s) Fla.

Source said this person was believed by the DGI to be an operative of CIA in Miami. The DGI has a file on this individual in Havana. (S)(X)(u)

~~[PEDRO EUGENIO ANDRES PELEGRINO]~~ (s) Cuba Fla.

The DGI has a file containing a great deal of information on ~~[ANDRES]~~ (s). The attempt to recruit ~~[ANDRES]~~ (s) to work for the DGI was made by letter. This letter was one of many form letters which were sent out to selected individuals in recruitment attempts. Source said to the best of his knowledge, ~~[ANDRES]~~ (s) was never utilized as an agent. (S)(X) (s)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RE: [CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES] X(S)(U)  
[IN THE UNITED STATES]

Source neither [recognized the name] nor the [photograph] of the following persons: (S)

- ~~PEDRO OSCAR FERREIRO CALVO~~
- ~~JOSE IGNACIO DIAZ HERNANDEZ~~
- ~~PLACIDO HERNANDEZ VALDES~~
- ~~LESLIE DOBAL SAMPEDRO~~
- ~~ROBERTO CERNUDO TRUJILLO~~
- ~~EVELIO SANTOS MACHADO~~
- ~~RIGOBERTO DELGADO PEREZ~~
- ~~FELIX PELAEZ PENA~~
- ~~LINO PEREZ GOMEZ~~
- ~~EFRAIN DUARTE GARCIA~~
- ~~JOSE CARBONELL MARRERO~~
- ~~ROBERTO LOPEZ MARRERO~~
- ~~SANTIAGO GARRIGA LORENZI~~
- ~~EFRAIN TRUJILLO~~
- ~~RAUL ANDRE LLANO~~
- ~~FEDERICO OTERO~~
- ~~ADOLIS COBOS RICARDO~~
- ~~JUAN RAMOS ZAMBRANO~~
- ~~DANIEL ORESTES CLARO MAUZUARIETA~~
- ~~MIGUEL ENRIQUE ESPINOSA AMEZAGA~~
- ~~SEVERINO BARBA LOPEZ~~

Cuba

(S)  
(S)(X)

Source also [viewed a photograph of EMILIO ECHARTE PEDROSO.] (S) Certain background facts concerning [ECHARTE] were (S) related to source, and he advised that he is not positive but vaguely remembers the story. He said, however, he cannot positively identify [the photograph or] recall with exactness the information concerning him. (S)(X)

[CUBAN AGENT PELOTA] (S)(X)

[Background Information] (S)(U)

Sometime prior to 1967 (S) a [female] (S) who was given the (code name, PELOTA) (S) was recruited in Cuba to serve as an intelligence agent in the United States in the Miami, Florida, (S)(X)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~ *[Handwritten initials]*

area. Source does not know whether ~~PELOTA~~<sup>(S)</sup> is from Havana or what ~~her occupation~~<sup>(S)</sup> was in Cuba. ~~PELOTA~~<sup>(S)</sup> was married in Cuba to an ~~older man~~<sup>(S)</sup> with whom she ~~apparently~~<sup>(S)</sup> was not very much in love. ~~PELOTA~~<sup>(S)</sup> and her husband ~~apparently~~<sup>(S)</sup> had very poor sexual relations, and ~~she~~<sup>(S)</sup> was probably having relations with ~~other men~~<sup>(S)</sup> although Source is not positive about this matter. ~~(S)(C)~~

~~PELOTA~~<sup>(S)</sup> is a very ~~pretty~~<sup>(S)</sup> woman. She ~~has~~<sup>(S)</sup> a very ~~good~~<sup>(S)</sup> figure with a round face and a rather short neck. ~~PELOTA~~<sup>(S)</sup> dressed very well. ~~Her clothes~~<sup>(S)</sup> were not of the type which were available in Cuba and source believes ~~she~~<sup>(S)</sup> had probably obtained them during previous trips to another country, probably the United States. ~~(S)(C)~~

~~EDUARDO ARAOZ AGEDO~~<sup>(S)</sup> (DGI code name ~~AGEO~~<sup>(S)</sup>) ~~apparently~~<sup>(S)</sup> had something to do with ~~PELOTA's~~<sup>(S)</sup> recruitment and training. On one occasion ~~AGEO~~<sup>(S)</sup> claimed that he had been to ~~see PELOTA~~<sup>(S)</sup> at the Hotel Internacional. ~~AGEO~~<sup>(S)</sup> said that he had ~~PELOTA~~<sup>(S)</sup> disrobe and had taken photographs of her at the hotel. ~~AGEO~~<sup>(S)</sup> was accused jokingly by other DGI ~~officials~~<sup>(S)</sup> of ~~having~~<sup>(S)</sup> had sexual relations with ~~PELOTA~~<sup>(S)</sup> on this occasion, but ~~AGEO~~<sup>(S)</sup> denied it. None of the other officials believed ~~AGEO's~~<sup>(S)</sup> denial. ~~(S)(C)~~

~~PELOTA's~~<sup>(S)</sup> husband was financially well off in Cuba. Source believes that ~~PELOTA~~<sup>(S)</sup> and her husband ~~came~~<sup>(S)</sup> to the United States after ~~her recruitment~~<sup>(S)</sup> by way of Mexico although he is not sure. ~~She~~<sup>(S)</sup> was not the type of person who would travel as a refugee. ~~(S)(C)~~

Source believes that ~~PELOTA~~<sup>(S)</sup> speaks some English. ~~(S)(C)~~

~~Residence in the United States~~ ~~(S)(C)~~

~~PELOTA~~<sup>(S)</sup> apparently lived very close to the ~~Homestead~~<sup>(S)</sup> Air Force Base. ~~She~~<sup>(S)</sup> was apparently able to get to the base ~~(S)(C)~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~ ~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~ (u)

with ease and quickness. (S) [She] developed a female friend who was married to a pilot or an airman who was stationed at [Homestead] Air Force Base. This pilot was believed to be either a North American or of Puerto Rican extraction, and his wife was possibly of Cuban extraction. Source is not able to define exactly this relationship or the background of the pilot and his wife. Through the friendship of and association with this couple, [PELOTA] (S) was able to obtain information concerning the air base, which was furnished to DGI. [She] also furnished photographs of the base and its surroundings. (S) This information was never considered to be of great significance or value. The reports sent to Cuba by [PELOTA] were prepared by means (S) of the white carbon method. Source believes that [PELOTA] (S) taught school in the primary school system in the Miami area. He does not believe (S) she taught school in Cuba but (S) does not know for sure. (S) (u)

~~Trips to Canada~~ (S) (u)

In about 1968, [PELOTA] (S) became involved in some type of activity believed to have something to do with leftist movements. Source believes this activity involved demonstrations or protests, probably against the war in Vietnam. Because of this activity, [PELOTA] came to the attention of the FBI and was interviewed by the FBI. This interview had nothing to do with [her intelligence] (S) activities but was strictly in regard to [her involvement] (S) with leftist activities. [PELOTA] (S) advised the CIS in Havana of this FBI contact. [She] was instructed to go to [Canada] (S) and meet with her principal, ARQUIMEDES (Last Name Unknown) (DGI code name INFANTE). INFANTE made the trip to [Canada] on a Cuban boat. (S) [PELOTA] traveled to [Canada] (S) after obtaining permission from United States authorities to leave the country. [She] obtained (S) this permission because [she] was not a citizen. (S) (u)

In [Canada], she (S) met with [INFANTE] (S) and explained what had happened. [INFANTE] (S) counseled [her] (S) on what to say and how (S) (u)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~ SECRETRE: [CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES] X (u)  
[IN THE UNITED STATES]

to reach if the FBI should talk to [her again].<sup>(s)</sup> Apparently [she was] subsequently interviewed by the FBI. [She again]<sup>(s)</sup> advised CIS in Havana by coded message, utilizing the code that [she was] very sick, meaning that the FBI continued to be interested [in her].<sup>(s)</sup> At this juncture the DGI discontinued the operation of [PELOTA].<sup>(s)</sup>

[PELOTA]<sup>(s)</sup> apparently made a second trip to [Canada].<sup>(s)</sup> during the last part of 1967 or early 1968. This trip occurred during the time [Expo 67] was in progress in [Montreal]. PELOTA made her [trips] to [Canada] in the company of [her husband].<sup>(s)</sup> On the latter trip, [PELOTA] made contact with someone in the Cuban Government, possibly at the [Cuban Consulate in Canada].<sup>(s)</sup> Source does not know whom [she] met or the exact nature of the [contact].<sup>(s)</sup>

\*Contact with District Attorney X (u)

In Miami, [PELOTA]<sup>(s)</sup> became acquainted with a District Attorney. This District Attorney is possibly employed by [Dade] County. This fact is not known by the source. This District Attorney apparently was having [an affair with PELOTA].<sup>(s)</sup> From information which source heard concerning [PELOTA],<sup>(s)</sup> he received the impression that the District Attorney was somewhat older than [PELOTA], as is PELOTA's husband.<sup>(s)</sup> When [PELOTA] got involved in the leftist activity, the District Attorney warned [her] about it. He told her she was getting involved in something which could cause her trouble.<sup>(s)</sup> He told her the police were aware of [her activities],<sup>(s)</sup> and [she should] cease. This District Attorney is believed to have assisted [PELOTA] when she asked permission to leave the United States [when she] traveled to [Canada].<sup>(s)</sup>

This District Attorney's name was in the newspapers several times during the time [PELOTA] was being operated. His name usually appeared with the first initial and his last name, which source believes to be a short name. Clippings concerning this official were sent to the DGI, which maintains a file on [PELOTA].<sup>(s)</sup>

23.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RE: ~~[CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES]~~ (u)

him. It is source's impression that this District Attorney handled very important cases involving major matters of governmental interest. He is not believed to handle small criminal cases. (S)(X)

This District Attorney has some [type of connection] (S) with Cuba. He has an American surname, but source believes he was [born in Cuba] (S) and left there when he was about one to two years old. Inquiries in Cuba concerning him were made with negative results. Source believes that his parents were possibly [working in Cuba] (S) at the time the District Attorney was born. He has been employed as a District Attorney for a long time. His mother is believed to possibly [be of Cuban extraction.] (S)(X)

Association With Two Cuban Brothers in Miami (S)

[PELOTA] (S) became acquainted with two Cuban exiles who [are brothers.] (S) These brothers [are] believed to have a third brother (S) At least two of [the brothers] (S) were being operated by CIA in Miami. Source was given the impression from conversations overheard in Havana that [PELOTA] (S) was probably [involved sexually with one of the brothers] (S) Source said he has heard the names of [the brothers] (S) and he believes they (S) have a short surname which begins with [“B”] (S)(X)

Names of several Cubans known to have resided in the Miami area and believed to have been operated by CIA were mentioned to source with negative results. These names are as follows: (S)(u)

- MIGUEL SOTOLONGO
- EDUARDO SOTOLONGO
- TEOFILO BABUN
- LOMBERTO DIAZ
- SILVIO MORA
- LUIS TORNES
- LUIS POSADA
- ROGELIO DIAZ
- ROBERTO PARSONS

Cuba  
File  
(S)(u)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~

RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~ (u)

~~MARIO ANDRES ROMERO~~  
~~RIGOBERTO DELGADO~~  
~~ELIO GRILLO~~  
~~(First Name Unknown) SAJITO~~  
~~TONO SAAVEDRA~~  
~~RAFAEL LEON~~  
~~JULIO CRUZ~~  
~~PEDRO DIAZ~~  
~~DIONISIO PASTRANA~~  
~~JUAN SAJEDA~~  
~~NINO DIAZ~~  
~~JORGE ARMAS~~  
~~RUBEN MENDIOLA~~  
~~(First Name Unknown) VINAS~~  
~~JULIO CESAR CANIZARES~~  
~~CARLOS PEREZ SANCHEZ~~  
~~ENRIQUE ALVAREZ~~  
~~JULIAN PEREZ~~

Cuba  
 Flan (u)

(s) The following names and photographs of Cuban females who have been under investigation by the FBI were presented to source inasmuch as source said he has seen PELOTA's photograph and knows her name and would recognize either if he saw them again: (u) (s)

~~ELBA PEREZ OTERO~~  
~~FELICIA GONZALEZ VELIZ~~  
~~RAMONA IRZA CHIRINO GONZALEZ~~  
~~EDITH REINOSO HERNANDEZ~~  
~~CONSUELO VALDES OLIVA~~  
~~CIRA MONTANO LEZCANO~~  
~~JUSTINA MIREYA MORENO GONZALEZ~~  
~~LIBERTAD MARIA ANTIGUA ARENCIBIA~~  
~~MARIA LOURDES BLANCO DIAZ~~  
~~GLORIA MORATA CANADA~~

Cuba  
 Flan (u)

Source advised that none of the above individuals were identical to PELOTA. (u) (s)

(s) 25.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~ (u)

~~UNKNOWN SUBJECT;~~ (s)  
~~CUBAN ILLEGAL AGENT~~ WHO WORKED  
~~AT TALISMAN SUGAR CORPORATION,~~  
~~SOUTH BAY, FLORIDA~~ (s)

This agent was recruited by ~~PEDRO LUIS PINERO~~  
~~EIRIN (DGI code name ALEJANDRO)~~ (s) This agent is from  
Matanzas Province in Cuba. Source believes this person  
was residing in the United States and returned to Cuba  
on some type of mission, possibly an infiltration mission  
for CIA, at which time he was arrested and recruited for  
CIS service. This agent did not undergo a ~~full-scale~~ (s)  
training program. He was sent to the United States to  
attempt to obtain information concerning CIA operations  
and anti-CASTRO activities. In the United States, he worked  
briefly for the ~~Talisman Sugar Corporation~~ in South Bay, (s)  
Florida. While there, he furnished information to CIS  
concerning ~~PEDRO EUGENIO ANDRES PELEGRINO~~ (s) and his activities.  
He also furnished information concerning other Cuban exiles  
whose names source cannot remember. This agent reported that  
~~ANDRES PELEGRINO~~ (s) was working at ~~Talisman~~ (s) as a ~~tractor foreman~~ (s) (s) (s) (s)

This unknown agent was the ~~most important agent~~ (s) CIS  
operated in the United States ~~until G-11~~ (s) was dispatched.  
However, this unknown agent's reports were never very complete  
and were sporadic. It was extremely difficult to communicate  
with him, and his reports contained less information after  
the ~~arrival of G-11~~ (s) and were delayed for long periods of time.  
When ~~Cuban Agent G-11~~ (s) was sent to the United States, it was  
the hope of the DGI that he would soon be able to handle most  
of the intelligence reporting. After he began to report on a  
regular basis, the unknown agent was discontinued. Additionally,  
some type of problem with the unknown agent developed. The  
source said he cannot recall the nature of the problem; however,  
it was of such importance that the DGI discontinued his operation.  
This probably occurred sometime in 1968. (s) (s) (s) (s)

While he was reporting, this unknown agent reported  
on infiltrations of CIA, times of departure of infiltration (s) (s)

26.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~ (S) (X) (u)  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~

groups, and other information concerning Cuban exile activity. His reports were never [as valuable] as those submitted by [G-11]. He sent reports via the CMUN. He was [not trained] in the [reception of radio messages]. Not only was communication with him very difficult, but it was also very hard to obtain information and reports from him. Source believes that this unknown agent was handled by

[ALEJANDRO] (S) (X)

Source said he is unable to provide a description of this unknown individual. He believes he has seen a photograph of him in the DGI archives but is not sure. He said he believes he has a nickname, something like "POCHO" or "PACHO". Source said he is not positive about this. He does believe that this unknown individual was a revolutionary prior to 1959 but does not know whether he fought with FIDEL CASTRO or was engaged in some other fighting. (S) (X)

[CARLOS ALBERTO SANTANA] (S) (X)

[SANTANA] is a young Cuban who is very much in favor of the regime of FIDEL CASTRO. [SANTANA] has received a considerable amount of training in espionage and sabotage matters supposedly for future activity in foreign countries. Source believes that [SANTANA] was trained for possible future action in the United States. Source believes that the plan for [SANTANA] was to have him leave Cuba sometime around October, 1970. This departure would have probably taken place along with other Cubans who were also being readied for such foreign activity. Source is aware, however, that [SANTANA] did not leave at that time for some reason but has possibly departed subsequently. The original plan was for [SANTANA] to leave Cuba and travel to the United States and enter illegally, probably under a false name. (S) (X)

[SANTANA's] father's name is also [CARLOS SANTANA]. His father was in prison in Cuba accused and convicted of having attempted to poison FIDEL CASTRO. The older [CARLOS] (S) (X)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

133

DATE: 11-14-2017

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~  
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~ *JAB(y)*

~~(S)~~ [SANTANA] had been a member of the ~~(S)~~ [Cuban Navy] for many years. As part of the plan to send ~~(S)~~ [SANTANA] to the United States as an agent, the CIS planned to release his father from jail, send him to Miami as a refugee, and expect him to establish residence in the Miami area. The father would not have knowledge of his son's training or mission in the United States and would be expected to normally make contact with exiles and exile organizations in Miami. The son would then attempt to obtain information concerning these exiles and their activities through his father. To the best of source's knowledge, no attempt has ever been made to recruit the father. ~~(S)~~ [SANTANA]'s mother, name unknown, continues to reside in Cuba. She is divorced from ~~(S)~~ [SANTANA]'s father and probably remarried by now. ~~(S)~~ [SANTANA] lived with his mother on ~~(S)~~ [17th Street near 4th Avenue in Havana. This is very near the residence of] ~~(S)~~ [FIDEL CASTRO. ~~(S)~~]

~~(S)~~ [SANTANA] is well known by the source. The source last saw him during the early Fall of 1970. ~~(S)~~ Source believed that if ~~(S)~~ [SANTANA] is in the United States and learns of ~~(S)~~ [source's defection], he will undoubtedly leave and return to Cuba. Also, source believes that if ~~(S)~~ [SANTANA] has not yet departed Cuba for his mission, he will probably not come to the United States because of source's presence here. However, source pointed out that ~~(S)~~ [SANTANA] is not afraid of anything and would be willing to take any assignment. Source does not believe he would be used in an attempt to seek revenge on source because he is so well known by source. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~ Source described ~~(S)~~ [SANTANA] as a white Cuban male, ~~(S)~~ [24 to 25] years old, slender, 5' 8" tall, 140 pounds, black hair, and very young looking. According to the source, ~~(S)~~ [SANTANA] speaks English quite well. He appears to be about 17 to 18 years old. ~~(S)~~ [SANTANA] has no unusual physical characteristics and does not drink very much; however, he does have a great weakness for women. The DGI has had trouble with ~~(S)~~ [SANTANA] in the past because of his apparent inability to stay away from women. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

28.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

1333