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Sept

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM: *Wew*
WE/1/CE
Ext. 2053

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. WE/1/Finland		9/9	9/9	AK
2. DC/WE-1			9 Sept	BS
3. C/WE/1			9/9	BF
4.				
5. SR/2/CE	2607	10 SEP 1959	10.9.	9
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NAME OFFICE

NAME TITLE

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HAROLD GRANQUIST WE/1/CE

RELEASING OFFICER

NAME TITLE

Benjamin A. G. Fuller
BENJAMIN A. G. FULLER C/WE/1

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT

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FILE NUMBER

201-150156

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

21 SEP 1959

DOCUMENT NUMBER

OFHW-2915-2937

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. DFHM-2925 2937
TO INFO	Chief of Station, [redacted]	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 20L-150156 21 SEP 1959	
FROM	Chief, WE	DATE	
SUBJECT	Costille/GOLUB/AKPANKE/5 Contacts	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)	
ACTION REQUIRED	See below	<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
REFERENCE(S)			

1. Headquarters' components have given considerable thought to the Costille/GOLUB/AKPANKE/5 contacts, and we shall attempt to outline below the gist of the consensus of opinion derived therefrom.

2. Putting first things first, it is believed that AKPANKE/5 (referred to as A/5 hereafter) has displayed naivete to too great a degree, both politically and emotionally, to be permitted to become any further involved in this liaison. This, together with her expressed aversion to covert activity, could make for problems in running her as a penetration double agent. Our reasoning is as follows.

3. The very fact that A/5, a KUBARK agent, and GOLUB, a known KISNIK, are in contact with each other, has implications which warrant close scrutiny. While it may be a bit too early to ponder the direction GOLUB's interest could take, (is GOLUB sizing up A/5 for recruitment, or is he falling for her, genuinely?) the following comments are offered in the knowledge that they are, by and large, self-evident. GOLUB has taken the initiative in maintaining contact with A/5, which follows the not uncommon modus operandi of a gift, dimers, movies, an appeal to the intellect, language lessons, and a little liaison initiated through the "jilted husband" routine. All of these contacts have revolved around A/5's apartment, which brings up the question of the [redacted] roommate. It would be odd to us if a native [redacted] sharing an apartment with an American, wouldn't be suspicious of a Soviet coming to the apartment for language lessons, phoning regularly, taking the American out to dinner, theater, etc. Perhaps Costille has already satisfied himself on this point, but Headquarters would appreciate being assured of the roommate's status and reliability.

4. GOLUB has made provocative remarks to both A/5 and Costille, including some pertaining to the A/5-Costille relationship, A/5's trip to the USSR, the likelihood that GOLUB's contact with A/5 had come to the attention of the U.S. Embassy with resultant inquiries instigated by Costille, and to the possibility that A/5 was reporting on her contact with GOLUB to the U.S. Embassy. Undoubtedly the thought has occurred to the [redacted] that GOLUB may well have Costille tabbed as an AIS officer specializing in REDSKIN-type operations. As you will recall, in a couple of instances GOLUB hinted to A/5 that he suspected that someone else was paying for her trip to the USSR when he asked her to whom did she have to account for her expenditures. Some of the things GOLUB might hope to gain from these contacts, assuming that he is suspicious of both Costille and A/5, are: an indication of the type of people PBPRIME sends on REDSKIN missions, what their backgrounds are and perhaps how they are spotted (e.g., whether they are students of Soviet affairs, or of the Russian language, etc.), what the backgrounds are of the AIS officers running the operations, and related matters. It might be doubted that GOLUB himself is a specialist in CE operations against the AIS, since he, as KGB Resident would have broader responsibilities. However, he might well be interested in "keeping his hand in" and of maintaining some personal contacts with Americans in order to get his own first-hand im-

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CLASSIFICATION
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pressions. It might be interesting to see whether after a while he turns over the Costille contact to someone else, such as Viktor Matveyevich ZEGAL, to whom he has introduced Costille. In this context, it is interesting to consider the Embassy report received as an attachment to OFRA-4067. In this report, Costille, says that CHALKOVSKIY, ZEGAL and GOLUB seem to be maintaining the majority of contacts with Americans. Some time ago we at Headquarters wondered if CHALKOVSKIY might be planning to specialize in American contacts, since he was the one who took over the [redacted] contact. And ZEGAL has spent considerable time in the United States, so he might be something of an American specialist, too.

5. It is difficult to say whether the following is relevant or not, but we were interested to read a recent [redacted] dispatch concerning a luncheon involving a KUBARKer and two known RIS officers. At this luncheon the suspect KGB Resident in Denmark alleged that one out of every three American visitors to the USSR is a spy. Here we have the suspect KGB Residents in two Scandinavian countries simultaneously expressing the same thoughts to and about Americans. We realize that one shouldn't try to make too much out of these coincidences, but it is worth noting that in Denmark the KGB Resident has subsequently turned over the contact with the AIS officer to an underling at the same time that GOLUB is introducing Costille to ZEGAL, who may, in turn, carry on the contacts. We plan to point out this coincidence to the [redacted]

6. To get back to the case in point: The pattern of A/5's contacts with GOLUB suggests that the latter has spotted and is in the process of assessing, and cultivating A/5. It may be that GOLUB is trying to involve A/5 in a romantic relationship in which emotional control could be exercised, since it is quite unlikely that this shrewd intelligence operator "likes her for her mind". It would also seem that the Soviets have a continuing interest in Costille and assuming that they are aware of at least some of the Costille-A/5 contacts, they may have in mind recruiting A/5 to get information on Costille and other American targets. GOLUB certainly appears to be trying to get A/5 on the "hook", be it for herself or to get information on the AIS, or both.

7. Costille says he has never been seen with A/5 and that all contact with her has been held in his apartment or car. However, it appears quite possible that their meetings have been observed, if the RIS had an inclination to do so, and it may well be that GOLUB is aware of the contact. It is requested that Costille advise Headquarters, for record purposes, as to the means of contact employed by him and A/5: telephone, meeting plans for a certain day of each week or alternate days, etc. Also, does she come unaccompanied to his apartment or does he meet her at a designated place, what is the usual hour (daylight or dark), duration of visit; if meeting is in his car, where do they meet, do they drive around, where does he drop her off? All of this could be surveilled by the Soviets, if they were so inclined.

8. If our suspicion is correct that GOLUB has A/5 and Costille tabbed, from a CE standpoint it would be appropriate to discourage any further contact between A/5 and GOLUB. He might just continue to fish around for occasional items of operational intelligence, and we see nothing to be gained from the contact. A/5 might have enough of a sense of mission to allow herself to be egged on into a conversation from which GOLUB would derive more benefit than she or we. If GOLUB wants to defect, he won't need A/5's help, and he's probably too sharp, and she too untutored, for us to be the winner in a continuation of this relationship. At this point, it is suggested that Costille himself be careful in his relations with GOLUB and report in detail on all such contacts.

9. The REDSKIN angle concerning A/5 will be covered in a separate dispatch.

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- Distribution:
2 - [redacted]
1 - RI
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ME/1/CE/[redacted]/sjm
9 September 1959

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