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REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

PROJECT: LIENVOY

CASE OFFICER: Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

STATION: Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION: Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Jan
11 Feb 65

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PROJECT LIENVOY RENEWAL

A. CURRENT OBJECTIVES

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The LIENVOY Project provides for a [redacted] telephone tap unit and for (a [redacted]) [redacted] The tap unit provides direct support necessary to cover targets and operational programs levied on the Mexico Station via the RMD as well as spot requests from Headquarters and other Stations. This Project also produces positive intelligence.

B. CHANGES

(1) Operational Mechanism

01,01 The LIENVOY Project was⁰¹ created in late (1958) and put into operation in early (1959) at the request of (LITENSOR) who appointed (LIELEGANT) as his special 01,024 assistant to work with Willard C. CURTIS in the supervision and administration of the project. In mid-1964 it became evident that (LIRAMA) would replace (LITENSOR) in²⁴ December 1964. (LIRAMA was then LITEMPO-2 and a [redacted] with [redacted] Willard C. CURTIS under the LITEMPO [redacted] (LIRAMA (LITEMPO-2)) asked CURTIS and (LIELEGANT) for a conference (reported to Headquarters in MEXI-0521 dated 10 August 1964).⁰¹ At this meeting, (LIRAMA) advised that 01 (LITENSOR) had briefed him on the LIENVOY Project in detail and that it should be 01 continued with the same personnel and manner of operation.⁰¹ (LIELEGANT) and (LIENVOY-2) have been given nominal positions which provide cover for daily reports to (LIRAMA) 01 31 [redacted] are also being provided for Staff Agent Arnold F. AREHART and the local agents working in the LP.⁰¹ (LIRAMA) has requested that the LP remain in its present location and has provided a [redacted] for the inside of the front doorway which prohibits entry to anyone [redacted] 24

(2) Agents

During the last project year there have been no changes in the agent personnel. For the information of reviewing officials there is enclosed as Attachment-1, a chart listing current LIENVOY targets as well as functions of LIENVOY agents. Arnold F. AREHART, Staff Agent, has been responsible for maintenance of the technical equipment for the past five years. His work continues to be outstanding and accounts for the fact that after almost six years' use, the equipment is in good working order and has sustained a minimum of loss through negligent breakage or theft (both very common in Mexico). There has been no major mechanical breakdown since AREHART has been supervising the maintenance of the equipment.

C. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

While telephone tap operations are commonly classified as "support operations", the LIENVOY Project by nature of some of its targets, has produced considerable

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positive intelligence. It has been reviewed both at Headquarters and in the Mexico Station as one of the most productive telephone tap projects in KUBARK of both FI and CI/CE information.

(1) FI information. From 1 February 1964 through 31 December 1964, this project was the source of 240 positive reports. The general subject categories within which these reports fall as related to objectives of the most recent RMD (HMMS-3190 dated 21 October 1963) are:

Priority A. 1, 2, 3, and Priority B. 1, 2, and 4.
Cuban Embassy Activities in Mexico
Soviet Embassy Activities in Mexico

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Communist Party of Mexico (PCM) Activities in Mexico
Communist Front Activities (Movimiento Liberacion Nacional - MLN) in Mexico
Activities of Communist, Leftist, figures
Activities of Communist China representatives in Mexico

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(2) CI/CE information. In addition to the general subject categories of FI interest, the LIENVOY Project fulfills a standing requirement to provide CI/CE data on the following selected targets: Cuban Embassy - six lines; Soviet Embassy - five lines; Czech Embassy - two lines; Polish Embassy - 2 lines; Yugoslav Embassy - two lines (disconnected in April 1964); and the Communist Chinese News Agency (NCNA) - one line (being installed as of January 1965).

D. EFFECTIVENESS

(1) From 1 February 1964 through December 1964 (eleven months) the LIENVOY Project covered a total of 30 (thirty) targets simultaneously which provided 7,462 reels of raw take. This was processed into 21,564 pages of transcripts (of this amount actual count by LIENVOY processors was 17,064 pages, an estimate by the outside Czech translator was 1,500 pages, Russian translator 2,000 pages, and Polish translator 1,000). Enclosed as Attachment-2 is a copy of the work load log and list of targets which Arnold F. AREHART provides the Station on a monthly basis. This log, of course, includes only the work done inside the LP and variance of monthly figures is accounted for by additional work done by other Station () translators.

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(2) (a) [Mexican] Targets. Of the 30 lines covered, 15 of them are always exclusively for KUBARK. The remaining targets are selected by (LIRAMA) but are usually of interest to KUBARK as sources of positive intelligence. The [Mexican] targets covered during the past project year were:

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Of the 19 targets listed above, 15 were covered simultaneously depending upon [] interest in the individual at the time; however, lines to all the above run into the intercept center and can be connected as machines become available when other lines are out of order or disconnected for one reason or another.

The reels from the above targets are not transcribed completely, LIENVOY monitors extract significant conversations and include them in the []²⁴ the original of which is read daily by (LIRAMA) and a copy of which is delivered daily to the Mexico Station. The reels are retained usually for ten days for fuller transcripts if requested by [] or by the Mexico Station. The [] is typed in four copies at the end of each day (covering conversations which occurred that day). On the following morning by 0800 hours, one copy is hand-carried by (LIENVOY-2) to LIRAMA. At the same time, Arnold F. AREHART delivers a copy to Robert B. RIGGS for delivery to Willard C. CURTIS. A third copy is delivered to (LIELEGANT by LIENVOY-2). The fourth copy is retained in a chronological file in the intercept center. 01.01

(b) KUBARK Targets. The Mexico Station CI/CE requirement is partially fulfilled by LIENVOY which during the past project year covered the telephone lines of the Cuban Embassy, Soviet Embassy, Czech Embassy, Polish Embassy, Yugoslav Embassy, and made preliminary installation for the Communist Chinese News Agency (NCNA). There follows selected significant examples of the LIENVOY product from each of these targets with a Station appraisal of its effectiveness.

1. Cuban Embassy. The six lines covered are:

14 42 37	The Ambassador's private telephone
25 07 95	The Chancery
14 13 26	The Chancery
25 09 14	The Commercial Office
11 28 47	The Consulate
25 07 77	Elena Vasquez Gomez

The Chancery and Consulate lines regularly identify foreigners in Mexico who contact the Cuban Embassy. Expeditionary processing of the transcripts frequently permits the Station to arrange for unilateral surveillance and identification of other contacts. The Commercial Office coverage provides information on Cuban Commercial activities in Mexico and identification of firms dealing with Cuba.

The Elena Vasquez Gomez target has been of interest in connection with the AMROD operation. The AMROD Headquarters Case Officer, Thomas

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G. URQUHART (ps), presently in Mexico on temporary duty has provided the Station with the following evaluation of the LIENVOY product: "The LIENVOY production on the Cuban Embassy traffic in Mexico City has been one of the basic elements contributing to the success of the AMROD operation, directed against the CUIS for CA purposes. The LIENVOY operation has been of value in two general senses: a. The documentary material derived from the texts has formed some of the basis for reconstruction of historical facts needed for the operation. b. The day to day coverage has enabled the case officer on the AMROD operation to sense the climate inside the target, to keep track of the movements of key opposition personnel, to check on the bona fides of certain agents, to check the work of others for veracity and to live monitor portions of the reactions to the AMROD operation itself. Being able to keep track of the shifts and movements of the opposition and their personal relations has been of vital importance to this operation. On two occasions the AMROD Case Officer also used the LIENVOY base as his command post when engineering personal contacts between a KUBARK staffer and the opposition. This type of close support did much to determine the success of those meetings and contributed greatly to the success of the operation. These transcripts provide one of the best sounding boards for the AMROD operation and are regularly forwarded to me at Headquarters."

The six lines above are fully transcribed by LIENVOY transcribers and delivered by AREHART to RIGGS each morning. Lengthy conversations sometimes require an additional day for transcription. A carbon copy is pouched weekly to Headquarters for WH/SA use. The original is retained by the Mexico Station. A third copy is retained in the intercept center chronological files.⁰¹ (LIRAMA) does not read these transcripts unless some significant item appears in the which causes him to ask for a fuller transcript or listen to the tape.

The coverage of this target also yields a good picture of daily activities, residences, personal habits and weaknesses of Cuban official personnel in Mexico. This is used by Station Case Officers in selection of targets for recruitment and in checking on activities of agents already recruited and either working for or in contact with Embassy officials.

2. Soviet Embassy. The Soviet Government has over fifty officials permanently stationed in Mexico (the largest foreign embassy except for the U.S.). Thirty-four of these Soviets (almost 70 percent of the staff) are known or suspect intelligence officers. The five lines under LIENVOY provide details on the activities of most of these Soviets. The lines are:

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- 15 60 55 Soviet Consulate and Chancery. This line is used by fifteen (15) known or suspect KGB officers. It is also used by foreigners in Mexico attempting to make contact with the Soviets. When contacts suggest clandestine meetings, the Station arranges for unilateral surveillance and has had some success in identifying contacts.
- 15 61 55 Soviet Chancery. This line is used primarily by the Ambassador and provides more information on protocol contacts than leads of intelligence interest. However, it gives the Station a picture of the personalities being cultivated by Soviet diplomats and of Mexicans who are seeking contacts with the Soviets.
- 15 61 07 Soviet Commercial Office. Four (4) known or suspect GRU officers use this number. They are Military intelligence officers using Commercial Office cover and in some instances actually perform commercial functions of trade negotiations but the volume of trade between Mexico and the USSR does not justify a Commercial Office staff of eight (8) Soviets. This produces some information useful to check on double agent operations run by the Station against the GRU officers. In addition, the LIENVOY product usually identifies the GRU officers as escorts for trade, scientific, commercial, and tourist delegations who now are constantly on trips from the USSR to Mexico. LIENVOY also provides details of the itineraries of these groups once they arrive in Mexico.
- 15 12 64 Soviet Films Office. This leads into the residence and office of Vladimir Petrovich OBRUBOV, a suspect GRU officer, who distributes Soviet Commercial Films in Mexico. There have been several calls from what appear to be Central Americans but the Station has not been successful in identifying the callers or determining the nature of the calls.
- 15 69 87 Soviet Military Attache. This is the least productive of the coverage simply because the Soviet Military officers either won't answer the telephone or spend very little time where it rings. Nevertheless, U.S. AWOL servicemen try this number to make contact. There are three GRU colonels and six (6) civilian GRU officers who use this line.

The Soviet information is transcribed by the LIENVOY transcribers in the same way as the Cuban traffic except that the transcripts are delivered daily with the reels from which an outside translator (Douglas J. FEINGLASS) transcribes the Russian conversations into English. These Russian conversations are of considerable value and it is apparent that the Soviets are not aware that these conversations are being overheard and understood. There have been conversations identifying code room personnel; one conversation between two Soviet children revealed the entire layout of the Soviet Commercial Office; personality clashes and grievances are also aired.

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In June 1964 the SR Division made available personnel for temporary duty in Mexico to analyze and collate personality and background data collected by LIENVOY but which had accumulated in Station files on Soviet officials. These Soviet Personality Reports (SPR) should be useful on a world-wide basis as Soviet officials are transferred from post to post, in providing the KUBARK representative with a summary of the Soviet's past work pattern, intelligence activities as far as known, physical description, weaknesses, and vulnerability toward recruitment by a Western service. Not all but a large percentage of this data is received from LIENVOY.

3. Czech Embassy. Two lines in the Chancery (45-30-91 and 45-30-12) are covered by LIENVOY. Reels from these targets are delivered daily by AREHART to RIGGS who delivers them to the EE Case Officer who arranges for transcription and translations to be done by David B. SCHLAGTER, field contract agent. This agent also prepares a monthly summary of information on the activities of Czech officials in Mexico. During September 1964 LIENVOY revealed important information on the establishment of a factory equipped with Czech machinery to produce dyes in Mexico (ANYL MEX). In addition to the significance of this information in assessing Czech economic activities in Mexico, there was operational benefit in dealing with DISOBER, a Czech official on temporary duty in Mexico in connection with the opening of this factory.

4. Polish Embassy. LIENVOY covers one line (11 25 49) in the main Chancery which produces data on the activities of Polish officials stationed in Mexico. The second line (25 82 38) is the private line of Polish Commercial Counselor, Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWIEZ, in whom the Mexico Station has a definite operational interest [redacted] 24
[redacted] Reels (without transcripts) from these targets are delivered daily by AREHART to RIGGS who delivers them to the EE Case Officer who arranges for translations and transcriptions to be done by Norma Q. RYMINSKY, a contract employee.

5. Yugoslav Embassy. During part of the project year LIENVOY covered two lines in this Embassy. The lines were disconnected by LIENVOY in April 1964 and transferred to LIFEAT. The reason for this termination was to conceal interest in DMPETAL, an agent recruited as a result of a follow-up of a lead supplied through LIENVOY coverage. During the time this target was covered, LIENVOY transcribers provided transcriptions of the Spanish conversations. The reels were then delivered to Victor W. OBOLD, a career agent who provided translations.

6. Communist China News Agency (NCNA). On 18 December 1964 Willard C. CURTIS briefed LIRAMA on the presence in Mexico of representatives of Communist China using journalist cover for an intelligence mission. LIRAMA agreed to install LIENVOY coverage of this line and [redacted] 4
[redacted] This will be a [redacted] and 24
[redacted] The Station hopes to use this information to influence LIRAMA to declare these persons persona non grata. LIFEAT has been taken off of this target.

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In summary, the Station Case Officers responsible for established FI and CI/CE programs feel that LIENVOY has made a very necessary intelligence support contribution. It should be noted that LIENVOY facilities during the project year produced about three times the volume of raw audio take as that produced by LIFEAT over the same length of time at approximately one half the cost. This is possibly due to the [centralized] tapping and transcribing facilities of LIENVOY as compared with the widely scattered ones of LIFEAT. LIENVOY (as a 24 [redacted]) is able to tap any phone desired whereas LIFEAT, (as a 24 [redacted]) must take greater security precautions. The Chief of Station Mexico feels that the success of Station Mexico's operational program against the Cuban, Soviet and Soviet Satellite installations and personnel in Mexico is largely attributable to the continuous and thorough coverage of these targets provided by LIENVOY. COS recommends that the project be renewed for another year as an essential collection and support operation for the Mexico Station.

E. PROBLEMS

There have been no significant security, cover, control, or liaison problems during the project year.

F. [redacted]

This Project continues to encompass [redacted] 24

Some examples are:

a). In January 1964 CURTIS met with (LITENSOR) to discuss Communist China and was told by (LITENSOR) that [redacted] 4

b). CURTIS had several meetings with (LIELEGANT) during April 1964 when (LIELEGANT) provided information from (LITENSOR) on Communist agitation throughout Mexico.

c). In August 1964 CURTIS and (LIELEGANT) met with (LIRAMA) to discuss the continuation of the LIENVOY Project.

d). In September 1964 CURTIS at the request of Chief, PESWING, saw (LIRAMA) to deliver an invitation to visit the home of GPLOGIC. Several other meetings were held between CURTIS and (LIRAMA) prior to this trip.

e). On 7 November 1964 Chester D. DAINOLD and Cedric B. PAPATE accompanied CURTIS to a meeting with (LIRAMA) where DAINOLD and PAPATE gave briefings on the Cuban situation and on Latin America. Full details of these briefings were reported to Headquarters in HMMA-24700 RYBAT dated 9 November 1964.

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f). On 9 December 1964 (LIRAMA)^{ol} asked CURTIS for assistance [redacted] ²⁴

[redacted] LIRAMA
Headquarters KURIOT fulfilled this request [redacted] ²⁴

g). On 16 December 1964 CURTIS met with (LIRAMA)^{ol} and provided him with information on Cuban Embassy activities and association with members of Mexican universities, Personalities in the S.N.T.E. and pro-Cuban associations, Capture of guerrillas, arms and documents in Guatemala, Chinese Communists in Mexico, and Communist Activities in Chihuahua. Copies of information given to (LIRAMA) were pouched to Headquarters. ^{ol}

G. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION.

No formal coordination is required in this Project. Chief, PBSWING, Mexico, is the only ODYOKE official in Mexico outside KUBARK who is aware of this project and its provision for a [redacted] LIRAMA²⁴. Special briefings are cleared with PBSWING before KUBARK representatives meet with (LIRAMA)^{ol}. CURTIS advises Chief, PBSWING of significant and pertinent subjects which are discussed in meetings between CURTIS and (LIRAMA). ^{ol}

H. PLANS.

The Station plans to continue the intercept^{ol} program without change for the next project year. As previously noted, (LIRAMA) has asked that the project continue without a change in personnel or in the manner of operation.

I. FUNDS.

1. For the past period.

The cost of the LIENVOY Project (paid by Mexico Station exclusive of Headquarters costs) from 1 February 1964 through 30 June 1964 was US \$19,415.22 and from 1 July 1964 through 31 December 1964 \$23,677.68 and for January 1965 \$5,000.00 is estimated.

2. During the next project year.

During the period 1 February 1965 through 31 January 1966, an estimated amount of US \$47,468.00 will be required with US \$19,010 to be spent from 1 February 1965 through 30 June 1965 and \$28,458.00 to be spent from 1 July 1965 through 31 January 1966.

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3. Agent Salaries.

	<u>FY 1965</u>	<u>FY 1966</u>
LIENVOY-2 ^{ol}	\$ 2,400.00	\$ 3,360.00
LIENVOY-4	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-5	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-6	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-7	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-11	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-12	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-14	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-15	260.00	364.00
LIENVOY-16	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-18	1,200.00	1,680.00
Christmas bonus one month's pay 1965		2,320.00
Contingency fund for new agents or severance pay	950.00	1,334.00
Operational expenses	800.00	1,200.00
Local purchase supplies & equipment	1,000.00	1,500.00
Upkeep of QP vehicle (1)	200.00	400.00
Safehouse rental	1,000.00	1,500.00
Entertainment & gifts for Mexican officials	2,000.00	2,000.00
Purchase of information via LIENVOY-2 ^{ol}	1,200.00	1,600.00
TOTAL	\$ 19,010.00	\$ 28,458.00

J. ANNEX.


On two occasions during the Project year, the Station requested KURIOT assistance in making a technician available for temporary duty replacement for Arnold F. AREHART. Newton T. RUTSAY came to Mexico in May and September 1964 to supervise the tap center and maintain the equipment. The Headquarters support furnished this project was timely and commendable.

K. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

There has been no change in emergency conditions arrangements since the last project renewal request.

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
MONITORS	TRANSCRIBERS	WATCHMAN	FILES
LIENVOY-4	LIENVOY-6 Cuban Tapes	LIENVOY-15	LIENVOY-14
LIENVOY-5	LIENVOY-7 Cuban Tapes		
LIENVOY-11	LIENVOY-16 Russian Tapes (Spanish)		
LIENVOY-12			

TARGETS

KUBARK:

- 5 - Cuban Embassy (14 42 37, 25 07 95, 25 09 14
11 28 47, 14 13 26)
- 1 - Vazquez Gomez (25 07 77)
- 5 - Soviet Embassy (15 60 55, 15 12 64, 15 61 55
15 69 87, 15 61 07)
- 2 - Czech Embassy (45 30 91, 45 30 12)
- 2 - Polish Embassy (11 25 49, 25 82 38)

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ATTACHMENT No. 1 to
LIENVOY Project Renewal
Forwarded in HMMA-25141

1 JANUARY 1965
MEXICO DF

1964 WORK LOAD FOR LIENVOY PROJECT

MONTH	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
RESUME PAGES	102	119	116	120	131	122	144	107	121	78	92	98	1350
CZECH TAPES	55	41	20	24	26	46	40	45	44	45	41	44	471
RUSA TAPES	110	118	94	123	137	112	110	108	109	115	104	119	1359
RUSA PAGES	763	864	790	825	862	795	805	737	763	803	633	495	9135
POLACA TAPES	8	39	25	46	36	54	52	50	49	47	50	40	496
CUBANA TAPES	104	147	154	144	167	162	197	198	147	180	180	176	1956
CUBANA PAGES	670	798	713	664	679	748	879	612	553	634	714	460	8124
MISC ITEMS	22	32	15	28	37	27	21	19	14	28	41	41	325
OTHER TAPES USED	113	401	389	394	314	236	269	308	346	272	303	315	3560
TOTALS	1947	2559	2316	2268	2389	2302	2517	2184	2146	2202	2158	1788	26776

ATTACHMENT No. 2 to
 LIENVOY Project Renewal
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Arnold T. Archart

MAQUINA LINEA TELEFONO SUSCRIPTOS OBSERVACIONES.

1	1		
2	39		
3	3		
4	4		
5	5		
6	32		
7	45	11-25-49	EMBAJADA POLACA
8	34	15-60-55	EMBAJADA RUSA
9	9		
10	10		99
11	36	14-42-37	EMBAJADA CUBANA
12	12	45-30-91	EMBAJADA CHECA
13	13	25-07-95	EMBAJADA CUBANA
14	47	25-09-14	EMBAJADA CUBANA
15	43	25-82-38	EMBAJADA POLACA
16	16		99
17	33	15-12-64	EMBAJADA RUSA
18	11	11-28-47	EMBAJADA CUBANA
19	14		
20	20		
21	44		
22	35	15-61-55	EMBAJADA RUSA
23	33		
24	19		99
25	18		
26	26	15-69-87	EMBAJADA RUSA
27	27	15-61-07	EMBAJADA RUSA
28	28	45-30-12	EMBAJADA CHECA
29	29		
30	31	14-13-26	EMBAJADA CUBANA
	2	11-43-53	EMBAJADA POLACA
	25	14-96-45	EMBAJADA POLACA

211-1-1111111-25791

Ms of 5 January 1965