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MEXICO CITY COVERAGE OF OSWALD VISIT



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Intelligence Sources on Oswald's Visit to Mexico City in 1963

1. [ ] Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened [ ] until the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station [ ] the Station had developed a support apparatus to exploit

leads from the Soviet Embassy [ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]

[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]

(English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc.) [ ]  
Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican American [ ]

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station [ ]  
officer assisted by [ ]  
advised the Station on the best types [ ]  
equipment [ ]  
LIPSTICK (namely, LIMITED, LITVIO [ ]  
fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Embassy ( [ ]  
street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian entrance. [ ]

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~~gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the~~  
~~Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across~~  
~~double lined street on the southeast corner of that block (See~~  
~~attached diagram). LIMITED was the film photo base and opera-~~  
~~ted strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. This~~  
~~base however, was closed when the Station ascertained that the~~  
~~photograph of the "subject" film was being reviewed by the~~  
~~Warren Commission. LIMITED was an attempt at photographic base.~~  
~~It was located in an upper story of an apartment building on the~~  
~~same side of the street as the LIMITED site in the middle of~~  
~~the block. It had a private view of the front garden of the~~  
~~Soviet Embassy. LIMITED, the third photographic site, was located~~  
~~in one of a row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet~~  
~~Embassy compound. This site overlooked the back garden of the~~  
~~Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this site was to get~~  
~~good identification photographs of Soviet personnel. The three~~  
~~photographic sites were managed by a recruited agent who was a~~  
~~Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother and Mexican father~~  
~~(deceased). This agent collected the film from the LIMITED and~~  
~~LILYPIC sites three times a week. The film was then developed and~~  
~~printed into 9 x 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was ori-~~  
~~ginally processed in the Station laboratory by 1969, due to the~~  
~~resignation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and~~  
~~LILYPIC was processed on the outside by a recruited agent.~~

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Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers. These two officers supervised a team of six recruited agents who maintained a panel truck surveillance over the campsite established by the UNITEC site whenever a process of industrial in the course of the Central Embassy. These agents were aware of the UNITEC site and they had obtained UNITEC photographs for identification purposes.

The station maintained an external mail intercept operation, IDICUT, which was headed by an American case officer. A recruited Mexican agent who had a semi-official status obtained selected letters from a sub-agent employed by the Mexican postal

division

2. Liaison Bureau

Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the Mexican government. The Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), from which conducted liaison, was a big pocket group out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This Ministry was principally occupied with political investigations and control of foreigners. Their agents were cruel and corrupt.

Case officer trained a number of them in name, travel and travel control.

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which became known as LIENVOY, was run by a Mexican officer. The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time. The transcription was staffed by Mexican Army Officers. In 1951 because of mismanagement by the Mexican principals, the Station Chief, himself, became the project base officer. A Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the listening post and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes. There was also an American technician inside the listening post.

### 3. Signal Coverage.

In mid 1962, a Mexican officer in charge of LIENVOY (the joint tan operation) asked the American officer at the LIENVOY listening post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and Satellite Embassies in anticipation of possible coverage. The Station immediately disconnected all of the unilateral telephone taps on these Embassies so that they would not be discovered when the Mexicans hooked up their taps. The Mexicans soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five Soviet lines, three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav line. At the listening post, the monitors made short summaries of conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume for the Chief of Station. Later when a reel was completely recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian or a language other than Spanish or

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English were taken to another location for translation and typing. Mr. Boris Paraseff did the Russian translations but because of the volume of Russian conversations, the translations were about a week behind the date of the conversation. All transcripts were made in either Spanish or English since the Chief of Station could read only those two languages and because he personally reviewed the transcripts for operational reads.

Soon as the Chief of Station learned that an American identifying himself as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture of the Station started screening all photographs. However, here again there was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a week, but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the technician who was processing the film did not work right time being. Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of film was used. Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera at the end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining. The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours) and to photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy cover had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties.

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~~2. It seems to the attention of [redacted] [redacted]  
 on [redacted] [redacted] of the Soviet [redacted] [redacted] was picked up and  
 taken to [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] the caller  
 [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] was some delay because  
 [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] to review the photographs [redacted] [redacted] ly  
 [redacted] the typed transcript [redacted]~~

4. ~~Almost Covered~~

~~This is [redacted] at [redacted]~~