

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT NO.	00A-3, 203, 015
SUBJECT	Alex B. Pirogov, Soviet Exchange Student, Suspended Return to the USSR/ Possible Susceptibility to Conversion/ Incident with American Agent/ Safety	DATE DISTR.	4 December 1961
DATE OF INFO.	20 Nov 61 and earlier	NO. PAGES	3
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	1/27/62 - SA 6005	REFERENCES	Case No 3,112 (NY-52511) C/S 10099 Source: [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizens, head of the chemistry department of a large US technical institute.

During the period 17 Sep to 23 Oct 61, Alex B Pirogov, Soviet Exchange Student under North-American Agreement, was under the supervision of [redacted] member of his staff.

1. Alex B Pirogov came to do post-graduate research work in the Department of Chemistry under the supervision of [redacted] and [redacted] on 27 Sep 61. He was pursuant to the North-American exchange agreement and it was intended that he would work here for a period of three or four months. He had been here less than a week when his sudden and unexpected departure occurred on 23 Oct 61. Prior to coming here, he had been a Scientific Associate of the Institute of Chemical Physics, at the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow.
2. We were very much disturbed by Pirogov's sudden departure because we feared that the whole exchange program might have been jeopardized. So, on 27 Oct 61, we sent a cable to Professor Nikolay Aleksandrovich Pirogov, a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, who is the Head of the Institute of Chemical Physics, Moscow, where Pirogov had worked. Summary supplied to this office with a cable which we received 11 Oct 61. It was very conciliatory. It stated that Pirogov even had six family members. "We are extremely sorry," it said, "and will write a letter with details later." However, no such letter has arrived to date, 28 Nov 61.
3. Another cable was sent by the Russian Academy of Sciences, 6 Nov 61 to the Russian Ambassador [redacted]. Forwarding of the findings of witnesses of the incident and this or that, has so far not been received, on 28 Nov 61.
4. As far as I am concerned, I am sure that this incident with Pirogov is safe and finally will be settled to the satisfaction of the person for his departure.
5. I think his departure decided, there is a gap that is being examined. Or it may have been a combination of two or three little things that brought about his recall.
6. Pirogov proved to very well here. He is a very pleasant fellow. He gave me the title of Academic Assistant. He seemed to work with post-graduate [redacted]

5
4
3
2
1

[redacted]

12/4 Copy to FI/SIG and SR/6

STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FBI	AEC				
-------	------	------	-----	-----	-----	--	--	--	--

NO DISSEM ABROAD
LIMITED: Distribution limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI, and, within CIA, only those personnel producing NIS elements, and higher echelons with their immediate supporting staffs.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1066c

students about four or five years after receiving their Ph.D. When he arrived, he spoke very little English but was learning fast. He had a room in a dormitory over at the Long Island College, where we worked our floor. He made many friends. He is married and has a wife and two children who remained in Moscow. One of his parents came from the Ukraine, I believe. The U.S.S.R. has all the details. "They are paying the freight."

7. He was favorably impressed with Pirogov's ability and regarded him as a capable research worker. He is well informed in the kind of work in which he has been working. He shared well with the other students. He was not pretentious. He did not seem to hide anything. On the subject of learning, for example, he did not pretend that the USSR's is up to date in the U.S. He was not justifying for the Soviet system. It seemed to me that he was the sort of man who might have been converted to the U.S. way of doing things, if he was not careful. It may be that the people to whom he reported in the Council of the Soviet Delegation to the U.S. at Park Avenue and 63rd Street, New York City, may have sensed the man's confusion. Or his departure may have been brought about for other reasons, for example, by his work with Leonid Brezhnev's group, confederation and president of the International Astronomical Society and Chairman of the Soviet Inter-planetary Commission.
8. Dr. Sefor was visiting our institution and one of us thought it would be a good idea for Pirogov to meet Sefor. This was brought about as a reception when he was introduced as "Pirogov of Moscow." They shook hands and Pirogov said something in English like, "pleased to meet you." Sefor said something to him in a very sharp tone in Russian and later, in the elevator, gave him advice and lectured him in a very stern voice. I was present and observed that Pirogov grew pale. Later, he became very nervous and went to the U.S. Delegation Headquarters on Park Avenue and 63rd Street. I understood that they laughed at his explanations and told him not to worry. However, from then on he became more nervous. Suddenly, he said, but indicated that he was talking too much. He was afraid he had given away some important information.
9. This was a lot of bother because we already knew what they are doing. He certainly had no reason to feel he was disclosing more than he should. He only disclosed what was necessary to do the work planned for him in the program assigned under the exchange agreement. It would have been impossible for him to carry out his assignment without making the disclosures that he made. You just cannot work on such a project without being communicative. Just the same Pirogov became very apprehensive and said he might be recalled. They will regretted no anyway. They think I have talked too much about what we are doing in the Institute of Chemical Physics." Pirogov had taken the position that it was not wrong for him to talk about his work at this Institute in the USSR, which is the one headed by Sefor, incidentally. Pirogov indicated that an exchange project cannot be all take and no give. There is supposed to be an exchange of information.
10. Another thing that contributed to Pirogov's apprehensions was the fact that he had not heard from his wife or family for several weeks. He was greatly concerned about this. However, I believe he did have a letter from his wife just before he left.
11. My own feeling is that his popularity worked against him. The sympathetic people in the U.S. Delegation office did not like the idea of his becoming a part of the community here. The students liked him and he went to classes with them. When some of my students were celebrating receiving their degrees, Pirogov joined the party and after dinner he came along with the rest of them to have a drink at my house. He obviously acted like a human being.
12. In my opinion, Pirogov's exposure into a curious attitude is not appreciating what a good propaganda agent he was for their system, even though he was not afraid to admit that the Soviet system is not perfect and that there

SECRET

-3-

is a leading director, for example. They certainly talked too much and was too friendly. He did not keep his mouth shut and he did not act like a bear. I am sure they concluded that he was susceptible to coercion. I thought as usual.

13. As I suspect that Flanagan dug his own hole. He had to report to the Council of the US Delegation every week and, in the process, his general attitude got across to them. He talked too much. His conversation with Saker was an example.
14. Again, what he was working on here was very close to what he had been working on under Saker and the Council may have jumped to the conclusion that he was talking or all that he knew.
15. The problem on which he worked here was the copolymerization of dienes and alpha-olefins using a transition metal catalyst system. For example, one of the copolymerizations on which he worked involved the diene, butadiene, and the alpha-olefin, propylene.
16. He was known to many of the staff and was intimate with ten or fifteen students here but was probably most intimate with the man with whom he shared a laboratory. This was an Italian, named Dr. Lucilio [redacted]. They appeared to be good friends.
17. I do not think that Flanagan was the victim of an infatuation. I have ventured about this a lot but I do not think this is what happened. I think, as I said before, that he dug his own hole. Incidentally, we were most anxious to keep this incident out of the papers and there was no leak. Had there been an infatuation, this might not have been the case.

-4-

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

8090

SECRET