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*Extract from  
Archive files of COMINT  
obtained thru Rino/SPIC*

Summary of Initial Missions


In the period from 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defense system was subjected to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven occurring within a period of only eight days. It must be remembered that [redacted] provides the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet system. This is important because it is clear [redacted]

[redacted] However, some tentative conclusions may be drawn from these initial flights and these are indicated as follows:

1. In spite of the fact that these missions came as a surprise, none of them went undetected. This is clear evidence that their radar coverage extends above [redacted] feet.


2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware of the purpose of the missions and were taking counter action. One positive action was the standdown of civil flights while the mission aircraft was over the USSR, and a second action which is believed related is the moving of MIG-19 aircraft into East Germany and Poland on 7 July 1956. Also MIG-19's were moved into Hungary at about this time.

3. The performance of the Soviet system on the 5 July mission, 2014, was indeed curious. While the action evident from [redacted] is not clear an explanation which appears to fit the known facts is offered as follows: As a result of the previous missions, the Soviets had concluded the essential facts concerning the missions, i.e., that they were for reconnaissance, that they flew above [redacted] feet, and that a penetration as deep as Moscow was possible. They probably surmised that the 5 July mission was headed for Moscow when the track appeared on a northeasterly heading [redacted]




4. By 9 July 1956, in addition to the evident recognition of the great height of the mission flights, tracking was better and in general the performance of the warning system was much improved.

5. The next day, 10 July 1956, [redacted]



6. The first eight missions proved that the air defense warning system is deployed in depth. [redacted]



7. Confusion and track loss seemed to be related

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8. The question of radars for height finding,

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