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TOP SECRET

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman

John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,
Executive Director

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

From: James B. Weidner
Subject: Interview with Raymond G. Rocca,
February 14, 1975, 2 p.m.

A. BACKGROUND

Rocca is originally from San Francisco, and he still maintains a home there. He was graduated from the University of California in 1938 with an AB and in 1939 with an MA in international relations. His thesis related to the fascist problem in the Mediterranean area.

In April, 1942, he joined the Research and Development Section of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. With the collapse of Italy in September, 1943, Rocca joined the OSS X2 group (which was independent although coordinate with the counterintelligence OSS unit).

Until early July, 1944, when he went to Rome, Angleton assumed command of the X2 unit in 1944. Rocca eventually became Angleton's executive aide there.

Angleton left Rome in November, 1947. Rocca remained, under student cover. He was not under "official cover."

Rocca returned to the United States and stayed a year in CIA headquarters. He attended the National War College in 1954-55. Rocca then joined Angleton in the recently created Counterintelligence (CI) Staff of the CIA. (The Staff was set up in December, 1954 or early 1955. Prior to that time, the counterintelligence operation had been submerged in foreign intelligence. At this point, it was broken out to be

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an independent unit.) Rocca was assigned to be the chief of the Research and Analysis (R and A) component of the CI Staff. He remained in that capacity until 1969 when he became Angleton's deputy. He resigned/retired from the CIA on December 31, 1974.

B. OBJECTIVES OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

The overall objective of the Staff was to form a doctrinal basis for CI. Because CI had not been a separate unit theretofore, it was necessary to specify precisely what its purpose and operational objectives would be. These objectives were: (1) penetration of other agencies; that is, identification of other agents and achievement of placing other agents therein; (2) developing double agents; (3) handling defectors, principally those coming out of other services; (4) development of types of controls; that is, intercepting and deciphering of communications (The mail intercept program would have fallen within this objective.); and (5) accomplishment of research. This involved building files, analyzing relevant information, and creating descriptive papers.

C. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

A. Research and Analysis

Inventoried initially, the status of counterintelligence work being done by various of the CIA stations. This was necessary in order to determine the scope of such activity then in existence. Eventually, approximately 133 people were engaged in full-time CIA work overseas.

B. Creation of Section 56 of the National Intelligence Survey

This was commenced in 1950 and "finished" in 1955 insofar as the Survey related to CI. The report, however, is still being updated. This involved collection of information from various branches of the CIA's clandestine activities and editing the information.

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C. Providing Support to Casework

Examples of this support were the arrest of Sobel in the 1950's (R and A made a man available to work on this case.) and the Reino Hayhanen defection leading to the conviction of Abel.

D. Training

R and A does part of the counterintelligence training.

Rocca gave me a detailed outline of the organization of the CI Division. A schematic of that organization is annexed hereto. The organization retained its structure until August, 1973, when its operations were reduced substantially. (According to Rocca, approximately 100 of the CI personnel were shifted to other areas.)

E. Mailing Intercept Program

Rocca knew nothing of the program at all until 1960 when R and A commenced receiving through COMINT channels moderate amounts (no more than one or two pieces a month) of descriptions or photographs. He could not recall the particulars of any of these matters. He assumed that the entire project had been directed and properly approved. The project was handled, insofar as CI was involved, by the Special Investigations group. It was highly compartmented. When Rocca became Angleton's deputy in 1969, he learned more concerning the existence of the project. He understood that it was a special project producing high-grade information on the main adversary. Rocca said that he would classify the project as a "strategic significance" because it yielded information on individuals communicating with people working for the KGB. He could not recall specific details. Particularly important, in his opinion, was the fact that the adversary did not know that the project existed.

Rocca was not responsible on a day-to-day basis for the project even after he became deputy. That responsibility was given to Fred Hubbard, Angleton's Executive Director, whom I believe had been appointed at approximately the same time as Rocca. Monthly reports from the project would come to Rocca at which time he reviewed them briefly and passed them on to Angleton.

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Rocca says that he had no particular discussions concerning the project with either Angleton or Hubbard which he can recall.

In 1971 or 1972, however, Rocca had to "defend" the project to Karamessines. This was a part of what constituted, in essence, an annual review by the Deputy Director of all significant projects in which CI was involved. The task fell to Rocca because Angleton was then on vacation. Hubbard and others involved directly in the project prepared a pro forma justification for Rocca to present to Karamessines. This was based on the production of the project, as well as the high security surrounding it.

In July, 1973, after Hubbard had left, Rocca and the DCI had determined to abandon the mail intercept project. Rocca was assigned to wind down the operation. At that point, there were three or four CI people in headquarters involved in the project.* The project was located in the COMINT area on the seventh floor. Because COMINT needed the space, Rocca developed a new vault for it on the second floor with the remainder of CI. Mrs. [] was reassigned to Operations, and the two translators were assigned to R and A. The product of the project still remains in the vault area on the second floor.

Rocca had no knowledge of the specifics of the operation in New York. This was because that aspect of the project was handled by the Office of Security. In essence, the Special Investigations group of CI was a "customer" of the Office of Security. In addition, CI analyzed the materials and distributed them to the appropriate recipients. Angleton determined who would receive the materials.

Rocca knew nothing of the New Orleans operation and almost nothing about the San Francisco operation. His only connection with the latter was when people from, he believes, the Far East operational unit inquired of him about the New York operation. Because Rocca knew little of the operation, he referred them to Security.

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F. Dissident Operation

Rocca knew nothing of this operation at the time it was established in 1967 except that he recalls having seen the memorandum which specified that information relating to foreign contacts of dissidents in this country would be obtained and analyzed. He recalls that in about 1966-67 Ober who had been under Rocca in R and A was assigned to Operations. There he became the Referent for the Domestic Operations Division which had been created in 1964. At that point, Ober left the CI area on the second floor and established his own operation somewhere else in the building.

When Rocca became Angleton's deputy, the project had already been established and was funded through the regular staff budget. Rocca never saw any of the substance of the project. His only connection with it was signing authorizations for expenses upon Ober's request. Ober did not explain what the expenses were for. This was typical where, as here, the operation was fully compartmented.

Although Rocca was generally in charge of staff briefings on projects, he did not brief on this project. The briefing was done by Ober of any personnel who had the need to know.

Ober dealt directly with Karamessines or Helms on this project. He did not deal through Rocca, nor, so far as Rocca knows, did he deal through Angleton. Rocca said that this project was simply not within his duties as a deputy, and that he did not exceed the scope of his assignment as a deputy.

G. Police Liaisons

As far as Rocca knows, CI has not had any contact with any local police to the extent that such contacts or liaisons would have occurred; this would have been done by the Office of Security.

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H. Surveillance, Breaking and Entering, Taps, Etc.

Rocca was not aware of any such activity by CI in the United States.

I. Present CI Activities within the United States

Rocca said that he was aware of only four areas in which CI presently operates in the United States.

1. CI handles four Soviet or Bloc defectors in the United States. For example, CI has a man on the East Coast who is a retired annuitant acting as a local handler of a defector.

2. CI has various consultants on projects doing work in the United States. These are people actually working under a contract with CIA. For example, a woman is currently working part time on a book relating to the use of disinformation. The contract relating to preparation of this book calls only for its publication abroad, and a foreign publishing house has agreed to the publication.

3. CI has twenty former agents who previously worked abroad, now acting under military cover in the United States analyzing the Soviet press for relevant intelligence information.

4. CI has several people who may not be CIA personnel reporting on their contacts with Soviets. Both in the United States and abroad, these people may also report on their contacts with people abroad who, in turn, have contacts with the Soviets.

J. Miscellaneous Comments

Rocca said that he believed that the informant referred to in the Hersh article of December 29, 1974, was a fraud. He thinks that the informant must have been a person fraudulently posing as a former CIA agent because the information contained in the article is, according to Rocca, not only incorrect but does not even make sense in the context of the CIA. Rocca could not elaborate on exactly what he meant but strongly suggested that we talk to Bill Hood, who was formerly Chief of Domestic Operations

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in New York before joining the CIA in Washington. (It seemed apparent to me that Rocca must have spoken to Hood and did not want to incorrectly interpret what Hood had told me.)

Based on the above discussion, Rocca said that he felt it was important that a Federal law be enacted which makes it a crime for a CIA employee or former employee to reveal classified information which he learns in the course of his activities. Rocca said that it was ironic that such laws existed for other agencies but not for the CIA.

Rocca also referred to the Hersh article of January 10, 1975, relating to the possible destruction of CIA files. Rocca said that contrary to the implication in the article that files might be destroyed, he personally wrote a memorandum stating that no files should be destroyed under any circumstances given the existence of the present investigations. Rocca will provide a copy of that memorandum.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Leaving CIA - Raymond G. Rocca's Story

1. The immediate background of Mr. Rocca's departure from CIA was a brief discussion between Mr. Angleton and Mr. Colby late in the afternoon of 20 December 1974. The gist of the discussion was related to Mr. Rocca by Mr. Angleton at around 1800 hours when Mr. Rocca was summoned to Mr. Angleton's office.

Mr. Angleton said Mr. Colby, after referring to a forthcoming article by Mr. Hersh, which, however, had not exercised a determining influence in his decision, had asked Mr. Angleton to leave his position as chief and take the advantages of retirement. In response to Mr. Angleton's question about a successor, the DCI said he had not given any thought to that, but had named three individuals, presently overseas, as examples off the top of his head. Mr. Angleton, as Mr. Rocca understood it from

*Attachment #1
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him, asked the DCI whether the leadership possibilities were extendable to Mr. Rocca or Mr. Miler and was told, "that was negotiable." It was stipulated that further discussion should take place with the DDO, Mr. Nelson, and only Mr. Rocca would be informed at that stage.

2. On Saturday, the 21st, Mr. Angleton telephoned Mr. Rocca and expressed the view--with which Mr. Rocca agreed--that he should ask Mr. Nelson to enlarge the range of discussion by including Mr. Miler.

3. Mr. Hersh's piece, falsely accusing CIA of running a massive domestic surveillance operation, appeared on 22 December.

4. At 1000, Monday, 23 December, Mr. Miler and Mr. Rocca were asked to accompany Mr. Angleton to a meeting in Mr. Nelson's office. Mr. Nelson's deputy, Mr. Blee, was present. The discussion took place under considerable time pressure because as the meeting went on, it became clear that a Special DDO Staff Meeting had been called for 1100, at which, presumably, the results of the discussion underway would be announced. Among other details there was an extensive discussion between Mr. Angleton and

Mr. Nelson on two points:

a. By Mr. Angleton. That it would be a mistake to retire him at that stage because it would be universally interpreted as an admission of the New York Times story. Also Mr. Angleton reviewed the items of upcoming business that had already been programmed in sensitive CI matters for January and February.

b. By Mr. Nelson. The absolute necessity to take action necessary to assure the integrity of the investigations which were to be foreseen.

Mr. Angleton's removal as Chief / CI, was assumed in this discussion, presumably by derivation from the Friday talk with the Director. Mr. Angleton reviewed the merits of having the succession in the staff passed to Mr. Rocca and/or to Mr. Miler.

5. At a certain point Mr. Nelson asked what did Mr. Rocca and Mr. Miler want to do. (It will be recognized that there was, under the circumstances, no chance for consultations, and, actually, no possibility of considered thought.) Mr. Nelson did not offer either of these men the succession to Mr. Angleton, neither did he ask Mr. Rocca (or Mr. Miler) to leave the Agency. He did request that

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they stay on in their positions for a transition period.

6. Mr. Rocca, in the absence of any indication of interest by Mr. Nelson in him as successor, stated he was not desirous of remaining on in any task other than counterintelligence. He would be willing to stay on for the transition--under a contract, which Mr. Nelson had stated would be possible--for whatever time was necessary, and therefore he too would retire by 31 December, bearing in mind the advantage of the joint cost-of-living increases of 31 December and 30 June 1974.

7. To sum up, Mr. Rocca would not have retired on 31 December 1974 had he been offered the command succession. (That, as he understood it, would have been Mr. Angleton's wish.) He was not made the offer. As he saw it, under the circumstances, there was really no other option to retirement in the interest of the CI function or in his own interest.


Raymond G. Rocca

27 February 1975
Langley, Virginia

Attachment #1
To TS 780527
OLC Cy #1

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

RAYMOND G. ROCCA

(Former Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence Staff)

A. Background

Mr. Rocca joined the Counterintelligence (CI) Staff of the CIA in 1955, having previously served in Italy as a member of the X2 Unit of the OSS. The chief of his unit in the OSS had been Mr. Angleton.

Upon joining the CI Staff, Rocca became a member of its research and analysis component. He remained in that capacity until 1969, when he became Deputy Chief of the CI Staff, under Mr. Angleton.

B. Mail Intercept Program

Rocca knew nothing of the program at all until 1960 when R and A commenced receiving through COMINT channels moderate amounts (no more than one or two pieces a month) of descriptions or photographs. The program was highly compartmented.

When Rocca became Angleton's Deputy in 1969, he learned more concerning the existence of the project. He understood that it was a special project producing high-grade information on the main adversary. The project was handled, insofar as CI was involved, by the Special Investigations group.

Rocca was not responsible on a day-to-day basis for the project even after he became Deputy. That responsibility was given to Fred Hubbard, Angleton's Executive Director. Monthly reports from the project would come to Rocca at which time he reviewed them briefly and passed them on to Angleton.

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TO TS 780527
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In 1971 or 1972, however, Rocca had to "defend" the project to Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans. This was a part of what constituted, in essence, an annual review by the Deputy Director of all significant projects in which CI was involved. The task fell to Rocca because Angleton was then on vacation. Hubbard and others involved directly in the project prepared a pro forma justification for Rocca to present to Karamessines.

Rocca has no specific knowledge of the part of the operation which occurred in the New York City Post Office. This was because that aspect of the project was handled by the Office of Security. In essence, CI was a "customer" of the Office of Security. In addition, CI analyzed the materials and distributed them to the appropriate recipients. Angleton determined who would receive the materials.

In July, 1973, Rocca was assigned to wind down the operation, after the DCI had determined to terminate it. Rocca moved the physical location of the project within headquarters and arranged to have the three or four people involved in the project re-assigned. The work product of the project remains at headquarters.

C. Dissident Operation

Rocca knew nothing of this operation at the time it was established, except that he recalls having seen the memorandum which specified that information relating to foreign contacts of dissidents in this country would be obtained and analyzed. He also knew that in 1967, Ober, who had been under Rocca in Research and Analysis (R and A) was assigned to Operations, where he became the Referent for the Domestic Operations Division. At that point, Ober left the CI area and established his own operation somewhere else in the headquarters building.

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When Rocca became Angleton's Deputy in 1969, the project had already been established. It was funded through the regular staff budget. Rocca's only connection with the project, even then, was signing authorizations for expenses which Ober requested. Ober did not explain what the expenses were for. Ober dealt directly with Karamessines or Helms on this project. Ober did not deal through Rocca nor, so far as Rocca knows, did he deal through Angleton.

D. Police Liaisons

As far as Rocca knows, CI has not had any contact with any local police. To the extent that such contacts or liaisons may have occurred, he believes it would have been done by the Office of Security.

E. Surveillance, Breaking and Entering, Taps, Etc.

Rocca is not aware of any such activity by CI in the United States.

F. Present Counterintelligence Activities within the United States

Rocca is aware of only four areas in which CI presently operates in the United States:

1. CI handles Soviet or Bloc defectors in the United States.
2. CI has various consultants doing work in the United States.
3. CI has former agents (who previously worked abroad) in the United States analyzing the Soviet press for relevant intelligence information.
4. CI has several people in the nature of agents reporting on their contacts with Soviets both in the United States and abroad.

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*Attachment #2
To TS 780527
OLCCy #1*

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MR. ROCCA: Yes sir.

MR. BELIN: I am going to turn the questioning over to Jim Weidner.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Is there an opening statement?

TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND G. ROCCA

MR. ROCCA: I have prepared a small curriculum vitae. It behooves a native San Franciscan to circulate it to his constituents. There may be some extra copies. I will pick them up.

MR. BELIN: Do you have anything you want to state first before your interrogation?

MR. ROCCA: No sir. I have a statement there, an aide memoire, which goes to the implications of what is going on for counterintelligence. The only statement that I had in addition is that my preoccupation in this discussion grows out of the conviction, based on operational facts, that hostile espionage, political action, and counterintelligence -- in other words, uncontested expansion of Soviet intelligence presence, successful recruitments, penetrations, and disinformation by the Soviets and the Bloc services of intelligence and security and other conspiratorial organs -- will increase during the period of detente.

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OLC Cy #1
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1 The hard fact that KGB presence under Soviet official
2 cover has continued to increase throughout the world, parti-
3 cularly in areas of direct concern to us like Western Europe,
4 Latin America, and Africa, makes it a matter of urgency for
5 CIA to devote a larger part of its energy to the CI problem.
6 The same thing has happened in the U.S.; the remedy, through
7 the appropriate Federal agency or agencies, will have to be
8 the same.

9 The fact that the KGB/Bloc services, including Cubans,
10 have continued in the past two years to undertake developmental
11 relations and have made pitches to and significant contacts
12 with American officials overseas at an undiminished rate, that
13 work out to one or more per week, is the complementary opera-
14 tional element that underlines the urgency for an effective
15 counterintelligence response abroad and domestically.

16 Overhead photography and sophisticated but remotely
17 operating equipment will not, and never will, tell us who the
18 Soviet, Bloc, and Cuban spies are. This inimical activity
19 originates abroad and is no respecter of our organizational,
20 jurisdictional, or territorial distinctions. As we are pre-
21 sently organized in the United States, no one Federal agency
22 can hope to deal successfully with the growing threat alone.
23 This integrated, determined adversary can only be dealt with
24 by coordinated, innovative and aggressive defense through
25 counterintelligence and counterespionage operations which bring

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1 together the operational capabilities of all Federal agencies
2 invested with the problem.

3 I have been a member now for 30 or more years of
4 one of the components invested with this job and my career has
5 ended by retirement. I contemplate the future in the statement
6 as well as the past and I want to say that as far as I know, the
7 component I have been a member of CI staff, has engaged or
8 participated in no way in the domestic activities specified by
9 Hirsh in the New York Times, that is, in the Breakins,
10 physical audio surveillances and the other massive elements of
11 surveillance that he has charged.

12 With respect to the mail intercept program, I have
13 talked in detail with Mr. Weidner and I am prepared to discuss
14 that as well as anything else you have in mind.

15 MR. WEIDNER: Perhaps we should back up just a bit to
16 the time that you returned to the United States and joined
17 the CIA staff here. You have given us a biography that brings
18 us up to that point.

19 What position did you take in 1955 when you returned?

20 MR. ROCCA: I became Chief of the Research and
21 Analysis Division, it was called at that moment. It became a
22 group later on. It numbered at no time more than 35 or 36
23 people and it was concerned in the main with the topics that
24 I have outlined in my biography. It represented an attempt to
25 bring to bear brain power on the problem, research, hard

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1 research brain power on the problem of the identification,
2 neutralization and manipulation of Soviet agents and their
3 principals.

4 MR. WEIDNER: At that time was the counterintelli-
5 gence funcwion of the CIA just being established in a formal
6 sense?

7 MR. ROCCA: The question turns in a formal sense
8 there had been counterintelligence in OSS, it had been indepen-
9 dent under General Donovan, it had been headed by Jimmy Murphy,
10 it had its own cadre, it had its own ciphers, it was an
11 autonomous part of OSS function, it was submerged as a function
12 to foreign intelligence during the SSU and following periods.
13 In other words, it became a subordinate part of what we call
14 foreign intelligence activities until late '54, early '55,
15 when it was finally broken out as a coordinate activity at the
16 staff level.

17 MR. WEIDNER: Was one of your early functions to
18 determine precisely what counterintelligence activities had
19 been going on up to that point that were not particularly
20 coordinated?

21 MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. One of our first jobs was to
22 study first of all how many people were doing counterintelligence
23 full time within our organization. We found the number to be
24 extremely small. As a matter of fact, they are still extremely
25 small and growing smaller.

attachment #3
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1 Fulltime counterintelligence at the non staff level,
2 people overseas and in headquarters divisional and branch
3 components.

4 MR. WEIDNER: Did Research and Analysis have any
5 operational activities at all?

6 MR. ROCCA: At that time it undertook no operational
7 activities except in direct dealings on an ad hoc basis with
8 people like defectors who had something to contribute directly
9 to the research impact.

10 MR. WEIDNER: What sort of dealings did you have with
11 them?

12 MR. ROCCA: As you know, by law we have the responsi-
13 bility for resettlement of defectors and any number of Soviet
14 defectors, any number of incidents these people remained in
15 contact with us continuously and are handled as continuing
16 sources of information, in some instances compensated, in other
17 instances not.

18 MR. WEIDNER: Would the FBI have played a part in
19 this?

20 MR. ROCCA: FBI might or might not have played a
21 part. They have always participated in the continuing debrief-
22 ing of defectors.

23 For example, we have a number, the staff still
24 operates a number of these, I would say half a dozen of those.
25 The FBI sees on a continuing basis at least two of them. They

1 continue to show photographs of incoming people, that is,
2 incoming Soviets, to try to pick up in these human sources who
3 have memories about that service people that they are still in
4 the Service and are coming into the country. So we are in
5 touch with the FBI.

6 MR. WEIDNER: This is activity within the United
7 States?

8 MR. ROCCA: This is activity within the United States
9 with respect to defectors.

10 MR. WEIDNER: We will return to other activities in
11 a more general sense. But you mentioned the mail intercept
12 program.

13 When was the first time you became aware that such
14 a program was in existence?

15 MR. ROCCA: I became aware of the actual content of
16 the program and of its existence in a formal sense on the 4th
17 of April 1960.

18 MR. WEIDNER: How is that?

19 MR. ROCCA: This fact is registered and I was able
20 to confirm by simply looking. At that point I was cleared
21 for the reception of material.

22 MR. WEIDNER: When you say it is registered, the
23 registration is the fact of your clearance?

24 MR. ROCCA: There is a card which indicates the name
25 of every individual who knows or knew.

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OLC Cy # 1*

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 MR. WEIDNER: Excuse me. What did you learn of the
2 program at that point?

3 MR. ROCCA: Nothing of its mechanics. My assumption
4 was that this was an authorized directed program and I simply
5 attempted to read and utilize the material, if that were
6 possible.

7 MR. WEIDNER: You say you assumed that it was a
8 directed and authorized program.

9 Did anybody ever tell you how it had been authorized
10 and/or directed?

11 MR. ROCCA: No, I got that knowledge later on and
12 specifically in the more recent events.

13 MR. WEIDNER: You mean in preparing for these
14 hearings?

15 MR. ROCCA: In preparing for these hearings and read-
16 ing the background of the actual discussions.

17 MR. WEIDNER: Up to that point you had no knowledge
18 of that subject?

19 MR. ROCCA: Of that subject, yes.

20 MR. WEIDNER: What sort of materials?

21 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Could he give us the dates at
22 which in his exploration he found the program was authorized
23 and by whom and so forth, if you have that?

24 MR. ROCCA: Early this year in reading a paper
25 prepared on the program, and its background, it was specified

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1 in the paper that the program had been originated in the early
 2 '50's, and that it had been cleared by a succession of Post-
 3 masters General and others, including an ex Attorney General,
 4 as I recall. There was a specific reference to Mr. Allen
 5 Dulles having gone to the Postmaster General, it is my best
 6 recollection, I think you have that in your attachment, and
 7 to my knowledge is really effective based on that attachment.

8 MR. WEIDNER: The attachment you are speaking of is
 9 the attachment Mr. Angleton submitted?

10 MR. ROCCA: Yes sir.

11 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: The reason I raised the ques-
 12 tion was up to his testimony, I thought it was '53, he said
 13 this program was initiated back in '49, I think. Was it '52?
 14 Excuse me?

15 MR. ROCCA: It may have had a lapse.

16 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: In a previous Administration.

17 MR. ROCCA: He may have had a lapse.

18 MR. WEIDNER: What is your understanding?

19 MR. ROCCA: My understanding is it was '55.

20 MR. BELIN: '52 or '53.

21 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: '53 officially by the higher-
 22 ups it had been recommended and undertaken within the Agency
 23 prior to that.

24 MR. ROCCA: This is quite without my knowledge.

25 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: I couldn't even guess.

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9

1 MR. WEIDNER: What sort of material?

2 MR. ROCCA: My understanding is that the origin of
3 it went back to the component, that actually in the clandestine
4 services or equivalent at the time actually had the function
5 of working against the Soviet Union. That was the SP Division.

6 MR. GRISWOLD: Could you speak up. You are talking
7 to us, not to the people down there.

8 MR. ROCCA: I am sorry.

9 MR. GRISWOLD: Thank you.

10 MR. WEIDNER: When you started receiving these
11 materials you were still in R&A; is that correct?

12 MR. ROCCA: Yes sir.

13 MR. WEIDNER: What sort of a flow in terms of numbers
14 of materials would you receive?

15 MR. ROCCA: It was a very small flow of material and
16 none of it sticks in my mind at this time as outstanding in
17 importance to what we were doing in R&A. I have better
18 recollection for later pieces of information that concerned,
19 that is, for information in the '60's when we became very much
20 interested in the problem of disinformation -- dez informatzia,
21 that is what the Soviets call strategic deception. This
22 information went, some of the coverage concerned one of our
23 specific targets who was an individual named Victor Louie and
24 on him we had as I recall from this material very good
25 coverage.

*Attachment #3
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OLC cy # 1*

TOP SECRET

1 MR. WEIDNER: Could you determine from the materials
2 you received whether these were letters to or from the United
3 States?

4 MR. ROCCA: No sir.

5 MR. WEIDNER: Just the substances of the information?

6 MR. ROCCA: These things came in, they were mostly
7 from the USSR, not the other way.

8 MR. WEIDNER: You became Mr. Angleton's Deputy in
9 1969, is that correct?

10 MR. ROCCA: Yes. First of July I judge was the date.

11 MR. WEIDNER: Did you gain any further information
12 concerning the mail intercept program at that point?

13 MR. ROCCA: Not at that point. At that point in the
14 staff's development I became Deputy, leaving the position as
15 Chief of Research and Analysis, where my Deputy succeeded in
16 my place. I took with me a good number of jobs that I had
17 already begun on the research side and there was created an
18 executive officer and it was through him that the direct
19 oversight was continued in the project. Now, what had happened
20 is, more than what I had stated to you the other day, in
21 becoming Deputy, I did not succeed to the job which the
22 previous deputies had, and there had been two, Mr. Horton, and
23 Mr. Hunt, had had which was simultaneously acting as Deputy
24 to Mr. Angleton's staff and Chief of Operations. I did not
25 succeed as Chief of Operations. Mr. Miler became Chief of

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1 Operations. So an executive officer was added, Mr. Hubbard
 2 at this time, and he took over the chore of direct oversight
 3 of the project though I remained on the distribution for
 4 materials as they came in on a routine monthly basis indicating
 5 what had been covered in cryptic language, and I was in general
 6 aware of the project on that level until it was terminated, and
 7 that was in '73, I judge.

8 MR. WEIDNER: Did there come a time when you had a
 9 discussion with Mr. Karamessinas, who was the Deputy Director
 10 of Plans, concerning the project?

11 MR. ROCCA: I did. At one time during this period --

12 MR. WEIDNER: What period is that?

13 MR. ROCCA: 1971 is my best recollection. During Mr.
 14 Angleton's absence, inasmuch as it was my function as Deputy
 15 to act in his absence, there was some kind of a question that
 16 had arisen that required the presentation of an indication of
 17 the results as they had accumulated in the recent past, for
 18 him, and to the best of my recollection Mr. Hubbard and I went
 19 together to present these elements of production and security
 20 review. They were interested in how secure was the project
 21 and so forth. And I presented these materials to Mr.
 22 Karamessinas in written form, as I recall.

23 MR. WEIDNER: Was it Mr. Karamessinas' general mode
 24 of operation to have annual or periodic reviews of projects
 25 within his directorate?

*Attachment #3
 To TS 780527
 OLC Ch #1*

1 MR. ROCCA: This is standard order of procedure for
2 all projects so I cannot say that that was what motivated this,
3 but certainly I can, I recall this episode in the fall of, as
4 I have it, in '71.

5 MR. WEIDNER: During that particular conference or
6 at any other time that you can recall was there any question
7 raised as to the propriety, the legal propriety of the project?

8 MR. ROCCA: No, not to my knowledge. Not to my
9 knowledge or recollection.

10 MR. WEIDNER: And you never had any particular dis-
11 cussion with anyone concerning the approval or legality of
12 the project?

13 MR. ROCCA: I did not, sir, ever.

14 MR. WEIDNER: Now, what was counterintelligence's
15 relationship to the mail intercept program?

16 I think the Commission has already been told that the
17 operation actually occurred in New York City?

18 MR. ROCCA: That is correct. The operation origi-
19 nated outside of CI. CI took it over as a customer and
20 dissemination point in 1955 or whenever. That was our relation-
21 ship to it. The actual work was done by another component
22 outside of the seat of Government.

23 MR. WEIDNER: You say the actual work, the actual
24 work of collection?

25 MR. ROCCA: The actual, whatever went into the

1 mechanics of the handling of the material.

2 MR. WEIDNER: But the processing of it, that is the
3 analysis, was done in headquarters in Washington?

4 MR. ROCCA: That is correct, sir.

5 MR. WEIDNER: And that was done by counterintelli-
6 gence?

7 MR. ROCCA: That was done by a very highly compart-
8 mented small unit of Russian language specialists who were set
9 up in a comintarea, a vaulted area, under every possible safe-
10 guard, and they treated this material in accordance with their
11 skills, that is they translated or summarized or otherwise
12 prepared it.

13 MR. WEIDNER: Was that vaulted area in the part of
14 the building where CI is located or was it in a separate area?

15 MR. ROCCA: It was in a separate area for most of the
16 time that the project existed, as far as I know. They may
17 have started in 1955-56 in that area, in that timeframe, on
18 the same floor, but very quickly thereafter moved to the 7th
19 floor into comint area where a vaulted area had been prepared.

20 MR. WEIDNER: Was there any particular reason for that
21 move, that you can recall?

22 MR. ROCCA: I could only justify it on the basis of
23 the security and the handling of the material. It was handled
24 as comint also.

25 MR. WEIDNER: Did you participate in the decision to

1 discontinue the program, and I believe the testimony has been
2 that it was decided to discontinue it in approximately July
3 of '73?

4 MR. ROCCA: I did not, sir.

5 MR. WEIDNER: Did you learn of that decision?

6 MR. ROCCA: I learned of it.

7 MR. WEIDNER: Who told you?

8 MR. ROCCA: Mr. Angleton.

9 MR. WEIDNER: Did he tell you why?

10 MR. ROCCA: The indication that he gave me was that
11 Mr. Schlesinger had agreed to go to the President to get a
12 top executive decision with respect to the continuance or
13 discontinuance of the program, that this issue had been raised
14 in a discussion between him, Dr. Schlesinger and Mr. Colby,
15 before that; that Dr. Schlesinger had agreed to take that
16 action, Mr. Colby, or someone was to talk with Cotter, or
17 someone, whoever it was.

18 MR. WEIDNER: Who was Cotter?

19 MR. ROCCA: As I understand it, he is the individual
20 on the Post Office side who was actually handling it, the
21 Post Office interest, and he refused to permit the time
22 necessary for Dr. Schlesinger to go to the President. The
23 thing therefore ended summarily at his choice.

24 MR. WEIDNER: At Mr. Cotter's choice?

25 MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. I am giving you the name in

1 complete good faith. It may not be correct, he may well have
2 been out of it by that time.

3 MR. WEIDNER: Were you told whether the impetus to
4 terminate the project had come from within the CIA or from
5 without?

6 MR. ROCCA: No; I was not. I jusged that there had
7 been some difference with respect to the project inside as well
8 as out but I only know that by hearsay.

9 MR. WEIDNER: What difference?

10 MR. ROCCA: That the decision as to whether or not it
11 should be continued or terminated.

12 MR. WEIDNER: Did you play any part in the termina-
13 tion of the project, that is, once the decision was made to
14 terminate it?

15 MR. ROCCA: Yes, these decisions coincided with the
16 decisions made by Dr. Schlesinger to compress personnel in the
17 Agency and as a consequence the first large hemorrhage of per-
18 sonnel took place on the retirements that took place on 30
19 June 1973, and among them was the Executive Office.

20 MR. WEIDNER: And the Executive Officer is Mr.
21 Angleton?

22 MR. ROCCA: Yes; Mr. Hubbard. The job of winding
23 this down and taking care of the details became mine and I
24 did it.

25 MR. WEIDNER: What did you do?

1 MR. ROCCA: Through our administrative officer and
2 the people still engaged in the project, we, and under the
3 pressure of the need of our comint' people for additional space
4 on the top floor, and they wanted, in other words, to usefully
5 employ the space we occupied, we secured new vault space of
6 similar level of security, securely transferred all of the
7 material to the new vault space where it remains together with
8 its indices and appurtenances.

9 MR. ROCCA: The new vault space is within the CI
10 counterintelligence area?

11 MR. ROCCA: The new vault space is on the same floor
12 but physically dislocated from CI. It is, however, an approved
13 security office vault which meets, in other words, all of the
14 minimum standards. We created it, it had to be built.

15 MR. WEIDNER: The personnel were reassigned, then?

16 MR. ROCCA: The personnel were reassigned to other
17 tasks.

18 MR. WEIDNER: If the Commission wanted to look at
19 the records of this project to determine the substance of it,
20 are those records still in existence and intact?

21 MR. ROCCA: They are totally intact.

22 MR. WEIDNER: In this vault, newly created vault?

23 MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. And I am sure the Commission
24 would be welcome to examine them, both the vault and the
25 material, in its present status.

1 MR. WEIDNER: Let me turn to a different subject.

2 MR..BELIN: Before you leave that subject, there may
3 be a question of two some of the Commission might want to ask.

4 You have discussed this entire area with Mr.
5 Angleton recently in interviews with members of the staff; is
6 that correct?

7 MR. ROCCA: Well, I read the attachment.

8 MR. BELIN: That Mr. Angleton prepared?

9 MR. ROCCA: Yes.

10 MR. BELIN: Or was prepared that Mr. Angleton
11 presented?

12 MR. ROCCA: Yes sir.

13 MR. BELIN: Is there anything in the attachment with
14 which you disagree?

15 MR. ROCCA: No sir. It seems to me like a perfectly
16 complete narrative, descriptive account, as far as I know.

17 COMMISSIONER REAGAN: This chart that you gave us
18 here, we have some difficulty identifying them. How do we
19 estimate the increase in the number of agents, foreign agents
20 they have?

21 MR. ROCCA: These are official personnel assigned
22 here, sir, you see, and within the official personnel that they
23 assigned here on 16th Street. There is an institution known
24 as the Resident Toura which comprises those that work for
25 State Department and for GRU, Soviet military intelligence,

1 so these charts reflect the growth of Soviet official presence
2 throughout the world and in the United States, delineates in
3 another line, a solid bar, what we know among them to be
4 security and military intelligence operatives, and then it
5 draws another line, which is an estimate, and it is a minimal
6 estimate, the 40 percent line, which we have come upon as the
7 result of the research that I have been doing for years, as
8 the minimal. And as you see we are falling behind in our
9 identifications both here and abroad, and very seriously
10 abroad.

11 MR. CONNOR: May I ask a question on this subject.

12 Based on your experience, was the substance of the
13 material that was obtained from these written communications
14 back and forth of value to the counterintelligence group?

15 MR. ROCCA: I consider it sir, mind you, I am talking
16 now completely as an individual who was not privy to the begin-
17 ning of it and did not get into it until 1960, and therefore,
18 to a large extent impressionable. It seems to me that for the
19 '50's and '60's this what may be called a source of strategic
20 importance for counterintelligence. AS to the extent that the
21 Soviets did not know it we had it. It was capable of bearing
22 indications that would have given us identifications not only of
23 legals but of illegals and of other interests that the Soviets
24 had that we could get in no other way and that I could only
25 compare it to the overhead photography which functioned at the

1 same time and gave us another type or for a good part of that
2 time of strategic information.

3 This taken together with the six or seven defectors
4 that came out in the '50's, who gave us living examples and
5 identifications, and the three penetrations that we had going
6 in the '50's of the Soviets, they were Popov, and Penkovsky, and
7 Goyenevski, three people working inside those surfaces over a
8 period of time from '53 to '61. We had the foundation of a
9 strategy response to the Soviet threat and all you have
10 to do is to read the '60's and you read the results because
11 at no time in the history of Soviet intelligence and counter-
12 intelligence have they been hit so hard as in the decade of
13 the '60's. We got Blake in '61. We got Philby in '63. We
14 got Pak, these are two UK fellows, Vassil, another UK one, in
15 '64. Pak in France in '64. Felde, the Chief of German
16 Counterintelligence, West German, about the same time. There
17 are a number of NATO cases that grew out, all of them, of this
18 combination of what I call strategic CI weaponry. Defectors,
19 penetrations and unfortunately all of these penetrations were
20 compromised. Penkovsky was tried and shot, Popov was tried
21 and shot. Only one got away, and that is Goyenevsky.

22 So I would say that this was an extraordinary resource
23 particularly in view of the way it was handled for counter-
24 intelligence. I can't go beyond that because, as I say, I
25 don't know where every distribution went to the Bureau, how

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Attachment #3
TO TS 780527
AICCI #1

1 many went, how many reports went with the Bureau, you have that
2 data and can gauge it for yourself. To me it was part and
3 parcel of an advantage which was extraordinary and it hurts
4 me to talk about it now.

5 MR. GRISWOLD: What was the relation of this to the
6 defectors. I haven't found that connection.

7 MR. ROCCA: Well, a defector will talk about collec-
8 tion by true name and in some instances in this project, in
9 this material, we found that individual writing to people here,
10 and so by that kind of correlation of identification of names,
11 the project makes its contribution to an ongoing lead which
12 began with a defector. So that the idea of backing up
13 operations with research involves using all of these tools
14 against the target.

15 That is a specific example that I can recall offhand.

16 COMMISSIONER CORBIN: You have given an example of
17 mail coming from USSR. What about mail originating in the
18 United States?

19 MR. ROCCA: As I say, the stuff I saw came from the
20 USSR. I can't make anything out of the other at all because
21 I was not that close to it.

22 COMMISSIONER BELIN: Basically the defectors were
23 of prime importance?

24 MR. ROCCA: Absolutely gilt edge..

25 COMMISSIONER BELIN: And the technical observations

1 through the U-2 and satellites?

2 MR. ROCCA: This is another thing.

3 COMMISSIONER BELIN: And both of those were far more
4 substantial than the mail intercept program; isn't that true?

5 MR. ROCCA: I can't argue the merit really in that,
6 with that fineness of degree of detail because they were laid
7 to different --

8 COMMISSIONER BELIN: To follow through the question
9 Mr. Corbin asked, was there anything that you can specifically
10 remember that was gleaned from intercepting the mail of an
11 American citizen going to the Soviet Union?

12 MR. ROCCA: I have not that capability, not because
13 it doesn't exist, in fact I think there are some specific
14 examples cited in the report.

15 COMMISSIONER BELIN: In Mr. Angleton's report?

16 MR. ROCCA: Yes. But maybe other witnesses could
17 clarify that.

18 COMMISSIONER LEMINITZER: You don't know whether
19 it went to the FBI?

20 MR. ROCCA: I am sure the reports were shared with
21 the FBI. I am sure they were. Sir, what I don't know is in
22 response to Mr. Belin's question, how important it was, whether
23 they made any cases, that kind of thing.

24 COMMISSIONER BELIN: Mr. Weidner.

25 MR. WEIDNER: I would like to turn to the operation

1 concerning dissidents or information relating to foreign news
2 or contacts with American dissidents.

3 I believe the project was established sometime in
4 1967. The record will show that.

5 At that point you were still in R&A; is that correct?

6 MR. ROCCA: That is right.

7 MR. WEIDNER: Were you aware that this particular
8 project was being established?

9 MR. ROCCA: I was aware of it when it was announced
10 in the regulation. It was not discussed with me before it was
11 announced, before the action was taken. I was not privy to
12 that kind of thing as Chief of Research and Analysis though
13 the very man chosen had spent sometime in Research and Analysis
14 working specifically on machine records and techniques which
15 was a matter of grave concern to him, and interest. He was
16 specifically interested in developing and perfecting the
17 techniques of ADP control over data. I recall him, Mr. Ober,
18 a fine officer, who spent sometime in R&A before he went down
19 to OPS, from whence he went into this unit.

20 COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: Excuse me. What do you mean
21 when it was announced?

22 MR. ROCCA: I would say there was an actual announce-
23 ment by Karamessinas which said as of such and such a date a
24 unit has been created under the headship --

25 COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD. This was an internal announce-

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1 ment?

2 MR. ROCCA: Within the DDP.

3 COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: Not a public announcement?

4 MR. ROCCA: No.

5 COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: Do you know about when that
6 was?

7 MR. ROCCA: I would guess it was '57, sometime in
8 '57.

9 COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: You mean '67?

10 MR. ROCCA: '67, I am sorry.

11 COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: Thank you.

12 MR. WEIDNER: Mr. Ober was transferred out of R&A
13 at about that time, or was it before then?

14 MR. ROCCA: Before then. Because he did a
15 transitional tour. I had nothing permanent for him to do in
16 R&A besides this work that he was doing. We have our own
17 machine, I had my own machine records, so he went to OPS as
18 referent, as we call it, as the OPS Supervisor for the Domestic
19 Operations Division.

20 MR. WEIDNER: Was this program a part of the
21 Domestic Operations Division, do you know?

22 MR. ROCCA: No, I don't think so.

23 MR. WEIDNER: Well, then, did he leave Domestic
24 Operations, the referent desk?

25 MR. ROCCA: As the referent he was in CI and in the

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1 part of CI known as CI Operations which had a number of
2 referents for each of the major counterintelligence jobs that
3 was being done overseas or in the United States as in this
4 instance it turned out.

5 MR. WEIDNER: What I am driving at, whether this
6 project was a part of the Domestic Operations Division or
7 whether this was a separate project, the dissident project.
8 Do you know?

9 MR. ROCCA: It was a separate project as far as I
10 know.

11 MR. WEIDNER: When you became Mr. Angleton's Deputy
12 in '69, did you gain any greater knowledge about this project?

13 MR. ROCCA: I gained no greater knowledge because
14 it was absolutely compartmented and sat in another part of the
15 building. What I gained was the opportunity of administra-
16 tively seeing budget and travel accounts pertaining to Mr.
17 Ober's activity and his people's activity within the United
18 States.

19 MR. WEIDNER: Did he specify to any degree what those
20 activities were?

21 MR. ROCCA: I was never told what those activities
22 were. In fact, I am sure I would not have been even had I
23 asked because these were known as compartmented activities.

24 MR. WEIDNER: Did Mr. Ober deal through you as Mr.
25 Angleton's Deputy?

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To TS 780527
OLCC # 1*

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1 MR. ROCCA: Never dealt through me to Mr. Angleton.
2 MR. WEIDNER: Other than for the expense request?
3 MR. ROCCA: Other than these.
4 MR. WEIDNER: It seems to me that the mail program ---
5 MR. ROCCA: He dealt with Mr. Karamessinas and Mr.
6 Helms on these matters. I would say that he was with us for
7 rations and quarters. This would be something that General
8 Leminitzer recognizes.
9 MR. WEIDNER: There seems to be a certain parallel
10 between the mail program and what I will call the dissident
11 program, that is, both seemed to have a chain of command, if
12 you want to call it that, somewhat out of the ordinary. Is
13 that a fair statement?
14 MR. ROCCA: Yes, I think that is probably a fair
15 statement and in both instances I think the differences pertain
16 to the sensitivity of the activity.
17 MR. WEIDNER: You never had any discussion with any-
18 one concerning the propriety of the dissident program?
19 MR. ROCCA: No, I would never have thought of it as
20 being improper. The National Security Act in its provisions
21 with respect to limitations on our powers does not proscribe
22 that we live in another country in doing our operations and
23 my assumption had always been, and I have not seen any evidence
24 to the contrary, that Mr. Ober's activity, the activity of
25 this unit, at all times looked to fruits abroad, which is

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TO TS 7A 0527

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1 precisely where we were supposed to operate.

2 MR. WEIDNER: You say that is your assumption. Do
3 you have any specific facts on which you would base that?

4 MR. ROCCA: I don't know Mr. Ober's operations. He
5 had them because, as I say, I know the budgetary line-up of
6 the period and, therefore, I am sure you can get them from him.
7 They were never explained to me under this need to know
8 principle.

9 One operation that I know is his, and maybe you
10 already know about it, is the penetration of Agee in Paris.

11 MR. WEIDNER: Perhaps you can tell us about that.

12 MR. ROCCA: Agee is a defector, an American intelli-
13 gence defector, as far as I am concerned, the only one we have
14 had, and he has just written a book that is going to be a
15 massive blow to the security and identity of our operations
16 in Latin America. It comes out in England. He was an
17 individual recruited in the late '50's, he operated in Latin
18 America in the '60's, and left us under what he himself called
19 very friendly circumstances in 1968 in Mexico City after his
20 personal affairs had become completely mucked up as a conse-
21 quence of the collapse of his marriage.

22 One of the final things he did was to write the
23 Director -- this is again hearsay, I have not seen the letter,
24 but I believe my sources are good on it -- a letter in which
25 he said no hard feelings, I will always be your principal

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*attachment #3
To TS 280527*

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1 backer, and so forth. This is 1968. By 1971 we knew that he
 2 had made two trips to Cuba. The origins of his ideological
 3 conversion, whatever they might be, in Mexico City, after he
 4 left us, presumably, he went to the University of Mexico, he
 5 had, as I say, marital problems, another woman, whom he has
 6 since left. I can't judge. But when he became by his action
 7 a threat we only had to point out what the nature of that
 8 threat was and to assess it. It is, I am told, that the
 9 individual who succeeded in placing an agent within the zone of
 10 confidence in Paris was Mr. Ober and this was one of his
 11 operations, perfectly legitimate operations, as far as I am
 12 concerned, because while it involved an American, I think,
 13 maybe not maybe, it was in Latin American, but whatever, it
 14 took place outside of this country and it presented us with
 15 extremely useful information on the basis of which we could
 16 assess the potential damage and intention of Agee, all of which
 17 has come to pass.

18 MR. WEIDNER: You say this was a part of Ober's
 19 special operations?

20 MR. ROCCA: As far as I know this is one of Agee's
 21 operations and it should figure as one of the big cases.

22 MR. WEIDNER: I think you mean one of Ober's
 23 operations?

24 MR. ROCCA: Who did I say?

25 MR. WEIDNER: Agee's.

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ALCOA #1

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MR. ROCCA: Ober. I am sorry. Now, that is one I do know about by the unconventional route of just listening but I can't cite any of the others at all.

MR. WEIDNER: Let me turn to another subject, or perhaps if anyone else has any questions on this one before I do?

COMMISSIONER BELIN: I think we had better move forward because we have one more witness.

MR. WEIDNER: Let me touch briefly on two other subject matters which have come to light, at least in publicity, and that is the liaison with local police forces and/or this use of surveillance, breaking and entering, and the like, within the United States.

Are you aware of any such activities by counter-intelligence?

MR. ROCCA: No. And as far as police are concerned, we have no relations with, we have never had any relations with local police.

MR. WEIDNER: What about surveillance and the like?

MR. ROCCA: As far as I know the staff has never done any surveillance of any kind. It has no capability to do it or experts to do it, and we have a TO officer that was as high as 202 and it is now down to 78, and each I think can be if necessary summoned and questioned on the point. No breakins, no surveillances, involving audio or physical activity, no

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1 no contact with police in the mail operation that I have told
2 you about or otherwise.

3 MR. WEIDNER: What about wiretaps?

4 MR. ROCCA: No wiretaps.

5 MR. WEIDNER: Are you aware now of any activity?

6 MR. ROCCA: We were interested in other people's
7 capabilities of wiretapping us. As I told you, we had a
8 specialized component that studied Soviet capabilities of
9 tapping our communications and we reported to the
10 community regularly on this.

11 MR. WEIDNER: Are you presently aware of any CI
12 counterintelligence activities within the United States?

13 MR. ROCCA: At present CI activity in the United
14 States outside of our headquarters building involves contacts
15 with the Washington area and in one major city, Eastern
16 Seaboard city, with defectors, Soviet defectors, and we have
17 contacts in this area with about [] I am in personal
18 contact with some of these people at least on a weekly basis.
19 I have an officer in touch with them nearly on a daily basis.
20 The exception outside of the Seat of Government in this major
21 city is handled by another officer, former staffer, who is now
22 a hired annuitant. So these are defector contacts that we
23 have. These are highly specialized relations dealing with the
24 main enemy as I have described him and I consider them entirely
25 within our legal brief. So we have a [] defectors that

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1 we are in direct touch with and to whom we move and from whom
2 we move, each on a regular basis.

3 Second, we have three consultants. These are
4 private individuals who are experts in international communism,
5 or on disinformation, and there again the contact is direct.
6 We don't buy all of their time, we buy some of it, and those
7 are, in other words, consultants.

8 MR. WEIDNER: What sort of work. Can you give me an
9 example?

10 MR. ROCCA: One of the topics, one of the consultants
11 is on tap for disinformation. I think we have contact with
12 the person who is probably the world's best authority on this
13 topic and we simply pay for a part of his time.

14 MR. GRAY: Would these be university professors and
15 similar people?

16 MR. ROCCA: They could have been formerly. This
17 person is not.

18 COMMISSIONER BELIN: By disinformation you mean
19 intentionally misleading misinformation released by the
20 Soviets?

21 MR. ROCCA: Yes sir.

22 COMMISSIONER BELIN: Or some other?

23 MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. For example, before the Yom
24 Kippur War telling us through various cables they were tired of
25 the Arabs and the Arabs couldn't shoot straight and this and

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1 that and the other, that is dissinformation. No question it
2 would have been good to have recognized it then instead of now.

3 MR. WEIDNER: These consultants are U.S. citizens
4 under contract with the CIA; is that correct?

5 MR. ROCCA: Yes.

6 MR. WEIDNER: Do you have any other activities within
7 the United States in which counterintelligence is involved?

8 MR. ROCCA: We have a group of former agents.
9 These are people who work for us abroad that we keep under
10 appropriate cover here in Washington, official cover, working
11 on overt Soviet publication, that is things in the Russian
12 language, that they read and from which they extract information
13 dealing with Soviet intelligence and security matters. These
14 people have cover status in official buildings, they don't
15 figure as CIA. We pay them salaries and we interact with them.
16 I think that is the entire extent of it.

17 MR. WEIDNER: Do you have any people through whom
18 you maintain contact with other Soviets here in the United
19 States or abroad?

20 MR. ROCCA: These might be uncompensated contacts
21 who would really figure in the area of agents or double agents,
22 either active or under development, and there are such. Again
23 perfectly legitimate developmental activity.

24 COMMISSIONER BELIN: There has been a lot of comment
25 about possible wiretapping by CIA people. Could you tell us

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1 what the Russians are doing in this country? Summarize what
2 they might be doing insofar as wiretapping or eavesdropping
3 on phone conversations?

4 MR. ROCCA: The Russians' sophistication in this area,
5 Mr. Belin, if you are interested in it, to the extent that you
6 seem to be, should be gained from someone who has expert
7 knowledge, and I think you ought to lay the question on for
8 NSA or someone, but it is phenominal. Their ability to cover
9 communications, including microwave, is astounding, and I am a
10 layman in this, therefore, I am giving you what I have been told
11 in the course of briefings designed to keep me from using even
12 our own phone, a 351 number, even the 351 number. They have
13 the degree of sophistication of coming in and discriminating,
14 if you use a microwave, on that kind of a code. So this is an
15 extraordinary thing. It is going on right here in your back
16 yard.

17 MR. WEIDNER: If they want to they could get every
18 conversation coming out of Capitol Hil, or most conversations?

19 MR. ROCCA: That is too much. I haven't the
20 expertise to say that but I think if you are interested in it
21 get the experts.

22 (Off the record discussion)

23 COMMISSIONER BELIN: Mr. Rocca, Mr. Corbin has one or
24 two questions.

25 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: I want to ask a question.

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1 And that is, what in your opinion caused the downward curve
2 of identification of agents starting in 1968?

3 MR. ROCCA: This is on the domestic chart?

4 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Domestic. Then it has picked
5 up again but you show a lag there.

6 MR. ROCCA: That is right. This is the Bureau
7 record. It is directly related, sir, I believe to, there are
8 a number of explanations or points bearing on an explanstion.
9 One of them is it is directly related, I believe, to a 12
10 percent decline in Bureau manpower expenditure, which I am not
11 showing and which I am just giving you.

12 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Is that true on a worldwide
13 basis, too?

14 MR. ROCCA: On a worldwide scale we have simply gone
15 off line in our counterintelligence work. I think Mr.
16 Angleton said so in his statement that we are looking for
17 other things, we are not analyzing resident tourists, and our
18 gap is getting resident toura. That word means resident toura.
19 That is the word that means the organized intelligence and
20 security component within each Soviet Embassy or Consulate.
21 It has its own capabilities, its won ciphers and its own
22 operations.

23 We used to study those and we knew them everywhere
24 in the world back in the good old days, but along with manpower,
25 and we have been cut well into the bone, not just to the bone.

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We have I think to face up on our side to the fact that our priorities have been shifted and now I think with these revelations we are dead in the water.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: When you said Bureau do you mean FBI or CIA?

MR. ROCCA: This is the domestic figures.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: You used the phrase Bureau with regard to curtailed 12 percent.

MR. ROCCA: That is the Bureau.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: That is the FBI?

MR. ROCCA: Yes sir.

COMMISSIONER CONNOR: In Washington parlance FBI is called the Bureau and CIA is called the Agency.

MR. ROCCA: That is right.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: I would like to have the court reporter make these charts a part of your interrogation together with your statement, so we will give you two copies of the charts so they will be in the transcript.

(The above referred to charts follow)

*Attachment #3
TS 780527
OLCCy #1*

BIOGRAPHY

Raymond George Rocca, born 22 February 1917 in San Francisco, which is family home. Sherman Grammar School, Galileo High School ('34). University of California, Berkeley, AB - '38 in Political Science. Phi Beta Kappa. MA - '39, Highest Honors in International Relations. Worked for Doctorate 1939 - April 30, 1942, successfully completed orals. (Unclassified)

Joined Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Washington, D. C., 3 May 1942 as Italian broadcast analyst. (Unclassified)

Joined OSS Counterintelligence component, April 1944. Arrived Rome, Italy, July 1944. Remained in Italy in service of OSS and its successor agencies, the Strategic Services Unit and CIA, under military and as of end 1947, under non-official cover, until 1953. Temporary duty assignments abroad: 1955, 1956, 1959, 1964, 1967, 1969, 1971, and 1973. (Secret)

National War College, class of 1954-55. (Unclassified)

Joined DDP/CI Staff, July 1955 as Chief of its Research and Analysis Group. Functions: production and editing of finished CI studies, case studies, briefings, defector debriefings, accumulation of CI doctrine, and research, stimulation, and participation in CI training. Deputy Chief, CI Staff (as of July 1973 renamed CI/OPS), July 1969 - 31 December 1974. Principal functional concerns:

- a. General staff administration oversight and bureaucratic detail.
- b. Responsibility for specific Soviet and Bloc defector development.
- c. Soviet Deception and Disinformation.
- d. Development of liaison relations with selected Western intelligence and security services on case study and analyses. (Secret)

*Attachment #4
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(unless impossible, insert date or event)	

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Aide-memoire for the Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States

My preoccupation in this discussion grows out of the conviction, based on operational facts, that hostile espionage, political action, and counterintelligence--in other words, uncontested expansion of Soviet intelligence presence, successful recruitments, penetrations, and disinformation by the Soviets and the Bloc services of intelligence and security and other conspiratorial organs--will increase during the period of detente.

The hard fact that KGB presence under Soviet official cover has continued to increase throughout the world, particularly in areas of direct concern to us like Western Europe, Latin America, and Africa, makes it a matter of urgency for CIA to devote a larger part of its energy to that CI problem. The same thing has happened in the U.S.; the remedy, through the appropriate Federal agency or agencies, will have to be the same.

*Attachment 15
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DLCCY#1*

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The fact that the KGB/Bloc services, including Cubans, have continued in the past two years to undertake developmental relations and have made pitches to and significant contacts with American officials overseas at an undiminished rate, that work out to one or more per week, is the complementary operational element that underlines the urgency for an effective counterintelligence response abroad and domestically.

Overhead photography and sophisticated but remotely operating equipment will NOT, and never will, tell us who the Soviet, Bloc, and Cuban spies are. This inimical activity originates abroad and is no respecter of our organizational, jurisdictional, or territorial distinctions. As we are presently organized in the United States, no one Federal agency can hope to deal successfully with the growing threat alone. This integrated, determined adversary can only be dealt with by coordinated, innovative, and aggressive defense through counterintelligence and counterespionage operations which bring together the operational capabilities of all Federal agencies invested with the problem.

Washington, D. C.
17 February 1975


Raymond G. Rocca


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TS 780527
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Soviet Official and Intelligence & Security Presence--World-wide, 1959--1974

The "Counterintelligence Gap": the relative decline in identifications of known and suspect Soviet security and intelligence operatives in the US and World-wide (excluding Bloc countries)




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Attachment #6
To 75780527
OLCCM#1

SECRET

Soviet Official and Intelligence & Security Presence--United States, 1959--1974

The "Counterintelligence Gap": the relative decline in identifications of known and suspect Soviet security and intelligence operatives in the US and World Wide (excluding Bloc countries)



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Attachment #6
TO TS78 0527
O2C Cg #1