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SUBJECT: Delay in sending the first cable about
OSWALD

1. Much has been written about the delay (by the Mexico Station) in sending the first cable request for traces on the name Lee OSWALD. It was discussed in Dave Phillips book as a case of laziness on the part of the Soviet case officer (which in my view was unjust and unnecessary and indicates that Dave didn't know what he was talking about).

2. Normally, the Spanish transcript for the 1 October conversation would have been picked up on the morning of the 2nd of October. The Russian language portion would have gone to the Russian/English transcriber on the 3rd of October. The translation would have been returned the following day (4th) at which time, the Soviet case officer would have asked for the photographic coverage. That coverage would not have been in the station before the 7th since the film was still in the camera on the 3rd of October and it was picked up probably on the 4th, processed and passed to the Station on the next work day which would have been Monday, 7 October.

3. Later the film was taken out of the camera every day but at that time, the film stayed in the camera until a full roll was completed which might take three or four days.

4. A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone but that wasn't the way Win Scott ran that Station. He wanted the photographic coverage tied in with the telephone coverage... sometimes there was a U.S. automobile license number. It was also part of the "numbers game" of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables or reports produced.

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2 May 1977

SUBJECT: Review of Mexico City Station Files
at the [redacted] Record's Center

1. On 2 May 1977 Chris Hopkins and Annie Goodpasture visited the [redacted] Record's Center to review old Mexico City files in search of additional photographs of the "unidentified man". We were unable to locate any such photographs. It appears that earlier photographs may have been destroyed in a purge of Mexico City Station files and that the folders for the destroyed material were re-used to forward more recent photographic material to Headquarters for retention. Following are the Job numbers of boxes reviewed and pertinent notations re re-use of the old folders:

Job #70-236 Box 1 of 3

LILYRIC Photos

LICALLA Negatives

1 February - 1 March 1968
(Filed in re-used folder,
LILYRIC 1 Aug. 1966 to 31 Aug 66)

In white letter-sized
envelopes - five
packages C-1873 - 2031

1 March - 1 April 1968
Back folder - re-used LILYRIC
folder 1 Sept 66 - 31 Oct 66

Front folder re-used LILYRIC
folder 2 Dec 63 - 28 Feb 64

1 April - 2 May 1968
Back folder re-used LILYRIC
folder 2 Mar 64 thru 29 May 64

Front folder re-used LILYRIC
folder 1 Nov thru 15 Dec 66

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3 May - 3 June 1968

Back flap re-used LILYRIC folder
16 Dec 1966 thru Jan 1967

Front flap re-used LILYRIC folder
18 Nov 1964 thru 26 Feb 1965

3 June - 1 July 1968

back flap one side re-used
Czech photos July 64 & Aug 64

back flap-other side re-used
LIMITED 11 May 66 thru 31 July 66

1 July 68 - 31 July 1968

back flap re-used LICALLA folder
7 May 64 - 27 July 64

Front flap re-used LILYRIC folder
16 May 61 - 16 Aug 61
File # 50-6-74/6

Job #70-236 Box 2 of 3

LILYRIC Photos

Back flap 3 Apr 67 - 2 May 67
filed in re-used folder LIMITED
16 May 61 - 18 July 61
File # 50-6-74/5

Front flap re-used LILYRIC April 67

Back flap 2 May 67 - 1 June 67
re-used LICALLA folder Dec - Jan 67

Front flap clean

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1 June - 3 July 1967

Clean folder

3 July - 31 July 1967

Back flap re-used LILYRIC folder
July - Aug 64

Front flap clean

1 Aug 67 - 4 Sept 67

Clean folder

4 Sept - 2 October 1967

Clean folder

2 Oct - 31 October 1967

Clean folder

1 Nov - 22 Dec 67

Back flap re-used LILYRIC folder
12 Apr 66 - 18 May 66

Front flap re-used incoming cable
chrono folder 1-31 Jan 65

9 Jan - 31 Jan 68

Front flap re-used LILYRIC folder
1 July thru 31 July 1966

Back flap - clean

Job #70-236 Box 3 of 3

LICALLA Photos

2 Jan - 27 Feb 1967

Back flap re-used LICALLA folder
5 Nov 62 - 31 Jan 63

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Front flap re-used LICALLA folder
1 Dec 66 - 15 Feb 67

1 Mar - 28 April 1967
Back flap re-used LICALLA folder
1 Feb - 29 June 63

Front flap re-used LICALLA folder
20 Feb - 31 May 1967

* 2 May 67 - 30 June 67
Back flap re-used LILYRIC folder
23 July 63 (Y-1257) to
30 Nov 63 (Y-1308)

Front flap re-used LICALLA folder
1 Sept thru 30 Nov 1966

3 July - 30 August 1967
Back flap re-used LICALLA folder
19 Sept 63 (C-1351) to
30 Nov 63 (C-1414)

Front flap LICALLA re-used folder
1 June thru 30 June 1967

1 Sept - 27 Oct 1967
Back flap clean

Front flap re-used LICALLA folder
1 Aug - 31 Aug 1967

6 Nov - 29 Dec 1967
Back flap clean

front flap re-used LICALLA folder
1 July - 31 July 1967

3 Jan - 28 Feb 1968
Front flap re-used LICALLA folder
1 July thru 31 August 1966

Back flap Czech photos re-used folder
Sept - Nov 64

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1 March thru 29 April 1968
Front flap re-used LICALLA (C)
28 Nov 61 to 10 Feb 62

Back flap re-used LICALLA folder
1 Apr to 1 July 1966

2 May thru 19 June 1968
Back flap re-used LILYFC folder (Y-907 to Y-969)
12 Sept 61 - 23 Mar 1962

Front flap re-used LICALLA folder
1 Jan thru 31 Mar 1966

N.B. There was no coverage from 19 June to 15 July 1968

15 July thru 30 August 1968
Front flap re-used LICALLA folder
23 Nov to 27 Feb 1963

Job #72-626/36
File # 50-8-21
Box #5
Contained nothing prior to 1967. Looking for 1963.

Job #70-209
Box #3 (Boxes 1&2 at Hqs)
Nothing pertinent to our search.

Box #4
Nothing pertinent to our search.

Box #5
Nothing pertinent to our search.

Box #6
Nothing pertinent to our search.

Box #7
Nothing pertinent to our search.

Box #8
Nothing pertinent to our search

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Box #9
Nothing pertinent to our search.

Box #10
Nothing pertinent to our search.

Box #11
Nothing pertinent to our search.

Box #12
Nothing pertinent to our search.

Job #73-506
File # 50-6-74/3
Box #1

LILYRIC

1 - 30 June 1970
July
Aug 70
Sept 70
Oct 70
Nov 70
Dec 70

LICALLA

Jan & Feb 70
Mar & Apr 70
May & June 70
July & Aug 70
Sept & Oct 70
Nov & Dec 70

Dispatch HMT 11,368, dated 17 March 1972. Photos were filed in re-used subject and "P" folders (equivalent of subject 201 folders), indicating contents of "original subject and "P" files were destroyed.

Ref (to previous shipment) HMA 40,562, 21 May 71.

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Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963)

1. [] Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened [] until the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station [], the Station had developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This umbrella type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multiline phone taps, three photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team and a mail intercept operation.

Telephone taps (LIFEAD) were placed by [] [] handled by a Station case officer. The number of lines tapped was limited only by the availability of a listening post nearby and the availability of language (English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc.) transcribers. Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican-American recruited agents.

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case officer assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who advised the Station on the best types of cameras, films, and concealment devices. These operations had sub-crypts under project LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA). LIMITED was a fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Embassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian entrance. The gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the

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Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a double laned street on the southeast corner of that block. (See attached diagram). LIMITED was the first photo base and operated strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. This base, however, was closed when the Station received word that the photograph of the "unidentified man" was being released by the Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photographic base. It was located in an upper story of an apartment building on the same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of the block south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the Soviet Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located in one of a row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet Embassy compound. This site overlooked the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of Soviet personnel. The three photographic sites were managed by a recruited agent who was a Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother and Mexican father (deceased). This agent collected the film from the LIMITED and LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then developed and printed into 3 1/2 x 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was originally processed in the Station but in early [redacted], due to the resignation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and LILYRIC was processed on the outside by a recruited agent.

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Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers. These two officers organized a surveillance team of six recruited agents which used late model cars and a panel truck for surveillance. The team could be activated by radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs for identification purposes.

The Station also conducted a [redacted] man intercept operation, LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer. A recruited [redacted] obtained selected letters from a subagent [redacted].

2. [redacted] Coverage:

[redacted] coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the [redacted] at that time. The Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), [redacted] was a hip-pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This Ministry was principally occupied with political investigations and control of foreigners. Their agents were ~~ineffective~~ and corrupt. [redacted]

[redacted]

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LIENVOY, [redacted]. The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time. The transcription room was staffed by [redacted]. In 1961, [redacted], the Station chief [redacted], became the project case officer. A Station officer assisted him in the day-to-day supervision of the listening post, and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes. There was also an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Oswald Coverage:

In mid-1962, [redacted] LIENVOY (the

[redacted] LIENVOY [redacted] post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and Satellite Embassies in [redacted] the Station immediately

[redacted] soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five Soviet lines, three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav line. At the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian

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or a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location for translation and typing. Mr. Boris Tabasoff did the Russian translations but because of the volume of Russian conversations, the translations usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation.

As soon as the Station learned that an American identifying himself as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture of the Station started screening all photographs. However, here again, there was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a week but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the technician who was processing the film, did so on a night-time basis. Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of film was used. Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera at the end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining. The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours) and to photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties.

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post operators from a tap of the Soviet line. It was picked up and taken to Mr. Boris

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Tarasoff for translation because the carrier was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay because Station personnel waited to compare the photographs with the typed transcript. All transcripts were made in either Spanish or English since the Chief of Station could read only these two languages and because he personally screened the transcripts for operational leads.

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10 Feb 77

Source: Notes made by A. Goodpasture for John Leader, IG Staff

Subject: Background on Mexico Station Support Assets (Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies)

1. [redacted] coverage. From the time the Mexico Station was opened in [redacted] (by Bill Doyle) until arrival of Win Scott as COS in 1956, Charles Anderson III (still in LA/HQ) had developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy. This umbrella type project (LIFEAT) consisted of multi line phone taps, three photo sites, a mobile surveillance team and a mail intercept operation.

a. Phone taps were placed [redacted]

[redacted] handled by David WILSTED (pseudo). The number of lines tapped was limited by availability of a listening post nearby (since the taps were not made in the main central and English/Spanish (Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc) transcribers. Generally these agents (mostly Mexican or Mexican American) were related (which the station at that time felt was good security in that if they talked about shop, they would talk to each other.)

b. Three photo sites were handled by Anderson with the help of Harry Mahoney (retired living in Chicago) and TDY TSD people checking the best type of camera, film, and concealment devices. These had sub-chips under LIFEAT (LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA). LIMITED was a fixed site bang opposite across the street from the front gate of the Soviet Embassy which had both a vehicle and foot entrance. The Soviet gate was on the North West corner of their compound and LIMITED was diagonally across a double barrelled street on the Southeast corner of

(See Summary page 10)

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that block. LIMITED was the first base and it operated strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. I think the Mexi Station bought this property (a/Spanish Colonial store house through LIMOUSINE (check to be sure). Later this house began to fall apart. This base was closed when the Station got word that the photo of "unident man" was being released to the public by the Warren Commission. The photo operators were moved to another apt nearby. The property was sold (under an operational agreement with LIMOUSINE for a long term lease on the top floor of a new apartment bldg to be built on this site). LILYRIC was planned as an alternate photo base to LIMITED. It was in an upper storey (3rd floor -check) on the same side of the street as LIMITED but in the middle of the block South. It had a slanted view of the front gate of the Soviet Embassy. The agents in LIMITED and LILYRIC (both Mexican families) as far as we knew, were not acquainted with each other. LILYRIC was a rented apartment. LICALLA, the third photo site was located in one of a row of four houses on the South side of the Soviet Embassy compound which the Mexico Station purchased in about 1958 (check date), also using LIMOUSINE as the purchaser (check). This site overlooked the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of the Soviet personnel (who at that time were largely unidentified in Mexico Station records). The three photo sites were handled by

[redacted] (Mexican citizen of U.S. mother [redacted])
[redacted]. [redacted] collected the film ~~collected~~ from LIMITED and LILYRIC three times a week. His sister's husband, [redacted] developed and printed the film into 8x10 contact print strips. The master plan was for LICALLA film to be processed ^{but} inside TSD man from 1957 to 1959 [redacted] [redacted] - resigned) could not handle the volume and as the unprocessed film began to accumulate, the inside CO (Mahoney) became disgusted and took the film out for [redacted] brother-in-law to process (probably early 1959). Thus [redacted] became the handler for all three photo bases. A sensitive staff D monitoring operation

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was run out of another one of these houses (crypt for the four houses was LIMJUST,1, etc). This was handled by Glen WIDDEN (outside TSD officer) and Mahoney using HQ TDY teams for monitoring. This operation was also separate from LICALLA. The two houses in between were rented to unsuspecting tenants.

c. Mobile surveillance was developed by Anderson and later placed under Mahoney and Joseph Sancho. This team consisted of a half dozen or so agents who used three to four late model cars and a panel truck (which could be used on stake outs for photo coverage). The plan was to activate this group by radio (from LIMITED BASE) when someone of interest left the Soviet Embassy gate and stay with them until they made their meetings. These agents knew about the LIMITED BASE because they had LIMITED photos for identification purposes. This worked fairly well until about the middle of 1958 (check date) when one of the surveillance agents got too close to his target and was arrested by the Mexican transit police and turned over to the Mexican Secret Service. By the time the Station could arrange through a cleared attorney to bail him out [redacted]

[redacted], the agent had identified Sancho (who was evacuated across the border at Nogales by Bob Shaw) and the inside phone number of Mahoney (who was subsequently replaced by Louis Fockett). As a result of this flap, the LIFEAT project was broken up into several others. The agents were not changed but were given new crypts. Frank Estabone and [redacted] replaced Anderson in handling the [redacted] phone taps. Fockett replaced Mahoney and handled the surveillance team (LIFEAT) and the photo bases through [redacted].

d. LIBIGHT was the crypt used for a [redacted] mail intercept handled by Charlie Anderson III, [redacted]

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[redacted] [redacted] His case officers
Alfonso Spera,
were later/Puckett, Robert Feldmann, and Alan White.

2. [redacted] was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature
of the [redacted] at that time. [redacted]

[redacted] with which we dealt was a [redacted] pocket group [redacted]

[redacted] established contact with one of them [redacted]
[redacted] (later LIFIRE group) in about 1950 or 51. He gave them some
training (a group of about five surveillance types) [redacted]

[redacted] where the files
were poorly organized and often inaccurate. Now and then, however, some useful
information was developed but it could not be depended upon. [redacted] was
replaced by [redacted], Mahoney, Thomas
Hazlitt, and Robert Feldmann (the other)

During 1958, [redacted] Scott met socially some of the [redacted]

[redacted]. During this period, the U.S.
Ambassador Robert C. Hill (reflecting the policy of then Sec State J.F. Dulles)
was energetic in organizing groups to "fight communism". One of these seeds
grew into a proposal [redacted]

[redacted] This
project (LIEVOY) went through about four distressing years of a shakedown.
[redacted] (LIELEGANT) was inexperienced, old, and greedy. His
son (LIEVOY-2) was a masterpiece of deceit and corruption. LIELEGANT also
manipulated control over the principal agent of LIBIGHT [redacted]. The
first case officer was Alfonso Spera inside with [redacted] (retired) outside
and John [redacted] (TSD training officer for surveillance and head of the listening
post where thirty telephone lines would connect as well as a transcription room

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staffed by [redacted] Initially the station tried to meet every demand [redacted]. Both [redacted] and John had language difficulties and personal problems associated with being outside the station [redacted]

[redacted] equipment at enormous costs and neglecting their part of the bargain [redacted]

[redacted] Spera was replaced by Jack Brady who found himself in the same pincer movement of having Scott approve a request by LIELEGANT that Brady [redacted]

Finally when the cost became exorbitant and there was little to show for it, the project was revamped. [redacted] and John returned to the U.S. and were replaced by a TSD officer, Charles Flick, who was put inside the listening post to maintain the equipment. / Scott took over the project as case officer meeting with LIELEGANT. Brady was reassigned to other duties pending a transfer.

He designated Ann Goodpasture to meet dailing with Flick for routine supervision of the listening post, picking up transcripts and tapes. Goodpasture had no [redacted] except when Scott was ill or out of town. Generally, all decisions were made by Scott. This was about late 1961.

3. My memory is a little vague about the origins of the Cuban Embassy but I think the staff first developed from a pro-Castro group celebrating on New Years eve 1959. As I recall, it was a makeshift arrangement of volunteers through most of 1960 and 61 with Tom Hazlitt producing voluminous reports on their activities and recruiting agents right and left among Cuban nationals in Mexico City.

4. Personnel assignments of interest to us now is who was in Mexico during the period prior to Oswald's visit and the subsequent investigation by the Warren Commission. To determine who was there and what they were doing I have grouped persons together chronologically with areas of their assignment covering from [redacted] to 1969 so that ~~Scott's~~ names pop up, one can tell what period they were in Mexico and their assignments ^{at} the time.

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8/56-6/69 COS Winston M. Scott (deceased)

DCOS 7/56 - 7/58 Alfonso Rodriguez (retired)
10/58 - 12/62 [redacted] (retired)
6/63 - 9/65 Alan White (retired) -
10/65 - 1969 Stanley Watson (retired in Mexico)

COVERT ACTION

[redacted] Howard Hunt (retired)
12/54 - 7/58 Williard Hill (resigned)
12/56 - 9/61 Stannard Short (retired)
Chief
9/61 - 3/64 David Phillips C (retired) -
8/62 - 9/64 [redacted] Asst
2/64 - 6/65 James Flannery C (retired)
9/64 - 11/66 Harold Dalghren Asst
10/65 - 1967 Stanley Watson C (retired)
66 - 68 [redacted]
68 - 71 [redacted]

CUBA OPERATIONS

56 - 4/62 Thomas Hazlitt Chief
2/60 - 4/62 [redacted] (retired Costa Rica)
4/63 - 4/65 Bob Shaw Chief -
9/63 - 7/65 [redacted]
10/63 - 5/65 Lorna Mackay (retired)
8/63 - 6/65 David Phillips Chief (retired) -
9/65 - 10/68 Joseph Piccola
10/65 - 12/67 [redacted]

SOVIET TARGET

6/57 - 10/59 Louise Lyon (retired) 6/62 - 1/67 Prentice Marheine (ps)
9/59 - 8/65 [redacted] Chief - (retired ?)
9/59 - 8/65 [redacted] - Outside CO
5/64 - 7/66 William Bright
4/65 - 11/67 Cynthia Hausmann
6/65 - 7/67 Alice Pittinger
7/65 - 4/69 Paul Dillon Chief

SOVIET TRANSCRIBERS

6/56 - 8/58 Morris Gordon (resigned)
6/58 - 6/63 George Misko -
6/63 - 70 Boris Tarasoff (retired in Mexico) -

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SUPPORT ASSETS

[] phono taps

- 1961 Charles Anderson III Chief [] Outside CO
- 4/60 [] Asst [] DELETED (ps)
- 6 - 1/62 Frank Estancona Chief [] Retired in Mexico
- 0 - 10/64 Thomas Keenan -
- 4 - 12/67 Michael Farmer

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[] photo Cubans

- 9 - 4/64 Robert Zambernardi (resigned Mexico)
- 9 - 6/62 [] TSD (retired)

[] photo Soviets

- 4/59 Harry T. Mahoney (retired Chicago) 56 - 68 Outside Agent [] (resigned in Mexico)
- 7 - 8/64 A. Goodpasture (alternate CO - and internal routing)
- 8 - 6/63 Louis D. Puckett (retired)
- 3 - 10/64 Thomas Keenan - Robert H. (sl3) 6
- 5 - 66 William Bright

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
Cubana - opl reporting
Travel - LA

[] phone taps

- 9 - 1969 Winston Scott (deceased)
- 9 - 1960 Alfonso Spera (retired)
- 9 - 1960 [] (outside, now retired)
- 9 - 1960 John (Training rept resigned)
- 0 - 1961 John Brady (retired)
- 2 - 1968 A. Goodpasture -
- 1 - 1971 Charles Flick (outside TSD Staff Agent - retired) -

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[] - surveillance

- [] (retired)
- 4 - 4/59 Harry Mahoney (retired)
- 9 - 1961 Thomas Hazlitt
- 62 - 9/67 Robert Feldmann

Outside unit

- 3 - 12/63 Glen Widden (retired) -
- 7 - 4/64 Joseph M. Resigno (ps) Unit blown and closed down

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About mid 1962 (check date) LIFEAT [redacted]

[redacted] telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban, and Satellite Embassies.

[redacted] LIFEAT [redacted] was [redacted]

[redacted] connected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet lines, 3 Czech, 2 Polish, and 1 Yugoslav line. The basehouse listening post had a live monitor who made short summaries of interesting conversations for a daily resume which was received each day around 8 a.m. (passed by Flick to Goodpasture to get to Scott before 9 a.m.) Later (when the reel was completely recorded) full transcripts were typed and passed to the station in the same way, however, there was usually a time lag of a day or so. Those transcripts which had Russian or another language besides Spanish or English went out of the listening post the day after the transcript (of other conversations on the reel) was typed. These reels were taken to another location where they were translated and typed. In the case of the Russian translations, Boris Tarasoff usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation because of the volume of Russian conversations among the members of the Soviet Embassy. During this period (fall of 1963) the reels were probably being brought into the station and carried to Boris by one of the people from the Soviet Section or they may have been carried to him by Flick but I think I brought the reel in and gave it to [redacted] to take to Boris. [redacted]

[redacted] handled all of the processing of Soviet transcripts. My job involved screening the photographs as soon as we learned that the man calling himself Oswald was probably an American. However, here again there was a backlog because the photos were picked up three times a week but the ones picked up were usually for dates a few days previously because [redacted] processed the film on a night time basis. Photographs were made usually until one roll was used but later we got it changed to one day coverage on each roll - in other words the operators cleared the camera each day whether there was any ~~film~~ a full roll of film exposed. Instructions were to cover office hours, photograph each

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new Soviet and family, all foreigners and foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment (a pulse camera) but it frequently developed mechanical difficulties. Bob Zarbarnardi and [redacted] (I think) handled this film pick up and delivery. Lorna MacKay screened the film inside the station.

I am certain that the Oswald call came to our attention from the Soviet line. It was picked up and taken to Boris for a translation because the caller was trying to speak Russian. Any delay was caused by waiting to compare the photographs with the typed transcript. There were no copies of transcripts ever made in languages other than Spanish or English because Win Scott could read only those two languages and he personally screened the transcripts for operational leads he wanted pursued.

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


Plate Sheet

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