

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

(Varona 24)
7 March 1961
RAY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Plans for the Establishment of the Cuban Provisional Government

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Record of C/WH/4/PA, dated 28 February 1961, Same Subject

1. As indicated in paragraph 5 of the referenced memorandum, Varona and Ray--according to the understanding reached during the 24 February 1961 Washington meeting--were to proceed to New York on or about 26 February. There they met with Artimo, Carrillo, Chibas, and Pazo and returned to Washington the afternoon of 5 March. A meeting between Varona, Ray, and Mr. William Carr took place on 6 March in the Shoreham Hotel (this meeting was taped).

2. For the record, the presence of Mr. Carr should be explained here: For the longest time it has been felt that--at the beginning of a new mechanism such as a revolutionary council--it would be wise to introduce a new face which was not committed through past associations to any given political or organizational course. In looking for a suitable individual, it was felt that Mr. Carr would fill this bill; He would preserve the continuity of the Bender Group whose "senior partner" he had been from the inception of the project; he would also be a new face in as much as he has not been very active in the project for the last four to five months. Thus, Mr. Carr was asked by Chief, WED during the weekend of 26 February to assume the roll of primary negotiator in the establishment of a revolutionary council. Mr. Carr agreed; he came to Washington where he was fully briefed and brought up to date by Mr. Droller and [redacted] D3

3. On 6 February Droller and Carr met with Varona and Ray; Droller introduced Carr to Ray as the Bender Group senior partner whose long experience in Latin America affairs and fluency in Spanish would greatly facilitate the negotiations. After this introduction, Carr and Droller brought to the attention of the Cubans the 5 March 1961 "Baltimore Sun" story, which gave a fairly accurate report of the current negotiations. The Cubans were advised in rather strong terms to obtain utmost security in the future.

4. At this point of the meeting, Droller excused himself by saying that he had other important business to attend and withdrew from the meeting.

5. The results of Carr's discussions with the Cubans are summarized in attachment "A". A translation of a tentative Cuban agreed program is attachment "B".

[Signature]
GERARD DROLLER
C/WH/4/PA

cc: A/DDP/A
DDP
C/WH/D
C/WH/4

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

[Handwritten initials]

SECRET

(ATT.)

MEMORANDUM

1. At the meeting this morning between Carr, VARGAS and RAI, the latter two outlined the proposal or formula reviewed by the Committee of Six during the New York negotiations for the selection of a Provisional President and the members of a revolutionary council. The following are the highlights of this formula as explained to Droller, Nevell and me by Mr. Carr:
 - A. The Committee selected for the selection of a broad-based assembly of 12, 30, or any other number of delegates.
 - B. In lieu thereof, the Committee or its members already had drawn up a list of six candidates for the presidency. Exactly how agreement on this would be achieved was not made clear.
 - C. The list of names would be sent to Cuba to be approved by the directors of each "sector" and would also be submitted to exile groups for approval.
 - D. After all members of the "sectors" have indicated their agreement with the list of six candidates, each one of the original Committee of Six (RAY, FAYON, LIMA, ANTONIO CASSELLIO and VARGAS) would receive a "ballot" with the six names of the candidates appearing thereon and would indicate his preference in order of preference. Although Carr did not say so, presumably some sort of point system would be used for determining the victor. At any rate the election of the Provisional President would be accomplished by the Committee of Six.
 - E. Carr was told that provided agreement is reached on the procedure, the matter of selecting a Provisional President can be accomplished within ten days. That is, the lists will be sent to the "sectors" in Cuba and elsewhere and be returned to the Committee (in Miami) within the ten-day period. (This seems very optimistic).
 - F. The President will then elect freely the members of his council. About one-third will be selected at once, and the other two-thirds will be selected once the Provisional Government is set up in Cuba and CASILLIO is overthrown.
 - G. THE COUNCIL: There would be two distinct parts to the "council":
 - Part A. A legislative Council composed of 13 to 15 ministers (with portfolios) who will be freely selected by the President. These would apparently have both executive and legislative functions.

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

Part B. A technical cabinet composed of from 6 to 10 members "without portfolios" who will be elected by the various "sectors" and approved by the President. These members would draw up projected laws, etc. for submission to the "Legislative Cabinet" for approval.

- H. MINISTER OF DEFENSE. A Minister of Defense will be selected freely by the President prior to going into Cuba.
- I. MINISTER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. A Minister of Foreign Relations will also be selected freely by the President prior to going into Cuba.

2. PROGRAM OR PLATFORM

A four-page Program or Platform which VARONA and RAY said should only be considered "a rough draft" was given to Carr for his information. A summary is attached.

Items of the program as a whole, on which agreement as yet has not been reached are the following:

- A. Nationalization of Public Utilities. Not agreed as yet as to whether telephone and electric companies should be nationalized. General agreement on need to nationalize "obras publicas" - transportation and communications facilities.
- B. "Cubanization" of the Banks. VARONA is against requiring all deposit banks to be Cuban. RAY is in favor. RAY, however, not opposed to foreign banks having agencies in the country with all the rights and privileges, except the right to accept deposits.
- C. Agrarian Reform. Almost complete agreement except for matter of "limitation of land" - a phrase which Carr was unable to explain further, except that he supposes they meant there must be some maximum limitations on land that can be held by any one person or firm.
- D. Public Servants. RAY wants to purge all CASTRO people from the list of civil servants. VARONA does not think a "plank" on civil servants needs be included in a platform of principles and program.

3. MILITARY MATTERS

RAY and VARONA, according to Carr, were united in their thinking on the military aspects of the operation against CASTRO:

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

- A. Both feel we have sent "undesirable" people to the camps and that this cannot further be tolerated. Recruiting must be done by Cubans under Frente personnel designated by the Frente. "Jimmy" must stop recruiting, although he is free to indicate what the needs are. (Tony said will quit if recruiting not controlled by FRD.)
- B. Both insist that Col. Manuel VARELA Castro be named as head of the camp and that Juan CONSUEGRA be given work in a military capacity. These two, plus the present camp commanders, should make up the "General Staff."
- C. RAY complained that "nothing" is being done to supply the fighters in the Kacambrays.
- D. A "public statement" must be made that no Batistianos will be taken in.
- E. Certain recruiting personnel (Napoli has the names) should be removed from their positions.
4. RAY made an "impassioned" plea for positive help from the United States for his group. Mentioned need of boat and an increase (by his group) in psychological warfare activities.
5. RAY told Carr he wants to get away on 7 March for Miami. He said he will give us 48 to 72 hours to put this matter "on a level of final decision or resolution."

SECRET