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19 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Manolo RAY

1. I did not have the opportunity to discuss many Cuban problems with Manolo RAY during the period 4-13 June in both San Juan and Paris. Our meetings were largely devoted to the effort of contacting and attempting to recruit or cause the defection of Carlos FRANQUI. The following, however, are the conclusions of my brief effort to discuss the general situation with RAY.


2. Manolo RAY's Attitude Towards KUBARK: It has become obvious to me on this second meeting with Manolo RAY that:

a. RAY is convinced that the Agency had in the past purposely and actively attempted to destroy him as a political leader. In this connection, RAY feels that the Agency, following the Bay of Pigs invasion, was partially responsible for the break up of the MRP clandestine network and resistance potential in and out of Cuba. RAY stated that he has proof of the participation of at least one KUBARK officer in a plot with certain MRP officials to remove him from the MRP as a condition for KUBARK's assistance to that organization. RAY added that the officer in question has been fired. He either did not know or could not recall the individual's name or preferred not to mention it.

b. On the strength and position of the State White Paper on Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs, RAY's MRP joined the FRD (later the CRC). While his organization was a member of the FRD, the attention of KUBARK and the U. S. Government was called time and time again by the FRD and by the MRP to the infiltration and use of notorious Batistianos in anti-Castro activities. Despite these warnings, nothing was done to remove these people, giving RAY to feel that we either did not know what we were doing or that our purposes were self-serving.

c. RAY claims that he and his followers have repeatedly asked for KUBARK help to implement certain plans for action. He specifically reminded me of one of the originally presented concepts for action, a plan to free Huber Matos which goes back to RAY's relationship with our COS in Havana in 1960, [redacted]. RAY has the feeling that it is futile to present us with any more plans or ideas; for we have never helped, have always refused, or not answered.

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
3. RAY told me that he felt it possible to speak in a completely frank manner with me. I urged him to do so, stressing that only in such an atmosphere was there any hope of our eventually arriving at some constructive understanding. I attempted to assure RAY that our motives were never sinister, that every action we have ever taken was based on a need to use those instruments which promised most in our effort to free Cuba. He replied that he believed that this might be an honest statement on my part, but that I could not speak for the past actions of certain individuals. At this point I told him that we had many friends in our Agency as well as in the U.S. Government, but that naturally there were people who believed him to be too far to the left. I also stressed that our assistance to anyone could not be a one-way street, and I reminded him that I made the same point to him in our first meeting almost a year ago. I pointed out that we naturally work best with those who cooperate. I told him of our need for intelligence, not with any desire to know all the secrets of his organization and its political plans, but with the end of gaining that knowledge which could help in more quickly restoring freedom and democracy to Cuba. Toward the end of this phase of our discussion, I asked RAY if he would be willing to give us the intelligence product of his activities inside Cuba if we were, in turn, to give him certain material support. His reply was an emphatic yes.

4. The Present Plans of the JURE: I asked RAY what he was doing of a positive nature inside Cuba today. He told me that the major effort of the JURE at this time was the caching of resistance materials and supplies inside Cuba. I commented that the caching of supplies implied the existence of individuals inside Cuba to receive them. RAY did not respond to this comment, leading me to believe from previous conversations that it would probably be some time before he is willing to trust us with the knowledge of his assets inside Cuba. Naturally I also concluded from the silence and from remarks made later on that he does not, in fact, have a large organized resistance network inside Cuba. RAY went on to comment that with help or no help they (JURE) would proceed day after day, and month after month in a plan that they were certain would bring about a change in Cuba. He stated that their path is sure, albeit, fraught with peril and difficulty, but certain. The "way" apparently is based on these assumptions:

a. Cuba is a "mess"; it will become increasingly chaotic, alienating larger and larger segments of the population.

b. The JURE is politically and morally clean. It has not compromised its principles for any advantage. It is, and will increasingly become acceptable as the heir to the revolution.

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c. The JURE represents a group of men of unquestioned integrity, intelligence, organizational ability, or general competence to run a free Cuba in the tradition of the revolution.

d. The JURE has a sense of timing, the patience that must go with this, and an appreciation of the need to create a truly Cuba "mistique" in a movement to fight for the liberation of Cuba. (In this connection, it is important to note that RAY did not, and would not, expose himself to an effort against FRANQUI without some assurance of success. He stated openly that it would ill-become him to associate himself with failure.)

e. The JURE, when they have the logistical support in place and ready for use, will have the personnel ready. This was clearly implied but not actually stated. RAY stated that no purpose would be served, except to expose those who will assist them, by engaging in clandestine activities that do not have the necessary material and logistical support.

5. While we covered various aspects of the above ground from different angles and I reiterated again the fact that cooperation is a two-way street which RAY acknowledged in seemingly sincere tones; he was completely forthright in stating that whereas they needed assistance and would gladly take it, they have always been refused it and in essence the time has passed to ask, for without it or not, their role and goal are clear and in one manner or another they will succeed.


6. Recommendation for Future Relations with RAY (JURE):

a. RAY cannot be overlooked in the struggle for Cuban freedom; of all the Cubans I have met, he is the most purposeful, methodical, as well as the most experienced clandestine operator. I think he does know a sure way of overthrowing Fidel, but it will be a long, hard struggle without aid.

b. For the U.S. or KUBARK to continue to pass up the opportunity to work with RAY may prove to be a most costly error in our long term relations with Cuba, as well as with important political segments of Latin America.

c. I recommend that we maintain a steady contact with RAY, feeling assured that he will be increasingly cooperative. In addition, I recommend that we subsidize the efforts of JURE for the running of autonomous ops with a fixed monthly sum (perhaps \$5,000) for a trial period of approximately

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one year. In return for our assistance, RAY is to provide KUBARK with all manner of intelligence derived from JURE operations inside Cuba.

d. The assistance to RAY and contact with him should produce enough information to judge his true effectiveness and make possible his neutralization when and if this should become necessary.

7. Conclusions:

a. Because the cables sent in to Hqs both from San Juan and Paris are an accurate, if condensed, version of my relations with RAY in his operational efforts against Carlos FRANQUI, Enrique CABRERA Infante and Gustavo ARCOS, a separate memorandum for the record will not be prepared unless so desired by the Chief, SAS.

b. RAY has known me as Alfredo Fernandez, but because of operational limitations (false identity documents, reservations in true name) it became necessary for him to call me in my true name. He was not, however, told that this latter name was in fact true. In all our personal meetings he continued to call me "Fernandez."

c. RAY recognized and remembered having met [redacted] (Growery-P) in Cuba years ago. [redacted]

Alfonso Rodriguez
SAS/SO

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