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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: AMALUC-1 operation 24

[Redacted]

00106

1. The briefing was held in a small luxurious government conference room on the afternoon of Friday 9 October 1964, lasting about 2 1/2 hours. [Redacted] attended for the [Redacted] were present. 03, 03, 16-2 07 03

2. At the request of the [Redacted] I prefaced the operational briefing with a brief description of how the U.S. intelligence community operates, of the role of CIA, of the need for compartmentation and security, and specifically of how the foregoing considerations make it imperative for the [Redacted] to adopt security precautions which will ensure that the information we provide and the [Redacted] we undertake [Redacted] within the [Redacted] and, in fact, discussed by the [Redacted] exclusively with our representatives in the field). 24

3. Following the introductory remarks outlined above, I briefed the group on the DCI structure, the DCI operational techniques, and specifically on DCI aims and operations in [Redacted]. The [Redacted] lent close attention throughout the briefing and examined the exhibits closely, including the DCI intelligence requirements [Redacted]. [Redacted]

4. After the foregoing exposition, I explained [Redacted] our aims in exploiting the information with regard to the [Redacted] aspect, [Redacted] control [Redacted]. In this connection I asked for [Redacted] promising that we shall do our utmost and making reference to our [Redacted]. [Redacted]

5. With reference to [redacted] because of the developments and plans [redacted] I explained briefly the status of the [redacted] and the possibility [redacted] (This was in line [redacted] which included [redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

24

6. The [redacted] made a rather impassioned speech in which he covered the following points:

a. His own long experience in the OAS, in Cuba and in Central America;

b. His early warnings about Castro--which were disregarded;

c. The extent to which [redacted] has lived up to its obligations in the [redacted] to which it has [redacted] in efforts [redacted] and to which it has looked toward U.S. leadership;

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d. The failure of the U.S. to take aggressive action against Cuba and the need for taking a hard line, including the use of force in support of military activity by the free Cubans and the other American countries;

e. His appreciation that the Soviets will not be willing to risk a nuclear war over Cuba;

f. Condemnation of Mexico for her dealings with Cuba, for failure to abide by her obligations in the OAS, and for permitting the Castroites to operate out of Mexico against other American countries;

g. The need for action against Mexico;

h. The effectiveness of his own actions against guerrillas [redacted] and his determination to "meet violence with violence;"

i. Recognition of the importance of the information covered in the briefing, and of its exploitation;

j. Reference to the case of the [redacted] working for Cuban intelligence and now detained 24 in [redacted]

k. Acceptance of security restrictions and his decision to hold the information to those present.

7. In reply to the remarks [redacted] I said that we appreciate the cooperation [redacted] 24 and that we shall be most interested in the exploitation of the possibilities in the present case. I added that the matter of using force against Cuba is a policy matter on which I was not competent to comment but that the decisions made by the United States Government are based on careful study of detailed information including information on Soviet intentions and capabilities.

8. At the conclusion of the meeting, [redacted] asked for a copy of the LCI requirements (which he already had gone over closely) and took the copy with him to study further.

Harold E. Swenson  
Chief, WII/SA/CI

SECRET

6/pj