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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMWHIP/1, New York City, 28 April 1965

1. Time-Place-Purpose

AMWHIP/1 was met on 28 April in New York City for the purpose of introducing the undersigned's replacement and to debrief him on his recent trip to Europe. The undersigned met AMWHIP/1 at his office at 1215 hours and chatted there for a short time. The undersigned and AMWHIP/1 then went to the lobby of Waldorf Astoria Hotel where the undersigned's replacement, Mr. [redacted] was introduced to AMWHIP/1. Mr. [redacted] used the alias "Harry Wills." After a working lunch at the Waldorf's Bull and Bear Restaurant, the party motored by taxi to the Taft Hotel (Room 551). The meeting lasted, including lunch, from 1214 hours until 1700. At the conclusion of the debriefing at the Taft, the undersigned accompanied AMWHIP/1 back to his office and made the appropriate goodbys. Following that, the undersigned returned to the Taft Hotel to pick up Mr. [redacted]

2. Details of the meeting

A majority of the items covered during the meeting have been the subject of previous cables from the field. However, for greater clarity, a number of these were reviewed with AMWHIP/1 and additional information and comments obtained.

a. Cuban Government efforts to obtain foreign exchange through the Florida lotteries.

(1) AMWHIP/1 stated that he had been approached in Madrid by Rafael Garcia-Bongc Dirube (see [redacted] 3486-IN 24295)

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and related traffic) who wanted him to act as a contact man with Santos Trafficante who is presently living in Miami. According to GB, he had been told by <sup>02</sup>(UNENAFU/19) <sup>02</sup>(U/19) that DSE Chief Pineiro had okayed the following operation involving the Cuban lotteries played illegally in Florida. The Cuban Government was prepared to give through <sup>02</sup>(U/19) three winning numbers per week for Trafficante to use in ~~profiting~~ on the Cuban lotteries played in Florida. Trafficante was to pay \$50,000 upon receipt of the numbers from <sup>02</sup>(U/19) and an additional \$50,000 after the win. This money, which would have been a free source of income to the Cuban Government, would then be either banked in Europe by <sup>02</sup>(U/19) on behalf of the Cuban Government or sent to Havana according to instructions he received. GB had found out that AMWHIP/1 knew Trafficante in Miami and, had contacted him to act as a messenger to Trafficante. AMWHIP/1 was also offered, but declined, sum of money for his participation in this operation. As a matter of interest this ploy for illegal winning from the lottery was first conceived in 1959 by GB and Trafficante but it did not materialize as Pineiro and perhaps other govt officials would not play ball at that time. It is interesting to note that, for the price of \$100,000 a week in foreign exchange, the Cuban Government is now willing to enter into a conspiracy of this level with well-known gangster elements. Other people in the Florida area who will probably be affected by this action are Amlato Batisti (former owner of the Seville Biltmore Hotel in Havana) and one FNU Santos both of whom are also involved as king pins in the lottery racket in Florida.

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According to AMWHIP/1, Tampa is the center for this activity. AMWHIP/1 stated that if we wanted to take any action in this matter, it would have to be done soon as GB would expect him to react regarding the contact with Trafficante in the very near future. Extreme caution should be used in any action in this field as any leak might readily finger to AMWHIP/1. It is interesting to note that in an interview with a <sup>F5-2</sup> [redacted] officer (cited Para 5-<sup>20-2</sup> [redacted] 4386), GB stated that he had turned down a DSE request to work for them overseas. He had however offered to become involved in illegal business deals abroad on behalf of DSE. He never received a reply to this offer. It is also noted that, according to AMWHIP/1, <sup>02</sup> (D/19 is not witting that he (AMWHIP/1) has this opportunity to act as a go-between with GB and Trafficante on this matter.

b. Luis Blanca Fernandez, Vice Minister of Communications.

(1) In response to the question AMWHIP/1 stated that he knew Blanca slightly but had no significant assessment to give on the man. He did know that he was an old DR member and that the best sources of information on him would be AMLASH/1, /2 and /3.

c. AMNIP/1

(1) In discussing the general situation in Madrid and Europe, AMWHIP/1 again deplored the use by KUBARK of AMNIP/1 in operations against the Castro Cubans. He stated that he didn't know him personally but that many people had told him that AMNIP/1 was no good and a person in whom one could have absolutely no confidence. He cited for an example how AMNIP/1 had told the mother of Diaz-Argueles that he had been sent from AMLASH/3, a

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statement, which according to AMWHIP/1, was simply not true.

d. Milan Travel Agency

(1) AMWHIP/1 mentioned the Travel Agency in Milan which he had noticed was advertising trips to Cuba. AMWHIP/1 had nothing more to contribute to this bit of information beyond that already reported in <sup>20-7</sup> [ ] 3900 (IN 47562).

e. ZAYAS Bazan, Cuban technician at La Rochelle, France.

(1) AMWHIP/1 mentioned this man may in fact have a brother, Enrique ZAYAS Bazan, who is sympathetic and is now working at the parking lot at the Miami Airport. He had found nothing to add on this lead other than that provided in \_\_\_\_\_ ?

f. AMWHIP/1's itinerary in Europe.

(1) For the record, AMWHIP/1 varied his itinerary during his last trip in Europe to some degree from that agreed upon with his Headquarters case officer. His itinerary was as follows: New York to Paris, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Milan, Madrid, Miami.

g. <sup>MADAN</sup> Jorge Medan Rivas, Vice Minister for Foreign Commerce

(1) AMWHIP/1 stated that Jorge MEDAN has a brother now living in Miami, Ricardo MEDAN Rivas, who would be an excellent entre to the former. AMWHIP/1 reported on Ricardo in <sup>20-4</sup> [ ] 0190 (IN 35169). AMWHIP/1 stated that Ricardo was a trustworthy man who knows ANCRUMB/1 well, plus a great many people who are still in the Cuban Government today. (Writer's note: This lead should be followed through.)

h. <sup>02</sup> Dismissal of (UN)NAFU/9 by (UN)NAFU/19

(1) The gist of this matter was forwarded to Headquarters

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in <sup>02</sup> [ ] 0253 (IN 37416). AMWHIP/1 repeated his feelings as basically reported in the aforementioned cable. He stated that <sup>02</sup> (UNSNAFU/19 in discussing the incident actually was very fair to <sup>02</sup> UNSNAFU/9 and had stated that he was truly sorry to have had to dismiss <sup>02</sup> (UNSNAFU/9. He said however that <sup>02</sup> (UNSNAFU/9's pugilistic attitude and threats to himself as Cuban Ambassador to France could simply not be tolerated. He stated that had this flare-up by <sup>02</sup> (UNSNAFU/9 taken place in Havana, then it might have been dealt with as a man-to-man matter rather than as an employer-to-employee matter. He also said that he hated to fire <sup>02</sup> (UNSNAFU/9 due to the latter's friendship with AMNIP/1 and AMWHIP/1. As a result of <sup>02</sup> (UNSNAFU/9's being fired, his wife also lost her job with the Cuban representation to UNESCO in Paris. She has since however found another job in UNESCO working for the delegation of another country.

i. <sup>02</sup> (U)19's recent trip to Havana

(1) Because of the interest in the "coincidental" trip to Havana of both <sup>02</sup> (UNSNAFU/19 and AMCASH/3 shortly after having received the "planted" information of the MISPAWN operation, we queried AMWHIP/1 regarding <sup>02</sup> (U)19's trip. AMWHIP/1 stated that, to the best of his knowledge, <sup>02</sup> (U)19 went home because of the precarious condition of his mother's health. <sup>02</sup> (U)19 was called by Foreign Minister Roa in Madrid and advised that he should return. <sup>02</sup> (U)19 carried certain medicines with him for his mother. AMWHIP/1 did not know the nature of the mother's illness, but apparently it came on rather suddenly (if possible, the medical history of <sup>02</sup> (U)19's

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mother should be traced). AMWHIP/1 stated that AMLASH/2, Garcia-Banga, and Gallerreta all confirmed<sup>02</sup>(U/19's mother's illness. Carrillos left for Havana on about the 29th of March.

<sup>02</sup>j. for the record AMWHIP/1, in discussing the<sup>02</sup>(UNSNAFU/9-<sup>02</sup>(UNSNAFU/19 affair, stated that only<sup>02</sup>(U/19 and his family and the code clerk (Clavista) and his family now are living in the Embassy building itself. The living quarters for a number of the other Cuban mission employees are now located in the Consular. (Check this)

k. AMLASH/3 returned to Havana

(1) "Cucu DeLeon told AMWHIP/1 three or four days ago in Miami that AMLASH/3 had called from Madrid very recently and stated that he was going to return to Havana. AMWHIP/1 had no other details on AMLASH/3's return or whether in fact he had actually done so.

1. AMLASH/2

(1) AMWHIP/1 stated that AMLASH/2 and 3 were indeed disillusioned with the Americans to date. AMLASH/3 still believed that it had been through the office of the American Government that he had been refused a visa to the Dominican Republic. (It will be recalled that AMLASH/3 had complained of this before to AMWHIP/1, and AMWHIP/1 had been instructed to suggest to AMLASH/3 that it was his own known employment by the Government of Cuba in a legitimate capacity which was probably reason enough in itself for the Dominican Government to refuse him a visa.) AMWHIP/1 stated that he had used this argument with AMLASH/3, but that AMLASH/3 remained convinced that there was more behind the refusal than this. AMLASH/3 stated, in discussing his dissatisfaction with

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the Americans, that he was generally displeased because Americans would use people like AMNIP/1 and then did not wish to talk to, let alone deal with, people like himself and AMLASH/2. He did not probe into the discussions in Madrid between AMWHIP/1, AMLASH/2, /3, and <sup>02</sup>QUSPORT/1. AMWHIP/1 did say that there was no point in trying to argue with these people at that time, or to defend the possible American positions vis-a-vis them, because they were in fact so convinced in their own minds that there would be little use at that time in trying to change their views (this point at a subsequent fuller review of these discussions should be conducted in Spanish by Swenson at an appropriate time in the near future).

m. MISPAWN Operation

(1) AMWHIP/1 did not have much additional information to contribute concerning his MISPAWN talks with <sup>02</sup>(U)/19 beyond that reported in <sup>20-4</sup>[ ] 0355 (IN 41111), He did say, however, that he had actually given the name and address of Mr. <sup>02</sup>[ ] to Carrillos who included this in his cable about the matter directly to Celio Sanchez to Havana. AMWHIP/1 stated that he digressed slightly from the story as given him in the briefing because he felt that if he pin-pointed Fidel as the one leader who must go, <sup>02</sup>(U)/19 would possibly then not have taken such quick action on the matter, and in fact, may not have reported it at all. AMWHIP/1 felt that Carrillos undoubtedly will discuss the MISPAWN information on his current trip to Havana. AMWHIP/1, as stated in above cable, said that he offered to try to get more information from Mr. Callado if <sup>02</sup>(U)/19 so desired. <sup>02</sup>(U)/19 stated that he would await comment from Havana before deciding on any further action. AMWHIP/1

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was certain that this ploy worked without suspicion, and stated that he was willing to go further with this operation if so desired by KUBARK. Caution! :

<sup>oz</sup>  
n. AMWHIP/1 representative to travel to Havana on invitation of (U)19.

(1) Regarding <sup>oz</sup>(U)19's offer for AMWHIP/1 or AMWHIP/2 to travel to Havana on 7 May with a french theatrical group in order to examine additional paintings, gems, and other loot taken from Cuban refugees and now offered for sale by the Cuban Government to obtain sorely needed foreign exchange, AMWHIP/1 stated that he would need an answer on this matter fairly soon. (It will be noted that we told <sup>15-4</sup> [ ] in DIR 99724 that there was interest in this offer and that we were seeking a suitable candidate). Since Headquarters has not had a suitable candidate for this trip and did not have prospects of developing one who could make the trip securely, we asked AMWHIP/1 if he had someone in mind who could make the trip. AMWHIP/1 stated that he thought an "experienced" person of our choosing would be able to get more useful information for us. We stated that perhaps it would be best not to involve an agent witting of AMWHIP/1's true relationship with KUBARK in the event that the agent was arrested and forced to talk. We told AMWHIP/1 that as a safer, but obviously less desirable, alternative we might have an unwitting person go in, because much of the information that he would normally get as a result of a legitimate business interest in the loot will be in fact of use to KUBARK, and we were willing to forego a maximum "take" for the trip in the interest of security. AMWHIP/1 then said, "In that case, perhaps

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my business partner in Milan, Oreste Corletto, would be willing to make the trip for me." AMWHIP/1 did not have details on Corletto at his fingertips but said that he would either send them or telephone them to "Harry Wills" the following days. AMWHIP/1 stated however that Corletto, who is about 44 years old and born in Milan, is very pro-American and defends the American position in the world at the drop of a hat with anyone who takes issue. AMWHIP/1 stated that Corletto had just returned from a pleasure trip to Moscow and that if anything, was even more pro-West and pro-American after this experience. (Follow up soonest)

o. <sup>02</sup> (UNSNAFU/19 Gas-Light Club Membership)

(1) It has suggested previously that AMWHIP/1 buy <sup>02</sup> (UNSNAFU/19 a membership in the Paris Gas-Light Club as a gesture of friendship and good will. <sup>02</sup> (UNSNAFU/19, according to AMWHIP/1, enjoys the Gas-Light Club and its attractively dressed (or undressed, as the case may be) hostesses. It is noted for the record that Nester Sanchez Originally had had the idea that it might be possible to use this Gas-Light Membership in order to put a willing, witting, and attractive woman against <sup>02</sup> (UNSNAFU/19 to attempt the type of classic operation.

p. Local employees and Cuban Embassy Paris

(1) AMWHIP/1 stated that <sup>02</sup> (UNSNAFU/19 was looking for a female secretary who was fluent in French and Spanish. <sup>02</sup> (UNSNAFU/19 stated that he preferred to have a local contract type employee for this job as it saved the Cuban Government the additional cost of pensions, social security, home leave and travel expenses, etc.

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In other words, the Cubans in the interest of economy are prepared to sacrifice a degree of security. AMWHIP/1 stated that if we had a girl who could handle this assignment, he would be willing to propose her employment to (UNSNAFU/19. (This we should follow up soonest). This lead also was received by cable according to [redacted] subsequent to the undersigned's leaving WH/Cuba.

3. Security

There were no instances of a security nature to be reported. However, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that the new case officer/s conduct their meetings with AMWHIP/1 away from his office as much as possible. There was no reason to believe that any of AMWHIP/1's employees have overheard any conversations in the past, but they probably are well aware that the undersigned is not always calling on AMWHIP/1 to discuss strictly commercial matters. Since there may be a change in the complexion of the AMLASH/1 operation and an increased operational use of AMWHIP/1 in Europe, it would be well to vary the pattern of meetings with AMWHIP/1. There is probably no danger in calling on him at his office occasionally, but prolonged conversations and too frequent meetings with the new case officer on the premises should be avoided.

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