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REGISTRAR FOR: Chief, W/3

SUBJECT : Comments on MFP Plan for Anti-Castro Operations

1. The Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP) has submitted a plan for the conduct of anti-Castro operations. The original was received from the MRP Chief, Manuel Antonio Ray y Rivera, in Miami on 17 June 1961 and a copy of it has been carried to Headquarters on 19 June 1961. It is our understanding that certain (to us unspecified) elements in the United States Government view the Ray plan with favor, feeling that the "tabs" in the way of information and the maintenance of a resistance organization in Cuba would be worth the price.

2. We have been asked to comment on the MRP plan. Attached are the comments of Mr. [redacted] formerly of this Section, and several members of the W/3/PA staff. Paragraph 6 was submitted by Mr. Dave Phillips, Chief, W/3/7 Propaganda. I ought add that no one is in agreement with the entire paper. We all agree, however, with the conclusion that the plan, as submitted, is not one meriting support from this or any other U. S. Government Agency. We see little chance for a reasonable return for cost unless real control by the provider of the funds is built into the plan.

Robert B. Moore
Chief, W/3/PA

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CONCEPTS OF THE MSP GENERAL PROGRAM

1. The MSP plan presented by Rosalee Ray proposes, in brief, that the MSP be provided with funds in the amount of \$2,500,000 for a six-month period, with which to mount anti-Castro operations. It is assumed that additional financing would be provided, at a rate exceeding \$2,000,000 per year, until the objectives were achieved.

2. No where in the plan is there any statement as to what return, if any, the providers of the funds would receive for their support, other than the knowledge that the money had been provided for furtherance of the desirable goal of bringing about the demise of the Castro regime.

3. It is noteworthy that the plan insists that the MSP retain complete and sole control of all the operations contemplated. Thus, it states, on page 6, that:

"Contributions will be received without compromising the responsibility for decisions and organization of the plans. This does not rule out our search for consultation and coordination with other factors present, but without ever surrendering the responsibility and absolute control of the operations." (Underlining added)

It also appears to be the MSP view that its position should be analogous to that of a government-in-exile which has been recognized as the rightful regime of its country. Thus the plan states that:

".....with the government willing to agree as we should establish high-level contact which will make it possible to discuss questions of basic policy of events and plans opportunistically, on a mutual footing." (Underlining added)

4. The operations contemplated by the MSP are not too dissimilar from those proposed by the W/4/PA Section for FY 1962. They include the operation of maritime assets capable of reaching all Cuban coasts, the operation of aerial supply craft (from two bases), the training and infiltration of W/PA operators and intelligence agents, support of internal guerrillas, and the training of eight or ten 150-man groups for introduction into Cuba at the right time. (There is also considerable stress given to the mounting of extensive psychological warfare). The MSP plan would pose many of the problems that any W/PA program does -- the when, where, how, and how much questions involved in procuring and operating air and maritime bases and the policy questions relating to actions which include sabotage and active resistance.

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-4-

3. It is our view that the MFP plan should not be supported in its present form for these reasons:

a. The MFP seeks exclusive control of the anti-Castro resistance. The plan itself states that the best hope for the Cuban people is "offered by the set of ideas and aims of the democratic left". Aside from the truth or falsity of that statement, the MFP is in no position to claim effective leadership of the anti-Castro resistance. There have been, and are many groups in that field. The MFP has no record or action of which we have reliable evidence which would argue for giving them preferential status. In specific instances their claim to certain capabilities have been tested and found wanting. It is our view that reliance upon groups as such, with no control, is detrimental to operational achievement.

b. The MFP seeks "blind-check" financial support while retaining complete control of operations. So far as we are aware there is no provision in either Agency or U. S. Government policies and regulations which would permit the handing over of the substantial sums envisaged by the MFP plan without retention by the donor of the same measure of control over the use of the funds. The MFP plan, e.g., almost certainly would involve operations mounted from bases within U. S. territorial jurisdiction, yet those operations would remain under MFP "absolute control". We doubt that the I.S.I., Customs and Immigration Service, Coast Guard and other concerned agencies would ever agree to any such arrangement where U. S. territory is concerned, and we would certainly be in no position to vouch for the MFP operations. Anti-Castro operations mounted from anywhere outside of Cuba are going to be attributed to the United States. Since that is the case, the U. S. Government must control those operations as effectively as it can.

c. The MFP seeks to operate on an equal footing with the providers of funds. While governments, including in some instances governments-in-exile, can be treated as equals by the U. S. Government, there is no precedent for extending such treatment to a private organization. To do so in this case would result in the granting of the bitter enemy of the anti-Castro resistance groups, of which there are many, without any corresponding benefit.

d. The "take" from MFP operations would not justify the cost envisaged. The MFP "take", to date, whether in intelligence or in resistance activity, has been negligible. There are many news stories which refer to the MFP as the largest and best organized of the resistance groups. The MFP plan claims organization down to the township level and states that:

"The MFP has an extensive communication net and is competent in obtaining indispensable elements of intelligence."

This may be so, but we are not aware of any extensive valid information from the MFP of any important resistance activity conducted by them. The entire history of Agency operations involving groups suggest the inadvisability of handing over substantial sums in the hope of a future

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-3-

Plan. Aside from certain varied liaison arrangements, the "Plan" is taken by agents carrying out our direction, regardless of the groups to which they do or do not belong.

6. It should be pointed out, that from a political standpoint, the MIP organization and plan, have elements worthy of consideration. The most important is that the MIP program is one that is attractive to the Cuban masses, especially the new middle class. (Because of all skills program that of the MIP is the nearest to the originally stated but now betrayed platform of the Castro revolution.) For the same reason, the MIP is acceptable to many liberal Latin American governments which do not consider the support of other exile groups. Setting up, the advantage of the MIP in political and propaganda terms, is that it, unlike other exile groups, offers the people of Cuba a positive program of social and economic returns. (Whether such a program would be compatible with U. S. interests is, of course, a matter of much controversy.)

7. In conclusion, we believe that the MIP plan is worthwhile and worthy of further consideration in its present form. We do not see any possibility of securing a reasonable return for money required by this plan unless real control by the provider of the funds is agreed to by all and made a part of the plan. It is our conception that future clandestine operations in Cuba should be controlled and directed by the United States and organized on a national basis throughout the island. While some services would belong to one or another of the several resistance groups, and through them we would furnish aid to the groups, the entire emphasis would be on agent operations.

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