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
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61

(11)



22

DRAFT OF REPORT
FOR RC. Delivery
to Envy Proj. Held 17 I 6

14-00000
Subject: Photo of one
The unidentified individual in the
Warren Commission Report: A Factual
Chronological Survey

Reference: Memorandum by David W. Belin
to Mr. E. Henry Knoche, 15 April
1976. (Attachment A)

1. Reference memorandum suggests it would
be appropriate to reconsider full disclosure
of the circumstances and factual data relative
to the subject. The purpose of this ~~the survey~~
~~to be published~~
is to permit an evaluation of the suggestion
by ~~ascertaining what happened and just~~
~~what it is that would be.~~

2. Background. This examination and summary
has
of the records concerning ^{cropped} ~~the~~ ^{photographs} ~~of evidence~~
~~introduced by the~~
at the
considered by the President's Commission
on the assassination of President Kennedy
(hereinafter cited as the Warren Commission)
and introduced into evidence as

Admission Exhibit No. 1. The photographs
Hearing before the President's Commission
on the Assassination of President
Kennedy (Frank
1. See Vol. XX:3, page 691. ~~what is, evidence~~

resulted ~~originated~~ ^{highly sensitive} ~~with~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~CIA~~

as must be seen,

(together, with others of the same individual) ^{then, and still,}

originated from a highly sensitive operation in October 1963

being conducted by the CIA

against the Soviet and

Cuban Embassies in Mexico City.

On 14 October 1963 it was normally

~~before~~

Under the press of the ~~latest~~ ^{extensive}

efforts to develop information on the

assassin and the assassin's copies of

the photographs were made available

by CIA's Mexico Station Chief on the afternoon of 22 November, and later that day,

with the concurrence of the ambassador

^{copies} ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~photographs~~ ~~of~~ ~~this~~ ~~ambassador's~~ ~~individual~~

² ~~are~~ ~~flown~~ ~~up~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~State~~ ~~Department~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~US~~ ~~Naval~~ ~~Attache~~ ~~and~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~FBI~~

as a matter of possible use in the ^{FBI} ~~investigation~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ~~assassination~~

are going investigators. ~~The~~ ~~one~~ ~~photograph~~ ~~is~~ ~~being~~ ~~investigated~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~FBI~~

it had been
after crossed ~~the~~ ^{margin} ~~in~~ ^{to} FBI ~~and~~
agent, who shown to Mrs Ruby ~~and~~
~~with~~ ^{on the evening of 23 November}
spread of photo of individuals
who might have been known to
her or having been known or
in contact with her son. Mrs Margaret
Oswald did not at the time recognize
the

was shown to Mrs Margaret Oswald
in Dallas on the evening of November 23, 1963
by FBI agent, Bradwell D. ODUM.

The Warren Commission's ^{Report} ~~report~~ describe
the sequence of events ~~at~~ pp. 364-5

and 667. (Attachment 8) ^{The report of}
which ultimately

~~the~~ resulted in Mrs Margaret Oswald's ~~she~~
allegations that ^{she had been shown a} ~~the~~ ^{propagated} photo
~~was~~ of Jack Ruby ^{the day before}

he murdered her son. (A further com-
plication ^{leading} to this ~~obvious~~ conclusion
had been the fact that when she had
been shown ^{a copy of the} same photograph in
her appearance before the Commission,
it had been copied, ^{by the FBI} in a slightly
different manner.) ~~that photograph had been~~

No details in the Warren Commission's report
so vividly ~~illustrate~~ ^{more vividly than} ~~the~~ ~~preservation~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~evidence~~ ~~that~~ ~~has~~ ~~been~~ ~~preserved~~
~~the~~ ~~difficulties~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~investigation~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~truths~~
~~of~~ ~~power~~ ~~and~~ ~~self~~ ~~interest~~
~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~difficulties~~

in the politicized, ~~rigidly~~ rigidly determined
interpretive climate that has ~~prevailed~~ ~~in~~
the ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~country~~

been nurtured by the media over the
past decade. Why ~~was~~ ~~the~~ ~~photograph~~,

now acknowledged, ^{not} to be Ruby, ^{was} ~~now~~
become a centerpiece in an alternate
explanation that holds Oswald to have
been "framed" by the use of a double in his
~~the~~ ^{the} activity ~~of his~~ ⁱⁿ Mexico City. [?]

3. This is the thrust of the article "The CIA and
the Man who was Not Oswald" by Bernard
Fensterwald and George O'Toole, in the
New York Review of Books, (attached to reference,
'Loony of which')

~~W.A.~~
Oswald's ~~past~~

Report in ~~all~~ ^{although in no way} related to

3. LEE Harvey Oswald - Mexico City Stay - Photographs

~~of the unidentified individual from the~~
~~caption, a number, ~~and other details~~ that~~
~~developed~~

Lee Harvey Oswald ~~from~~ ^{the morning of} his stay in Mexico
City from 27 May to the morning of 2 October
1963, the photographs of the unidentified
man ~~was~~ originated during Oswald's
stay there, and, ~~subsequently~~ ~~will~~

~~was~~
~~that~~
~~was~~
~~that~~ ~~will~~ (throughout
his ~~entire~~ stay, ~~was~~) ~~believed~~

~~by the Mexican Station to be of possible~~
~~collateral interest~~

It is therefore important to ~~be~~ ^{have} an understanding
with the photographs
of what was done by the Mexico City station

~~The ~~idea~~ ~~has~~ ~~is~~ ~~no~~ ~~review~~ ~~of~~~~
The facts about Oswald's ~~the~~ ~~contacts~~
~~with the Station ~~and~~ ~~and~~~~

(2)

did with ~~testimony~~^{the} information it developed about Oswald ~~was~~ Mexico City, together with Noy actors on this information before the assassination, 22 Nov 1963, and immediately thereafter.

4. From all credible evidence known to this Trust (none, incidentally, added since the exhaustively unique work of the Warren Commission), Lee Harvey Oswald spent 4 full days and 2 partial days - about 116 hours in all - in Mexico City from about 10:00 27 September 1963 to about 09:00 2 October 1963. His ~~only~~ point of residence was a small commercial

Travellers hotel, ~~by name~~ not frequented by "jugglers" - the ^(where he was registered under alias) Hotel Commercios. Excerpts and detailed ~~later~~ interviews

and interrogated by the Mexican authorities and the FBI established that in the recollections of all hotel personnel he left early and returned late each day of his stay.

Assuming, ^{and allowing for the} ~~that~~ fact of late arrival and ~~and~~ early departure, ~~that~~ that he slept 1/3 of the ^{time} ~~time~~ of his stay (28 or 39 hours), there ~~is~~ remain some 78 hours of activity to be accounted for. ~~The~~ ~~fact~~ Oswald, on the basis of CIA's coverage can account solely ~~of~~ for minutes during ~~the~~ 27, 28 September and 1 October. All coverage by CIA during this period was technical, ^{inter} and the station had no line source (line agent) ~~the~~ ~~coverage~~ either, ~~from~~

or from Oswald was

in no sense "under investigation." None
 of the facts of his defection to the USSR and
~~his~~ return to the U.S., 1959-1962 were
 registered in Mexico Station files before
 10 October 1963, when this information
 was forwarded by Hqs. in response to
 the Station report of 8 October forwarding
 on a routine basis what was judged
 to be an American contact for a visa
 to Cuba in transit to the USSR as ~~stated~~

indicated and deduced from ~~the~~ technical
 on 1 October, which was the first and only occasion
~~on which~~ acquired information. (At no time ~~was~~)

during his stay in Mexico city did the CIA
 facility acquire a photo of him. A careful
 review of all coverage, ^{and} wire intercept, and
 photographic ~~data~~ ^{data} ~~and~~ ^{and} both
 Soviet and Cuban embassies was made
 by the Station on the 22 and 23 November

1963 after the associations going back to materials from mid year. It is therefore firm that there was no CIA photo coverage of Oswald at any time during

Mexico his Mexican trip or stay in Dallas Mexico, despite the report on 15 October City of the press states that Geo photo of Oswald Hqs. before 22 Nov 1963

Voia intercept data received by the monitor on the basis of the 1 October intercept (which had been reported to Hqs and disseminated to the interested members of the intelligence community - as an ex-claris see Henry Oswald was a Navy and FBI case under the delimitation and, potentially, by interest to the Department of State - turned up matches based on content, not on identity, with material intercepted on 27 and 28 September 1963. Matches based on voice

comproison (except what could be recalled by the monitor - and this was not insignificant because of the ^{uniquely} procedure spoken by Oswald) could not be made because the tapes, in accordance with the normal practice, had been ~~destroyed~~ ^{crossed} ~~and~~ ^{re-used}.

~~Attaching to this~~

It should be noted that Bowie's intercept and photo graphic coverage was not processed in "real time". ~~and the volume of the information~~ The nature of acquisitions, precluded anything but the spot reporting of items ~~to~~ judged by the monitor of more than ordinary (ordinary) interest and therefore ~~reproduced~~ notes in summary log. Full text of selected items would require ~~reference to~~ consultation of the tapes and either a field transcription or full translation, in both. Photo coverage ^(includes) ~~processed~~

to become available in quantity lists ~~etc~~
 which requires scanning and collection
 on a rapid and accelerated basis. One
 of the "triggers" that normally operates
 to focus and accelerate the processing
 and reporting of this kind of raw
 intelligence is the mention of ~~a~~ a name,
 as will be seen,
 This, was precisely what occurred
 in the 2nd of two conversations Donald
 had on 1 October with the Soviet Embassy,
 to whom he said he was "Lee Coward";
 and it was this information reported by
 the Station ~~to~~ to ~~the~~ Hqs. on 8 October.

~~The Central has not developed that Oswald~~
~~was the person~~

According to [unclear] that the Station reported
 that information on Oswald's identity
 to Hqs. only by voice intercepted in [unclear]
 [unclear]

The Mexico City Station did not mention
 in its report on Oswald ^{has} based on its
 own October radio intercepts: It compared
 this data with ^{descriptions} information it had
 acquired from a collateral source
 a photo graph ~~by the Mexico station~~
~~did not state this was~~ ^{an individual,}
 apparently ^{American,} a male ^{who was observed}
 entering the Soviet Embassy ~~on~~
 on 1 October.

The station reported these details as a
 coincident detail. The station
 did not ~~state~~ assert or suggest that
 the data deduced from the photo was
 in fact Oswald, or indeed, in any
 way related to Oswald.

5. Lee Harvey Oswald ^{CIA?} - Coverage of his Mexico
 City stay. One additional element of back-

(Friday)

A. 27 Sept 1963 16:05 Mexico City train:

(A Mexican national)
Silvia Duran, a local employee of the Cuban Embassy, consular section, a receptionist, speaks with an unknown male at the Soviet Embassy:

Silvia tells ~~me~~ that the American citizen was there, the one who wants a visa for Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union and he wants to know with whom he was talking there because she (Silvia) had sent him to the Soviet Embassy saying that if they accepted him and gave him a visa then the Cubans (Embassy) would also give him a visa without further paper work only advising Immigration in Cuba. ~~He~~ wants to know with whom he had talked there because he says he was told there would be no problem. ~~He~~ says to wait a moment. A different ~~person~~ and Silvia explains the same thing to him. This ~~person~~ says to leave name and telephone number and ~~he~~ will call back. Silvia gives telephone 11-28-47 (Cuban Consulate). Silvia takes advantage of the ~~person~~ and states she has moved and wants to advise the Soviet Embassy of her change of address so that she can receive the Bulletin. ~~He~~ says to call KOUKHARENKO to give her new address, then ~~he~~ asks the name of the Consul or Cultural Attaché. Silvia says the name is Teresa PROENZA and the telephone number is 14-16-26. ~~He~~ says thanks.

(L. Duran)

(Friday)

B. 27 Sept 1963 16:26 Mexico City train:

An unidentified male ~~tells~~ ^{calls} the Cuban consulate, only Silvia Duran →

MI says the American had been there. Silvia says he is there now. MI says the American showed papers from the Consulate in Washington, that he wants to go to the Soviet Union and be there for a long time with his wife who is Russian, but the answer has not come from Washington in respect to this problem, and according to this procedure it takes four or five months, but without having permission from the Soviet Union they should ask, or better said, they cannot issue a visa here without asking Washington; however, according to this man he showed a letter indicating he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and that the Cubans said that they cannot issue a visa without his having a visa for the Soviet Union, and now MI does not know what to do with him (the American), because they have to wait for the answer from Washington. Silvia agrees this

RK

MI says that the problem exists with the Cubans, that the American (the American) is that he does not know anyone in Cuba and therefore if that is true it will be difficult for him to get a visa for Cuba, because he was thinking of processing his visa (for Soviet Union), because he knew it would require waiting a long time for his visa to the Soviet Union while in Cuba and from there go to the Soviet Union. MI said the thing is that if his wife right now were in Washington she would receive her visa right now, or permission, from the Soviet Union, to return to her country, she is going to receive her visa in Washington but having this visa, she could communicate to any place this permission, for example here or any place she could receive it (visa or permission) but right now they do not have them. (no las tienen). Silvia says certainly and they cannot give a letter either because they do not know if the visa will be approved. MI says they only give visas according to indications. Silvia says that she will put that on the list. MI says he cannot give a letter of recommendation either because he does not know him (the American) and excuse me for bothering you. Silvia says that is alright and many thanks.

C. 28 Sept 1963 (Saturday), 11:51 Mexico City

Silvia says that in the Cuban Embassy is a North American who was at the Soviet Embassy. MI says wait a minute. Silvia speaks English with someone - and comments in Spanish that they gave APBICIO telephone 14-12-88 and to take the number down - Silvia says she saw the American citizen and he is going to talk with you. (American speaks Russian and speaks in English. They continue in English. American talks broken Russian and says I was in your Embassy and speak to your consul. Just a minute. MI takes phone and asks American in Spanish what does he want? American says, Please speak Russian. MI says what else do you want? American says I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address. MI says I know that. American, in hardly recognizable Russian, says I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it. MI says why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it is not far from the Cuban Embassy. American says I'll be there right away.

cc. the Soviet. The

D. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 10:31 Mexico City time. An unknown male (American) contacts the Soviet Embassy, the Military Attaché's residence, 15-69-07, and says to an unidentified Soviet respondent:

SECRET

The Soviet

~~NO~~ I was at your place last Saturday and talked to your Consul. They said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new? ~~He~~ says I'd like to ask you to call another phone number. Please write it down 15-60-55 and ask for a consul. Thank you.

E. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 10:45 Mexico City time.

NO (the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian) speaks to OBYEDKOV. He says: This is Lee OSWALD speaking. I was at your place last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the name of that consul. OBYEDKOV says: NOSTIKOV. He is dark (hair or skin??). ~~OSWALD~~ says yes, my name is OSWALD. OBYEDKOV says, Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they haven't received anything yet. OSWALD says: Have they done anything? OBYEDKOV says: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet. OSWALD says And what...? OBYEDKOV hangs up.

(a Soviet Embassy guard)

including the text of the now ~~refused~~
7. All of these items, ^{read} were discussed with and
examined by Warren Commission staffers in
Mexico City and at the ~~State~~ ^{Mexico City} ~~State~~ ^{State} during
~~their stay there~~ a stay of from 8 to 13 April
1964. *

* The Warren Commission group that visited
Mexico City stated consisted of Mr. Callahan,
Mr. Shawron and Mr. Willes. They examined
not only the ~~intercepted~~ ~~intercept~~ intercepts
A-E, above, but others, ~~from the 27th~~
one for 3 days ^{for}
and ~~admitted~~ ~~later~~ that ~~they~~ ~~were~~
that appeared to have
relevance. These have been omitted from
this summary because ~~they~~

that have included in this summary because
they appear, on review to be includable on
~~logical~~ ~~ground~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~Oswald~~ ~~matters~~ ~~on~~
logical or substantial grounds, or both,
On the 27th at 10:37 the Soviet Embassy
received a ~~call~~

Keeping in mind that the Soviet Embassy ~~etc.~~
received many calls pertaining to visa

visa matters.

On the 27th at 10:57 AM, Embassy received a call, ^{presumably in English,} from an unknown individual who said he wanted to ~~meas~~ to go to Odessa. He was told the consul was not in and to call back at 1130. Oswald is known to have arrived at the Flecken Point Bus terminal on Boat 56 at c. 10:40 on the 27th. It is therefore ~~it is possible, to include by reference of this call~~ for him to have made this call. Granting this, it ~~seems~~ seems ~~unreasonable~~ to believe the call was awarded for the following reasons: (a) The caller wanted visas and specifically for Odessa. Oswald was seeking a visa and never in any other context did he specify Odessa or the Black Sea port of Odessa as his destination. (b) The call was directed to the correct ^{consul} consular number: 15-60-55. ~~Oswald seemed to have~~ ~~apparently~~

On the 1st of October -

Oswald first called the wrong number, 15-69-17 (the M's) number and had to be directed to ~~the correct~~

~~him~~ his call to the correct number, 15-60-55. It seems unlikely he would have made ~~the~~ ^{what would have been his} ~~initial~~ call, on Friday the 27th, to the correct consular number and ~~made an incorrect number on~~ ^{called the} 1 October. (c) There is every reason to believe from the context, ~~to back up~~ ^{in the intercepts A-E above,} that Oswald's first destination after arrival

and check in to the hotel over a ~~long~~ visit to the Cuban Embassy. ^Q The use of the Spanish language, ^{which Oswald would be made use of as an intermediary, which seems unlikely, but} (On 3 October at 15:39 an individual of his M.I. speaking broken Spanish then English, called the Soviet Embassy and asked for a visa. The Soviet respondent. The Soviet

Oswald speaks in broken Spanish then in English to MI. He says Hello. Visa for Russia. MI says Call on the other phone. He says I'm looking for a visa to go to Russia. MI says Please, call on the telephone of the consul, 15-60-55. He says One moment please, I'll have to get a pencil to write the number down. They issue the visa there? He That depends on your conversation. I don't know about this business. Please call the office of the consul and ask your question. He asks for the number again. He gives him the number and tells him to ask for the Consul of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. He says Thanks.

The request
The request
The Soviet says:
The Soviet

The relevance of this intercept is ~~eliminated~~ ^{excludable} on three grounds: (a) the use of broken Spanish. Oswald throughout used broken Russian or English, he had no competence in Spanish. (b) the substance of the request indicates that a visa request in the first stages of initiation. Oswald had put his matter ~~to~~ ^{with} the Cubans and ~~ambassadors~~ ^{ambassadors}.

The Soviets to a point will bypass the substance of the call. (c) Oswald had left Mexico city, based on all the credible evidence ~~shows~~ ^{shows} the early morning of the previous day, ~~he~~ ^{he} could not have made the local call.

end foot note

from evidence
8. Assuming up, we can state or reasonably
infer the following with
Edward Oswald, head the ~~ops~~
(made the following

contacts with the Cuban and Soviet
official establishments in Mexico city:

(Friday)

a. 27 Sept 1963. After arrival and check-in to
his hotel Oswald went, at least
twice to the Cuban ~~embassy~~ ^{first Cuban embassy}
twice to the Cuban Embassy, where
he talked with Silvia Roman. The
time of his first visit is unknown. The
time of his second ~~visit~~ ^{embassy visit} was
about 1600 (i.e. just before closing).

Sometime between the two ~~embassy~~
visits, he must have visited the
Soviet Embassy) ~~(we have coverage)~~
(we have coverage

only on the second Cuban Embassy
visit. ~~Edward Oswald presumably~~
~~became involved in a person~~

We have no indications who
he talked with at the Soviet Embassy.
There was no photographic coverage
of Oswald's entries into either the
Cuban or Soviet embassies on the 27th.

The lack of coverage on the
~~Cuban~~ ^{Soviet} installation is explainable: the
camera ~~based~~ ^{based} on the recollection of
officer's ~~at~~ ⁱⁿ service ~~at~~ ^{at} the time, was down

on the 27th because of mechanical
malfunction. Why Oswald was
missed at the ~~Embassy~~ installation
in his ~~own~~ ^{own} ~~entrance~~ ^{entrance} to the
~~am~~

is not yet explained.

① (Saturday) 28 Sept 1963. Note: ~~the~~

~~was a Friday. Oswald~~

(Oct 1963)
Both Cuban and Soviet Embassies
~~were closed on Saturday~~
~~were temporarily closed to the public~~
and Saturdays. Photographic coverage
was normally suspended Saturday
and Sundays.

Oswald, notwithstanding the
Saturday holiday schedule went
to the ~~embassy~~ ^{embassy} ~~on Saturday~~ ^{on Saturday} morning to the
Soviet Embassy ^(his record visit) where he spoke to a
council. He apparently could not
recall his new ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~Trotsky~~ ^{Trotsky} address.
~~He then went~~ ^{He then went} ~~at c. 11:50~~ ^{at c. 11:50} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~the Cuban Embassy~~ ^{to the Cuban Embassy} where he
had registered it on his visa
applications the day previously. He

summed the address from Miss Bureau
and she called the Soviet consulate
presumably to permit him to give
them the address over the phone. Instead,
the Soviet with whom Oswald spoke
over Miss Bureau's telephone invited
to come back in person and he said
he would. Presumably Oswald
thereupon ~~wrote the top entry:~~
I went back to the
Soviet installation (his third entry) &
gave them his Texas address.

c. 29 Sept 1963 (Sunday). No activity
registered

d. 30 Sept 1963 (Monday). No activity
registered (It is known that Oswald
rained upon this date on a Mexico City-
Laredo Bus, departing 2 October 1963 at
08:30.)

e. 1 Oct 1963 (Tuesday). Oswald made
at least two calls to the Soviet Embassy
at 1031 and 10:45 respectively.
He identified him during the
second call when he talked with
OBYEDIKOV - a guard - and referred
to his ~~brother~~ talk on Saturday
~~was~~ probably with KOSTIKOV. There
was no photo graphic ~~that~~ coverage
of Oswald on October. From the
context of the two calls & moreover,
they would have been no reason
for him to go to the Embassy. His case

had clearly been placed ~~at~~ at
the entrance of the USSR Embassy in
Washington. His two calls on ~~the~~ 1 Oct
~~first~~ were concerned with
whether any reply had been received
from Washington. Under these circum-
stances, it is ~~unreasonable~~ ^{unreasonable} to believe
Oswald would have gone to the
Soviet Embassy on this date. The
camera was ~~working~~ ^{working} however at
at about mid-day it registered ~~its~~

~~the~~
entry into the Soviet Embassy of a
white skinned individual, who ~~was~~ among
all the photographic coverage
and the only ~~person~~ person
who entered the
who ~~first~~ ^{first} appeared
could be

A ~~man~~ ^{man} later, ~~was~~
possibly American - who entered
the Soviet installation that day. ~~He~~
~~was~~ ^{was} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~only~~ ^{only} ~~person~~ ^{person}
~~who~~ ^{who} ~~entered~~ ^{entered} ~~the~~ ^{the}
~~building~~ ^{building} ~~on~~ ^{on} ~~the~~ ^{the}

On the chance that there could be
an association between the ~~above~~
~~data~~ ^{data} derived from the voice intercept
and the descriptive data derived
from the photograph, the station ~~is~~

reported,
~~the~~ the two elements in it called
~~to~~ to Hqs. on ~~the~~ 8 October. The
Station's action was not unusual
considering the ^{permissive and optatory} ~~permissive and optatory~~
status of the overall identifications
and many examples of the kind
of ~~the~~ thing ^{can} be found in the
day-to-day record of
Station/Hqs. correspondence. But do
~~the~~ ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~justify~~ ~~the~~ ~~use~~ ~~of~~ ~~permissive~~ ~~and~~ ~~optatory~~ ~~identifications~~
~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~kind~~ ~~of~~ ~~permissive~~ ~~and~~ ~~optatory~~ ~~identifications~~
~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~kind~~ ~~of~~ ~~permissive~~ ~~and~~ ~~optatory~~ ~~identifications~~

4. STATION SHOULD PASS INFO REF AND PARA ONE TO ^{Embassy} ~~the State, the Navy and I&NS~~ ^{the State, the Navy and I&NS} ~~INFO PARAS~~ ^{INFO PARAS} ~~STATE, ODSNY, ODCATH, AND ODSNY LOCALLY.~~ ~~TWO AND THREE ORIGINATES WITH ~~ODSNY~~~~ ^{to FBI}

5. REF AND POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION BEING DISSEMINATED TO HQS OF ~~ODSNA, ODAUD, ODSNA, AND ODSNA.~~ ^{FBI, STATE, Navy and I&NS} PLS KEEP I&NS ADVISED ON ANY FURTHER CONTACTS OR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF OSWALD.

END OF MESSAGE

VE CRT: According to LIENVOY 1 Oct, an American male who spoke broken Russian said his name was Oswald (phonetic) stated he at Sov Emb on 28 Sept when spoke with Consul. He discussed sending a telegram to Washington. No local dissemination had been made.

T. H. BASSINER

ARMY
ISSUING OFFICER

SR/CI/A/ROLL (in draft)
CI/Liaison/Roman (in draft)
CI/SPG/Leertan (in draft)
C/WH/S
WH/COMS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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J. C. H. H.
C. H. H.
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

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Development from 8 Oct - 22 November

9. Mexico City station reported to Hqs on 8 Oct (and by 9 Oct) the following initial information on Oswald:

Center (1.00)

~~100-115000~~ 1 OCT 63, AMERICAN MALE WHO SPOKE BROKEN RUSSIAN and
SAID HIS NAME WAS OSWALD (PHONETIC), STATED HE AT SOVIETS ON 28
SEPT WHEN SPOKE WITH CONSUL WHOM HE BELIEVED RE GALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
KOSTIKOV. SUPT ASKED SOV GUARD [IVAN] OBYEDKOV, WHO ANSWERED, IF THERE
ANYTHING NEW RE TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON. OBYEDKOV UPON CHECKING SAID
NOTHING RECEIVED YET. BUT REQUEST HAD BEEN SENT.
A PHOTOGRAPH APPEARS RE AMERICAN ENTERING SOVIETS 1216
HOURS, LEAVING 1222 ON 1 OCT. APPARENT AGE 35, ATHLETIC BUILD,
CIRCA 6 FEET, RECEDING HAIRLINE, BALDING TOP. WORE KHAKIS
AND SPORT SHIRT.

3. NO LOCAL DISSEMINATION has been made by the
Station.

10. On 10 October 1963 at 20:12 Z time
the WH Division component responsible for
acting on this report disseminates to
the Department of State, the FBI and the
Navy Dept by teletype
Country electrical transmission
the report received from Mexico Station together

14-00000
Preliminary collateral details drawn from the
a file review:

Context

1. ON 1 OCTOBER 1963 A RELIABLE AND SENSITIVE SOURCE
IN MEXICO REPORTED THAT AN AMERICAN MALE, WHO IDENTIFIED
HIMSELF AS LEE OSWALD, CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN
MEXICO CITY INQUIRING WHETHER THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED
ANY HINTS CONCERNING A TELEGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO
WASHINGTON. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXIMATELY
35 YEARS OLD, WITH AN ATHLETIC BUILD, ABOUT SIX FEET TALL,
WITH A RECEDING HAIRLINE.

2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OSWALD MAY BE IDENTICAL TO LEE
HENRY OSWALD, BORN ON 18 OCTOBER 1939 IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA,
A FORMER U.S. MARINE WHO DEFECTED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN
OCTOBER 1959 AND LATER MADE ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE UNITED
STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH
HIS RUSSIAN BORN WIFE, MARIA NIKOLAEVNA PUSKOVNA, AND THEIR
CHILD.

3. THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH ONE IS BEING DISSEMINATED
TO YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN MEXICO CITY. ANY FURTHER INFORMATION
RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE FURNISHED YOU. THIS INFORMATION
IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE. ~~END OF MESSAGE~~

11. Although the reactions of the headquarters desk
was "by the book" and in good stead, there
were a number of errors in this reporting,
advising the principal departments which
on the record were concerned with the
Oswald case!

(A) Oswald's middle name was misspelled: "Henry" for Harvey.

(B) His wife's maiden name was misspelled: "PUSAKOVA" for RKUSAKOVA.

Neither of these errors were significant.

More important was,

(C) Para 2 of the Mexico Station's report which had already ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~separated~~ ^{separated} (dealt with a concurrent phenomenon,

the description of an unidentified individual

observed going into and out of the Soviet

Embassy, ~~was reported to~~

had been locked out to ^{alleged} be Oswald as a descriptive fact.

(E. A comparison of the two cables was

actually the

can be no) There ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~no~~ ^{no} question that this ~~history~~ ^{history} misunderstanding of the Mexico Station report

was an analyst error which escaped
detection ^{during the} ~~with the~~ ~~line of~~ ~~coordinates~~
~~in the~~ ~~given~~ before release: the described
details attributed to Oswald were
so far off the mark ^{as to be} that they
would ~~immediately~~ ~~instant~~

Immediately recognizable as such
by the recipients. (In postal
explanation, if not reculpatation, he it
recalled that as of that moment
CIA ~~had~~ had no photographs
of Oswald to refer to.)

12. Confirmation of this judgement ~~is~~
is provided by the contents of the
cable ^{composed} ~~sent~~ by the same analyst and
sent 7 22 09 2 times Σ two hours

Notes to Mexico Station:
Continued

1. LEE OSWALD WHO CALLED SOVEMB 1 OCT PROBABLY IDENTICAL
LEE HENRY OSWALD ^(sic) ~~201-289219~~ BORN 13 OCT 1939, NEW ORLEANS,
LOUISIANA, FORMER RADAR OPERATOR IN UNITED STATES MARINES
WHO DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 1959. OSWALD IS FIVE FEET TEN
INCHES, ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE POUNDS, LIGHT BROWN WAVY HAIR,
BLUE EYES.

2. ON 31 OCT 1959 HE ATTEMPTED TO RENOUNCE HIS UNITED
STATES CITIZENSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES EMB IN MOSCOW,
INDICATING HE HAD APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. ON 13 FEB
THE US EMB MOSCOW RECEIVED AN UNDATED LETTER FROM OSWALD
POSTMARKED MINSK ON FIVE FEB 1962 IN WHICH SUBJ INDICATED
HE DESIRED RETURN OF HIS US PPT AS WISHED TO RETURN TO USA
IF "WE COULD COME TO SOME AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DROPPING
OF ANY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ME." ON 3 JULY ON HIS OWN
INITIATIVE HE APPEARED AT THE EMB WITH HIS WIFE TO SEE ABOUT
HIS RETURN TO STATES. SUBJ STATED THAT HE ACTUALLY HAD NEVER
APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP AND THAT HIS APPLICATION AT 10 Oct 63

REFUSING OFFICERS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(CONTINUED)

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

80 0001

THAT TIME HAD BEEN TO REMAIN IN USSR AND FOR TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF HIS TOURIST VISA PENDING OUTCOME OF HIS REQUEST. THIS APPLICATION, ACCORDING TO OSWALD, CONTAINED NO REF TO SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. OSWALD STATED THAT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE 13 JAN 1960 IN BELORUSSIAN RADIO AND TV FACTORY IN MINSK WHERE WORKED AS METAL WORKER IN RESEARCH SHOP. OSWALD WAS MARRIED ON 30 APRIL 1961 TO MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA, A DENTAL TECHNICIAN BORN 17 JULY 1941 USSR. NO HDQS TRACES. HE ATTEMPTED ARRANGE FOR WIFE TO JOIN HIM IN MOSCOW SO SHE COULD APPEAR AT EMB FOR VISA INTERVIEW. HIS AMERICAN PPT WAS RETURNED TO HIM. US EMB MOSCOW STATED TWENTY MONTHS OF REALITIES OF LIFE IN SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY HAD MATURING EFFECT ON OSWALD.

3. LATEST HDQS INFO WAS ^{an FBI} ~~ADACED~~ REPORT DATED MAY 1962 SAYING ^{FBI} ~~ADACED~~ HAD DETERMINED OSWALD IS STILL US CITIZEN AND BOTH HE AND HIS SOVIET WIFE HAVE EXIT PERMITS AND DEPT STATE HAD GIVEN APPROVAL FOR THEIR TRAVEL WITH THEIR INFANT CHILD TO USA.

(CONTINUED)

ISSUING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

13. The Headquarters ~~statement~~ feedback
of Oswald's correct description should
have been sufficient ~~to~~ ^{in view of} details deduced from
the incongruity with the ^{photo of}
the unidentified male, to keep these
two matters apart as investigative facts,
in any case Mexico Station, ~~possibly Staff~~
~~command~~

1
on 15 October 1963,

(in any case, ~~which~~ Hqs. to 'Please
provide a photo of Oswald'. Headquarters
electrically delivered to the Department of the

Wavy the following message:

"See (Hqs. (vii) Oswald...
"It is requested that you forward
to the office as soon as possible
two copies of the most recent
photographs you have of subject,
(the (vii) Oswald) (We will
forward them to our representative
in Mexico, who will attempt to
determine if the see Oswald in
Mexico city, and subject are the same
individual."

1. ~~Report~~ ~~has~~ ~~been~~ ~~received~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~proper~~ ~~authorities~~
~~by~~
~~the~~
~~proper~~
~~authorities~~

(22 Nov 1963. 2)

4. Within its limitations and capabilities, Mexico City status had done all it could to comply with Headquarters instructions:

(A) Headquarters had been alerted and ^{was} ~~been~~ this agency with ^{an} investigators expressing interest in Oswald had been alerted both in Reg Washington and in the field.

(B) Mexico City had no further contacts by Oswald to report because - as it was ultimately necessary - he had left Mexico City on 2 October. (C) Oswald was not an agency investigative responsibility, in any case. Even with a photograph it would have taken very special efforts triggered by the other interested U.S. agencies to have

(4)

makes a positive identification in view
of Oswald's hotel registration under
alias. This ^{is} matter noted at this point
~~is~~ mid-day

22 November 1963.

The insertion of the photo of the unidentified
individual into the chain of evidence.

15. On 22 November 1963 the Mexico City
at 22:52 time
station called Wage after learning of the
arrest of Lee H. Oswald, ^{Case 24 possibly} in connection
with the assassination and reference
and 18
its earlier telegram message of 9 Oct and

Wax. note of 10 October. The station

REQUEST PRIORITY POUCH PHOTO OSWALD SO THAT STATION
CAN CHECK ALL RECENT ~~WAX~~ COVERAGE FOR ^{Oswald} ~~ITEM~~ FORWARDING
SOONEST COPIES OF ONLY VISITOR TO SOVEMB ¹⁷ OCT WHO COULD
BE IDENTICAL WITH OSWALD.

Cent
pi

16. It is clear that Mexico Station had lost

(4)

for other that according to its own
communications the unidentified male in
the photo has an "apparent age 35" and
that the accurate description of Oswald
furnished by the 10th precluded
~~the possibility of any other person~~ (the only person they regarded as
the identity of) the only visitor to the
Sweet Embassy on 1 October who could
be identical, ~~was~~ ^{could} indeed be.


16. The Station had meanwhile begun an
expansion and accelerated review of all
its technical and photographic intelligence
and dispatch was prepared in accordance
with the instructions given in the Cable of
22 November, cited in para 15 above. The
dispatch noted that photo coverage of
the unidentified individuals had been ^{turned}
discontinued on 4 ~~October~~ and 15

October at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies,
respectively. The text of the 22 Nov 1963
journal dispatch was:

1. Attached are copies of the only photographs obtained
on 4 October 1963, which appear to be an American. This same man visited
the Soviet Embassy on 4 October 1963.

2. Copies of these photographs were shown to The U. S. Ambassador
on 22 November 1963 and a copy of each of the two photographs was given to
Chief ~~of~~ Mexico, on that date. . . .

FBI



P.S. Photographs dated 15 October 1963 were inserted after typing
of dispatch. These were taken as person entered the Cuban
Embassy.

Attached were eight photographs: 4 (of which two marked
1 Oct on reverse) showing the individual in a white shirt and
4 (unmarked on reverse) showing the individual in a black shirt.
It would seem to be logical that the word "sets" was
probably omitted in the second line of para 2, between "two" and
"photographs".

17. That the Station was working under journal

draft is apparent from the text of the dispatch, which
contains a material fact ~~that~~ ^{inserted} as a postscript.

That fact was ~~that~~ reported simultaneously
by cable to Hqs, at 00:53 2 time 23 November:
centamps

1. MEXI² STATION HAS PHOTOS SAME UNIDENTIFIED AMERICAN
TYPE WHO IS POSSIBLY OSWALD ENTERING CUBAN EMBASSY ON 15
OCTOBER. SEARCHING FOR POSSIBILITY PHOTO-DOCUMENTED ENTRY
CUBAN EMBASSY OTHER DAYS.

2. ALSO ATTEMPTING ESTABLISH OSWALD ENTRY AND DEPARTURE
MEXICO.

all photographs - all to be kept in the most available file.

18. Simultaneously with the foregoing cables to HQ,
General Secretary [unclear]

the Chief of Station Mexico City spoke directly
by double talk telephone with the
Western Hemisphere Chief of Station, J.L. King. The
gist of what was transmitted is conveyed in
a personal note ~~dated [unclear] to the Chief of~~
~~Station Mexico City, [unclear]~~
~~from Dallas to HQ.~~

and secured permission to give copies of the
photographs to the legal Attaches and to
make them known
(to the Ambassador, ~~to the [unclear] what happened~~)

The next development
is clearly reflected in a personal note
by the Chief of Station to the WH Division Chief,
mailed ^{to the [unclear]} from Dallas together with copies
of the photographs by the FBI representatives

by cable (8:21:44 2 time, 23 Nov):

FBI agent left here 2:00 local time with two copies each of six photos of a person suspected to be Oswald. He is carrying envelope with one copy each photo for airmail agency from Dallas to JFKing at home or per telephone conversation with Scott. 1 copy of each of the three photos plus a copy of each of two photos showing this same person sitting the Cuban Embassy forwarded by memorandum leaving by regular pouch tonight. In view of above does Hqs still want a Staffer to visit additional photo(s)?

re. Hqs registered 1422 2 time, 23 Nov 1963, cancelling its ~~req~~ immediately preceding request:

1. NO NEED SEND STAFFER WITH PHOTOS. WE HAVE ASKED NAVY FOR PHOTOS AGAIN, BUT MEXI CAN SEE OSWALD'S PICTURE SOONER ON THE PRESS WIRE.
2. HAVE JUST RE-EMPHASIZED TO ODENVY HQRS THE SENSITIVITY OF PHOTOS YOU ARE SENDING AND ALSO RELAYED NAMES OF TRAVELERS WITH SIMILAR NAMES. NOTE RADIO SAYS OSWALD LIVED UNDER ALIAS OF O.H. LEE.

who delivered them to the FBI for that act.

22 November 1963

Clear, this is

1
Dear J.C. KING

Reference is made to our conversation of 22 November in which I requested permission to give the Legal Attache copies of photographs of a certain person who is known to you.

Attached are copies of each of the photographs we have with the dates of the visits stamped on the back.

At 6 p. m. Mexico time on 22 November, The Ambassador decided that this was important enough to have a member of the Legal Attache's office take copies of these pictures to Dallas, Texas. The Naval Attache is making a special flight from Mexico City for this purpose. The Legal Attache's officer who is going to Dallas has promised to mail this material to you for me.

Copies of these photographs are also being sent by pouch which will leave Mexico City on the night of 22 November 1963.

Best wishes,

Win [Scott]

According to the side lined comment on this letter, the legal attache's officer was Eldon Rudd. ~~The photographs were being already being prepared.~~
~~After the Ambassador had made the decision to forward the photographs to the Dallas FBI~~

19. The decision to remit the photographs to the ~~FBI~~ FBI in Dallas had been made by the Ambassador, according to the Chief of Station who several times with the FBI agents' departure reported to the

21. On 22 Nov 1963 at 17:29 2 time, Headquarters Mexico City:

The FBI says that the photos of the man entering the Soviet Embassy which Mexico station sent to Dallas were not of Lee Oswald. Presumably Mexico station has doubtless checked date of these photos and is also checking all pertinent other photos for possible shots of Oswald.

22. And at this point, ^{Nor} Mexico City station ~~agreed~~ ^{agreed} 22:48 2 time, 23 Nov 1963

Saw photo of Lee Oswald on television night of 22 Nov and it obvious photo sent to Dallas were not identical with Lee Oswald held in Dallas. Dates are as given on photos. Mexico station ^{is} reviewing all available photos of persons entering Soviet and Cuban embassies.

(22:54 2 time, 23 Nov 1963)
24. Two hours later, the station reported the results of ~~the~~ ^{its} effort to review all available

Coverage:

Complete review of photos of all
 visits to Cabana Embury from
 August through first half of
 November against good press
 photo shows no evidence of
 Oswald visit. Similar blank
 against all Soviet Embassy photos
 from 1 September. Note, only
 visit we know he made was
 to Embury Embury 28 September,
 Saturday on which Embury
 closed and we have not had
 coverage... ~~the by photos we will~~
~~require at least half a day~~

36. With this communication the matter of the
"Unidentified Individual" reaches the
end of Phase I, the key element of
which is the conviction ^{at first} latent, then
expressed, that the photographed
individual ^{might} be identical with
Crawford. This is applied
especially to the evidence, though
at a certain point even Hqs. moved
no rebuttal but ^(the word) kept the facts
that ~~of~~ ~~of~~ ~~of~~ of quite
disparate description.

37. This review has attempted to
deal even-handedly with all items
in the case record that have a
bearing on what happened. The
operational goal, summarizing and

the high commitment of all involved,
especially in Mexico City, speaks for itself.
Equally apparent - because of this,
the 20-20 advantages of handsopt -
is the evidence of non performance.
and, perhaps, the limited gain

It was a critical factor, for example,
that no photo of Oswald was
made available - though it was
repeatedly requested both at headquarters
and by the field - or that it was
not more aggressively sought by CIA,
before the 22nd of November. A photo-
graph of Oswald would have obviated -
in a way the mere possession of a
correct physical identity could not -
the whole successive deteriorations

of what began as an impressionistic
~~tract~~ (selection of the photograph on
1 October 1963, ~~to~~ into a course
celebre ~~today~~ today.

38. It should be clear) ~~above all~~
from this factual survey that issue
was ^{been} there a course celebre with less
intrinsic merit. Equally clear,
should be the demonstration of
the fact themselves that there was
nothing contrived, or contrived
about ~~what~~ in what happened;
unless ~~we~~ ... we have now
descended to that point in ~~our~~
human values ~~we~~ reached during
achieved under
Stalinism &
Stalin in the USSR and under Hitler
in Germany, where just a plain
mistake is ~~per se~~ ~~unintentional~~

evidence of conspiracy.

and Development

38. The Genesis of ODUM Exhibit No 1 and
Commission Exhibit 287

Special Agent of the FBI, Bardwell

Harold D. Odum, on 23 November

1963, ~~showed~~ ~~after an unsuccessful~~

showed one of the six photos
of flown up from Mexico City the
previous day to Oswald's mother,

Marguerite Oswald. ODUM himself
had trimmed the off the background
by straight cut. Mrs Oswald ~~could~~
had no recognition of the image in

the photograph. Bardwell's own details
account may be found ^{among} ~~in~~ ~~the~~

Hearings Exhibits, ~~Vol XX~~ ~~of the~~

Hearings, op cit, Vol XX: p. 268 ~~and~~
~~with this for me~~

39. The photograph shows the unidentified individual in a black shirt. It is one of the 5 photos taken of him in front of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on 4 October 1963, two days after Oswald had left the city.

40. At this point for the record the total available ^{photo} coverage of the unidentified individual numbers

12 photographs:

(a) 5 taken ~~later~~ on 1 October 1963, entering and exiting the Soviet Embassy. He is

(b) 5 taken on 4 October 1963 in front of the Soviet Embassy. He is garbed in a ~~light colored (Khaki?) trousers~~ ^{dark shirt and light colored trousers} and a dark jacket. He is garbed in a dark, open button-down dark shirt and dark trousers.

(c) 2 taken on 15 October 1963 in front of the Cuban Embassy

wears a high
neckline under-
shirt showing,

a history of mental instability, and was summoned,
 recalled from the League,
 for reportedly for reasons related to that point,
 in August 1966.)

Intercepted Conversation of Cuban Embassy
Employee Inisa CAJEDON, afternoon of
22 November, 1963. At 1730 Mexico City, Texas

Some about 5 hours after the Kennedy assassination in Dallas, ~~Miss~~ a Cuban Embassy employee named "Inisa" subsequently identified as Inisa CAJEDON received a telephone call from an unidentified male ~~subject~~. The caller asked her if she had heard the latest news. Inisa CAJEDON jokingly replied: "Yes, of course, I heard it almost before Kennedy.... Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs), what barbarian!...."

Dr. Gott. speaker agreed on the circumstances of the assassination. Inisa also states that party at Silvia Duran's had been called off as it would not appear that they were celebrating the death of KENNEDY, nor would they have the party coinciding with burial. Finally she might also planned to move that night into the home of a doctor (a woman) friend.

What type hole? ~~Exaggerated or not party scene in Texas?~~
~~Unimpaired? Yes, it is the only item to be taken into consideration~~
~~perfectly reasonable subject after the assassination that party~~
~~to the interest, significant character of this~~

conversations ~~from addenda. Inisa~~
~~is simply highlighting~~
becomes more.

by the following facts:

9
(a) "Luisa" is probably identical with
Luisa Cordeiro, a caber worker of the
Cuban Institute General of Pesticides
(W-41). ~~in this city~~ The ~~was~~ chief in
~~Mexico City at~~ She returned to
Mexico in 1954 and was reported to be working in
No. 11, La Aurora

(b) The first foreign element in Mexico City
in the fall of 1963 was headed by Alfredo
MIRABEL ~~the~~ ~~agent~~
1963, ~~for~~ King, who had arrived on 2 Sept
formally on the replacement of
the Cuban teacher agent (deposed 19 Nov
1963). The Deputy 1st chief (and as of June
1964, MIRABEL's successor) was Manuel
Enrique VEST Perez.

(c) The
Luisa Cordeiro "Luisa" was named in
Luisa's conversation with the recipient,
~~was~~ a Mexican national, who handled
LH's plea during his flight (entry to the
Cuban ~~over~~ ~~relates~~ ~~in~~ ~~known~~
on 27 and 28 September, to the Cuban
installations ~~previously~~ in connection
with a ~~visa~~ ~~application~~ for entry to
Mexico. Luisa Cordeiro is the sole link
between VEST regarding LH's activity in
Mexico City. Her testimony, however, in its
entirety was taken and presented orally by the
Mexican governmental ~~and~~ ~~authorities~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~
~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~same~~

(A first conversation with Luisa)
The Cuban Commission ~~is~~ ~~was~~ requested for

numerous took to days.

~~My~~ ~~legislation~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~country~~

There is no evidence in the Cowell case
file that Robert Brown was subjected
to a systematic systematic interrogations
that ~~collected~~ ~~has~~ ~~owned~~.

I would have related her ~~admittedly~~
dealings with Cowell ~~with~~ ~~confer-~~
~~to~~ ~~Brown~~ and

confirmed by intercept - with the

~~data~~ ~~held~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~file~~ ~~on~~ ~~the~~
~~Walden~~ ~~Carbon~~ ~~West~~ - ~~in~~ ~~its~~ ~~personality~~ ~~and~~
methods - in Mexico City. Was it unusual

for a case like Cowell's ~~application~~ - ~~application~~
to pass he allegedly made with ~~have~~ -
for the application to be handled solely
by a ~~local~~ ~~employee~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~office~~ and a ~~house~~

As well,
but ~~of course~~ ^{of course} that had been taken earlier by

of chief? ~~What~~ ^{What} since the answer

to this question, there remains the more
fundamental question: Could the accepting
the Bureau story on its face, could it
have happened without the W.G. elements
above cited knowledge and participation?

~~That is, it is~~ It is doubtful that
the reply could be other than a solid negative

and in that case, it is palpable that Coster's
^{could}
intelligence and security services ~~had~~ ^{had} been

~~more~~ more in its file, than has been surmised
in the Bureau's statements. ^{Was he}
this suggests that

Coming back to the beginning: "hina" —
(member of the ^{red unit in} therefore
Luna Calderon — as a ^{red unit} ^{could}
very well have had ^{implications} that
~~known something~~

would make what she said to be uninteresting

rather than of a case.

(rather than a matter of) most full self indulgence

that was ~~immediately excluded~~

then was examined at the time.

14 1967 Silvia Buzian was reported by a
and sensitive
witness, a nurse to have broken out all
relations with Cushman. She stated that this
transpired before she was arrested
described the

Her account of how
she stated that she had been taken into custody
but had been interrogated after the subsequent
with her.

repeated
did not ~~not~~ subsequently to what was already
known. She added under these
circumstances
the

that did not permit the source to challenge
or elicit the corroborative detail, that she
gone out with Lt. during his stay in Regina
city and she stated she had sexual
relations with Brown

Observation, when she finally admitted
before the Commission that the Odium
~~photograph~~ ^(photograph) was not Ruby, was that the
photo had been cropped differently
from the one she had been shown
in Dallas. ^{(Inspector Malley's cropped version} ~~Malley's~~ of the Odium photo-
graph became Commission Exhibit 237 (see
Hennings; vol XVI, p. 638).

42. The net effect of these ^{development} ~~events~~
in the opinion of the Commission was to require
the admission of the ^{cropped} photograph into
evidence in a ~~chain~~ ^{chain} of deposition

beginning with Odium, including
the FBI State Inspector, James R. Malley
(who had ~~been the originator of the photograph~~ ^{trimmed the photograph used}
~~in Washington~~
by the Commission in Washington) and
Mr Helms, ~~who had the photograph~~
~~had origins~~ who deposed for the
originator. These documents speak

for themselves and will be found
in the Hearings, Vol. XI pp. 468-70.

#3. Mexico City Station and other senior
agency officers strongly ~~advised~~ advised
~~that~~ against the publication of the ~~photos~~
photograph in any form on the grounds
that the Soviets ~~would~~ would
be immediately alerted to the existence
of a useful and still continuing U.S.
intelligence operation and the operation
would go down the drain. ~~It is felt~~
~~that the above is correct.~~

~~Despite repeated cable exchanges
and consultations with the
the US~~
There were repeated cables ^{exchanged} on this point
between Headquarters and Mexico City

station press during the summer of
1964 and in particular from 23 September
to 15 October 1964 when the Station
Head had plans underway to abandon
its operation.

The ~~Head~~ needs of the Warren Commis-
sion prevailed.

44. In accordance to the ~~Head~~
Commission's request for a deposition
Mr Helms, then the Deputy Director for
Plans, ^{affirmative} replied to Mr Roubin by
memorandum on 25 June 1964 which
press included the following addition
observation:

"The Central Intelligence Agency

recommends that this photograph
not be reproduced in the
Commission's report because
it would jeopardize a most
confidential and productive
operation. In addition, it could
be embarrassing to the
individuals involved who as
far as this Agency is aware, had
no connection with Lee Harvey
Oswald or the assassination
of President Kennedy.

In this instance

45. The needs of the Commission
prevailed over the ~~Statute~~ Act's
statutory obligation to protect sources
and methods. The "Unidentified
Individual" remains to this day
unidentified and there is no
credible evidence ^{up to this time} to rebut the
assertions made by Mr. Helms in
his concluding sentence of his
memorandum to Mr. Ransby on
23 June 1964, ... And the photo opera-

ations did, as predicted, go down
the drain. Within a few weeks of
the public appearance of ^{the} Odum
Exhibit 237 No 1 and Commission
Exhibit 237, members of the Soviet
Embassy began systematic efforts to
survey ^{the surrounding} buildings, ~~there~~ particularly
for rental space, but clearly these
inquiries were directed to spotting possible
camera sites. The operation was contained
in any case. Within a year it had
~~also~~ become almost totally
unproductive in coverage on American
in contrast with the Embassy - a
clear sign that the category of
visitors ~~had~~ been was being
worned away by the Soviets themselves

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DOCUMENTATION BEARING
ON THE "UNIDENTIFIED
PHOTOGRAPH OF THE
INDIVIDUAL

1. Mexico Station telegram 6453
(IN-36017) 9 October 1963. 1 page
2. CIA Headquarters ^{electrical} telegraphical
dissemination to Department
of State, FBI and ^{the} Department
of the Navy. (DIR-74673), 10
October 1963, (2 pages.
20:12 2 times.)
3. CIA Headquarters cable to Mexico
Station (Out 74830), 10 October 1963,
22:09 2 times. 3 pages.

4. Mexico Station telegram 6534
(IN-40357), 15 October 1963. 1
page; and, CIA Headquarters
electrical dissemination to
the Department of the Navy, 23
October 1963, 1 page.

5. Mexico Station telegram 7014
(IN-66781), 22 November 1963, (1 page
22:29 2 times.)

6. Priority Dispatch from Mexico
City Station (HMMA-22533),
22 November 1963. [Encloses copies
of photo of the unidentified individual
taken 1, 4 and 15 October 1963.]
1 page with attachment.

7. Mexico Station telegram 7019
(IN 66846), 22 November 1963,
(1 page. 00:53 2 times)

8. Private letter by Chief of Station,
Mexico, Mr. Wain Scott to Chief
of WH Division, Mr. JC King,

22 November 1963.

9. Mexico Station telegram 7021
(IN - 66896), 23 November 1963. 1
page. 02:44 2 times

~~10. Mexico Station telegram -~~

10. CIA Hqs. telegram to Mexico
Station, DIR - 84822, 23 Nov
1963. (1 page. 04:22 2 times.)

11. Mexico Station telegram,
7027 (In - 67189), 23 Nov 1963.
20:43 2 times. 1 page.

12. Mexico Station telegram
7025 (In. 67186, 23 Nov 1963
20:34 2 times) and 7033 (In -
67232, 23 Nov 1963, 22:46 2 times).
[Forward transcript texts.]

1009

10 Mexico Station telegram of 7020 (In-66891),
23 Nov 1963, 02:31 - 3 times

11. CIA Hqs. telegrams to Mexico Station,
DIR-84821 and 84822, 23 Nov 1963,
01:36 2 times and 04:22 2 times, respectively.
1 page, each.

Mexico Station telegram, 7027 (In-67189),
23 Nov 1963, 20:43 2 times. 1 page.

12. Mexico Station telegram 7025, 23 November
1963. 16:55 2 times. [Forward transcript
informants] 2 pages

~~Mexico Station~~

13. ^{CIA} Hqs. telegram to Mexico Station, ~~DIR~~
(DIR-84888), 23 Nov 1963, 17:29 2 times.
1 page

^{New} ~~item~~ 14. [This is Mexico 7025 & 7033, which you
already have.]

15. ~~Mexico Station telegram 7020~~
(In-67189)

16. Mexico Station telegram 7029, (23 Nov 1963,
20:48 2 times.

17. Alexio Stens 7035 (Inv 67233),
23 Nov 1963, 2254 2 times.

18. Memorandum for the Record by Chief of Station, Mexico, 11 April 1964. Subject: Visit by Three Staff Representatives of Warren Commission. 3 pages and covering dispatch (HMAA 23249, 14 April 1964)

~~19-23~~ Text 1
19-23. ~~Text 1~~ Texts 27, 28 September, and 1, 3 October 1963. (For 27 and 28 texts in both Spanish and English, for 1st and 3rd, in English translation only).

24-26. Five photographs of unidentified individuals entering and leaving Soviet Embassy, (1 October 1963, Mexico City, Graham)

27-29. Five photographs of unidentified individuals in front of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, 4 October 1963. (Graham)

30. Two photographs of unidentified individuals, taken in front of Cuban Embassy, 15 October 1963.

31-34. Mexico Photos - CIA Hqs correspondence, ~~18~~ 3

18, 29 May and 26 June and

3 July 1967 relatives to negatives of photographs noted at 29-30, above.

35. letter by DFR Deputy Director for Plans, Mr Helms to Mr. J. Lee Rankin, 23 July 1967. 1 page.

36-7. Texts of affidavits by Bradwell D.

ODUM, James R. MALLEY and Richard

Helms. Hearings, vol. XI, pp. 468-70.

UNCLASSIFIED

38. Reproductions of Odum Exhibit No 1

~~and~~ (Hearings, vol XX, p 691) and

Commissioner Exhibit 237 (Hearings

vol XVI, p. 638). UNCLASSIFIED

39. Extracts from Warren Commission Report, pages 364-5 and 667, dealing with the photographs of the unidentified individual. UNCLASSIFIED

40. A Selection of Postment, Documents reflecting ^{CIA} Hqs and Mexico Stations Reaction to and Handling of the Warren Commission Publications of the Photo of the Unidentified Individual, September - October 1964

41. Letter by CIA General Counsel, Lawrence R. Houston to the Honorable Bernard T. Bagert, United District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, 16 May 1967. 2 pages. UNCLASSIFIED

42. Correspondence with ^{Hq.} Emory L. Brown 4, 17 April, 1970. 3 pages. UNclassified

43. Correspondence with Mr. Paul L. HOCHT, 1 and 15 November 1971 and 24 and 14 Dec. 1971. 8 pages. UNCLAS-SIFIED

44. Correspondence ~~with~~ ^{with and related to} ~~Mr. Bernard Finsterwald Jr.~~ ^{Requests by} ~~Mr. Bernard Finsterwald Jr.~~ ^{Mr. Bernard Finsterwald Jr.} March 22 1971; 8 April (2 MORS); 9-18 February 1972; 24 Feb - 6 March 1972; 11-13 April 1972; 26 and 29 June 1972; 28 July and 17 August 1972; and ~~memorandum~~ ^{memorandum} by Mr. Houston ^{to} Director, FBI on ^{interest,} 11 October 72 ^{together with two supporting} papers, a Cable ~~from~~ ^{to} Mexico Station dated 3 October 1972, and ^{as a result of} interview, dated 11 October, 1972. 43 pages.

AC/Agoo

Subject: Review of Selected Items in the
Lee Harvey Oswald File re
Allegations of the Castro Cuban
Involvement in the John
F. Kennedy Assassination.

~~Review~~

The attached ^{review and summary.} was written at
the express request of Mr David W. Belin,
as a follow up to question #3
of his letter to the Agency of 15 April
1975.

The results as I have already told
him - add nuance, not evidence, to
what the Warren Committee and its
staff had laid before them in 1964.
~~Deleted copy~~ ~~the subject.~~
~~the subject.~~

The results of the review are stipulated
in the sentence at para 8 of the attach-

ment.

~~at the~~ ^{file.}
~~the~~ ~~documentation~~ ~~del~~ ~~book~~
~~the~~ ~~copy~~ ~~instead~~ -

~~This is a companion piece to the~~
~~series of the~~ ~~the~~ ~~Photographs~~ - ~~the~~ -
Unidentified individual, submitted
a few weeks ago.

~~all~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~case~~ ~~data~~

There seemed to be no reason to
attach ~~the~~ ^{copy} copies of the ~~the~~ reports
from the file to this summary. There
can be made ^{promptly} ~~available~~ ~~however~~, ~~with~~ ~~an~~
request,

Background

On Saturday evening, September 7, 1963, Fidel Castro, in an act unusual for him, appeared at the Brazilian Embassy reception in Havana. Even more unusual Castro submitted to an informal interview by the Associated Press correspondent Daniel HARKER'S.

HARKER'S interview ~~reached~~ ^{reached} New York on Sunday, September 8th, and was in print throughout the country on Monday, September 9th. There can be no question from the facts surrounding the Castro appearance, ^{which had not been expected,} and his agreement to the interview, that this was a represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message ~~through~~ ^{through} registered on the record in the

Castro's statements
United States. The ~~Harber~~ interview
~~concerned~~
to HARBER covered a range of topics
but dealt principally
~~about~~, (with ~~Castro~~ American
political leadership, ~~with~~ in particu-
lar President Kennedy whom he
excoriated in extraordinarily provocative
fashion ("... Kennedy is a creature; ... the
Batista of his times ... the most opportunist
American President of all time."). ~~There~~
~~was~~ ~~reference~~ ~~to~~ ~~Senator~~ ~~Goldwater~~,

The interview had other content -
~~rich~~ uncomplimentary reference
to Senator Goldwater and Cuban delay
in signing the limited nuclear test
ban - and ^{there were significant differences} ~~was~~ ~~played~~ by
^{in the} ~~was~~ ~~played~~ by
^{which the} US newspapers; ^{the} New York Times and
Washington, ~~where this~~ with a result

that Castro's "message" ~~was~~ ^{was} significantly
modulated.

In New Orleans, where he formerly
resided until the middle of September
1968, the HARKER story appeared in
the principal morning newspaper,
the TIMES-PICAYUNE on Monday, Sept
8, page seven under a three
column headline: "Castro Blasts
Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leaders
Impeded by Aid to Rebels." ~~The~~
The story then followed under the Harker
by-line:

The New York Times, in its coverage on
Sept 9th used a UPI wire service report which
omitted any reference to the warning and
threat

on the Kennedy assassination that this ^{by the by} Castro interview was considered, in

following up leads, or in dealings with the the Warren Commission and its staff, ~~although~~ ~~except for a~~

although Mexico States specifically directed Hqs. attention to the AP story ^{very shortly} ~~in the~~ after the ~~fact~~ there is no evidence, ^{in any} ~~letter~~, that the Warren Commission Dallas ~~letter~~ calling ^{staff, itself, perceived} this ~~implication~~ of the Castro interview in dealing with the ^{conspiracy hypothesis}

The purpose of this review is to reconsider Lee Harvey Oswald's activity

~~that~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~light~~ ~~of~~ on the assumption

~~that~~ (avid newspaper reader ~~that~~ ~~as~~ ~~an~~ ~~idea~~ ~~is~~ ~~is~~ which we know from

Marius Oswald's (testimony) and others - he read the ~~fact~~ Castro warning and threat as reported above.

The results of the review - admittedly
bearing ~~the~~ ^{utilizing} ~~the~~ 20-20
quality of hindsight - may be
stipulated in summary:

(a) There is no increment of ^{Credible} evidence ~~of~~
of ~~political~~ Soviet ^{and} or Cuban political,
intelligence or security service involvement
~~with~~ to what was developed and
considered by the Warren Commission
and its staff. ~~THE~~ The Commission's
~~to the effect that the report~~ ~~was~~ ~~based~~ ~~on~~ ~~an~~
~~finding~~ ~~thereof~~, ^{that} LEO was the killer
on the basis of ^{credible evidence}
of JFK and officer Tippett and did
and ~~of~~ his own determination
~~that~~ them in alone, must stand.

(b) "credible evidence" that would ^{upset} ~~change~~
^{significantly}
as modifies this judge's ~~and~~ ~~has~~
not exist in Woburn to ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~city~~
) but it
~~is clear that~~ such evidence could

exist in Moscow and Havana,
where voluntary inputs to the Warren
Commission, ~~are not~~

are minimal in
quantity and to facilitate, ~~design~~

design

the design, ~~design~~ cover

up any ~~other~~ connection by which
Oswald might be connected
directly or indirectly with the
commission. They ~~will~~ ~~admittedly~~

~~at the time of the~~

judgment

as a belief

~~that there was indeed a KGB link
or a Det~~

Soviet and or Cuban (KGB and/or
Det) connection will persist,
and grow further, until there
has been a full disclosure by
these governments of all ~~operational~~
elements of Oswald's ~~contacts~~
in the Soviet Union, ~~handing~~ and

stay

and his
contacts in Mexico City are
made available by these two
governments. The Warren Commission
Report should have left a wider
"window" for ~~the~~ the Portuigey

pathological protection of Oswald
possible progressive syndromes are
his identifications with Fidel Castro
and the Cuban.
etc

going back

^{this}
and Cuban revolution which is directly
traceable as far back as his Marine
Corp service in El Toro, California.

If Oswald read Castro's threat and
warning?

Castro

Castro's ^{own} words
warning and threat

Castro's statements to AP correspondent
Hoshea - investigator of the extent
whether there was any formal meeting
or even secret, serious contact with
Oswald by the Cubans or the Russians -
may have

could have been acts of singular
importance and under no circumstances
allowable. ~~for~~ ^{as} possible ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~just~~
allowable, ~~refers~~ ^{refers} for what the Cuban agents
were doing during the summer of 1963,

which ~~represented~~ gave the interview
its real significance. The Washington Post
^{abbreviated} did ~~a rewrite~~ (Sept 9, p. A-7) which,
similarly, omitted any reference to the
main thrust of Costello's remarks. The
Evening Star, ^{of Washington DC.} printed the Harber story
nearly in its entirety ~~but buried it~~
(in the shorter section of the paper
(9 Sept 1963, page B-4). ^{it} But reordered
the content of the Harber interview,
placing the emphasis of the Ad political
aspects - in particular highlighting the Cold-
water element ~~which~~ and burying
the Costello's explicit ~~the~~ warning to US.
leadership in the middle ~~part~~ of
the piece.

There is no evidence in the ^{Agency's} files ~~the~~

with or without CIA's knowledge or
more properly, the knowledge of the
President's brother, Robert Kennedy,
who was personally involved with
overnight Cuban matters at the
Federal level after the Bay of Pigs
failure.

(1) (2)
Elizabet Castro
Cuban Contact with Oswald, Santa Ana, California, Jan

1959? (The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains ^{an} important
section of general significance to any
review of the background of LHO's feelings
toward and ~~possibly~~
and relations with Castro Cuba. See

His Cuban record is summarized.

Delgado was probably the closest non-group
member to Oswald ^{his} during special training
period at El Toro Marine Corps Base in 1959.

Dec 58 - Jan 1959. The Warren Commission Report
takes note of this:

"Oswald told Delgado that he
was in trade with Cuban diplomatic
officials in this country; which Delgado
at first took to be "one of his ex-
periences, but later believed."

1. Report of the President Commission on the
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
(Wash. 1964), p. 687. Hereafter cited as,
Report.

14-00000

Actually Oswald's testimony, says a lot more of possible operational significance than is reflected by the language of the report and has not appeared to have been imbedded or disclosed by investigators. Under the record of Oswald's ^{the beginning of} ~~beginning~~ relationships with the Cubans ~~it~~ starts with a question mark.

Delgado
The period was one of transition in US-Cuban relations after Castro's takeover. ~~Both~~ Delgado, and Belgado at the outset, were North Castro supporters, Belward having particularly been about how to get there. Delgado testified:

"... I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that I know was to get in touch with a Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time that I told him that we were on friendly terms with

Cuba, you know, is a very important
subject or, or important, you know.
I didn't know what to answer him.
I told him to see them.

"After a while, he told me he was in
contact with them

"... I saw this envelope in his footlocker
wall-locker, and it was addressed to
him, and they had an official seal
on it, and as far as I could recall
that was mail from Los Angeles, and
he was telling me there was a Cuban
consul. And just after he started receiving
these letters - you see, he would
never go out, but stay near the
post all the time

"... he had one visitor. After he started
receiving letters he had one visitor.
It was a man, because I got the
call from the MS guard shack, and
they gave me a call that Oswald
had a visitor at the front gate. This
man had to be a civilian, otherwise they
would have let him in. So I had
to find somebody to relieve Oswald, who
was on guard, to go down there to
visit with this fellow, and they spent
about an hour and a half or two hours
talking, I guess, and he came back.
I don't know who the man was
or what they talked about, but he
looked wonderful about the whole

them when he came back. I was waiting
at the way, waiting.

"The incident. How long did the talking to him,
do you remember?"

"Mr. Delgado, about an hour and half, 2
hours...."

"Mr. Wheeler. You never asked Oswald what this
fellow was that he talked to?"

"Mr. Delgado. No. No...."

"Mr. Wheeler. Did you connect this visit that
Oswald had at that time with the Cuban
Consulate?"

"Mr. Delgado: I did; because I thought it
funny for him to be receiving a cable
at such a late date - time. Also, up to
this time he hardly ever received mail, in
fact he almost never received mail from home
because I made it a policy ~~in fact he~~
~~never~~ ~~almost~~ ~~never~~ ~~received~~ ~~mail~~ ~~from~~ ~~home~~,
because I made it

I used to pick up the mail for one hour
and distribute it to the guys in the, and
very seldom did I see one for him. But
very so often, after he started to get in
contact with these Cuban people he started
getting little pamphlets and little newspapers.

"... and he also started receiving
letters, you know, and one booklet,
maybe pamphlet, you know, little - like
bulletin, things like that from Cuba, you
know, but it wasn't a church.

"Mr. Walker, when they write in Spanish, they
of them, do you know?
in English. But that is even more
"Mr. Walker, had you known any nothing of before
they then they come to correct from the
English comments?"

"Mr. Walker, well I try it for generalizing
edit after from the college here... down
being like a Mexican style, with a day,
improvement you know, they have
different from me, not, not and not, almost
book it like me, when you know, but
I can't make the case. I just know, I am
in Latin, Greek, Persian, etc. that is
English comments, it was better."

"Mr. Walker, you don't know for some words
it was from the English comments?"

"Mr. Walker, No. But he had not any thing
just before, I found they were in
his work before, that he was copying
word from them, and me from his,
appeared to show it to me, but I never
knew the work to do, and I never
did ask to see that paper again, you
know."

"Mr. Walker, that is all you want to know
negotiations with the English comments.
any about? Also, he didn't
"Delgado's book."

"Mr. Delgado, did he ever indicate to you that it had to do with the conversation about your book about going over to Cuba?"

"Mr. Delgado. No. The only thing he told me was that right after he had this conversation with the Cuban people was that he was going to — once he got out of the service he was going to Switzerland...." 2

2. Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. HEARINGS before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Nov 1964) Vol. VIII: 241-243.

Hereafter cited as, HEARINGS.

On 27 Sept 1959 he was named a US passport valid for travel - among other places - for Cuba and the USSR.

Albert
Council's application to Schweizer College, Chaux-walden, Switzerland was dated 19 March 1959, and he was promised to report time by June 20 April 1960. Insistence for discharge from the Marines on 7 Dec 1959. Insults accelerated his exit on alleged grounds of family hardship in Sept 1959. He contacted the Soviet Union through early Switzerland on 15 October 1959.

Delgado's testimony has the cost of credibility. Denying that, it is of basic importance to focus attention on the real issues which confronted it at Chaux El Tou cony and

14-00000
The most important, however, is that
there is no mention of Oswald's activities in the US before or after
his departure for Cuba. (The
latter half of the document, 1/2 and 2 pages.)

The word reflects no identification of
this contact. DeLoach's presumption is that he
was from the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. (The question
is: was there, reporting to Havana
in effect
that would represent, at a minimal guess,
the opening of a file on Oswald? ³

US-Cuban diplomatic and consular relations
were severed on 3 January 1961.

Indication of President Kennedy's demise by CP
cell leader Morris Bennett Zabala, HQ, Guatemala
 Station forwarded to HQ on 9 January 1964
 a duplicate copy of a raw report by a
 penetrating source dated 5 January 1962
 describing event at this year CP cell
 meeting. The cell leader, Morris ~~BENNETT~~
 Zabala ~~the cell leader~~ said that the
 Communist Party in Guatemala should
 form a single new party: "We need
 not preoccupy ourselves over the politics
 of President Kennedy because we know,
 according to prognostications, that he will
 die within the present year, 1962."

This report apparently had been disseminated
 by the ~~the~~ ^{the} Station ^{when} before it had been received
 and was not forwarded until the Station
 re-received all of its material ^{(after the} in compliance

14-00000

assessors, The file reflect no follow up
journal ^{of the report}
or dissemination ~~of the information~~ not from
~~possible to do any more~~ ~~investigation~~ ~~to~~ ~~necessary~~
~~inquiries in that regard~~.

Emigrating Puerto Ricans by Cuban Third Secretary
in the Hague 7/8/63. I suspect [redacted]

source, reportedly after the Kennedy assassination,
indicated that at the Soviet reception on 7 Nov
1963, the Cuban Third Secretary Ricardo ^{L.} SANTA
(Pera) discussed the ~~refugee~~ ^{refugee} ~~emigration~~ ^{emigration}

rights on Cuba and their implications
with a host-country diplomat, concluding
with the following admonition: "... just
wait and you will see what we can
do. It will happen soon." Asked to
be more specific about what would
happen soon Santa replied: "just
wait, just wait."

(Phil Kessel)

(These data were passed to the Warren
Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964.
Santa was subsequently reported to have a

San Francisco, California and 57

Roy Dobkin

The Alvarado case is ^{taken up} discussed in detail by the Warren Commission under the cryptograph "D". ⁶ ~~The threat of~~ ALVARADO claims

6. See, REPORT, pp. 307-308.

~~account was~~
that he had seen an American, whom he identified as Oswald, receive money, approximately in mid-September 1963 in a park near the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. Alvarado's story was ultimately ~~shown to be~~ ~~the conclusion reached that he was lying~~

~~by the combination of~~
[the use of the polygraph, ⁱⁿ ~~which~~ Alvarado showed deception, and ~~the~~ ^{his} bringing Alvarado's Nicaraguan security

service control into the core. ~~base of~~

~~Alvarado~~

The Alvarado story is particularly acute representation of the difficulties that beset the valuation of observed evidence's ~~even when it seems~~ certain elements of the ~~story~~ persist despite the misstatement of its major premises. In this case ALVARADO, ~~whose~~ whose account did not become public until the publication of the Warren Report in October 1967 — talked consistently of the presence in the ^{Carbon compounds} transaction ~~of~~ ~~substitution of~~ a Negro with red-dyed hair.

Elena Garro de Paz is a ^{Mexican} successful, articulate and socially prominent ~~actress~~,

married, but separated, from a high ranking
Mexican foreign service official. She is, also,
the cousin of Horacio Duran, the ~~husband~~
of Silvia Duran, ~~the wife of the husband~~
~~of Silvia Duran~~ Cited above. ~~by name~~
~~There is a~~

strong personal antipathy between
the two women arising from
Elena Garro's trenchant anti communism.

~~He has~~ ~~had~~ ~~the~~ ~~initial~~ ~~reference~~ ~~to~~
From October 1964 until his retirement
in the fall of 1969, ~~the~~ ~~former~~ ~~State~~ ~~politician~~
Charles Thomas, ~~a~~ ~~U.S.~~ ~~Embassy~~ ~~Officer,~~
~~presently~~ ~~kept~~ ~~up~~ ~~a~~ ~~regular~~
~~stream~~ ~~of~~ ~~reports~~ ~~and~~ ~~memoranda~~
reflecting GARRO's account of what
~~actually~~
had gone on between Oswald, the
widow and ^{at} ~~particular~~ ^{Silvia} Duran in September
1963, ~~part~~ ~~including~~ ~~including~~ ~~the~~
a ~~repeated~~ ~~reference~~ ~~to~~ ~~a~~ ~~Negro~~ ~~meeting~~
~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~time~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~meeting~~.

The first reference to the GARRO

story, ~~as stated by~~ was noted in

Mexico Station

a Memorandum of Record dated

12 Oct 1964.

"Eleana GARRO (said) that she and her daughter were invited to a party at the Cuban Embassy during the period she now finds out that Oswald was here in Mexico prior to the assassination. She was invited by a Mexican senator in the Cuban Embassy whose husband is a cousin of the Garro family (Horacio Duran). At the party, she saw ~~the~~ three gingos, not drinking, not smoking and more or less just standing around together like 'three lumps on a log'. They were so obviously out of place, she asked someone in the Cuban Embassy about them and was told that 'they were just passing through.' She claims that on the way these three gingos stood and she took a good look at them as her daughter. When the assassination occurred and Oswald's picture was spread into the newspapers, both Eleana and her daughter

immediately said that he was
one of the 'three geniuses' without
a doubt' at the party

GARRO repeated her story to Mr.
Charles ^{William} Thomas, ^{an} Embassy Political

Officer on 10 Dec 1965: In Sept 1963

after her return from abroad, she was
accompanied by her daughter
to a party, at the home of Ruben Duran

[emphasis added. Ruben is one of the two
brothers of Horacio Duran], who married

her cousin. She met Oswald and 2

other young Americans. At the party,

she was discouraged from talking

with him. Other guests were the Cuban

consul AZCUE; general Clark Flores,

Silvia Dillhoff, who she later learned

was Oswald's mother when he was

here, Emilio CARBALLIDO, and a
Latin American negro man with

red hair. [Embassy added.] In
November 1963 when the identity of the
assassin became known, she and her
daughters went to the Cuban Embassy and
shortly "overcome" and other insults
at the stay there. Shortly afterward,
she and her daughter ^{(was visited by}
a friend, Manuel ^(a CARILLO) TRIVELLO, then
an official in the Secretariat of
the Gobernacion [Threatened at the
time by ECHEVERRIA], and were
told he had orders to escort
them to a small and obscure hotel
in the center of town. He were kept
there for 8 days under pretext
that they were in danger. When
she told ~~that~~ CARILLO she wanted
to go to the American Embassy and
explain what she knew of Oswald,
she was told that the American
Embassy was full of Communist
spies.

On the 25 Dec 1965 and 9 Jan 1966 in
further interviews with Thomas, GARRO
and her daughter elaborated and on

certain particulars, ^{significantly} modified ~~the~~ her
earlier account. She also acknowledged that
that she and her daughter had
been interviewed earlier by Embassy
officer to whom ~~she~~ she claimed
they did not give a very complete
story because ~~of~~ the Embassy officer
did not appear to give much
evidence to anything they said.

It was developed that ~~the~~ GARRO
and daughter had been interviewed by
the legal Attache on 17 and 24
November 1964. Her informant's had
been similar to what she claimed
in her account to Thorne, but had
not been substantiated by inquiry.
The FBI representatives therefore con-
sidered the matter closed and reoff-

10000
urged his disengagement from the matter
to the CIA chief of State on 27 Dec 1965
and to the Ambassador on 28 Feb 1965.

~~But~~ however,
The Embassy Political Officer, present
in his interview and reporting. A memoran-
dum of conversation, 13 July 1966, in which
GARRO identified the ~~hotel~~ ^{place} to which she
had been taken by CALVILLO, as the Hotel
Vermont. (This detail checked out
affirmatively. J. GARRO was at the
Hotel for 23-24, 25-27, and 28-30
November 1963.) Another on 7 Feb 1967
in which GARRO's continuing vicissitudes
with the Cubans are set out. Finally,
after Thomas' retirement from
the ^{U.S.} State Government service, the Depart-
ment of State at his request, ^{28 August 1969,} dissumulated
to CIA and FBI a ~~confidential~~ ^{dissemination of his} ~~problem~~

reporting of the ^{then} GAPP interview.

Then the matter was ~~re-examined~~
~~date of origin of the~~

GAPP's chronology of ^{the} events she
described ~~in G~~ as having occurred
~~in the Mexican capital~~

(in September 1963 ~~was~~ ~~not~~ ~~never~~
confirmed
coincided with the ~~known~~

date of the Oswald's presence there.

Her story however had two points
congruence with ~~other~~ ^{other} allegations by
~~others~~ ⁽²⁾ regarding Oswald: Alvarado's allegations

regarding the Negro with the Red-dyed
hair. [This detail could, however, been

gleaned from the Warren Commission's

account of the "D" case] and (4)

Sylvia Burro's ~~allegation of intimacy~~
~~with~~ ^{was later claim of}

intimate personal contacts with Oswald.

Heritage Co

and amplified in the
Begin in March ~~1967~~ the American ¹⁹⁶⁷
Benjamin J. ROYLE
Consul, in Tampico developed a contact

with a local Mexican journalist, Oscar
Lartigue

COATEHUACAN (under various names) claimed
with other pro-Castro students
to have encountered Oswald at the

University of Mexico campus in September

1963.

In June 1969, Contreras was interviewed

by - CIA officers.

He studied law at the Univ. of
Mexico for 3 years, approximately
1960-1964. He belonged to a Cuban-
time pro-Castro Revolutionary
group at the University. Regarding
the Oswald case he was extremely
cautious and ~~was~~ and although
he was not able or willing to
give dates and names, he said
Oswald visited the University of
Mexico campus shortly after the
Cuban Embassy refused him a
visa to visit Cuba. Oswald
made inquiries regarding pro-
Cuban revolutionary groups at

the University and was directed to Contreras and his friends. Oswald met Contreras and four other persons as they came out of a round-table discussion held in the faculty of Philosophy. Oswald told the group it was urgent he visit Cuba and the Cuban Embassy denied him a visa. He requested aid from Contreras' group. Contreras and other ministers Oswald became they felt he was a CIA provocator. The group allowed Oswald to accompany them the rest of that day, that night and part of the next day. Oswald was very interested and appeared to be slightly crazy. Oswald made no mention of an assassination plot but kept bringing up the point he had to travel to Cuba immediately.

with FBI knowledge,
At this point, the matter was turned over to the Mexican authorities who determined that Contreras was indeed at the University of the Mexico but ~~only~~ only for the years 1959 and 1960. ~~and~~ that he had been publicly associated ^{protest} in activities for the Student Revolutionary Bloc (SRB) in

January, however,
the group closed functioning
in 1961, ~~and~~ ^{mid 1961}
as such in the 1962 and Oscar Contreras was
never one of its leaders. ~~Contreras~~

No further work ~~on this~~ is reflected in the
files on the Contreras allegations. ~~By~~ Apart
from the uncorroborated claims made
by Contreras about his own presence at
the University, there is an additional
element that undermines the credibility
of his account: Oswald's ^{which was barely adequate to get him} ~~was~~ ^{mentally near his hotel, it}
seems hardly likely to
~~not~~ have permitted him to ~~function with~~
a university.

anyone ~~with~~ for an extended period with
a University student group.

22 November 1963.

9. Mexico Station telegram 7021
(IN - 66896), 23 November 1963. 1
page. 02:44 2 times

~~10. Mexico Station telegram -~~

10. CIA Hqs. telegram to Mexico
Station, DIR - 84822, 23 Nov
1963. (1 page. 04:22 2 times.)

11. Mexico Station telegram,
7027 (In - 67185), 23 Nov 1963.
20:43 2 times. 1 page.

12. Mexico Station telegram
7025 (In 67186, 23 Nov 1963
20:34 2 times) and 7033 (In -
67232, 23 Nov 1963, 22:46 2 times).
[Forward transcript texts.]

10-00000
Mexico Station telegram, 7020 (In-66591).

23 Nov 1963, 02:31 2 times!

11. CIA Hqs. telegrams to Mexico Station,
DIR-84821 and 84822, 23 Nov 1963,
01:36 2 times and 04:22 2 times, respectively.
1 page, each.

Mexico Station telegram, 7027 (In-67187),
23 Nov 1963, 20:43 2 times. 1 page.

12. Mexico Station telegram 7025, 23 November
1963. 16:55 2 times. [Forward transcript
information] 2 pages

~~Mexico Station~~

CIA
13. Hqs. telegram to Mexico Station, ~~DIR~~
(DIR-84888), 23 Nov 1963, 17:29 2 times.
1 page

New
order 14. [This is Mexico 7025 & 7033, which you
already have.]

15. Mexico Station telegram 7020
(In-67189)

16. Mexico Station telegram 7029, (23 Nov 1963,
20:48 2 times.

17. Mexico Station 7055 (Inv 69233),
23 Nov 1963, 225# 2 trees.

18. Memorandum For the Record by Chief of Station, Mexico, 11 April 1964. Subject: Visit by Three Staff Representatives of Warren Commission. 3 pages and covering dispatches (HMAA 23249, 14 April 1964)

~~19-23~~

Texts of

19-23. ~~Texts of~~ Intercept 27, 28 September and 1, 3 October 1963. [For 27 and 28 texts in both Spanish and English, for 1st and 3rd, in English translation only].

24-26. Five photographs of unidentified individual entering and leaving Soviet Embassy, (1 October 1963.
Mexico City, [Stohm])

27-29. Five photographs of unidentified individual in front of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, 4 October 1963.
[Stohm]

30. Two photographs of unidentified individual, taken in front of Cuban Embassy, 15 October 1963.

31-34. Mexico Station - CIA Hqs correspondence, 18 pages 3

18, 29 May and 26 June and

3 July 1967 relative to negatives of photographic notes at 28-30, above.

35. letter by D.A. Deputy Director for Plans, Mr Helms to Mr. J. Lee Rankin, 23 July 1967. 1 page.

36-7. Texts of affidavits by Bradwell D. ODUM, James R. MALLEY and Richard Helms. Hearings, vol. XI, pp. 468-70.

UNCLASSIFIED

38. Reproductions of Odum Exhibit No 1 ~~and~~ (Hearings, vol XX, p 691) and Commission Exhibit 237 (Hearings vol XVI, p. 638). UNCLASSIFIED

39. Extracts from Warren Commission Report, pages 364-5 and 667, dealing with the photographs of the unidentified individual. UNCLASSIFIED

... (Classified)

40. A Selection of Postment, Documents reflecting ^{CIA} Hqs and Mexico Stations Reactions to and Handling of the Warren Commission Publications of the Photo of the Unidentified Individual, September - October 1964

41. Letter by CIA General Counsel, Lawrence R. Hornston to the Honorable Bernard T. Bagert, United District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, 16 May 1967. 2 pages. UNCLASSIFIED

42. Correspondence with ^{Hq.} Emory L. Brown 4, 17 April, 1970. 3 pages. UNclassified

43. Correspondence with Mr. Paul L. HOCH, 1 and 15 November 1971 and 24 and 14 Dec. 1971. 8 pages. UNCLAS-SIFIED

44. Correspondence ^{with and related to} ~~with~~ ^{and related to} ~~and related to~~ ^{for Requests by} ~~for Requests by~~ ^{Chenoweth (of record)} ~~Chenoweth (of record)~~ Mr.

Bernard Fensterwald Jr. March 22 1971 [8 April (2 HORS); 9-18 February 1972; 24 Feb - 6 March 1972; 11-13 April 1972; 26 and 29 June 1972; 28 July and 17 August 1972; and, ~~and~~

^{and memorandum} by Mr. Houston to ^{Director}, FBI on ^{internal} 11 October 72 - together with two supporting pages, a Cable from Mexico Station dated 3 October 1972 and an memo of interview, dated 11 October, 1972. 43 pages.

invest.

^{files}
The documentation for individual
files is as follows -

This is a comparison file to the
series of the ~~file~~ photographs - the
unidentified individuals, submitted
a few weeks ago.

All of the case data

There seemed to be no reason to
attach ~~the~~ copies of the ^{case} ~~file~~ reports
from the file to this summary. These
can be made ^{promptly} available, however, ~~with~~ on
request.

Background

On Saturday evening, September 7, 1963, Fidel Castro, in an act unusual for him, appeared at the Brazilian Embassy reception in Havana. Even more unusual Castro submitted to an informal interview by the Associated Press correspondent Daniel HARKER'S.

HARKER'S interview reached New York on Sunday, September 8th, and was in print throughout the country on Monday, September 9th. There can be no question from the facts surrounding the Castro appearance, ^{which had not been expected,} and his agreement to the interview, that this was a significant & more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message through ~~the press~~ on the record in the

Castro's statements
United States. The ~~Harber~~ interview
~~conducted~~
to HARBER covered a range of topics
but dealt principally
about, (with ~~Latin~~ American
political leadership, ~~with~~ in particu-
lar President Kennedy whom he
excoriated in extraordinarily provocative
fashion ("... Kennedy is a ~~victim~~," the
Batista of his times ... the most opportunist
American President of all time."). ~~There~~
~~uncomplimentary~~
were references to Senator Goldwater,

The interview had other content,
~~rather~~ uncomplimentary, reference
to Senator Goldwater, and Cuban delay
in signing the limited nuclear test
ban and ^{there were significant differences}
~~was~~ ^{in the ~~new~~ ~~rel~~} ~~was~~ ^{employed} by
US newspapers, ^{(like the} ~~the~~ ^{Times} ~~and~~
Washington, ~~where this~~ with a result

that Castro's "message" ~~was~~ ^{was} significantly
modulated.

In New Orleans, where he formerly
resided until the middle of September
1968, the HARKER story appeared in
the principal morning newspaper,
the TIMES-PIRAYUNE on Monday, Sept
8, page seven under a three
column headline: "Castro Blasts
Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leader
Imperiled by Aid to Rebels." ~~The~~
story then followed under the Harker
by-line:

1
The New York Times, in its coverage on
Sept 9th used a UPI wire service report which
omitted any reference to the warning ~~present~~

The results of the review - a ^{admittedly} ~~substantive~~ ^{utilitarian} ~~study~~ of the 20-20
quality of hindsight - may be
stipulated in summary:

(a) There is no increment of ^{credible} evidence ~~of~~
of ~~any~~ Soviet ^{and} or Cuban political,
intelligence or security service involvement
~~with~~ to what was developed and
considered by the Warren Commission
and its staff. ~~The~~ The Commission
~~to the extent that the report properly reflects, does not~~
~~find~~ ^{find} ~~that~~ ^{that} LEO was the killer
on the basis of ^{credible evidence}
of JFK and Officer Tippett and did
~~that~~ ^{and of his own determination} them in ~~alone~~ ^{alone} must stand.

(b) "credible evidence" that would ^{upset} ~~change~~
^{significantly}
or modify this judge's ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~
not exist in Webster's ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~
~~is clear that~~ ^{but it} such evidence could

get the general picture of Oswald
from the press and the public. and
his identification with Fidel Castro
and his role in the Cuban
Revolution.

(Gandy book.
and ^{the} Cuban revolution, which is directly
traceable as far back as his Marine
Corps service in El Toro, California.)
(If Oswald read Castro's threat and
warning?)

(Winters
Castro's threat
Castro's statement to AP correspondent
Horkin - irrespective of the threat
whether there was any formal records,
or even secret, service contact with
Oswald by the Cubans or the services,
anyhow
could have been acts of singular
irresponsibility and under no circumstances
allowable, retroactive for what the Cubans might
were doing during the summer of 1963,

with or without CIA's knowledge, the
man proposed, the knowledge of the
President's brother, Robert Kennedy,
who was personally involved with
over-sight Cuban matter at the
Federal level after the Bay of Pigs
failure.

21
Telegraph
Custom Control and Oswald, Santa Ana, California, in

1959? The testimony of Nelson DELGADO ⁱⁿ as
is a section of germinal significance to my
review of the background of LHO's feelings
toward ~~and possibly~~ ^{and possibly} relations with Costa Rica. Delgado
is a former member of the Communist Party.

Delgado was probably the closest ~~person~~ ^{person} ~~group~~
member to Oswald ^{his} during ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~period~~ ^{period} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~El Toro~~ ^{El Toro} ~~Morris~~ ^{Morris} ~~Corp.~~ ^{Corp.} ~~from~~ ^{from} ~~1957~~ ¹⁹⁵⁷
Dec 58 - Sept 1959. The Warren Commission Report ^{also}
takes note of this.

Oswald told Delgado that he
was in trade with Cuban diplomatic
officials in this country; which Delgado
at first took to be "one of his ~~own~~
lies, but later believed."

2. Report of the President's Commission on the
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
(Wash. 1964), p. 687. Hereafter cited as
Report.

Cuba, you know, is the main subject
subject of our absolute program here.
I didn't know what to do with him.
I told him to see them.

"After a while, he told me he was in
contact with them....

"... I seen this envelope in his foot locker
well-looker, and it was addressed to
him, and they had an official seal
on it, and as far as I could recall
that was mail from Los Angeles, and
he was telling me there was a Cuban
consul. And just after he started receiving
these letters I got here, he would
never go out, he'd stay near the
post all the time....

"... he had one visitor - after he started
receiving letters he had one visitor.
It was a man, because I got the
call from the US guard shack, and
they gave me a call that Oswald
had a visitor at the front gate. This
man had to be a courier, otherwise they
would have let him in. So I had
to find out what it was. Oswald, who
was our guard, to go down there to
visit with this fellow, and they spent
about an hour and a half, I guess,
talking, I guess, and he come back.
I don't know what the man was
or what they talked about, but he
looked worried about the whole

There were some books in some volumes
in the house, nothing.

"The rebels, now, long did I talk to him,
do you remember?"

"The rebels, about one hour and half, 2
hours...."

"The rebels, you never asked Corwood what this
yellow was that he talked to?"

"The rebels, No. No...."

"The rebels, did you comment this night that
Corwood had at that time with the Cuban
Comrades?"

"The rebels: I did; because I thought it
funny for him to be receiving a letter
at such a late date - time. Well, up to
this time he hardly ever received mail, in
fact he always cleared out of town home
because I made it a policy, in fact he
never received mail from home,
because I made it -"

"I used to pick up the mail for him and
distribute it to the guys in town, and
very seldom did I see one for him. But
every so often, after he started his
contact with these Cuban people he started
getting letters, pamphlets and other newspapers."

"... and he also started receiving
letters, you know, and one book
maybe pamphlet, you know, little - little
things, things you get from church, you
know, but it wasn't a choice."

"The British. Did you know they were coming?
The British. Yes, they were in the
of them in the hands?
the British. But that I can't say.

"The British. Did you know they were coming?
The British. Yes, they were in the
of them in the hands?
the British. But that I can't say.

"The British. Well, I try at the generalities
did not know the college here...
being like a Mexican eagle, with wings,
unpleasant you know, they look
different from us, not only in color, but
look like you know, they are
I can't recall the exact I just know
in fact, I don't, I'm sorry, I don't
couldn't understand from that.

"The British. You don't know for sure whether
it was from the Cuban committee?

"The British. No. But I don't feel sure
just before I found they were
know from them, and we have
opposed it about it, but I don't
much interest because of the
kind to speak to do, and I never
but not to see that you are
know.

"The British. But in the year what has
negotiated with the Cuban committee?
any about? Also, in that
the British.

"Mr. DeLoach said he was positive to you that at that time he was in conversation with you and about going over to Cuba?"

"Mr. DeLoach. No. He said they he told me was about eight after we had this conversation with the Cuban people was that he was going to — once he got out of the service he was going to Switzerland." "

2. Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. HEARINGS Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of

President Kennedy, (H.R. 704) Vol. III: 241-243.

Hereafter cited as, HEARINGS.

Jan 27 Sept 1959 he was named as US passport holder for travel - common with plans for Cuba and the USSR.

Albin

Council application to Switzerland College Board - Walden, Switzerland was dated 19 March 1959, and he was presumably to report same to James on 21 April 1960. Indicted for discharge from the Marines on 7 Dec 1954. Allegedly accelerated his exit on alleged grounds of family hardship in Sept 1957. He contacted the Soviet Union through early Finland on 15 October 1959.

DeLoach's testimony has the cost of credibility. In saying that, it is clear of basic importance to focus attention on the real sector who contacted it at least it was easy and

essentials, The following
journal
is submitted; ~~it is not~~
~~possible to do any more in the necessary~~
~~inquiries in that regard.~~

4
Imaginary Friends by Cuban Third Secretary
in the Hague 7 Nov 1963. of similar relation

source, reportedly after the Kennedy assassination,
indicated that at the Soviet reception on 7 Nov
1963, ^{the} Cuban Third Secretary Ricardo ^LSANTO
(son) ^{refugee} discussed the ^{refugee} situation ⁱⁿ Europe

write on Cuba and their implications
with a host-country diplomat, concluding
with the following admission: "... just
wait and you will see what we can
do. It will happen soon." Asked to
be more specific about what would
happen soon Santo replied: "Just
wait, just wait."

(Phil Rissold)

(These data were passed to the Warren
Commission by memorandum, 31 Nov 63. Got.
Santo was subsequently reported to have a

14-00000

3

a history of metal instability and was
recovered from the rig.
The rig was reportedly in serious condition that
in August 1966.

2) "unso" is probably identical with
unsa (unsa), a code word for the
Cuban Revolution General G. ...
(1961) ... The ... chief in
... .. She ... returned to
... ..

3) The first ... element in ... city
in the fall of 1963 was headed by ...
MIRABAL ...

1963, ... who had arrived on 2 Sept
... on the appointment of
the ... (deposed 19 Nov
1963). The ... (and on 2 June
1964, ...'s ... was named
Enrique ...

4) ... in
... was the ...
... a ... national, ...
... his ...
... ..

on 27 and 28 September, to the ...
... in connection
with a ... application ...
... ..

... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..

(The)
... ..

... in the ...
... from ...
... in an allocation on 27 September with
Lepismat.

Enoch Azcar

Dr Manuel Eugenio ...
and his ... assistant ...
Lopez was positively identified ...
Feb. 1964 by two independent ...
engaged in the active development and
facilitation of the training ...
the purpose of ... General
Carrasco ... V ... it is
established, ... in Mexico
(support)

City during ...
Council stay there
... present.

27 Sept. 23rd 1963. ...
operation ...

he left Mexico City ...
1963 ...
... report about
... individuals going to ...
legally or illegally must ...
... data and sent it to ...
... a procedure ...

...
... release that had been taken earlier...

... chief? ~~first~~ ...

to this question, there remains the more
fundamental question: could the accepting
by Baron [Name] on its face, could it
have required without the [Name] elements
above cited knowledge and participation?

~~First~~ ... It is doubtful that
the reply could be other than a solid negative

and in that case, it is palpable that Costello
^{could}
intelligence and security service ^{is} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~is~~

more in the file than has been surfaced

in the Baron's statements. ~~My~~ ~~de~~ ~~town~~
this subject that

Coming back to the beginning: "visa" —
... ^{member of the} ... ^{therefor} ...
... could
... well have had information that

14-00000

would make what she said to be unscientific

rather than of a casual
casualness a matter of
more substantial illness - hospital self indulgence

illness - self indulgence, concluded.

There was examined at the time.

idea that it is the United States and its interests,
through the ^(Carrington, etc.) ~~international~~ ~~market~~
to be ^{you} ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~center~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~action~~
directly in ~~the~~ ~~case~~

fulfilled to remove
the

accidental interest and
possibly permit us to dispel this
buried egoism as a part of the

most with dignity the most
psychologic)
has been ~~the~~ ~~beginning~~
of the ~~case~~

The United States has nothing
to do with the Roosevelt case at
all.

SUBJECT: The Photo of an Unidentified Individual in the
Warren Commission Report: A Factual
Chronological Survey

REFERENCE: Memorandum by David W. Belin to Mr. E. Harry Knoche,
15 April 1975 (Attachment A)

1. Reference memorandum suggests it would be appropriate to reconsider full disclosure at this time of the circumstances and factual data relative to the Subject. The purpose of this survey is to permit a realistic evaluation of the suggestion.

2. Background. This examination and summary of the record concerns a cropped photograph considered by the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (hereinafter cited as the Warren Commission) and introduced into evidence as Odum Exhibit No. 1.¹ The photograph (together ~~with~~ *with* ~~others~~ with others of the same individual) originated from a ~~photo~~ *photo* ~~and~~ *intelligence* highly sensitive operation being conducted in October 1963 by the CIA against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City.

3. Under the ~~provisions~~ *provisions* the extraordinary efforts ^{to} to develop information on the assassin and the assassination, copies of the

¹ See Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (hereinafter cited as Hearings), Vol. XX, page 691.

DRAFT

photograph were made available by CIA's Mexico Station Chief on

the afternoon of 22 November to the local FBI representative, and

later that day, ^{essentially on the decision} ~~the~~ ^{of the Ambassador,} copies

were ~~made up~~ by the U.S. Naval Attaché and conveyed by ~~the~~ FBI

^{by a special flight carried out by the US Naval Attaché,} representative to the Dallas office ^{as to} ~~the~~ possible use

in the ongoing investigation. ^{2 of the FBI - copied by the FBI,} One photograph ^{was} shown to

Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD, in Dallas on the evening of 23 November 1963

by FBI Agent ~~Ed~~well D. ODUM.

4. The Warren Commission's Report describes the sequence of events at pp.364-365 and 667 (Attachment B) which ultimately resulted in Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD's allegation that she had been shown a cropped photo of Jack RUBY, the day before he murdered her son. (A further complication leading to this conclusion ^{was} ~~had been~~ the fact that when she had been shown a copy of the same photograph in her appearance before the Commission, it had been cropped by the FBI ^{in Washington} in a slightly different manner.)

5. No detail in the Warren Commission report illustrates more vividly than this one the difficulties that beset simple truth in the politicized, rigidly determined ^{the} interpretive climate that has been nurtured by the media over the past decade. ^{About the Kennedy assassinations,} The photograph, (now) acknowledged not to be RUBY, has ~~not~~ become a

*Continued to
persecute for
"specialists" and
less now*

the centerpiece *of an alternate hypothesis* ~~of an alternate explanation~~ that holds OSWALD to have been "framed" by the use of a double in his activity in Mexico City.²

6. Lee Harvey OSWALD - Reporting Mexico City Stay. Although in no way related to Lee Harvey OSWALD or his stay in Mexico City

from the morning of 27 ^{Sept} ~~May~~ 1963 to the morning of 2 October 1963, *at*

(sent one set)
~~the~~ photograph of the unidentified man originated during OSWALD's

stay there. ~~and~~ It is (therefore important) to an understanding of

(its acquisition and handling)
~~what was done with~~ the photograph by the Mexico City Station to

review ~~the facts about~~ what the Station ascertained and did with ~~the~~

information it developed about OSWALD in Mexico City, together

with Headquarters action on ~~the~~ information, ~~before the assassination~~

~~on 22 November 1963, and immediately thereafter.~~

7. From all credible evidence known to this time (none, incidentally, added since the exhaustively unique work of the Warren Commission), Lee Harvey OSWALD spent 4 full days and 2 partial days--about 116 hours in all--in Mexico City from about 10:00 a.m. 27 September 1963 to about 8:50 a.m. 2 October 1963. His ^{base} point of residence was a small commercial traveler hotel, not frequented by "gringos"--the Hotel Comercio --

² This is the thrust of the article "The CIA and the Man Who was Not Oswald" by Bernard Fensterwald and George O'Toole in the New York Review of Books, a copy of which is attached to reference (Attachment A).

→ A careful review of all coverage, voice intercept, as well as photographic, of both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies was ~~made~~ *conducted* by the Station on 22 and 23 November 1963 after the assassination, going back to materials from mid-year. It is, therefore, firm that there was no CIA photo coverage of OSWALD at any time during his Mexico trip or stay in Mexico City. Moreover, *although it has made a call* despite its request on 15 October, the Mexico Station had no photo of OSWALD in its records, nor did it receive one from Headquarters before 22 November 1963.

During this intercept remains
 10. *transmits* voice intercept ~~data~~ *and other photos* ~~by~~ the monitor on the basis of the 1 October intercept--which had been reported to Headquarters and disseminated to the interested members of the intelligence community (as an ex-Marine, OSWALD was a Navy and FBI case under the delimitations, and potentially of interest to the Department of State)--~~tuned up matches based on content, not on announced identity,~~ with materials intercepted on 27 and 28 September 1963. *These matches were reported to Hqs. on 23 November 1963. Analysis* ~~Matches~~ based on voice comparison (except what could be recalled by the monitor--and this was not insignificant *element* because of the *memorably* ~~uniquely~~ poor Russian spoke by OSWALD) could not be made because the tapes, in accordance with the normal practice, had been erased and re-used.

11. It ~~should~~ ^{must stressed} be noted that voice intercept and photographic ^(most normally, is not) coverage was not processed in "real time." The nature ^{means} of acquisition and the volume of the information precluded anything but the spot reporting of items judged by the monitor ^{to be} of more-than-ordinary ~~human~~ interest and, therefore, noted in summary logs. Full texts of selected items ^{actually} would require consultation of the tape and either a full transcription or full translation or both. Photo coverage tended to become available in quantity lots which required scanning and selection on a rapid and accelerated basis ^{in 4 or 5 day "peaks"}. One of the "triggers" that normally operated to focus and accelerate ^{more speedily} the ~~report~~ review and reporting of this kind raw intelligence ^{was} the mention of a name. This ^{as will be seen,} was precisely what occurred in the second of two conversations ~~mentioned~~ on 1 October with the Soviet Embassy, ^{during which the speaker} ~~was~~ he said he was "Lee OSWALD," ^{and} it was this information reported by the ^{in its first indications on Oswald} Station to Headquarters on 8 October 1963.

12. The Mexico City Station did one more thing in its report ^{8th October} on Lee OSWALD based on its 1 October voice intercepts: it coupled ~~the~~ data with descriptive information it had acquired from a collateral sensitive source--a photograph of a male individual, apparently an American, who was observed entering the Soviet Embassy on 1 October. The Station reported ^{this} ~~these~~ details as a

really is
coincident ~~fact~~. The Station did not assert or suggest that the data ~~produced~~ *deduced* from the photo was in fact OSWALD, or indeed, in any way related to OSWALD.

13. Lee Harvey OSWALD - CIA Coverage of His Mexico City Stay.

One additional element of background must be stipulated now as the final precondition to understanding the relevance (or irrelevance) of the photo of the unknown individual placed in the chain of evidence on 23 November in Dallas by FBI Agent ~~B~~ Edwell ODUM: what was the totality of CIA ~~intercept~~ *intercept* coverage of OSWALD's activity as of the afternoon of the ~~22nd~~ *22nd* and 23rd when all available coverage had been rechecked?

14. The totality of Mexico City Station coverage on, or reasonably inferable to be OSWALD, consisted of five (5) voice intercepts as follows:

a. 27 September 1963 (Friday), 1605 Mexico City time.

Silvia DURAN, a local employee ^a of Mexican nationality ^{of} the Cuban Embassy, ³ Consular section, a receptionist, speaks with an unknown male at the Soviet Embassy. Silvia DURAN tells the man that the American citizen was there, the one who wants a visa for Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union, and he wants to know with whom he was talking there because she ^{Duran} (Silvia) had sent him to the Soviet Embassy saying that if

they accepted him and gave him a visa, then the Cubans (Embassy) would also give him a visa without further paper work, only advising Immigration in Cuba. ^{The Soviet} ~~he~~ wants to know with whom he had talked there because he says he was told there would be no

problem. The man in the Soviet Embassy says to wait a moment.

A different ^{Soviet} man speaks, and Silvia ^{Duran} explains the same thing to

him. This man says to leave name and telephone number and says

he will call back. Silvia ^{Duran} gives the telephone 11-28-47 (Cuban

Consulate). ^{she} Silvia also takes advantage of the conversation

and states she has moved and wants to advise the Soviet Embassy

of her change of address so that she can receive the

Soviet Embassy Bulletin. The man says to call KOUKHARENKO

to give her new address, then he asks the name of the Consul

or Cultural Attaché. Silvia says the name is Teresa PROENZA

and the telephone number is 14-13-26. The man says thanks.

b. 27 September 1963 (Friday), 1626 Mexico City time.

An unidentified male ^{a Soviet,} calls the Cuban consulate, asks

Silvia DURAN if the American had been there. Silvia DURAN

says he is there now. The Soviet says the American showed

papers from the Consulate in Washington, that he wants to go

to the Soviet Union and be there for a long time with his wife,

who is Russian, but the answer has not come from Washington in

respect to this problem, and according to this procedure it takes four or five months, but without having permission from the Soviet Union they should ask, or better said, they cannot issue a visa there without asking Washington. However, according to this man, he showed a letter indicating he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and that the Cubans said that they cannot issue a visa without his having a visa for the Soviet Union, and now he (the Soviet) does not know what to do with him (the American), because they have to wait for an answer from Washington.

Silvia DURAN agrees the same problem exists with the Cubans, that the problem with him (the American) is that he does not know anyone in Cuba and therefore if that is true it will be difficult for him to get a visa for Cuba, because he was thinking of processing his visa (for the Soviet Union), because he knew it would require waiting a long time for his visa to the Soviet Union while in Cuba, and from there go to the Soviet Union. The Soviet said the thing is that if his wife right now were in Washington she would receive her visa right now, or permission, from the Soviet Union, to return to her country, she is going to receive her visa in Washington but having this visa, she could communicate to any place this permission, for example here or any place she could receive it

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(visa or permission), but right now they do not have them.

My Uncle Silvia DURAN says certainly and they cannot give a letter either because they do not know if the visa will be approved. The Soviet says they only give visas according to indications. Silvia DURAN says then she will put that on the list. The Soviet says he cannot give a letter or recommendation either because he does not know him (the American) and asks to be excused for bothering her. Silvia DURAN says that is all right and many thanks.

c. 28 September 1963 (Saturday), 1151 Mexico City time.

Silvia DURAN calls the USSR Embassy and ^{tells} to an unidentified Soviet ^{She} says that in the Cuban Embassy there is a North American who was at the Soviet Embassy. The Soviet says wait a minute. Silvia DURAN speaks English with someone--and comments in Spanish that they gave APARICIO telephone 14-12-99 and to take the number down--Silvia DURAN then says the American citizen is going to talk with you, i.e., the Soviet. The American first speaks Russian and the Soviet speaks English. They continue in English. The American talks broken Russian and says I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minute. A Soviet takes the phone and asks the American in English what does he want? The American says please speak

Russian. The Soviet says what else do you want? The American says I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address.

The Soviet says I knew that. The American, in hardly recognizable Russian, says I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it.

The Soviet says why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it is not far from the Cuban Embassy. The American says I'll be there right away.

d. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 1031 Mexico City time.

An unknown male (American) ^{calls} ~~contacts~~ the Soviet Embassy, the Military Attache's number, 15-69-^B07, and says to an unidentified Soviet respondent: I was at your place last Saturday and talked to your Consul. They said that they would send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new? The Soviet says I would like to ask you to call another phone number. Please write it down: 15-60-55, and ask for a consul. Thank you.

e. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 1045 Mexico City time. The

same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian speaks to OBYEDKOV (a Soviet Embassy guard). He says: This is Lee OSWALD speaking. I was at your place last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they would send a

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(telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the name of that consul. OBYEDKOV says: KOSTIKOV. He is dark (hair or skin-?). OSWALD says yes, My name is OSWALD. OBYEDKOV says, just a minute, I'll find out. They say that they have not received anything yet. OSWALD says: Have they done anything? OBYEDKOV says: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet. OSWALD says, and what . . .? OBYEDKOV hangs up.

15. All of these items, including the texts of the raw intercepts, were read, discussed with, and examined by the Warren Commission staffer in Headquarters and at the Mexico City Station during a stay from 8 to 13 April 1964.³

3. The Warren Commission group that visited the Mexico City Station consisted of Mr. COLFMAN, Mr. SLAWSON, and Mr. WILLENS. They examined not only the intercepts a through e above, but others for the 27th and one for 3 October that ^{seem to} ~~appear to~~ have relevance. These have not been included in this summary because they appear, on review, to be excludable from the OSWALD matter on logical or substantive grounds, or both, bearing in mind that the Soviet Embassy received many calls pertaining to visa matters.

On the 27th at 1037 the ^{Embassy} ~~Embassy~~ received a call from an unknown individual ^{speaking Spanish} who said he wanted visas to go to Odessa. He was told the consul was not in and to call back at 1130. OSWALD is known to have arrived at the Flecha Roja bus terminal on bus #516 at ca. 1000 on the 27th. It was, therefore, possible for him to have made this call. ^{But} Granting this, it ^{is} ~~seems~~ unreasonable to believe the calls were OSWALD's for the following reasons:

a. The caller wanted visas, and specifically for Odessa. OSWALD was seeking a visa and never in any ~~other~~ context did he specify the Black-Sea port of Odessa as a destination.

b. The call was directed to the correct Soviet consular number: 15-60-55. On ~~the 14th~~ ^{the 14th} October, OSWALD first called the wrong number, 15-69-87 (the MA's number), and had to redirect his call to the correct number, 15-60-55. It seems unlikely he would have made what would have been his initial call, on Friday the 27th, to the correct number, and called the incorrect number on 1 October.

c. There is every reason to believe from the context of the intercepts ^{para 14} a through e above, that OSWALD's first destination after arrival and check-in to his hotel, was a visit to the Cuban Embassy.

d. The use of the Spanish language would exclude OSWALD unless he made use of an intermediary, which seems unlikely ^{from} what is known of his modus operandi.

FOOTNOTE 3 (continuation)

On 3 October at 1539 an individual speaking broken Spanish, then English, called the Soviet Embassy and asked for a visa. The Soviet respondent says: Call on the other phone. The requestor says: I'm looking for a visa to go to Russia. The Soviet says: Please call on the telephone of the consul, 15-60-55. The requestor says: One moment please, I'll have to get a pencil to write the number down. They issue the visa there? The Soviet: That depends on your conversation. I don't know about this business. Please call the office of the consul and ask your question. The requestor asks for the number again. The Soviet gives him the number and tells him to ask for the Consul of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

The relevance of this intercept to OSWALD is excludable on three grounds:

- a. The use of broken Spanish. OSWALD throughout used broken Russian or English. He had no competence in Spanish *to handle*
a conversation of this kind.
- b. The substance of the request indicates a visa request in the first stages of initiation. OSWALD had developed his matter with the Cubans and the Soviets *the previous Saturday* to a point well beyond *the stage indicated by* the substance of this call.
- c. OSWALD had left Mexico City, based on all the credible evidence, the early morning of the previous day, *2 October,* and could not have made this local call.

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16. ^{Each} ~~any~~ Of these items, including the texts of the raw intercepts, were read, discussed with, and examined by Warren Commission staffers in Headquarters and at the Mexico City Station during a stay from 8 to 13 April 1964.³ [footnote is on a separate page, but should be inserted in the final typing as part of the continuous text.]

17. ^{Walden} Summing up, we can state, or reasonably infer from the evidence, that OSWALD made the following contacts with the Cuban and Soviet official establishments in Mexico City.

a. 27 September 1963 (Friday). After arrival and check-in to his hotel, OSWALD went first to the Cuban Embassy where he talked with Mrs. Silvia DURAN. The time of his first Cuban Embassy visit is unknown. The time of his second Cuban Embassy visit was about 1600 (i.e., just before closing). Sometime between the two Cuban Embassy visits, at Mrs. DURAN's indication, he must have visited the Soviet Embassy. We have coverage only on the second Cuban Embassy visit. We have no indication who he talked with at the Soviet Embassy. There was no photographic coverage of OSWALD's entries into either the Cuban or Soviet Embassies on the 27th. The lack of coverage on the Cuban installation is explainable: the camera, based on the recollection of officers still in service in Headquarters, was

down on the 27th because of mechanical malfunction, which was
in course of correction. Why OSWALD was missed in his entry to
the Soviet installation is not yet explained.

b. 28 September 1963 (Saturday). [Note: Both ^{its} Cuban and
Soviet Embassies were closed to the public on Saturdays.

Photographic coverage was normally suspended Saturdays and
Sundays.] OSWALD, notwithstanding the holiday schedule, went
on Saturday morning to the Soviet Embassy (his second visit)
where he spoke to a consul. He apparently could not recall
his new Texas address. At ca. 11:51 he went to the Cuban
Embassy--his third entry--where he had registered it in his
visa application the day previously. He secured the address
from Mrs. DURAN and she called the Soviet Consulate presumably
to permit him to give them the address over the phone.

Instead, the Soviet with whom OSWALD spoke over Mrs. DURAN's
telephone invited OSWALD to come back in person, and he said he
would. ^(immediacy) (Presumably OSWALD thereupon) went back to the Soviet
installation (his third entry). ~~to give them his Texas address.~~

c. 29 September 1963 (Sunday). No activity registered.

d. 30 September 1963 (Monday). No activity registered.

(It is known that OSWALD reserved space this date on a Mexico
City-Loredo bus, departing 2 October 1963 at 0830.)

c. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday). OSWALD made at least two calls, at 1031 and 1045, to the Soviet Embassy. He identified himself twice during the second call when he talked with OBYEDIKOV--a guard--and referred to his talk on Saturday, probably with KOSTIKOV. There was no photographic coverage of OSWALD on 1 October; ^(if the following reasoning is correct, that could be) ^{OSWALD} ~~(From the context of the two calls, we know about)~~ ~~no October~~ (there would have been no reason for him to go to the Embassy. His case had clearly been placed at the sufferance of the USSR Embassy in Washington. His two calls on 1 October were concerned with whether any reply had been received from Washington. Under these circumstances, ~~In hindsight~~ it is unreasonable to believe OSWALD would have gone to the Soviet Embassy on ~~that~~ date.

18. The camera at about mid-day registered the entry into the Soviet Embassy of an white-shirted individual who, among all ^{persons} ^(that day) the photographic coverage ^{for the opinion of the Station,} appeared to be the only person--a non-Latin, and possibly an American--who entered the Soviet installation. ~~that day~~ On the chance that there could be an association between the ~~photo~~ identification data derived from the voice intercept and the descriptive data derived from the photograph, the Station reported the two elements ^{as separate facts} in its cable to Headquarters on 8 October.

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18. The Station's action was not unusual *(Nally annotated to an analytical "question leaf,")* *(considering the)*
justified by the)
(primitive and initiatory status of the OSWALD identification.

Many examples of a similar kind of thing can be found in the
day-to-day record of Station/Headquarters correspondence *and reporting*

19. Developments from 8 October - 22 November 1963. Mexico.

City station reported to Headquarters on 8 October (received in
Headquarters 9 October) the following initial information on OSWALD.*

1. On 1 Oct 63, an American male who spoke
broken Russian and said his name Lee OSWALD (phonetic),
stated he was at SovEmb on 28 Sept when ^{he} spoke with a
consul whom he believed to be Valeriy Vladimirovich
KOSTIKOV. Subject asked the Soviet guard [Ivan]
OBYEDKOV, who answered, if there anything new
regarding a telegram to Washington. OBYEDKOV upon
checking said nothing had been received yet, but the
request had been sent.

Mexico Station said it
2./ had photos of a male who appeared to be
an American entering Soviet Embassy 1216 hours,
leaving 1222 on 1 Oct. Apparent age 35, athletic
build, circa 6 feet, receding hairline, balding top.
Wore khakis and sport shirt.

3. No local dissemination was being made by
the Station.

here, and throughout,
* Cable has been rendered ¹⁴ into readable English. *The without*
substantive changes have been made for clarity or precision.
Cryptonyms and pseudonyms have been omitted or foot noted.

(see memo. later)
32. Headquarters responded 0422Z time, 23 November 1963,

cancelling its immediately preceding request:

"1. No need send staffer with photos. We have asked Navy for photos again, but Mexico can see OSWALD's picture sooner on the press wire.

"2. Have just re-emphasized to FBI *(see memo. later)* the sensitivity of photos you are sending and also relaying names of travelers with similar names. Note radio says OSWALD lived under alias of O. H. LEE."

³⁶
33. On the 23rd at 1729Z time, Headquarters advised Mexico City:

"The FBI says that the photos of the man entering the Soviet Embassy which Mexico Station sent to Dallas were not of Lee OSWALD. Presume Mexico Station has double-checked dates of these photos and is also checking all pertinent *photos* photos for possible shots of OSWALD."

³⁷
34. And at this point, 2048Z time, 23 November, Mexico *Station* City Station ^{finally} agreed:

"Saw photos of Lee OSWALD on television night of 22 November and it obvious photos sent to Dallas were not identical with Lee OSWALD held in Dallas. Dates are as given on photos."

"Mexico Station is reviewing all available photos of persons entering Soviet and Cuban Embassies."

35. Two hours later (2254Z time, 23 November 1963) the Station had reported the results of its effort to review all available coverage:

"Complete recheck of photos of all visitors to Cuban Embassy from August through first half of November against good press photos shows no evidence of OSWALD visit. Similar blanks against all Soviet Embassy photos from 1 September. Note, only visit we know he made was to Cuban Embassy 28 September, Saturday, on which Embassy closed and we had not had coverage"

36. With this communication the matter of the "unidentified individual" reaches the end of Phase I, the key element of which is the conviction, at first latent, then expressed, that the photographed individual might be identical with OSWALD. This applies especially to the Station, though at a certain point even Headquarters moved no rebuttal despite

the hard fact ^{of quite disparate descriptions} ~~of quite disparate descriptions~~ ^{that the descriptions of Oswald and the Unidentified individual were quite disparate.}

37. This review has attempted to deal even-handedly with all items in the case record that have a bearing on what happened. The operational zeal, innovativeness and the high committment of all involved, especially in Mexico City, speaks for itself. Equally apparent - because of the 20 - 20 advantage of hindsight - is the evidence of non-performance. It was a critical failure, for example, that no photo of OSWALD was made available - though it was expressly requested both at Headquarters and by the field - or that it was not more aggressively sought by CIA, before the twenty-second of November. A photograph of OSWALD would have obviated - in a way the mere possession of a correct physical evidently could not - the whole successive deterioration of what began ^{in Mexico City} as an impressionistic selection of the photograph on 1 October 1963 into a cause celebre today.

38. It should be clear from this factual survey that never has there been a cause celebre with less intrinsic merit. Equally clear should be the demonstration of the facts themselves that there was nothing contrived or conspired in what happened unless we we have now descended to that point in human values achieved under STALIN in the USSR and under HITLER in Germany, where just a plain mistake is per se evidence of conspiracy.

⁴¹
39. The Genesis and Development of ODUM Exhibit No. 1 and Commission Exhibit 237.

Special Agent of the FBI, Bardwell D. ODUM, on 23 November 1963 showed one of the six photos flown up from Mexico City the previous day to OSWALD's mother, Marguerite OSWALD. ODUM himself had trimmed the off the background by straight cuts. Mrs. OSWALD had no recognition of the image in the photograph. Bardwell's own detailed account may be found in HEARINGS, op cit, Vol. XX, p. 268

⁴²
40. The photograph shows the unidentified individual in a black shirt. It was one of the five photos taken of him in front of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on 4 October 1963, two days after OSWALD had left the city.

⁴³
41. At this point for the record the total available photo coverage of the unidentified individual numbers twelve photographs:

- a. Five taken on 1 October 1963, entering and exiting the Soviet Embassy. He is garbed in a white shirt a light colored (khaki) trousers.

the Soviet Embassy. He is garbed in a dark, open, button-down shirt ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ with a high neckline under-shirt showing and dark trousers.

c. Two taken on 15 October 1963 in front of the Cuban Embassy. He is wearing a dark, collarless T-shirt or light sweater.

The negatives of all of these are extant and are now held in Headquarters as integral parts of the OSWALD and related file holdings.

42. The result of ODUM's display of the photograph-- to repeat, a cropped version of one of those noted under paragraph 41b, above - was Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD's allegation that she had been shown a picture of her son's killer, Jack RUBY, a day before he perpetuated the deed! Again the Warren Commission Report (pp. 364 - 365, 367) exhaustively disposes of this erroneous charge and requires no repetition here. A complicating fact developed along the way was Mrs. OSWALD's (correct) observation, when she finally admitted before the Commission that the ODUM photograph was not RUBY, was that the photo had been cropped differently from the one she had been shown in Dallas. Inspector MALLEY's cropped version of the ODUM photograph became Commission Exhibit 237 (see HEARINGS, Vol. XVI, p. 638).

43. The net effect of the developments in the hearings of the Commission was to require the admission of the cropped photograph into evidence in a chain of depositions beginning with

ODUM, including the FBI Inspector, James R. MALLEY (who had trimmed the photograph used by the Commission in Washington) and Mr. HELMS, who deposed for the originator. These documents speak for themselves and will be found in the HEARINGS, Vol. XI, pp. 468- 470.

44. Mexico City Station and other senior Agency officers strongly advised against the publication of the photograph in any form on the grounds that the Soviets would be immediately alerted to the existence of a useful and continuing U.S. intelligence operation and the operation would go down the drain. There were repeated cables exchanged on this point between Headquarters and Mexico City Station during the summer of 1964 in particular from 23 September to 15 October 1964 when the Station had plans underway to abandon the operation.

45. In acceding to the Commission's request for a deposition Mr. HELMS, then the Deputy Director for Plans, replied affirmatively to Mr. RANKIN by memorandum of 23 June 1964 which including the following additional observation:

"The Central Intelligence Agency recommends that this photograph not be reproduced in the Commission's report because it would jeopardize a most confidential and productive operation. In addition, it could be embarrassing to the individual involved who as far as the Agency is aware had no connection with

Lee Harvey OSWALD or the assassination of
President KENNEDY."

46. In this instance the needs of the Commission prevailed
over the DCI's statutory obligation to protect sources and
methods. The "Unidentified Individual" remains to this day
unidentified and there is no credible evidence up to this
time to rebut the assertion made by Mr. HELM's in the concluding
sentence of his memorandum to Mr. RANKIN on 23 June 1964 . . .
And the photo operation did, as predicted, go down the drain.
Within a week of the public appearance of the ODUM Exhibit
No. 1 and Commission Exhibit 237, members of the Soviet Embassy
began systematic efforts to survey the surrounding buildings,
ostensibly for rental space, but clearly their inquiries
were directed to spotting possible camera sites. The operation
was continued in any case. Within a year it had become almost
totally unproductive in coverage on Americans in contact with
the Embassy - a clear sign that this category of visitor was
being warned away the the Soviets themselves.

PHASE THREE: THE "UNIDENTIFIED MAN" PHOTOGRAPHS, 1964 - 1975

49. As could be foreseen, there has been persistent pressure by critics of the Warren Commission Report to exploit ~~the~~ ODUM Exhibit No. 1 and Commission Exhibit No. 237 for partisan interpretive purposes.

A considerable correspondence has accumulated since the end of 1964 in which the Agency has attempted to be responsive to these requests ^{made} ^{has, directed to} simultaneously, to satisfy what has been ^{it} the sole interest from the inception of the matter: to protect the method of acquisition of the photograph and the which made the acquisition possible.

50. Following are highlights from the correspondence from the current phase:

a. On 16 May 1967 over the signature of the General Counsel of the Agency, Lawrence R. Houston, CIA voluntarily submitted ^{about the photographs} ~~the~~ statement to Judge Bagert of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana. The response dealt affirmatively with the contents of the subpoena that had been delivered to the United States Marshall in the District of Columbia. ⁽ Despite the fact that the subpoena could not be executed because of the lack of jurisdiction, ^{Mr. Houston proffered on Agency behalf} categorical assurances to the court regarding ^{the} inaccurate statements and inferences made by Mr. Garrison in New Orleans about the

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photograph of the unidentified individual. The following is ^{attached} quoted

from Mr. Houston's memorandum:

"Because of the publicity which has surrounded the Orleans Parish Grand Jury proceedings, we have recently carried out an exhaustive search of the files of the Central Intelligence Agency for any picture of Lee Harvey Oswald taken in Mexico. As a result of this search, I can state categorically that the files of this Agency do not contain, and never have contained, any such picture of

Lee Harvey Oswald taken in Mexico and that we have no information whatsoever that any such photograph ever existed. To the best of our knowledge and information, therefore, there is no such photograph. Furthermore, the photograph which is printed in the Warren Commission Report, Exhibit No. 237 in Volume XVI, never contained more than one figure, and the figure in the photograph depicts an individual who, to our knowledge, has not been identified. The circumstances of the filing of this photograph with the Warren Commission are set forth in affidavits of pages 468 and 469 of Volume XI, Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Consequently, we have no record of any photograph that answers in any way the description of the one we understand was requested in the subpoena.

"I hope you will accept this information in this form in the spirit of cooperation in which it is proffered."

1. The Agency has repeatedly serviced requests about the identity of the unknown individual ^{from} Mr. Emory L. Brown, Jr., Rte #4, Box 82

Sqanqum Road, Farmingdale, New Jersey. The last exchange of correspondence in our record covered the period 4 - 17 April 1970.

D R A F T

20. On 10 October 1963 at 2011Z time the WH Division,
component responsible for action on this report disseminated to
the Department of State, the FBI, and the Navy Department by
routine electrical transmission, ^{with the} the report received from Mexico
^{adding some}
Station together with preliminary collateral details drawn from
a file review:

1. On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive
source in Mexico reported that an American male, who
identified himself as Lee OSWALD, contacted the Soviet
Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the Embassy
had received any news concerning a telegram which had
been sent to Washington. The American was described
as approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build,
about six feet tall, with a "receding" hairline.

2. It is believed that OSWALD may be identical
to Lee Henry [sic] OSWALD, born on 18 October 1939 in
New Orleans, Louisiana, a former U.S. Marine who
defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later
made arrangements through the United States Embassy in
Moscow to return to the United States with his Russian-
born wife, Marina Nikolaevna PUSAKOVA [sic] and their
child.

3. The information in paragraph one is being
disseminated to your representatives in Mexico City.

Any further information received on this subject will be furnished you. This information is being made available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

21. Although the reaction of the Headquarters desk was "by the book" and in good time, there were a number of errors in this advisory to the departments which, on the record, were concerned with the OSWALD case:

a. OSWALD's middle name was misspelled: ^{given:} "Henry" for Harvey.

b. His wife's maiden name was misspelled: "PUSAKOVA" for ^{PR} RUSAKOVA.

Neither of these errors are significant, *(though they persist in the Headquarters communications)* More important was: *throughout the month,*

c. Paragraph 2 of the Mexico City Station's report

which had dealt with a concurrent, but separate, phenomenon,

the description of an individual observed going into and out of the Soviet Embassy, had been locked on to Lee OSWALD as an alleged descriptive fact. *(There can be no question that this misreading*

of the Mexico City Station report was an analyst's error

which escaped detection in the coordination before release:

the descriptive details attributed to OSWALD were so far off

the mark as to be immediately recognizable as such by the

recipients. *in Headquarters, among whom both the Navy and the FBI had photos of Oswald,*

be it recalled that as of that moment CIA had no photograph
in files in Mexico City
of OSWALD to refer-to. 1)

21. Confirmation of this judgment is provided by the contents
of the cable composed by the same analyst and sent as of 22093 time
(two hours later) to Mexico City Station, *referring its 8 October cable:*

1. Lee OSWALD who called SovEmb 1 Oct
probably identical Lee Henry [sic] OSWALD born
18 Oct 1939, New Orleans, Louisiana, former radar
operator in United States Marines who defected
to USSR in Oct 1959. OSWALD is five feet ten
inches, one hundred sixty five pounds, light
brown wavy hair, blue eyes.

2. On 31 Oct 1959 he attempted to renounce
his United States citizenship to the United States
Emb in Moscow, indicating he had applied for Soviet
citizenship. On 13 Feb the US Emb Moscow received
an undated letter from OSWALD postmarked Minsk on
five Feb 1961 in which subj indicated he desired
return of his US PPT as wished to return to USA
if "we could come to some agreement concerning
the dropping of any legal proceedings against me."

On 8 July on his own initiative he appeared at the
Emb *with* with his wife to see about his return to States.

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OSWALD stated that he actually had applied for Soviet citizenship and that his application at that time had been to remain in USSR and for temporary extension of his tourist visa pending outcome of his request. This application, according to OSWALD, contained no ref^{erence} to Soviet citizenship. OSWALD stated that had been employed since 13 Jan 1960 in Belorussian radio and tv factory in Minsk where worked as metal worker in research shop. OSWALD was married on 30 April 1961 to Marina Nikolaevna PUSAROVA [sic] a dental technician born 17 July 1941 USSR. No Hdqs traces. He attempted arrange for wife to join him in Moscow so she could appear at Emb for visa interview. His American ^(passport) VPT was returned to him. US Emb Moscow stated twenty months of realities of life in Soviet Union had clearly had maturing effect on OSWALD.

3. Latest Hdqs info^{was} was an FBI report dated May 1962 saying FBI had determined OSWALD is still US citizen and both he and his Soviet wife have exit permits and Dept State had given approval for their travel with their infant child to USA.

4. ^{PM} Station should pass info ref^{erence} and para one^(is, outside cable) to the Embassy to the FBI, the Navy, and I&NS locally. The informants^{phm}

as paras two and three originates
with the FBI.

5. Ref. and possible identification being disseminated to Hdqs of FBI, State, Navy, AND I&NS. Pls keep Hdqs advised on any further contacts or positive identification of OSWALD.

23. The Headquarters feedback, ^{E Mexico City} of OSWALD's correct description should have been sufficient, in view of the incongruities with the details deduced from the photo of the unidentified male, to keep but things did not work out that way these two matters apart as investigative facts. Mexico City Station on 15 October 1963, ~~In any case~~ asked Headquarters to

"please pouch a photo of OSWALD." Headquarters electrically

delivered to the Department of the Navy the following message on 24 October 1963:

"Lee Henry [sic] OSWALD . . .

"It is requested that you forward to this office as soon as possible two copies of the most recent photo graph you have of subject. We will forward them to our representative in Mexico, who will attempt to determine if the Lee OSWALD in Mexico City and subject are the same individual."

No photo had been received by CIA by 22 November 1963.

24. Within its limitations and capabilities, Mexico City Station had done all it could to comply with Headquarters instructions:

a. Headquarters had been alerted and in turn those agencies with an investigative or policy interest in OSWALD *as an American in the United States,* had been alerted, both in Washington and in the field.

b. Mexico City had no further contacts by OSWALD to report because--as it was ultimately ascertained--he had left Mexico City on 2 October.

c. OSWALD was not an Agency investigative responsibility, in any case. Even with a photograph, it would have taken very special efforts triggered by the other interested U.S. agencies to have made a positive identification in view of OSWALD's hotel registration under alias.

There the matter rested until mid-day 22 November 1963.

25. The Insertion of the Photo of the Unidentified Individual with the Chain of ^{Evidence} ~~Events~~ On 22 November 1963 the Mexico City Station cabled Headquarters at 2229Z time after learning of the arrest of Lee H. OSWALD, age 24, possibly in connection with the assassination and referencing ^{ad} its earlier message of ^{CS 9/1} 14 and 15 October ⁴⁻⁶⁴ and Headquarters' reply of 10 October. The station ^{requested by} request priority pouch ^{p photo} photo OSWALD so that Station can check all recent coverage for OSWALD. Forwarding soonest copies of only visitor to SovEmb ^{it} 1 Oct who could be identical with OSWALD."

26. It is clear that Mexico City Station had forgotten that according to its own communication the unidentified male in the photo was of "apparent age 35" and that the accurate description of OSWALD forwarded by Headquarters on the 10th precluded the person whom they regarded as the "only visitor to the Soviet Embassy on 1 October who could be identical," could indeed be.

27. The Station had meanwhile begun an exhaustive and accelerated review of all its technical and photographic intelligence. A dispatch was prepared in accordance with the indication given in the cable of 22 November, cited in paragraph 25 above.

The dispatch noted that photo coverage of the unidentified individual had turned up on 4 and 15 October at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies, respectively. The text of the 22 November 1963 pouched dispatch ~~was~~ *read*:

"1. Attached are copies of the only photographs obtained . . . on 1 October 1963, which appeared to be an American. This same man visited the Soviet Embassy on 4 October 1963.

"2. Copies of these photographs were shown to ~~the~~ [sic] U.S. Ambassador on 22 November 1963 and a copy of each of the two photographs was given to Chief FBI, Mexico, on that date....

"P.S. Photographs dated 15 October 1963 were inserted after typing of dispatch. These were taken as [the] person

entered the Cuban Embassy."

Attached were eight photographs: four (of which two were marked 1 October on reverse) showing the individual in a white shirt and four (unmarked on reverse) showing the individual in a black shirt.

It would seem to be logical that the word "sets" was probably omitted from paragraph two of the dispatch between the words "two" and "photographs."

30. That the Station was working under forced draft is *clearly* apparent from the text of the dispatch, which *tacked-on a* ~~contains a~~ material fact ~~inserted~~ as a postscript. That fact was reported simultaneously by cable to Headquarters at 0053Z time, 23 November:

"1. Mexico Station has photos same unidentified American type who is possibly OSWALD entering Cuban Embassy on 15 October. Searching for possibility photo-documented entry Cuban Embassy other days.

"2. Also attempting establish OSWALD entry and departure Mexico."

³¹ 29. Headquarters, at 01:36 ^{23 Nov 1963} Z time, ^a asked Mexico Station to send a staff member with all photographs to Headquarters on the next available flight.

³² 30. Concurrently with or before the foregoing cables to Headquarters, the Chief of Station, Mexico City ^{look} spoke directly by double-talk telephone with the Western Hemisphere Chief of

Station, J. C. KING, and secured permission to give copies of the

photographs of the unidentified individual to the Legal Attache

and to make them known to the Ambassador. *What happened next is best* The next development is

clearly reflected in a personal note by the Chief of Station to the

WH Division Chief, mailed to the latter from Dallas, together with

copies of the photographs, by the *Legal Attache* FBI representative who delivered

them to the FBI in that city.

"22 November 1963

"Dear J.C. [KING]:

"Reference is made to our conversation of 22 November in which I requested permission to give the Legal Attache copies of photographs of a certain person who is known to you.

"Attached are copies of each of the photographs we have with the dates of the visits stamped on the back.

"At 6 p.m. Mexico time on 22 November, The Ambassador decided that this was important enough to have a member of the Legal Attache's office take copies of these pictures to Dallas, Texas. The Naval Attache is making a special flight from Mexico City for this purpose. The Legal Attache's officer who is going to Dallas has promised to mail this material to you for me.

"Copies of these photographs are also being sent by

D R A F T

pouch which will leave Mexico City on the night of

22 November 1963.

"Best wishes.

"Win [SCOTT]"

• According to ^{the} ~~the~~ sidelined comment~~s~~ on this letter, the Legal Attache's officer was Eldon RUDD.

34. The decision to remit the photographs to the FBI in Dallas had been made by the Ambassador, according to the Chief of Station, who simultaneously with the FBI agent's departure reported to Headquarters by cable (0244Z time, 23 November):

"FBI agent left here 2000 local time with two copies each of six photos of a person suspected to be OSWALD, on a special flight for Dallas. He is carrying ^{an} envelope with one copy each photo for airmail special ^{delivery} from Dallas to J. C. KING at home as per telephone conversation with SCOTT. One copy of each of these photos plus a copy of each of the photos showing the same person exiting the Cuban Embassy forwarded by memorandum leaving by regular pouch tonight. In view of above does Hqs still want a staffer with additional photo(s)?"

be stipulated in summary:

a. *shown strictly,* There is no increment of credible evidence, *in the assassination* applying *any* this of Soviet and/or Cuban political, intelligence or security service involvement to what was developed and considered by the Warren Commission and its staff. The Commission's finding on the basis of credible evidence that Lee Harvey OSWALD was the killer of President KENNEDY and Officer TIPPIT and did them alone and of his own determination ~~part~~ stands.

b. "Credible evidence" that would upset or significantly modify this ~~judgment~~ *part* did (and does) not exist in Washington. But such evidence could exist in Moscow and/or Havana, where *voluntary* inputs to the Warren Commission were minimal in quantity and ~~quality~~ *quality,* and ~~designed~~ *designed* to cover up any knowledge *admission* of, or connection with OSWALD which might be *related* ~~connected~~ directly or indirectly with the assassination. The ~~statement~~ *belief* that there was Soviet and/or Cuban (KGB and/or DGI) connection *with Oswald* will persist and grow ~~until~~ until there has been a full disclosure by these governments of all elements of OSWALD's handling and stay in the Soviet Union and his contacts in Mexico City. The Warren Commission report should have left a wider "window" for this contingency. ~~and~~ That, indeed, was the opinion at the working level particularly in the counterintelligence component in *the CIA in* 1964. *As was indicated by Mr. Helms in his testimony before the Warren Commission, CIA would have made available to*

c. In the absence of additional or new *elements* "credible" evidence, there are "hunches" ~~elements~~ in the record that emerge as noteworthy, in the light of the other conclusions. These are reviewed and summarized below, item-by-item.

1. Investigation of the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy. Hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, 1964), vol. 14. [I'll give you this citations by phone, Andy.]

Report this report on the Oswald case in all open files

d. CASTRO's warning and threat of 7 September 1963 -

if OSWALD did indeed read it in New Orleans - must be considered
of great significance in the light of the pathological evolution
of OSWALD's passive/aggressive makeup and his identification with
After his attempt to kill General Walker in April 1963,
Fidel CASTRO and the Cuban revolution which is directly traceable
as far back as his Marine Corps service in El Toro, California.
CASTRO's warning and threat ^{given} to AP correspondent HARKER, ir-
respective of whether there was any formal mandate, or even
security service contact with OSWALD by the Cubans or the
Russians - ~~was an act of~~ singular irresponsibility
and under no circumstances ^{excusable} ~~excusable~~ ^{affordable} ~~affordable~~ retorsion for what
the Cuban emigres were doing during the summer of 1963, ~~with or~~
~~without CIA's knowledge or, more properly, the knowledge of~~
~~the President's brother, Robert KENNEDY, who was personally~~
~~invested with oversight of Cuban matters at the Federal level~~
~~after the Bay of Pigs Crisis.~~

Cuban Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD, Santa Ana, California, early
1959(?).

9. The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains an assertion of germinal significance to any review of the background of Lee Harvey OSWALD's feeling toward and relations with CASTRO's Cuba. DELGADO was probably the closest peer group member to OSWALD during his specialist training period at El Toro Marine Corps base December 1958 - September 1959. The Warren Commission Report takes note of this:

"OSWALD told DELGADO that he was in touch with Cuban diplomatic officials in this country; which DELGADO at first took to be 'one of his lies, but later believed.'"

10. Actually DELGADO's testimony says a lot more of possible operational significance than is reflected by the language of the report and ^{its implications} does not appear to have been ^{There} rundown or developed by investigation. ^{(The} record of the beginning of OSWALD's relationship with the Cubans starts with a question mark.

|| The period was one of transition in U.S. - Cuban relations after CASTRO's takeover. OSWALD, and DELGADO at the outset, were CASTRO supporters, OSWALD being particularly keen about how to ^{to do it} get ~~there~~ (DELGADO testified

"... I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that I know was to get in touch with a Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time/I told him this - we were on friendly terms with Cuba, you know, so this wasn't no sub-^{mission} or malintent, you know. I didn't know what to answer him. I told him to see them.

¹ Report to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Washington, 1964), p. 687 Hereafter cited as Report.

"After a while he told me he was in contact with them ...

"... I seen this envelope in his footlocker, wall-locker, and it was addressed to him, and they had an official seal on it, and as far as I could recollect that was mail from Los Angeles, and he was telling me there was a Cuban Consul. And just after he started receiving these letters - you see, he would never go out, but stay near the post all the time ...

"... he had one visitor after he started receiving letters he had one visitor. It was a man, because I got the call from the MP guard shack, and they gave me a call that OSWALD had a visitor at the front gate. This man had to be a civilian, otherwise they would have let him in. So I had to find somebody to relieve OSWALD, who was on guard, to go down there to visit with this fellow, and they spent about an hour and a half, two hours talking, I guess, and he came back. I don't know who the man was or what they talked about, but he looked nonchalant about the whole thing when he came back. He never mentioned who he was, nothing.

"Mr. Liebeler: How long did he talk to him, do you remember?

"Mr. Delgado: About an hour and half, two hours ...

"Mr. Liebeler: You never asked OSWALD who this fellow was that he talked to?

"Mr. Delgado: No. No ...

"Mr. Liebeler: Did you connect this visit that OSWALD had at that time with the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. Delgado: I did ; because I thought it funny for him to be receiving a caller at such a late date - time. Also, up to this time he hardly ever received mail; in fact he seldom received mail from home because I made it a policy, I used to pick up the mail for our unit and distribute it to the guys in there, and very seldom did I ever see one for him. But every so often, often after


he started to get in contact with these Cuban people, he started getting letter pamphlets and newspapers...

"... and he also started receiving letters, you know, and no ~~books~~, maybe pamphlets, you know, little-like church, things we get from church, you know, but it wasn't a church.

"Mr. Liebeler: Were they written in Spanish, any of them, do you know?

"Mr. Delgado: Not that I can recall; no.

"Mr. Liebeler: Did you have any reason to believe that these things come to OSWALD from the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. Delgado: Well, I took it for granted that they did after I seen the envelope know ... Something like a Mexican eagle, with a big, impressive seal, you know. They had different colors on it, red and white, almost looked like our colors, you know. But I can't recall the seal. I just knew it was in Latin, United something like that. I couldn't understand. It was Latin. 


"Mr. Liebeler: You don't know for sure whether it was from the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. Delgado: No. But he had told me prior, just before I found that envelope in his wall locker, that he was receiving mail from them, and one time he offered to show it to me, but I wasn't much interested because at the time we had work to do, and I never did ask to see that paper again, you know.

"Mr. Liebeler: Did he tell you what his correspondence with the Cuban Consulate was about?

"Mr. Delgado: No, he didn't.

"Mr. Liebeler: Did he ever indicate to you that it had to do with the conversations that you had about going over to Cuba?

"Mr. Delgado: No. The only thing he told me was that right after he had this conversation with the Cuban people was that he was going to -- once he got out of the service he was going to Switzerland... 

~~Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. KENNEDY, Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, 1964), Volume VIII, pp. 241-243. Hereafter cited as Hearings,~~

1. OSWALD's application to Albert Schweitzer College, Churwalden, Switzerland, was dated 19 March 1959, and he was presumably to report there on 20 April 1960. Destined for discharge from the Marines on 7 December 1959, OSWALD accelerated his exit on alleged grounds of family hardship in early September 1959. On 27 September 1959 he was issued a U.S. passport valid for travel - among other places to Cuba and the USSR. He entered the Soviet Union from Finland on 15 October 1959.

2. DELGADO's testimony has the cast of credibility. Granting that, it is of basic importance to focus attention on the male visitor who contact OSWALD at El Toro camp and talked with him for between one and a half to two hours. The event was unique in DELGADO's recollections, ^{and} actually there is nothing like it - on the record - in everything else we know about OSWALD's activity in the United States or after. The record reflects no identification of the contact. ^{El Toro} DELGADO's presumption is that the was from the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. Assuming that, the question is: *Who was it?*

And was there reporting to ^{from Los Angeles to Washington and Havana} ~~the~~ ^{Cuba} ~~minimal question~~ ^{that would, in effect, represent} the opening of a file on OSWALD? *24*

U.S./Cuban diplomatic and consular relations were severed on 3 January 1961.

Prediction of President KENNEDY's Demise by Communist Party Cell
Leader Morse BENITEZ Zabola, 1962.

13 [redacted] forwarded to Headquarters on 9 January 1964 a duplicate copy of a raw report by a penetration dated 5 January 1962 describing events at the yearly Communist Party cell meeting. The cell leader, Morse BENITEZ Zabola, said that the Communist Party in Guatemala should form a single new party: "We need not preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President KENNEDY because we know, according to prognostications, that he will die within the present years, 1962."

14 This report apparently had been discounted ~~by the Station~~ when it ~~had been~~ received and was not forwarded until the Station re-reviewed all of its material after the assassination. The file reflects no followup or formal dissemination of the report.

Enigmatic Threats by Cuban Third Secretary in The Hague,
7 November 1963.

15. A sensitive [] source, reporting after the KENNEDY assassination, indicated that at the Soviet reception on 7 November 1963, the Cuban Third Secretary, Ricardo L. SANTOS Pesa, discussed the recent refugee raids on Cuba and their implications with a host-country diplomat, concluding with the admonition: "... just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon." Asked to be more specific what would happen soon, SANTOS replied: "Just wait, just wait."

16. These data were passed to the Warren Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964. SANTOS was ~~subsequently~~ reported to have a history of mental instability and was summarily recalled from The Hague reportedly for reasons related to that fact in April 1966. †

14-00000
Intercepted Conversation of Cuban Embassy Employee, Luisa CALDERON,
Afternoon of 22 November 1963

17 At 1730 Mexico City time, about five hours after the KENNEDY assassination, ~~was~~ a Cuban Embassy employee named "Luisa" received a telephone call in Spanish from an unidentified male outside.

18 The caller asked her if she had heard the latest news. Luisa jokingly replied: "Yes, of course, I knew it almost before Kennedy ... Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs), what barbarians!.."

19 Both speakers agreed on the seriousness of the assassination. "Luisa" also stated that the party at Silvia DURAN's had been called off so it would not appear that they were celebrating the death of KENNEDY, nor would they have the party coincide with the burial. Finally she said she planned to move that night into the house of a doctor (a woman) friend.

20 Later hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of fore-knowledge? This is the only item in the intercept coverage ~~of the~~ ^{of the} Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that ~~presented~~ ^(contains) the suggestion ~~of foreknowledge or expectations.~~ ^{of foreknowledge or expectations.}

21 The tenuous, enigmatic character of the conversation is sharply highlighted by the following facts:

a. "Luisa" was probably identical with Luisa CALDERON, a cadre worker of the Cuban Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI). She returned to Cuba in 1964 and was reported to be working in DGI headquarters.

b. The DGI element in Mexico City in the fall of 1963 was headed by Alfredo MIRABEL Diaz who had arrived on 2 September 1963, formally as the replacement of the Consul Emésio AZCUE (departed 19 November 1963). The deputy DGI chief (and as of June 1964, MIRABEL's successor) was Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez.

c. ~~The "Silvia DURAN" named in Luisa's conversations was the receptionist, a Mexican~~

c. The "Silvia DURAN" named in Luisa's conversation was the receptionist, a Mexican national, who ~~worked~~ ^{dealt with} Lee Harvey OSWALD during his known visits on 27 and 28 September, to the Cuban installations in connection with a Cuban visa application for stay and/or transit. Silvia DURAN is the sole live witness ^{on the records} regarding LHO's activity in Mexico City. Her testimony, however, in its entirety was taken and presented, solely, by the Mexican Governmental authorities. A direct confrontation with her was requested by the Warren Commission ^{but} ~~but~~ rejected by the Mexican authorities. It is from Silvia DURAN's statements that it was learned that LHO became engaged ^{personally} in a /altercation on 27 September with Eusebio AZCUE.

d. Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez, alias Marcos, and his DGI assistant, Rogelis RODRIGUEZ Lopez were positively identified in February 1964 by two independent sources as engaged in the active development and facilitation of the training of Nicaraguan agents for the purpose of assassinating General Anastasio SOMOZA. VEGA, it is established, was on post in Mexico City during OSWALD's stay there 27 September - 2 October 1963. He left Mexico City on 3 November 1963 for Havana. It was reliably reported about VEGA that all individuals going to Cuba, legally or illegally, had to pass through him first. He took the biographical data and sent it to Cuba for name checking, a procedure which normally took 15 days.

e. There is no evidence in the OSWALD case file that Silvia DURAN was subjected to a systematic elicitive interrogation that would have related her dealings with OSWALD, known and confirmed by intercept, with the data held ~~in our files~~ on the Cuban DGI, its personalities and methods, in Mexico City. Was it normal for a case like OSWALD's, considering the fuss he allegedly made with AZCUE, for the applications to be handled solely by a local employee and a lame duck ^{like} AZCUE whose slot had been taken ~~over~~ by the DGI chief?

Whatever the answer to the ¹⁰ questions, they were 5. For example, VEGA would have handled the details of the visa activity

and facilitation of the trip to Cuba via Mexico City, that
was taken by Vincent Theodore Hall, the organizer
of the Fair Play Committee for Cuba, with which
Lieutenant Oswald established relations from Dallas in
April 1963 and from New Orleans ~~for the~~ ^{for a} ~~period~~ ^{period}
during the period April -

2 Nov 1963. There is an ~~interesting~~ ^{interesting} ~~connection~~ ^{connection}
~~between~~ ~~the~~ ~~two~~ ~~trips~~ ~~to~~ ~~Cuba~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~trip~~ ~~to~~ ~~Havana~~

overlay between his and Vago's travel to Havana during
that period: VEBT departed Mexico City on 6 January for
Havana and returned on 13 February 1963.

not asked at the time. Good Times

remains the more fundamental question: accepting the DURAN story on its face, could it have happened without the DGI ^{personnel} ~~elements~~ above cited (knowledge and participation)? ~~It is possible that the reply could be other than a solid negative and in that case, it is~~

~~palpable that~~ CASTRO's ^{service} ~~unique~~ intelligence and security service could have more in its files than ~~has been~~ ^{has} surfaced in the DURAN statements. Coming back to the beginning: "Luisa" - Luisa CALDERON - as a member of the DGI unit in Mexico City - could very well have known something that would make what she said to her unidentified caller less a matter of boastful self-indulgence than was assumed at that time.

*especially because VEGA is later, having
been cited by a Cuban defector, as having
acknowledged stated he was aware
of several more several visits to the
Cuban consulate. ~~It~~ It is clear that*

14-00000

Spec

Silvia DURAN, Substantial Amplification of Admission of
Alleged Personal Relations with LHO, 1967.

cf. The defects viewed in hindsight of the Silvia DURAN testimony already have been suggested above. (In that context of criticism it would also be relevant to reconsider the implications of the two intercepted telephone conversations on 26 November 1963 between the Cuban President, DORTICOS, and his Ambassador to Mexico, Joaquim Hernandez *Armas*, because the thrust of the conversation dealt with the question whether Silvia DURAN had been asked *(or been offered?)* about money payments by her Mexican interrogators.)

cf. As of September 1964 Silvia DURAN gave up her Cuban Embassy job. In the spring of 1967 Silvia DURAN was reported by a reliable and sensitive source to have cut all relations with Cubans. Her account *in 1967,* of how she had been taken into custody and had been interrogated after the assassination repeated what was already known. She added, under circumstances that did not permit the source to challenge or elicit corroborative detail, that she had gone out with LHO during his stay in Mexico City and claimed she had sexual relations with him.

spell out

Allegations of Conspiratorial Contact between OSWALD and Cuban Government Agents with Particular Reference to Allegations of (a) Elena GARRO de Paz and (b) Oscar CONTRERAS

25. As the Warren Commission reported, "Literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between OSWALD and agents of the Cuban Government have been investigated ...". Among these cases, which consumed hundreds of CIA man-hours in Headquarters and abroad - and similarly the FBI in the United States - ~~was~~ the Nicaraguan walkin in Mexico City on 26 November 1963 of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte, ~~(1) the case of Victor Rojas Villeneuve in Coahuila and Guadalupe; (2) the allegations of Enrique Ruedolo Burgos in New York; (3) the claims of Robert Edward GALLANT in Santa Clara prison in California; and (5) Roy DOBKIN.~~

26. The ALVARADO case is taken up in detail by the Warren Commission under the cyrptograph "D." ALVARADO claimed that he had seen an American, whom he identified as OSWALD, receive money sometime in mid-September 1963 in ^{in a meeting in a patio} of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. ALVARADO's story was ultimately broken by the use of the polygraph, on which ALVARADO showed deception and bringing ALVARADO's Nicaraguan security service ^{contact} into the case.

27. The ALVARADO story is a particularly acute representation of the difficulties that beset the evaluation of observed evidence: certain elements of the story persist despite the impeachment of its major premises. In this case ALVARADO, whose account did not become public until the publication of the Warren Report in October 1964, talked consistently of the presence in the Cuban Consulate transactions of a Negro with red-dyed hair.

28. Elena GARRO de Paz is a mecurial, articular and socially prominent Mexican writer, married, but separated from a high-ranking Mexican foreign service official. She is, also, the cousin of Horacio DURAN, the husband of Silvia DURAN, cited above. There is a strong personal antipathy between the two women descending from Elena GARRO's trenchant anti-Communism.

See Report, p. 305 ff. Some of the other ^{cases} were: the case of Ylario ROJAS Villeneuve in Coahuila and Guadalupe; the ^{allegations of Enrique Ruedolo} GONZALEZ, in New York City; the claims of Robert Edwards GALLANT, Santa Clara prison farm, California; and the allegations of Roy DOBKIN.

29. From October 1964 until his retirement in the fall of 1969, a U. S. Embassy officer, Charles THOMAS, persistently kept up a stream of reports and memoranda reflecting GARRO's account of what had actually gone on between OSWALD, the Cubans and in particular Silvia DURAN in September 1963, including a repeated reference to a Negro with *red-tipped hair*.

30 The first reference to the GARRO story was noted in ^a Mexico Station Memorandum of Record dated 12 October 1964:

"Elena GARRO [said] that she and her daughter were invited to a party at the Cuban Embassy during the period she now finds out that OSWALD was here in Mexico prior to the assassination. She was invited by a Mexican secretary in the Cuban Embassy whose husband is a cousin of the GARRO family [Horacio DURAN]. At the party she saw three Gringos, not drinking, not mixing and more or less just standing around together like three bumps on a log. They were so obviously out of place, she asked someone in the Cuban Embassy about them and was told that 'they were just passing through.' She claims that on the way these three Gringos stood out she took a good look at them as did her daughter. When the assassination occurred and OSWALD's picture was spread into the newspapers, both Elena and her daughter immediately said that he was one of the three Gringos without a doubt' at the party."

31 GARRO repeated her story to Mr. Charles William THOMAS, an Embassy political officer on 10 December 1965: In September 1963 after her ~~return~~ return from abroad, she went to a party, accompanied by her daughter, at the home of Ruben DURAN [emphasis added], Ruben is one of the two brothers of Horacio DURAN], who married her cousin. She met OSWALD and two other young Americans. At the party she was discouraged from talking with him. Other guests were the Cuban Consul AZCUE, General Clark FLORES, Silvia DURAN, who she later learned was OSWALD's mistress while he was here, Emilio CARBALLIDO, and a Latin American Negro man with red hair [emphasis added]. In November 1963 when the identity of the assassin became known, she and

her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted "assassins" and other insults at the staff there. Shortly afterward, she and her daughter were visited by a friend, Manuel CARVILLO (or CALVILLO), then an official in the Secretariat of the Gobernacion ~~which was headed at the time by ECHIVERRIA~~, and were told he had orders to escort them to a small and obscure hotel in the center of town. They were kept there for eight days under pretext that they were in danger. When she told CARVILLO she wanted to go to the American Embassy and explain what she knew of OSWALD, she was told that the American Embassy was full of Communist spies.

32. On 25 December 1965 and 9 January 1966 in further interviews with THOMAS, GARRO and her daughter elaborated and in certain particulars significantly modified her earlier account. She also acknowledged that she and her daughter had been interviewed by Embassy officers to whom she claimed they did not give a very completed story because the Embassy officers did not appear to give much credence to anything she said.

33. It ~~was~~ developed that GARRO and daughter had been interviewed by the Legal Attached on 17 and 24 November 1964. Her information had been similar to what she claimed in her account to THOMAS, but had not been substantiated by inquiries. The FBI representative therefore considered the matter closed and reaffirmed his disengagement from the matter to the CIA Chief of Station on 27 December 1965 and to the Ambassador on 25 February 1965.

34. The Embassy Political Officer, however, persisted in his interviews and reporting. A memorandum of conversation, 13 July 1966, in which GARRO identified the place to which she had been taken by CALVILLO as the Hotel Vermont. (This detail checked out affirmatively. GARRO was at the Hotel 23 - 24, 25 - 27 and 28 - 30 November 1963.) Another, on 7 February 1967, in which GARRO's ~~account~~ continuing vicissitudes with the Cubans are set out. And finally, upon THOMAS' retirement from U.S. Government service, the Department of State, at his request, 28 August 1969, disseminated to CIA and FBI a compilation of his reporting of the Elena GARRO ~~interviews~~ interviews.

35. There the matter rests. GARRO's chronology of the events she described as having occurred in the Mexican capital in

These particulars were not confirmed by independent observers, at this time.

September 1963 never coincided with the confirmed ~~data~~ ^{data} of OSWALD's presence there. Her story however had two points ^{of} congruance with allegations by others regarding OSWALD: (a) ALVARADO's allegations regarding the Negro with the red-dyed hair [this detail could, however, have been gleaned from the Warren Commission's ^{published} account of the "D" case] and (b) Sylvia DURAN's ~~own~~ later claim of intimate personal contacts with OSWALD.

36. Beginning in March and amplified in May 1967, the American Consul, Benjamin J. RUYLE, in Tampico developed a contact with a local Mexican journalist, Oscar CONTRERAS Lartigue, who claimed to have encountered OSWALD with other pro-CASTRO students at the University of Mexico campus in September 1963.

37. In June 1969, CONTRERAS was interviewed by a CIA officer:

He studied law at the University of Mexico for three years, approximately 1960 - 1964. He belonged to a clandestine pro-CASTRO Revolutionary group at the University. Regarding the OSWALD case he was extremely cautious and although he was not able or willing to give dates and names, he said OSWALD visited the University of Mexico campus shortly after the Cuban Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. OSWALD made inquiries regarding pro-Cuban revolutionary groups at the University and was directed to CONTRERAS and his friend. OSWALD met CONTRERAS and four other persons as they came out of a round-table discussion held in the faculty of Philosophy. OSWALD told the group it was urgent that he visit Cuba and the Cuban Embassy denied him a visa. He requested aid from CONTRERAS' group. CONTRERAS and others mistrusted OSWALD because they felt he was a CIA provocation. The group allowed OSWALD to accompany them the rest of that day, that night and part of the next day. OSWALD was very introverted and appeared to be slightly crazy. OSWALD made no mention of an assassination plot but kept bringing up the ~~point~~ point he had to travel to Cuba immediately.

At this point, with FBI knowledge, the matter was turned over to the Mexican authorities who determined that CONTRERAS was indeed at the University of Mexico but only for the years 1959 - 1960 and that he had been publically ^{associated} in protest activity for the Student Revolutionary Bloc (BER) in January 1961. However, the group ceased functioning as such in the middle of 1962 and Oscar CONTRERAS was never one of its leaders. No further work is reflected in the files on the CONTRERAS allegations. Apart from the unsustained claims made by CONTRERAS about his own presence at the University, there is an additional elements that undermines the credibility of his account: OSWALD's Spanish, which was barely adequate to get him meals near in hotel, ~~it~~ seems hardly likely to have permitted him to carry on for an extended period with a University student group.