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## TOP SECRET

 Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study entitled, <u>The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB</u> <u>Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO</u> dated February 1968 (copy 10).
Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

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WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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# **TOP SECRET**

# Annex A

# Statuments of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

#### 4 February 1964

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NOSENKO defected in Geneva.

#### 6 February 1964

The Chief of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February. They speculated privately between themselves that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an automobile accident.

#### 8 February 1964

An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four days.

#### 9 February 1964

Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

# 10 February 1964

The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.

Top Secret

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(Annex A)

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10 February 1964 (continued)

A U.S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKU as KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.



and British nationals. According to a sensitive source,

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<u>Comment</u>: NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in Geneva; he asserted that some others, known by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not.

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TS No. 197124

**Top Secret** (Annex A) 10 February 1964 (continued) According to a sensitive source MARKET NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine. Comment: NOSENKO claims to have served in the GRU until 1953, when he entered the EGB. According to a sensitive source, Concernance and a serveral KGB It appeared quite certain to washing and a second state of the sec officers that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KG3. Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been. a KGs lieutenant colonel. According to a sensitive source, from KCB officers and and a substantian and a su the The photograph, which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO.One appeared worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate. - be the says of and souther as · · 1- · 363 TS No. 197124 Tod Secret 10 Coov

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(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

<u>Comment:</u> and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection was by error not that of NOSENKO but'of Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom comment and NOSENKO both identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, GOLITSYN recalled that NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate officer working against American citizens.

<u>Comment</u>: Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962 (before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.

# 11 February 1964

Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release, and to demand an immediate interview with him.

### 12 February 1964

S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disatmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

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#### (Annex A)

#### 12 February 1964 (continued)

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Wishington as soon as possible.

NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours.

#### <u>12-13 February 1964</u>

#### 14 February 1964

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In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO read to Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a

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### (Annex`A)

#### 14 February 1964 (continued)

"gross provocation by American Intelligence organs". GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and Third Secretary V.F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. NOSENKO told both the Suiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

#### 18 February 1964

Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of International Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV, NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and "famous for his character".


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
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According to a sensitive source, and in a response to a question whether NOSLNKO actually defected or whether and the defection hight be a KOB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.

22 February 1964

According to a sensitive source from conversations with various unnamed KOB

officers: NOFENKO worked against personnel

stationed at the American Probassy in Noncow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGD that he is familiar with the number and location of microgrammes in the Embassy.

<u>Comment</u>: Although NOSENKO knew that there were microphones in three general locations in the Embassy, his specific information regarding the number and location of microphones was limited to that contained in a written list brought to Geneva in 1964, a list which he claimed no one in the KGB knew he had.

## 24 February 1964

Women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time, expressing disbelief that he had voluntarily betrayed his family and country and requesting a personal meeting with him.

371

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(Annex A)

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24 February 196: (continued)

Connent: NOSENKO confirmed their identities as his wife and mother on the basis of physical descriptions. On only one previous occasion have members of a defector's family called on a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in 1963, his wife appeared at the British Enhassy to make inquiries about him.

#### 

According to a sensitive source, KUROCHKIN (fnu), a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington, will not be sent as he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Noscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted with him".

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROCHKIN nor referred to the name.

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177

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**Top Secret** (Annex A) Section 2 CITATINE KAT DESIGNATION DE LA CALCONT DE LITERATION CENTRAL STATES S CHARLE MILLED February 1964 Nikolay ARTAMONOV, who defected from the Soviet Navy in N the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO's defection. He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO in 1944-1946. ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of Comment: the dates involved differs from those. claimid by NOSENKO. 麗 KCR officer Viadimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a TULAYEV said that NOSENKO, whom he knew-well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV later said on another occasion that he had friends who knew NOSENKO well.) Comment: NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name or photograph. When asked, NOSENKO denied knowing him. TS No. 197124 **Top Secret** Copy 10

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#### February-March 1964

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According to a sensitive source:

A KGB conmission was in the process of studying the scale of loss" [caused by NOSENKO's defection] to the USSR. The commission was very large, formed from different departments of the KGB. The study (sic) was made "because it is supposed that NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many details about life of the leaders of the country, in the government...that he knew very much about internal relations between the people working in the KGB, that he had many close friends among them and [spent] days and nights together with them. The whole history of his life was studied step by step very carefully."

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. **HETERCEDWERT**A Tag Securi March 1999 According to a sensitive source, Control (from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers contraction in the NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dising room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB. NOSENEO never referred to the dining rooms Comment: until the January-March 1965 interrogations, when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room". 200 Ste CITY IS A REAL PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE 院 CARLES STREET, CARLES CONTRACTOR ie sta TS No. 197124 Secret CODY

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#### 23 March 1964

The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

376

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

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# (Annex A)

27 March 1964

According to a sensitive source

(from various unnamed KGB officers (KGB) chiefs (KGB) chiefs (KGB) that NOSENKO...could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. MOSENKO would also have had a 100-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some (KGB) "chiefs" (KGB) that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.

<u>Comment</u>: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB directories described.


31 March 1964

KGB officers	nad		in
told their agen	E Contraction of the second seco	to ceas	e all intel-
ligence activit;	y for a year, to d	estroy any inc	riminating
materials in his	s possession as we	11 as to suppl	y the Soviets
with passport p	hotographs so that	"escape" docu	ments could
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asserting NOSEN	KO "was just a sec	retary".	

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(Annex A)

# Apr11-May 1964

KGB officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lee JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSON on the street rather than in various restaurants as had been their habit. At one of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to the United States, VLASOV told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector could not identify JOHNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See p 24 for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)

#### CHINADEPHON.

May 1964: According to a sensitive source officers (from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB officers (a) to been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to idetermine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.

380

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51	to the Americans which resulted in the found. NOSENKO knew only the general	microphones being location of the 40		1	1
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	reported Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Sovi	at the American et official with whom	•	•	
	he was acquainted told him that NOSENK with two wives and many debts and is c	O was a profligate		• •	<u>家</u> 24
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69	22 June 1964			· ·	
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#### 22 June 1964 (continued)

the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENYO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO - had concerning the KGB.


### 29 June 1964

GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two. or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959. When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department. NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during 1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section until 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsibilities or may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or 1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section on at least three occasions from early 1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been in the Section, particularly if NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief. G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the Section during this period.

382 **Top Secret** 

TS No. 197124

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(Annex A)

#### June 1964 (continued)

Comment: (Continued)

Conselor of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified as a KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.

<u>29 July 1964</u>

According to a sensitive source, (from unnamed sources, presumably KCB officers article ( An investigating commission of the CP5U Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSINKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK [BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employe expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating compission had determined that Yu. I. GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legel Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB

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	Top Secret
	(Annex A)
	29 July 1964 (continued)
	Concinued)
	Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO
a 9	and COLUBLV were given different assignments within the KGB
	and thereafter did not associate with one another in the
	course of their daily activit es.
	Corrent: NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claims
	Corrent: NOSESKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claims that GRIBANOV had been instrumental in his
<b>5</b>	advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identi-
	fied by name and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he
ត្ត ស	had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO
1	said he had never worked with him at KGB Head-
	quarters since (GOLUBEV had, always been in the
M M	First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the
	USSR on 28 August 1964.
4 64	
<b>N</b>	July-August 1964
	According to a sensitive source:
	The first
	information for a second s
	NOSENKO was compression from KGB Headquarters which reported
J CH	the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed
	to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The
<b>1</b> . <b>11</b> .	letter, which was very brief, said that "the loss was very great and some new forms of work should be created to be
g 84	efficient in the future". The Legal Residency had not
	before received any "reports or commentaries on NGSENKO's
r 😭	escape".
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# Teo Secret

#### (Annex A)

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# CITE THE

#### November 1964

Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian people had been told of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American acquaintance that they had not been told officially but they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. It was in this way, GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance. According to the "grapevine", the defection was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States.

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**Top Secret** (Anner A) November 1964 (continued) Conment: GAMKRFLIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his Ľ, statements, actions, and unusual freedom of solitary movement while on visits to the United States. GAMERELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he had met with their American counterparts". During that 1964 meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject of NOSENKO, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country". CONTRACTOR DE LA CONTRACT and the second state of th December 1964 a source Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's/roommate in Geneva at the time of his defection, told . That he had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection, and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK source reported to the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what RESHETNYAK said, compared thought the KGB might go so far source TS No. 197124 **Top Secret** Copy \_10

(Annex A)

December 1964 (continued)

as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. (Internidentified RESHETNYAK as a RCB officer.) Source

<u>Comment:</u> NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation.

29 January 1965 According to a sensitive source


(from conversations with unrecalled KGE officers (from conversations with unrecalled KGE officers (c) (from conversation): It is common knowledge among (c) (from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable "compromising information" concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the notation: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.


Comment:


NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV was responsible for sending him to Geneva in 1964, but after retracting his claim that GRIBANOV had played any special role in his assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved the 1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his father and GRIBANOV were acquainted.

TS No: 197124

Top Secret







(Annex A)

#### 

Summer 1965 According to a sensitive source

With the second second

<u>Comment</u>: SEMICHASTRYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in 1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.

<u>Winter</u> <u>1965-1966</u> Source, a

till a station of the second of the

Chief Directorate agent (from KCB officer V.G. SVIRIN.

That SVIKIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations sgainst the American Embassy in Moscow):

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
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
NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering". NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.

392

**Top Secret** 



**Top Secret** March 1956 (continued) Contrent: NOSENDO has claimed that he prejected an offer to attend the Hilitary Diplomatic Academ. - 4 . --- Source (which he, like the called the GRU ·· - 2 Military Academy), by choice accepting assignment to the Far East on entry to the GRU in 1951. At the time, the Hilitary Diplomatic Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO did attend the school, he could not have servel auffle claimed in the GRU. GILS 15 Source the sole source (Lesides NOSENKO) who alleged MOSENKO, served in the GRU. CALLER STREET, S 63 din di ATTENT THE REPAIR STATES また。たいたい S. P. S. as A STATE OF A 12 394 TS No. 197124 **Top Secret** Copy



**Top Secret** (Annex A) Mid-1966 Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time. KOROLEV is believed identical with Yuriy KOROLEV Corment: who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International KOROLEV has travelled previously to Brussels as a correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik, and to Japan and the United States as a correspondent for Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by an official Soviet press representative of information on a "Soviet secret agent", which turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without precedent. October 1956 Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editors to ... provide a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their 396 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy .

(Annex A)

### October 1966 (continued)

life in Moscow gluce NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement KOROLEV provided Paris Match editors stated: "NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.: it was granted to him. This was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Sucurity organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espicoage and counterespionage departments and also was clonely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident (the defection). Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be givenmuch publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." KUROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family could be obtained and that interviews with them and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspondent.

**Top Secret** 

<u>Comment</u>: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request.

28 January 1967 According to a sensitive source (from personal knowledge): Referring to his own

knowledge of KGB organization, et al. said if NOSENKO heard his explanation, he would call knew these matters better than at KGB Headquarters longer.

397

**Top Secret** 

Source

TS No. 197124

THE BE & MADE WHERE WE AND A Top Secret (Annex A) February 1967 According to a sensitive source (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow): NOSENKO worked only in kU Information Department of the GRU, and only for about five or six months, after which he went to the KCB. May 1967 According to a sensitive source sel an The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole system of surveillance of Americans. He worked on it, knew all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight. According to a sensitive source NOSENKO worked in the GAU Information Department he worked only in the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. He worked badly there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went to the KCB. 5 June 1967 According to a sensitive source There had been some . KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts "which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Genevalto investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of SHAKHOV. Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962 to investigate SHAKHOV. 1. 1. يريع المسترجة المحالي المسترجين المسترجين المسترج المسترجين المسترجين المحالي والمحالي والمحالي والمحالي والمحالي المحالي والمحالي المحالي والمحالي المحالي والمحالي 1 45 100 398 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy

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