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SECRET EYES ONLY

KEMORANDUM FOR THE ECCORD

REPORT OF INTERROGATION

DATE: 29 July 1965

- 1. Questioning was concentrated on documents that had to be filled out when Subject was entering the KGB. Komsomol questions and service in the Baltic were not touched at all. Following highlights:
- a) ARKETA (DPHQ): Subject displayed a superficial knowledge of this basic questionnaire. He knows generally the appearance, the nature of the questions, and the purpose of the document. He continued to maintain, incorrectly, that it was required in two copies, that he filled it out at home, that it consisted of 4-6 pages. He amended his story to say that he does not remember for sure whether the turned it in to BOZHENKO's people on one of his first visits, or gave it to SAKHAROV when he first reported for work.

COMMENT: An ordinary member of the KGB might conceivably have forgotten the details of this document which was filled out only at the beginning of his career. As a supervisor, however, Subject claims to have reviewed many personnel files (as he should have): a such, he could not possibly make the mistakes that he has about this document, or be unable to give a better description ofit.

- b) Secrecy Agreement: Subject himself stated that he had signed such a form for SAKHAROV when he first reported for work. He was unable to remember the proper designation or contents of the document, however. The description of the wording which he provided was similar to that used prior to 1947; also, it is similar to the secrecy agreement that might be signed by an agent.
- c) Lichniy Listok po Ucbetu Kadrov: This is not a very important document, but it is filled out by every officer, and is found in every personnel gile. Subject was not only unable to recall it, he maintained he had never beard of it even afterit was described to him.

SECRET EYES C'ILY COMMENT: Again, although Subject might have forgotten it if he had been just a plain case officer in the KGB, he should know of it as a supervisor, or even as Secretary of the Komsomol Organization (it is a CC/CPSU questionnaire).

d) SPRAVKA No.1: This document is required for every personnel action. Subject did not react at all to its name and said he didn't know of it. When it's purpose was described to him, Subject managed to give a superficial description of the document.

COMMENT: An ordinary case officer would know of the existence of this form, but would not necessarily have ever seen it. As deputy chief of a department, however, Subject would handle this document 30-40 times a year. and would be thoroughly familiar with it. Thus, his limited knowledge of it could only have come from a brief.

- e) Posluzhney Spsok (Employment and Service Record): Asked about this document, Subject gave a good description of its nature and purpose. His answer that he himself did not fill it out but that it was filled out by personnel on the basis of the data in his Anketa is perfectly plausible. It is odd, however, that Subject insisted that he did not sign this document when he first entered the KGB (as is normally done) but only "in 1958 or 1957."
- 2. Subject was asked how he answered some of the questions in the Anketa, particularly the questions on his former wife, her relatives, and on his mother's ancestry. I then asked Subject how it was, taking into account his mother's aristocratic ancestry, the fact that he father died in jail, the Trotskyite allegations against Subject's father, the fact that Subject's former father-in-law was still in jail, and the fact that Subject was present when TELEGIN's apartment was searched -- that he had been accepted into the KGB, particularly in 1953. Subject admitted that the question was logical, and said that he could only assume that the failuence of KOBULOV and the important and influential position of his own father outweighed these negative factors. He also cited his GRU experience in this connection.

I then asked Subject how he had reported his second marriage to the KGB. He replied that before the marriage he had mentioned it briefly to GORBATENKO, and that he had

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unofficially run a name check on his prospective bride, (which was "clean"), and that after the marriage he had filled out another ankets for personnel in which he included all the required data on his wife and her relatives. After considerable prompting, Subject said that he had indicated that she and her parents had been in France, but that he had concealed the fact that her grandmother had been in German occupied territory during the war (he admitted that the KGB would have learned this in a routine check, however.) I then reviewed for Subject the negative security factors mentioned above, adding the arrest of KOBULOY, the fact that his new wife and her parents had been abroad, the fact that her grandmother was in Germanoccupied territory, the fact that Subject was now everage for ... the Komsomol but not yet a party member or candidate, and the fact that Subject received a 15 day sentence for misuse of cover documents and incurring [and asked if he didn't think that 'his personnel file had been reviewed in 1954, and is so what grounds there could have been for retaining him in the KGB. Subject said that he thought that his file probably was reviewed but that again the influence of his father had saved him. Subject added that another important factor was probably his language qualification and particularly his higher education. I told Subject that we would examine the question of his education in greater detail later. He made no comment. I also pointed out to Subject that if his second wife and her parents had been abroad it was impossible that her name check could have been negative. He admitted it was illogical, but insisted that this was so.

- 4. CONCLUSIONS: Evidence continues to pile up to show that Subject was never in a supervisory position in the KGB, and that he could not have and did not enter the KGB in 1953. His weak knowledge of the documents discussed indicates that if he was ever in the KGB at all it was liter, and for a relatively short time.
- 5. Despite the fact that I continued to challenge Subject frequently, the tone of the interrogation was particularly friendly today. The following exchange was of some interest:

Subject: You probably worked for twenty years in personnel!

Ted: Not exactly. You should know better.

Subject: No, I don't know. If you told me your name?

Ted: We'll talk about that later, and maybe even drink to each other's health.

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6. The plan for tomorrow's session is to attack Subject on his service in the Baltic in 1952.

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