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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

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PROJECT ZRRIFLE
HANDWRITTEN NOTES
ASSASSINATION PROJECT

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~SECRET~~

HARVEY EX 1 R371

6/25/75

9/8/81

1

Project ZRRIFLE

1994
APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA MEMORANDUM
AS SANITIZED
23 JUN 94
(S) (A)
(S) (B)
(S) (C)

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~with~~ ~~posts~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is ~~to spot, develop, and use agent assets for Division D operations in accordance with requirements levied on the clandestine service~~ ~~since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project.~~ Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as

3. Background: needed.

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3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements ~~of the National Intelligence Agency~~ ~~Division D~~ in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

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~~Criminal Sanctions~~

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period requirements [redacted] became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D [redacted] could best conduct the activity. The first spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OSA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 [redacted] in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted & sporadically by [redacted] in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. In ^{October} ~~September~~ 1960,

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3

Routine annual salary : \$ 7,200
Travel + ops expenses for
Routine + other agents + agent candidates : 2,000
Fees for services by and
standby of agents and
agent candidates : 2,000
Travel of staff employees
engaged in Zovible activity : 2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles
and other operational expenses : 1,000
\$ 14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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1) Legal, ethical → morals, operational problems; political: non-attribution
ability.

2) One man experience (CIA/NSA) (+ effect on DDP) and experience
w/ KGB (CIA/NSA) → require must
professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable,
CF-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient
search + w/ ability to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him
he should, ^{offensive high regard for operational security} assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubaek only (e.g., what does ~~foreign~~ know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies

b. Within Kubaek, one focal point for control,
search, training, case officing, etc. - DDP authority
in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous
cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility
of one-man success (Europe) control base with
owner (non-station) commo. Word of mouth +
no bailfutures re trips

d. No PA's or intermediaries; rigid case-officing,
from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign
govts.

f. No use of any agent who
ever worked for a Govt. agency, Training
by opposition would need.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g.,

~~Wanted~~ in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubaekers who can

pass as foreigners.

- i. Pretect ~~Not to be~~ reveal; the establishment ~~is~~
- j. No discussion in stations. No team until ready to go if fall

4. Blackmail:

- a. No American citizens or residents or people who was obtained U.S. visas
- b. No chain of connections; strictly person to person; night ops.
- c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.
- d. Exclude organization ~~criminals~~, those in record of arrests, those w/ mutability of purpose as criminals.
- e. Staffers involved - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for planning hours or checks in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. ~~Should have planning 21~~ ~~to be kept~~ ~~all~~ ~~about~~ ~~the~~ ~~possibility~~ ~~of~~ ~~blow~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~operation~~ ~~if~~ ~~fall~~ ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~prevented~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~staff~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~cover~~ ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~maintained~~ ~~at~~ ~~all~~ ~~times~~

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. ~~Blackmail~~

Keeping of files.

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freed to travel 6

Legal; operational + ethical -> moral problems.

[Redacted] case.

- 1) Maximum security + within Kuba only (e.g., how much does [Redacted] know?). Limitation on number of [Redacted] objectives.
- 2) One focal point for research, control, tracing, case-officer + PD selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point escalator. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.
- 3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no walk-shout PAs.

Non-attributability:

- 4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners - and limited official reference.
- 5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.
- 6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.
- 7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., Officer) has been examined.

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8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Greeks) in case of blow. CIA
21 1975
: 4 above essential.

- 9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

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11) ~~Criteria recommended.~~

~~Criteria~~

11) Former recitation personnel offer possibilities. (ARS archives)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selected.

13) ^{ally} ~~any~~ which personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) ~~What are the~~ stable in ~~the~~

15) What are limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) For Danger of standbys.

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red 1 - 25/1 - eye station
"The Magic Button"

8

Paracetols Büro ~~AS~~ ~~AS~~ ~~AS~~
"for a living" - RIS 201 cover
Carbon - Bankruptcy - no star
eyes - Jim A. / Contract structure
not a TSD problem ~~AS~~ / from U-2

Apply brakes
Last resort beyond last resort &
a confession of weakness -
- El Benefactor - assumptions -
Examples 3 "urray"

Transmittal of ~~AS~~ job. ~~AS~~
~~AS~~ - memo. ~~AS~~
~~AS~~
~~AS~~
~~AS~~

~~AS~~ Bear

REC-11
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Anesthesia -

- 26/1 - ~~AS~~ ~~AS~~ - matter -
no file Review - ~~AS~~
1. Select proper open to run -
 2. ~~AS~~ ~~AS~~ Max. of 2
 3. Security Rules B-WHM-AS-3
 4. ~~AS~~ levels Sid - Review.
 5. Last Resort - Brakes - ~~AS~~ ~~AS~~ ~~AS~~

- 6. no ~~other operations~~
 - 7. no projects or papers except for covers.
 - 8. Principal Agent - ~~G. (Mack)~~? -
~~AFI~~ Project draft XCH -
 ticket 1500 - from MB.
 Mark spot again - still at
 project - de Blake
 - 9. Disposal -
 - 10. Targets info & names -
 Must know before
 we can spot -
 - 11. Case officering
 - 12. ~~Cover file - work in progress~~
~~AS on alt. in - review~~
 - 13. ~~had charges of RT covert~~
~~action & manner of being~~
~~are planned~~
- Fd list - Remember

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