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JFK RECORDS

Cross Reference: None

Status in System:

-----  
 -----  
 AGENCY : HSCA  
 RECORD NUMBER : 180-10142-10060  
 RECORD SERIES : CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION  
 AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 22-23-02  
 Other Agency Equity: None  
 -----  
 -----

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA  
 FROM : CIA  
 TO :  
 TITLE :  
 DATE : 00/00/00  
 PAGES : 29  
 DOCUMENT TYPE : NOTES  
 SUBJECT(S) : ; CIA, FILES; HELMS, RICHARD; WC;  
 CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
 RESTRICTIONS : 3  
 CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN PART  
 DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/07/95  
 COMMENTS : Box 11

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 53080 Date: 06-01-2017
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Date in: 01/26/96

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IV

Tel Taps and Photo Surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during the initial stages of its investigation, of the existence of <sup>at CIA's</sup> telephonic and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City directed against the Cuban and Soviet Embassy / Consulate. Helms' testified:

The reason for the sensitivity of these telephone taps and surveillance was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with the Mexican authorities and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason.

[ Helms Exec Session hearing, pp 51-52, regarding Mexico <sup>Govt. of</sup> involvement see \_\_\_ ]

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations

up to the assassination and during the post-assassination period on a regular basis [cites?]  
 In addition, as of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information made available to <sup>by DCI McGeorge</sup> National Security Council? Since Mr. George Bundy, was aware that the CIA had telephone taps in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Embassy / Consulate and that through the tapes Oswald's presence ~~at~~ in Mexico City had been corroborated <sup>prior to the assassination</sup> ~~detected~~

The CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission of the surveillance operations and <sup>as he describes</sup> ~~to volunteer~~ <sup>to</sup> the Commission in the early stages of the investigation ~~with~~ the transcription of Oswald's <sup>conversations</sup> ~~with~~ <sup>and other</sup> Cuban and Soviet officials is a source of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an attitude on the Agency's part, ~~that it would~~ <sup>to</sup> unilaterally determine the substance of CIA generated information to be provided the Warren Commission. [see Scels. dep. ] This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to proceed

in its investigation with all the facts before it, even those which ~~showing~~ certain sensitive operations.   
 to the Commission.

might have meant

On January 31, 1964, The CIA provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during Sept 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum ~~did~~ made no mention of the fact that Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been tapped and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, that memorandum made no mention of the fact that the CIA had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy employee ~~Miss~~ Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico when the CIA had also tapped and transcribed.

On Feb 1, 1964 Helms' appendix before the Commission [secretive and files]   
 The [unclear] 21/1/64

On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard

④

to the CIA memorandum of January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that at least as of the letter's date the Warren Commission had no <sup>substantive</sup> knowledge of the telephone surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts, from that operation Rankin inquired on the February 10, 1964 whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in # \_\_\_ of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Commission had been informed of the telephone surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald's, the inquiry by Rankin would not have been made.

Raymond Paccia's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Paccia's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia

and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City. [Rocca-ly. p 89]

However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath <sup>precisely</sup> the point in time at which the Warren Commission learned of these operations.

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the ~~the~~ Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did not reveal the source of this information in its response to the Commission or indicate that it would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing)

continue  
& show  
in mention  
in WC memo  
to tel type

V

During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which <sup>among other issues</sup> concerned, Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tend to support the Committee's belief that Warren Commission, through Moses Slawson, Coleman, and Willers did not obtain access to <sup>CIA</sup> telephone surveillance material until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, Slawson and Willers met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City who provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy / Consulates. [Slawson memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: ]

However, ~~it~~ prior to that date it appears doubtful that <sup>the Commission</sup> had been given <sup>even partial</sup> access to the referenced material <sup>(the record)</sup> ~~on~~ March 12, 1964, ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~CIA~~ ~~staff~~ ~~at~~ ~~that~~ ~~time~~ ~~and~~ ~~therefore~~ ~~it~~ ~~is~~ ~~concluded~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~Warren~~ ~~Commission~~ had at least become aware that

7/2/64  
nevertheless



the CIA did maintain telephone surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. [Stawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: Meeting with CIA representatives]. Stawson's memorandum reveals that the Warren Commission had learned that CIA had in its possession transcripts of conversations between ~~the~~ the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas and the Cuban President Dorticos. These conversations, <sup>requestion of the Warren Commission representatives</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>at a meeting with CIA representatives, including Richard Helms</sup> ~~occurred~~ after Silva Duran's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police, ~~and~~ <sup>on that date</sup> ~~the~~ Helms responded to the Commission's request for access, indicating that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representatives' review of this material. [Stawson memo, March 12, 1964]

& concerned

It should be noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-Armas intercepts. As detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA's telephone surveil-

[c. 10] One of the <sup>other</sup> ~~other~~  
 lane activities in Mexico City. ~~the~~  
~~the~~ could well have provided  
 the Warren Commission with this  
 information. Nevertheless, Raymond  
 Lucas testimony as cited herein ~~is~~  
 dep. 3 lends <sup>some</sup> support to the  
 position that the Commission had  
 been informed of the Daticos - Armas  
 conversations through the CIA's  
 initiative.

Another  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~, Slawson  
 memorandum, dated March 25, 1964  
 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico.  
 Slawson therein stated that the  
 tentative conclusions, <sup>as</sup> related to  
 Oswald Mexico trip, that he had reached  
 were derived from CIA memoranda  
 of January 31, <sup>1964</sup> and February 19, 1964.  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ and a <sup>modification</sup> ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ <sup>Mexican police</sup>  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ <sup>summary</sup> <sup>copy</sup>  
 of interrogations <sup>conducted shortly after the assassination w/</sup> certain Cuban  
 Embassy employees. Slawson  
 wrote?

a large part of it (the summary  
 report) is simply a summation of  
 what the Mexican police learned  
 when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia  
 Duran, <sup>ESIC3</sup> a employee of the Cuban

Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police.

~~the Duran transcript~~ ~~comment~~ ~~limited release~~ ~~upon~~ <sup>indicate</sup>

The Mexican police summary <sup>moreover</sup> which is no indication that Slawson had been provided ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~transcript~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~telephone~~ ~~intercept~~ ~~transcript~~, ~~which~~ ~~was~~ ~~the~~ ~~Committee's~~ ~~belief~~ ~~that~~ Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcript is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964. [Cite] wherein he states ~~that~~ his ~~conclusion~~ conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on the occasion. This conclusion he writes is based upon an ~~analy~~ analysis of Silvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. Once again, ~~there~~ there is no indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Had Slawson been given access to ~~the~~ ~~transcript~~, his analysis ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~transcript~~ ~~should~~ ~~have~~ ~~reflected~~ ~~the~~ ~~fact~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~review~~ ~~either~~ ~~by~~ ~~its~~ ~~corrobor-~~ ~~ation~~ ~~a~~ ~~criticism~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Mexican~~ ~~police~~ ~~summary~~ ~~report~~.

that Slawson

the Duran transcript by virtue of Slawson's comment concerning the transcript but would appear that the Warren Commission as of March 25 had been provided little or no information regarding Slawson's Duran

transcripts of Slawson had access to the transcripts, and that the substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accounting of notes in his summary

As of March 25, 1964, the record demonstrates that the Warren Commission, in its effort to investigate Oswald's activities in Mexico City had not been given access to the Duran transcripts. The Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the surveillance operations and a summary police report. The Agency had been successful for over 3 months in not exposing the surveillance operations to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable to its Mexico City Station, <sup>December 29, 1964</sup>

Our present plan in passing info to Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order protect your continuing ops. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave ODACID here.  
 ( CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-759, Dec 20, 1964 CIA p 2144 )

On March 27, 1964 Slawson wrote that he had determined that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy three times. He stated that this conclusion was based upon his review of Silvia Duran's testimony to the Mexican police. [Slawson memorandum, March 27, 1964, CIA P 19727. Slawson does not state that his conclusion was also drawn from review of any of the production from the Mexico City <sup>station</sup> surveillance operation. Slawson does indicate, however, that his reasoning <sup>is an inference</sup> regarding Oswald's visits to the Cuban Embassy. Logically, access to the <sup>teletype</sup> surveillance production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy, requesting an in-transit ticket to Cuba. This American was determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. <sup>11:51 a.m.</sup> Silvia telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as Oswald is at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, on two specific occasions it is definitively established that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions.

Moreover, the specific date and exact time of his presence in the Cuban Embassy are established as the result of the telephone surveillance. And this information has been made available to Elson, the calculation of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more fully established than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transcripts could have been made available to the Warren Commission at its inception but they were not then made available.

The record supports the Committee finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the <sup>about</sup> referenced <sup>telephone</sup> ~~phone~~ <sup>intercepts</sup>. On a memorandum by Coleman and Elson, they articulate one quarter <sup>French</sup> and two requests for information from the Agency: [Ambassador Mann file memo April 2, 1964, [1975]]

1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28, telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa;

2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the intercepts, translated if possible, in all cases where the intercept refers to the ~~conversations~~ <sup>communication</sup> a related subject;

3) We would especially like to see the intercept in which the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed.

The question initially posed in the above-referenced memorandum, April 22 concerns the CIA telephone intercept of September 27, 1963 at 10:57 a. m. (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, CIA p 32, 33). Naturally, if Slawson is asked for the source of the information, he should be provided that source which in this case is the telephone intercept cited herein.

<sup>just</sup> The Column. Slawson request further-  
more clearly advised that he did not believe ~~that~~ <sup>they had</sup> been given access, at the very least, to all intercepts concerning the assassination (as is clearly corroborated by the question set forth above). In short, the request could well be interpreted to mean that they had not been given access to any of the subject material.

The second request, item no 3 of the above listing reveals that the intercept, the Datus - Arrived conclusion of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of money is discussed, has not as of April 22 been provided to the Commission. If

Commission had specifically requested the Dattus - Armas transcript at the March 12, 1964 meeting between <sup>Commission</sup> representatives and Agency representatives. E.O. 12812

On April 3, 1964, Colman and Slawson articulated their concerns for receiving complete accounts to all matters relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip. They wrote

The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no riots, conspiracies, etc., took place.

... In order to make such a judgment (that all reasonable lines of investigation that might have uncovered the motivations or possible conspiracies, have been followed through with negative results) we must be conversant with the detail of what both the American and Mexican investigatory agencies have done. This means reading their reports, after translation if necessary, and in some cases talking with the investigators themselves.

The thoroughness of investigation  
The familiarity with the detail

check  
of quoted  
language



where Coleman and Slawson were  
 cited as a vital concern to the Commis-  
 sion's investigation had been <sup>the</sup> <sup>cases</sup> <sup>by</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>CIA</sup> <sup>over</sup> <sup>concern</sup> <sup>for</sup> <sup>appear</sup>  
 of <sup>particular</sup> <sup>interest</sup> and methods, relevant  
 to the Commission's investigation,  
 to a limited number of persons, engaged  
 in an investigation of a gravity and  
 historical significance unprecedented  
 in this nation's history.

On April 9, David Slawson, Howard  
 Willens and William Coleman flew  
 to Mexico City, Mexico to meet with  
 representatives of the State Department,  
 FBI, CIA, and the government of Mexico.  
 Prior to their departure, <sup>they met with</sup> <sup>William</sup> <sup>Mann</sup>  
 Ambassador to Mexico during Oswald's  
 visit to Mexico City and at the time of  
 President Kennedy's assassination.  
 Ambassador Mann indicated to  
 the Warren Commission representatives  
 that the CIA's Mexico City station  
 was actively engaged in photovisual  
 operations against the Soviet and  
 Cuban Embassy / Consulates. [Slawson  
 memo April 22, 1964, p 3]

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico  
 City they were met by U.S. Ambassador  
 Freeman, Clare Boothe of the State  
 Department, Clarke Anderson of the

4B) and Winthrop Scott of the CIA.

That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group ~~the~~ actual transcripts of the telephone surveillance operation and English translation of the same. David Slawson wrote:

...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the source of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this. [Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p 22]

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination. Scott indicated that his staff <sup>at that point began to</sup> compile dossier on Oswald Dwan, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald [p 22]. Scott revealed

In addition to providing the group with notes, photos, etc. the Commission representatives had most of the photos of Oswald taken in Cuba & Soviet Embassy entrance.

all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents had immediately been put under surveillance following these circumstances. Simon was setup with Mexican Special, particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the Mexican Government [p 23-24]. Slawson then concludes in his memorandum:

Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown disclosed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been on Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the Embassy to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that it would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close note as possible from the

original source materials  
at some later time during or  
about [E part]

Slawson's memorandum of April 21, 1964  
reads the results of the notations  
from original source materials that  
the des following Scott's disclosure.  
These notes deal exclusively with the  
telephonic intercept pertaining to Robert  
Duran and Oswald conversations.

It is evident from Slawson's report,  
that the Agency's denial of original  
source materials, in this case the  
telephonic surveillance intercepts,  
seriously impaired the Commission's  
ability to draw conclusions regarding  
Oswald's movements in Mexico City, based  
upon the best sources available. It  
seems that as of April 10, 1964,  
during the halfway point of the  
Warren Commission investigation,  
the Commission was forced to  
retrace the factual path by which  
it had structured Oswald's activities  
in Mexico City. It further reveals  
that the Agency had provided  
ambiguous information to the Commission  
when in fact "in almost all the crucial  
points significantly more precise  
materials were available for analysis by  
the Commission. Thus, the Agency's  
early policy of not providing the Commission  
with the vitally relevant information,

details for certain circumstances  
 and methods had severely undermined  
 the investigation and possibly  
 foreclosed other investigation that  
 might have been <sup>more soundly</sup> considered had the  
 material been <sup>of value</sup> <sup>involvement</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>authorities</sup> <sup>concerned</sup> <sup>and</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>public</sup> <sup>interest</sup> <sup>in</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>matter</sup> <sup>and</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>need</sup> <sup>for</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>material</sup> <sup>to</sup> <sup>be</sup> <sup>so</sup> <sup>readily</sup> <sup>and</sup> <sup>so</sup> <sup>readily</sup> <sup>provided</sup>

photograph by the Central Intelligence Agency. Parker requested that the identity of the individual depicted in the photograph and information be available.

On that same day, in a separate letter to DCT McConel, Parker wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret Service that the CIA had disseminated several reports or communications concerning the assassination to the Secret Service some November 22, 1964. Parker requested copies of these reports and the originals.

(It should appear that <sup>not</sup> disseminated in any fashion and unbeknownst to Parker and the Commission, a copy of the material disseminated to the Secret Service was a November 26 dissemination (DIR 85/77) a copy of which was transmitted to the Secret Service.) That cable concerned the Dallas Area Conviction and disclosed the existence of a telephone surveillance operation in Mexico City at the time of the assassination and Oswald's earlier visit.

John Seals testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the eventual application given to the

3 copies  
1 that was  
with  
the  
passed  
with conviction  
believed to  
have been  
a  
from  
Oswald's  
mother.

On November 23, 1963, Margaret Oswald was shown a photograph <sup>by FBI SA [unclear]</sup> of a man bearing no resemblance to her son. This photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22, by the CIA's Mexico City Station. The photograph was a series of ~~photographs~~ of the individual man (later known as the Mexico Mystery Man) resulting from the CIA's photo surveillance operation against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies, <sup>Consulate</sup> had been ~~linked~~ <sup>linked</sup> to the assassination of Lee Harvey Oswald, as by the CIA's Mexico City Station. Robert Helms, a sworn affidavit by the Warren Commission states that the photograph shown to Margaret Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963, in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to Oswald.

On February 10, 1964 Margaret Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and described the circumstances under which she was shown the photograph. Mrs. Oswald states that she believed the photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. <sup>p 183.</sup>

Thereafter on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote to Thomas Harwood Helms assistant regarding the circumstances of the obtaining of the

after  
 had  
 searched  
 then files  
 in an effort  
 to locate  
 information  
 on Oswald

Commission of the origin of the  
photograph in question. See also  
stated

We did not initially disclose  
to the Warren Commission our  
own technical operations. On  
other words, we did not initially  
disclose to them that we had  
of the same cell as because the  
November photo we had (of  
mm) was not of Oswald. There-  
fore it did not mean anything,  
you see?

Mr. Goldsmith: ... So the Agency was  
making a unilateral decision  
that this was not relevant  
to the Warren Commission.

Seebo: Right, we were not authorized,  
at first, to reveal ~~any~~ <sup>all</sup> our  
technical operations  
[Seebo dep. p 158]

Thus, at the same point in  
time at which the Warren Commission  
was beginning to realize the need  
for access to telephone surveillance  
data (and discussed this in the preceding  
section) the source of the photographs  
development operations, through  
the source of the mm, began to  
cause concern within the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond  
Rosen wrote in an internal



memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination. Rocca outlines Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23, 1964. Rocca then states:

Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait until the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter) if it come back on this point before that you, in some form, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material with transcripts to them in copy. Incidentally, none of ~~the~~ these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier letters the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous set of photographs which are not of Oswald...

[ Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-2507

On March 12, 1964 representatives of the Warren Commission and the CIA

conferred regarding it - February 5  
12 Report for the materials forwarded  
to the Secret Service by the Agency  
[ See Rankin memo, March 12, 1964 ]  
[ See Rankin letter of March 16, 1964 and

The record indicates that the Commission at the March 12 meeting passed  
for access to the Secret Service  
materials. Rankin wrote to Helms  
on March 16 that at his understanding  
standing that the CIA would supply  
the Commission with a paraphrase  
of each report or communication pertaining  
to the Secret Service materials "with  
all indications of your confidential  
communications techniques and  
confidential sources deleted. You  
will also afford members your  
staff working in the area an  
opportunity to review the actual file  
so that they may give assurance  
that the paraphrases are complete."

( Rankin letter of March 16, 1964 #2 )  
Rankin further indicates that the  
same procedure is to be followed  
regarding any materials in the pos-  
session of the CIA prior to November  
22, 1963, which has not yet been  
furnished because of sensitive  
sources and methods.  
[ Rankin letter, March 16, #3 ]

Helms responded to Rankin's  
March 16 letter on March 24 [ DDP 4-  
1554, CD 631 & DDP 4-1555, CP 674 ]  
by two separate communications.  
CD 631 provides the Commission

with a copy of the October 10, 1963  
 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept, -  
 NS + Navy Dept (SS on 22 Nov). regarding Lee Harvey  
 Oswald and his presence at the Soviet  
 Consulate in Mexico City. The report  
 further revealed that on October 23, 1964,  
 CIA had requested two copies of its  
 most recent photograph of Oswald  
 in order to check the identity of the  
 person believed to be Oswald in  
 Mexico City. Furthermore, the CIA  
 stated that <sup>it had determined that the</sup> photograph  
 shown to Marguerite <sup>Oswald</sup> on November  
 22, 1963 did not refer to Lee Harvey  
 Oswald by checking the photograph  
 against the press photograph of  
 Oswald generally available on November  
 23, 1963.

CD 674 reveals that on November  
 22, 1963 immediately following the  
 assassination and on November  
 23, 1963 three cabled reports were  
 received at CIA Headquarters from  
 the CIA Mexico City Station regarding  
 photographs of an unidentified man  
 who had visited the Cuban and  
 Soviet Embassies during October and  
 November 1963. Paragraphs of these  
 cables, not including sensitive areas  
 and methods were attached to CD 674.  
 The Agency further states that the

⑤

subject of the photo referenced in  
the cable from Oswalds.

It is further stated that.

check  
your

" In regard to our meeting  
of 12 March and your memo  
of 16 March, Stern and  
Wallen will review at  
Langley the original copies  
of these 3 dissemination  
to the Secret Service and  
the cable in which they  
were based, as well as the  
photo of the unidentified  
man. [CIA P 116444]  
+ notes

Begin w/ Cot... unhappy 1 3/26

Also find out if  
this involves tel.  
surveillance  
or just  
concerned w/  
photo operation

On March 26, William Colman wrote in a memorandum for the record the CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin (Commission Document No 631) <sup>March 24, 1964</sup> in which it set forth the dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us the additional information we requested.

Colman went on to state:  
As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the assassination. I hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 (CP 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to the inquiry.

The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and Agency representatives, Samuel Stein of the Commission visited CIA Headquarters

in Langley, Virginia.

Starn memorandum revealed that he reviewed Oswald's file with Raymond Posen. Starn indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren Commission by the CIA.

- The file also contained:
- 1) Cable reports <sup>of November 22 & November 23</sup> from the CIA's Mexico City Station relating to the photographs of the unidentified individual mentioned above to be Lee Harvey Oswald and the report on those cables furnished on November 23, 1963 to the Secret Service by the CIA.

Starn noted that the message was accurately paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674, provided the Warren Commission on March 24, 1964.

- 2) Starn also reviewed the Oct 19, 1963 cable from CIA's Mexico City Station to the CIA Headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. He also reviewed the Oct 10, 1963 cable from CIA Headquarters to the Mexico City Station regarding background information on Oswald.

Starn noted that the messages were also paraphrased accurately.

a reported in the CIA's <sup>January 31 memo to</sup> Oswald's Mexico City trip <sup>the Warren Commission</sup> <sub>reporting</sub>.

<sup>Further</sup> Stern noted that Rosen provided him for his review a computer printout of the reference to Oswald documents located in the Agency's electronic data storage system. He stated "There is no item listed on the printout which the Warren Commission has not been given by either in full text or a photograph. This, by the 27<sup>th</sup> of March a Warren Commission report had been approved of the circumstances surrounding the magazine photograph ~~of Oswald's~~ ~~photograph~~." ~~of Oswald's~~

review CD's 631+674 to determine exactly what content of cables was