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THE SLUME

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT:

Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

- 1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.
- 2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.
- 3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.
- 4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).



- 5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.
- 6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.
- 7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Acting Deputy Director
for Plans