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TO : ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

TITLE : CONTACT OF LEE OSWALD WITH A MEMBER OF SOVIET KGB

ASSASSINATION DEPARTMENT

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ASSASSINATION DEPARTMENT

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23 November 1963

SX-25550

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director, Plans

FROM:

Acting Chief ED BARRINGTION

SUBJECT:

Contact of Lee OSWALD with a member of Soviet KCB

Assassination Department

1. According to an intercepted phone call in Mexico City, Lee OSWALD was at the Soviet Embassy there on 28 September 1963 and spoke with the Consul, Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. This was learned when OSWALD called the Soviet Embassy on 1 October, identifying himself by name and speaking broken Russian, stating the above and asking the guard who answered the phone whether there was "anything new concerning the telegram to Washington." The guard checked and then told OSWALD that a request had been sent, but nothing had as yet been received. (MEXI 6453, 9 October 1963) The FBI liaison officer, Mr. Pappich, told me on 23 November that the Bureau has reason to believe that OSWALD's visit was to get Soviet support for a U.S. passport or visa matter perhaps the new passport mentioned in the press articles.

2. KOSTIKOV is an identified KCB officer. He was a case officer in an operation which is evidently sponsored by the KCB's 13th Department (responsible for sabotage and assessination). This operation, which is controlled by the FBI under the cryptonym TUMBLEWEED, involved a German-national resident of Oklahoma who was recruited in Europe, and met this year with KOSTIKOV in Mexico City and shortly thereafter with a known 13th Department officer, Oleg BRYKIN, in New York. The instructions given TUMBLEWEED of the two officers, (pinpointing objectives for sabotage) and the alternations of the same KGB component, the 13th.

3. Of course it is not usual for a KCB agent on a sensitive mission to have such overt contact with a Soviet Embassy. However, we have top secret Soviet intelligence documents, describing Military Intelligence doctrine, which show that very important agents can be met in official installations using as cover for their presence there some sort of open business: Vice Admiral

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for FOIA Review on . APR

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L. BEKRENEV, in a top secret lecture to a Soviet Military Intelligence course at Military-Diplomatic Academy, 1960, said,

"Case officers who usen Soviet Trade Representation, TASS or Sovintormbur assignments as backstopping for non-c andestine meetings with certain agents whose particular activities officially associate them with the previously mentioned Soviet institutions. However, such non-clandestine meetings within a legal residency should be restricted to a minimum both as to place and time. Meetings of this type should be carried out only in exceptional cases with tested and reliable agents in order to avoid provocation by the local counterintelligence service against the Soviet installation being used as cover. Such meetings are held as a rule in the work offices of the case officer or of the agent during working hours. It is necessary that such meetings be conducted naturally, that they do not attract the attention of outsiders, and that the receipt and transmittal of intelligence matters, properly camouflaged, be carried out discreetly. In setting up such meetings, measures against tapping must be taken. One must bear in mind that a meeting with persons outside official premises and during non-working hours usually signifies a relationship between the two parties that is above and beyond official matters

Also, such contact in official Installations have being used by the agent's own carelessness. Again Admiral BEKREVEY speaks:



"Some agents, because of interpretate or because of deliberate violation of the rules of security through peculiar personal rashness,... approached our case officers at places not stipulated as operational meeting sites, others telephoned the case officer at his Soviet installation and discussed personal contact arrangements, while others still showed up personally at the Soviet installation in order to contact the case officer."

4. I called the above connections to the attention of Mr. Pappich by phone to his FBI office at 1030 hours on 23 November.

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restincy, who was supplied to the soviet small to the Soviet small

Valeriy Yladinirovich KOSTIEGY (201-305052)

A fluent Spanish special to had thavelled abroad at least three these before this permanent resignment; moreover, in 1959 MOSTIKOV applied for a visa to accompany Premier Bikita Sergeyo-vich KHRUSECHEV's party to the United States as an official of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but we have no record of his having come to this country at that time. KOSTIKOV served as an interpreter at international conferences at Madrid and Barcelona in 1958 and 1959. In late 1959 and early 1960 he attended Soviet exhibitions in Mexico City and Mayana; ha is known to have been in Suba from 6 January to 7 March 1960 (Accounts to find the physical description of KOSTIKOV salte accountely fits

The physical description of KOSTIKOV quite accurately fits that of a Soviet case officer who nearly a year ago met in Hexico an FSI-controlled double agent. This double agent's Soviet case officer in the United States has been Cleg Danile-vich BEYKIS of the Thirteenth Department, KGB First Chief Directorate, occupying the overt position of translator-traines, U.H. Secretariat, New York City. BRYKIN was stationed in New York City from December 1960 to July of this year.

Since arriving in Mexico, KOSTIKOV is known to have travelled three times outside the capital: In March 1963 and again for the first two weeks of September he went to Tijuana, Emsenada, and Mexicali, estensibly for the purpose of purchasing cotton. The U.S. Department of State, however, has reported that during these trips KOSTIKOV mot local representatives of Movimento Liberation Mational and Central Compesing Independienta, both large Communist from organizations. In addition, according to PHI sources, KOSTIKOV and additions. In addition, according to Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYAM, the top factor on the September trip by Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYAM, the top factor of Englands neveral persons including Communist my paraticipal of the September had been exsociated with Soviet of September attioned in Mexico City.

ALFERIEV, a PRAVDA correspondent legistatio, was in close contact with Cuban diplomata and local communist leaders during a February 1962 visit to Quito.

11/29/63 check at NSA showed byeld flate Diseated from Tysiana dates 10/10/63 which stated south en who have refloited embed will CET 4 MLN later raid the way is wrow, air This was no record of ship must of exposibales of entire.

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SUBJECT: