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The following is a retyped copy of an illegible copy in the ZRNICK (1963) Vol I File. (BOX 10, Job # 75-752).

Periodic Activity Report
962 L

Date: ?
Presumably Dec 1963.

B. PAMELA

In addition to the regular bi-weekly schedules held on 10 and 24 November, a special schedule was held on 29 November, as was done in the case of AMAPOLA.

Among various matters dealt with in the message transmitted on 10 November, one, in particular, was of high interest/ This was the request for a man to be chosen to handle communications in cases of emergency, inasmuch as it would be more difficult to accomplish this as "the struggle worsens." An exhaustive report on all aspects of counterrevolutionary groups and activities was also requested of the agent.

On 24 November (1963), as in the case of AMAPOLA, a special code was set up to enable "A--CH" (illegible) to report by cable directly to drops in Cuba on the situation in Puerto Rico after the assassination of President Kennedy. "SANTOS", the agent ~~xxx~~ who actually receives all messages transmitted to PAMELA was to contact "AB--N" (illegible) and have him report on the development of any of the following situations: (I) - if a contingent of "GUSANO" Cubans

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has arrived there; (2) - if mobilization of resident "GUSANO" Cubans is noticed; (3) if mobilization of U.S. forces is noticed; (4) - if the Cubans who arrived and those who were there before have "developed circulation;" (5) - if activities of repressive organs against popular forces have increased. A special transmission was scheduled for the following Thursday at the same time.

As there were no adverse developments in the situation after the President's death, this subject was not dealt with in the special transmission made on 29 November (1963).

C. ROBERTO

(Para 3) On 25 November the agent was asked to report on the reaction to the assassination of President Kennedy by governmental, right-wing and left-wing circles. The agent was also ~~XXXX~~ asked to report of the status of plans of aggression against Cuba.

A. AMAPOLA CUIS AGENT IN THE U.S.

(Para 5) Cuban authorities were obviously concerned about reactions and possible repercussions against Cuba as a result of President Kennedy's assassination. In the message of 24 November a special code was set up for the agent by which he could report by cable to Havana any unusual activities such as "YANKEE" concen-

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trations, mercenary concentrations, increase in repression of Cuban and leftist sympathizers, and any disappearance of active counterrevolutionaries. In addition a special schedule was set up for Wednesday, 27 November. The purpose of this schedule was undoubtedly to pass special instructions to the agent in case developments arising after the assassination adversely affected Cuba. A full report via Candi*** (probably in secret writing) was requested on the reaction of the "GUSANOS" (Cuban exiles) and the Republicans to Kennedy's death. -----

***For information on Candi and a possible ~~identification~~ identification of Candi, refer to the Cuban teltaps. The taps show that the wife (~~Marta~~ Marta) of a known DGI officer, Oscar CONCEPCION Mendoza made the following statement: Tell LLAGOSTERA to tell Oscar not to forget the Candy. This statement is decidedly non-sequitor in the context of the conversation.

18 OCT 1976
 (MEMO ON CONCEPCION
 2 (SLIPARKE-1))

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PERIODIC ACTIVITY

Report

96 v L

V. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. GENERAL

Regularly scheduled clandestine voice broadcasts continue to be made to agents ANTONIA, RAFAEL and ANTONIO. The only other message noted in voice broadcasts was "TRIGS LINE" message.

DATE

Dec 65

2. ANTONIA

In the transmission of 3 November, the agent control section in Havana requested that the agent was using international in his secret writing messages for which he paid in New York and was receiving in Havana. Information was requested on one "TRIGS" in order to determine the name (in Cuba) in which he was located.

On 10 November, the agent was told that the plan to deliver \$3,000.00 to the agent (see message transmitted on 3 October 1963) in New York had been cancelled. The plan is now to be delivered personally, supposedly in Toronto, Canada, after 20 January 1964. The agent was instructed to acknowledge receipt of the book "TRIGS LINE" which was sent to agent, and of his letter drops (see message transmitted on 20 October), by sending a cable message "TRIGS is well." Personal and family information regarding his New York drop and his wife also included. This was done (Jama), his son Felix, and grandchildren, Maria, Alfonso, Consuelo, and Ernesto. This information was to aid the agent in writing extensive overt texts as a security measure in covering the secret writing indicated in New letters.

On 17 November, the agent was instructed to befriend Domingo Carrizo with the ultimate aim of recruiting him for the cause of the revolution. Carrizo works in an office at 57 N. W. Taylor (actual address - 2007 West Flagler Street, Miami) and handles matters such as uniforms, visas, and taxes. The agent was instructed to proceed very cautiously with the matter, guarding his true objective, and to find out all that he could about the subject. Carrizo reportedly is devoted to helping the revolution and has access to information. His wife, Estela, was also labeled a "PROGRESSIVE." Light, a request was made for plain text values of international that the agent was using which were not held by official. Information was to proceed on the latest activities of Domingo Carrizo.

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~~TOP SECRET [DWAR] TRIG~~

The Agent was cautioned not to use secret writing, or discuss important matters, when writing to Garcia until further notice. Garcia was moving and the agent was instructed not to write to her any more. As a point of interest, regarding Juan Luis Garija, the office in which he works is shared with the "Blanco Driving School." The owner of this enterprise is a Cuban named Roberto Blanco. On the evening of 27 November, a stick of dynamite was placed on the ledge of the large window in the front of the office. According to newspaper accounts of the incident, the window was damaged and the furniture inside was slightly damaged as a result of the explosion. He was not present in the office at the time, and it is not known if the act was committed against Garija or the owner of the driving school.

Cuban authorities were obviously concerned about reactions and possible repercussions against Cuba as a result of President Kennedy's assassination. In the message of 24 November, a special code was set up for the Agent by which he could report by cable to Havana any unusual activities such as "YAVITA" concentrations, literary concentrations, increase in repression of Cuban and leftist sympathizers, and any disappearance of active revolutionaries. In addition, a special schedule was set up for Wednesday, 27 November. The purpose of this schedule was undoubtedly to pass special instructions to the Agent in case developments arising after the assassination adversely affected Cuba. A full message via Canal (probably in secret writing) was requested on the morning of the 27th (Cuban office) and the department in Havana's death. Havana acknowledged receipt of the instructions it had been lacking. Additional information of Garija was also included. He was born two months ago in Cuba, his home address is "1505 N.E. Street (AIG)" and his telephone number is 28-26-21. He has two married sisters, one named Lily who was killed for a Miami divorce suit, and one named Mary who was killed for being a "YAVITA."

The special transmission mentioned in the preceding paragraph was made at the regular hour and on the usual frequency. Its message was not enclosed and the text clearly stated that there was nothing to be transmitted to the Agent on that day.

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In DATA

In addition to the regular biweekly sessions held on 10 and 24 November, a special subschedule was held on 29 November, as was done in the case of A-SPYLA.

Among various matters dealt with in the sessions transacted on 10 November, one, in particular, was of high interest. This was the decision for a call to be placed to Havana communication in case of emergency, inasmuch as it would be very difficult to accept this as "an strategic measure." An administrative report on all aspects of counter-revolutionary groups and activities was also requested of the agent.

On 24 November, as in the case of A-SPYLA, a special call was set up to enable "A-SPYLA" to report by cable directly to Diego in Cuba on the situation in Puerto Rico after the consolidation of Executive Agency. "A-SPYLA", the agent who actually receives all messages transmitted to Havana, was in contact "A-SPYLA" and gave his report on the development of any of the following situations: (1) - if a contingent of "CIAA" Cubans had arrived there; (2) - if utilization of personnel "CIAA" Cubans is noticed; (3) - if utilization of U.S. funds is noticed; (4) - if the Cubans who arrived had those who were there before have "developed circulation"; (5) - if activities of revolutionary organs against popular fronts have increased. A special transmission was conducted for the following Saturday at the same time.

As there were no adverse developments in the situation after the President's death, this report was not dealt with in the special transmission made on 29 November. Instead, political matters were covered in this message. The Dominican, Justo Milnes, of the PR party, was allowed to present himself at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. Jose B. Melendez, of the PSP (party), was not given clearance (to do the same) until the matter was discussed with the also, because no exact date was held on file. The matter of Marie de la S. Alvarez was approved and the agent was to indicate the route and date of the trip. The agent was requested to purchase \$200.00 worth of internal revenue stamps from Santa Fe, in denominations of \$0.50. Marie was to repay the agent (A-SPYLA) for this expenditure. Agents was to communicate all the foregoing matters in detail to Puerto, so that they might be discussed fully in New York.

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11. MESSAGES

This agent traveled to an unclassified country from San Jose, Costa Rica to meet "our man" from Havana. While he was away on this trip, a busy message of thirty groups length was transmitted on two of his regular schedules. The first of these messages was transmitted on his regular schedule for 4 November. The next busy message was also transmitted on his next regular schedule on 11 November. The purpose of these busy messages was to cover the absence of the agent and make it appear that normal communications were being maintained with the agent during this time.

On 11 November, this agent was again passed to this agent. During this meeting, certain messages for a report on the trip. The agent was also asked to report on the situation and the possibilities of a coup d'etat (country unspecified). The cryptic phrase "cavalry is pending" (HAVA IN PLAIN ENGLISH) was included in the text without further explanation. The meaning of this phrase is unknown. However, as Havana obviously did not know when the agent was returning to Costa Rica, he was advised that if he received the message and was passed to L. Rivero, he was to disregard it, as it was not valid.

On 15 November, the agent was asked to report on the situation in the assassination of President Kennedy by a far-left, right-wing, and left-wing circles. The agent also asked to report on the status of plans of aggression against Cuba.

12. WIRE LINE MESSAGES

The only voice transmission intercepted other than the three regular and established activities noted in the previous sections were those which used the callup "TRIGS WIRE 100-100." On 11 November, at 1700Z, a 60 group message was transmitted on the primary frequency of 7.122 Mc, and repeated on the secondary frequency of 7.130 Mc. Normal communication procedure was utilized, with the exception that no sign off was used on the secondary transmission. If hearing were taken from the station and they resulted in showing the transmitter in the general Havana area.

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~~TOP SECRET (S) TRIG~~

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later on 21 November, at 1500Z-1600Z, a 47 group message was transmitted with the same calling. Again, normal procedure was followed, with the exception that there was a sign off at the secondary transmission. On 23 November at 1500Z-1600Z a 71 group message was transmitted on the primary frequency of 714.500 and repeated on the secondary frequency of 714.500. Again, no sign off was noted in the secondary transmission. On 25 November, at 1500Z-1600Z, an 81 group message was transmitted on the primary frequency of 714.500 and repeated on the secondary frequency of 714.500. As in prior instances, no sign off was noted at the end of the secondary transmission. The messages appear to be valid, but attempts to recover the system full keys have been unsuccessful as of this time. The nature of operation tends to identify this activity as being a voice component of CUI/UCI, a warning net which locally has operated on several occasions. (This net is covered in another section of the writing on clandestine activities) This activity does not appear to have any connection with past activity using the calling "714.500 1015." As can be noted, the transmitting calls are different.

B. 115

Additional information from NSA indicates that one or other clandestine voice transmission was during the month. This was the single callout "115" asking for a readability check, with no specific delay period. This transmission was made on 30 November at 0100Z on 714.500.

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