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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10309-10008

### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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MICROFILMED  
MAR 16 1965  
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17.	RID/FI	FILE TITLE	19-603-2/2
TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)	19-6-84/3
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		DOCUMENT NUMBER	UFGA-11829



Discussions with Headquarters personnel were held on 5 and 6 September, during which AMICE-27 continued to stick to exactly the same story which he had given during his JMWAVE debriefings. These discussions also covered the future direction and scope of the AMTRUNK project. No concrete meeting of minds between KUBARK officers and AMICE-27 was obtained during these two days. It was agreed that the discussions would continue in the JMWAVE area.

On late 6 September, AMICE-27 proceeded alone to New York City to contact Dr. Raul TRILLO Gomez, former comandante in the Rebel Army and personal physician of AMTHUG-1, to ask him to come to the JMWAVE area for discussions with AMTRUNK-9 and KUBARK officers on the general AMTRUNK concept. At the same time, PEGGINS and Willard R. NAUMAN from Headquarters returned to the WAVE area. On 7 September AMICE-27 accompanied by TRILLO arrived in that area. Discussions continued in the safehouse during 7 and 8 September.

At the same time, preparations were going forward to infiltrate AMTRUNK-9 and to exfiltrate AMFAUNA-1, -3 and -34. AMICE-14 was to be acting team leader for this operation, accompanied by the two team guides, AMTRUNK-7 and -8. Late on 8 September AMICE-27 escorted TRILLO to the airport for his return to New York. Several hours later the infiltration team consisting of AMICE-14, AMTRUNK-7, -8 and -9 were loaded on board the M/V Neptune for their infiltration scheduled for the following evening, 9 September. The infiltration of AMTRUNK-9 and the exfiltration of four AMFAUNAs (AMFAUNA-13 was included in the exfiltration party at the last moment) went off very smoothly. Attached herewith as Attachment A is AMICE-14's log of this operation. Due to the fact that the infiltration area was rolled up because of an exile refugee infil in the same area, AMICE-14 decided to clear the area one night earlier than scheduled. He therefore headed straight for Marathon, arriving the following morning within one mile of that town. At this point he had the misfortune to run out of gas, to be picked up by the Coast Guard, and to be towed into the town dock where the boat was greeted by police, newspaper photographers and tourists. This created considerable stir but the team was eventually picked up from local authorities by the case officer without any team identities becoming known. Through liaison with two local newspapers, all photographs showing identifiable team member faces were suppressed and obtained for Station files. The rather spectacular nature of the AMTRUNK re-entry at Marathon somewhat obscured the precise, professional manner in which the team had carried out its assigned task during the entire mission, including the feat of sailing a 16' Boston Whaler with seven persons aboard across some 120 miles of ocean.

During the latter half of the reporting period considerable discussion continued between the case officers and AMICE-27 as to the future direction of the operation. AMICE-27 continued to hold out for very grandiose schemes. In essence he wanted carte blanche to recruit more infil-exfil agents, to organize an amorphous Rebel Army group in exile, to recruit, train and dispatch PM teams for resistance and sabotage on the inside, to establish a commando unit on the outside, and to run a propaganda program beamed from PBPRIME into Cuba. At one point in these discussions the COS, JMWAVE, was introduced to AMICE-27 and laid out the general parameters as to the Station's interest in AMICE-27's ideas. By the end of the reporting period we had been able to reduce AMICE-27 again to a manageable size and were proceeding to spot and recruit two candidates for the next AMTRUNK infiltration and to work out a propaganda program to be handled by the Station's

PW Branch beamed at the Cuban Rebel Army. During the reporting period two S/W messages were received from AMTRUNK-11 and S/W messages were sent to AMTRUNK-10, AMTRUNK-11 (2) and AMTRUNK-12. One OWVL message was sent to AMTRUNK-9.

Transmitted herewith are several other attachments to help bring the record of AMTRUNK activities up to date. Attachment B is the account of the August infiltration as written by AMICE-27. In this account, "Leon" is AMICE-27, "David" is AMICE-14. Attachment C is a more thorough debriefing of the AMICES on their initial contacts on the inside. Attachment D lists the main operational contacts of AMTRUNK-10, as obtained from debriefing AMICE-14 and 27. Attachment E is a paper written by AMICE-27 attempting to outline his ideas, following the discussions held in ZRMETAL. AMTRUNK-1 told PEGGINS that this paper was originally about twelve pages long, but that he had helped AMICE-27 cut it down. A-1 didn't think much of the paper, just as he professes not to think much of AMICE-27's ideas. In this regard it would appear that AMTRUNK-1 has been of help to the case officers in that he, too, has been deflating A-27's balloon since the latter's ZRMETAL trip.

## 2. INTELLIGENCE REPORTING

UFG-3596, 11 September 1963, Unexplained Presence of Soviets at Playa Menendez & Presence of Hungarian Agricultural Advisors at Finca Hatuey, Matanzas Province.

UFG-3608, 12 September 1963, Militia Outposts and Patrols in the Area of the Coastal Keys North of the Bahia de Santa Clara, Matanzas Province.

## 3. OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES

### Salaries

AMICE-27	\$350.00
AMICE-14	\$250.00
AMTRUNK-7	\$200.00
AMTRUNK-8	\$200.00
	<u>\$1,000.00</u>

Expenses (safehouse and operational including AMICE-27 ZRMETAL and New York City trip): \$493.87

Mileage : \$126.00  
GRAND TOTAL : \$1,619.87

### Pesos

AMICE-14	P 700.00
AMTRUNK-9	<u>P 2,000.00</u>
Peso Total :	P 2,700.00

4. PROJECTED PLANS

During the month of October, it is planned to process and debrief the two new candidates for infiltration, AMTRUNK-13 and -14, to prepare them to begin FI and tradecraft training during the latter part of the month. Continued planning for the propaganda campaign, to be directed against the Rebel Army, will be carried on during the month of October. In addition, further progress on the formation of a political platform is expected during the coming month. Other possibilities which will be explored with AMICE-27 and -14 are the infiltration of one or several radio operators to shore up the system of communications with the internal AMTRUNK assets and the formation of one action team to be infiltrated for an indefinite period.

*Carded  
E.D.*

END OF DISPATCH

*19-607-242-14-6-84/3*

14 September 1963

LOG OF SEPTEMBER OPERATION

29 (3)

1. We were left 2.7 miles from La Empalizada on the 9th of September at 2210 hours. We arrived at the Tolo gulch at 0130 on the 10th, finding Isaac Moreno fishing at the entrance; we sent a message with him to Tony (Antonio Diaz) and Cando (Candido Diaz) so as to make contact as soon as possible and at the same time we obtained information on the area.

*should be AMTRUNK-0 (see attach. p. 1)*

2. Tony and Cando arrived at 2000 hrs. on the 10th. We received more information on the area and we agreed with them on the hour and place where Jose Lopez (AMTRUNK-10) would be picked up. They took David (AMICE-14) and Carlos (AMTRUNK-7) in the boat, to dry land, leaving Tomas (AMTRUNK-8) in charge of the boat with Jose.

3. David and Carlos arrived at Antonio Garcia's house at 2400 hours on the 10th, and Antonio agreed to take Luis (Luis Garcia, his brother) to the place indicated by David and Carlos, where they would wait for the exfiltrees.

4. Luis arrived at 0600 hours on the 11th, agreeing to go to the point where Julio, Richard and Hortensia (the AMFAUNA exfiltrees) would be picked up, having been informed of the place, time and countersign as well as the place to where they were to be taken as soon as they arrived. It was also agreed that on his return he would take Jose Lopez, who would be picked up by car at 0530 on the 12th at a point already agreed upon with Cando Diaz.

5. At 0800 on the 11th David and Carlos returned to the boat.

6. At 2000 on the 11th David, Carlos, Tomas and Jose took the boat to dry land, landing at 2100 hrs. on the 11th. At 2230 hrs. on the 11th we made contact with Luis and the group of exfiltrees, leaving Jose with Luis to infiltrate.

7. At 2300 hrs. on the 11th we began leaving the area of infil by boat. At 0230 hrs. on the 12th we arrived at the mouth of La Empalizada, beginning our trip towards the U.S. We arrived in the U.S. at 1130 hrs. on the 12th of September.

8. Information from September infiltration:

- a. According to information submitted by the fisherman Isaac Moreno, a helicopter was seen searching the area on 9 September.
- b. On the 11th and 12th planes flew over the area constantly about every two hours.

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*8 Oct 63 Att A*

*19-603-2/b 19-6-24/3*

*att #1 to UFGA 11209*



- c. On the 10th two boats, armed, sailed through the bahia of Santa Clara.
- d. On the 12th two boats, 19 ft. and 28 ft., entered La Palma river at 11 o'clock and left at 14 hrs.
- e. The militia searched the land and embankment around Rio la Palma on the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th.
- f. All the planes flew at about 2000 ft. They were single engine and twin motor planes but no other identifying marks could be observed.
- g. Conclusion: These searches were due to the fact that a boat from Miami had come to pick up some 30 persons. One of these had abandoned his car in the canal of "San Mateo". This boat was under the command of Juan Manuel MILIAN. (At some time during this period, this boat and its occupants were picked up by the GOC and MILIAN was caught.)

OPERATIONAL REPORT

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AMICE-24 AMICE-14 AMTRUNK-7 and -8 48

The group formed by Leon, David and 2 others, left from Florida at dawn of 11 August on the mothership "Kilo", towing the boat to be used in the infiltration, which we will call "Pedro".

The mother ship went near the banks of Cay Sal, anchoring and remaining there until mid-afternoon. We proceeded in examining "Pedro", finding that the drain corks were out of place and that there was approximately 5 inches of water in the boat. We took out the water and put the corks in their places. We tried out the main motor and placed the gasoline tanks under the seat of the helmsman and under the lateral seats (total of 3).

At sundown, "Kilo" went towards the destination point, arriving at about 10 p.m. to the chosen point, that is, approximately 2 miles north of the narrow channel called Empalizada. Here we installed the remaining gas tanks, the silent motor and the equipment. We left for the entrance of the channel using the silent motor which, due to poor functioning in the intake of gasoline, stopped several times, so we decided to use the main motor.

After an exploration necessary to locate the channel again, because the boat drifted while we were stopped, we entered it and followed the pre-established route. We only encountered two boats which were quite far away, at the entrance of the Santa Clara bay. Once there, we went to the Concunil lagoons where we ran into a white fishing boat with a sail mast (it was later proved that it belonged to a militia informer), so we decided to go to the nearest point of the entrance to firm land, through the so-called Three Towers lagoon (Tres Torres), which joins the Santa Clara Bay by the narrow channel called Lolo. In this place, an entrance was selected (away from the principal lagoon). This entrance was approximately as wide as the boat, and its shores were covered with high and thick mangroves that covered the boat pretty well. As an additional precaution, we used them to camouflage the boat by making a roof for it. The boat was located in the middle of a mangrove swamp without firm land, approximately 1.5 kms from the Santa Clara Bay and 2 kms from firm land.

In the afternoon of the 13th, the entrance of a fishing boat was detected. It had a motor of the type called "planta" (1 cylinder 12 h.p.), about 18 feet long, with a 3 member crew, and also a small "chopin" type boat (punt or dory), which the fishermen usually use for their work in that area. The owner of the boat identified himself as Isaac MORENO who was accompanied by his father, Feliciano MORENO and by a nephew. Since these people were known to us, we approached them and upon learning that they were willing to help us in our activities, they were asked to fish that day, and go to their departure point, which was Menendez beach, where they were to contact Oscar DIAZ and send him to the lagoon. The exact location of our boat was not revealed to them.

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MAR 16 1965

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ATT B

*14 Aug*  
 The next morning, a fishing boat, about 20 feet long, with motor, towing a "chapin" entered the lagoon. On it were Oscar DIAZ, Antonio DIAZ (his son) and Candido DIAZ, who were the people we had sent for. We explained the cooperation needed from them and how to carry out the activities that would be entrusted to them. They happily accepted everything and showed their willingness to cooperate in every way they could.

Through them we sent two messages. Candido DIAZ would go to Cardenas and would talk to Pedro BARBI to arrange for our transportation from the area to Havana; and Antonio DIAZ would arrange our landing on firm land, to the houses of Antonio GARCIA or Francisco GARCIA and move us to Itabo or Marti.

The boat carrying Antonio DIAZ and Candido DIAZ returned to the lagoon after having established contacts with Fermin GONZALEZ Fernandez. Using the "chapin" towed by the boat, Leon, David and one of the guides that accompanied us from the exterior, moved to the end of the mangroves, where the swamp area begins, adjacent to an abandoned salt pit. The three men went to the farm of Antonio GARCIA where at dawn they were to be picked up by a chauffeur known as Mako, who passes through that area as he has relatives living there.

*(15 Aug)*  
 We arrived at that farm at 5:30 a.m., time agreed upon, but due to an interpretation error, the car didn't arrive until after 7 in the morning and didn't stop at the agreed place, so the three persons above mentioned went back to where the boat was hidden and waited to establish a new contact. The next afternoon Juan PEREZ came to the lagoon saying that he had prepared a new trip for nightfall.

*15 Aug*  
 During the crossing of the lagoons, we met a "chapin" manipulated by Juan Manuel and Luis Garcia, the latter a brother of Antonio Garcia. The car was to come to Antonio's farm, and he offered himself to be used as permanent contact point, as he was moving with his wife to that farm within the next 10 days, in an independent house that would not have dogs.

The group formed by Leon, David and the guide arrived at the farm at nightfall, where they were received by Antonio Garcia. Moments later the car arrived and the infiltrees went to a mechanic's workshop located in the town of Itabo, where Fermin worked. On the patio of the mentioned workshop, away from public sight, the infiltrees switched to Fermin's car, in which they were taken to the Guipuzcoa sugar factory, to the house of Esmeraldo MONTALVO, nicknamed "Aldo". Aldo is a negro taxi driver who usually travels out of the area. Besides the mentioned chauffeur and the infiltrees, there was also a cousin of the driver, Angel, also a negro.

*15 Aug*  
 The departure for Havana was at 9 p.m.; the trip was made without any incidents, without searches or checks or any type of vigilance on the highway.

that the UCAL had been working jointly with the UR but that the UCAL at this time is practically out of business.

6. AMTRUNK-9

Asked if he had ever seen Fidel since February 1959, A-9 said that he had not, although Fidel had twice asked him to come see him and he had declined. Under questioning, A-9 said that he has never been arrested by the G-2 at any time. However, he said that he was accused in 1960 along with Sori Marin, of anti-government activities but was not picked up. He said that he has been investigated by the G-2 and interrogated by them although not actually arrested. The last time apparently that he was investigated openly by the G-2 was in 1960. He states however, that he is under surveillance from time to time and his house has been staked out from time to time by the G-2. He says that he knows one G-2 Captain fairly well; an individual by the name of Juan De la Pena, alias Boris. He says that the alias comes from the fact that De la Pena looks like Boris Karloff.

19-6-84/3


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27 September 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contacts of AMTRUNK-10

SOURCE : AMICE-14 and AMICE-27



1. The following are the most significant contacts of AMTRUNK-10 as discussed with AMTRUNK-10 by AMICE-27 and -14 during their August 63 infiltration. The background information on these individuals comes from personal knowledge of both AMICES.

A. Rolando CUBELA Secades, Subject of 201-252234

CUBELA was born in 1933, in Placetas, Las Villas Province. His mother and father are divorced. He has one sister, no brothers. AMICE-14 met CUBELA while both students at Havana University. CUBELA was in his 6th year of medical school (med school is 7 straight years) when he assassinated fnu BLANCO Rico, Chief of SIM, in 1956. This assassination was accomplished with the help of two compatriots of CUBELA's in the Directorio Revolucionario, one CARBO Servia (shot shortly thereafter for his part in the affair) and Jose FERNANDEZ Cossio, who drove the getaway car. CUBELA hid out in Havana for about 4 months while being actively sought by Batista police (c HOMON) and then fled to the United States where he, Faure CHAUMONT, AMICE-14 and several others shared a home.

In January 1958, CUBELA re-infiltrated into Cuba with the 21-man "Directorio Expeditionary Force" under the command of Faure CHAUMONT. CUBELA was 2nd-in-command. The group infiltrated at Nuevitas, Camaguey Province. CHAUMONT split from the group at Nuevitas and proceeded to Havana to organize the underground while CUBELA took the rest of the group to the Escambray. CUBELA remained in the Escambray for the rest of the war.

After the revolution was accomplished, CUBELA returned to medical school in 1959. AMICE-14 comments that with his war record and his position as President of the University of Havana Student Association (which includes all 13 colleges of the university), none of the professors were disposed to give him anything but passing marks. CUBELA finished med school in 1961.

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In 1962, CUBELA was an intern at Mercedes Hospital in Havana and now, according to AMICE-14, is in private practice. AMICE-14 says that CUBELA has no official position in the government but that he is quite influential because of his close ties with Jose Antonio NARANJO Morales aka "Pepin", Mayor of Havana; Faure CHAUMONT Mediavilla, Minister of Communications and ex-Ambassador to the USSR; Jose LLANUSA Gobel aka "Pepe", Minister of Sports & Recreation; Alfredo YABOR Maluf, Minister of Justice; and Cdte. Raul DIAZ Arguelles, Chief of "Departamento Technico de Investigacion" (DTI).

According to AMICE-14, whose information comes also from AMTRUNK-10, CUBELA is not a communist, is not even particularly politically conscious but he is where he is because he has gone too far to turn back and because he enjoys the fruits of life as a member of Fidel's hierarchy.

B. Faure\*CHAUMONT Mediavilla 201-270370

AMICE-14 states that "CHAUMONT" is his legal name but that he signs it "CHOMON". CHAUMONT was born 23 February 1929 in Victoria de las Tunas, Oriente. He has one brother, Florial, who was a radio announcer for "Radio Reloj" and also for a Cuban station in U.S. Florial is now back in Cuba, present job unknown.

CHAUMONT supposedly studied in the School of Administrative Law at Havana University, but never graduated. AMICE-14 cannot recall ever having seen him attend class. CHAUMONT was apparently an agitator first, using the forum of the University to make a name for himself, and a student second.

1957--CHAUMONT was in the US for about 6-9 months after the failure of the assault on the Presidential Palace (objective--assassinate Batista) where he was wounded in the leg and arm.

January, 1958--Returned to Cuba as commander of the "Directorio Expeditionary Force" of 21 persons. The group was infiltrated at Nuevitas, Camaguey, where CHAUMONT split off from the group and CUBELA, the 2nd-in-command, took the rest to the Escambray. CHAUMONT proceeded to Havana to organize the underground but some of his weapons were discovered and he was forced to flee back to the Escambray where he fought (and distinguished himself) until the end of the war.

January 1959--CHAUMONT still a Commandante but not being paid by the government. CHAUMONT is supported through "Directorio Revolucionario" treasury and by friends such as AMTRUNK-10. CHAUMONT made a statement to AMICE-14 and AMICE-14's cousin that Fidel would have to be killed. Fidel was anti-Directorio and there was personal dislike between CHAUMONT and Fidel because they both wanted to be "El Maximo Lider" and Fidel won out.

1960--After over a year without any official position, Fidel brought CHAUMONT into the government where he could keep an eye on him and control him to a degree. In late 1960 or early 1961, Fidel appoints CHAUMONT Ambassador to the Soviet Union. CHAUMONT is recalled from the USSR after barely 1 year as Ambassador. When queried by close friends about the USSR, CHAUMONT replies "Rusia es un gran mierda". Appointed Minister of Communications in 1962 where he remains.

AMICE-14 states that CHAUMONT is a leftist, but not a communist. To a degree, he shares the same position as Rolando CUBELA in that he has gone too far to turn back and he enjoys the privileges of his position. According to AMICE-14, CHAUMONT is highly intelligent and shrewd and has a large personal following resulting from his long-time revolutionary activities.

AMTRUNK-10 believes that he can approach CHAUMONT safely. He thinks that CHAUMONT may turn him down but won't turn him in.

C. fnu NIEVES

NIEVES is about 30 years old, a Commandante from humble origins in Las Villas Province. NIEVES has little education but regardless worked his way up to Commandante while fighting in the Escambray along with AMTRUNK-10. NIEVES is a member of the original "Directorio Revolucionario". NIEVES is believed to be a troop commander in one of the provinces, probably Las Villas. NIEVES has a brother, also fnu, who was aide to Camilo Cienfuegos during the war, who was arrested about 4 months ago with one AVERHOFF on trumped-up charges of trying to kill Fidel.

AMTRUNK-10 considers NIEVES very reliable. AMTRUNK-10 believes that NIEVES can be approached and that he will cooperate with AMTRUNK-10.

D. "Bu" TRAVIESO

TRAVIESO is about 25 years old, a member of the DR, and formerly was executive officer to the Chief of the Air Force, Sergio del VALLE. TRAVIESO has since been thrown

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- 4 -

out of the Air Force because he was not "politically reliable". According to AMTRUNK-10, TRAVIESO does not now hold any official position. TRAVIESO could be valuable for his contacts in the Air Force and his contacts in the Rebel Army which stem from when he was a Captain under Camilo CIENFUEGOS.

AMTRUNK-10 considers TRAVIESO a possibility for recruitment but he is not as sure of TRAVIESO as he is the other three, CUBELA, CHAUMONT and NIEVES.

E. Captain Enrique VARONA aka "Varonita"

VARONA is the Cuban Commander of San Antonio de los Banos Air Base. He is a pilot. VARONA is a friend of AMTRUNK-10's, but AMTRUNK-10 does not consider him reliable or trustworthy.

F. Captain Diego (?) OQUENDO

OQUENDO is flying MIG of unknown type. He is a friend of AMTRUNK-10 and VARONA. He might be willing to defect with a MIG.

G. Captain Manuel ARTIAGA


ARTIAGA is an INRA official and AMTRUNK-10's supervisor. ARTIAGO was a member of Fidel's bodyguard and is now Chief of "Operacion Escambray", an anti-guerrilla operation in the Escambray which has both military and agricultural responsibilities. ARTIAGA is a communist and not to be trusted but AMTRUNK-10 plans to attempt to elicit information from him.

*Reuben A. Hannula*  
Reuben A. HANNULA

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19-603-2/2  
19-6-84/3





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16 September 1963

4P (S)

SUBJECT: RESULTS OF OPERATION LEONARDO AND PLAN OF ACTION

(1) On 3 February 63 we formulated the preliminary plan of "Operation Leonardo", considered as a preliminary step to the coordination of "anti-Castro" elements within the Cuban Government, The Rebel Army and Militia with the ultimate objective of producing and carrying out the overthrow of the Government.

(2) The immediate objective of the operation was to establish contact with some of these elements, with the purpose of converting into action their anti-communist sentiments and to convince others who up to now had maintained a passive attitude but who would be susceptible to being induced to act against the Communist regime.

(3) The basis for making us think of the feasibility of "Operation Leonardo" had its origin in information received on the following extremes:

- a) The time had come for action of this kind, inasmuch as favorable conditions were rapidly ripening.
- b) The progressing moral and economic weakening of the Communist Government and the internal tension among its members.
- c) The favorable effect of President Kennedy's speech made at the Orange Bowl to the Brigade 2506 in the last days of 1962, which recognized this possibility.

(4) In order to prove these ends and take the first steps towards the aforementioned coordination, we offered to land in Cuba and establish contact with Rebel Army officers and Government officials. The object of this memorandum is to give a resume of the conclusions to which we have arrived after fulfilling phase II of "Leonardo".

#### CONCLUSIONS

We can definitely establish the following:

(1) It is estimated that about 80% of the Cuban population is against the Communist Regime. However it lacks effective organization and necessary resources to attempt the overthrow of the Communist dictatorship.

(2) In addition, also opposed to the Regime although maintaining a passive attitude is an important nucleus of the Rebel

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Army, Militia and Civil officials of the Regime. This group is characterized by the following:

- a) For the most part these are men who took part in the revolutionary activities against the Batista Government and gave full approval to the Revolutionary Government in those initial moments.
- b) They continue offering apparent cooperation and help to the Regime.
- c) They maintain a state of total or partial inactivity, due to the lack of means and coordination for the fight against the Communist Government, in whose invincibility they are beginning to believe, AT THE SAME TIME THAT THEY HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF CUBA AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THE RETURN OF CORRUPT REGIMES OF THE PAST.

(3) We understand that the basic plan of "Operation Leonardo" has been approved in its entirety. Especially regarding the existence of an important nucleus within the Government, Rebel Army and Militia, ready to lend collaboration to plans of internal action "in crescendo", which would culminate in the overthrow of the Communist dictatorship and the re-establishment of a democratic regime based on a respect of God, Human Rights and which promotes the general well being and social justice.

(4) It has also been duly proven that these men are ready to act against the Communist Regime for purely ideological reasons, AS LONG AS THEY ARE GIVEN A MINIMUM OF GUARANTY, which can be summed up in the following terms:

(a) Implementation of the principles which were first decreed by the triumphant Revolutionary army at the beginning of January 1959 and then betrayed by the Communist Government; and the establishment of a democratic regime, with respect towards God, and to human rights, which promotes the general well being and social justice.

(b) The non acceptance of individuals who have directly or indirectly committed or been implicated in crimes and tortures or have made illicit gains.

(c) The selection of capable men with clean public service records, preferably from the Rebel Army, to direct and orient the action against the Regime and the VISIBLE AND DOMINANT PARTICIPATION of persons offering guaranties to individuals who still, apparently, represent the backing of the imperious regime. Said guaranty should not cover those individuals stained by blood.

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(5) That the above is possible and that there actually in truth exist some individuals, anti-communists, who are ready to act, was demonstrated by the following: a) the establishment in Cuba of a growing organized nucleus and other contacts; b) the establishment of communication with the exterior which is already working; c) the organization of a route of entry and exit of the Island whose effectiveness has already been proven.

Obliged by the growing rhythm of the organization in Cuba, which under no circumstances should be held back and where for lack of action or contacts with the exterior the impression of abandonment might be created, we urgently consider that Leonardo should be continued on the following basis:

RECRUITMENT of an integrated group in exile, of persons who combine the characteristics described under item c) paragraph (4), some of which are mentioned in our initial Memorandum of 3 Feb 63, which will have in its charge the following:

- a) Establish the ideological basis for the fight.
- b) Orient and direct the propaganda towards Cuba. Said propaganda should be in accord with the before mentioned principles and very specially should project the
  - a') guaranties offered to collaborators who directly or indirectly are the backbone of the imperious regime;
  - b') the implementation of the principles first offered by the triumphant Revolution at the beginning of January 1959.
- c) Establish the contacts within Cuba, personally or by whichever means possible in order to penetrate the military, the militia and the civil section of the Government.
- d) Establish contacts within Cuba, personally or by any other means possible and organize a clandestine combatant net which will have in its charge, with the help to be given from the exterior, the execution of all types of action, which will tend to demonstrate the vulnerability of the Regime and the disposal of the people of Cuba to fight until the overthrow is accomplished.

It is well to point out the importance of these clandestine actions by their effects: a') facilitating the recruitment of persons who hold or are carrying out Government charges. b') Their favorable moral effect on those already recruited, who feel they must continue these actions against the group of which they are a part, since their participation, directly in the fight, will necessarily fall behind at the opportune moment at the deciding level.

- e) Direct participation by the exile group in the fight which will be produced in Cuba, at the moment considered most opportune by said group, and for which effect they necessarily must transfer to Cuba.

The preceding represents the results of conversations with various elements in Cuba, who offered their opinions and moreover represented the opinions of the majority of the recruitable people. This affirmation is also a result of the manifestations made by an ex-Comandante of the Rebel Army during a recent trip to this city, which are voiced in some of his writings before he returned to continue the development of "Operation Leonardo".

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~~19-6-84/3~~

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Since we arrived in Havana at 2 a.m. and could not establish immediately the contact, we decided to go to the house of Angel's mother and sister where we waited until 6 in the morning, time at which Leon contacted Teresa Azcarate and David went to contact his family.

At 10 a.m., Leon, accompanied by Teresa Azcarate, and David, accompanied by his aunt, were to make the first contact with Orozco, which could not be done, as the person was not home, so they went to the house of David's aunt, from where they tried to contact Orozco again, unsuccessfully. Leon then moved to the house of Teresa Azcarate, where he joined Adolfina Suarez More to whom he gave the first instructions on S.W. He slept in that house, and got ready to make contacts with the principal targets the following day. He was able to make the contacts from noon until late at night, including Orozco and Ravelo, and slept in the house of Pedro Gomez.

18 Aug  
The next day contact with Jose Vazquez was made and Leon attempted to contact Suarez More and Fernando Fernandez Supervielle, but without success since they were out of town and were not expected to return for a couple of days. Nevertheless, contact with the wife of Fernandez Supervielle and with the sister of Suarez More was made, and the matter was discussed with them. That night we slept in the house of Mrs. Vazquez. Cerdas

19 Aug  
The next morning we had an interview with Guin, and it lasted almost all day. That night Aldo's car arrived, accompanied by Angel and Fermin, and we returned to the infiltration area, accompanied by Orozco. Upon arriving at the mentioned area, in the town of Marti, we were informed that the car which was to be used to take us to the safehouse on the coast, was being used by the militiamen of the area, so, being accompanied by an expert of the zone, we decided to go where the boat was located, walking through the fields. We made the trip without approaching any house of inhabited areas, arriving the next morning. - 20 Aug (AMTRUNK-10)

That morning we saw a helicopter combing the area east of Playa Menendez, and, thinking of the possible contact of one of the ex-filtrees, Fermin, with a G-2 informer, we decided not to wait for "Kilo" and that night we left for Cay Sal. This was done without important incidents, except the fact of not being able to use the silent motor, as it did not function properly, apparently due to the gasoline pump as it was explained above.

The arrival at Cay Sal was at about 8:30 a.m., 23 August. We obtained the cooperation of the persons there, and were able to call Jorge Volsky by radio telephone, as we'd agreed, giving our position. This was done at 8:45 a.m.

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At about 6 p.m. we found out that a boat without visible flag was approaching the place, and informed that it was a North American coast guard boat, we went to retrieve the equipment that was drying. Later the boat sent a motor boat, with 4 persons. As it approached and the men landed, we realized they were English. There was no time to hide the weapons and ammunition, for which upon searching us and finding it, they asked us to go on the boat. At this time another boat arrived, apparently a recreation boat, handled by Fred, among other persons.

Once on the British ship, the group was put under custody waiting for the Nassau authorities to decide the situation. On the ship a formal interrogation was given basically addressed to Leon. The police inspector and the ship's officer informed us that the most probable decision would be to hand over the group to the American authorities in Key West with all the equipment, but without the ammunition. Nevertheless, they made clear, that the final decision depended from Nassau, since that was only a suggestion of theirs.

The group remained on the mentioned ship until 25 August at which time they were authorized to land, accompanied by a member of the American Immigration Department, and they were given all the equipment except weapons, maps, infra red light, etc. etc.  
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Initial Operational Debriefing of AMTRUNK Team

1. Pick-Up by the British

The AMTRUNK team was picked up by the British destroyer "Caprice" at Cay Sal on the afternoon of 23 August approximately 20 minutes before the KUBARK boat "Matusa Times" reached them. The cover story given to the Brits was that they were a group of refugees fleeing from Cuba. Although it is quite obvious that the British did not believe this story fully, they were never able to break the team's cover. The personal documents of the team members were never checked by the British. The team members gave the following names, none of which are true names: AMICE-27 used the name "Leon Lopez", AMICE-14 used the name "David Pardo", AMTRUNK-7 used the name "Carlos Menendez", AMTRUNK-8 used the name "Rodrigo Fernandez Lopez", AMTRUNK-9 used the name "Jose Lopez", and the sixth member of the group Fermin Gonzalez used the name "Ramon Lopez". (From the names given to the British, it looks as though most of the Lopez' in Cuba came out on this Boston Whaler!) When the team was landed at Key West and reported to Immigration there, the names given to Immigration were the alias documentation names for the first four members of the team, the name "Jose Lopez Lopez" for AMTRUNK-9, and the true name for Fermin Gonzalez Fernandez. The weapons picked up by the British and not returned consisted of one FAL, three M-3 sub-machine guns, two 9 mm Brownings, one Colt .38 Detective Special, one Smith-Wesson .38 Chief's Special (personal weapon of AMICE-27) and one .38 automatic belonging to AMTRUNK-9. Team members were not searched by the British and were not interrogated separately. The majority of the talking was done by the team leader AMICE-27. In addition to the weapons listed above, the British took a set of 1:50,000 maps of the north coast of Cuba and maritime charts of the Santa Clara Bay area. They also took one dynamite which was not returned.

See  
Attach-1  
p. 12. Information on Fermin Gonzalez Fernandez

Subject was the other individual exfiltrated by the AMTRUNK team along with AMTRUNK-9. He was born 7 July 1931 in Marti, Matanzas, Cuba and his last address was Finca Favorito, Itabo, Marti, Matanzas. He was an auto mechanic by profession, is married and has one child 20 months old. His father's name is Gumersindo Gonzalez and his mother's name is Catalina Hernandez Suarez. Fermin acted as coordinator of numerous underground activities in the Marti area. When the team recruited Fermin to help them shortly after their infiltration, they also promised to exfiltrate Fermin if he got into serious trouble. During the time that the team was in Havana, Fermin was approached by a negro named Jose LNU who had infiltrated with two other persons from the Miami area in recent days and whose boat had run aground and was leaking. Jose LNU attempted to recruit Fermin to help him. Fermin suspected this individual of being a G-2 informer and declined to help. He later heard that Jose LNU had been denounced to the G-2 by a local chivato but that the G-2 had not come and arrested Jose. According to his story, this

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confirmed his suspicion that Jose was a G-2 and was out to get information on Fermin. He requested exfiltration from the AMTRUNKers and they agreed to bring him out.

### 3. Initial Team Contacts in Cuba

On the first night when the team infiltrated they went to a point at coordinates 139514 Map 4085 III, the entrance to a large lagoon into which they hoped to sail and hide the following day. At the entrance to this lagoon they saw a boat and they therefore kept moving in a westerly direction to point 133512, at which a natural canal heads into the mangroves in a southerly direction. They steered into this canal, down through two small lagoons, and into a third larger lagoon located at 130495. This lagoon was the site of their base camp where the Boston Whaler was kept hidden in the mangroves during the entire stay. The first contact that they made was with a fisherman by the name of Isaac \*Moreno who was recognized and previously known by AMTRUNK-7 and 8. He was approached on the following day in the large lagoon and was asked to send word to the team's first contact Oscar \*Diaz, the uncle of AMTRUNK-7. Oscar, his son Antonio \*Diaz Torres, and Candido \*Diaz (no relation to the others) next showed up in a small fishing boat. These men recommended Fermin Gonzalez Hernandez as the best man to be able to help them in the town of Marti. Fermin was then contacted by one of the Diaz' and came out by boat along with another man by the name of Felix \*Munoz to discuss the operation. In the meantime Oscar Diaz had recruited one Juan \*Perez another fisherman, to act as a guard and to fish outside the lagoon in order to give warning of any approaching boat.

### 4. Transportation

The first car used was that owned by Candido Diaz who has an old car in which he transports fish between the Casualidad area and Cardenas. In this car Candido Diaz went to Cardenas and contacted AMICE-14's old friend Pedro \*Barbi. Candido took the team members AMICE-27 and AMICE-14 from Casualidad in his old car to Itabo. In the outskirts of Menendez the road passes the house of a chivato named Braulio \*Madruga. The latter's entire family is a chivato family and reports to the G-2 on any strange traffic passing on the road to Playa Menendez. At Itabo the two agents were passed on to Fermin Gonzalez who took them in his own car to Marti. In Marti the team was passed on to a negro named Esmeraldo \*Montalvo, nicknamed "Aldo" or "Aldito" who works in a sugarmill near Marti and also drives a taxi. He was recommended both by Fermin Gonzalez and by Pedro Barbi. Aldo picked the team up and took them from Marti to Habana. On the return trip from Habana, Aldo again drove from Habana to Marti, and the procedure was reversed.

### 5. Underground Activities in Marti

Fermin Gonzalez claimed to be a member of the Union Cubana de Accion Libertadora (UCAL). He said that the coordinator of this organization had been Daniel Cardo but that subject had been caught in July and was executed in mid-August as a counter-revolutionary. Gonzalez said



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