

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

Date: 02/21/05

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10414-10345
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : RUSS HOLMES WORK FILE

Released under the John
F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 53320 Date:
06-26-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : COS MEXICO CITY
TO : CHIEF, WOACRE, CHIEF WH DIVISION
TITLE : DISPATCH-PROGRESS REPORT: 1 JULY - 30 SEPTEMBER 1971.
DATE : 09/29/1971
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS : AFGHAN
JFK ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/04
COMMENTS : JFK-RH07 : F133 : 20040324-1064411

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10414-10345

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
DATE
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH

TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	Chief, WOACRE		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City 872		MICROFILM
SUBJECT	KDAFGHAN Progress Report: 1 July - 30 September 1971		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Paragraph 16 (WOACRE)

1. SUMMARY: During the reporting period this Project continued with no change. The KDAFGHANS continued to provide the Station with photographic coverage of visitors to the Cuban Embassy. A new case officer took over the Project at the beginning of the period and has spent the major part of his meetings with KDAFGHAN-1 and 2 on discussing and planning ways to improve the percentage of identifications made by them. What follows is a description of the operation as it now stands and the Station's plans to improve it.

2. PRESENT KDAFGHAN ROUTINE: Visual coverage of the entrance to the Cuban Embassy compound is provided from 0900 to 1800 (the approximate hour at which lighting conditions prevent further photography with the present equipment.) Embassy hours are 0800-2100, approximately. KDAFGHAN-1 provides the majority of the manpower, with KDAFGHAN-2 filling in for rest breaks, lunch and while KDAFGHAN-1 processes the previous day's take. The general practice is to observe the entrance without optical assistance until a person or vehicle is seen to be entering or leaving the gate area. The restricted size of the aperture possible in the OP for this viewing (a rectangular opening approximately four by five inches) prevents simultaneous viewing of any other area of the compound. When a target is seen, the observer shifts his head a few inches to the reflex finder of the camera and is given a 20 X magnification of the target. This is more than adequate for identification of any target. If the target is unknown and/or a previous photograph has not been taken, the observer takes one. At the same time he records the time of arrival/departure, whether the target is known or unknown, and records any obvious identifying data such as license plate, apparent nationality, apparent occupation, etc. In addition

Continued.....

Attachments:

- A - as stated h/w
- B - as stated u/s/c - 8/c ATTACHED by JC/AN 2 OCT 71

Distribution:

- 1 Orig. & 2 - Chief, WHD (w/atts. A and B h/w & u/s/c)
- 1 - Chief, WOACRE (w/o/atts.)

ES COPY

FOSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 41087	29 September 1971

CLASSIFICATION

FILE THE NUMBER

to the above general visual surveillance, the agents are occasionally provided with photographs of targets the Station believes might visit the compound and on whom we wish a specific alert - such as visiting agent personnel and third country subversives known or believed to be in the area. Each day, KDAFGHAN-1 processes his notes and the photographs taken and submits them to the Station in the following form (one day's production is illustrated in Attachment A):

- a. A timetable of arrivals and departures (the number in the left margin indicates that a photograph was taken).
- b. The original negative. The daily average seems to be about eighteen photographs.
- c. A contact print of the above negatives (the inked numbers on the photographs correspond to the marginal numbers on the report).
- d. Enlargements of selected subjects (not included).

✓ 3. THE AGENT PERSONNEL: GARDALPHE spent one day, from 0645 to 1900, inside the OP, observing the agents and their routine. Both seem to have adapted to a very boring routine quite well. Their eyesight, which has been the subject of quite a few off-the-record comments at both Headquarters and at the Station (viz, that they are blind), was checked out thoroughly, but innocuously, by asking them who such and such a person was at the gate or in photos and by asking them to read some very small print film-processing instructions. While KDAFGHAN-2's eyesight is definitely poorer than that of KDAFGHAN-1, she easily identified the subjects and was able to read the test literature with no problem. She was observed carefully while manning the OP and she missed no one in that one and one-half hour period. Previous cases of missing known targets scheduled to visit the Embassy are more probably the result of boredom and a resultant lack of attention. Their job requires them to be hermits. They have very few friends and even fewer visitors. To break them out of this rut, the Station will soon start altering their work hours to provide more extended coverage of the target, and give them more interesting work to do.

4. PRESENT KDAFGHAN FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT: The present OP is located on the roof of a three-story apartment house located about eighty yards from the compound entrance (see Attachment B). Concealment is excellent. Windows on other floors allow visual observation of most of the compound facing the OP and of the entrance to the Consulate. However, they do not permit photography, except on a selected basis, because of the concealment problem. The OP proper is a small bathroom about five by six feet in what used to be the maid's quarters. A captain's chair, the tripod, camera, lens and a small worktable have been fitted in between the various plumbing fixtures. Adjacent to this is another room of approximately twice the size which contains a desk, cot, the printer and a wardrobe for storing photographic materials. This room has a large picture window overlooking the entrance to the Consulate.

Continued.....

5. The photographic equipment used by the KDAFGHANS at present consists of a Bausch and Lomb spotting scope with 20-X eyepiece, and a Pentax H-3 camera. This equipment is not satisfactory (see below). Except for the printer, all darkroom equipment is located in a darkroom on the first floor. The darkroom is well equipped and adequate. KDAFGHAN-1 makes no attempt to conceal the darkroom. His cover for the darkroom is that it is his hobby.

6. STATION PROCESSING OF THE KDAFGHAN PRODUCTION: Time-
tables are filed and not processed - at present. If the Station
is looking for confirmation of an agent report or a surveillance
report, they are sometimes consulted. About every year they are
shipped to Headquarters for retention in the Archives. The
negatives and contact prints are handled in the same way.

7. The enlarged photographs are processed in the following way:

- a. Certain photographs of unidentified persons are sterilized and forwarded to the local office of LNERGO. The Station receives no feedback or identification of these individuals from LNERGO.
- b. Photographs of PCS or known TDY Embassy personnel are kept and used for identification purposes at the Station and some are forwarded to Headquarters for the same reason.
- c. Photographs of other identified persons are placed in Station personality files.
- d. All other photographs (the major portion) are simply destroyed.

8. LNERGO was recently queried on the value of this operation to them. They replied, "(these photographs) are compared with the photographs of known leaders of extremist groups in WOCORK as well as with photographs of persons who are subjects of Identification Orders prepared on badly wanted fugitives in WOCORK. It is requested, therefore, that you continue this service if it does not cause problems or unusual costs to your office." While this project may be of some value to LNERGO, it is of little value, as presently constituted, to the Station. There are other, and cheaper, means of obtaining photographs of PCS and TDY personnel. No identification or operational use is made of the photographs of the unidentified subjects - at least by JKLANCE - and no operational use is made of the timetable. For instance, license plate numbers are not now traced as either a possible means of identification, or leads to CI or recruitment targets. A previous effort at analyzing the timetable for possible patterns of activity was unproductive and has not been repeated. Only in selected instances do we try to correlate the information received from KDBADGER coverage of the Embassy and that provided by the KDAFGHANS. But generally this has not been successful, since most often people with previous appointments are going to the Consulate (which we do not cover with KDAFGHAN), or too many unidentified people arrive around the same time at the gate, precluding a positive identification. While the above evaluation

Continued.....

FORM 8-64 (40)	53a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3 of 6
----------------------	-----	-----------------------	-----------------------------------	--	------------------------

may read more like a project termination request than a progress report, the Station does believe that this project could be made productive if not extremely valuable to both JKLANCE and LNERGO if faces could be related to names and other operational leads inherent in the KDAFGHAN production were abstracted and followed out. Our plans to do so are outlined below.

9. PLANS: Technical quality needs to be improved. The present enlargements are only poor to fair in quality. This is due to the lens now in use, which only has an effective aperture of f-22. The Station WOACRE officer will soon initiate correspondence to obtain a better lens which will not only result in higher quality photos, but extended coverage in conditions of darkness or twilight by increasing the light-gathering capability of the camera. A camera with a behind the lens light meter will be used from now on to prevent underexposures in poor light conditions. The present enlarger lens has a fungus growth which lowers photographic quality. This will be repaired or replaced.

10. Since the move to this OP, a street sign in the line of sight to the target area obstructs or spoils over half of the photographs. This prevents the Station from using the photographs with agent personnel or contacts who might be able to identify the subject of the photograph. For, unless heavily sterilized, it provides a very easy means of identifying where the photograph was taken, and conceivably, by using a theodilite, determining the exact location of the OP. An operation, through liaison, to remove this obstruction has been initiated.

11. Identification of PCS personnel, out-bound TDY and in-transit passengers can easily be raised to near one-hundred percent. The Station will arrange for our current KDGLACIER passport coverage to be passed on a routine basis to KDAFGHAN and, using these, he should be able to identify all of the subjects that fall in the above category. He will also be instructed to start a photo file on all TDY and in-transit personnel and, as he builds this base up, he should be able to identify more and more of the in-bound in-transit personnel. Consideration is also being given to have him develop and process these passport photos for both himself and the Station. This would not only speed up identification of these subjects - and the exploitation of possible ops leads - but relieve the Station Technician and Support Section of some of their work load.

12. The exploitation of potential operational leads through the compilation of data on license plates, servicemen, known visitors and arrival and departure times, has previously been tried by the Station on a sporadic basis with no success. This is primarily due to the fact that the workload involved on Station personnel has prevented a continuing effort. Since KDAFGHAN-1 and 2 are underworked (and would probably welcome some change in their incredibly boring routine), this job will be given to them. They will be required to submit monthly reports on:

- a. All vehicles that call at the compound (frequency figures).
- b. All service calls.
- c. All visitors and or servicemen who get inside the compound.

Continued.....

FORM 8-64 (40)	53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	EXEMPT G X CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 4 of 6
----------------	---------------------------	-------------------------------------	----------------------------	--------------------

- d. All visitors and or servicemen who get inside the gate.
- e. Compiled statistics on the arrival and departure time (and method) of each known or suspect intelligence officer.

This should considerably improve the Station's ability to exploit any leads that might arise.

13. The one problem area remaining, and the one where we stand to strike the most "pay-dirt" is that of identifying the photographs of non-Cuban personnel who visit the Embassy or the Consulate. While, true, we are unlikely to identify any DGI agent personnel or illegals, we would be most likely to obtain identification of subversives traveling to Cuba and on local sympathizers or contacts who could possibly serve as access agents. Linking unknown faces to names can only be done by technical means. The target situation and our proposed means of attack are given below.

14. Since the arrival of the new DGI Chief of Center and the DSE security officer last year, security at the Cuban Embassy and Consulate has tightened drastically. Metal shutters have been placed on all but one of the windows in the area suspected of being the DGI center. Not even a crack of light now shows from these windows at night. The entire compound and the surrounding wall have been floodlighted. In KDAFGHAN's words, "the only shadows in the place now are during the daytime". The former open grill gate to the automobile entrance has been replaced by an electrically operated solid metal garage door. Passerbys can no longer look into the compound or gatehouse and KDAFGHAN can no longer observe the latter. The door into the gatehouse, which is in the outer wall alongside the automobile entrance, has been changed to a heavy metal door with a one-way mirror for observation. No vehicles except those belonging to the Embassy are now allowed inside. All delivery trucks must park outside and carry their items inside. A completely new, and unknown, telephone system has been installed. Access control is now rigorous. When a visitor now calls at the Embassy he must ring the doorbell, wait for the door to be opened slightly, and, if he is not recognized, announce his name and business. The door is then shut in his face, the gatekeeper calls the person he wants to see and the person is then either let in or turned away. If let in he no longer is allowed into the compound - with some few rare exceptions - but is led into the former gatehouse which has just been converted into a reception area. The person he came to see comes to the reception area and interviews him there. Very rarely is the visitor let into the compound. If the visitor calls at the Consulate he may freely enter that one room on the ground floor, but is allowed no further. Usually the secretary handles all requests. Some times a visitor to the Consulate who requires an interview with one of the consuls is taken or sent to the Embassy entrance and interviewed in that area. Our chances of implanting an audio device inside the Embassy, the Consulate, or the gatehouse with our current assets and under these conditions is nill.

15. There are seven telephone lines into the Cuban compound. Five of these go directly to the Ambassador's office, the Cultural Office, the Press Office, the Commercial Office and the Consulate. As far as we know, the DGI center has no

Continued.....

FORM 8-64 (40)	53a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION	SECRET	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	PAGE NO.	5 of 6
----------------	-----	-----------------------	----------------	--------	---	----------	--------

SECRET
FORM - 41067

* *no hot-mike possible*

direct lines. Two lines go to a switchboard of unknown capacity in the gatehouse/reception room. These lines receive an average of two thousand calls each per month. Many times, in reading the take, we note that a person will call and say that he is coming by at a certain time - or he will be called and told to come at a certain time. If KDAFGHAN could correlate these calls with the photographs he takes he could make many identifications which, in turn, could be exploited by other Station assets, KDGLACIER, or LNERGO. Even of more assistance would be the "hot miking" of these lines. That way we could not only identify any caller to the Consulate or gatehouse, but also who the gatekeeper calls inside to announce the visitor. In addition, we would also expect to pick up quite a bit of conversation of interest, for the gatehouse seems to be a favorite hangout in the Embassy for DGI personnel. KDAFGHAN 1 and 2, being experienced LP operators, could easily handle the take. KDAFGHAN-1, being fluent in English, could also handle the English language portions of any take - which in view of the number of English-speaking visitors would probably be considerable.

16. Therefore, we request that we be advised what technical information is necessary for WOACRE to determine the feasibility of a hot mike installation into the gatehouse and Consulate (assuming no access to the instruments) serviced by an LP located in the current KDAFGHAN OP. In the meantime, we will investigate the possibility of tapping one of the gatehouse telephones currently monitored by KDBADGER and running it into the KDAFGHAN OP where it will not only be transcribed but live monitored.

17. PRODUCTION: Production figures for this period were normal. KDAFGHAN provided an average of 600 contact prints and 150 enlargements per month. No new identifications were made.

18. ADMINISTRATIVE: There were no changes in costs or personnel during this period.

19. SECURITY: There were no security incidents during this period. To improve security, meetings have been reduced to an average of one every two weeks. Use of the safehouse is now held to a minimum and wherever possible meetings are by car pickup. While KDAFGHAN-1's cover for his darkroom is that it is supposedly his hobby, there is not one photograph or camera visible anywhere in his house. He has been instructed to correct this deficiency.

J. R. Gardalphe
Jesse R. GARDALPHE

FORM 8-64 (40)	53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	<input type="checkbox"/> NO CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 6 of 6
----------------	---------------------------	-------------------------------------	---------------------------------------	--------------------

50-6-122/3