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Date: 02/16/05

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10438-10106

23 November 1963

S.X-25350

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director, Plans

FROM ?

Acting Chief, SR Division 6

SUBJECT:

Contact of Lee OSWALD with a member of Soviet KGB Assassination Department

1. According to an intercepted phone call in Mexico City, Lee OSWALD was at the Soviet Embassy there on 28 September 1963 and spoke with the Consul, Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. This was learned when OSWALD called the Soviet Embassy on 1 October, identifying himself by name and speaking broken Russian, stating the above and asking the guard who answered the phone whether there was "anything new concerning the telegram to Washington." The guard checked and then told OSWALD that a request had been sent, but nothing had as yet been received. (MEXI 6453, 9 October 1963) The FBI liaison officer, Mr. Pappich, told me on 23 November that the Bureau has reason to believe that OSWALD's visit was to get Soviet support for a U.S. passport or visa matter /perhaps the new passport mentioned in the press articles/.

2. KOSTIKOV is an identified KGB officer. He was a case officer in an operation which is evidently sponsored by the KGB's 13th Department (responsible for sabotage and assassination). This operation, which is controlled by the FBI under the cryptonym TUMBLEWEED, involved a German-national resident of Oklahoma who was recruited in Europe, and met this year with KOSTIKOV in Mexico City and shortly thereafter with a known 13th Department officer, Oleg BRYKIN, in New York. The instructions given TUMBLEWEED by the two officers, (pinpointing objectives for sabotage) and the circumstances of their involvement in the case, left no doubt that both of them were working for the same KGB component, the 13th.

3. Of course it is not usual for a KGB agent on a sensitive mission to have such overt contact with a Soviet Embassy. However, we have top secret Soviet intelligence documents, describing Military Intelligence doctrine, which show that very important agents <u>can</u> be met in official installations using as cover for their presence there some sort of open business: Vice Admiral

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	for FOIA Review on	APR 1976 CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CONDUCTED ON 16 APR 1976		
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L. BEKRENEV, in a top secret lecture to a Soviet Military Intelligence course at Military-Diplomatic Academy, 1960, said,

"Case officers who use as cover, let us say, the Soviet Trade Representation, TASS or Sovinformburo, can use their cover assignments as backstopping for non-clandestine meetings with certain agents whose particular activities officially associate them with the previously mentioned Soviet institutions. However, such non-clandestine meetings within a legal residency should be restricted to a minimum both as to place and time. Meetings of this type should be carried out only in exceptional cases with tested and reliable agents in order to avoid provocation by the local counterintelligence service against the Soviet installation being used as cover. Such meetings are held as a rule in the work offices of the case officer or of the agent during working hours. It is necessary that such meetings be conducted naturally, that they do not attract the attention of outsiders, and that the receipt and transmittal of intelligence matters, properly camouflaged, be carried out discreetly. In setting up such meetings, measures against tapping must be taken. One must bear in mind that a meeting with persons outside official premises and during non-working hours usually signifies a relationship between the two parties that is above and beyond official matters."

Also, such contact in official installations may be caused by the agent's own carelessness. Again Admiral BEKRENEV speaks:

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4. I called the above connections to the attention of Mr. Pappich by phone to his FBI office at 1030 hours on 23 November.

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1) a summary of our information on KOSTIKOV; and

• 2) all valid background information now available on the work of the 13th Department of the Foreign Intelligence of the KCB:

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Chief, SR/CI



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23 November 1963

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PAGE 207 of 212

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director, Plans

FROM:

Acting Chief, SR Division 5

SUBJECT:

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PROHIBITED

NW 53320

DocId:32395389 Page 6

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PAGE 208 of 212

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
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ALFERYEV, a PRAVDA correspondent in Mexico, was in close contact with Cuban diplomats and local Communist leaders during a February 1962 visit to Quito.

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REPRODUCTION

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PASZ 210 or 212

SUBJECT: Valoriy Vladinirovich KOSTIEGY (201-305052)

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A fluent Spanish speaker, he had travelled abroad at least three times before this permanent assignment; moreover, in 1959 MOSTIKOV applied for a visa to accompany Premier Bikita Sergeys-Vich XHRUSECHEV's party to the United States as an official of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but we have no record of his having come to this country at that time. KOSTIKOV served as an interpreter at international conferences at Nadrid and Barcelona in 1958 and 1959. In late 1959 and early 1960 he attended Soviet exhibitions in Hezico City and Havana; he is known to have been in Cuba from 6 January to 7 March 1960 Moviely identified by Marks. Through the formation

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Wife: Rosa Aleksandrovna, born 2 March 1932 Arkhamgel Oblast. Daughter: Svetlana Valerievna born 1959, Moscov. Wife and daughter accompanied Subject to Mexico. Graduate of Foreign Language Institute and/or Institute of

Foreign Affairs, Moscow.

From 30 June to 10 July 1959 was at the Electrotechnical Congress in Madrid; attended a conference in Madrid and Barcelona in 1958.

November 1959 to 6 January 1960 - Soviet Exposition in Mexico City.

6 JA-war 1960 - in ATO ACCIDENT AT VERA GAUZ

Contacts in Ensenada, Baja, California, September 1963:

- Daily with Isaak Karlos CHAPLUK (201-229418) and with CHAPLUK's son.
 - 7 September, stayed 45 minutes at Nuna SIMANOVKA's Curio Shop.

3. 7 September, dinner with Miguel POPOFF (201-286055)

Note that ALFEREV claimed that he was a guest of the party of Eva Samano de Lopez MATEOS, wife of the President of Mexico, Adolfo Lopez MATEOS. On the trip to Baja, California; Mrs. Lopez was attending a Congress of the National Institute for the Protection of Children.

201-289248



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Page 10----

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23 November 1953

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FROM:

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