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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION	Released under the John F. Kennedy
JCS 202-10001-10165 JCS FOIA # 4 DOC 166	Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 54214 Date: D9-13-2017
DOCUMENT INFORMATION	
OSD BRIG GEN LANSDALE ALTERNATE COURSE B 08/14/62 12 MONGOOSE	
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT TOP SECRET 1C RELEASED WITH DELETIONS	
	JCS 202-10001-10165 JCS FOIA # 4 DOC 166 DOCUMENT INFORMATION OSD BRIG GEN LANSDALE ALTERNATE COURSE B 08/14/62 12 MONGOOSE PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT TOP SECRET 1C

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COMMENTS : Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff.

EXEMPT PER E.O. SEC 3.3(b) Sax 5	13526		
DATE EXEMPTED:		2016	
JS RE-REVIEW DA	TE: <u>3</u>		7
OKAY TO RELEASE	AS Re	DACTED	

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

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COVERT

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population, the political and military power centers and selected individuals inside Cuba. Its purpose will be to maintain morale and increase the will to resist. Initially the following themes and general guidance will be emphasized:

- 1) Expose the betrayal of the original aims of the Revolution.
- 2) Expose the contradictions between past and current promises and performance of the Castro regime.
- 3) Expose the encraochment of Bloc Communists into the domestic affairs of Cuba and increasing foreign domination of Cuba by Soviet imperialism.
- 4) Stimulate disaffection in the leadership and ranks of the supporters of the Castro regime, principally among the militia, the government bureaucracy, organized labor, youth and students, farmers.
- 5) Inspire tensions between Cuban leaders and Bloc representatives.

The following psychological/political warfare activities are considered compatible with and essential to the operational plan:

- Stimulate and guide the propaganda and political action activities of the Cuban exile political, professional, student, cultural and other groups and individuals which have an existing or potential capability for communicating with and influencing the behavior of their counterparts inside Cuba. Also utilize these groups and individuals for propaganda activities in Latin America and other critical areas.
- Continue and expand operations involving the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers or controlled couriers.
- Establish a propaganda balloon launching capability with appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations. (CIA proposal, questioned by State and USIA)

G(1)(c)

4) Continue and expand the "Voice of Free Cuba" memorias dec broadcasts in collaboration with the Nevy

SENSITIVE 8

- 2. <u>Rural Cells</u>: Three- to five-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small "legal" compartmented cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are seriously endangered or if they pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the infiltrees can be accomplished within CIA facilities and existing policy approvals.
- 3. <u>Commando/Sabotage Teams</u>: (Described in the Economic section above.)

F. MILITARY

- 1. DOD continue to develop and refine contingency plans in order to take advantage of any unforeseen breaks.
- 2. DOD continue to support CIA and other agencies to the full extent of DOD capability as required.

IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The policy implications of the activities outlined above include:

A. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching (State and USIA questioned).

B. Annhomity to nee W.S. Nievy mismarines for influention/crfiltratio

C. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration missions using CIA aircraft with U.S. or other contract crews.

D. Authority to conduct selected sabotage principally against major Cuban industries and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications.

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E. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for limited covert operational purposes including agent infiltration/exfiltration, support for clandestine maritime operations, and for holding and interrogating Cuban agents and suspects who enter the base. (The scope of the proposed operational use of Guantanamo would not provide the Cuban government

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with additional issues to enable them to increase their already existing or planned pressure on the U.S. retention of Guantanamo.) State and Defense representatives disagreed to CIA proposal.

[A]

F. Authority to occasionally utilize DOD facilities to provide specialized training for the commando/sabotage teams when such training cannot be duplicated at CIA facilities.

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