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Date₎: 08/28/98

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note)

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IOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING MOFORN

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8 AUG 1962

Case No. 91-T5-39
Document No. 28

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation MONGOOSE, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to this request, the requirement has been divided into its separate parts.

2. Requirements (personnel, units and equipment)

a. In order to seize control of key strategic areas in Cuba within 10-15 days with minimum casualties to both sides about 261,000 US military personnel would participate in the operation.

b. About 71,000 Army and 35,000 Marine forces will be engaged on the ground within Cuba. In addition, approximately 29,000 Army troops will be available as on-call forces.

c. Major units/involved in the initial assault include:
Two Army airborne divisions, an infantry brigade, and an armored combat command; one and one-third Marine division/wing teams; a Navy Striking and Covering force together with an amphibious task force; and 17 USAF tactical fighter squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport squadrons.

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d. Principal equipment includes:

ASE OF THIS DOCUMENT (1) Army - Artillery units and armor (including about

SA; NO OBJECTION 275 tanks.)

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

(DOC 15)

The Department of State has no objection to the elease of declassification of this document in full for the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (Pt 102-55)

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IOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

- (2) Marines Artillery units and armor (including about 85 tanks), plus some 320 supporting aircraft.
 - (3) Navy Approximately 175-200 ships, including two aircraft carriers with approximately 180 aircraft embarked
 - (4) Air Force About 490 troop carriers and transports, 312 tactical fighters, and 65 reconnaissance and refuelling aircraft.
- 3. Level of National Mobilization Required.

a. Army - None. In lieu of mobilizing Civil Affairs units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil Affairs/Military Government operations.

- b. Navy For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in mobilization level would be required beyond the present authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter shipping.
- c. Air Force In order to land the maximum number of airborne troops in the minimum time, fourteen Air Force Reserve troop carrier squadrons (C-119) were originally included in the airlift plan, however, CINCLANT and USAF have been requested to prepare alternate plans not involving any mobilization prior to D-day.
 - d. Marines None.
- e. Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent political or military situation exists which would make such a precaution desirable in order to assure US military responsiveness to additional demands.
- 4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React The present basic contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic areas in Cuba within 10-15 hays. Subsequent to gaining such control of the island there will be a progressive withdrawal of forces as the situation permits.

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

a. When the assault forces have been committed to the Cuban operation, the strategic Army forces in CONUS would be short the supporting forces for the remaining five divisions. It is estimated that the Army Airborne two Sivision force fould be available for other operations 15-30 days after with raisal from Cuba. Substantial Army forces from the on-call cchelon will relieve the assault forces and remain on the island to perform counterguerrilla operations and conduct military government activities. This force will be progressively withdrawn as the new Cuban government increases in effectiveness.

b. The Atlantic Fleet amphibious troop lift capability (less that deployed with the Sixth Fleet) will be engaged fully during the initial phase of the operation. . There may be a requirement for amphibious lift for rapid redeployment and counterguerrilla activity until order has been restored. It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available for other commitments within approximately 30-45 days. About 40 to 50 per cent of the Pacific amphibious troop lift capability will be employed in the landings in the eastern end of Cuba. These ships would be available for other operations in the Pacific about 15 days after the withdrawal of the Pacific Marines from Cuba In addition to the amphibious troop lift capability the initial requirements for sealift will include MSTS ships obtained through the Maritime Administration. Over-all requirements for shipping will diminish after the initial 10-20 days of the operation.

- c. It is estimated that combat-ready status of the Atlantic Command Marine division/wing team will be restored within 15 days of withdrawal; combat-readiness of the Pacific Command Marine expeditionary brigade within 30 days of withdrawal.
- d. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift would be fully committed.

SPECIAL HANDLING MOFORM

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8 AUG 1962

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d. Principal quipment includes:

(1) Army

NO OBJECTION 2510091


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TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN



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a. Army - None. In lieu of mobilizing Civil Affairs units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil Affairs/Military Government operations.

b. Navy - For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in mobilization level would be required beyond the present authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter shipping.

c. Air Force

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included in the airlift plan, however, CINCLANT and USAF have been requested to prepare alternate plans not involving any mobilization prior to D-day.

- d. Marines None.
- e. Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent political or military situation exists which would make such a precaution desirable in order to assure US military responsiveness to additional demands.
- 4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React The present basic contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic areas in Cuba within anys. Subsequent to gaining such control of the island there will be a progressive withdrawal of forces as the situation permits.

IOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

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b. The Atlantic Fleet amphibious troop lift capability (less that deployed with the Sixth Fleet) will be engaged fully during the initial phase of the operation. There may be a requirement for amphibious lift for rapid redeployment and counterguerrilla activity until order has been restored. It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available for other commitments within approximately 30-45 days.

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c. It is estimated that combat-ready status of the Atlantic Command Marine division/wing team will be restored within 15 days of withdrawal; combat-readiness of the Atlantic Command Marine division/wing team will be restored within 15 days of withdrawal;

within 30 days of withdrawal.

d. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift would be fully committed.