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8 AUG 1962

58
(438)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)

1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation MONGOOSE, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to this request, the requirement has been divided into its separate parts.

2. Requirements (personnel, units and equipment)

a. In order to seize control of key strategic areas in Cuba within [10-15] days with minimum casualties to both sides about [261,000 US military] personnel would participate in the operation.

b. About [71,000 Army and 35,000 Marine forces] will be engaged on the ground within Cuba. In addition, approximately [29,000 Army troops] will be available as on-call forces.

c. Major units involved in the initial assault include: [Two Army airborne divisions, an infantry brigade, and an armored combat command; one and one-third Marine division/ wing teams; a Navy Striking and Covering force together with an amphibious task force; and 17 USAF tactical fighter squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport squadrons.]

d. Principal equipment includes:

(1) Army - [Artillery units and armor (including about 275 tanks.)]

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Reviewed on 7/30/98

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23 June 98 mblw
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(DOC 15)

(2) Marines - [Artillery units and armor (including about 85 tanks), plus some 320 supporting aircraft.]

(3) Navy - [Approximately 175-200 ships, including two aircraft carriers with approximately 180 aircraft embarked.]

(4) Air Force - [About 490 troop carriers and transports, 312 tactical fighters, and 65 reconnaissance and refuelling aircraft.]

3. Level of National Mobilization Required.

a. Army - None. In lieu of mobilizing Civil Affairs units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil Affairs/Military Government operations.

b. Navy - For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in mobilization level would be required beyond the present authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter shipping.

c. Air Force - [In order to land the maximum number of airborne troops in the minimum time, fourteen Air Force Reserve troop carrier squadrons (C-119)] were originally included in the airlift plan, however, CINCLANT and USAF have been requested to prepare alternate plans not involving any mobilization prior to D-day.

d. Marines - None.

e. Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent political or military situation exists which would make such a precaution desirable in order to assure US military responsiveness to additional demands.

4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The present basic contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic areas in Cuba within [10-15] days. [Subsequent to gaining such control of the island there will be a progressive withdrawal of forces as the situation permits.]

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a. When the assault forces have been committed to the Cuban operation, the strategic Army forces in CONUS would be short the supporting forces for the remaining five divisions. It is estimated that the Army Airborne two division force would be available for other operations 15-30 days after withdrawal from Cuba. Substantial Army forces from the on-call echelon will relieve the assault forces and remain on the island to perform counter guerrilla operations and conduct military government activities. This force will be progressively withdrawn as the new Cuban government increases in effectiveness.

b. The Atlantic Fleet amphibious troop lift capability (less that deployed with the Sixth Fleet) will be engaged fully during the initial phase of the operation. There may be a requirement for amphibious lift for rapid redeployment and counter guerrilla activity until order has been restored. It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available for other commitments within approximately 30-45 days. About 40 to 50 per cent of the Pacific amphibious troop lift capability will be employed in the landings in the eastern end of Cuba. These ships would be available for other operations in the Pacific about 15 days after the withdrawal of the Pacific Marines from Cuba. In addition to the amphibious troop lift capability the initial requirements for sealift will include MSTs ships obtained through the Maritime Administration. Over-all requirements for shipping will diminish after the initial 10-20 days of the operation.

c. It is estimated that combat-ready status of the Atlantic Command Marine division/wing team will be restored within 15 days of withdrawal; combat-readiness of the Pacific Command Marine expeditionary brigade within 30 days of withdrawal.

d. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift would be fully committed.

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8 AUG 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation MONGOOSE, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to this request, the requirement has been divided into its separate parts.

2. Requirements (personnel, units and equipment)

a. In order to seize control of key strategic areas in Cuba within [REDACTED] days with minimum casualties to both sides about [REDACTED] personnel would participate in the operation.

b. About [REDACTED] will be engaged on the ground within Cuba. In addition, approximately [REDACTED] will be available as on-call forces.

c. Major units involved in the initial assault include:
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

d. Principal equipment includes:

(1) Army [REDACTED]

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Reviewed on 7/30/98

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25 JUN 98

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(DOC 15)

(2) Marines [REDACTED]

(3) Navy [REDACTED]

(4) Air Force [REDACTED]

3. Level of National Mobilization Required.

a. Army - None. In lieu of mobilizing Civil Affairs units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil Affairs/Military Government operations.

b. Navy - For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in mobilization level would be required beyond the present authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter shipping.

c. Air Force [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] were originally included in the airlift plan, however, CINCLANT and USAF have been requested to prepare alternate plans not involving any mobilization prior to D-day.

d. Marines - None.

e. Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent political or military situation exists which would make such a precaution desirable in order to assure US military responsiveness to additional demands.

4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The present basic contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic areas in Cuba within [REDACTED] days. Subsequent to gaining such control of the island there will be a progressive withdrawal of forces as the situation permits.

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~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~

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a. When the assault forces have been committed to the Cuban operation, the strategic Army forces in CONUS would be short the supporting forces for the remaining five divisions. It is estimated that the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could be available for other operations 15-30 days after withdrawal from Cuba. Substantial Army forces from the on-call echelon will relieve the assault forces and remain on the island to perform counter guerrilla operations and conduct military government activities. This force will be progressively withdrawn as the new Cuban government increases in effectiveness.

b. The Atlantic Fleet amphibious troop lift capability (less that deployed with the Sixth Fleet) will be engaged fully during the initial phase of the operation. There may be a requirement for amphibious lift for rapid redeployment and counter guerrilla activity until order has been restored. It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available for other commitments within approximately 30-45 days. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] These ships would be available for other operations [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] about 15 days after the withdrawal [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition to the amphibious troop lift capability the initial requirements for sealift will include MSTs ships obtained through the Maritime Administration. Over-all requirements for shipping will diminish after the initial 10-20 days of the operation.

c. It is estimated that combat-ready status of the Atlantic Command Marine division/wing team will be restored within 15 days of withdrawal; combat-readiness of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] within 30 days of withdrawal.

d. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift would be fully committed.