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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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TO :
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COMMENTS : Reviewed by JCS, OSD, State, CIA.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
~~REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF~~

CIA
DATE: MAR 2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

Operation MONGOOSE

7 August 1962

26 Feb 1962

Mr. McManara undertook to provide any boats needed by CIA on preparation of a list of requirements.

It was decided that an internal land-based radio facility would not be considered at this time.

5 March 1962

The Group noted that the scale of the covert intelligence effort is about the maximum that can be supported with the assets available.

13 March 1962

It was agreed that CIA would continue to bring specific proposals which involve policy considerations, to the Special Group for approval.

CIA was asked to look into private sites for training, and to re-examine with the possibility of using Isolation. (Note: This was in connection with a suggestion to use a specific Defense facility.)

The Air Force was asked to come up with an estimate within two weeks of its capability to provide one or two aircraft for initial resupply operations. Preliminary preparations are also to be made leading toward the availability of personnel and aircraft. Mr. McManara urged, however, that such planning should proceed on two "tracks" with the idea that decisions might be made that would make it impossible to use U.S. personnel.

In connection with small boat operations, the Secretary of Defense undertook to provide anything available within Defense for which a requirement might be established. CIA will present a specific request for equipment other than PT-boats (these not being available) within the next few days.

22 March 1962

General Craig summarized an Air Force study on risks which would be involved in air resupply. He emphasized that the Air Force study is only "a first look" because "a detailed plan has not been submitted by CIA."

The Group agreed that each projected flight would be submitted to it for approval.

The Attorney General urged that airplane pilots and other Cuban defectors be carefully looked at in connection with resupply missions.

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In 6/23/98
GSD: NO OBJECTION
25 JUN 99

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DOC # 191

3 PP

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

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30 March 1962

[A] 124

General Lansdale reported that two Air Force airplanes and crews had been readied for air resupply missions, although no such mission had yet been requested. Mr. McCone said he was not yet informed on CIA readiness to supply non-U.S. crews. Lansdale said that the Air Force had offered to train personnel and run the air operation completely for CIA.

5 April 1962

Mr. McCone said that CIA has concluded that Cubans are not suitable for night supply drops, although they could be used for less demanding missions such as leaflet drops. However, CAT pilots could be available in 30 days and arrangements could be made to remove their attributability to the U.S. Government. The Group appeared to feel that such U.S. civilians would not be essentially different from sheep dips.

11 April 1962

Mr. McCone said that present restrictions on attribution present difficulties with respect to training agents and supply missions.

The Secretary of State asked about the adequacy of existing policy approvals. In response, General Lansdale said it would be useful to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents rather than restricting them to intelligence. It was agreed that within the framework of present understandings more people could be infiltrated. It was noted that it would be difficult if not impossible to maintain motivation, and without at least an implied promise of eventual U.S. action.

12 April 1962

Mr. McCone urged that activities in addition to intelligence should be authorized, and that the U.S. should be prepared to accept more attributability than it perhaps now is. It was agreed that the Guidelines did not require revision at this time but that the operation as presently conceived, with the stepping up indicated by Mr. McCone, should be continued until August.

Mr. Gilpatric thought it necessary to achieve as high a posture of readiness as possible, for example by acquiring materiel necessary for more active operations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~EYES ONLY~~

44

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7 August 1962

26 ~~March~~ 1962

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[A]

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
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