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# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

|  | IDENTIFICATION                                  |                    |  |  |
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| PAGES :  | 00/00/00  | IN GENERAL         | , LANSDALE'S   | PROGRAM  |
| CLASSIFICATION :<br>RESTRICTIONS :                           | 1B, 1C, 4<br>RELEASED WITH DELETION<br>02/24/98 |                    |  |  |
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#### [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED



TAB "A"


## SUBJECT: Tasks Assigned to CIA in General Lansdale's Program Review

### A. TASKS

Part V, pp. 5-8, of General Lansdale's program review of the Cuba Project, dated 18 January 1962, assigns 32 specific tasks to elements of the U.S. Government. Of these, 16 are assigned to CIA solely or jointly. The tasks have been reviewed by this Agency, and it has been determined that substantially all reporting and planning deadlines can be met. Work on all tasks, with and without assigned dates for completion, is in progress. The following detailed observations are keyed to General Lansdale's paper.

 Task l, p. 5. The intelligence community is hard at work on NIE 85-62 and is attempting to meet the deadline of 7 February. As was agreed in a conversation of 23 January 1962 with General Lansdale, a short extension may be necessary.

2. Task 2, p.5. The Opa-Locka Interrogation Center in
Florida will be in operation on 15 February -- the deadline date.
3. Task 3, p.5. The survey is in progress and will be
completed on the stipulated date. On the basis of the information




obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation points will be determined.

4. Task 4, p.5. An operational assessment of the staybehind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline of 15 February. Because communication with singleton agents is by SW, not W/T, it is unlikely that assessment can be completed by the date stipulated; an extension to 28 February may be necessary, although every effort is being made to complete the work before that date. An intensive program aimed at the acquisition of third country assets through the cooperation of liaison services is also under way, particularly in Spain, Belgium, France, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. A progress report on the status of this program will be made by 15 February, although this Agency cannot be sure that the cooperation of all intended participants will have been obtained by that date. CIA has also taken the following additional steps in respect to Task 4.

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a. A cable has been sent to field stations to give added impetus to the search for assets and the development of both unilateral and joint operations. Progress reports have been required by 1 March.

b. A survey of the Euban Chinese community and of



operational access to it is under way. Target date: end of February.

c. An assessment of more than one hundred persons to determine their suitability for return to Cuba as agents in the guise of students is also being conducted. Target date: end of February.

5. Task 5, p. 5. The 1 February deadline will be met, and by that date we shall also have begun the search for suitable intermediaries. Analysis to date has not uncovered a top-level official of the Cuban regime whose personal characteristics indicate he would accept recruitment or agree to defection now. Although some targets of opportunity will appear outside Cuba, most planning will necessarily be based upon an appeal made inside the island by intermediaries selected from the ranks of journalists, foreign officials, international businessmen, foreign lawyers, crime syndicates, international detectives and foreign police officials. Additionally, plans for the defection of lower-level Cuban officials abroad have been completed, and the search for targets and access abroad is under way.

6. Task 6, p.5. By the assigned date we shall complete and submit a coordinated plan. We shall also have begun action on

cover and deception operations by that date.

7. Task 7, p.5. By 1 February CIA will submit an operational schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance movement inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities selected and the assessment of some candidates. A full assessment will be completed in accordance with the schedule listed in para. 4, above, in conformance with Task 4. It should be noted, however, that this operational schedule (like the schedules ćalled for in Tasks 10, 26, and 30) will necessarily be tentative and subject to later revision as the number of assets inside Cuba increases and as the flow of intelligence is augmented. Moreover, the development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable, so that operational timetables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions.

8. Task 10, p. 5. CIA has on hand both propaganda and political action assets in the Caribbean area and elsewhere in Latin America. It is planned to use those assets both to support the Project inside Cuba and to generate and mobilize public and official opinion against Castro outside Cuba. The operational schedule will be submitted on the stated date.

9. Task 18, p.6. Discussions with the appropriate AFL-CIO




officials have been donducted and a report of developments will be submitted by 15 February.

10. Task 21, p.7. Plans for inducing the failure of crops will be submitted by 15 February. These plans will envisage both the use of controlled assets who can be infiltrated and exfiltrated and the provision of encouragement and guidance to the resistance, so that it will undertake acts of sabotage, some of which are to be directed against crops, particularly rice.

11. Task 24, p.7. This deadline will also be met. Primary methods of disrupting the supply of Cuban nickel to the USSR could, if approved, include (1) the sinking of Cuban or Bloc ships by open attack; (2) the use of "frogman" or UDT tactics in harbors for the same purpose; (3) the employment of torpedos and mines toward this end; and (4) the sabotaging of primary or secondary sources of Cuban nickel, such as the Nicaro and Moa plants. CIA now has no proven internal assets capable of carrying out any of these actions. The Agency does have external assets capable of undertaking actions (2) and (3). It also has an external group capable of undertaking (4) upon the completion of specialized training. All studies, including a plan for using overt or covert means to prevent reinstitution of the Canadian supply to the USSR, will be submitted by 15 February. It is suggested that consideration be given to

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assigning to the economic action group, chaired by the Department of State, responsibility for overt action designed to deny Canadian The is consistent nickel to the USSR.

12. Task 26, p.7. Together with Tasks 27 and 28, Task 26 constitutes an outline of a plan for a psychological warfare operation. These tasks are so closely interrelated that CIA proposes to submit by 15 February a single plan dealing with all three tasks.

13. Task 27, p.7. See preceding paragraph.

14. Task 28, p.7. See paragraph 12.

15. Task 30, p.7. By 15 February CIA will submit an operational schedule dealing with the sabotage of (1) shipping in Cuban waters and harbors, (2) Cuban transport facilities, (3) communications facilities, (4) equipment for the refining of petroleum, (5) facilities for producing and distributing power, (6) industry, (7) food supplies, (8) key military and police installations and materiel. The schedule will also include the disruption of military and police communications and harassment of military and police training and personnel.

16. Task 31, p.8. This deadline will be met.

## B. ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKINGS

The following comments are keyed to Sections D through K, Part IV (pp. 3 and 4) of the program review.



17. Section D, p. 3. Six men, to form the initial nucleus, have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates inside and outside Cuba is in progress, and it is expected that ten of these will be recruited by 15 February.

18. Section E, p. 3. To date fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers of resistance because of (1) the presence there of groups among which there is patent or incipient unrest, (2) the presence of strategic and tactical targets for use or deactivation, and (3) proximity to potential unconventional warfare areas. In order of priority, the fifteen centers are Havana, Camaguey, Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, Cardenas, Sancti Spiritus, the Escambray Mountains, Holguin, Siantago de Cuba, Ciego de Avila, Baracoa, Pinar del Rio, Manzanillo, and Colon.

19. Section F. p. 3. In support of State's efforts CIA has conducted propaganda operations, including a number of mass demonstrations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

20. Section H, p. 4. One TV intrusion operation has been conducted, on 16 January. Plans for an intrusion during the scheduled parade and demonstration in Havana are being formulated.



21 Section K, p. 4. Groups with which CIA has exploitable access or entree include women, labor, students, teachers, jurists, and other professional classes. International contacts with labor organizations and members of the Catholic Church will also be utilized.

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