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DRAFT OF REPORT  
FOR RC. Return  
to El Dorado Field 416

Subject: Not of any  
The unidentified individual in the  
Warren Commission Report: A further  
chronological Survey

Reference: Memorandum by David W. Rehn  
 to Mr. E. Harry Krosche, 15 April  
 1976. (Attachment A)

1. Response memorandum suggests at early  
aspects to reconsider full disclosure  
of its circumstances and future date relative  
to the subject. The purpose of this survey  
is to permit an evaluation of the suggestion.  
My reasoning about how best and just  
what it is that would do.

2. Background. This examination and summary  
 concerns <sup>cropped</sup> a photograph  
 of the record concerning ~~and~~ <sup>an</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>considered by the</sup>  
~~considered by the~~  
 considered by the President's Commission  
 on the assassination of President Kennedy  
 (hereinafter cited as the Warren Commission).  
 and introduced into evidence as

Odomer Exhibit No. 1. The photograph  
Hearings before the President's Commission  
on the Assassination of President  
John F. Kennedy, Volume XX, page 691. (See also, Exhibit No. 1)

highly sensitive

~~assaulted~~ ~~highly sensitive~~  
~~assassinated~~ ~~with~~ ~~as CIA~~

(as must be seen,  
 together, with others of the same individual)  
 thus, and still,  
 originates from a highly sensitive operation  
 in October 1963  
 conducted by the two CIA and Mexican  
 security authorities against the Soviet and  
 Cuban embassies in Mexico city.

On 24 October 1963 it was reasonably  
 before  
 Under the press of the latest extorted  
 efforts to develop information on the  
 assassin and the assassin's copy of  
 this photograph were made available  
 by CIA's Mexico Station Chief on the after -  
 noon of 22 November, and later that day,  
 with the concurrence of the ambassador  
 copies ~~photographs~~ <sup>to the local FBI representatives</sup> of this individual  
 were flown up to the Dallas office ~~of the~~  
 by the U.S. Naval Attache <sup>by the</sup>  
 as a matter of possibly use in the <sup>FBI</sup> <sup>of the</sup> ~~by the~~  
 are going investigation. ~~The~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ photographs  
 are ~~photographs~~

(fragments)

it had been  
after crossed ~~photographs~~ by F.B.I. ~~the~~  
~~agent~~, who shown to Mrs. ~~Conley~~ <sup>Oswald</sup> in a  
spread of photos of individuals  
who might have been known to  
her as having been known or  
in contact with her son. Mrs. Margaret  
Oswald did just at the time recognize  
this.

was shown to Mrs. Margaret Oswald  
in Dallas on the evening of November 23, 1963  
by F.B.I. agent, Broadwell D. ODUM.

The Warren Commission <sup>Report</sup> describes  
the sequence of events ~~as~~ at pp. 368-5  
and 667. (Attachment 8), <sup>which</sup> ultimately  
resulted in Mrs. Margaret Oswald's ~~sight~~  
<sup>(she had been shown a)</sup> allegations that the forged photo  
~~was~~ of Jack Ruby, a day before

be measured her son. (A further complicating factor leading to this notorious conclusion had been the fact that when she had been shown the <sup>copy of the</sup> same photograph in her appearance before the Commission, it had been cropped, <sup>by the FBI</sup> in a slightly different manner.) ~~but details might vary~~

No details in the Warren Commission's report possibly ~~but~~ <sup>more vividly than</sup> illustrates (this one, ~~especially~~ <sup>this best</sup>) the difficulties of simple truths ~~of power over people, the self-swinging~~  
~~opposition~~

in its politicized, ~~butting~~ rigidly determined interpretive climate that has ~~prevailed~~ in the glorified been nurtured by the media over the past decade. Only because the photograph,

now acknowledged <sup>not</sup> to be Ruby; <sup>but</sup> now  
become a centerpiece in an alternate  
explanation that holds Oswald to have  
been "framed" by the use of a double in his  
~~other~~  
~~the activity of his supporters~~  
in Mexico City.<sup>3</sup>

3. This is the thrust of the article "The CIA and  
the Man who was Not Oswald" by Bernard  
Frostwald and George O'Toole, in the  
New York Review of Books, (attached to reference,  
'2 copy of which is)

*V.A.C.*  
Burke's research

(1)

reporting although it was very  
 3. Lee Harvey Oswald - His is City Stay. Photographs  
~~of~~ of the unidentified individual ~~was~~ found  
~~in~~  
~~city~~, a number ~~of~~ photographs ~~that~~  
~~destroyed~~

Lee Harvey Oswald ~~had~~ or his stay in Mexico  
 City from <sup>the morning of</sup> 27 Aug to the morning of 2 October  
 1963, the photograph of the unidentified  
~~man~~ originated during Oswald's  
 stay there, and subsequently ~~was~~  
~~seen~~  
~~written~~  
~~shortly~~  
~~there~~  
~~day~~ ~~with~~ ~~(through~~  
~~unintentional,~~ ~~)~~ ~~obscure~~  
~~report~~  
~~by the Mexican station to be of greatest~~  
~~collected interest~~

It is therefore important to the understanding  
 of what was done by the Mexican City stations  
 to ~~decide~~ ~~less~~ ~~is~~ ~~to~~ ~~review~~ ~~that~~  
 the facts about Oswald's ~~the~~ contact  
~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~station~~ ~~and~~

(2)

did with ~~the~~ ~~to tell his~~ information it developed about Oswald via Dallas city, together with Nog's actions on this information before the assassination, 22 Nov 1963, and immediately thereafter.

4. From all credible evidence known to this time (some, incidentally, added since the exhaustively unique work of the Warren Commission), Lee Harvey Oswald spent 4 full days and 2 partial days - about 116 hours in all - in Dallas City from about 10:00 27 September 1963 to about 0900 2 October 1963. His ~~off~~ point of residence was a small commercial travellers hotel, probably not frequented by "jungos" - the <sup>where he was registered under alias</sup> Hotel Commissary. Examinations and detailed notes were

(3)

and interrogations by the physician authorities and the FBI establishes that in the interests of all hotel personnel he left early and returned late each day of his stay.

<sup>and allowing for 65</sup>

Assuming, ~~the fact~~ <sup>that</sup> of late arrival and early departure, ~~that~~ <sup>to</sup> that he slept  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the time of his stay (22 or 33 hours), there ~~remain~~ remain over 78 hours of activity to be accounted for. ~~Oswald~~ Oswald on the basis of C/H's coverage can account solely ~~for~~ for minutes during ~~26~~ 27, 28 September and 1 October. All coverage by C/H during this period was technical, ~~and~~ of the station broadcast his source (bureau agent) ~~the~~ coverage either ~~from~~ material or from physician liaison. Oswald was

(R)

in our sense "under investigation." None  
 of the facts of his defection <sup>and 8 jobs in</sup> to the USSR and  
~~the~~ return to the U.S., 1959-1962 were  
 recorded in Mexico Station files before  
 10 October 1963, when this information  
 was forwarded by Hq. in response to  
 the Station report of 8 October concerning  
 the routine basis what was judged  
 to be an American contact for a visa  
 to Cuba in transit to the USSR as ~~that~~  
 indicated and deduced from ~~the~~ technically  
~~on 1 October, while on the first and only occasion~~  
~~assumed to identify himself by name~~  
~~as acquired information).~~ (At no time ~~was~~  
 during his stay in Mexico City did the CIA  
facility acquire a photo of him.) A careful  
 review of all coverage, visa intercept, and  
 photographic data satisfied both  
 Soviet and Cuban leaders via mode  
 by the Station on the 22 and 23 November.

(5)

1963 after the assassination going back to materials from mid year. It is therefore firm that there was no CIA photo coverage of Oswald at any time during

Mexico in October to fit the story in Hqs' version, despite a report on 15 October City of the places it states had two photos of George Hqs. Bureau 22 Nov 1963

With intercept data received by

the monitor on the basis of the 1 October intercept (which had been reported to Hqs and disseminated to interested members of the intelligence community —

as an ex-thesis her Hanes Oswald was a Navy and FBI case under the definition and, potentially, of interest to the Department of State — turned up matches <sup>unconfirmed</sup> based on content, not on identity, with material intercepted on 27 and 28 September 1963. Matches based on void

(6)

compression (except what could be  
assisted by the monitor - and this was  
not insignificant because of the poor  
compression system by Comsat) could  
not be made, because the tape ~~is~~  
~~an interface with the normal protocol~~  
had been ~~closed~~ closed, ~~and~~ and

~~editing delayed~~

It should be noted that basic antisub  
and photographic coverage was not  
processed in "real time". The nature of  
and volume  
and the volume of the information  
aggressions, precluded anything but  
the spot reporting of items ~~of~~ judged by  
the monitor of more than ordinary victory  
interest and therefore ~~immediacy~~ noted  
in summary log. Full text of selected  
items would require ~~experts~~ consultation  
of the tape and either a field transcription or  
full translation, or both. Photo coverage <sup>(tapes)</sup> seemed

(1)

to become available in greatly ht ~~er~~  
 which requires scanning and selection  
 on a rapid and accelerated basis. One  
 of the "triggers" that normally operates  
 to focus and accelerate the data search  
 and reporting of the kind of raw  
 intelligence is the mention of ~~of~~ a name,  
~~as will be seen.~~

Here this, was precisely what occurred  
 at the 2nd of two conversations Donald  
 had on 1 October with the Soviet embassy,  
 to whom he said he was "the coward,"  
 and it was this information reported by  
 the Soviets ~~to~~ to ~~to~~ Hqs. on 8 October.

(by Cuban) has not indicated that David off

had been informed

Surfacing is shown that the Cuban agents  
 had information on David's identity  
 to Hqs. orally; this voice intercepts or collects  
~~with knowledge~~

The Mexico City station did one monitoring  
in its report on Olszak based on its  
own photo surveillance intercepts: it compared  
these data with information it had  
received from a collateral source —  
a photograph taken by the Mexico station  
~~that did not~~ <sup>but</sup> did not ~~not~~ <sup>showing</sup> ~~not~~  
~~not~~ <sup>an individual,</sup>  
approximately <sup>(unintelligible)</sup> as male photos were observed  
entering the Soviet Embassy, ~~Peru~~  
on 1 October.

The Gators reported these details on an  
entirely coincident detail. The Gators  
did not ~~ever~~ assert or suggest that  
the dots deduced from the photos were  
in fact Oswald, or indeed, in any  
way related to Oswald.

5. His Excellency Donald C. <sup>CIA</sup> - Coverage of his Major City Stay. One additional element of back-

(9)

ground must be stipulated [redacted] now for  
 the final precondition to understanding  
 relevance or irrelevance of  
the evidence and the place  
the photo of the unknown individual,  
placed in the chain of evidence on 23  
November in Dallas by the FBI agent,  
Bordwell whom: Please tell what  
was the totality of CIA coverage  
of Oswald activity as of the afternoon  
of the 22nd and 23rd when all available  
coverage had been re-checked?

6. The totality of the May Radio stations  
on, or reasonably approachable by  
coverage of Oswald, consisted of five (5)  
 voice intercepts as follows:

A.

2

(Friday)

A. 27 Sept 1963 (16:05 Physic City train :  
 Silvia Duran, a local employee  
 of the Cuban Embassy, Consular  
 Section, a receptionist, speaks with  
 an unknown male at the Soviet  
 Embassy :)

*Dumaine*  
 Silvia tells #10 that the American citizen was there, the one who  
 wants a visa for Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union and he wants  
 to know with whom he was talking there because she (Silvia) had  
 sent him to the Soviet Embassy saying that if they accepted him  
 and gave him a visa then the Cubans (Embassy) would also give him  
 a visa without further paper work only advising Immigration in Cuba  
 [redacted] wants to know with whom he had talked there because he says  
 he was told there would be no problem. [redacted] to wait a moment.  
 A different [redacted] and Silvia explains the same thing to  
 him. This [redacted] says to leave name and telephone number and he will  
 call back. Silvia gives telephone 11-28-47 (Cuban Consulate).  
 Silvia takes advantage of the [redacted] and states she has moved  
 and wants to advise the Soviet Embassy of her change of address so  
 that she can receive the Boletin. He says to call KOUKHARENKO to  
 give her new address, then asks the name of the Consul or  
 Cultural Attaché. Silvia says the name is Teresa PROENZA and the  
 telephone number is 14-16-26. [redacted] says thanks.

(Friday)

B. 27 Sept 1963 (16:26 Physic City train :)

An unidentified male calls the  
 Cuban consulate, only Silvia Duran  
 →

He says if the American had been there, Silvia says he is there now. He says the American showed papers from the Communists in Washington, that he wants to go to the Soviet Union and be there for a long time with his wife who is Russian, but the answer has not come from Washington in respect to this problem; and according to this procedure it takes four or five months, but without having permission from the Soviet Union they should ask, or better said, they cannot issue a visa here without asking Washington; however, according to this man he showed a letter indicating he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and that the Cubans said that they cannot issue a visa without his having a visa for the Soviet Union, and now FA does not know what to do with him (the American), because they have to wait for the answer from Washington. Silvia agrees the

same problem exists with the Cubans, that the problem is that the American (the American) is that he does not know anyone in Cuba and therefore if that is true it will be difficult for him to get a visa for Cuba, because he was thinking of processing his visa (for Soviet Union), because he knew it would require waiting a long time for his visa to the Soviet Union while in Cuba and from there go to the Soviet Union. MI said the thing is that if his wife right now were in Washington she would receive her visa right now, or permission, from the Soviet Union, to return to her country, she is going to receive her visa in Washington but having this visa, she could communicate to any place this permission, for example here or any place she could receive it (visa or permission) but right now they do not have them. (no las tienen). Silvia says certainly and they cannot give a letter either because they do not know if the visa will be approved. MI says they only give visas according to indications. Silvia says then she will put that on the list. MI says he cannot give a letter of recommendation either because he does not know him (the American) and excuse me for bothering you. Silvia says that is alright and many thanks.

C. 28 Sept 1963 (Saturday), 11:51 Mexico City

~~Silvia~~ Chat in the Cuban Embassy is a North American who was at the Soviet Embassy. It says Wait a minute. Silvia speaks English with some - and comments in Spanish that they gave APOLICIO telephone 1-12-99 and to take the number down. Silvia says ~~she is an American~~ ~~she is going to talk with you~~ ~~she is an American~~ speaks Russian and ~~she~~ speaks in English. They continue in English. American talks broken Russian and says I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minute! American takes phone and asks American in English what does he want? American says Please speak Russian. American says what else do you want? American says I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address. American says I know that. American, in hardly recognizable Russian, says I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it. American says they don't. You come again and leave your address with us, it is not far from the Cuban Embassy. American says I'll be there right away.

-15-the Soviet. Pres

(11)

D. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 10:31 Physics

city train. An unknown male (Kremlin) contacts the Soviet Embassy, the phone number 15-69-87, and says to an unidentified Soviet resident:

~~SECRET~~

~~The secret~~

No... I was at your place last Saturday and talked to your Consul. They said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new? ~~Mr~~ says I'd like to ask you to call another phone number. Please write it down 15-60-55 and ask for a consul. Thank you.

E. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 10:45 Physics

city train:

No (the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian), speaks to OBYEDKOV. He says: This is Lee OSWALD speaking. I was at your place last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the name of that consul. OBYEDKOV says: KOSTIKOV. He is dark (hair or skin??). ~~Mr~~ says yes, my name is OSWALD. OBYEDKOV says, Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they haven't received anything yet. OSWALD says: Have they done anything? OBYEDKOV says: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet. OSWALD says And what...? OBYEDKOV hangs up.

(a Soviet Embassy guard).

7. All of these items,<sup>ready</sup>, were discussed with and examined by Warren Commission Staffers in  
May, and at the ~~Station~~<sup>May 10th</sup> they during  
~~their stay here~~ a stay to from 8 to 13 April  
1964. \*

\* The Warren Commission group that visited  
the May 16 San Pedro canister of Mr. Colley,  
Mr. Flanagan and Mr. Wilkins. They remained  
not only to investigate ~~but~~ intercept  
A-E above but others (see the 27th  
and 28th) and others (see the 29th)  
and sometimes later that helped him  
that appeared to have  
relevance. These have been omitted from  
this summary because the

not been included in this summary because they appear, on review to be extraneous or logical from the Oswald matter on logical or substantive grounds, or both.)  
On the 3<sup>rd</sup> at 10:37 the Soviet Ambassador accounted as

Keeling in mind that the first Embryo ~~the~~  
received many cells pertaining to ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~

visa matters.

On the 27<sup>th</sup> of October, Embassy received a call, from an unknown individual who said he wanted to visas to go to Odessa. He was told the consul was not in and to call back at 1130. Oswald is known to have arrived at the Alaska Royal Bus terminal on Bus #516 at c. 1020 on the 27<sup>th</sup>. It does therefore seem possible ~~to conclude by elimination~~ that ~~it is~~ ~~possible~~ for him to have made this call. Bearing this, it seems unreasonable to believe this call was arranged for the following reasons: (1) the caller wanted visas and specifically for Odessa. Oswald was seeking a visa and never in any other context did he specify Odessa the Black Sea port of Odessa as his destination. (2) the call was directed to the correct ~~incorrect~~ <sup>consular</sup> number: 15-600 55. ~~Oswald seemed~~ ~~desperately~~ to have

to

(On the 1<sup>st</sup> of October -

Oswald first called the wrong number, 15-69-47 (the MT's) number and had to be directed to ~~15-600 55~~

and his way to the correct number, 15-60-55. It seems unlikely he would have made ~~the~~ <sup>want</sup> ~~initial~~ call, on Friday the 27<sup>th</sup>, to the correct consular number and made an incorrect number on 1 October. (3) there is every reason to believe from the context ~~of~~ <sup>in</sup> the intercept A-6 above, that Oswald's first destination after arrival

(3)

and check-in to the hotel was a ~~visit~~  
 visit to the Cuban Embassy. (A) the use of  
 the Spanish language, although named Oswald, Oswald  
 spoke English in most of his conversations,  
 which was unusual. (B) On 3 October at 15:39 an individual  
 who had been staying at the Hotel Mexico,  
 spoke broken Spanish then English, only  
 to the Soviet Embassy and asked for a visa.  
 The Soviet resident, ~~the Soviet~~

Oswald speaks [in broken Spanish] then in English to MI. He says  
 Help. Visa for Russia. MI says Call on the other phone. MI  
 says I'm looking for a visa to go to Russia. MI says Please,  
 call on the telephone of the consul, 15-60-55. MI says One  
 moment please, I'll have to get a pencil to write the number  
 down. They issue the visa there? MI That depends on your  
 conversation. I don't know about this business. Please call  
 the office of the consul and ask your question. MI asks for the  
 number again. MI gives him the number and tells him to ask for  
 the Consul of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. MI says Thanks.

~~The request~~

The Soviet

The request

The Soviet says:

The behavior of this individual is  
 excluded on three grounds: (A) the use  
 of broken Spanish. Oswald throughout  
 used broken Russian or English, he had  
 no competence in Spanish. (B) the substance  
 of the request indicates this a visa request in  
 the first stages of initiation. Oswald had  
~~not~~ (his matter) ~~had~~ with the Cubans any  
 developments

He speaks to a point well beyond the  
 substance of the call. (C) Oswald had  
 left Mexico City, based on all the credible  
 evidence before the early morning of  
 the previous day, ~~left~~ and could not  
 have made this local call.

end foot note

from outside  
from his mother, we can state, or reasonably  
~~suspect~~ following with

that Donald had the ~~opportunity~~  
(made the following  
contacts with the Cuban and Soviet  
official establishments in Mexico City:  
(Friday)

a. 27 Sept 1963. After arrived and checked  
into hotel Donald went at least  
twice to the Cuban ~~Embassy~~  
~~Embassy to the Cuban Embassy~~ ~~Embassy~~  
He talked with Silvia Duran. The  
time of his first visit is unknown. The  
time of his second ~~visit~~ ~~Embassy~~ was  
about 1600 (i.e. just before closing).

Sometime between the two ~~visits~~  
<sup>at the Cuban indication</sup>  
visits, he must have visited the  
~~Soviet Embassy~~ ~~Embassy~~ ~~Embassy~~  
<sup>(we have coverage</sup>  
only on the second Cuban ~~Embassy~~  
visit. ~~Donald~~ Donald presumably  
~~because embassies in a person~~

We have no indication who  
he talked with at the Soviet ~~Embassy~~.  
There was no photographic coverage  
of Donald's entries into either the  
Cuban or Soviet embassies on the 27<sup>th</sup>.  
This the lack of coverage on the  
~~Cuban~~ ~~embassies~~ visit is explainable: the  
camera based on the recollection of  
officer's self as senior ~~as his~~, was down

on the 27<sup>th</sup> because of mechanical  
breakdown. Why Oswald was  
moved to the ~~other~~ installation  
in his ~~two~~ entry to the  
same

is not yet explained.

② (Saturday) 28 Augt 1963. Note: ~~the~~  
~~for the month~~, a ~~visiting~~ ~~laboratory~~  
~~150~~

Databank  
Batty Lision and Soviet Envoys  
~~been closed to Saturday~~  
over technically close to the public  
and Saturdays. Photographic coverage  
was normally suspended Saturday  
and Sundays.

signed the address from this bureau  
and she called the Soviet Comptate  
presumably to permit him to give  
them the address over the phone. Instead,  
the Soviet unit whom Oswald spoke  
with Mrs. Brown's telephone invited  
him back in person and he said  
he would. Presumably Oswald  
thereupon ~~made his top entry~~  
> went back to the  
Soviet installation (his third entry) &  
gave them his Texas address.

RG

c. 29 Sept 1963 (Sunday). No activity  
registered

d. 30 Sept 1963 (Monday). No activity  
registered (it is known that Oswald  
reached space this date on a Megicoltz-  
Karedo Bus, departing 2 October 1963 at  
08:30.)

e. 1 Oct 1963 (Tuesday). Oswald made  
at least two calls to the Soviet Embassy.  
He identified him twice during the  
second call when he talked with  
OB YEVKOV - a guard - and referred  
to his ~~telephone~~ talk on Saturday  
~~which~~ probably with KOSTIKOV. There  
was no photographic coverage  
of Oswald on October. From the  
context of the two calls the morning,  
they would have been no reason  
for him to go to the embassy. His con-

had clearly been placed ~~to~~ at  
 the entrance of the USSR Embassy in  
 Washington. His two calls on the 16th  
~~first~~  
 were concerned with  
 whether any reply had been received  
 from Washington. Under these circum-  
 stances, it is reasonable to believe  
 Oswald would have gone to the  
Soviet Embassy on this date. (The  
camera was missing however at  
at about mid-day it registered the

~~On December 16th~~  
 entry into the Soviet Embassy of a  
 white shirted individual who was  
~~seen by all the photographic crews~~  
~~as the only~~  
~~person~~  
~~who entered the~~  
~~water fountain~~  
~~should be~~

~~a non-latin, and~~  
~~possibly american - who entered~~  
~~the Soviet installation that day. Despite~~  
~~the lack of photographic evidence~~  
~~concerning~~  
~~whether he could be the~~

(On the chance that there could be  
~~an association between the said~~  
~~data derived from the voice intercept~~  
 and the descriptive data derived  
 from the photograph, the station ~~trans~~

(3)

reported  
← ~~contains the two elements in its cables~~  
~~report to Hqs. on the 8 October. The~~  
States' action was not unusual.  
considering the ~~aggressiveness~~ <sup>animosity and irritability</sup>  
states of the Arnold identifications  
and many examples of this kind  
of ~~thing~~ <sup>a general</sup> could be found in the  
day-to-day record of  
States/Hqs. correspondence. But do  
this case, fulfill ~~beginning of~~ partly an  
attempt of ~~to~~ <sup>in</sup> implementation of propaganda  
~~to~~

4. STATION SHOULD PASS INFO REF AND PARA ONE TO ~~the 41st Parallel, K-25, N-26, and L-26~~  
~~TELETYPE, CABLE, OUTLET, AND LOCAL~~ <sup>Temporary</sup> INFO PARAS  
 TWO AND THREE ORIGINATES WITH ~~GENERAL~~.

5. REF AND POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION BEING DISSEMINATED  
 TO STATE, ~~Navy and I.G.N.S.~~  
 TO HQS OF USDAO, ~~ODACID, OSACID, AND OASACID~~. PLS KEEP  
 EGS ADVISED ON ANY FURTHER CONTACTS OR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION  
 OF OSWALD.

END OF MESSAGE

RE CDT: According to ~~ENVY~~ 1 Oct, an American male who spoke broken Russian said his name was Oswald (phonetic) stated he was Sov Emb on 28 Sept when spoke with Consul. He discussed sending a telegram to Washington. No local Dissemination had been made.

T. TELEMESSAGES

ADMN  
ROUTING OFFICER

SR/CIA/Roll (in draft)  
 CI/Liaison/Roman (in draft)  
 CI/SPG/Exterar (in draft)  
 C/WHS  
 WH/COMS

201-283248

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S E C R E T	

Information from 8 Oct - 22 November

9. Mexican stations reported to Hqs on 8 Oct (ref byg. 9 Oct) the following initial information on Oswald:

(Continued)

+ 1902Z ENCL 1 OCT 63, AMERICAN MALE WHO SPOKE BROKEN RUSSIAN AND  
SAID HIS NAME WAS OSWALD (PHONETIC), STATED HE AT SOVIEN ON 23  
SEPT WHEN SPOKE WITH CONSUL WHOM HE BELIEVED TO BE VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH  
KOSTIKOV. SUBJ ASKED SOV GUARD [MAN] OBYEDKOV, WHO ANSWERED, IF THERE  
ANYTHING NEW RE TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON. OBYEDKOV UPON CHECKING SAID  
NOTHING RECEIVED YET, BUT REQUEST HAD BEEN SENT.

~~RE~~ HARD PHOTOS, SAME AS APPEARS RE AMERICAN ENTERING SOVIEN 1916  
~~MURKIN~~ STATION AND 4  
HOURS, LEAVING 1922 ON 1 OCT. APPARENT AGE 35, ATHLETIC BUILD,  
CIRCA 6 FEET, RECEDING HAIRLINE, WEARING TOP, MORE KHAKIS  
AND SPORT SHIRT.

3. NO LOCAL DISSEMINATIONS were being made by the  
stations.

10. On 10 October 1963 at 2012Z fm  
the W/H Division component responsible for  
acting on this report disseminates to  
the Department of State, the FBI and the  
Navy Dept by ~~telegram~~

Assuming electrical transmission in  
the report receives from Mexican stations together

preliminary collateral details drawn from the  
a file source:

Contin

1. ON 1 OCTOBER 1963 A RELIABLE AND SENSITIVE SOURCE IN MEXICO REPORTED THAT AN AMERICAN MALE, WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS LEE OSWALD, CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY INQUIRING WHETHER THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED ANY NEWS CONCERNING A TELEGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO WASHINGTON. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXIMATELY 35 YEARS OLD, WITH AN ATHLETIC BUILD, ABOUT SIX FEET TALL, WITH A RECENTLY HAIRLINE.

2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OSWALD MAY BE IDENTICAL TO LEE HENRY OSWALD, BORN ON 18 OCTOBER 1939 IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, A FORMER U.S. MARINE WHO DEFECTED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN OCTOBER 1959 AND LATER MADE ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH HIS RUSSIAN BORN WIFE, MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA, AND THEIR CHILD. 245

3. THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH ONE IS BEING DISSEMINATED TO YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN MEXICO CITY. ANY FURTHER INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE FURNISHED YOU. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

11. Although the reaction of the headquarters desk was "by the book" and in good time, there were a number of errors in this ~~advisory~~ advisory to the ~~intelligence~~ department which on the record were concerned with the Oswald case!

(a) Oswald's middle name was misspelled: "Henry" for Harvey.

(b) His wife's maiden name was misspelled: "PUSAKOVA" for RKUSAKOVA.

Neither of these errors are significant.

More important was,

(c) Para 2 of the Myrick Sisters' report which had clearly ~~been~~ <sup>and</sup> separate dealing with a concurrent phenomenon,

the description of an unidentified individual observed going out and out of the Soviet Embassy ~~at approximately half~~

I had been asked out to see Oswald as an <sup>alleged</sup> descriptive fact.)

b. A comparison of the two cables was actually the

There <sup>can be no</sup> ~~was~~ question that this ~~was~~ misreading of the Myrick Sisters' report

was an analysts error which required  
 identification of coordinates  
before ~~before~~ <sup>after</sup> release: the descriptive  
 details attributed to Oswald were  
 as far off the mark that they  
would immediately ~~instant~~

immediately recognizable as such  
 by the recipients. (In postal  
 explorations, if out culpable, be it  
 recalled that as of that moment  
~~CIA~~ had no photograph  
 of Oswald to refer to.)

12. Confirmation of the judgment. This  
 is provided by the contents of the  
 cable <sup>composed</sup> sent by the same analyst and  
 sent 2 22 09 Z time [two hours

*lates to Mexico Station!*

*Continued*

1. LEE OSWALD WHO CALLED SOVEMB 1 OCT PROBABLY IDENTICAL  
 LEE HENRY OSWALD (201-289248) BORN 18 OCT 1939, NEW ORLEANS,  
 LOUISIANA, FORMER RADAR OPERATOR IN UNITED STATES MARINES  
 WHO DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 1959. OSWALD IS FIVE FEET TEN  
 INCHES, ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE POUNDS, LIGHT BROWN WAVY HAIR,  
 BLUE EYES.

2. ON 3 OCT 1959 HE ATTEMPTED TO RENOUNCE HIS UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES EMB IN MOSCOW, INDICATING HE HAD APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. ON 13 FEB THE US EMB MOSCOW RECEIVED AN UNDATED LETTER FROM OSWALD POSTMARKED MINSK ON FIVE FEB 1961 IN WHICH SUBJ INDICATED HE DESIRED RETURN OF HIS US PPT AS HE WISHED TO RETURN TO USA IF "WE COULD COME TO SOME AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DROPPING OF ANY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ME." ON 3 JULY ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE HE APPEARED AT THE EMB WITH HIS WIFE TO SEE ABOUT HIS RETURN TO STATES. SUBJ STATED THAT HE ACTUALLY HAD NEVER APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP AND THAT HIS APPLICATION AT

RELEASING OFFICE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

201-287248  
 GROUP I  
 Excluded from automatic  
 downgrading and  
 declassification

10 Oct 63  
 (CONTINUED)

AUTHENTICATING  
 OFFICER

Copy No.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

cc copy

(6)

THAT TIME HAD BEEN TO REMAIN IN USSR AND FOR TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF HIS TOURIST VISA PENDING OUTCOME OF HIS REQUEST. THIS APPLICATION, ACCORDING TO OSWALD, CONTAINED NO REF TO SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. OSWALD STATED THAT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE 13 JAN 1960 IN BELORUSSIAN RADIO AND TV FACTORY IN MINSK WHERE WORKED AS METAL WORKER IN RESEARCH SHOP. OSWALD WAS MARRIED ON 30 APRIL 1961 TO MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAROVA, A DENTAL TECHNICIAN BORN 17 JULY 1941 USSR. NO HQS TRACES. HE ATTEMPTED ARRANGE FOR WIFE TO JOIN HIM IN MOSCOW SO SHE COULD APPEAR AT EMB FOR VISA INTERVIEW. HIS AMERICAN PPT WAS RETURNED TO HIM. US AMS MOSCOW STATED TWENTY MONTHS OF REALITIES OF LIFE IN SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY HAVING EFFECT ON OSWALD.

*an FBI*  
 3. LATEST HQS INTO FAS ~~DATA~~ REPORT DATED MAY 1968 SAYING ~~DATA~~ HAD DETERMINED OSWALD IS STILL US CITIZEN AND BOTH HE AND HIS SOVIET WIFE HAVE EXIT PERMITS AND DEPT STATE HAD GIVEN APPROVAL FOR THEIR TRAVEL WITH THEIR INFANT CHILD TO USA.

CONTINUED

ISSUING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP I  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassificationAUTHENTICATING  
OFFICER

REPRODUCTION

SECRET

OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE PROHIBITED

Copy No.

(B) The Headquarters ~~stated~~ fed back  
of Oswald's correct description should  
have been sufficient <sup>to</sup> ~~in view of~~ details deduced partly  
the incongruity with the photo of  
this unidentified male, to keep these  
two matters apart as investigation facts.)

~~In any case Mexico Station, possibly still~~

~~known~~

on 15 October 1963,

~~(In any case you will have to "Please  
push a photo of Oswald". Headquarters  
electrifiedly delivered to the department of the~~

Wing the following message:

"We have (knows) (sic) Oswald..."

"It is requested that you forward  
to this office as soon as possible  
two copies of the most recent  
~~photographs~~ <sup>of a bone of subject,</sup> (the ~~same~~ <sup>(the same)</sup> ~~subject~~) (we will  
forward them to our representative  
in Mexico, who will attempt to  
determine if the bone Oswald in  
Mexico City and subject are the same  
individual."

~~Headquarters had been advised by CIO [by]  
[to] the time of  
[to] [to]~~

(22 Nov 1963. 2)

¶. Within its limitations and capabilities,

Mexico City Station had done all it could to comply with Headquarters instructions:

- ① Headquarters had been alerted and turned this agency over, <sup>on</sup> investigating anything related in Donald. Head had been alerted both in Prop Washington and in the field.
- ② Mexico City had no further contact by Donald to report because - as it was ultimately voluntary - he had left Mexico City on 2 October. ③ Donald was not an agency investigator's responsibility, in any case. Even with a photograph it would have taken very special efforts to gain by the other interested U.S. agencies to have

make a positive identification is made  
of Bennett's hotel registration under  
alias. This mattox nested at the point  
~~at~~ water mid-story

22 November 1923.

The insertion of the first of the Unidirectional  
individually into the chain of evidence.

15. On 22 November 1963 the Mayor City  
at 221252Z time  
station cabled to Hqgs after learning of the  
Case 24 possibly  
arrest of Lee H. Oswald, in connection  
with the assassination and differences  
and 15  
its earlier letter message of 9 Oct and  
Hq's reply of 10 October. The station  
REQUEST PRIORITY POUCH PHOTO OSWALD SO THAT STATION  
CAN CHECK ALL RECENT ~~WORLD~~ COVERAGE FOR ITEM (FORWARDING  
SOONEST COPIES OF ONLY VISITOR TO SOVEMB <sup>15</sup> OCT WHO COULD  
BE IDENTICAL WITH OSWALD.

Ces 5

16. It is clear that Major Sftion had lost

(4)

forster that according to its own  
communications the unidentified male in  
the photo was "present age 35" and  
that the accurate description of Oswald  
communicated by Hqrs. in the 10<sup>th</sup> precluded  
~~from its identification they regard it as~~  
~~the possibility of the only victim to the~~  
Soviet Embassy on 1 October who could  
be identical", ~~and~~ indeed he.

16. The Station had immediately begun an  
expansion and accelerated review of all  
its technical and photographic intelligence  
as dispatch was prepared in accordance  
with the indications given in the cable of  
22 November, cited in para 15 above. The  
dispatch noted that photo coverage of  
this unidentified individual had been <sup>turned</sup>  
~~discovered~~ up on 4 dates and 15

Notice at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies,  
respectively. The fact of the 22 Nov 1963  
jacketed dispatch was:

- Centurys*
1. Attached are copies of the only photographs obtained ~~on 15 October 1963~~ which appear to be an American. This same man visited the Soviet Embassy on 4 October 1963.
  2. Copies of these photographs were shown to The U. S. Ambassador on 22 November 1963 and a copy of each of the two photographs was given to Chief ~~ENVOY~~ Mexico, on that date.
- FBI

P. S. Photographs dated 15 October 1963 were inserted after typing of dispatch. These were taken as person entered the Cuban Embassy.

Attached were eight photographs: 4 (of which two worked out on reverse) showing the individual in a white shirt and 4 (unmarked on reverse) showing the individual in a black shirt. It seemed very likely that the word "sets" was possibly omitted in the second line of para 2, between "two" and "photographs".

17. That the Station was working under jacketed

draft is apparent from the text of the dispatch, which contains a material post <sup>marked</sup> ~~that~~ (as a postscript).

That post was ~~typed~~ reported simultaneously

by cable to WFO, at 0053 Z time 23 November.

*Centurys*

1. NEXI STATION HAS PHOTOS SAME UNIDENTIFIED AMERICAN TYPE WHO IS POSSIBLY OSWALD ENTERING CUBAN EMBASSY ON 15 OCTOBER. SEARCHING FOR POSSIBILITY PHOTO-DOCUMENTED ENTRY CUBAN EMBASSY OTHER DAYS.
2. ALSO ATTEMPTING ESTABLISH OSWALD ENTRY AND DEPARTURE MEXICO.

Concurrently with the foregoing cable to Sir,  
18. Hamilton, and the other  
<sup>to hope</sup>

The Chief of Stations, Muscatine, spoke directly  
by double talk telephone with the Western Hemisphere  
Chief of Stations, T. C. King, about  
most of what ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~former~~ period is covered in  
and ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~latter~~ part of the ~~period~~ <sup>period</sup> of  
covering the last, ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~earlier~~ <sup>earlier</sup> part of  
covering the last, ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~earlier~~ <sup>earlier</sup> part of

~~from Berlin to Paris~~

and secured permission to give copies of the  
photographs to the legal authorities and to  
make them known.  
(To the Ambassador,) ~~Please let me know if you have~~

is clearly reflected in a pastoral note

by the chief of Sptns to the WH division chief,  
mailed <sup>to the latter</sup> from Dallas together with copies  
of the photographs by the FBI representative

by cable (8244 2 fm, 23 Nov):

FBI agent left here 2000 local  
time with two copies each of  
six photos of a person suspected  
to be Oswald, or, special agent  
for Waller. He is carrying envelope  
with one copy each photo for  
air mail special from Waller  
to T C King at home or per  
telephone conversations with  
SAC. 1 copy of each of the  
three photos plus a copy of  
each of two photos showing  
the same person having  
the Cuban Embark forwarded  
by memorandum bearing  
by regular pouch tonight.  
In view of above has Hqs  
still want a staffer & with  
additional photo(s)?

re. Hq's regarding 0422 2 fm, 23 Nov (563),  
canceling its ~~next~~ immediately preceding  
request:

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. NO NEED SEND STAFFER WITH PHOTOS. WE HAVE ASKED NAVY FOR<br>PHOTOS AGAIN, BUT MEXI CAN SEE OSWALD'S PICTURE SOONER ON THE<br>PRESS WIRE.  |  |
| 2. HAVE JUST RE-EMPHASIZED TO ODENVY HQRS THE SENSITIVITY OF<br>PHOTOS YOU ARE SENDING AND ALSO RELAYED NAMES OF TRAVELERS<br>WITH SIMILAR NAMES. NOTE RADIO SAYS OSWALD LIVED UNDER ALIAS OF<br>O.H. LEE. |  |

who delivered them to the FBI by that date.

cept, the 18<sup>th</sup>

22 November 1963

Doris J. C. KING

Reference is made to our conversation of 22 November in which I requested permission to give the Legal Attaché copies of photographs of a certain person who is known to you.

Attached are copies of each of the photographs we have with the dates of the visits stamped on the back.

At 6 p.m. Mexico time on 22 November, The Ambassador decided that this was important enough to have a member of the Legal Attaché's office take copies of these pictures to Dallas, Texas. The Naval Attaché is making a special flight from Mexico City for this purpose. The Legal Attaché's officer who is going to Dallas has promised to mail this material to you for me.

Copies of these photographs are also being sent by pouch which will leave Mexico City on the night of 22 November 1963.

Best wishes,

Win Scott

According to the side hand comment on this letter, the Legal Attaché's officer was Eldon Rudd.  
~~(The legal attaché had already been appointed.)~~  
~~(One Legation had just made the decision to forward~~  
~~(the photographs to the Dallas FBI)~~

19. The decision to return the photographs to the ~~FBI~~  
 FBI in Dallas had been made by the Ambassador,  
 according to the Chief of Staff's notes summarizing  
 with the FBI agents' departure reported to him

U

24. On the 23rd, at 17:25 2 time, Hq. advised me  
Mexico City:

The FBI says that the photos  
of the man entering the Soviet  
Embassy which Mexico station  
sent to Dallas were not of  
Lee Oswald. Presently Mexico  
station has double checked  
dates of these photos and is  
also checking all pertinent other  
photos for possible shots of  
Oswald.

Nov  
22:48 2 time, 23 Nov 1963

22. And at this point, Mexico City stations  
agreed,

~~Saw~~ Saw photos of Lee Oswald on television  
night of 22 Nov and it obvious  
photos sent to Dallas were not  
identical with Lee Oswald held  
in Dallas. Dates are as given on  
photos.

Mexico station, after all available  
photos of persons entering Soviet  
and Cuban embassies.

(22:54 2 time, 23 Nov 1963)

24. Two hours later the station reported  
the results of ~~the~~ ~~effort~~ of all  
its effort to review all available

(10)

## Coverage:

Complete review of photos of all visitors to Labour Embassy from August through first half of November against good press.  
Photos shows no evidence of Oswald visit. Similar blank against all Soviet Embassy photos from 1 September. Note, only visit we know he made was to Labour Embassy 28 September, Saturday on which Embassy closed and we had no ~~had~~ ~~no~~ ~~had~~ coverage... ~~The day before our meeting~~  
~~against at less a half day~~

36. With this consideration the reader ? The "Unidentified individual" reaches the end of Phase II, the key element of which is the conviction latent, then expressed, that the photographed individual <sup>might</sup> be identical with himself. But still, Mr. This applied especially to Mr. Gurnee, though at a certain point even Mr. moved no rebuttal but held his position <sup>(the word)</sup> fast in spite of ~~of~~ <sup>in</sup> great pressure.

37. This review has attempted to deal somewhat with all items in the case record that have a bearing on what happened. The operational goal, innovativeness and

to high commitment of all involved,  
especially in physical means for itself.  
Equally apparent - because of this -  
the 22-23 advantages of hindsight -  
is the evidence of more performance.  
and, perhaps, additional action  
It was a critical failure, for example,  
that no photo of Oswald was  
made available - though it was  
apparently requested both at headquarters  
and by the field - or that it was  
not more aggressively sought by CIA,  
before the 22<sup>nd</sup> of November. A photo-  
graph of Oswald would have obviated -  
in a way the mere possession of a  
correct physical identity could not -  
the whole successive deterioration

of what began as an ~~unintentional~~  
~~test~~ selection of the photograph on  
 1 October 1963, ~~is~~ into a cause  
celebre ~~but still~~ today.

38. It should be clear ~~above all~~ from this factual survey that since ~~it has been~~ there <sup>is</sup> ~~been~~ a cause celebre with low intrinsic merit. Equally clear, should be the demonstration of the fact themselves that there was nothing contrived or conspired about who is what happened; unless ~~we~~ ... we have now descended to that point in ~~the~~ human values ~~blasted~~ during <sup>2</sup> activities under ~~Stalinism~~ & Stalin in the USSR and under Hitler in Germany, where just a plain mistake is ~~purely~~ ~~unintentional~~.

evidence of conspiracy.

and Development

38. The Genesis of ODUM Exhibit No 1 and  
Commission Exhibit 237  
Special Agent of the FBI, Bardwell

Mosse D. Odum, on 23 November

1963, ~~had after an unsuccessful~~

} showed one of the six photos  
of blown up from Mexico City the  
previous day to Oswald's mother,  
Marguerite Oswald. ODUM himself  
had trimmed this off the background  
by straight cuts. Mrs Oswald ~~and~~  
had no recognition of the image in  
the photograph. Bardwell's own details  
account may be found <sup>among</sup> ~~in~~  
Hearings ~~Exhibits~~, ~~Vol XXI of the~~  
Hearings, op cit, Vol XXI: p. 268,  
~~and with these four~~

39. The photograph shows the unidentified individual in a black shirt. It is one of the 5 photos taken of him in front of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on 4 October 1963, two days after Oswald had left the city.

40. At this point for the record the <sup>phot</sup> total available coverage of the unidentified individual consists of 12 photographs:

(a) 5 taken earlier on 1 October 1963, entering and exiting the Soviet Embassy. He is parked in a light shirt and light colored trousers,

(b) 5 taken on 4 October 1963 in front of the Soviet Embassy. He is parked in a dark, open, button-down dark shirt and dark trousers.

(c) 2 taken on 5 October 1963 in front of the Cuban Embassy

a history of mental instability and was summoned  
recalled from the Army  
for (apparently) an interview related to that fact,  
in August 1966. )

۶

Participated in a conversation at Cuban Embassy  
Employee visa CADIZON, afternoon of  
22 November, 1953. At 1730 Mexico St., Tijuana.

After about .5 hours after the Kennedy assassination in Dallas, Blodgett, a Cuban Embassy employee named Luisa, subsequently identified as Luisa Lopez, received a telephone call from an unidentified male bystander. The caller asked her if she had heard the latest news. Luisa Galdeira gloomily replied: "Yes, of course, I knew it almost before Kennedy.... Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs), what barbarians!..."

R. B. St. John agreed on the arrangement of the  
memorial. "Lynn" also states that party at  
Silvia Dorrian's house had been called off, so it would  
not appear that they were celebrating the  
Death of Kennedy, nor would they know the  
party coincided with burial. Finally she says  
she planned to wear that night with the form of  
of Doctor (a woman)-friend.

conversatio<sup>n</sup>, ~~comes ad hanc. ferme~~  
~~qui est adhuc non satis-~~

~~is~~ is simply highlighting

by the following fact:

- (d) "Luis" is probably identical with  
Miguel Lopez, a cadre member of the  
Cuban Communist Council of National Government  
(CCNN). In this city, he was chief of  
Miguel's City at the time he returned to  
Cuba in 1963 and was reported as working as  
a political propagandist.

(e) The last known element in Mexico City  
in the fall of 1963 was headed by Alberto  
M. R. A. B. C. - ~~See Agent Report~~  
1963, (for him, who had arrived on August  
1963,) ~~for~~ (him), who had arrived on August  
1963, ~~for~~ (him) as the replacement of  
the present teacher's agent (designated 19 Nov  
1963). The agent's last report (as of June  
1964, M. R. A. B. C.'s personnel) was named  
Enrique Velt Perez.

(f) ~~See~~ (for him) ~~See~~ (for him) ~~See~~ (for him)  
Luis Silveira Sabor, Cuban member of  
Luis' conversations with the anarchist  
~~and~~ a Mexican national, who founded  
L. 40's ~~See~~ (for him) his villa (estate), ~~to the~~  
Cuban installation ~~in~~ <sup>known</sup> ~~as~~  
on 27 and 28 September, to the Cuban  
installation ~~probably~~ in connection  
with a ~~new~~ <sup>new</sup> application for entry to  
Cuba. Since ~~see~~ <sup>see</sup> ~~see~~ <sup>see</sup> the sole basis  
without which regarding L. 40's entry, in  
Mexico City. For testimony, however, in its  
entirety was taken and presented orally by the  
Mexican government ~~the authorities~~ ~~the~~

(A direct confrontation with her by  
the woman ~~convinced~~ it ~~was~~ exaggerated. The

repeated in the Persian authorities). This

from Silvia Brown's ~~test~~ statement that it was known that she became engaged in an altercation on 27 September with Spelman.

*Emilia Agassiz.*

(f) Manuel Eugenio VELA, Pérez, & Flores  
and his Dr. assistant, Rogelio RODRÍGUEZ  
LÓPEZ were positively identified (July 15  
1964) by two independent sources as  
engaged in the active development and  
facilitation of the training of agents for  
the purpose of assassination, General  
Constitution SONORA. VELA ~~etc.~~ of  
established, etc. ~~in~~ Mexico  
(cont'd)

City during ~~the~~  
Cawell's stay there  
27 Sept. 23d 1963. Visit principal  
libraries segment was presented to the organiza-

He left Mexico City (for Havana) on 3 Nov  
1963 & returned until 16.  
~~At present~~ It was officially reported that  
he left that all individuals going to Cuba,  
legally or illegally, must prove they're  
himself. He took the background  
data and sent it to Cuban for  
some checking, a procedure which

numerous took place.

My neighbour's  
Cacique of the Corle

There is no evidence in this record case  
of it that Black labour was subjected  
to a systematic discrimination - organization  
that dictated less work.

I would have related her ~~admitted~~

festivals with Coward, ~~and~~ — confr-  
imposition and

confirmed by intercepts with the

W. H. Abbott

data sheet in your file on the  
[Signature] 17

~~Winged~~ Earwig ~~etc.~~ — for its ~~parts~~ <sup>possessives</sup> and

method - in Mexico City. Was it normal

for a case like Bowditch's operation. — May 12.

it, from the allegedly made with Scott -

for its application to medical reality.

for its application to medical society  
by a local organization had a license

Accus.)

in which slot had been taken earlier in  
the chief ~~of~~ ~~of~~ whatever. Whatever the answer  
to this question, there remains the more  
fundamental question: Would the accepting  
the Baron story on its face, could it  
have happened without the following  
above cited knowledge and participation?  
This reply ~~is~~ ~~not~~ It is doubtful that  
the reply could be other than a solid negative  
and in that case, it is palpable that Costas  
~~was~~ ~~could~~  
~~intelligence and security service~~ ~~that~~ ~~there~~  
~~was~~ ~~more in it~~ file than has been surfaced  
in the Baron ~~his~~ statements. ) This ~~in turn~~,  
this suggests that

Coming back to the beginning: "him a —  
member of the ~~but not in~~ therefore  
Lester Goldstein ~~as a~~ ~~as a~~ ~~as a~~ ~~as a~~ could  
very well have had information that  
"Baron" something.

(b)

wanted much what she said to be unidentified.

Caller has of a coast.

(caller has a mother 71)  
more substantial than a most foul self indulgence

had an opportunity concealed.

This was examined at the time.

RECORDED BY TELETYPE  
AT 10:45 A.M. ON JUNE 10, 1968  
IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK  
BY THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT  
INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION  
COMMERCIAL RECORDING SECTION

(b)

given Duran, substituted interpretation for  
high information or personal relations with  
CIA, 1967.)

The left-to-right review in hindsight of  
the Solis Duran testimony shows him magnified  
already. (In that context of criticism it should  
also be mentioned to reconsider the implications  
of this)

of the Intercepted telephone conversation  
on 28 November 1963.

(Intervenor after Cuban incident, DORTICOS

and C.P. Ambassador to Mexico, Jauregui

item number four, because the thrust of  
the conversation dealt with the nature of

question whether Solis Duran had made  
any statement

that had been forced to make, any admissions  
about money payments by other

Mexican interrogators.)

As to September 1963 Solis Duran took  
credit for his Cuban Embassy visit. In the spring

of 1967. Julia's Brian was reported by a  
and sometimes  
would seem to have withdrawn at all  
relations with Brian. ~~but that~~ ~~not the~~  
~~time she got off the phone~~

described the

her account of how  
~~illustrating that she had been taken into custody~~  
and has been interrogated after the administrative  
detention

injected  
but not at substantially what was already  
known. ~~she added,~~ ~~that she did~~  
under circumstances

below

that did not permit the source to challenge  
or limit ~~the~~ corroborative detail, that she

go out with Mr. during his stay in Paris  
etc., and ~~etc.~~, obtained only such general

information with known

(in Hqrs)

He is wearing a dark, collared  
T-shirt or light sweater.

The negatives of all of them are extant and are now  
held as integral parts of the Oswald <sup>files holding</sup> and related.

#### 41. The result of ODVM's display of

the photograph - the repeat, a cropped  
version of one of those notes under  
para 40(h), above - was Mrs. Marguerite  
Oswald's allegation that she had been  
shown a picture of her son's killer,

Ted Kennedy, a day before he perpetrated  
the deed! Again, the Warren Commission

Report, ~~see testimony~~

(pp. 364-5, 367) ~~disbunking~~  
disposes of this erroneous charge ~~and~~  
~~will not be repeated here~~

and requires no repetition here. <sup>13</sup>

A complicating fact ~~which~~ <sup>developed along</sup>  
the way was Mrs. Oswald's <sup>incorrect</sup> (correct)

observations when she finally admitted before the Commission that the Odum photograph ~~was~~ was not Ruby, was that the photo had been cropped differently from the one she had been shown (Major Mallings cropped her face in Dallas). Exhibit 237 (See Hearings, Vol XVI, p. 638).

Hennings, Vol XVI, p. 638). The net effect of these developments in the opinions of the commission was to require the admission of the photograph in evidence as a ~~specimen~~ <sup>original</sup> of degradation beginning with Obina, including the FBI lab technician, James R. Mallay (who had ~~truncated~~ <sup>trimmed</sup> the photograph used by the Commission in Washington) and Mr Holmes, ~~both~~ whose photograph had ~~original~~ <sup>been</sup> seized for the originator. These documents speak

for themselves and will be found  
in the Hearings, Vol. XI pp. 468-70.

43. Mexico City Station and other senior  
agency officers strongly advised  
~~that~~ against the publication of the ~~picture~~  
photograph in any form on the grounds  
that the Soviets ~~would~~ would  
be immediately alerted to the existence  
of a useful and still continuing U.S.  
intelligence operation and the operation  
would go down the drain. (This advice  
was not taken.)

Despite repeated cable exchanges  
and contact with the  
this to

There were repeated replies on this point  
between Headquarters and Mexico City

station flora during the summer of 1964 and in particular from 23 September to 15 October 1964 when the Station Head had plans underway to abandon the operation.

43. The field needs of the Warren Commission presented no serious problem.

44. In acceding to the Warrent Commission request for a deposition Mr Helms, then the Deputy Director for Operations responded to Mr Rankin by memorandum on 25 June 1964 outside forces included the following additional observation:

"The Central Intelligence Agency

recommend that this photograph  
not be reproduced in the  
Commission's report because  
it would jeopardize a secret  
confidential and productive  
operation. In addition, it could  
be embarrassing to the  
individual involved who as  
far as this Agency is aware had  
no connection with Lee Harvey  
Oswald or the assassination  
of President Kennedy;

In this instance)

45. The needs of the Commission  
prevailed over the ~~Hoffman~~ Del's  
statutory obligation to protect sources  
and methods. The "unidentified  
individual" remains to this day  
misidentified and there is no  
<sup>as yet</sup> creditable evidence to rebut the  
assertion made by Mr. Kilbey in  
the concluding sentence of his  
memorandum to Mr. Roach on  
23 June 1964, ... And the photo opera-

ators did, as predicted, go down the drain. Within a few weeks of the public exposure of the Odum Exhibit and No 1 and Commission Exhibit 237, members of the Soviet Embassy began systematic efforts to survey buildings, either publicly or privately for rental space, but clearly their purpose was directed to squatting places known to them. The operators was certainly in any case, within a year it had fully become almost totally unproductive in coverage on American in contrast with the Embassy - a clear sign that this category of visitor had been was being warned away by the Soviets themselves.

INDEX OF CONTENTS SELECTED  
DOCUMENTATION FROM BEARING  
ON THE "UNIDENTIFIED"  
PHOTOGRAPH OF THE  
INDIVIDUAL

1. Mexico Station <sup>6453</sup> ~~telephone~~  
(IN - 36017) 9 October 1963. 1 page
2. CIA Headquarters <sup>electrical</sup> ~~telegraphic~~  
dissemination to Department  
of State, FBI and <sup>to</sup> Department  
of the Navy. (DIR - 74673), 10  
October 1963, <sup>(2 pages)</sup>  
~~20:12 2 times.~~
3. CIA Headquarters cable to Mexico  
Station (out 74830), 10 October 1963,  
22:09 2 times. 3 pages

(2)

4. Mexico Station telegram 6534  
(IN-40357), 15 October 1963, 1  
page; and, CIA Headquarters  
electrical dissemination to  
the Department of the Navy, 23  
October 1963, 1 page.
5. Mexico Station telegram 7014  
(IN-66781), 22 November 1963, (1 page)  
(22.00 2 times.)
6. Priority Dispatch from Mexico  
City Station (HMMA - 22533),  
22 November 1963. [Encloses copies  
of photos of the unidentified individual  
taken 1, 4 and 15 October 1963.]  
1 page and attachment.
7. Mexico Station telegram 7019  
(IN 66846), 22 November 1963,  
(1 page. 500:53 2 times)
8. Private letter by Chief of Station,  
Mexico, Mr. Win Scott to Chief  
of WH Division, Mr. TC King,

(3)

22 November 1963.

9. Mexico Station telegram 7021  
(IN - 66896), 23 November 1963. 1  
page. *02:44 2 times*

*on Mexico Station telegram -*

10. CIA Hqs. telegram to Mexico  
station, DIR - 84822, 23 Nov  
1963. (1 page. *04:22 2 times*)

11. Mexico Station telegrams,  
7027 (IN - 67189), 23 Nov 1963.  
20:43 2 times. 1 page.

12. Mexico Station telegrams  
7025 (IN 67186, 23 Nov 1963  
~~20~~:34 2 times) and 7033 (IN -  
67232, 23 Nov 1963, 22:46 2 times).  
[Forward transcript texts.]

(100%)

1. → of Mexico Station telegram, 07020 (In-66891),  
23 Nov 1963, 0231 2 times.

2. CIA Hqs. telegrams to Mexico Station,  
DIR - 84821 and 84822, 23 Nov 1963,  
0136 2 times and 0422 2 times, respectively.  
1 page, each.

3. Mexico Station telegram, 7027 (In - 67189),  
23 Nov 1963, 2043 2 times. 1 page.

12. Mexico Station telegram 7023, 23 November  
1963. 16:59 2 times. [Forward transcript  
information] 2 pages

~~At DIA's Request~~

- CIA  
13. Hqs. telegram to Mexico Station, ~~7028~~  
(DIR - 84888), 23 Nov 1963, 17:29 2 times.  
1 page

- New item 14. [This is Mexico 7025 & 7033, which you  
already have.]

15. Mexico Station telegram 702-  
(In-67189)  
16. Mexico Station telegram 70291, (23 Nov 1963,  
20:48 2 times.)

17. Myioe Station 7035 (Inv-67235),  
23 Nov 1963, 225# 2 tons.

18. Memorandum For the Record by Chief Information Station, Physics, "14 April 1964. Subject: Visit by Press Staff Representatives of Warren Commission. 3 page and covering dispatch (HAMA 23289, 14 April 1964)

~~Text 1~~  
19-23. ~~Text 1~~ Intercept 27, 28 September, over 1, 3 October 1963. 2 for 27 and 28 texts in both Spanish and English, for 1E and 3A, in English translators only).

24-26. Two photographs of unidentified individual entering and leaving Soviet Embassy, (1 October 1963.)  
*(Physics City, Ztoban)*

27-29. Two photographs of unidentified individual in front of Soviet Embassy, Physics City, 4 October 1963.  
*(Ztoban)*

30. Two photographs of unidentified individual taken in front of Cuban Embassy, 15 October 1963.

31-34. Mexico Notes - CIA Hq. correspondence,  
{ 3 July 3

{ 18, 29 May and 26 June and  
3 July 1967 relates to negative of  
photographs notes at 24-30, above.

35. letter by DIA Deputy Director for Plans,  
Mr Helms to Mr. T. Lee Ruckin, 23  
July 1967. 1 page.

36-7. Text of affidavits by Bushnell D.  
ODUM, ~~James~~ R. MALLEY and Richard  
Helms. Hearings, vol. XI, pg. 468-70.

UNCLASSIFIED

38. Reproductions of Odum Exhibit No 1  
and 20 (Hearings, vol XX, p 691) and  
Commission Exhibit 237 (Hearings  
vol XVI, p. 638). UNCLASSIFIED

39. Extracts from Warren Commission Report, page 364-5 and 667, dealing with the photograph of the unidentified individual. UNCLASSIFIED

40. A Selection of Postment Documents  
 reflecting CIA and Mexico Stations  
 Reactions to and Handling of the  
 Warren Commission Publications of  
 the Photo of the Unidentified  
 Individual, September - October 1964

41. letter by CIA General Counsel, Lawrence R. Horowitz to the Honorable Bernard T. Baker, Orleans District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana,  
 16 May 1967. 2 pages. UNCLASSIFIED

42. Correspondence with Harry L. Brown  
 4, 17 April, 1970. 3 pages.  
Unclassified

83. Correspondence with Mr. Paul L.  
HOCHS, dated 15 November 1971 and  
24 and 14 Dec. 1971. 8 pages. UNCLAS-

SIFTED

44. Correspondence ~~with~~ and related to  
the Request by ~~the~~ Canadian Government with Mr.  
Bernard Feinstenwald Jr. dated 22  
1971, 8 April (2 MORS); 9-18 February  
1972; 24 Feb - 6 March 1972; 11-13  
April 1972; 26 and 27 June 1972; 28 July  
and 12 August 1972; and, ~~various~~  
<sup>numerous</sup> ~~various~~ <sup>including</sup> ~~including~~  
by Mr Houston to Director, FBI on  
11 October 72 together with two supporting  
pages, a cable to the Mexican States  
dated 3 October 1972 and a memo of  
interview, dated 11 October, 1972.  
43: pages.

cc/ Ogs

Subject: Review of Selected Items in the  
Lee Harvey Oswald File re  
Allegations of the Covert Cuban  
involvement in the John  
F. Kennedy Assassination.

~~Review and Summary~~  
The attached, was written at  
the express request of Mr David W. Belin,  
as a follow up to question #3  
of his letter to the Agency of 15 April  
1975.

The results - as I have already told  
him - add nuance, not evidence, to  
what the Warren Committee and its  
staff had laid before them in 1964.  
*Belief and/or  
the evidence  
on the subject*

The results of the review are stipulated  
at the outset at para 8 of the attach-

ment.

Specs.  
B & W photo  
The documentation on which  
this info is based -

This is a copy of a press release to the  
media of the FBI Photo graph - the -  
Unidentified Individual, submitted  
a few weeks ago.

8/11/68 one date

There seemed to be no reason to  
~~copy~~  
attach the copies of the ~~the~~ report  
from the file to this summary. These  
can be made ~~promptly~~  
available however, with a  
request.

I:

①

Background Saturday evening,  
 On September 7, 1963, Fidel Castro, in  
 an act unusual for him, appeared at  
 a Brazilian Embassy reception in Havana.  
 Even more unusual Castro submitted  
 to an informal interview by the  
 Associated Press correspondent Daniel  
 HARKER'S.

HARKER'S interview reached New York  
 on Sunday, September 8<sup>th</sup>, and was  
 in print throughout the country on  
 Monday September 9<sup>th</sup>. There can be  
 no question from the facts surrounding  
 which had not been expected,  
 the Castro appearance, and his agreement  
 to the interview, that this went beyond  
 a mere - than - ordinary  
 attempt to get a message thought  
 registered on the record in the

to Castro's statements  
United States. The ~~Harker interview~~  
~~consisted~~  
to HARKER covered a range of topics  
but dealt principally  
today (with ~~other~~ American  
political leadership, with ~~the~~ in particular  
the President Kennedy whom he  
excoriates in extraordinary prosocative  
fashion ("... Kennedy is a cretin"; "... the  
Batista of his times ... the most opportunist  
American President of all time."). There  
~~was~~ <sup>no</sup> reference to Senator Goldwater.

The interview had other content -  
~~such~~ misimplementations, reference  
to Senator Goldwater, and Cuban delay  
in signing the limited nuclear test  
there were significant differences  
between and was ~~notably~~ played by  
<sup>(also the</sup> <sup>Times</sup>  
US newspaper; the New York <sup>Times</sup> and  
Washington, ~~where they~~ with a result

that Castro's "message" was significantly modulated.

In New Orleans, where he ~~had~~<sup>was</sup> resided until the middle of September

1963, this HARKER story appeared in the principal morning newspaper, the Times-Picayune on Monday, Sept 9, page seven under a three column headline: "Castro Blasts Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leader Impelled by Aid to Rebels." ) ~~The~~

The story then followed under the Harker by-line:

| The New York Times, in its coverage on Sept 9<sup>th</sup> used a UPI wire service report which omitted any reference to the warning and threat

on the Kennedy assassination that this  
<sup>by the beginning</sup>  
 Coste interview was considered, in  
 following up leads, or in dealing  
 with the Warren Commission and  
 its staff, ~~objectively except for a~~  
 although Mexico States  
 specifically directed Hqs. attention  
<sup>very shortly</sup>  
 to the AP story ~~transmitted~~ (apts. the  
There is no evidence either, that the Warren Commission  
Dallas ~~that~~ killing <sup>staff, it self, pursued</sup> ~~was~~ implication  
of this Coste interview in dealing with the  
conspiracy hypothesis.

The purpose of this review is to  
 reconsider Lee Harvey Oswald's activity  
~~but also in the light of~~ on the assumption  
~~that he~~ (avid newspaper reader ~~etc.~~)  
 that as an  
~~were~~ which we know from  
Mariia Oswald's (testimony) and others -  
 he read the ~~that~~ Coste warning  
 and threat as reported above.

The results of the review - admittedly  
 heavily ~~utilizing~~ <sup>utilizing</sup> ~~dictated by~~ of the 20-20'  
 quality of hindsight - may be  
 stipulated in summary:

- credible
- ① There is no increment of evidence ~~of~~  
~~of~~ <sup>and /</sup> Soviet or Cuban political,  
 intelligence or security service involvement  
~~with respect to~~ to what was developed and  
 considered by the Warren Commission  
 and its staff. ~~that~~ <sup>to the extent the</sup> The Commission's  
~~findings~~ <sup>findings</sup> therefore, (that LEO was the killer  
~~on the basis of credible evidence~~)  
 of JFK and officer Tippett and did  
~~and of his own determination~~  
~~them in alone, must stand.~~

- ② "credible evidence" that would ~~not~~ <sup>upset</sup> ~~change~~  
 significantly as modifies this judge did (and does)  
 not exist in Washington ~~for Mexico~~  
~~) but it~~  
~~is clear that such evidence could~~

exist in Moscow and Havana,  
whose voluntary inputs to the Warren  
Commission, ~~suppose~~ <sup>or</sup> will

prove minimal in  
quantity and to facilitate, ~~design~~  
<sup>design</sup>

~~they design to assist me~~ cover  
up any ~~link~~ connection by way  
of Oswald which might be connected  
directly or indirectly with the  
assassination. ~~The world~~ ~~should~~

### Conclusion of the

~~Report~~ <sup>As a belief</sup>  
~~judgment~~, ~~sustainable beyond the~~  
~~point of reasonable doubt~~, ~~which~~  
~~that there was indeed a ~~link~~ link~~  
~~or a ~~link~~~~

Soviet and/or Cuban (KGB and/or  
DGS) connection will persist,  
and grow with time, until there  
has been a full disclosure by  
the governments of all ~~operative~~  
~~elements of Oswald's~~ ~~but also~~  
in the Soviet Union,

and his  
contacts in Mexico City are  
made available by these two  
governments. The Warren Commission  
Report should have left a wider  
"window" for ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Contingency~~

of this kind and that indeed was the opinion at the working level, particu-  
larly in the Committee's intelligence  
component in 1964.



as noteworthy, in the light of the  
the conclusions ~~and the~~  
~~of great importance~~

*other* *sunbeam* *and*  
*these* *are* *diminutive*  
*below*, *steep*-*by*-*stem*.

- (d) Cast's warning and threat of "Suffice  
her 1963 comment to us if Edward did  
indeed need to do it. He will be unwise  
to consider ~~any~~<sup>any</sup> action to corroborate  
~~any~~<sup>any</sup> of the  
of great potential significance

(great)  
of great potential significance. Extended  
etc.  
in the legal  
important people  
of concerned pathological patient's attendants.

pathological condition of Oswald  
from progressive glioblastoma. His  
identification made up and  
with his wife giving birth to his  
and by Carlson.

Boring Brook

and Cuban revolution which is directly  
traceable as far back as the Marine  
Corps service in El Toro, California.)

If Oswald read Castro's threat and warning?

Christie

*Gulft round ssp.*

Coston's statement to AP Correspondent  
Horner - irrespective of the extent  
whether there was any formal meeting  
or even secret, secret contact with  
Oswald by the Cuban or the Russian  
agents here.

could never have acts of singular  
negligence and under no circumstances  
~~probable~~ as conceivable the fact  
allows refraction for what the Cuban angles  
were being during the summer of 1963,

which ~~represented~~ gave the interview its real significance. The Washington Post  
~~abbreviated~~ did a rewrite (Sept 9, p. A-7) which,  
similarly, omitted any reference to the  
main thrust of Carter's remarks. The  
Evening Star printed the Haskin story  
nearly in its entirety ~~but buried it~~  
in the secondary section of the paper  
(S Sept 6, 1963, page B-4). But reordered  
the content of the Haskin interview,  
placing the emphasis of the Ad political  
aspects - in particular highlighting the Gold-  
water element ~~which~~ and burying  
the Carter's explicit ~~the~~ warning to U.S.  
leadership in the middle ~~part~~ of  
this piece.

(b)(6)(B)  
(b)(7)(C)  
(b)(7)(D)

There is no evidence in the files (b)

with or without its knowledge or,  
more precisely, the knowledge of the  
President's brother, Robert Kennedy,  
who was personally involved with  
oversight Cuban matters at the  
Federal level after the Bay of Pigs  
failure.

(d)

(e)

~~Retained~~ <sup>testimony</sup>  
Cuban Contact with Oswald, Santa Clara, California, in

1959? The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains <sup>an</sup> ~~an~~  
<sup>RE</sup> ~~the~~ factors of genuine significance to any  
 review of the background of LHO's feelings  
~~toward and past~~ and relations with Castro Cuba. Ad office

Other Agency record is ~~unavailable~~.

Delgado was probably the closest non-group  
 member to Oswald during <sup>his</sup> ~~specialist~~ training  
 period at El Toro Marine Corps base ~~base~~

Dec 58 - Sept 1959. The Warren Commission ~~found~~  
 takes note of this:

"Oswald told Delgado that he  
 was in touch with Cuban diplomatic  
 agents in this country; which Delgado  
 at first took to be "one of his acts  
 his, but later believes,"

---

2. Report of the President Commission on  
 Assassination of President John F. Kennedy  
 (Wash. 1964), p. 687. Hereafter cited as,  
Report.

With respect to Oswald's testimony, say, or, at more of possibly questionable significance than is reflected by the language of the report and does not appear to have been somehow or disclosed by investigation. With the record of Oswald's <sup>the beginning of</sup> beginning relationships with the Cubans I start with a question mark.

Belfar  
The period was one of transition in US-Cuban relations after Castro's takeover. Both DeGolyer, and Delgado at the outset, were under Castro supporters, disposed <sup>initially</sup> to being particularly keen about how to get them. Delgado testified:

"... I didn't know what to tell him, as I told him the best thing that I know was to get in touch with a Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time that I told him this we were on friendly terms with

Cuban, you know, is in the moment now  
subversive to our administration, you know.  
I didn't know what to answer him.  
I told him to see them.

"After a while, he told me he was in  
contact with them ....

"... I seen this envelope in his foot locker,  
well-locked, and it was addressed to  
him, and they had an official seal  
on it, and as far as I could remember  
that was mail from Los Angeles, and  
he was telling me there was a Cuban  
consul. And just after he started reading  
this letter (you know, he would  
never go out & keep stay near the  
post all the time) ....

"... he had one visitor. after he started  
receiving letters he had one visitor.  
It was a man, because I got the  
call from the Warden Shacks, and  
they gave me a call that Donald  
had a visitor at the front gate. This  
man had to be a civilian, otherwise they  
would have let him in. So I had  
to find somebody, Mr. James Donald, who  
was our guard, to go down there to  
visit with this fellow, and they spent  
about an hour and a half, hours  
talking, I guess, and he come back.  
I don't know what the man was  
or what they talked about, but he  
looked wonderful about the whole

them when he come back... we were meeting  
he's been very, nothing.

"The incident. How long did it take him to bring  
it up you remember?

"The Salgozo, about an hour and half, 2  
hours..."

"The incident. You never asked Donald what this  
fellow was that he talked to?

"The Salgozo. No. No....

"The incident. Did you connect this visit that  
Donald had at that time with the Cuban  
Comandos?

"The Salgozo: I did; because I thought it  
funny for him to be receiving a call  
at such a late date - time. Plus, up to  
this time he hardly ever received mail; i  
first he always received mail from home  
because I made it a policy ~~impossible~~  
~~very difficult~~ to receive mail from them,  
because I wouldn't

I used to pick up the mail on one hand  
and distribute it to the guys in there, and  
very seldom did I see one for him. But  
only as often, after he started to get in  
contact with these Cuban people, he starts  
getting letters from his and letters newspaper.

"... and he also started receiving  
letters, you know, and one broken,  
meager pamphlet, you know, little - like  
sheets, things can get from almost, you  
know, but it wasn't a sheet.

"Mr. Lubetkin. Were they written in Spanish, or  
of them, do you know?  
Mr. Delgado. Not that I can recall; no.

"Mr. Lubetkin. Did you have any reason to believe  
that this thing came to Oswald from the  
Cuban communists?

"Mr. Delgado. Well I took it for granted that they  
did after I seen the eagle know....some-  
thing like a Mexican eagle, with a big,  
impressive seal you know. They had  
different colors on it, red and white; almost  
looked like our colors, you know, but  
I can't recall the seal. I just knew it was  
in Latin, almost, something like that I  
can't understand. It was written.

"Mr. Lubetkin. You don't know for sure whether  
it was from the Cuban communists?

"Mr. Delgado. No. But he had told me part, just before I found out they were, so in  
his word locker, that he was receiving  
mail from them, and one time she,  
offered to show it to me, but I wasn't  
much interested because at the time we  
had ~~the~~ work to do, and I never  
did ask to see that paper again, you  
know.

"Mr. Lubetkin. Did he tell you what his co-  
respondence with the Cuban communists  
was about?

"Delgado. No, he didn't.

"He said this, did he ever indicate to you that it had to do with the conversation, what you had about giving over to Castro?"

"He didn't. No. The only thing he told me was that right after we had this conversation with the Cuban people was that he was going to — once he got out of the Service he was going to South America...." 2

---

2. Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. (Part 304) Vol. III: 241-243.

Hereafter cited as, Hearings.

(On 27 Sept 1959 he was issued a US passport valid for travel among other places for one year.)

Albert

Conrad's application to Somerville College, Chelmsford, Switzerland was dated 19 March 1959, and he was presumably granted leave to leave on 21 April 1960. In view of his desire for discharge from the Marines on 7 Dec 1959, Conrad accelerated his trip in alleged pursuit of family members living in Sept 1959. He entered the Soviet Union from East Poland on 15 October 1959.

Delgado's testimony in his case of credibility, denying that it is less of basic importance to focus attention on the next victim rather than on the contact of JV at Plaza El Torecours and

(unique to ~~US-Cuban~~ records) extremely  
 The point was probably made to indicate that there is no  
 (no known information available in the U.S. papers or after  
 my inquiry about Oswald's activities in the U.S. before or after  
 October, 1963, from the intervals 1/2 and 2 hours.) The  
 record reflects no ~~good/good~~ identification of  
 this contact. Agency's presumption is that the  
 (was friendly) <sup>(assuming that)</sup>  
 Cuban Comandante is his brother. The question  
 (before) is: was this reporting to Havana  
 that would represent, at a minimum guess,  
 the opening of a file on Oswald? <sup>3</sup>

=====

US-Cuban diplomatic and consular relations  
 were severed on 3 January 1961.

(3)

(4)

Indication of insufficient funds by CP  
cell leaders to build Committee Labora, H.D., Guatemala  
 States forwarded to FBI on 9 January 1964  
 a duplicate copy of a report sent by a  
 penetration leader dated 5 January 1962  
 describing event at the year CP cell  
 meeting. The cell leader, Moscoso DEVINE  
Zabala told CP he said that the  
 Communist Party in Guatemala should  
 form a single new party: "We need  
 not preoccupy ourselves over the politics  
 of President Kennedy because we know,  
 according to prognostications, that he will  
 die within the present year, 1962."

This report apparently had been discounted  
 by the FBI <sup>when</sup> Gatson but it had been received  
 and was not forwarded until the States  
 received all of its material <sup>(after the)</sup> in compliance

assassinations. The file includes no follow-up  
journal <sup>(of the report)</sup> or dissemination information. It has not been  
possible to determine whether the necessary  
instructions in that regard.

(b)

Emigrante Press by Cuban Third Secretary  
to the USSR, 7 Nov 1963. It says his liaison

source, reporting after the Kennedy assassination,  
indicates that at the Soviet reception on 7 Nov

1963, <sup>this</sup> Cuban Third secretary Ricardo SANTOS  
(see) <sup>L.</sup> <sup>refugee.</sup> (discussed the recent) Cuban initiative

with on Cuba and thus implication  
with a host country deportee, concluding  
with this ~~philosophy~~ admonition: "...just  
wait and you will see what we can  
do. It will happen soon." Asked to  
be more specific about what would  
happen soon Santos replied: "Just  
wait, just wait."

(Third Article)

(These facts were passed to the Warren  
Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964.  
Santos was subsequently reported to have a

Aug 1864. The following day, I took a walk up the creek.

Person transmission reported as "initially  
demonstrated" allegation of a conspiratorial  
contact between Oswald and agent of  
the Cuban government has been investigated

5. Jan., Kehlert, p. 3<sup>o</sup>5 ff.

Mr. H. C. St. John's  
and stations in the Chilean,  
Among these cases, which contained numbers  
of specimens in figs. and about one  
million, the 751 in its 15-mm. of the  
Nicaraguan working - 26 November 1863 - collected  
at SILVADOC (2) the song of Paras  
(in Cozumel and Guadalupe).  
NOTAS VILLASQUEZA (3). The extinction of  
the "Eurasie". See -

John Ferguson, in New York (the  
former) First Church Street, in

San Francisco, California and 5)

Roy Dobbins

The Alvarado case is discussed in detail by the Warren Commission under the cryptograph "D".<sup>6</sup> ~~The threat to~~ <sup>taken up</sup> Alvarado claims

6. See, REPORT, pp. 307-308.

~~account to~~  
that he had seen an American, whom he identifies as Oswald, receive money sometime in mid-September 1963 in an open spot Cuban consulate in Mexico City. Alvarado's story was ultimately ~~checked~~ and ~~the conclusion reached that he was lying~~

~~by the Commission~~  
[the use of the polygraph, <sup>in</sup> Cuban  
Alvarado's deceptions, and the bringing  
Oswald's Nicaraguan security

service control into the case. ~~thereby~~

Alvarado

The Alvarado story is particularly acute representation of the difficulties that beat the validators of observed evidence's ~~to know when it occurs~~ certain elements of this other story persist despite the upgradement of its major premises. In this case ALVARADO — whose account did not become public until the publications of the Warren Report in October 1964 — failed consistently of the presence in the transaction <sup>as labor organizer</sup> ~~of~~ substituted for a Negro with red-dyed hair.

Eugenio Carrillo de Poyz <sup>Mexico</sup> is a unusual, articulate and socially prominent <sup>collector</sup>, collector,

married, but separated, from a high ranking Mexican foreign service official. She is, also, the cousin of Horacio Duran, the husband of Silvia Duran, ~~and thus the mother~~  
~~of~~ listed above. ~~by name~~  
~~of~~ There is a strong personal antipathy between the two women arising descending from Elena Gárrido's trenchant anti communism.

~~Charles Edward Thomas~~ From October 1964 until his retirement in the fall of 1969, the former ~~the political~~  
Charles Thomas) a U.S. Embassy Officer, persistently kept up a steady stream of reports and memoranda reflecting GARRIDO's account of what actually had gone on between Oswald, the Cuban and <sup>at</sup> <sup>Silvia</sup> particularly Duran in September 1963; ~~Dark station~~ including ~~etc~~ a repeated reference to a Negro with ~~etc~~

The first reference to the ~~Carrasco~~  
 story ~~was~~ was noted in  
 Mexico Station  
 in the ~~Chronicle~~ of Record dated  
 12 Oct 1864.

Elena GARRIDO (said) that she and her daughter were invited to a party at the Cuban Embassy during the period she now finds out that Oswald was here in Mexico prior to the Amistad. She was invited by a Mexican Senator in the Cuban Embassy whose husband is a cousin of the Carrasco family (Francis Duran). At the party she saw the three gringos, not drinking, not mixing and more or less just standing around together like 'three lumps on a log'. They were so obviously out of place, she called someone in the Cuban Embassy about them and was told that "they were just passing through." She claims that on the very day these three gringos stood up she took a good look at them and her daughter. When this was also occurred and Oswald's picture was spread to the newspapers, both Elena and her daughter

immediately said that he was  
one of the three amigos, without  
a doubt' at the party."

Grosso repeated her story to Mr.  
William Charles Thomas, the Embassy Political  
Officer, on 10 Dec 1965: In Sept 1963  
after her return from abroad, she was  
accompanied by her daughter,  
to a party, at the home of Rubén Duran

[Englehardt added. Rubén is one of the two  
brothers of Horacio Duran], who married  
her cousin. She met Oswald and 2  
other young Americans. At the party  
she was disengaged from them  
wrote him. Other guests were the Cuban  
consul ARCE; General CLARK Flores,  
Silvia Díaz, who she later learned  
was Oswald's sister while he was  
here, English CARBACEDO, and a  
Latin American negro man well

red hair. [Emphasis added.] In November 1963 when the identities of the assassins were known, she and her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and sought "asylum" and other asylts at the stay there. Shortly afterward, she and her daughter (~~a woman~~ wife of a friend, Manuel GARRIDO), then an officer in the Secretariat <sup>(while on)</sup> of the Gobernacion [headed at the time by ECHEVERRIA], and were told he had orders to escort them to a small and obscure hotel in the center of town. They were kept there for 8 days under pretext that they were in danger. When she told ~~that~~ GARRIDO she wanted to go to the American Embassy and explain what she knew of Oswald, she was told that the American Embassy was full of Communist spies.

On the 25 Dec 1965 and 9 Jan 1966 in further interview with Thomas, GOLDBECK and her daughter elaborated and on

significantly

certain portions, modified to her  
own account. She also acknowledged that  
that she and her daughter had  
been interviewed earlier by Embassy  
officer to whom she claims  
they did not give a very complete  
story because the Embassy officer  
did not appear to give much  
credence to anything they said.

It was developed that ~~Ed Gaddo~~  
and daughter had been interviewed by  
the legal Attache on 17 and 24  
November 1964. Her information had  
been similar to what she claims  
in her account to Thorne, but had  
not been substantiated by inquiries.  
The FBI representatives therefore con-  
sidered the matter closed and reoff-

ended his disengagement from the matter  
to the CIA chief of Station on 27 Dec 1965  
and to the Ambassador on 25 Feb 1965.

~~PSR~~

The following political affair, presented  
in his interview and reporting, is memorandum  
of conversation, 13 July 1966, in which  
GARRO identifies the ~~hotel~~ <sup>place</sup> to which she  
had been taken by CALVILLO, as the Hotel  
Vermont. (This detail checked out  
affirmatively. G. L. ARGO was at the  
Hotel for 23-24, 25-27, and 28-29  
November 1963.) Annotes on 7 Feb 1967  
in which GARRO's continuing associations  
with the Cubans are set out. Then and  
finally, upon Thomas' retirement from  
the State government service, the Depart-  
ment of State at his request, disseminates  
to CIA and FBI a compilation of his  
~~compilation of his~~

28 August 1969,

Ella  
reporting of the 6789 interview.

Then the writer next ~~to~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~beginning~~  
~~dates of origin of G~~

Garro's chronology of events she  
described is as having occurred  
(in the Mexican capital)

(in September 1963 ~~were~~ did ~~not~~ <sup>confirms</sup>  
coincide with the ~~however~~

dates of the Oswald presence there.

Her story however had two points  
of her allegations by  
congruence with those of  
others.)

regarding Oswald: Alvarado's allegation  
regarding the Negro with the Red-dyed  
hair. [This detail could, however, been  
gleaned from the Warren Commission's  
account of the "D" code ] and (b)  
Sylvia Burrow's ~~the~~ <sup>own later claim of</sup> allegation of ~~extensive~~  
~~with~~ intimate personal contacts with Oswald.

During his

and amplified May 5<sup>th</sup>

Beginning in March 1967 the American  
Benjamin T. ROYLE  
Council, in Tampico developed a contact

with a local Mexican journalist, Oscar  
Lartigue  
CONTREJAS (who claimed to have been  
studied with other pro-Castro students  
to have encountered Oswald at the  
University of Mexico campus in September

1963.

In June 1969, Contrejas was interviewed  
by a CIA officer.

He studied law at the Univ. of  
Mexico for 3 years, approximately  
1960-1964. He belonged to a Cuban-  
pro-Castro Revolutionary  
group at the University. Regarding  
the Oswald case he was extremely  
cautious and said although  
he was not able or willing to  
give date and name, he said  
Oswald visited the University of  
Mexico campus shortly after the  
Cuban Embassy refused him a  
visa to visit Cuba. Oswald  
made inquiries regarding pro-  
Cuban Revolutionary groups at

the University and was directed to Contreras and his friends. Oswald met Contreras and four other persons as they came out of a round-table discussion held in the faculty of Philosophy. Oswald told the group it was urgent he visit Cuba and the Cuban Embassy denied him a visa. He requested aid from Contreras' group. Contreras and others invited Oswald because they felt he was a CIA provocateur.

The group allowed Oswald to accompany them the rest of that day, start night and part of the next day. Oswald was very interested and appeared to be slightly nervous. Oswald made no mention of an assassination plot but kept bringing up the point he had to travel to Cuba immediately.

With FBI knowledge,  
At this point, the matter was turned over  
to the Mexican authorities who determined that  
Contreras was indeed at the University of  
Mexico but only for the years  
1959 and 1960. <sup>and</sup> that he had  
been publicly associated <sup>in protest</sup> with activities for  
the Student Revolutionary Bloc (BR) in

January, however,  
early in 1961, ~~the group~~ ceased functioning  
midway  
or earlier in the 1962 and Oscar Contreras was  
never one of its leaders. ~~that~~

No further work ~~on the~~ is reflected in the  
files on the Contreras allegations. If apart  
from the uncorroborated claims made  
by Contreras about his own presence at  
the University, there is no additional  
element that undermines the credibility  
which was barely adequate to get him  
of his account. O'Neill's biography would  
~~seem hardly likely to~~  
~~not have permitted him to~~ ~~fit in with~~  
~~a minority~~

canyon birth for an extended period with  
a University student group.

(3)

22 November 1963.

9. Mexico Station telegram 7021  
(IN - 66896), 23 November 1963.)<sup>1</sup>  
page. 02:44 z time

10. Mexico Station telegram -

10. CIA Hqs. telegram to Mexico  
station, DIR - 84822, 23 Nov  
1963. (1 page. 04:22 z time.)

11. Mexico Station telegram,  
7027 (IN - 67189), 23 Nov 1963.  
20:43 z time. 1 page.

12. Mexico Station telegrams  
7025 (IN 67186, 23 Nov 1963  
20:34 z time) and 7033 (IN -  
67232, 23 Nov 1963, 22:46 z time).  
[Forward transcript texts.]

1. Mexico Station telegram, 0700 (In-66591).

23 Nov 1963, 02 31 2 times.

11. CIA Hqs. telegrams to Mexico Station, DIR - 84821 and 84822, 23 Nov 1963, 0136 2 times and 04:22 2 times, respectively. 1 page, each.

12. Mexico Station telegram, 7027 (In-67189), 23 Nov 1963, 2043 2 times. 1 page.

13. Mexico Station telegram 7023, 23 November 1963. 16:55 2 times. [Forward transcript information] 2 page

~~At Mexico Station~~

CIA  
13. Hqs. telegram to Mexico Station, ~~7023~~ (DIR - 84888), 23 Nov 1963, 17:29 2 times. 1 page

New item 14. [This is Mexico 7025 & 7033, which you already know.]

15. Mexico Station telegram 7025 (In-67189)

16. Mexico Station telegram 7029, (23 Nov 1963, 20:48 2 times.

17. Fugitive Shrikes 7055 (Inv 69235),  
23 Nov 1963, 225 & 2 pairs.

18. Memorandum For the record by Army 2 Station, Mexico, "1 April 1964. Subject: Visit by Their Staff Representative of Warren Commission. 3 page and covering dispatch (H MATA 2328G, 14 April 1964)

~~SECRET~~

Text 1

19-23. ~~SECRET~~ Intercept 27, 28 September and 1, 3 October 1963. 2 for 27 and 28 texts in both Spanish and English, for 1<sup>E</sup> and 3<sup>E</sup>, in English translation only).

24-26. Four photographs of unidentified individual entering and leaving Soviet Embassy, (1 October 1963.

<sup>2</sup> Mexico City, 3 photos

27-29. Four photographs of unidentified individual in front of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, 4 October 1963.  
3 photos

30. Two photographs of unidentified individual, taken in front of Cuban Embassy, 15 October 1963.

31-34. Physics Station - CIA Kya correspondence, 18 days 3

218, 29 May and 26 June and  
3 July 1967 relates to negative of  
photographs noted at 24-30, above.

35. letter by DIA Deputy Director for Plans,  
Mr Helms to Mr. J. Lee Rankin, 23  
July 1967. 1 page.

36-7. Text of affidavits by Bushnell D.  
ODUM, James R. MALLEY and Richard  
Helms. Hearings, vol. XI, p. 468-70.

UNCLASSIFIED

38. Reproductions of Odum Exhibit No 1  
dated 26 (Hearings, vol XX, p. 691) and  
Commissioner Exhibit 237 (Hearings  
vol XVI, p. 638). UNCLASSIFIED

35. Extracts from Warren Commission Report, page 364 - 5 and 667, dealing with the photograph of the unidentified individual. UNCLASSIFIED

. . . (Classified)

40. A Selection of <sup>CIA</sup> Pertinent Documents

reflecting US and Mexico Stations

Reactions to and Handling of the

Warren Commission's Publications of  
the Photo of the Unidentified

Individual, September - October 1964

41. letter by CIA General Counsel, Lawrence

R. Horowitz to the Honorable Bernard J.

Bajest, Orleans District Court for  
the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana,

16 May 1967. 2 pages. UNCLASSIFIED

42. Correspondence with <sup>Mr.</sup> Harry L. Brown

4, 17 April, 1970. 3 pages.

Unclassified

B. Correspondence with Mr. Paul L.  
 HICHO, 1 and 15 November 1971 and  
 24 and 14 Dec. 1971. 8 pages. UNCLAS-  
SIFTED

- with and related to
44. Correspondence ~~not~~ <sup>for</sup> and related  
~~to Requests by~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~Chairman of Committee~~ <sup>Chairman</sup> with Mr.  
 Bernard Feuerstein Jr. dated 22  
 1971 { 8 April (2 HOURS); 9-18 February  
 1972; 24 Feb - 6 March 1972; 11-13  
 April 1972; 26 and 27 June 1972; 28 July  
 and 17 August 1972; and, 044 memo  
<sup>of</sup> memorandum  
 by Mr Houston to Director, FBI on  
 internal,  
 11 October 22 <sup>of</sup> together with two supporting  
 papers, a cable to Mexico Station  
 dated 3 Oct 72 and an memo of  
 interview, dated 11 October, 1972.  
 43 pages.

Re/Agoo

Subject: Review of Selected Items in the  
Lee Harvey Oswald File re  
Allegations of the ~~Communist~~  
involvement in its killing.  
J. Kennedy assassination.

~~Review and Summary~~  
The attached, was written at  
the express request of Mr. Howard W. Belvin,  
as a follow up to question #3  
of his letter to the Agency of 15 April  
1975.

The results is as I have already told  
him - add nuance, not evidence, to  
what the Warren Committee and its  
staff had laid before them in 1964 on  
Delevery ~~of~~ <sup>the subject</sup> ~~of~~  
the ~~assassination~~

The results of the review are stipulated  
with the notice at para 8 of the attach-

Incident:

Street view

The documentation for which  
you spoke - enclosed

This is a copy made prior to the  
removal of this file. Photo graph - two -  
Unidentified individual, submitted  
against unknown.

### Officer's case - data

There seemed to be no reason to  
attach the copies of the ~~file report~~ <sup>(case)</sup>  
from the file to this summary. These  
can be made ~~promptly~~ <sup>promptly</sup>  
available however, with an  
request.

[Redacted]

Background — Saturday morning,  
On 7 September 1963, Tidal Costas, in  
an act unusual for him, appeared at  
a Brazilian Embassy reception in Havana.  
Even more unusual Costas submitted  
to an informal interview by the  
Associated Press correspondent Daniel  
HARKER'S.

HARKER'S interview reached New York  
on Sunday, September 8<sup>th</sup>, and was  
in print throughout the country on  
Monday September 9<sup>th</sup>. There can be  
no question from the facts surrounding  
which had not been expected,  
the Costas appearance, and his agreement  
to the interview, that this event represented  
a more-than-ordinary  
attempt to get a message through  
registered on the record in the

# Castro's statements  
United States. The ~~Hartley interview~~  
consisted  
to HARTLEY covered a range of topics  
but dealt principally  
about, with ~~Europe~~ American  
political leaderships, with particular  
President Kennedy whom he  
excoriated in extraordinarily prosecutorial  
fashion ("... Kennedy is a creation of the  
Batista of his times ... the most opportunist  
American President of all time."). There  
~~was~~ also reference to Senator Goldwater,  

---

H. The interview had other content.  
~~including~~ complementary references  
 to Senator Goldwater and Cuban delay  
 in signing the limited nuclear test  
<sup>there were significant differences</sup>  
 ban and ~~was~~ <sup>in this</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>played by</sup>  
<sup>also this</sup> US newspaper, the New York Times  
 Washington, ~~interviewed~~ with a result

---

that Castro's "message" ~~was significant~~  
 was significantly  
 modulated.

In New Orleans, where the Harker  
 resided until the middle of September  
 1963, the HARKER story appeared in  
 the principal morning newspaper,  
 the Times-Picayune on Monday, Sept  
 9, page seven under a three  
 column headline: "Castro Blasts  
 Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leader  
 Impelled by Aid to Rebels." ~~Pre~~  
 story then followed under the Harker  
 by-line:

The New-York Times, in its coverage on  
 Sept 9<sup>th</sup> used a UPI wire service report which  
 omitted ~~any~~ reference to the ~~warnings~~ present

The results of the review - admittedly  
 having <sup>utilizing</sup> ~~assisted~~ ~~in~~ of the 20-20'  
 quality of hindsight - may be  
 stipulated in summary:

(a) There is no increment of evidence <sup>Credible</sup>  
 of ~~fabricated~~ Soviet or Cuban political,  
 intelligence or security service involvement  
~~but also~~ to what was developed and  
 considered by the Warren Commission

~~to the best of the Agent's knowledge, based on the~~  
 and its staff. ~~that~~ The Commission's  
 finding therefore, (that LEO was the killer  
 on the basis of credible evidence)  
 of JFK and Officer Tippett and did  
 and at his own determination  
~~them~~ them in alone, must stand.

(b) "credible evidence" that would <sup>upset</sup> ~~change~~  
 significantly as modifies this judge did (and has)  
 not exist in Washington ~~at this~~  
~~but it~~  
~~is clear that such evidence could~~

of this kind and that varied was the  
opinion at the working level, particular-  
ly in its Committee intelligence  
component in 1964.

or now

- ② In the absence of additional "credible"  
evidence there are "measurably"  
elements in the record that emerge,  
~~no longer from the review and~~  
~~revision etc.~~

as noteworthy, in the light of the  
the  
two concluding Chapters,  
to reflect the implications  
other.

recently  
Please also summarize

short, clearly.

- (d) This summarizes the record of Egyptian  
in 1967 and it is apparent that  
indeed it did not, in my  
opinion, in any way, in contradiction  
of the record, of great potential significance  
(present)
- of great potential significance, but indeed  
important, probably ~~and~~ (not least, I think)  
of considerable pathological potential which,

get the signal resolution of funds  
from Congress and, furthermore, was  
the administration under way and  
the administration went, held tests  
but because testing had failed  
immediately carbon.

(CIA)

(back track.

and, carbon resolution which is directly  
traceable as far back as the Marine  
Corps service in El Toro, California.)

(If Oswald road Estes Street and  
warning,

Whistler

Backward steps  
warning and threat  
Estes' statement to AP corresponding  
Whistler - suggests as the threat  
whether there was any formal meeting,  
or even secret, series contact with  
Khrushchev by the Cuban or the Soviets  
may have  
caused them to act so angular  
unfriendly and under no circumstance  
allowable, referring for what the Cuban agencies  
were doing during the summer of 1963,

much or without this knowledge, the  
more progress, the knowledge of the  
present situation, Right now only,  
when we're numerically unrepresented,  
overight carbon matter at the  
federal level after the Day of Revo  
failure.

~~Reported~~ ~~in~~ ~~order~~

Indon Intel and Oswald, ~~and~~ ~~Indon~~, in

1959? The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains, as  
RK  
elsewhere sections of genuine significance to any  
review of the background of LHO's feelings  
~~toward and possibly~~  
and relations with Castro Cuba. ~~After all~~

~~After all~~ record ~~is~~ ~~available~~

Delgado was probably the closest ~~pro~~ ~~pro~~ com-  
munist to Oswald during <sup>his</sup> specialist training  
period at El Toro Marine Corp base ~~in 1957~~  
Dec 57 - Sept 1959. The Warren Commission ~~agent~~  
takes note of this.

"Oswald told Delgado that he  
was in touch with Cuban diplomatic  
officials in this country; which Delgado  
at first took to be "one of his men".  
his, but later believed." 6

---

1. Report of the President Commission on  
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy  
(Wash. 1964), p. 687. This often cited as,  
Report.

"... you know, so the man who was  
putting on an exhibition you know.  
I didn't know what to answer him.  
I told him to go there.

"After a while, he told me he was in  
contact with them ...

"... I saw this envelope in his footlocker  
well-locked, and it was addressed to  
him, and they had an official seal  
on it, and as far as I could remember  
that was mail from Los Angeles, and  
he was telling me there was a ~~Cuban~~  
couple. And just after he started writing  
this letter ~~to you see,~~ he would  
never go out, ~~and~~ stay near the  
front all the time ...

"... he had one visitor - after he started  
receiving letters from his visitors.  
It was a man, because I got the  
call from the N.Y. Guard Schools, and  
they gave me a call that Donald  
had a visitor at the front gate. This  
man had to be a civilian, otherwise they  
would have let him in. So I had  
to find out who it is, to whom Donald, who  
was on guard, had go down there to  
visit with this fellow, and they spent  
about an hour and a half, two hours  
talking, I guess, and he come back.  
I don't know what was said  
or what they talking about, but he  
looked wonderful about the whole

"Then when I come back... you know what may  
be the next meeting."

"The meeting, you know, did it in a big building,  
do you remember?"

"Mr. Fitzgerald, about an hour and half, 2  
hours...."

"Mr. Nichols. You were asked because who this  
fellow was that he talked to?"

"Mr. Fitzgerald. No. No...."

"Mr. Nichols. Did you connect this with that  
Gorrell bird at that time with the Cuban  
Comunists?"

"Mr. Fitzgerald: I did; because I thought, at  
first, for him to be receiving necessarily  
at such a late date - time. This, up to  
this time, he hardly ever receives mail, &  
first he always received mail from home  
because I made it a policy, ~~if you please~~  
~~every postman received mail from home,~~  
~~because I made it~~

"I used to pick up the mail over our bus  
and distribute it to the guys in there, and  
very seldom did I see one for him. But  
very so often, after he started getting  
contact with these Cuban people, he starts  
getting letters, packages and letters every day.

"... and he also started receiving  
letters, you know, and one brother  
over here going back, going back little by little  
through, things we got from him, you  
know, but it wasn't a child."

"Mr. Lubetkin. When they worked in Germany, ....

"I know, do you know?"

"Mr. Delgado. But that I can see all over.

"Mr. Lubetkin. Did you know any recently to Berlin  
that these things came to Germany from the  
Cuban communists?

"Mr. Delgado. Well I took it for granted that they  
did. After I seen the collage here.... some-  
thing like a Mexican eagle, with a big,  
immaculate seal you know. They had  
different colors on it, red and white; I don't  
know what other colors, you know. But  
I don't recall the seal. I just know it was  
in Latin, Spanish, something like that that I  
couldn't understand. It was broken.

"Mr. Lubetkin. You don't know for sure whether  
it was from the Cuban communists?

"Mr. Delgado. No. But he had told me prior,  
just before I found out that several, so in  
his work books, that he was receiving  
mail from them, and one time she,  
offered to show it to me, but I wasn't  
much interested because at the time she  
had ~~the~~ work to do, and I never  
did ask to see that, you know, again, you  
know.

"Mr. Lubetkin. Did he tell you what his cor-  
respondence with the Cuban communists  
was about?"

"Delgado. No; he didn't.

"The situation, and in a somewhatbridge  
that it took to submit the conversation,  
what you had about going over to  
India?"

"It didn't do. No. In fact, they he told me  
was being right after we had this conversation  
with the Indian people was that he was  
going there once he got out of the service  
he was going to live far away...."

2. Investigation of the Assassination of President  
John F. Kennedy. Hearings Before the Presi-  
dent's Commission on the Assassination of  
President Kennedy (Mar. 1964) H.R. 101; 24-243.  
Hearings cited as, Hearings.

On 27 Sept 1959 he  
was assigned to a project  
related to travel among  
the people of India and  
Asia.

DeGudo's application to Somerville College, Chur-  
chill, Scotland "was dated 19 March 1959,  
and he was granted a report to Japan on 21  
April 1960. Requests for discharge from the Marines  
on 7 Dec 1959, invalid accelerated his trip on alleged  
grounds of family hardship (Sept 1959). He  
entered the Great Union Board early January on 15  
October 1959.

DeGudo's testimony in the cost of readability:  
mentioning that, it is also of basic importance to  
your attention. At the next meeting will ~~call~~  
be contested in the first of two days and

The next question is whether the  
Government has authority to do anything else  
than to nominate the attorney-general or a magistrate  
to investigate and prosecute in the High Court or after  
trial with him for bribery, fraud & so on. The  
second neglects no prosecution, interpretation of  
the contract. Delgado's presumption is that the  
Government <sup>assuming that,</sup> 'either Complainant or his lawyer. The question  
therefore is: was there, according to Mexican  
law, would agree, at a minimum guess,  
the opening of a file on Complainant?

U.S. Customs Inspection and consultation  
were received on 3 January 1961.

US-Cambodia diplomatic and consular relations were severed on 3 January 1961.

Initiation of incident regarding: Bweise of CP  
U.S. Section Tidwell Committee - Atlanta, Ga.

St. Louis forwarded to N.Y.C. on 17 January 1964  
a duplicate copy of a report by a  
penetrating source dated 5 January 1962  
describing events at the year of cell  
meeting. The cell leader, Horse SERVICE  
Labor told cell said that the  
Communist Party in Guatemala should  
form a single new party: "We need  
not necessarily agree on the politics  
of President Kennedy because we know  
according to prognostication, that he will  
die within the present year, 1962."

This report apparently had been disseminated  
by the CP's before it had been received  
and was not forwarded until the St. Louis  
received all of its material <sup>(after the)</sup> in compliance

assessment. The following are findings  
from [redacted]  
~~or communication~~  
with the organization  
injuries in that regard.

6.

Emergency Update by Cuban Third Secretary  
in the USSR, 7 Nov 1963. A senior liaison

source, reporting after the Kennedy assassination,  
indicates that at the Soviet reception on 7 Nov  
1963, the Cuban Third secretary Ricardo SANTOS  
<sup>L</sup>  
<sup>(see)</sup> (sic) (referred to as a refugee)  
made the statement: "The situation  
exists on Cuba and other implications  
with a host country depicted, concluding  
with the following admonition: "...just  
wait and you will see what we can  
do. It will happen soon." Asked to  
be more specific about what would  
happen soon Santos replied: "Just  
wait, just wait."

(Ricardo Santos)

(These facts were passed to the Warren  
Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964.  
Santos was subsequently reported to have re-

a history of mental instability and was summoned  
to cancel from his job.  
He reportedly had various relatives that lost,  
in August 1966! ;

it "was at probably about half  
way down, a cable weather, in the  
Cukon River & General C. of all you  
(told) I think it right - The ~~old~~ ship is  
up to day at the - The miners returned to  
the air gun and were reported to be working  
at the head waters.

(f) The first single element in series 67,  
in the fall of 1963 was treated by the  
MIRABEL - ~~TEST~~  
1963, giving results on August

(journals on the replacement of  
the larval *Eusciurus tigrinus* (described 19 Nov-  
1963). The identity test (using data of June  
1964, H. R. B. E.'s specimen) was Hamer-  
Engel's test series.

(C) "Silesia since" edition, issued in  
Luisa's conversation with the newspaper,  
~~and~~ a dozen national, was limited  
to his own family, his wife (writing), brother  
Eduardo and relatives among  
on 27 and 28 September, to the Cuban  
newspapers, presumably in connection  
with a new application for entry to  
Cuba. Since Luisa is the sole heir,

written letters, regarding L.H.S. school, in  
this city. The testimony, however, is it  
entirely new, when and published early in the  
Year you demanded the certificates.

(A Miss corporation is being  
the women forming its incorporated, for

the first time I have seen a Chrysocoma flower  
open, and it is just now  
~~open~~ ~~open~~ ~~open~~ ~~open~~ ~~open~~ ~~open~~ ~~open~~ ~~open~~  
when the sun is up, and when  
it is down, it is closed. It is  
about 1 1/2 inches across, and  
is very fragrant. The leaves  
are long and narrow, and  
the stem is very slender.

July 22, 1863. Age 17.

Questions

What is the best way to prevent  
the spread of disease? What  
are the main causes of disease?  
How can we control disease?  
What are the symptoms of disease?  
How do we treat disease?  
What are the causes of disease?  
How can we prevent disease?  
What are the main types of disease?  
How do we diagnose disease?

Zurück zu Ihnen.

Leprosy

refugees left the camp.

Wig 19-1000. 100.

## Section of the Corbi

There is no evidence in the record case  
of it that such errors can be attributed  
to a systematic distortion suggesting  
that it could be avoided.

I would have related the ~~extremely~~  
findings with ~~newest~~, ~~most~~ — confor-

confirmed by intercept - with the

Fr. L. H. Shantz

Latin word in the title on this

Winged Indian Mantis its (conservative)  
petulants

method - in which they find themselves

for a state will demand a great exertion, — is

It was the official mode of the world.

for the application by landlady, etc.

by a local author, might find a home

~~This right~~, since it is impossible that  
the reply could be other than a solid negative  
and in that case, it is palpable that Costica  
means, I <sup>could</sup> intelligent and secret service <sup>after</sup> ~~the~~ ~~case~~  
names were in it, which has been surmised  
in the bureau files statements. ~~of~~ <sup>for</sup> ~~the~~ ~~case~~  
this suggests that

Coming back to the beginning: "here" —  
members of the WW meeting, therefore  
Luna (at least as a ~~member~~ <sup>attorney</sup>) could  
very well have had information that

would make what he said to his minister's  
father ~~view~~ of a council  
earlier (in a matter of)  
more substantial ~~allowance~~ ~~but~~ but only ~~and~~ ~~allowance~~  
~~there~~ and ~~substantially~~ ~~concluded~~.

This was assumed at the time.

(6)

given you on a number of occasions.  
This information (General situation with  
CIA, FBI, etc.). (Continued)

The following points were in mind's eye of  
the Soviet Union when they suggested  
alone. (In that context & criticism it would  
also be pertinent to remember the implications  
of this.)

(~~of the Intercepted Telephone conversation  
on 26 November 1963;~~)

(Discussing the Cuban incident, WALTERS  
and <sup>his</sup> Ambassador in Mexico, JORGENSEN  
remained firm, because the thrust of  
this conversation dealt with the question of  
whether Wilson had <sup>been</sup> ~~had~~  
~~unjustly~~  
~~been~~ ~~misrepresented~~ ~~in public, among~~  
~~newsmen~~  
~~about many~~  
~~recent~~  
~~politics~~  
~~in his~~  
~~Mexican interviews.~~)

On 15 September 1963 ~~Wilson~~  
discusses the Cuban situation with ~~in the hearing~~

of the same person. Moreover, when  
she was seen to have "fallen out" of the  
relation with Ethan, she had lost this  
time she had kept her property.  
Described the

her account, to know,  
demonstrating that she had been taken into custody  
but had been interrogated after the ~~interrogation~~  
~~before her~~ before her

and ~~interrogated~~  
did not add substantially, that she was already  
known. She added, ~~that she was not known~~  
~~under circumstances~~  
~~she~~

that did not permit the police to ~~cross-examine~~  
or direct ~~any~~ corroborative witness, that she  
go on to say, it's during his stay in this city,  
~~that you leave~~,  
etc., and ~~etc.~~ I learned she had regular  
relations with him.

Highway Department, ~~Highway~~  
should be kept  
green immorally  
sign of alligation of a consequential  
cost of winter bounds and agent of  
the labor government has been investigated.

195

5. in, Kerkel. p. 325 f.

identities of the Black Legion, but which, through the extensive mail system, enable it to maintain its influence.

Directly or indirectly, the Black

Legion is known

as

Constitutionalist interest and  
possibly permit us to dispel this  
false impression regarding the

most recent similarity between  
the Black Legion and the Klan from the beginning:

The Constitutionalist does nothing  
to do with the Klan but copy it  
all.

SUBJECT: The Photo of an Unidentified Individual in the  
Warren Commission Report: A Factual  
Chronological Survey

REFERENCE: Memorandum by David W. Belkin to Mr. E. Harry Knoche,  
15 April 1975 (Attachment A)

1. Reference memorandum suggests it would be appropriate to reconsider full disclosure at this time of the circumstances and factual data relative to the subject. The purpose of this survey is to permit a realistic evaluation of the suggestion.

2. Background. This examination and summary of the record concerns a cropped photograph considered by the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (hereinafter cited as the Warren Commission) and introduced into evidence as Odum Exhibit No. 1.<sup>1</sup> The photograph (together ~~with~~  
~~with~~, with others of the same individual) originated from a ~~Mexican~~  
~~intelligence~~ ~~and~~ ~~other~~ highly sensitive operation being conducted in October 1963 by the CIA and Mexican security authorities against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City.

3. Under the ~~orders~~ <sup>press of</sup> the extraordinary efforts to develop information on the assassin and the assassination, copies of the

---

1. See Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (hereinafter cited as Hearings), Vol. XX, page 691.

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photograph were made available by CIA's Mexico Station Chief on

the afternoon of 22 November to the local FBI representative, and

later that day, ~~as per suggestion of the Ambassador~~, copies

were ~~noted up by the U.S. Naval Attaché and~~ conveyed by ~~the~~ FBI

~~by a special flight carried out by the U.S. Naval Attaché,~~  
~~representative to the Dallas office as a matter of possible use~~

~~2 of the FBI carried by the FBI,~~  
in the ongoing investigation. One photograph was shown to

~~Oswald's mother,~~

Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD, in Dallas on the evening of 23 November 1963

by FBI Agent ~~Baldwell~~ D. ODUM.

4. The Warren Commission's Report describes the sequence of

events at pp.364-365 and 667 (Attachment B) which ultimately

resulted in Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD's allegation that she had been

shown a cropped photo of Jack RUBY the day before he murdered her

son. (A further complication leading to this conclusion ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~had been~~)

the fact that when she had been shown a copy of the same photo-

graph in her appearance before the Commission, it had been cropped

<sup>in Washington</sup>  
by the FBI in a slightly different manner.)

5. No detail in the Warren Commission report illustrates

more vividly than this one the difficulties that beset simple

truth in the politicized, rigidly determined <sup>interpretive</sup> climate

about the Kennedy assassination,  
that has been nurtured by the media over the past decade. The

photograph, (now acknowledged) not to be RUBY, has ~~now~~ become a

*contained to  
proceeds for  
"Specialists" and  
less now*

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~~the centerpiece of another hypothesis~~  
~~of an alternate explanation~~ that holds OSWALD to  
 have been "framed" by the use of a double in his activity in  
 Mexico City.<sup>2</sup>

6. Lee Harvey OSWALD - Reporting Mexico City Stay. Although  
 in no way related to Lee Harvey OSWALD or his stay in Mexico City

*Sept*  
 from the morning of 27 May 1963 to the morning of 2 October 1963, at

~~but unrelated~~  
~~the~~ photography of the unidentified man originated during OSWALD's  
 stay there. ~~and~~ It is therefore important to an understanding of  
~~the acquisition and handling of~~  
~~what was done with~~ the photograph by the Mexico City Station to  
 review the facts about what the Station ascertained and did with ~~the~~  
 information it developed about OSWALD in Mexico City, together  
 with Headquarters action on ~~the~~ information, before the assassination,  
~~tion, 22 November 1963, and immediately thereafter.~~

7. From all credible evidence known to this time (none,  
 incidentally, added since the exhaustively unique work of the  
 Warren Commission), Lee Harvey OSWALD spent 4 full days and  
 2 partial days--about 116 hours in all--in Mexico City from  
 about 10:00 a.m. 27 September 1963 to about 8:30 a.m. 2 October  
 1963. His ~~base~~ point of residence was a small commercial traveler  
 hotel, not frequented by "gringos"--the Hotel Commerico --

2 This is the thrust of the article "The CIA and the Man Who Was Not Oswald" by Bernard Fensterwald and George O'Toole in the New York Review of Books, a copy of which is attached to reference (Attachment A).

where he was registered under alias. Exhaustive and detailed interviews and interrogation by the Mexican authorities and the FBI established that in the recollection of all hotel personnel he left early and returned late each day of his stay.

8. Assuming, and allowing for the fact of late arrival and early departure, that he slept one-third of the time of his stay (38 or 39 hours), there remain some 78 hours of activity to be accounted for. Overall, ~~on the basis of CIA's information~~ can account solely for Oswald during 27, 28 September and 1 October.

All coverage by CIA during the entire period was technical. The Station had no live source (living agent) coverage either unilateral or from Mexican liaison. *It should be noted that* ~~Oswald was~~ in no sense "under investigation." None of the facts of his defection and stay in the USSR

and return to the U.S., 1959 - 1962, were ~~registered in Mexico~~

Station files before 10 October 1963, when the ~~information~~ was

forwarded by Headquarters in response to ~~a~~ Station report of

8 October forwarded, on a routine basis, what ~~appeared~~ to be an

*any American contact for a visa to Cuba in transit to the USSR. This had*

indicated and deduced from technically acquired information on

1 October, which was the first and only occasion in which *Oswald* *(partially)*

identified himself by true name. At no time during his stay in

Mexico City did the CIA ~~ever~~ acquire a photo of him.

DRAFT

→ A careful review of all coverage, voice intercept, as well as photographic, of both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies was made ~~conducted~~  
 by the Station on 22 and 23 November 1963 after the assassination, going back to materials from mid-year. It is, therefore, firm that there was no CIA photo coverage of OSWALD at any time during his Mexico trip or stay in Mexico City. Moreover, ~~although~~  
~~it had made a coded~~  
~~the~~ request on 15 October, the Mexico Station had no photo of OSWALD in its records, nor did it receive one from Headquarters before 22 November 1963.

*During this intensive review of transcripts and other personnel*

10. Voice intercept ~~had been reviewed~~ by the monitor on the basis of the 1 October intercept--which had been reported to Headquarters and disseminated to the interested members of the intelligence community (as an ex-Marine, OSWALD was a Navy and FBI case under the delimitations, and potentially of interest to the Department of State)--turned up matches based on content, ~~not on announced identity~~, with materials intercepted on 27 and 28 September 1963. ~~These matches were reported to HQs. on 23 November 1963. Analysis~~ based on voice comparison (except what could be recalled by the monitor--and this was not insignificant ~~element~~ because of the ~~unusually~~ poor Russian spoke by OSWALD) could not be made because the tapes, in accordance with the normal practice, had been erased and re-used. } .

IV. It ~~must~~ <sup>should</sup> be noted that voice intercept and photographic coverage was not processed in "real time." The ~~nature~~ <sup>means</sup> of acquisition and the volume of the information precluded anything but the spot reporting of items judged by the monitor <sup>the</sup> of more-than-ordinary ~~less~~ interest and, therefore, noted in summary logs. Full texts of selected items would require consultation of the tape and either a full transcription or full translation or both. Photo coverage tended to become available in quantity lots which required scanning and selection on a rapid and <sup>in 4 or 5 day "peaks"</sup> accelerated basis. One of the "triggers" that normally operated to focus and accelerate <sup>more quickly</sup> the review and reporting of this kind raw intelligence <sup>was</sup> the mention of a name. This ~~as will be seen,~~ was precisely what occurred in the second of two conversations

~~between~~ <sup>during which the speaker</sup> had on 1 October with the Soviet Embassy, ~~when he said~~ he was "Lee OSWALD," ~~and~~ it was this information reported by the <sup>in its first dedications on Oswald</sup> Station to Headquarters on 8 October 1963.

<sup>8<sup>th</sup> October</sup>  
 13. The Mexico City Station did one more thing in its report on Lee OSWALD based on its 1 October voice intercepts: it coupled this data with descriptive information it had acquired from a <sup>(collateral)</sup> sensitive source--a photograph of a male individual, apparently an American, who was observed entering the Soviet Embassy on 1 October. The Station reported <sup>this</sup> ~~these~~ details as a

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*Matty B)* coincident *fact.* The Station did not assert or suggest that the data *deduced* from the photo was in fact OSWALD, or indeed, in any way related to OSWALD.

13. Lee Harvey OSWALD - CIA Coverage of His Mexico City Stay.

One additional element of background must be stipulated now as the final precondition to understanding the relevance (or irrelevance) of the photo of the unknown individual placed in the chain of evidence on 23 November in Dallas by FBI Agent ~~Baddwell~~ ODUM:

what was the totality of CIA ~~intercept~~ coverage of OSWALD's activity as of the afternoon of the ~~22nd~~ and 23rd when all available coverage had been rechecked?

14. The totality of Mexico City Station coverage on, or reasonably inferable to be OSWALD, consisted of five (5) voice intercepts as follows:

a. 27 September 1963 (Friday), 1605 Mexico City time.

Silvia DURAN, a local employee of Mexican nationality of the

Cuban Embassy, Consular section, a receptionist, speaks with an unknown male at the Soviet Embassy. Silvia DURAN tells the man that the American citizen was there, the one who wants a visa for Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union, and he wants to know with whom he was talking there because she *Durran* (Silvia) had sent him to the Soviet Embassy saying that if

they accepted him and gave him a visa, then the Cubans (Embassy) would also give him a visa without further paper work, only advising Immigration in Cuba. <sup>(Detracted)</sup> <sup>He wants to know with whom he</sup> <sup>(The American, she says)</sup> had talked there because he says he was told there would be no problem. The man in the Soviet Embassy says to wait a moment.

<sup>Soviet</sup> <sup>Duran</sup>  
A different man speaks, and Silvia explains the same thing to him. This man says to leave name and telephone number and says <sup>Duran</sup> he will call back. Silvia gives the telephone 11-28-47 (Cuban Consulate). Silvia <sup>also</sup> takes advantage of the conversation and states she has moved and wants to advise the Soviet Embassy of her change of address so that she can receive the

<sup>Soviet</sup> Embassy Bulletin. The man says to call KOUKHARENKO to give her new address, then he asks the name of the Consul or Cultural Attaché. Silvia says the name is Teresa PROENZA and the telephone number if 14-13-26. The man says thanks.

b. 27 September 1963 (Friday), 1626 Mexico City time.

<sup>a Soviet,</sup>  
An unidentified male calls the Cuban consulate, asks Silvia DURAN if the American had been there. Silvia DURAN says he is there now. The Soviet says the American showed papers from the Consulate in Washington, that he wants to go to the Soviet Union and be there for a long time with his wife, who is Russian, but the answer has not come from Washington in

respect to this problem, and according to this procedure it takes four or five months, but without having permission from the Soviet Union they should ask, or better said, they cannot issue a visa there without asking Washington. However, according to this man, he showed a letter indicating he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and that the Cubans said that they cannot issue a visa without his having a visa for the Soviet Union, and now he (the Soviet) does now know what to do with him (the American), because they have to wait for an answer from Washington.

Silvia DURAN agrees the same problem exists with the Cubans, that the problem with him (the American) is that he does not know anyone in Cuba and therefore if that is true it will be difficult for him to get a visa for Cuba, because he was thinking of processing his visa (for the Soviet Union), because he knew it would require waiting a long time for his visa to the Soviet Union while in Cuba, and from there go to the Soviet Union. The Soviet said the thing is that if his wife right now were in Washington she would receive her visa right now, or permission, from the Soviet Union, to return to her country, she is going to receive her visa in Washington but having this visa, she could communicate to any place this permission, for example here or any place she could receive it

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(visa or permission), but right now they do not have them.

*(My Vietnamese)* Silvia DURAN says certainly and they cannot give a letter either because they do not know if the visa will be approved. The Soviet says they only give visas according to indications. Silvia DURAN says then she will put that on the list. The Soviet says he cannot give a letter or recommendation either because he does not know him (the American) and asks to be excused for bothering her. Silvia DURAN says that is all right and many thanks.

c. 28 September 1963 (Saturday), 1151 Mexico City time.

Silvia DURAN calls the USSR Embassy and to an unidentified *titular*  
*Shu* Soviet says that in the Cuban Embassy there is a North American who was at the Soviet Embassy. The Soviet says wait a minute. Silvia DURAN speaks English with someone--and comments in Spanish that they gave APARICIO telephone 14-12-99 and to take the number down--Silvia DURAN then says the American citizen is going to talk with you, i.e., the Soviet. The American first speaks Russian and the Soviet speaks English. They continue in English. The American talks broken Russian and says I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minute. A Soviet takes the phone and asks the American in English what does he want? The American says please speak

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Russian. The Soviet says what else do you want? The American says I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address.

The Soviet says I know that. The American, in hardly recognizable Russian, says I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it.

The Soviet says why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it is not far from the Cuban Embassy. The American says I'll be there right away.

d. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 1031 Mexico City time.

An unknown male (American) <sup>calls</sup> ~~contacts~~ the Soviet Embassy, the Military Attaché's number, 15-69-<sup>8</sup>~~77~~, and says to an unidentified Soviet respondent: I was at your place last Saturday and talked to your Consul. They said that they would send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new? The Soviet says I would like to ask you to call another phone number. Please write it down: 15-60-55, and ask for a consul. Thank you.

e. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 1045 Mexico City time. The same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian speaks to OBYEDKOV (a Soviet Embassy guard). He says: This is Lee OSWALD speaking. I was at your place last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that the would send a

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telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the name of that consul.

OBYEDKOV says: KOSTIKOV. He is dark (hair or skin-?).

OSWALD says yes, My name is OSWALD. OBYEDKOV says, just a minute, I'll find out. They say that they have not received anything yet. OSWALD says: Have they done anything? OBYEDKOV says: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet. OSWALD says, and what . . .?

OBYEDKOV hangs up.

15. All of these items, including the texts of the raw intercepts, were read, discussed with, and examined by the Warren Commission staffer in Headquarters and at the Mexico City Station during a stay from 8 to 13 April 1964.<sup>3</sup>

3. The Warren Commission group that visited the Mexico City Station consisted of Mr. COLEMAN, Mr. SLAWSON, and Mr. WILLIAMS. They examined not only the intercepts a through e above, but others for the 27th and one for 3 October that ~~appeared~~ to have relevance. These have not been included in this summary because they appear, on review, to be excludable from the OSWALD matter on logical or substantive grounds, or both, bearing in mind that the Soviet Embassy received many calls pertaining to visa matters.

On the 27th at 1037 the <sup>front</sup> Embassy received a call from an unknown individual who said he wanted visas to go to Odessa. He was told the consul was not in and to call back at 1130. OSWALD is known to have arrived at the ~~Electro~~ Roja bus terminal on bus #516 at ca. 1000 on the 27th. It was, therefore, possible for him to have made this call. <sup>But</sup> Granting this, it seems unreasonable to believe the calls were OSWALD's for the following reasons:

- a. The caller wanted visas, and specifically for Odessa. OSWALD was seeking a visa and never in any ~~other~~ context did he specify the Black Sea port of Odessa as a destination.
- b. The call was directed to the correct Soviet consular number: 15-60-55. On ~~the~~ 1<sup>st</sup> October, OSWALD first called the wrong number, 15-69-87 (the MA's number), and had to redirect his call to the correct number, 15-60-55. It seems unlikely he would have made what would have been his initial call, on Friday the 27th, to the correct number, and called the incorrect number on 1 October.
- c. There is every reason to believe from the context of <sup>para 14</sup> the intercepts a through e above, that OSWALD's first destination after arrival and check-in to his hotel, was a visit to the Cuban Embassy.
- d. The use of the Spanish language would exclude OSWALD unless he made use of an intermediary, which seems unlikely <sup>from</sup> what is known of his modus operandi.

1 (footnote)

## FOOTNOTE 3 (continuation)

On 3 October at 1539 an individual speaking broken Spanish, then English, called the Soviet Embassy and asked for a visa.

The Soviet respondent says: Call on the other phone. The requestor says: I'm looking for a visa to go to Russia. The Soviet says: Please call on the telephone of the consul, 15-60-55. The requestor says: One moment please, I'll have to get a pencil to write the number down. They issue the visa there? The Soviet: That depends on your conversation. I don't know about this business. Please call the office of the consul and ask your question. The requestor asks for the number again. The Soviet gives him the number and tells him to ask for the Consul of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

The relevance of this intercept to OSWALD is excludable on three grounds:

- a. The use of broken Spanish. OSWALD throughout used broken Russian or English. He had no competence in Spanish. *to handle a conversation of this kind*
- b. The substance of the request indicates a visa request in the first stages of initiation. OSWALD had developed his matter with the Cubans and the Soviets to a point well beyond *the previous history* ~~the stage indicated by~~ *2 Arthur*  
~~the substance of this call.~~
- c. OSWALD had left Mexico City, based on all the credible evidence, the early morning of the previous day, and could not have made this local call.

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16. *Early* ~~all~~ of these items, including the texts of the raw intercepts, were read, discussed with, and examined by Warren Commission staffers in Headquarters and at the Mexico City Station during a stay from 8 to 13 April 1964.<sup>3</sup> [footnote is on a separate page, but should be inserted in the final typing as part of the continuous text.]

*Oswald*  
16. Summing up, we can state, or reasonably infer from the evidence, that OSWALD made the following contacts with the Cuban and Soviet official establishments in Mexico City.

a. 27 September 1963 (Friday). After arrival and check-in to his hotel, OSWALD went first to the Cuban Embassy where he talked with Mrs. Silvia DURAN. The time of his first Cuban Embassy visit is unknown. The time of his second Cuban Embassy visit was about 1600 (i.e., just before closing). Sometime between the two Cuban Embassy visits, at Mrs. DURAN's indication, he must have visited the Soviet Embassy. We have coverage only on the second Cuban Embassy visit. We have no indication who he talked with at the Soviet Embassy. There was no photographic coverage of OSWALD's entries into either the Cuban or Soviet Embassies on the 27th. The lack of coverage on the Cuban installation is explainable: the camera, based on the recollection of officers still in service in Headquarters, was

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down on the 27th because of mechanical malfunction, which was  
 probably  
 in course of correction. Why OSWALD was missed in his entry to  
<sup>on 27th</sup>  
 the Soviet installation is not yet explained.

b. 28 September 1963 (Saturday). [Note: Both Cuban and

Soviet Embassies were closed to the public on Saturdays.

Photographic coverage was normally suspended Saturdays and

Sundays.] OSWALD, notwithstanding the holidayschedule, went

on Saturday morning to the Soviet Embassy (his second visit)

where he spoke to a consul. He apparently could not recall

his new Texas address. At ca. 1151 he went to the Cuban

Embassy--his third entry--where he had registered it in his

visa application the day previously. He secured the address

from Mrs. DURAN and she called the Soviet Consulate presumably

to permit him to give them the address over the phone.

Instead, the Soviet with whom OSWALD spoke over Mrs. DURAN's

telephone invited OSWALD to come back in person, and he said he

would. (Presumably OSWALD thereupon) went back to the Soviet

installation (his third entry). ~~to give them his Texas address.~~

c. 29 September 1963 (Sunday). No activity registered.

d. 30 September 1963 (Monday). No activity registered.

(It is known that OSWALD reserved space this date on a Mexico  
 City-Laredo bus, departing 2 October 1963 at 0830.)

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c. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday). OSWALD made at least two calls, at 1031 and 1045, to the Soviet Embassy. He identified himself twice during the second call when he talked with OBYEDIKOV--a guard--and referred to his talk on Saturday, probably with KOSTIKOV. There was no photographic coverage of OSWALD on 1 October; from the context of the two calls, one *if the following reasoning is correct, that could be* *as was* *known about*, *moreover* there would have been no reason for him to go to the Embassy. His case had clearly been placed at the sufferance of the USSR Embassy in Washington. His two calls on 1 October were concerned with whether any reply had been received from Washington. Under these circumstances, *In hindsight* it is unreasonable to believe OSWALD would have gone to the Soviet Embassy on that date.

18. The camera at about mid-day registered the entry into the Soviet Embassy of an white-shirted individual who among all persons *in the opinion of the Station* *that day*, the photographic coverage appeared to be the only person--a non-Latin, and possibly an American--who entered the Soviet installation. *that day*. On the chance that there could be an association between the *subject* identification data derived from the voice intercept and the descriptive data derived from the photograph, the Station reported the two elements in its cable to Headquarters on 8 October.

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*(really amounted to an analytic "counter-logic")*  
 18. The Station's action was not unusual (considering the  
*justified by the*  
 primitive and initiatory status of the OSWALD identification.

Many examples of a similar kind of thing can be found in the  
 day-to-day record of Station/Headquarters correspondence *and writing*

19. Developments from 8 October - 22 November 1963. Mexico

City station reported to Headquarters on 8 October (received in  
 Headquarters 9 October) the following initial information on OSWALD.\*

1. On 1 Oct 63, an American male who spoke  
 broken Russian and said his name Lee OSWALD (phonetic),  
 stated he was at SovEmb on 28 Sept when *he* spoke with *a*  
 consul whom he believed to be Valeriy Vladimirovich  
 KOSTIKOV. Subject asked the Soviet guard [Ivan]  
 OBYEDKOV, who answered, if there anything new  
 regarding a telegram to Washington. OBYEDKOV upon  
 checking said nothing had been received yet, but the  
 request had been sent.

Mexico Station said it  
 2./ had photos of a male who appeared to be

an American entering Soviet Embassy 1216 hours,  
 leaving 1222 on 1 Oct. Apparent age 35, athletic  
 build, circa 6 feet, receding hairline, balding top.

Wore khakis and sport shirt.

3. No local dissemination was being made by  
 the Station.

*\* cable has been rendered <sup>here, and throughout,</sup> 14 into readable English, <sup>the</sup> without  
 substantive changes <sup>been made in the original or otherwise.</sup>  
 Encryptions and pseudonyms have been omitted or kept in clear.*

R. S. A. F. T.

(see hours later)

32. Headquarters responded 0422Z time, 23 November 1963,  
cancelling its immediately preceding request:

"1. No need send staffer with photos. We have  
asked Navy for photos again, but Mexico can see OSWALD's  
picture sooner on the press wire.

"2. Have just re-emphasized to FBI <sup>(the next day)</sup> ~~Heads~~ the sensitivity  
of photos you are sending and also relaying names of  
travelers with similar names. Note radio says OSWALD lived  
under alias of O. H. LEE."

33. On the 23rd at 1729Z time, Headquarters advised  
Mexico City:

"The FBI says that the photos of the man entering  
the Soviet Embassy which Mexico Station sent to Dallas  
were not of Lee OSWALD. Presume Mexico Station has  
double-checked dates of these photos and is also  
checking all pertinent ~~other~~ photos for possible shots  
of OSWALD."

34. And at this point, 2048Z time, 23 November, Mexico ~~Station~~  
<sup>finally</sup>  
City Station agreed:

"Saw photos of Lee OSWALD on television night of  
22 November and it obvious photos sent to Dallas were  
not identical with Lee OSWALD held in Dallas. Dates are  
as given on photos.

~~DRAFT~~

"Mexico Station is reviewing all available photos  
of persons entering Soviet and Cuban Embassies."

35. Two hours later (2254Z time, 23 November 1963) the Station  
had reported the results of its effort to review all available  
coverage:

"Complete recheck of photos of all visitors to  
Cuban Embassy from August through first half of  
November against good press photos shows no evidence  
of OSWALD visit. Similar blank against all Soviet  
Embassy photos from 1 September. Note, only visit we  
know he made was to Cuban Embassy 28 September,  
Saturday, on which Embassy closed and we had not had  
coverage . . . ."

36. With this communication the matter of the "unidentified individual" reaches the end of Phase I, the key element of which is the conviction at first latent, then expressed, that the photographed individual might be identical with OSWALD. This applies especially to the Station, though at a certain point even Headquarters moved no rebuttal despite the hard facts ~~of quite disparate description, so that the description of Oswald and the unidentified individual were quite disparate.~~

37. This review has attempted to deal even-handedly with all items in the case record that have a bearing on what happened. The operational zeal, innovativeness and the high commitment of all involved, especially in Mexico City, speaks for itself. Equally apparent - because of the 20 - 20 advantage of hindsight - is the evidence of non-performance. It was a critical failure, for example, that no photo of OSWALD was made available - though it was expressly requested both at Headquarters and by the field - or that it was not more aggressively sought by CIA, before the twenty-second of November. A photograph of OSWALD would have obviated - in a way the mere possession of a correct physical evidently could not - the whole successive deterioration of what began <sup>in Mexico City</sup> as an impressionistic selection of the photograph on 1 October 1963 into a cause celebre today.

38. It should be clear from this factual survey that

never has there been a cause célèbre with less intrinsic merit... Equally clear should be the demonstration of the facts themselves that there was nothing contrived or conspired in what happened unless we have now descended to that point in human values achieved under STALIN in the USSR and under HITLER in Germany, where just a plain mistake is per se evidence of conspiracy.

39. The Genesis and Development of ODUM Exhibit No. 1 and Commission Exhibit 237.

Special Agent of the FBI, Bardwell D. ODUM, on 23 November 1963 showed one of the six photos flown up from Mexico City the previous day to OSWALD's mother, Marguerite OSWALD. ODUM himself had trimmed the off the background by straight cuts. Mrs. OSWALD had no recognition of the image in the photograph. Bardwell's own detailed account may be found in HEARINGS, op cit, Vol. XX, p. 268

40. The photograph shows the unidentified individual in a black shirt. It was one of the five photos taken of him in front of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on 4 October 1963, two days after OSWALD had left the city.

41. At this point for the record the total available photo coverage of the unidentified individual numbers twelve photographs:

- a. Five taken on 1 October 1963, entering and exiting the Soviet Embassy. He is garbed in a white shirt a light colored (khakai) trousers.

the Soviet Embassy. He is garbed in a dark, open, button-down shirt ~~and dark trousers~~ with a high neckline under-shirt showing and dark trousers.

c. Two taken on 15 October 1963 in front of the

Cuban Embassy. He is wearing a dark, collarless T-shirt or light sweater.

The negatives of all of these are extent and are now held in Headquarters as integral parts of the OSWALD and related file holdings.

42. The result of ODUM's display of the photograph - to repeat, a cropped version of one of those noted under paragraph 41b, above - was Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD's allegation that she had been shown a picture of her son's killer, Jack RUBY, a day before he perpetuated the deed! Again the Warren Commission Report (pp. 364 - 365, 367) exhaustively disposes of this erroneous charge and requires no repetition here. A complicating fact developed along the way was Mrs. OSWALD's (correct) observation, when she finally admitted before the Commission that the ODUM photograph was not RUBY, was that the photo had been cropped differently from the one she had been shown in Dallas.

Inspector MALLEY's cropped version of the ODUM photograph became Commission Exhibit 237 (see HEARINGS, Vol. XVI, p. 638).

43. The net effect of the developments in the hearings of the Commission was to require the admission of the cropped photograph into evidence in a chain of depositions beginning with

ODUM, including the FBI Inspector, James R. MALLEY (who had trimmed the photograph used by the Commission in Washington) and Mr. HELMS, who deposed for the originator. These documents speak for themselves and will be found in the HEARINGS, Vol. XI, pp. 468- 470.

44. Mexico City Station and other senior Agency officers strongly advised against the publication of the photograph in any form on the grounds that the Soviets would be immediately alerted to the existence of a useful and continuing U.S. intelligence operation and the operation would go down the drain. There were repeated cables exchanged on this point between Headquarters and Mexico City Station during the summer of 1964 in particular from 23 September to 15 October 1964 when the Station had plans underway to abandon the operation.

45. In acceding to the Commission's request for a deposition Mr. HELMS, then the Deputy Director ~~for~~ Plans, replied affirmatively to Mr. RANKIN by memorandum of 23 June 1964 which including the following additional observation:

"The Central Intelligence Agency recommends that this photograph not be reproduced in the Commission's report because it would jeopardize a most confidential and productive operation. In addition, it could be embarrassing to the individual involved who as far as the Agency is aware had no connection with

Lee Harvey OSWALD or the assassination of  
President KENNEDY."

46. In this instance the needs of the Commission prevailed over the DCI's statutory obligation to protect sources and methods. The "Unidentified Individual" remains to this day unidentified and there is no credible evidence up to this time to rebut the assertion made by Mr. HELM's in the concluding sentence of his memorandum to Mr. RANKIN on 23 June 1964 . . .

And the photo operation did, as predicted, go down the drain.

Within a week of the public appearance of the ODUM Exhibit No. 1 and Commission Exhibit 237, members of the Soviet Embassy began systematic efforts to survey the surrounding buildings, ostensibly for rental space, but clearly their inquiries were directed to spotting possible camera sites. The operation was continued in any case. Within a year it had become almost totally unproductive in coverage on Americans in contact with the Embassy - a clear sign that this category of visitor was being warned away the the Soviets themselves.

## PHASE THREE: "THE UNIDENTIFIED MAN" PHOTOGRAPHS, 1964 - 1975

As could be foreseen there has been persistent pressure by critics of the Warren Commission Report to exploit the ODUM Exhibit No. 1 and Commission Exhibit No. 237 for partisan interpretive purposes. A considerable correspondence has accumulated since the end of 1964 in which the Agency has attempted to be responsive to these requests simultaneously to satisfy what has been the sole interest from the inception of the matter: to protect the method of acquisition of the photograph and the foreign liaison relationship which made the acquisition possible.

Following are highlights from the correspondence from the current phase:

- a. On 16 May 1967 over the signature of the General Counsel of the Agency, Lawrence R. Houston, CIA voluntarily submitted a statement to Judge Bagert of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana. The response dealt affirmatively with the contents of the subpoena that had been delivered to the United States Marshall in the District of Columbia. Despite the fact that the subpoena could not be executed because of the lack of jurisdiction, Mr. Houston proffered on Agency behalf categoric assurances to the court regarding inaccurate statements and inferences made by Mr. Garrison in New Orleans about the

photograph of the unidentified individual. The following is quoted from Mr. Houston's memorandum:

"Because of the publicity which has surrounded the Orleans Parish Grand Jury proceedings, we have recently carried out an exhaustive search of the files of the Central Intelligence Agency for any picture of Lee Harvey Oswald taken in Mexico. As a result of this search, I can state categorically that the files of this Agency do not contain, and never have contained, any such picture of

Lee Harvey Oswald taken in Mexico and that we have no information whatsoever that any such photograph ever existed. To the best of our knowledge and information, therefore, there is no such photograph.

Furthermore, the photograph which is printed in the Warren Commission Report, Exhibit No. 237 in Volume XVI, never contained more than one figure, and the figure in the photograph depicts an individual who, to our knowledge, has not been identified. The circumstances of the filing of this photograph with the Warren Commission are set forth in affidavits of pages 468 and 469 of Volume XI, Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Consequently, we have no record of any photograph that answers in any way the description of the one we understand was requested in the subpoena.

"I hope you will accept this information in this form in the spirit of cooperation in which it is proffered."

The Agency has repeatedly serviced requests about the identity of the unknown individual, Mr. Emory L. Brown, Jr., Rte #4, Box 82

Sqanqum Road, Farmingdale, New Jersey. The last exchange of correspondence in our record covered the period 4 - 17 April 1970.

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20. On 10 October 1963 at [redacted] time the WH Division, component responsible for action on this report disseminated to the Department of State, the FBI, and the Navy Department by routine electrical transmission, the report received from Mexico <sup>and the</sup> adding some station together with preliminary collateral details drawn from a file review:

1. On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee OSWALD, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington. The American was described as approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build, about six feet tall, with a "receding" hairline.

2. It is believed that OSWALD may be identical to Lee Henry [sic] OSWALD, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former U.S. Marine who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later made arrangements through the United States Embassy in Moscow to return to the United States with his Russian-born wife, Marina Nikolaevna PUSAKOVA [sic] and their child.

3. The information in paragraph one is being disseminated to your representatives in Mexico City.

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Any further information received on this subject

will be furnished you. This information is being

made available to the Immigration and Naturalization  
Service.

21. Although the reaction of the Headquarters desk was "by the book" and in good time, there were a number of errors in this advisory to the departments which, on the record, were concerned with the OSWALD case:

a. OSWALD's middle name was misspelled: "Henry" for

Harvey.

b. His wife's maiden name was misspelled: "PUSAKOVA"

(PR)  
for PUSAKOVA.

(throughout the month)  
Neither of these errors are significant. More important was: (throughout the month)

c. Paragraph 2 of the Mexico City Station's report

which had dealt with a concurrent, but separate, phenomenon,

the description of an individual observed going into and out of the Soviet Embassy, had been locked on to Lee OSWALD as an alleged

descriptive fact. (There can be no question that this misreading

of the Mexico City Station report was an analyst's error

which escaped detection in the coordination before release:

the descriptive details attributed to OSWALD were so far off

the mark as to be immediately recognizable as such by the

recipients. (In Headquarters, among whom both the Navy and the FBI had

partial explanation, if not exculpation, of Oswald.)

be it recalled that as of that moment CIA had no photograph  
 (in files or in Mexico City  
 of OSWALD to refer-to.)

23. Confirmation of this judgment is provided by the contents  
 of the cable composed by the same analyst and sent as of 2209Z time  
 (two hours later) to Mexico City Station, referring to its 8 October cable:

1. Lee OSWALD who called SovEmb 1 Oct

probably identical Lee Henry [sic] OSWALD born

18 Oct 1939, New Orleans, Louisiana, former radar

operator in United States Marines who defected

to USSR in Oct 1959. OSWALD is five feet ten

inches, one hundred sixty five pounds, light

brown wavy hair, blue eyes.

2. On 31 Oct 1959 he attempted to renounce

his United States citizenship to the United States

Emb in Moscow, indicating he had applied for Soviet

citizenship. On 13 Feb the US Emb Moscow received

an undated letter from OSWALD postmarked Minsk on

five Feb 1961 in which subj indicated he desired

return of his US PPT as wished to return to USA

if "we could come to some agreement concerning

the dropping of any legal proceedings against me."

On 8 July on his own initiative he appeared at the

Emb with his wife to see about his return to States.

Being visited that he actually had never applied  
for Soviet citizenship and that his application  
at that time had been to remain in USSR and for  
temporary extension of his tourist visa pending  
outcome of his request. This application,  
according to OSWALD, contained no ref to Soviet  
citizenship. OSWALD stated that had been  
employed since 13 Jan 1960 in Belorussian radio  
and tv factory in Minsk where worked as metal  
worker in research shop. OSWALD was married on  
30 April 1961 to Marina Nikolaevna PUSAKOVA [sic]  
a dental technician born 17 July 1941 USSR. No  
Hdqs traces. He attempted arrange for wife to  
join him in Moscow so she could appear at Emb  
for visa interview. His American <sup>(passport)</sup> was returned  
to him. US Emb Moscow stated twenty months of  
realities of life in Soviet Union had clearly had  
maturing effect on OSWALD.

3. Latest Hdqs info was an FBI report dated  
May 1962 saying FBI had determined OSWALD is still  
US citizen and both he and his Soviet wife have  
exit permits and Dept State had given approval for  
their travel with their infant child to USA.

4. Station should pass info ref and para one to the Embassy  
to the FBI, the Navy, and I&NS locally. The information

~~copy stored~~ as para two and three originates

with the FBI.

5. Ref<sup>2</sup> and possible identification being

disseminated to Hdqs of FBI, State, Navy, AND I&NS.

PIs, keep Hdqs advised on any further contacts or

positive identification of OSWALD.

*to Mexico City*

23. The Headquarters' feedback, of OSWALD's correct description  
should have been sufficient, in view of the incongruities with the  
details deduced from the photo of the unidentified male, to keep  
*But things did not work out that way*  
these two matters apart as investigative facts. Mexico City

Station on 15 October 1963, *Br Henry char* asked Headquarters to  
"please pouch a photo of OSWALD." Headquarters electrically  
delivered to the Department of the Navy the following message on 24 October  
1963:

"Lee Henry (sic) OSWALD . . .

"It is requested that you forward to this office as  
soon as possible two copies of the most recent photo  
graph you have of subject. We will forward them to our  
representative in Mexico, who will attempt to determine  
if the Lee OSWALD in Mexico City and subject are the  
same individual."

No photo had been received by CIA by 22 November 1963.

24. Within its limitations and capabilities, Mexico City Station had done all it could to comply with Headquarters instructions:

- a. Headquarters had been alerted and in turn those agencies with an investigative or policy interest in OSWALD *as an American in the United States,* had been alerted, both in Washington and in the field.
- b. Mexico City had no further contacts by OSWALD to report because--as it was ultimately ascertained--he had left Mexico City on 2 October.
- c. OSWALD was not an Agency investigative responsibility, in any case. Even with a photograph, it would have taken very special efforts triggered by the other interested U.S. agencies to have made a positive identification in view of OSWALD's hotel registration under alias.

There the matter rested until mid-day 22 November 1963.

25. The Insertion of the Photo of the Unidentified Individual with the Chain of Events On 22 November 1963 the Mexico City Station cabled Headquarters at 2229Z time after learning of the arrest of Lee H. OSWALD, age 24, possibly in connection with the assassination and referencing *its earlier message of 12 and 15 October 1963* and Headquarters' reply of 10 October. The station *requested by* *reqd priority pouch photo of* OSWALD so that Station can check all recent coverage for OSWALD. Forwarding soonest copies of only visitor to SovEmb 1 Oct who could be identical with OSWALD."

Re. It is clear that Mexico City Station had forgotten that according to its own communication the unidentified male in the photo was of "apparent age 35" and that the accurate description of OSWALD forwarded by Headquarters on the 10th precluded the person whom they regarded as the "only visitor to the Soviet Embassy on 1 October who could be identical," could indeed be.

27. The Station [had] meanwhile begun an exhaustive and accelerated review of all its technical and photographic intelligence. A dispatch was prepared in accordance with the indication given in the cable of 22 November, cited in paragraph 25 above. The dispatch noted that photo coverage of the unidentified individual had turned up on 4 and 15 October at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies, respectively. The text of the 22 November 1963 pouches dispatch ~~under seal~~:

"1. Attached are copies of the only photographs obtained . . . on 1 October 1963, which appeared to be an American. This same man visited the Soviet Embassy on 4 October 1963.

"2. Copies of these photographs were shown to the [sic] U.S. Ambassador on 22 November 1963 and a copy of each of the two photographs was given to Chief FBI, Mexico, on that date....

"P.S. Photographs dated 15 October 1963 were inserted after typing of dispatch. These were taken as [the] person

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entered the Cuban Embassy."

Attached were eight photographs: four (of which two were marked 1 October on reverse) showing the individual in a white shirt and four (unmarked on reverse) showing the individual in a black shirt.

It would seem to be logical that the word "sets" was probably omitted from paragraph two of the dispatch between the words "two" and "photographs."

30. That the Station was working under forced draft is clearly apparent from the text of the dispatch, which contains material fact inserted as a postscript. That fact was reported simultaneously by cable to Headquarters at 0053Z time, 23 November:

"1. Mexico Station has photos same unidentified American type who is possibly OSWALD entering Cuban Embassy on 15 October. Searching for possibility photo-documented entry Cuban Embassy other days.

"2. Also attempting establish OSWALD entry and departure Mexico."

31 23 Nov 1963  
29. Headquarters, at 01:36 z time, asked Mexico Station to send a staff member with all photographs to Headquarters on the next available flight.

32. Concurrently with or before the foregoing cables to Headquarters, the Chief of Station, Mexico City spoke directly by double-talk telephone with the Western Hemisphere Chief of

Station, J. C. KING, and secured permission to give copies of the photographs of the unidentified individual to the Legal Attache and to make them known to the Ambassador. *(what happened next is best clearly reflected in a personal note by the Chief of Station to the NW Division Chief, mailed to the latter from Dallas; together with copies of the photographs, by the FBI representative who delivered them to the FBI in that city.)*

"22 November 1963

"Dear J.C. [KING]:

"Reference is made to our conversation of 22 November in which I requested permission to give the Legal Attache copies of photographs of a certain person who is known to you.

"Attached are copies of each of the photographs we have with the dates of the visits stamped on the back.

"At 6 p.m. Mexico time on 22 November, The Ambassador decided that this was important enough to have a member of the Legal Attache's office take copies of these pictures to Dallas, Texas. The Naval Attache is making a special flight from Mexico City for this purpose. The Legal Attache's officer who is going to Dallas has promised to mail this material to you for me.

"Copies of these photographs are also being sent by

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pouch which will leave Mexico City on the night of  
22 November 1963.

"Best wishes,

"Win [SCOTT]"

According to the sidelined comments on this letter, the Legal  
Attache's officer was Eldon RUDD.

34. The decision to remit the photographs to the FBI in  
Dallas had been made by the Ambassador, according to the Chief of  
Station, who simultaneously with the FBI agent's departure reported  
to Headquarters by cable (0244Z time, 23 November):

"FBI agent left here 2000 local time with two copies each  
of six photos of a person suspected to be OSWALD, on a  
special flight for Dallas. He is carrying envelope with  
one copy each photo for airmail special from Dallas to

J. C. KING at home as per telephone conversation with  
SCOTT. One copy of each of these photos plus a copy of  
each of the photos showing the same person exiting the  
Cuban Embassy forwarded by memorandum leaving by regular  
pouch tonight. In view of above does Hqs still want a  
staffer with additional photo(s)?"

be stipulated in summary:

a. There is no increment of credible evidence, applying this ~~phrase strictly~~, of Soviet and/or Cuban political, intelligence or security service involvement to what was developed and considered by the Warren Commission and its staff.

The Commission's finding, on the basis of credible evidence, that Lee Harvey OSWALD was the killer of President KENNEDY and Officer TIPPIT and did them alone and of his own determination ~~and~~ stands.

b. "Credible evidence" that would upset or significantly modify this judge ~~did~~ (and does) not exist in Washington. But such evidence could

exist in Moscow and/or Havana, whose voluntary inputs to the Warren Commission were minimal in quantity ~~and quality~~, ~~designed to cover up any knowledge~~ ~~of~~ ~~connection~~ ~~with~~ ~~OSWALD~~

~~connected directly or indirectly with the assassination~~ ~~before this belief~~ ~~with Oswald~~

Cuban (KGB and/or DGI) connection will persist

and grow ~~until there has been a full disclosure by these governments of all elements of OSWALD's handling and stay in the Soviet Union and his contacts in Mexico City. The Warren Commission report should have left a wider "window" for this contingency.~~

~~and That, indeed, was the opinion at the working level particularly in the counterintelligence component in the CIA in~~

~~1964. As was indicated by Mr. Holmes in his testimony before the Warren Commission, CIA ~~regarding~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ months previous to~~

c. In the absence of additional or new ~~elements~~ <sup>2</sup>)

"credible" evidence, there are "findings"

~~in the record that emerge as noteworthy, in the light of the other conclusions. These are reviewed and summarized below, item-by-item.~~

1. Investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, 1964), vol. I, pp. 1-129  
I'll give you this citation by phone, Monday. 3

~~Report this agent to the Central and a  
fully justified place~~

## d. CASTRO's warning and threat of 7 September 1963. -

if OSWALD did indeed read it in New Orleans - must be considered of great significance in the light of the pathological evolution of OSWALD's passive/aggressive makeup and his identification with *After his attempt to kill General Walker in April 1963,*

Fidel CASTRO and the Cuban revolution which is directly traceable as far back as his Marine Corps service in El Toro, California.

CASTRO's warning and threat to AP correspondent HARKER, ir-

respective of whether there was any formal mandate, or even security service contact with OSWALD by the Cubans or the

Russians. - ~~was an act of~~ singular irresponsibility

and under no circumstances excusable or excusable retort for what the Cuban emigres were doing during the summer of 1963, ~~with or~~

~~CIA's knowledge~~

~~President's brother Robert KENNEDY, who was personally invested with oversight of Cuban matters at the federal level~~

~~after the Bay of Pigs~~

Cuban Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD, Santa Ana, California, early  
1959(?)

9. The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains an assertion of germinal significance to any review of the background of Lee Harvey OSWALD's feeling toward and relations with CASTRO's Cuba. DELGADO was probably the closest peer group member to OSWALD during his specialist training period at El Toro Marine Corps base December 1958 - September 1959. The Warren Commission Report takes note of this:

"OSWALD told DELGADO that he was in touch with Cuban diplomatic officials in this country, which DELGADO at first took to be 'one of his lies, but later believed.'"<sup>1</sup>

10. Actually DELGADO's testimony says a lot more of possible operational significance than is reflected by the language of the report and does not appear to have been rundown or developed by investigation. The record of the beginning of OSWALD's relationship with the Cubans starts with a question mark.

11. The period was one of transition in U.S. - Cuban relations after CASTRO's takeover. OSWALD, and DELGADO at the outset, were CASTRO supporters, OSWALD being particularly keen about how to get ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~them~~ (DELGADO testified

"... I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that I know was to get in touch with a Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time/I told him this - we were on friendly terms with Cuba, you know, so this wasn't no subversion or malintent, you know. I didn't know what to answer him. I told him to see them.

---

<sup>1</sup> Report to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Washington, 1964), p. 687 Hereafter cited as Report.

"After a while he told me he was in contact with them ...

"... I seen this envelope in his footlocker, wall-locker, and it was addressed to him, and they had an official seal on it, and as far as I could recollect that was mail from Los Angeles, and he was telling me there was a Cuban Consul. And just after he started receiving these letters - you see, he would never go out, but stay near the post all the time ...

"... he had one visitor after he started receiving letters he had one visitor. It was a man, because I got the call from the MP guard shack, and they gave me a call that OSWALD had a visitor at the front gate. This man had to be a civilian, otherwise they would have let him in. So I had to find somebody to relieve OSWALD, who was on guard, to go down there to visit with this fellow, and they spent about an hour and a half, two hours talking, I guess, and he came back. I don't know who the man was or what they talked about, but he looked nonchalant about the whole thing when he came back. He never mentioned who he was, nothing.

"Mr. Liebeler: How long did he talk to him, do you remember?

"Mr. Delgado: About an hour and half, two hours ...

"Mr. Liebeler: You never asked OSWALD who this fellow was that he talked to?

"Mr. Delgado: No. No ...

"Mr. Liebeler: Did you connect this visit that OSWALD had at that time with the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. Delgado: I did ; because I thought it funny for him to be receiving a caller at such a late date - time. Also, up to this time he hardly ever received mail; in fact he seldom received mail from home because I made it a policy, I used to pick up the mail for our unit and distribute it to the guys in there, and very seldom did I ever see one for him. But every so often, often after

he started to get in contact with those Cuban people, he started getting letter pamphlets and newspapers...

"... and he also started receiving letters, you know, and no bibles, maybe pamphlets, you know, little-like church, things we get from church, you know, but it wasn't a church.

"Mr. Liebeler: Were they written in Spanish, any of them, do you know?

"Mr. Delgado: Not that I can recall; no.

"Mr. Liebeler: Did you have any reason to believe that these things come to OSWALD from the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. Delgado: Well, I took it for granted that they did after I seen the envelope know ... Something like a Mexican eagle, with a big, impressive seal, you know. They had different colors on it, red and white, almost looked like our colors, you know. But I can't recall the seal. I just knew it was in Latin, United something like that. I couldn't understand. It was Latin.

"Mr. Liebeler: You don't know for sure whether it was from the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. Delgado: No. But he had told me prior, just before I found that envelope in his wall locker, that he was receiving mail from them, and one time he offered to show it to me, but I wasn't much interested because at the time we had work to do, and I never did ask to see that paper again, you know.

"Mr. Liebeler: Did he tell you what his correspondence with the Cuban Consulate was about?

"Mr. Delgado: No, he didn't.

"Mr. Liebeler: Did he ever indicate to you that it had to do with the conversations that you had about going over to Cuba?

"Mr. Delgado: No. The only thing he told me was that right after he had this conversation with the Cuban people was that he was going to -- once he got out of the service he was going to Switzerland... 5

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Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. KENNEDY  
Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination  
of President Kennedy (Washington, 1964), Volume VIII, pp. 241-243.  
Hereafter cited as Hearings,

Oswald's application to Albert Schweitzer College, Churwalden, Switzerland, was dated 19 March 1959, and he was presumably to report there on 20 April 1960. Destined for discharge from the Marines on 7 December 1959, Oswald accelerated his exit on alleged grounds of family hardship in early September 1959. On 27 September 1959 he was issued a U.S. passport valid for travel - among other places to Cuba and the USSR. He entered the Soviet Union from Finland on 15 October 1959.

12. DELGADO's testimony has the cast of credibility. Granting that, it is of basic importance to focus attention on the male visitor who contacted Oswald at El Toro camp and talked with him for between one and a half to two hours. The event was unique in DELGADO's recollections, <sup>and</sup> actually there is nothing like it - on the record - in everything else we know about Oswald's activity in the United States or after. The record reflects no identification of <sup>El Toro</sup> the contact. DELGADO's presumption is that the was from the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. Assuming that, the question is: Who was it? And was there reporting to <sup>from Los Angeles to Washington and Havana</sup> ~~Havana~~ that would, in effect, represent <sup>Cuba</sup> ~~Cuba~~ <sup>a minimal guess</sup>, the opening of a file on Oswald?

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<sup>3</sup> U.S./Cuban diplomatic and consular relations were severed on 3 January 1961.

Prediction of President KENNEDY's Demise by Communist Party Cell Leader Morse BENITEZ Zabola, 1962.

Guatemala Station forwarded to Headquarters on 9 January 1964 a duplicate copy of a raw report by a penetration dated 5 January 1962 describing events at the yearly Communist Party cell meeting. The cell leader, Morse BENITEZ Zabola, said that the Communist Party in Guatemala should form a single new party: "We need not preoccupy ourselves over the politics of Presidency KENNEDY because we know, according to prognostications, that he will die within the present years, 1962."

This report apparently had been discounted [redacted] when it [redacted] received and was not forwarded until the Station re-reviewed all of its material after the assassination. The file reflects no followup or formal dissemination of the report.

Enigmatic Threats by Cuban Third Secretary in The Hague,  
7 November 1963.

15. A sensitive liaison source, reporting after the KENNEDY assassination, indicated that at the Soviet reception on 7 November 1963, the Cuban Third Secretary, Ricardo L. SANTOS Pesa, discussed the recent refugee raids on Cuba and their implications with a host-country diplomat, concluding with the admonition: "... just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon." Asked to be more specific what would happen soon, SANTOS replied: "Just wait, just wait."

16. These data were passed to the Warren Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964. SANTOS was subsequently reported to have a history of mental instability and was summarily recalled from The Hague reportedly for reasons related to that fact in April 1966.

Intercepted Conversation of Cuban Embassy Employee, Luisa CALDERON,  
Afternoon of 22 November 1963

17 At 1730 Mexico City time, about five hours after the KENNEDY assassination, ~~in Mexico~~, a Cuban Embassy employee named "Luisa" received a telephone call in Spanish from an unidentified male outside.

18 The caller asked her if she had heard the latest news. Luisa jokingly replied: "Yes, of course, I knew it almost before Kennedy ... Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs), what barbarians!..."

19 Both speakers agreed on the seriousness of the assassination. "Luisa" also stated that the party at Silvia DURAN's had been called off so it would not appear that they were celebrating the death of KENNEDY, nor would they have the party coincide with the burial. Finally she said she planned to move that night into the house of a doctor (a woman) friend.

20 Later hyperbole? boastful ex post facto suggestion of fore-knowledge? This is the only item in the intercept coverage ~~of the~~ <sup>contains</sup> Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that ~~presented~~ the suggestion ~~as~~ <sup>of</sup> foreknowledge or expectation.

21 The tension, enigmatic character of the conversation is sharply highlighted by the following facts:

a. "Luisa" was probably identical with Luisa CALDERON, a cadre worker of the Cuban Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI). She returned to Cuba in 1964 and was reported to be working in DGI headquarters.

b. The DGI element in Mexico City in the fall of 1963 was headed by Alfredo MIRABEL Diaz who had arrived on 2 September 1963, formally as the replacement of the Consul ~~Eusebio~~ AZCUE (departed 19 November 1963). The deputy DGI chief (and as of June 1964, MIRABEL's successor) was Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez.

c. The "Silvia DURAN" named in Luisa's conversations was the receptionist, a Mexican

c. The "Silvia DURAN" named in Phisa's conversation was the receptionist, a Mexican national, who ~~dealt with~~ <sup>met</sup> see Harvey OSWALD during his known ~~visits~~ <sup>on</sup> on 27 and 28 September, to the Cuban installations in connection with a Cuban visa application for stay and/or transit. Silvia DURAN is the sole live witness regarding LHO's activity in Mexico City. Her testimony, however, in its entirety was taken and presented solely by the Mexican Governmental authorities. A direct confrontation with her was requested by the Warren Commission <sup>PTB</sup> but rejected by the Mexican authorities. It is from Silvia DURAN's statements that it was learned that LHO became engaged in a / altercation on 27 September with ~~Eduardo~~ AZCUE. *Sgt*

d. Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez, alias Marcos, and his DGI assistant, Rogelis RODRIGUEZ Lopez were positively identified in February 1964 by two independent sources as engaged in the active development and facilitation of the training of Nicaraguan agents for the purpose of assassinating General Anastasio SOMOZA. VEGA, it is established, was on post in Mexico City during OSWALD's stay there 27 September - 2 October 1963. He left Mexico City on 3 November 1963 for Havana. It was reliably reported about VEGA that all individuals going to Cuba, legally or illegally, had to pass through him first. He took the biographical data and sent it to Cuba for name checking, a procedure which normally took 15 days.

e. There is no evidence in the OSWALD case file that Silvia DURAN was subjected to a systematic elicitative interrogation that would have related her dealings with OSWALD, known and confirmed by intercept, with the data held ~~nowhere~~ on the Cuban DGI, its personalities and methods, in Mexico City. Was it normal for a case like OSWALD's, considering the fuss he allegedly made with AZCUE, for the applications to handled solely by a local employee and a lame duck *lily* AZCUE whose slot had been taken ~~vacated~~ by the DGI chief?

~~Whatever the answer to the questions, there were~~  
5. For example, VEGA would have handled the details of the visa application

and facilitation of this trip to Cuba was Major Colby. This  
was taken by Vicente Theodore Bell, the organizer  
of the Fair Play Committee for Cuba, with which  
Lee Harvey Oswald established relations from Dallas on  
~~September~~ and from New Orleans ~~February~~ from April  
during the period April -

2 Nov 1963. There is an interesting portion of Vago's  
~~travel history~~ ~~of his influence~~

overlap between Hess and Vago's travel to Havana during  
that period: VEBT departs Mexico City on 6 January for  
Havana and returns on 13 February 1968.

not asked at the time. And there

remains the more fundamental question: accepting the DURAN story on its face, could it have happened without the DGI ~~personnel~~ above cited knowledge and participation? ~~and does that imply~~

~~consideration than a solid negative and in that case it is~~  
~~palpable that CASTRO's unique~~ <sup>own</sup> ~~intelligence and security~~  
~~service could have more in its files than~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~surfaced in the~~  
~~DURAN statements.~~

Coming back to the beginning: "Luisa" - Luisa CALDERON - as a member of the DGI unit in Mexico City - could very well have known something that would make what she said to her unidentified caller less a matter of boastful self-indulgence than was assumed at that time.

especially because VEGA is later cited by a Cuban defector, as having acknowledged that his informant R. Gould made several visits to the Cuban consulate. ~~This~~ It is clear that

*Spec L*

Silvia DURAN, Substantial Amplification of Admission of  
Alleged Personal Relations with EHO, 1967.

*e7.* The defects viewed in hindsight of the Silvia DURAN testimony already have been suggested above. (In that context of criticism it would also be relevant to reconsider the implications of the two intercepted telephone conversations on 26 November 1963 between the Cuban President, DORTICOS, and his Ambassador to Mexico, Joaquim Hernandez *Armas*, because the thrust of the conversation dealt with the question whether Silvian DURAN had been asked (*or been offered*) about money payments by her Mexican interrogators.)

*e8.* As of September 1964 Silvia DURAN gave up her Cuban Embassy job. In the spring of 1967 Silvia DURAN was reported by a reliable and sensitive source to have cut all relations with Cubans. Her account of how she had been taken into custody and had been interrogated after the assassination repeated what was already known. She added, under circumstances that did not permit the source to challenge or elicit corroborative detail, that she had gone out with *EHO* during his stay in Mexico City and claimed she had sexual relations with him.

*spell out*

Allegations of Conspiratorial Contact between OSWALD and Cuban Government Agents with Particular Reference to Allegations of (a) Elena GARRO de Paz and (b) Oscar CONTRERAS

25. As the Warren Commission reported, "literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between OSWALD and agents of the Cuban Government have been investigated . . ." Among these cases, which consumed hundreds of CIA man-hours in Headquarters and abroad - and similarly the FBI in the United States - were the Nicaraguan walkin in Mexico City, 26 November 1963,

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte, ~~(1) the story of Ylario Rojas Villeneuve in Cozumel and Guadalupe; (2) the allegations of Enrique Rudolfo Goncalves in New York; (3) the claims of Robert Edward GALLANT in Santa Clara prison in California; and (5) Roy DOBKINS.~~

26. The ALVARADO case is taken up in detail by the Warren Commission under the cyptograph "D." ALVARADO claimed that he had seen an American, whom he identified as OSWALD, receive money sometime in mid-September 1963 in ~~a meeting in El Pato~~ of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. ALVARADO's story was ultimately broken by the use of the polygraph, on which ALVARADO showed deception and bringing ALVARADO's Nicaraguan security service contact into the case.

27. The ALVARADO story is a particularly acute representation of the difficulties that beset the evaluation of observed evidence: certain elements of the story persist despite the impeachment of its major premises. In this case, ALVARADO, whose account did not become public until the publication of the Warren Report in October 1964, talked consistently of the presence in the Cuban Consulate transaction~~s~~ of a Negro with red-dyed hair.

28. Elena GARRO de Paz is a mercurial, articular and socially prominent Mexican writer, married, but separated from a high-ranking Mexican foreign service official. She is, also, the cousin of Horacio DURAN, the husband of Silvia DURAN, cited above. There is a strong personal antipathy between the two women descending from Elena GARRO's trenchant anti-Communism.

See Report, p. 305 ff. Some of the others were: the case of Ylario ROJAS Villeneuve in Cozumel and Guadalupe; the

See Report, pp. 307 - 308 allegations of Enrique Rudolfo

GONCALVES, in New York City; the claims of Robert Edward GALLANT, Santa Clara prison farm, California, and the allegations of Roy DOBKINS.

29 From October 1964 until his retirement in the fall of 1969, a U. S. Embassy officer, Charles THOMAS, persistently kept up a stream of reports and memoranda reflecting GARRO's account of what had actually gone on between OSWALD, the Cubans and in particular Silvia DURAN in September 1963, including a repeated reference to a Negro with red-tinted hair.

30 The first reference to the GARRO story was noted in Mexico Station Memorandum of Record dated 12 October 1964:

"Elena GARRO [said] that she and her daughter were invited to a party at the Cuban Embassy during the period she now finds out that OSWALD was here in Mexico prior to the assassination. She was invited by a Mexican secretary in the Cuban Embassy whose husband is a cousin of the GARRO family [Horacio DURAN]. At the party she saw three Gringos, not drinking, not mixing and more or less just standing around together like three bumps on a log. They were so obviously out of place, she asked someone in the Cuban Embassy about them and was told that 'they were just passing through.' She claims that on the way these three Gringos stood out she took a good look at them as did her daughter. When the assassination occurred and OSWALD's picture was spread into the newspapers, both Elena and her daughter immediately said that he was one of the three Gringos without a doubt at the party."

31 GARRO repeated her story to Mr. Charles William THOMAS, an Embassy political officer on 10 December 1965: In September 1963 after her ~~recent~~ return from abroad, she went to a party, accompanied by her daughter, at the home of Ruben DURAN [emphasis added], Ruben is one of the two brothers of Horacio DURAN, who married her cousin. She met OSWALD and two other young Americans. At the party she was discouraged from talking with him. Other guests were the Cuban Consul AZCUE, General Clark FLORES, Silvia DURAN, who she later learned was OSWALD's mistress while he was here, Emilio CARBALLIDO, and a Latin American Negro man with red hair [emphasis added]. In November 1963 when the identity of the assassin became known, she and

her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted "assassins" and other insults at the staff there. Shortly afterward, she and her daughter were visited by a friend, Manuel CARVILLO (or CALVILLE), then an official in the Secretariat of the Gobernacion ~~which was headed at the time by ECHVERRIA~~ and were told he had orders to escort them to a small and obscure hotel in the center of town. They were kept there for eight days under pretext that they were in danger. When she told CARVILLO she wanted to go to the American Embassy and explain what she knew of OSWALD, she was told that the American Embassy was full of Communist spies.

32. On 25 December 1965 and 9 January 1966 in further interviews with THOMAS, GARRO and her daughter elaborated and in certain particulars significantly modified her earlier account. She also acknowledged that she and her daughter had been interviewed by Embassy officers to whom she claimed they did not give a very completed story because the Embassy officers did not appear to give much credence to anything she said.

33. It was developed that GARRO and daughter had been interviewed by the Legal Attached on 17 and 24 November 1964. Her information had been similar to what she claimed in her account to THOMAS, but had not been substantiated by inquiries. The FBI representative therefore considered the matter closed and reaffirmed his disengagement from the matter to the CIA Chief of Station on 27 December 1965 and to the Ambassador on 25 February 1965.

34. The Embassy Political Officer, however, persisted in his interviews and reporting. A memorandum of conversation, 13 July 1966, in which GARRO identified the place to which she had been taken by CALVILLE as the Hotel Vermont. (This detail checked out affirmatively.) GARRO was at the Hotel 23 - 24, 25 - 27 and 28 - 30 November 1963.) Another, on 7 February 1967, in which GARRO's ~~was~~ continuing vicissitudes with the Cubans are set out. And finally, upon THOMAS' retirement from U.S. Government service, the Department of State, at his request, 28 August 1969, disseminated to CIA and FBI a compilation of his reporting of the Elena GARRO interview.

35. There the matter rests. GARRO's chronology of the events she described as having occurred in the Mexican capital in

*These particulars were not confirmed by independent observers, at this time.*

ember 1963 never coincided with the confirmed ~~date~~ (of OSWALD's presence there. Her story however had two points concurrence with allegations by others regarding OSWALD: (a) ALVARADO's allegations regarding the Negro with the red-dyed hair [this detail could, however, have been gleaned from the Warren Commission's account of the "D" case] and (b) Sylvia DURAN's ~~ever~~ later claim of intimate personal contacts with OSWALD.

26. Beginning in March and amplified in May 1967, the American Consul, Benjamin J. RUYLE, in Tampico developed a contact with a local Mexican journalist, Oscar CONTRERAS Lartigue, who claimed to have encountered OSWALD with other pro-CASTRO students at the University of Mexico campus in September 1963.

27. In June 1969, CONTRERAS was interviewed by a CIA officer:

He studied law at the University of Mexico for three years, approximately 1960 - 1964. He belonged to a clandestine pro-CASTRO Revolutionary group at the University. Regarding the OSWALD case he was extremely cautious and although he was not able or willing to give dates and names, he said OSWALD visited the University of Mexico campus shortly after the Cuban Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. OSWALD made inquiries regarding pro-Cuban revolutionary groups at the University and was directed to CONTRERAS and his friend. OSWALD met CONTRERAS and four other persons as they came out of a round-table discussion held in the faculty of Philosophy. OSWALD told the group it was urgent that he visit Cuba and the Cuban Embassy denied him a visa. He requested aid from CONTRERAS' group. CONTRERAS and others mistrusted OSWALD because they felt he was a CIA provocation. The group allowed OSWALD to accompany them the rest of that day, that night and part of the next day. OSWALD was very introverted and appeared to be slightly crazy. OSWALD made no mention of an assassination plot but kept bringing up the ~~same~~ point he had to travel to Cuba immediately.

At this point, with FBI knowledge, the matter was turned over to the Mexican authorities who determined that CONTRERAS was indeed at the University of Mexico but only for the years 1959 - 1960 and that he had been publically associated in protest activity for the Student Revolutionary Bloc (BER) in January 1961. However, the group ceased functioning as such in the middle of 1962 and Oscar CONTRERAS was never one of its leaders. No further work is reflected in the files on the CONTRERAS allegations. Apart from the unsustained claims made by CONTRERAS about his own presence at the University, there is an additional elements that undermines the credibility of his account: OSWALD's Spanish, which was barely adequate to get him meals near in hotel, ~~it~~ seems hardly likely to have permitted him to carry on for an extended period with a University student group.