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25 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Yuriy I. NOSENKO

1. The attached memorandum describes the techniques used and the results obtained in the first phase of the present interrogation of NOSENKO. The most significant item to emerge from this questioning and related polygraph testing pertained to Subject's story on Lee Harvey OSWALD. Subject's reactions to the polygraph indicate that he never heard of OSWALD until after President Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, that he was not an active participant in the case as claimed and that his whole story on OSWALD was prepared by the KGB and given to us at their direction.

2. Other areas of strong reaction refer to Subject's suspected contact with the KGB while in Geneva in 1962 and 1964 and to Abidian and the Pushkin Street drop (key factor in the PENKOVSKIY compromise). Subject became very upset at questioning on this subject and refused to discuss his own alleged involvement in the case. We also touched upon NOSENKO's parental background, periods of imprisonment and homosexuality. His reactions here all pointed to clear-cut contradictions in the story he has told us.

3. There still remain several areas of interest and importance to be covered with the techniques used to date. We expect to complete this line of questioning by 28 October.

4. This first phase has enabled us to confirm our analyses of key aspects of this case. More important is the fact that NOSENKO knows he is reacting in sensitive areas and this is worrying him because he is not sure how much we know or how we learned it. NOSENKO's reactions have given us hope that we may by this procedure have begun to strike home. We do not know what it is that keeps this man sitting month after month in his present situation. We speculate that one factor may be confidence that the KGB will get him out. Related to this may be the thought that the KGB has CIA so deeply penetrated that it would be unhealthy for him to confess. Our current line of interrogation, expanded and used even more forcefully, might

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break down some of his obstacles to confession by showing us in a different and stronger posture. Therefore, we now plan to go beyond the limited aims originally set for this phase of the interrogation. We plan to continue the interrogation in the hope of getting a confession; written plans will be submitted when they are more definitely formulated.

David E. Murphy
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

Attachment

cc: Acting DDP (w/attach)
Chief, CI (w/attach)
Director of Security (w/attach)

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24 October 1966

1. This is an interim report on progress to date in the new phase in the interrogation of NOSENKO, which began on 18 October 1966, and covers the first four days, 18-21 October. After a break, it will resume on 25 October.

2. Our aims in this phase of the interrogation have been limited: in view of the possibility of losing access to NOSENKO, we have sought (a) to strengthen our basic report, now in preparation, by testing his story further, clarifying points of confusion and revealing new contradictions, and by polygraph examinations of key areas, and (b) to lead toward his eventual confession by directly exploiting our hypotheses about the true background of NOSENKO and this KGB operation, to convey to NOSENKO the impression that we know more than before, that we possess irrefutable proof of his guilt and that he has no prospects for release. We refrained from doing this in earlier phases of the interrogation, but at this point there seems little to lose.

3. The first four days have shown that the method is useful. NOSENKO again proved a good reactor on polygraph, he seemed disturbed by our knowledge and the special areas of interest we revealed, and we were able to develop important new information, contradictions and indications concerning the background of this operation.

Method

4. Our basic approach has been to question NOSENKO in specific terms on selected and detailed aspects of the story he has told to date. We gave him no explanation for our renewal of the interrogation, nor has he asked for any. Our questions have been pointed and detailed and neither require nor permit long-winded answers; they do not seek new information but are clearly designed to check information he provided earlier; our questions are slanted to build up the impression that they are based on data we have learned independently. The subject matter is taken up in a predetermined order designed for maximum impact on NOSENKO. Interrogation sessions are followed by polygraph examinations on the matters covered in the interrogation and/or other topics. Somewhat more time is spent on direct polygraph examination than on interrogation.

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Highlights to Date

5. OSWALD Case: The opening session was a polygraph examination conducted by Nicholas Stolaken, whom NOSENKO recognized as his earlier polygraph operator. The questioning was devoted entirely to Lee Harvey OSWALD and NOSENKO's role in the OSWALD case. We hit this point before any other in order (a), to permit clean polygraph testing on this key matter without having disturbed him with other questions, and (b), to get over to NOSENKO the gravity of our concern on this matter of highest state interest. The operator's conclusions were:

a. Subject was not personally or actually involved in the OSWALD case from 1959 while OSWALD was in the Soviet Union.

b. Subject received special instructions (from the KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to tell American authorities about it.

c. Subject's alleged association with the OSWALD case both "before and after" the Kennedy assassination was partly for the purpose of supporting and substantiating Subject's cover story "legend".

d. Subject heard of OSWALD (as a case) only after Kennedy's assassination, however he was not an active participant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably briefed on the case by a KGB officer.

6. Geneva Meetings: We devoted several hours of interrogation and polygraph testing to the Geneva periods, June 1962 and January-February 1964. We hit this point second in order because there are clear signs of important deception behind it and it offers us special opportunities to suggest inside information which in fact derive from observation and deduction. Among the high points were the following:

a. Pavel SHAKHOV: NOSENKO's story of his "investigation" of SHAKHOV, a Soviet delegation member whom he said was suspected in 1962 to be an American agent, was covered again in detail. The new data we obtained tend to confirm that this is a serious part of NOSENKO's

message. SHAKHOV's background in fact suggests that he is actually a KGB officer: his contact in Geneva with David MARK, a former CIA cooptee in Moscow, is 06,08 at the center of NOSENKO's story. We slanted our questions to suggest knowledge that SHAKHOV is a KGB officer (not a KGB investigation suspect) and that we may know of some of his important operational contacts. NOSENKO was inconsistent in his story and reacted significantly under polygraph examination. We are currently tracing new names and data and are re-examining the significance of this matter.

b. KGB Control in Geneva: NOSENKO reacted very strongly and consistently to the question of whether or not he had been sent to Geneva by the KGB to contact CIA, whether he was receiving KGB direction there, and on related questions, including some related to his ostensible investigation of Pavel SHAKHOV.

c. U.S. Personnel and Installations in Geneva: NOSENKO was interrogated on his earlier story that he had seen in Geneva in 1964 the file on KGB activity against American installations in Geneva (KGB cryptonym "SKORPION"). His version this time conflicted with his 1964 version but contained the same message, that the weak and understaffed KGB in Geneva had little interest, limited facilities and no success in operations against the Americans and had practically no idea of the identities of CIA personnel there. In addition, NOSENKO reacted to polygraph questions related to whether the KGB had told him the name of his CIA case officers. On the other hand, he did not react to the names of the then COS Switzerland and COB Geneva, which suggests that he was not told them (these names were buried in lists of names).

d. KGB Personnel in Geneva: NOSENKO's answers to questions concerning Alexandr KISLOV conflicted with certain details earlier reported, including KISLOV's role in the [AE]CHITCHAT case. He seemed disturbed 02 by the questioning on KISLOV and finally said he saw no reason to answer any more of them. However, his polygraph reactions did not suggest that he was as sensitive to KISLOV as to other individuals and matters covered in the same series of questions. We also asked, with the polygraph, whether he was withholding anything



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concerning his alleged agent Oleg GRINEVSKIY, an official of the Soviet delegation; his reactions suggested that he may genuinely be ignorant of GRINEVSKIY's KGB activities as handler of a British double agent in Geneva at the time. He had earlier said that his daily access to the KGB Residency in Geneva in 1964 was due to his frequent contacts with Mikhail S. TSYMBAL; this time he said that he only saw TSYMBAL twice in Geneva in 1964 and failed to mention a Sunday meeting with TSYMBAL which he had reported to us at the time it occurred. This leaves open the whole question of how NOSENKO can explain his daily access to the Residency, which he himself now says - evidently on the basis of what he has learned from our previous interrogations - is not normally permitted. This will be covered in further questioning.

7. Matters Related to the PENKOVSKIY Compromise:

a. John ABIDIAN's Visit to the Pushkin Street Deaddrop: NOSENKO reacted with special sensitivity and intensity when asked in a polygraph test whether he had been instructed to tell CIA about ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop. In addition, he refused for the first time to discuss his own participation in the incident, adamantly claiming that he does not remember when or even whether he visited the drop or whether he read reports on surveillance coverage of it after ABIDIAN's visit. (He had earlier said he visited the drop at least twice, immediately after ABIDIAN's visit; he described the location and named the KGB officers he went with.) In sharp contrast to his reluctance to discuss his personal role was his unhesitating and confident response to other aspects of the Pushkin Street drop story: he reiterates that ABIDIAN was under full time, double-strength surveillance throughout his tour in Moscow and that ABIDIAN was surveilled to the drop. He now adds, for the first time, that the KGB concluded that the drop had been initially found by a U.S. tourist or delegation member and that ABIDIAN was merely checking out its suitability for some eventual use. (In fact, PENKOVSKIY proposed the drop and ABIDIAN went there only in response to the agreed telephonic signal triggered by persons unknown, not by PENKOVSKIY.)



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b. ONGKO-ZEPP: NOSENKO was again queried on Colonel DULACKI's bugged restaurant meeting with an Indonesian officer, whose name he gave as ZEPP in 1962 and ONGKO in 1964. He could not clarify why he had confused the names. Since we now know through Greville WYNNE that the Soviets were interested as late as early 1963 in clarifying PENKOVSKIY's allusion in a bugged conversation in 1961 to "Zepp", we believe that NOSENKO's 1962 version was a KGB fishing expedition. However, NOSENKO did not react to a polygraph question concerning the name Zepp, and he may not himself know that he was given a wrong name for the Indonesian officer, nor why.

c. Admiral VORONTSOV: It had been speculated that when NOSENKO mentioned in June 1962 meetings the name of his "big friend" in the naval GRU, Admiral VORONTSOV, he may have been fishing for comments from us concerning Marshal VARENTSOV, PENKOVSKIY's protector. Queried this time about Admiral VORONTSOV, NOSENKO said that he had never met him and had no personal or similar connection; he seems to have completely forgotten ever having claimed a personal relationship.

8. PREISFREUND and STORSBERG: NOSENKO was asked about Johan PREISFREUND, whom he had earlier claimed to have handled in 1960-61 in Moscow as an agent against the military code clerk Jim STORSBERG. NOSENKO again said he first met PREISFREUND in 1960. We told NOSENKO that PREISFREUND told us that he had not met NOSENKO until 1962. NOSENKO denied this. We then added to his concern by telling him (untruthfully, but with a reasonable estimate of the true situation) that PREISFREUND also said that the KGB had told him to say he first met NOSENKO in 1960. When polygraphed NOSENKO reacted strongly and consistently to questions on the subject. These reactions and our follow-up may well bear on the question of whether STORSBERG was actually recruited by the KGB, an issue we have reviewed with the FBI. NOSENKO must be concerned because he now says that the STORSBERG case was primarily GRYNAZOV's, not his own, although he, NOSENKO, "supervised" it. Thus disappears the sole case that NOSENKO has claimed as his very own.

9. Identity and Personal Background: One of the basic questions underlying this operation is NOSENKO's real identity and personal background. There are many indications, reported



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earlier, that he has spent time in prison and that he is not in fact a KGB officer; similarly, his stories of his early school and military service are inconsistent and unbelievable. We are trying in this interrogation to clarify this important point. Among the points covered so far are the following:

a. Identity: NOSENKO was questioned extensively on the polygraph concerning his identity. In one series of tests, for example, he was asked whether Minister of Shipbuilding Ivan NOSENKO was the father of Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO and was then asked whether Minister NOSENKO was his father; similarly with Tamara NOSENKO, his ostensible mother. NOSENKO did not react to the question phrased "Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO", but reacted consistently when asked if these were his own parents. He was sensitive to questions concerning his marriage. (There is reason to believe he is not, in fact, married.) He was also given a series of tests asking for the first letter of his given name. The whole alphabet was covered, and the polygraph charts show that he became increasingly tense, culminating at the letter S (or perhaps T) on both runs. While we recognize that testing of this sort may not give valid results, it certainly gets over to NOSENKO the degree of our doubt and may even help us determine who he really is. We will pursue this further, covering his patronym and family name as well.

08 b. Homosexuality: We tested polygraphically our observations that NOSENKO has homosexual tendencies and experience. He showed himself extremely sensitive to this line of questioning. The test results tend to show that he had homosexual experience in Soviet imprisonment (see below) and with the KGB homosexual agents whom he has told us he recruited and handled.

c. Imprisonment: In view of the strong indications that NOSENKO has spent considerable time in prison (as reported in the past), we questioned him on this. He reacted strongly and consistently to the question of whether he had been imprisoned in the USSR. We then ran a series of tests to determine his relative sensitivity to various types of imprisonment, various crimes for which he may have been imprisoned, various areas of the USSR where he may have been imprisoned,



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and various years of imprisonment. He seemed consistently sensitive to correctional labor camps as the type of prison, and to several possible causes of imprisonment: particularly homosexuality, desertion and felony. Interestingly enough he was not sensitive to questions concerning imprisonment for self-inflicted wounds despite his story that he had shot himself in the hand during the war. He seemed more consistently sensitive to Siberia as the area of imprisonment but the results were not as clear as on other aspects of his story. He seems particularly sensitive to the years 1954-1956, which immediately preceed the period from 1956 onward, when he began to appear in KGB operations.