	<u>ONLY.</u> ROUTIN	G AND	RECOR	D. SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)				
FROM: John M. Whitten WH 3			5613	NO.
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from to whom.) Draw a line across column after each con
1. DDP ADDP	1			Attached for your informat comment, and correction are in the original, unexpurgated
2. C/CI				version of the report on GPFL covering OSWALD's stayi in Meand including summaries of the
c/ci/si				telephone intercepts. This m useful to your analysts who a processing the rest of the
4. C/SR		va va		material and to the people pring the final report. In writhis up I have made certain
5.				comments and indulged in a cer amount of analysis, because the naked facts seemed to call for
6.				These thoughts are my own. For free to make your own analysis
, E			(2	If you have any correction ke, please write them on this aft and return it to me. I ll return the draft to you
1 Western or	(· · · ·			u want it. This report was written fo ternal use only and was not
w. Sie/ce cities				eant to be used outside the gency.
			-	
13.				
14.	·			
15.	 	 	 	

13-00000

SEGRET

Discovery of OSWALD in Mexico City

On 1 October 1963, the CIA Mexico City Station intercepted a telephone call Lee OSWALD made from an unknown location in Mexico City to the Soviet Embassy there, using his own name. Speaking broken Russian and using his true name, OSWALD was talking to the Embassy guard, OEYEDKOV, who often answers the phone. OSWALD said he had visited the Embassy the previous Saturday (28 September 1963) and spoken to a consul whose name he had forgotten, and who had promised to send a telegram for him to Washington. He wanted to know if there were "anything new." The guard said if the consul was dark it was (Valeriy Vladimirovich) KOSTIKOV. The guard checked with someone else and said that the message had gone out but no answer had been received. He then hung up.

This piece of information was produced from a telephone tap center which we operate jointly with the office of the President of Mexico. It is highly secret and not known to Mexican security and law enforcement officials, who have their own center. By 9 October, the OSWALD telephone conversation of 1 October had been transcribed and a summary of it cabled to Washington.

-2- SECIET

The cabled report was received in Washington on 9 October and checked in our files, where it was immediately noted that the Lee OSWALD phoning the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was probably the Lee OSWAID who had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and returned to the USA in 1962. On 10 October 1963, the day after the report from Mexico City, CIA Headquarters sent out a cabled report about Lee OSWAID's phone call to the Soviet Embassy; the report went to the FBI, the Department of State (because OSWALD was a U.S. citizen), and to the Navy Department (because he was a former Marine). The cabled report to these agencies highlighted the liklihood that the Lee OSWALD mentioned was probably the former defector. A copy of this same cable was delivered by hand to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, with which we have no cable link. The same day a long cable went out to Mexico City informing our Station of the background of defector Lee OSWALD and asking for more information. Our Station was instructed to pass its information on the phone call to the Mexico City offices of the FBI, the Embassy, the Naval Attache, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. This was done.

Our Mexico City Station very often produces information on U.S. citizens contacting Soviet bloc embassies in Mexico City. Frequently the information we get is extremely incriminating, and on one or two occasions we have is even been able to apprehend and return to the USA American military personnel who are attempting to defect. In all such cases, our Headquarters desk requests and obtains the special permission of the Deputy Director for Plans to pass the derogatory information on a U.S. citizen to other government agencies. We were not informed of what action the FBI and other agencies may have taken at that time based on our report. Later investigation has confirmed all the details of his trip, where he stayed, and what he did. To avoid crossing lines with the FBI, our Mexico Station undertook no local investigation of its own. As we now know, OSWALD left Mexico on 3 October and was no longer there when our report was put out.

Since this telephone tap operation is a joint one with the Mexican

Presidency, the Mexicans also had the 1 October intercept on Lee OSWALD, but it

apparently slumbered in their files until the assassination took place.

Of Child

- 4 -

22 November 1963

As soon as the name of Lee OSWALD was mentioned in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November, CIA file checks were begun and the Mexican station was asked by cable for more information on OSWALD.

Within a week, twenty-seven cabled reports had been sent to the White House, the State Department, and the FBI.

cIA field stations provided many lists of information during the week

after the assassination. The Mexico City Station researched its telephone

taps very thoroughly and came up with several more conversations probably

involving OSWAID, but not actually mentioning this name; these connected him

also to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. Several Mexicans were arrested

and questioned about his activities, giving a good picture of what he was really

up to. A host of fabricators, some anonymous, bombarded overseas embassies

with spurious tips on the case, most of which we investigated. All of these were

soon discredited, but they are still coming in.

During this phase of our work, we served primarily in support of the FBI, which was entrusted by the President with the major responsibility for the investigation. The Department of State photographed its entire file on

OSWAID and passed them to us, and the FBI gave us a copy of the Soviet Consular file on OSWAID which had been publicly given by the Soviet Ambassador to the Secretary of State. On Friday 6 December 1963, Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach invited us to review the FBI's comprehensive report on the case to make sure our sources were not jeopardized and that our information was correctly quoted. We found the report highly interesting and no threat to our security, as long as it was read only by the authorized investigative bodies.

After the first few days, the CIA investigation of the case was handled at Headquarters by a staff usually charged wk with investigation and analysis of the most important security cases, and by officers and analysts of our Western Hemisphere Division.

Reports from Mexico

As soon as our Mexico City Station realized that Lee OSWALD was the prime suspect, it began re-screening all the written telephone transcripts in its files a covering the Soviet Embassy for the pertinent period. The actual tapes were also reviewed, but many of them had been erased after the normal two weeks wait. Several calls believed to involve OSWALD were discovered and and their



contents cabled to Washington, where they were disseminated to the White House, the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

OSWAID's name was not actually mentioned in these additional calls, but similarity of speech and various plain points of content link them to him. These calls are summarized below in chronological order. They cover the period from 27 September 1963 to 3 October 1963, the whole span of OSWAID's visit to Mexico City as later learned from travel records.

27 September - A man phones the Soviet Military Attache and says he needs a visa to go to Odessa. Man answering says he should call 15-60-55 and ask for the Consul. Caller asks for the address, and it is given to him.

(There is no special reason for linking this call to OSWALD.)

27 September, 4:05 PM - The Cuban Consulate phoned the Soviet Consulate.

Silvia Duran, Mexican national clerk of the Cuban Consulate talked to a Soviet official, saying that a male American citizen was at the Cuban Consulate asking for a transit visa to pass through Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union. She wants to know to whom he talked in the Soviet Consulate and who told him he would have no problem about it. If a Soviet visa is assured, the Cuban Consulate

can grant him a transit visa and simply notify Cuban immigration authorities.

The Soviet first asks her to wait, and then she has to explain the whole thing over again to another Soviet official, who takes her telephone number and promises to call her back. Silvia DURAN concludes this call by telling the Soviet she herself has moved and gives her new address for the Soviet Embassy bulletin. He asks her to phone (Sergey Semenovich) KUKHARENKO (Second Secretary who puts out the Bulletin) to give him the new address and he asks who the Cuban Cultural Attache is. Silvia DURAN gives the Attache's name as Teresa PROENZA and adds her telephone number.

27 September, 4:26 PM - A Soviet official calls Silvia DURAN back and tells her that the "American" had been to see the Soviet's and shown them a letter from the Soviet Consulate in Washington indicating that he had been waiting for visas for himself and his wife to go to the Soviet Union for a long time, but that no answer had come from Washington, adding that the wait was sometimes four or five months. The "American" had shown the Soviets a letter showing he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and had claimed that the Cubans could not give him a visa without a Russian visa. Silvia DURAN

rejoins that they have the same problem; the "American" is still at the Consulate; they cannot give him a transit visa unless he is assured of a Soviet visa, even though he just wants to go to Cuba to wait there for his Soviet visa to be granted. He does not know anyone in Cuba. They end the conversation on this note. Silvia DURAN says that she will note this on his "card," and the Soviet concludes by saying, "Besides he is not known." He excuses himself for the inconvenience he has caused and Silvia DURAN says it is all right.

28 September - Silvia DURAN calls the Soviet Embassy from the Cuban

Consulate. She says that she has the American with her again. The Soviet

answering asks her to wait. When another Soviet takes up the phone, Silvia puts

the American on. The American tries to talk Russian to the Soviet who answers

in English. The American asks him to speak Russian. The American says that he

had been in the Soviet Embassy and spoken with the Consul, and that they had

taken his address. The Soviet replies that he knows that. The American then

says, somewhat enigmatically: "I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban

Embassy to ask them for my address because they have it." The Soviet invites him

to stop by again and give them the address, and the American agrees to do so.

(In this conversation, the American was speaking hardly recognizable Russian.)

As far as our records show, OSWALD did not phone the Soviet or Cuban Embassies again until Tuesday, 1 October 1963. The intervening days were a Sunday and a Monday. The contents of his later calls seem to show he did not contact the Soviets on that those days.

1 October, 10:31 AM - A man calls the Soviet Military Attache in broken
Russian and says he had been at their place the previous Saturday (28 September)
and talked to their Consul. They had said they would send a telegram to Washington,
and he wanted to know if there were anything new. The Soviets ask him to call
another phone number and gives him 15-60-55, saying to ask for a Consul.

1 October, 10:45 AM - (This is the phone call in which OSWALD used his true name and which was therefore cabled to Washington on 9 October 1963.)

Lee OSWALD called the Soviet Embassy and announced his own name, saying he had visited them the previous Saturday and spoken with a Consul. They had said they would send a telegram to Washington, and he wanted to know if there were anything new. He did not remember the name of the Consul. The Soviet, who was Embassy guard OBYEDKOV replied: "KOSTIKOV; he is dark." OSWALD replied: "Yes, my

name is OSWALD." The Soviet excused himself for a minute and then said they hadn't received anything yet. OSWALD asked if they hadn't done anything and the guard replied they had sent a request but that nothing had been received as yet." OSWALD started to say: "And what...", but the Soviet hung up.

3 October 1963 - A man speaking broken Spanish at first and then English phoned the Soviet Military Attache and asked about a visa. The Attache's office referred him to the consulate, giving the number 15-60-55. The caller wrote it down. The attache official shrugged off another question about whether the caller could get a visa, and the conversation ended. (There is no special reason to tie this in with OSWAID, who is now known to have re-entered the U.S. at Laredo the same day.)

Since the operation through which we tap the Soviet Embassy phones in Mexico City is managed jointly with the office of the President of Mexico, the information on Lee OSWAID also came to the attention of President LOPEZ Mateos after 22 November. The next day, 23 November, he called it to the attention of our Chief of Station, who was already working feverishly on the case. Similarly, the Mexicans noticed the involvement of Cuban Consular employee Silvia DURAN, a

Mexican national. Our Station suggested that she be arrested and interrogated about OSWALD. The Mexican authorities had the same idea and she and her husband were arrested on 23 November 1963, in the midst of a party at their home. All the guests were soon released but Silvia and her husband were questioned and released on 25 November 1963.

Silvia's husband, Horacio DURAN Navarro, an industrial designer, said under police interrogation that when OSWALD was named as the assassin of President Kennedy, his wife had recognized the name and recalled she had waited on OSWALD when he came to apply for a Cuban transit visa; he remembered she had said ken she dealt with the Soviet Consulate as well to find out whether he had a Soviet visa. Horacio DURAN recalled his wife had said OSWALD became angry and she had to call out the Cuban Consul, Eusebio AZCUE, to quiet him.

Silvia DURAN told the same story. She was a leftist sympathizer with Cuba and had worked for the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations. She recalled OSWAID well, described him accurately, related how he had wanted a Cuban visa but could not get one without the assurance of a Soviet visa, and remembered his tiff with the Consul. She admitted she had phoned the Soviet Embassy about him.

<u>S</u>I....

- 12 -

The sum total of the statements of Silvia DURAN and her husband was to mind confirm that OSWALD was in Mexico to get a Cuban visa so he could wait in Cuba for his Soviet visa. The Soviet Consular file passed m to the State Department in Washington by the Soviet Embassy confirms a long exchange between first, Mrs. Marina OSWALD, and later her husband, and the Soviet Consulate in Washington about their requests for permission to return to the Soviet Union.

OSWALD was still writing to the Soviets in Washington about this as late as

Consulate in Washington about their requests for permission to return to the Soviet Union. OSWALD was still writing to the Soviets in Washington about this as late as 9 November 1963.

Silvia DURAH was arrested again on 27 Hovember and held until 29 Hovember. She told essentially the same story over again.

Well-placed sources within the Cuben Embassy in Mexico City stated
that when Silvin DURAH was released from police arrest the first time en

25 Hovember, she was quite pleased with herself. She told her colleagues
the same story set out above, adding only that the Mexican police had
threatened to extradite her to the United States to confront Lee Harvey

OSNALD. The reaction within the Cuben Embassy to the news of President

Kennedy's death was sombre. To date, there is not credible information in

CIA files which would appear to link Lee OSNALD with the Cuben government
or the Cuben intelligence service.

The whole question of whether Lee OSWALD had any secret connection with the Soviets or Cubans in Mexico cannot yet be answered, but certain parts of the evidence indicate to the contrary. Silvia DURAH and the

Soviet Consular efficials spoke of him as a men with "no friends in Coba" on the one hand, and so a men not "known" in the Soviet Embassy, on the other. The very openness of his visits and the phone calls spouk against any secret role. His trip to Mexico was not itself a secret ent; he traveled under his real name or a close variant of it, lived openly in Mexicon hotels, and corresponded with the Soviets through the open mails about it when he got back to the US. His trip to Mexico was apparently made necessary because it was the nearest Cuban diplomatic installation where he could apply for a visa.

A perplaying aspect of CSNALD's trafficking with the Cubana and Soviets in Mexico City is his assertion in his call of 26 September that he did not know his address when he was at the Soviet Consulate and came to the Cuban Consulate because they had it. It is hard to explain just what he meant, but it should be remembered that he was talking in Russian, a language he could not manage, and that when he came to Mexico he was in the process of moving from New Orleans to Texas. He may not have memorized his new address in Texas, whatever it was, and may not have been able to

lay hands on it when he was in the Soviet Consulate that day. Perhaps he had earlier given the address to Silvia DURAN and wanted to look it up on her card.

A particularly sinister aspect of OSWALD's dealings with the Soviets in Mexico City arises from the liklihood that he met with Soviet Consul Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. In his 1 October phone call to the Soviet Embassy, the guard OBYEDKOV suggests that the Consul OSWALD had talked to was KOSTIKOV if he was dark. OSWALD seems to agree with this, but the identification is very casual. In his 9 November letter to the Soviet Consulate in Washington, OSWALD gives the name of the man he dealt with as "KOSTIN," but there is no person of that exact name in the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. KOSTIKOV is accredited as a Consular Attache and does actually do a lot of consular work, but he is known, on the basis of his position, associates, work habits and operational intelligence activity, to be a Soviet KGB officer, and there is reason to believe, on the basis of FBI information, that he works for Department 13 of the KGB, the Department charged with sabotage and assassinations.



13-00000.

SEGIL

Embassy guard Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV is himself believed to be a KGB man from previous assignments as a bodyguard and surveillant. But unless some direct evidence of Soviet complicity is discovered, it is most likely that OSWAID's dealing with KGB men OBYEDKOV and KOSTIKOV was nothing more than a grim coincidence, a coincidence due in part to the Soviet habit of placing intelligence men in the Embassies in positions where they receive a large portion of the visitors and phone calls. All of the five consular officers in the Soviet Embassy are known or suspected intelligence officers. Although it is not usual for a KGB agent on a sensitive mission to have such overt contact with a Soviet Embassy, top secret Soviet intelligence documents which set forth Military Intelligence doctrine state that very important agents can be met in official installations using as cover for their presence there some sort of open business. Thus, while it is unlikely that OSWALD's contacts with the Soviet Embassy had a more sinister purpose, it cannot be excluded.

Some insight on Cuban attitude toward the arm of Silvia DURAN and the involvement of the Cuban Consulate in the OSWALD case can be gained from two intercepted phone calls made between Cuban President Osvaldo DORTICOS and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas on 26 Nov 1963, the day after Silvia DURAN was released from her first arrest. At 09:40 AM that morning, President DORTICOS phoned the Ambassador from Havana and asked him several questions about a report which the Ambassador had sent in on the arrest of Silvia DURAN and the

OSWAID had with Consul AZCUE, and he says that Mexican police bruised Silvia

DURAN's arms a little shaking her to impress her with the importance of their

questions. They had asked her if she had been intimate with OSWAID and she had

denied it. President DORTICOS twice asked Ambassador

STORI

HERMANDEZ whether the Mexican police had asked Silvia DURAN questions about "money," and the President apparently wanted to know whether the Mexicans thought the Cubans had paid OSWALD money. HERMANDEZ insisted the Mexicans had not offered Silvia DURAN money, and DORTICOS gave us trying to put across his point. President DORTICOS instructed HERMANDEZ to know on questioning Silvia DURAN and to phone him back.

DORTICOS back, saying he had questioned "that person" again and she has nothing new to add. President DORTICOS returns to the issue of whether "they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the Consulate had given money to the manifithat American." But Ambassador HERNANDEZ persists in misunderstanding DORTICOS, answer in the negative, and says: "Absolutely nothing was given to her." DORTICOS seems to give up, and the conversation dies out after a few more general remarks.

We do not know for sure what made President DORTICOS press for informa- a tion about Cuban mency passed to OSWALD, but remore were current in Mexico and even, we understand, in the USA, that OSWALD had returned from Mexico 13-00000

SEGIL

City with about \$5,000. Perhaps DORTICOS was trying to learn whether the Mexican police believed that the Cubans had financed OSWAID. In any event, the Cuban Government sent the Mexicans a stiff note of protest over the arrest and detention of Silvia DURAN, but the Mexicans rejected the note.

At 1445 hours on 22 November, the Yugoslav Ambassador to Mexico, Gustav VLAHOV telephoned and insisted on speaking to Soviet Ambassador to Mexico BAZAROV. In a conversation concerning news of President Kennedy's assassination, VLAHOV said, "I knew he was wounded even before the Americans." Both then laughed.