

☐ UNCLASSIFIED☐ INTERNAL  
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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

HSCA Request dated 6 March 1978

FROM:

Deputy Inspector General  
6E19 Hqtrs. Bldg.

MAR 21

8:49 AM '78

5527

DATE

20 MAR 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS: (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Mr. Shepanek (SA/DDO)  
2D0109 Hqtrs. Bldg.2. *Russ Holmes*

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*- action*APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993  
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM☐ SECRET☒ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~☐ INTERNAL  
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INSPECTOR GENERAL

78-580

20 MAR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDO

ATTENTION : Mr. Shepanek

FROM : S. D. Breckinridge  
Deputy Inspector General


SUBJECT : HSCA Request dated 6 March 1978

REFERENCE : OLC 78-0448/1

1. In Attachment A is a document which refers to David E. Murphy. It is provided for your review in relation to subject request. Attachment B contains several items which mention Boris Tarasoff which you should also review in relation to this request.

2. Some of the material in Attachment B is contained in the Task Force Report which was transmitted to the HSCA in sanitized form and shown only to selected HSCA staff members in unsanitized form at Headquarters. Limited access should continue to be provided.

3. OIG files contained no information on Ann Tarasoff or James Wilcott.



S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments:  
As Stated

cc: OLC (Rodger Gabrielson),  
w/o attachments

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CL BY 013190

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~P. 15

Who was the unidentified man at a meeting with Richard Helms on 12 March 1964 who would have known if Oswald had been a CIA informant?

Answer:

The unidentified man who accompanied Mr. Helms to the 12 March 1964 meeting was Mr. David E. Murphy, then Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, DDP. See paragraph 6 of the Tab 9 memorandum of record of this meeting for Mr. Helms' reported remark that he and Mr. Murphy were the two Clandestine Services officers who certainly would know whether or not Oswald had been an agent for CIA in the Soviet Union.

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About mid 1962 (check date) LIENVOY outside Mexi rept asked for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban, and Satellite Embassies. With this forewarning, LIFEAT <sup>24</sup> [unilateral coverage] was disconnected. However, as I recall, <sup>24</sup> [the Mexicans connected] 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet lines, 3 Czech, 2 Polish, and 1 Yugoslav line. The basehouse listening post had a live monitor who made short summaries of interesting conversations for a daily resume which was received each day around 8 a.m. (passed by <sup>03</sup> [Flick] to Goodpasture to get to Scott before 9 a.m.) Later (when the reel was completely recorded) full transcripts were typed and passed to the station in the same way, however, there was usually a time lag of a day or so. Those transcripts which had Russian or another language besides Spanish or English went out of the listening post the day after the transcript (of other conversations on the reel) was typed. These reels were taken to another location where they were translated and typed. In the case of the Russian translations, Boris Tarasoff usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation because of the volume of Russian conversations among the members of the Soviet Embassy. During this period (fall of 1963) the reels were probably being brought into the station and carried to Boris by one of the people from the Soviet Section or they may have been carried to him by <sup>03</sup> [Flick] but I think I brought the reel in and gave it to <sup>03</sup> [Herbert Manell] to take to Boris. <sup>03</sup> [Herbert Manell] and <sup>03</sup> [his wife Barbara] handled all of the processing of Soviet transcripts. My job involved screening the photographs as soon as we learned that the man calling himself Oswald was probably an American. However, here again there was a backlog because the photos were picked up three times a week but the ones picked up were usually for dates a few days previously because <sup>08</sup> [the doctor] processed the film on a night time basis. Photographs were made usually until one roll was used but later we got it changed to one day coverage on each roll - in other words the operators <sup>later</sup> cleared the camera each day whether there was any ~~film~~ ~~exposed~~ a full roll of film exposed. Instructions were to cover office hours, photograph each

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new Soviet and family, all foreigners and foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment (a pulse camera) but it frequently developed mechanical difficulties. [Bob Zambarnardi]<sup>03</sup> and [Spathar]<sup>03</sup> (I think) handled this film - pick up and delivery. Lorna MacKay screened the film inside the station.

I am certain that the Oswald call came to our attention from the Soviet line. It was picked up and taken to Boris for a translation because the caller was trying to speak Russian. Any delay was caused by waiting to compare the photographs with the typed transcript. There were no copies of transcripts ever~~y~~ made in languages other than Spanish or English because Win Scott could read only those two languages and he personally screened the transcripts for operational leads he wanted pursued.

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8/56-6/69 COS Winston M. Scott (deceased)

DCOS [7/56 - 7/58] <sup>09</sup>Alfonso Rodriguez (retired)  
 09 [10/58] - 12/62 [Warren Dean] (retired)  
 6/63 - 9/65 Alan White (retired) -  
 10/65 - 1969 [Stanley Watson] (retired in Mexico) 03

## COVERT ACTION

Prior to 1954 Howard Hunt (retired)  
 09 [12/54 - 7/58] Williard Hill (resigned) 03  
 09 [12/55] - 9/61 Stannard Short (retired)  
 Chief  
 9/61 - 3/64 David Phillips C/(retired) -  
 8/62 - 9/64 [Gunnar Beckman] Asst - 03  
 2/64 - 6/65 James Flannery C/(retired) -  
 9/64 - 11/66 Harold Dalghren Asst  
 10/65 - 1967 [Stanley Watson] C/(retired) 03  
 66 - 68 [Don Heath]  
 68 - [71] Joseph Smith C/(retired in Mexico) 09

## CUBA OPERATIONS

09 [56] - 4/62 Thomas Hazlett Chief  
 2/60 - 4/62 [Jack Stewart] (retired Costa Rica)  
 4/63 - 4/65 Bob Shaw Chief -  
 9/63 - 7/65 [Ray Swider] 03  
 10/63 - 5/65 Lorna Mackay (retired) -  
 8/63 - 6/65 David Phillips Chief (retired) -  
 9/65 - 10/68 Joseph Piccolo  
 10/65 - 12/67 [Peggy Maggard]

03

## SOVIET TARGET

09 [6/57 - 10/59] Louise Lyon (retired) 6/62 - 1/67 Prentice Marheine (ps)  
 09 [9/59] 8/65 [Herbert Manell] Chief - (retired ?)  
 09 [9/59] - 8/65 [Barbara Manell] - Outside CO  
 5/64 - 7/66 William Bright  
 4/65 - 11/67 Cynthia Hausmann  
 6/65 - 7/67 Alice Pittinger  
 7/65 - 4/69 Paul Dillon Chief

## SOVIET TRANSCRIBERS

6/56 - 8/58 Morris Gordon (resigned)  
 6/58 - 6/63 George Misko -  
 6/63 - 70 Boris Terasoff (retired in Mexico) -

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## SUPPORT ASSETS

<sup>24</sup>  
[Unilateral] phono taps

09 [1949] - 1961 Charles Anderson III Chief 49-71 ? Outside CO  
 09 [4/55] - 4/60 Peggy Maggard Asst David WILSTED (ps)  
 09 [4/56] - 1/62 Frank Estancona Chief retired in Mexico  
 2/60 - 10/64 Thomas Keenan -  
 9/64 - 12/67 Michael Farmer

<sup>24</sup>  
[Unilateral] photo Cubans

09 [6/59] - 4/64 [Robert Zambarnard] (resigned Mexico)  
 09 [7/59] - 6/62 [Richard Spathar] TSD (retired)  
<sup>03</sup>

<sup>24</sup>  
[Unilateral] photo Soviets

3/54 - 4/59 Harry T. Mahoney (retired Chicago) 56 - 68 Outside Agent  
 5/57 - 8/64 A. Goodpasture (alternate CO - and internal routing) [Ramon Alvarez] (resigned in Mexico)  
 6/58 - 6/63 Louis D. Puckett (retired) <sup>03</sup>  
 6/63 - 10/64 Thomas Keenan - [Robert H. Feldmann]  
 65 - 66 William Bright 8/63 - 6/68  
 ↓  
 Cubana - opl reporting  
 Travel - LA

<sup>24</sup>  
[Liaison] phone taps

1959 - 1969 Winston Scott (deceased)  
 09 [1959] - 1960 Alfonso Spera (retired)  
 09 [1959] - 1960 [Turner Smith] (outside, now retired)  
 09 [1959] - 1960 John (Training rept resigned)  
 1960 - 1961 John Brady (retired)  
 1962 - 1968 A. Goodpasture -  
 1961 - 1971 [Charles Flick] (outside TSD Staff Agent - retired) -  
<sup>03</sup>

<sup>24</sup>  
[Liaison] - surveillance

09 Prior [1954] [Robert Melberg] (retired)  
 09 [3/54 - 4/59] Harry Mahoney (retired)  
 09 [4/59] - 1961 Thomas Hazlitt  
 12/62 - 9/67 [Robert Feldmann]  
<sup>03</sup>

TSD Outside unit

09 [4/58] - 12/63 Glen Widden (retired) -  
 [6/59] - 4/64 Joseph K. Resigno (ps) Unit blown and closed down  
 09

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Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963)

1. Unilateral Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened in <sup>09</sup> [April 1947] until the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in 1955, the Station had developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This umbrella type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multilene phone taps, three photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team and a mail intercept operation.

Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by <sup>24</sup> [an employee of the local telephone company] who was handled by a Station case officer. The number of lines tapped was limited only by the availability of a listening post nearby and the availability of language (English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc.) transcribers. Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican-American recruited agents.

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case officer assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who advised the Station on the best types of cameras, films, and concealment devices. These operations had sub-crypts under project LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA). LIMITED was a fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Embassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian entrance. The gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the



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Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a double laned street on the southeast corner of that block. (See attached diagram). LIMITED was the first photo base and operated strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. This base, however, was closed when the Station received word that the photograph of the "unidentified man" was being released by the Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photographic base. It was located in an upper story of an apartment building on the same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of the block south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the Soviet Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located in one of a row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet Embassy compound. This site overlooked the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of Soviet personnel. The three photographic sites were managed by a recruited agent who was a Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother and Mexican father (deceased). This agent collected the film from the LIMITED and LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then developed and printed into 8 x 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was originally processed in the Station but in early <sup>of</sup> [1959] due to the resignation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and LILYRIC was processed on the outside by a recruited agent.

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Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers. These two officers organized a surveillance team of six recruited agents which used late model cars and a panel truck for surveillance. The team could be activated by radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs for identification purposes.

The Station also conducted a <sup>24</sup>[unilateral] mail intercept operation, LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer. <sup>24</sup>[A recruited Mexican agent, who had a semiofficial status] obtained selected letters from a subagent <sup>24</sup>[employed by the Mexican postal system].

2. <sup>24</sup>[Liaison] Coverage:

<sup>24</sup>[Liaison coverage] was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the <sup>24</sup>[Mexican services] at that time. The Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), <sup>24</sup>[with which we conducted liaison] was a hip-pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This Ministry was principally occupied with political investigations and control of foreigners. Their agents were ~~incompetent~~ <sup>24</sup>~~incompetent~~, and corrupt. <sup>24</sup>[A Station officer trained a number of them in name tracing and travel control. In 1958, at the instigation of a Mexican official, a joint telephone tap operation came into existence. The operation, which became known as

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<sup>24</sup>  
[LIENVOY, was run by a Mexican officer.] The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time. The transcription room was staffed by <sup>24</sup>[Mexican Army officers.] In 1961, <sup>24</sup>[because of mismanagement by the Mexican principals,] the Station chief, himself, became the project case officer. A Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the listening post, and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes. There was also an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Oswald Coverage:

<sup>24</sup>  
In mid-1962, [the Mexican officer in charge of LIENVOY (the joint tap operation) asked the American officer at the LIENVOY listening post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and Satellite Embassies in <sup>24</sup>[anticipation of possible coverage.] The Station immediately <sup>24</sup>[disconnected all of the unilateral telephone taps on these Embassies so that they would not be discovered when the Mexicans hooked up their taps. The Mexicans] soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five Soviet lines, three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav line. At the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian

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or a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location for translation and typing. Mr. Boris Tarasoff did the Russian translations but because of the volume of Russian conversations, the translations usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation.

As soon as the Station learned that an American identifying himself as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture of the Station started screening all photographs. However, here again, there was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a week but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the technician who was processing the film, did so on a night-time basis. Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of film was used. Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera at the end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining. The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours) and to photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties.

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post operators from a tap of the Soviet line. It was picked up and taken to Mr. Boris

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Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay because Station personnel waited to compare the photographs with the typed transcript. All transcripts were made in either Spanish or English since the Chief of Station could read only these two languages and because he personally screened the transcripts for operational leads.

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