

CFMA-3513

DISPATCH

Chief, WE

18-3-2

Chief of Station, Helsinki  
 Station/Operations -- Survey of Official and Overt  
 Activities of Soviet Officials.

20 August 1958

None, for information only.

WE Field Notice No. 255, 28 May 1958

1. In reply to the referenced Field Notice, we cite the following instances (of which the Station has knowledge) of Soviet efforts to establish official and social contact and personal rapport with local government officials, political leaders, and persons in the fields of economics, science, technology, labor relations, cultural matters, etc. Included also are some instances of Soviet contacts with COYDEX representatives in Helsinki. According to VACODIX/6, Soviet efforts to cultivate local citizens noticeably increased during 1956-58, and have continued since that time. In July 1958 VACODIX/1 gave Poodites a long lecture on recent changes in local Soviet social practices. He said in brief that the Soviets since approximately mid-1957 have been coming more and more out of social isolation and making social contacts somewhat in the manner of Westerners; they rent summer and winter cottages outside of Helsinki and invite individual Finns or small groups out for an evening featuring innocuous conversation and drinking. The Soviets try to keep the Finns they are cultivating on a social merry-go-round, i.e., they try to make the Finns socially indebted and then smother them with further invitations, free tickets, etc., which are hard to turn down. All this makes the VACODIX' work of keeping track of Soviet espionage much more difficult. (Helsinki is trying to get more detailed information from the VACODIX.)

a. In the fall of 1956, Mikhail Grigoryevich VEDOVA (indications known REX), Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, invited VACODIX/1 to a private dinner after having met VACODIX/1 at an official reception at the Soviet Embassy.

b. Ivan S. BERONIKY, Soviet Consul in Helsinki from 1944 until 1957, occasionally had lunch with VACODIX/1, and some officers of the FINN DGE HRP DEX (separately). On at least one occasion, Yuri N. VORONIN was present at a lunch including HRP DEX personnel.

c. Yuri N. VORONIN maintained social contact with Sherman C. Torreyson from early 1955 until August 1958.

d. Viktor P. CHALEVOVSKY, Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, has tried to gain membership in the Western Foreign Press Club (WFPC) but was refused. He has cultivated various members of the WFPC through invitations to lunch. These include Joseph S. Tiffany and Boris VACODIX, an Italian newspaperman. He also occasionally entertains VACU/1.

e. Grigoriy Ye GOLOB, Soviet Consul who replaced I. E. BERONIKY, joined the Helsinki Consular Corps, which had previously had no Sino-Soviet bloc representatives, in the fall of 1957. Since the Consular Corps is not specifically a "Western" body, the Corps had no valid reason to refuse his entry. As far as is known, no other Sino-Soviet Bloc representative have followed GOLOB into the Corps.

f. During 1958, VALDITOR/1 has had several negotiations with the Soviet Commercial Mission in Helsinki regarding Soviet purchases of soap-making machinery and soap. VALDITOR/1 has also visited Leningrad in connection with these negotiations and plans to visit Moscow for further talks.

g. VACODIX/1 has sent a Finnish medical student to study in the USSR. In return, the Soviets intend to send three medical students on short visits to Finland. Many categories of persons in the fields of science, technology, construction work, and agriculture (both Finnish and Soviet) will visit each other's country within the framework of the Fermo-Soviet Technical and

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Scientific Collaboration Agreement. (see CPWA-2488).

b. Numerous contacts have taken place between ODIERI, ODUNIT, ODOATH representatives and their Soviet counterparts. Most of these have been reported to their Headquarters and are presumably available to KUBARK Headquarters.

i. VANITY/3 and VANITY/1 frequently receive invitations to Soviet cocktail parties and other official functions. VANITY/3 has occasionally attended them, particularly those having some connection with the Finland-Soviet Union Society. VANITY/1 has attended less frequently since he prefers to avoid the cocktail circuit.

j. Viktor M. VLADIMIROV, according to the VACCINES, was spotted in early 1958 picking up an unidentified Social Democratic member of the Diet in a covert manner and later letting him out of the car in an isolated spot. We have not been able to identify the Social Democrat, but the VACCINES spoke to him and even though he claimed that his association was innocent, the VACCINES strongly admonished him to stay away from the Soviets.

k. We were also advised by VACCINE/8 that the present secretary of the Finnish People's Party and former Minister of Defense Pekka SMALINEN gave V. M. VLADIMIROV some American maps after returning from an ASIA trip to the United States. VARIATION/1 reported that VLADIMIROV had known MALJUNEN. VALENTINE/8 has said that VLADIMIROV seems to be especially interested in the Finnish Reserve Officers Association.

l. V. M. VLADIMIROV has also made attempts to cultivate the Time/Life correspondent here, Lancelot KEYWORTH. Similarly, Y. N. VORONIN tried to cultivate Donald BAY, an expatriate American journalist here, to the extent that VORONIN offered BAY an expense-paid trip to Riga, Latvia. BAY refused.

m. Ambassador LEBEROV and Counselor ROTOV<sup>+</sup> in 1955 and 1956 had several luncheons with leading Social Democrats such as LESKIMEN and SKOG. In late 1957 and so far in 1958, there has been no such lunches or invitations by the Soviets to high members of the Social Democratic Party (as opposed to the Simonists), according to VANITY/4.

n. Y. N. VORONIN<sup>+</sup>, who has been identified in the VAQUERO operation as a KGB officer specializing in American and British contacts, also hobnobs with leaders of Helsinki ballet and theater circles (his wife is a former ballet dancer of Hungarian ancestry) and occasionally has liaison with the Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society.

2. The Soviets have numerous advantages for operating in Finland. Some of their principal advantages are:

- a. A larger staff of representatives than any other country; a larger staff than either of the Finnish security services trying to keep track of them.
- b. Ownership of seventy buildings or apartments in Helsinki alone.
- c. A large indigenous Communist Party.
- d. They own a large business firm which has gas stations in almost every Finnish hamlet, namely, Trusti Vapaa Bensini.
- e. Lack of defensive audio-surveillance equipment and know-how on the part of the Finnish security services.
- f. The longest common border with any Western European country; this border is not heavily guarded on the Finnish side.
- g. Soviet officials stationed in many cities aside from Helsinki.
- h. The Finns' weakness for alcohol.
- i. Case officers who specialize in various strata of Finnish society, as opposed to miniscule Western country staffs which do not have time or man power to specialize.

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j. The largest number of tourists transitting Finland in both directions.

k. A cultural, scientific and technical collaboration agreement for cover of intelligence operations.

l. Large numbers of Finns either working on hydroelectric stations in the Soviet Union or going to Leningrad and Moscow as tourists. This furnishes excellent cover for spotting, assessing, recruiting and other operational activities.

*Oliver P. Wallmark*  
Oliver P. Wallmark

*Malvin E. Pendleton*  
Malvin E. Pendleton

27 August 1968

Distribution:

1 - HQs  
2 - Helsinki

ADDENDUM: (add to end of paragraph 2)

m. Two Soviets who have been quietly asked to leave Finland were KGB officers who were brazenly propositioning several Finnish citizens upon very short acquaintance and who made very little effort to hide the fact that they were interested in espionage against Finland. Furthermore, virtually no Soviet agents who have had direct contact with Soviet case officers in Finland have been arrested and prosecuted. Those Finns prone to work for the Soviets and Soviet case officers themselves have very little to fear from Finnish law enforcement bodies as long as they are not too brazen in their activities.

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