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20 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT : AMWHIP/1 Meeting, New York City
Thursday, 14 November 1963

1. Meeting Time/Place. This meeting was laid on by phone from Washington on 13 November. It took place as scheduled using an office/work-room in A/1's jewelry factory-showroom at 31 W. 47th St., New York.

2. Purposes of Meeting. This meeting was scheduled in order to obtain information and identifications from A/1 relevant to the AMLASH Operation. We were particularly interested in determining AMLASH's present attitude toward the Operation and any details of or names of likely confederates which he may have discussed with A/1 after Ontrich's departure from the scene. We were also interested in using A/1 as a check against the list of likely AMLASH confederates which had been compiled by the MEAPRON group.


3. Finances. The undersigned was prepared to give AMWHIP/1 sufficient funds to cover his expenses and those of AMLASH during the recent three-week sojourn in Europe which A/1 made at our request. However, A/1 refused to accept any remuneration whatsoever, stating that the money we had given him for his round-trip ticket (\$950.00) was enough. This, for the record, represents an outlay conservatively of some \$1200 to \$1500 by A/1 from his own pocket on KUBARK behalf, not to mention the lost time from his own business. We believe this gesture should be remembered in future dealings with A/1.

4. General. A/1 was feeling poorly as the result of a flu-type cold when we met. He stated that he would not have come in at all were it not for our scheduled meeting. Nevertheless, he spent willingly several hours with us, going over the points in which we were interested. The meeting terminated at 1530 with no incidents of a security nature noted.

5. Details of Meeting. Collecting information for the AMLASH operation constituted the principal of discussions during this meeting, and may be found as attachment A to this report. A copy is filed also in the AMLASH 201.

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[William E. Wainwright]
SAS/202, C/S

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ATTACHMENT A TO: AMWHIP MEMO OF MEETING OF 14 NOV 1963

The following information and observations were obtained from A/1 during the above meeting:

1. AMLASH Secretary: Ernestina ACOSTA Gonzalez (nickname: Ene) calle 25 - #526 Apt 8 (presumably our 25th St., No. 526.... Vedado - Telephone 303865.

(Note AMLASH has considerable confidence in his secretary, and has suggested that letters or packages could be sent there on a one or two-shot deal.)

2. In response to the question of whom AMLASH might turn to in order to carry out his plans, AMWHIP mentioned the following persons:

⁰⁶ [Jose ACEF Yara], ca. 33 yrs old, who is functionary ⁰⁶ [in Havana municipal govt]. He is ⁰⁶ [of moorish descent]. Has wide circle of acquaintances in Havana.

⁰⁶ [Major AZMEJEIRAS]

Ramon GUIN

[Juan ALMEIDA] ⁰⁶

["The NIEVES brothers"] ⁰⁶

[Jose (Pepin) NARANJO] ⁰⁶

Of the above, ⁰⁶ A/1 felt that GUIN, [ACEF], The [NIEVES, NARANJO] and [AZMEJEIRAS] were the most dependable. The degree to which [Juan ALMEIDA] could be trusted was questioned by A/1.

In addition to the above names which A/1 volunteered, he asked about [Major DIAZ-ARGUELLES, Major Tony CASTEL] and ^{06,06} [Major Faure CHOMON]. A/1 stated that he felt [DIAZ-ARGUELLES] ^{06,06} and his brother "Tin-Tin" could be used and were trustworthy;

[CASTEL] and [CHOMON], ⁰⁶ on the other hand, would not be utilized in the initial efforts by AMLASH, but, if his efforts were successful, they could be counted on to support LASH in the period which followed. They would never be taken into the "inter-sanctum", however. When asked about [Majors Pedro ^{06,06} MIRET, Rodiles PLANAS] and [Enrique BORBONET Gomez] ⁰⁶ A/1 stated that [PLANAS] could never be utilized, [BORBONET] would ⁰⁶ fit into the [CASTEL-CHOMON] category, and [MIRET], though ⁰⁶ friendly with LASH, could not be trusted as his primary loyalty was to FIDEL CASTRO.

^{06,08} we have Arguelles himself carrying this nickname of "Tin-Tin" sure.

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Group 1
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
3. Concerning [Majors William GALVEZ Rodriguez ^{06,06,06} Victor BORDON Machado, Crescencio PEREZ (Montano?), and Antonio LUSSON (~~LUSON~~) Batlle], A/1 stated that he did not know these types well and therefore had little to say regarding them. He did say that he did not care for [GALVEZ] ⁰⁶ personally and that he was a little "psycho"; [BORDON] was ⁰⁶ OK; [PEREZ] was an older man, ca. 60 years, who was a nonentity who had his rank because he had guided the [GRANMA ⁰⁸ group] into the hills at the beginning of the fight against Batista: ⁰⁶ [LUSSON] was probably too loyal to Raul CASTRO to be considered for any initial action. 7

⁰⁶4. When questioned about the identities of followers of Major [ALMEJERAS], A/1 stated that it would be better to refer to ANLASH, as he (A/1) could only give information that was three years old and hence not very accurate. We did not press the question, nor suggest names, as it was evident that he felt that his answers would simply not give a true, current picture.

5. A/1 provided the full name of a possible lead ⁰⁶ which he had discussed earlier with Ontrich: Raudol RUIZ, ⁰⁶ [Calle 5 ~~Av.~~ 453, Apt 6, Vedado], Havana. ⁰⁶ [RUIZ] is an assistant to ⁰⁶ [Jose ~~San~~ LLANUZA, "Director of Sports"] for the National Govt in Havana. ^{06,08} *Cable*

6. In addition to the above information, the undersigned discussed various aspects of the ANLASH case, and in particular, questioned A/1 about ANLASH's frame of mind and future plans which he may have revealed to A/1 after Ontrich departed the scene. A/1 made several points, which basically boiled down to the fact that ANLASH was still not pleased with the support he was getting from the USG side. The visit with DAINOLD, who acted in the capacity of a representative of high levels of the Govt concerned with the Cuban problem, satisfied ANLASH as far as policy was concerned, but he was not at all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical assistance for the operational plan as he saw it. A/1 said that ANLASH dwelt constantly on this point. He could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the USG gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. According to A/1, ANLASH feels strongly on this point, and if he does not get advice and materials

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from USG technician, he will probably become fed-up again, and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date. A/1 stated that AMLASH now has his feet wet vis-a-vis cooperating with USG and has accepted the fact that he will work profitably and securely with it. It is this that we stand to lose with our procrastination. AMLASH also talked about going to the French terrorist group, the OAS, in order to get the materials and guidance he needs. It is believed that he was talked out of this idea, after the dangers involved were discussed with AMLASH.

7. With regard to the radio gear, AMLASH stated that he did not feel that he wanted to take one in with him, particularly in view of the recent arrests in Cuba of agents carrying concealed radios. He was not opposed, however, at this time to having a radio cached for him, to be recovered by him later.


8. According to AMWHIP, if there is any interest in having AMLASH link up with other trusted assets in Cuba, these names would have to be given to him before he returned; otherwise he would not trust any other means used later inside to get him to initiate or respond to such contacts.

9. A/1 stated that AMLASH talked about getting aid from, or at least discussing his position, with Manolo RAY. However, he stated that he questioned whether this was the best idea, since if RAY came to Paris while he (LASH) was there, people would conclude that there was something between the two. Another spot would be better, thought AMLASH.

10. At the time of A/1's departure, AMLASH said that he would contact "Jack" (Red Stent, Paris staffer) upon his return to Paris. (This he subsequently did on the 15th of November, according to info received from Paris-somewhat belatedly).

11. When AMLASH, A/1, and VENEGAS were together in Rome and Italy, VENEGAS told AMLASH that people were betting that LASH would not return to Cuba. Some had also questioned his mother on this point. AMLASH reportedly told VENEGAS to cover all the bets he could as he would be a rich man. (It was at this time, according to A/1, that AMLASH decided that he had better return to Havana

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a little sooner than he intended, in fact almost as soon as possible.)


12. AMLASH talked about the two possibilities of re-taking Cuba - either thru invasion by US troops, or his way. He also realized, however, that invasion was not to be considered seriously at this time. Also, AMLASH talked about his ability to take some men into the hills of Las Villas Province and taking the small towns of Trinidad and Topes de Collantes. He said that he and his men could last no more than 15 days in the hills as the anti-guerrilla fighters now employed by the Regime were ex-guerrillas themselves and knew the way to fight and win in the hills. Also the Soviet equipment made the govt forces much more formidable than in Batista's time. AMLASH apparently was discussing these ideas with the impression that this was the way to set up a provisional rebel govt and thereby invite and gain US support. By the way A/1 talked, it is fairly certain that AMLASH realized that this was not the kind of a plan which could even remotely be expected to receive USG aid. It is hoped that he does realize that Havana must first be taken... or failing that, a truly sizable piece of land (say, almost an entire province) which could be a true rallying point and staging ground under complete Rebel control, from which the rest of the island could be wrested from the Fidelistas and the Communists.

13. In summary, the talks with A/1 led the undersigned to believe that AMLASH is again entering one of his skeptical moods, one which our actions have done little to dispel. Too little and too late.....

End of Report

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[William E. Wainwright]
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