


**EFFORTS TO SPLIT THE REGIME**

**March - June 1962**

**Study of the Loci of Power Concluded**



EFFORTS TO SPLIT THE REGIME

I. March - June 1962: Study of the Loci of Power Concluded:

A. Power Groups in Cuba

- 1. 26th of July Movement
- 2. The Popular Socialist Party, Communist  
(Partido Popular Socialista - PSP)
- 3. The Revolutionary Director (Directorio  
Revolucionario - DR)

B. Key Leaders

- 1. 26th of July:
  - a. Fidel Castro
  - b. Raul Castro
  - c. Ernesto "Che" Guevara
  - d. Osvaldo Dorticos, President
  - e. Raul Roa, Foreign Minister
  - f. Ramiro Valdes, Minister of Interior
- 2. PSP - Communist Leaders
  - a. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, President of  
the National Institute of Agrarian Reform  
(Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria - INRA)
  - b. Blas Roca, Member of the Executive Board of  
Integrated Revolutionary Organizations  
(Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas -  
ORI)

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- c. Lazaro Pena, Secretary General of the Cuban Revolutionary Labor Council (Central de Trabajadores de Cuba Revolucionaria - CTC-R)
  - d. Manual Luzardo Garcia, Minister of Internal Commerce
  - e. Antonio Nunez Jiminez, Executive Director of National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA)
  - f. Severo Aguirre Cristo, a national leader of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI)
  - g. Lionel Soto \_\_\_\_\_, Director General of Schools of Revolutionary Instruction

3. Important Men not Clearly Aligned to the 26th of July or Communist Power

- a. Regino Boti, Minister of National Economy
- b. Armando Hart Davalos, Minister of Education
- c. Alfredo Yabur Maluf, Minister of Justice
- d. Carlos Lechuga Hevia, Ambassador to UN
- e. Faure Chomon
- f. Raul Prunilles, Cuban Delegate to the UN
- g. (Ambassador) Garcia Inchaustegui, until recently head of the Cuban delegation to the UN
- h. Rolando Cubela Secades, Ex-President of University Students
- i. Dr. Rene Vallejo, Castro's personal physician

C. Governmental Structure:

1. Present Ruling Political Group: Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas - ORI)
2. Future Ruling Political Group: United Party of the Socialist Revolution (Partido Unido de la Revolucion Socialista - PURS)
3. Numerical Representations of Power Groups on Ministerial Levels:
  - a. 26th of July Movement - 8
  - b. PSP - Communist - 2
  - c. Revolutionary Directorate - 3
  - d. Fidel Castro Appointment
    - (1) Raul Roa, Foreign Minister
    - (2) Rolando Diaz Astarain, Minister of Finance

D. The Implications to the Power Alignments of Escalante's Purge:

1. The purge of Anibal Escalante Dellunde, Executive Secretary of the PSP from the position of \_\_\_\_\_ in the ORI did not create a "split" between "new" and "old" communists.
2. Castro's reasons for purging Escalante were Almost Certainly Aimed at:
  - a. Reassuring those 26th of July leaders who had fought for the revolution but not for communism.

- b. Putting the brakes on the PSP's grab for power.
- c. Castigating Escalante for personal "sectarianism".

E. A New View on Splitting the Regime:

1. Castro's purge of Escalante surfaced his concern for the balance between the non-communist elements of the 26th of July Movement and the "unaligned" government leader and the PSP - "old" and "new".
2. To split Castro from the PSP would be difficult and of questionable value:
  - a. The PSP to gain its final objective would take any insult and turn the other cheek. It had embraced Fidel and would not let go under any circumstances. To rise against Castro now would not be opportune, and would probably be fatal.
  - b. Fidel was now totally dependent on the Soviet Union
  - c. The only hope was not to split Fidel from PSP but to identify, at every opportunity, him and his government with communism, for only the non-communist element of the 26th of July Movement and the "unaligned leaders

of the government could effectively be split from the government.

- d. This conclusion did not preclude the Task Force from attempts to create suspicion, hostility and friction between Castro and the PSP.

II. The Direction of Task Force Efforts to Split the Regime:

A. To identify those members of the 26th of July Movement and other "unaligned" government leaders who were for the revolution but against communism. To date, there is reasonably good evidence indicating that the following individuals do not approve of the communist direction of the Cuban revolution and may in fact be conspiring against the regime.

1. Major Pedro Miret Prieto, commanding artillery unit
2. Ambassador Gustavo Arcos y Bergnes
3. Commander Sebastian Arcos, brother of Gustavo and a commander in the Cuban navy. Has been in Prague for some time on a training mission
4. Orlando Ventura Reyes
5. Manuel Carbonell Duque
6. Major Faustino Perez, former minister charged with the recovery of stolen properties

7. Omar Fernandez Canizares, Minister of Transportation.

NOTE: ~~Ambassador Gustavo Arcos~~ is undoubtedly an important member of this group of potential conspirators. TFW has made an unsuccessful but sustained effort to recruit him in ~~Brussels~~. Despite our failure to date, ~~Arcos~~ remains in close and friendly contact with TFW sources.

Conspiring in Cuba today is dangerous business. These are fearful men and neither easily identified or easily contacted within Cuba.

Each of the above men remain as high priority targets within. Our main efforts to contact them take two directions: (1) The identification of suitable intermediaries to them, and (2) the eventual use of internal assets now in place.

8. Major Rolando Cubela Secades, ex-president of the Federation of University Students. An M.D., recruited, trained and returned to Cuba after attending the World Youth Festival in Helsinki in June 1962.

9. Juanita Castro, younger sister of Fidel and ~~Raul~~ - recruited, trained and returned to Cuba.

10. [ ] Major Raul Jaime Diaz Arguelles.  
Reporting from Havana through AMSTRUT/1, the [ ] who  
travels to Cuba for TFW from [ ] where [ ] lives.

Major Diaz is described as a "new" communist  
by Juanita Castro

11. Raul Roa, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Effort to contact and recruit in October 1962 failed. Recruited and working for TFW is the [redacted]  
[redacted] He resides in Miami. TFW is presently engaged in attempting to resettle the parents of [redacted] in the U.S. The departure of the parents from Cuba will leave [redacted] as the last member of her large family in Cuba. This move of her parents could cause a final break between the [redacted] who are already intensely concerned with their situation with Cuba. Raul Roa remains a high priority target.
12. President Osvaldo Dorticos. An attempt to recruit President Dorticos in October 1962 failed. Dorticos was approached by a TFW asset in New York during his last visit to the United Nations. Our agent was "forcibly" removed from the hotel where Dorticos was staying.
13. Jose Llanusa, Director of Sports in Cuba and one time "Mayor" of Havana. Efforts to recruit Llanusa in May 1962 failed; however, a total of ten (10) Cuban athletes defected during the same period of the 9th Central American and Caribbean games in Kingston, Jamaica.



14. Major Jose Ricardo Rabel Nunez, Chief of Rural Housing in Cuba refused to work in place but will defect. Contact is maintained inside Cuba. Rabel states he will fly out of Cuba with a "fat one" (unidentified).

15. [redacted] hired to recruit technicians for Cuban industry has been recruited. He has recently returned to Cuba. He claims to be close to "Che" Guevara and Minister of National Economy, Regino Boti.

[redacted] may serve as an excellent mechanism for the infiltration of TFW chosen technicians into Cuba.

16. Mrs. Carlos Lechuga, wife of Carlos Lechuga Hevia, Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations, is expected to seek asylum and break with her husband and Cuba toward the end of November 1962. [redacted]