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INSPECTOR GENERAL

77-1904

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29 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John H. Waller  
Inspector General

SUBJECT: The Defectors Nosenko and Golitsyn

1. Action Requested:

Approve providing the SSCI with additional material on above subject per Paragraph 4. below.

2. Background:

This report concerns the extent of information on the defectors, Yuriy Nosenko and Anatoly Golitsyn, which the Agency has made known to the Rockefeller Commission and to the Senate Church Committee and its oversight successor, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

NOSENKO: The record shows that the material listed in Attachment A regarding Nosenko was passed to the Rockefeller Commission in February 1975. This material held by the Rockefeller Commission was subsequently made available to the Church Committee for its investigation. Additional material gathered by the Rockefeller Commission on Nosenko through interviews with former employees, etc. may also have been made available to the Church Committee but we have no record of it. The Rockefeller Commission's brief mention of the Nosenko incarceration in its final report is attached as Attachment B.

The material concerning Nosenko which was provided the Rockefeller Commission included details of his background in the KGB, his recruitment in 1962 and his role as an agent in place, his defection in 1954, the nature of his involuntary confinement by the Agency during the period 1964-67 and the authority on which the confinement was based. The Rockefeller Commission was also provided a 15-page summary, perhaps better termed an apologia, prepared by the DDO's Soviet Russia Division and

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CI Staff in 1967. This paper sets forth the doubts concerning Nosenko's bona fides, the inconsistencies in his debriefings, his increasingly uncooperative attitude, and the indications of deception during his initial polygraph examinations. It describes how the determination was made that Nosenko was a dispatched KGB agent with a deception mission, and how Nosenko was then incarcerated to preclude any conceivable means of communication with the KGB. It was then believed that intensive interrogation, coupled with a Spartan-like existence in solitary confinement, would eventually break Nosenko and bring about a confession as to his true status and KGB mission. Nosenko withstood the arduous regimen and was subsequently vindicated.

Other material furnished the Rockefeller Commission on Nosenko included a rather short summary prepared by the Office of Security which touched on Nosenko's ultimate vindication, rehabilitation and current status as a Paid Consultant. There is no indication that Soviet defector Golitsyn's original stimulus to the Nosenko controversy was ever surfaced to either the Rockefeller Commission or the Senate Select Committee. Golitsyn has inspired and supported the CI Staff suspicion that Nosenko was a dispatched KGB agent. A study of the Nosenko case (which takes issue with the earlier suspicions toward and treatment of Nosenko) prepared by retired annuitant John Hart in early 1977 called "The Monster Plot" has not been shown to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and, of course, was not finished in time to have been made available to the earlier Church Committee.

It should be noted that there is a Memorandum for the Record prepared by CIA's Legislative Counsel, John M. Maury, on 5 August 1969 entitled "Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko Case" (see Attachment C). This indicates that Congressional oversight committees or oversight committee staffers, at least, were privy to CIA concerns regarding Nosenko's bona fides as long ago as 1969. This memorandum includes reference to CIA's incarceration of Nosenko, justifying it to permit "prolonged briefing", with the concern he might be targeted for "executive action" if the Soviets should discover his whereabouts.

Nosenko's own attitude since his abuse by CIA seems to have been philosophical and forgiving. He has lodged no complaints. Nosenko continues to be fully cooperative and

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stated his feelings to the Office of Security in 1975 to the effect that he desires no publicity; it would place him in personal danger and it would certainly discourage any Soviet official from defecting for years to come.

GOLITSYN: Information provided the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee on Anatoly Golitsyn, who defected in 1961, has been minimal. According to Agency records, it was limited to recounting the documentation requirements, including passports in alias, for change of identity procedures for Golitsyn and his family on three occasions. His thesis that Soviet defectors could not be trusted and his role in working with the CI Staff on an exercise to identify possible Soviet penetrations of CIA are not believed to have been known to the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee or the present Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Neither John Hart's report on Nosenko, nor Bronson Tweedy's report on Golitsyn, which analyze these situations, written after the Church Committee investigations, have been shown to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI).

It should also be noted that a staff member of the current Senate oversight committee (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence), Mr. Jean Malot Evans, was a DDO, CI Staff careerist until his retirement in June 1974. It is our understanding that he is, therefore, personally conversant with much of the background and developments in the Nosenko and Golitsyn cases, although we do not know how much he has recorded for the SSCI's benefit.

EDUARD OUN: The Rockefeller Commission report, on page 170, mentioned a case where a defector was physically abused, though not seriously injured, by an Agency employee. It added that the employee was subsequently discharged by the DCI. This case pertains to the Estonian national, Eduard Oun, who defected in 1955. The employee was [John<sup>03</sup> Torpats], also of Estonian origin. [Torpats] was returned to Headquarters to face charges. After lengthy and acrimonious suitability proceedings, <sup>03</sup>[Torpats] was discharged from CIA in 1961.

### 3. Recent Actions:

At your request, I briefed the Staff Director of the SSCI, Mr. William Miller, on 25 August 1977 in broad outline, and described the incident of Nosenko's incarceration by CIA from 1964-1967, which he was, of course, already familiar with. I also briefed him in general terms -- without naming specific officers -- how the careers of certain CIA officers had been

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
harmd by unsubstantiated suspicions that they were Soviet KGB agents, based on the theories and reasoning of defector Golitsyn. This situation had not been previously known by Miller or the SSCI (although the SSCI's CI Staff expert, Evans, as noted above, had previously worked on the DDO's CI Staff under James Angleton and thus may have had some familiarity with this episode in the Agency's history).

I also told Mr. Miller that newsman David Martin seems to be digging into the Nosenko and Golitsyn cases and is trying to interview various former CIA employees. I explained that it is possible, therefore, that there may be public surfacing of some or all of the story.

I offered more complete briefings to the SSCI, should it so desire.

4. Recommendation:

I recommend that we be prepared to offer Mr. Miller additional briefings of the Nosenko case and the Golitsyn case, should he request more detail.

  
John H. Waller

Attachments - 3  
Attachment A  
Attachment B  
Attachment C

APPROVED: 7s/ Stansfield Turner 31 AUG 1977  
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

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Attachment A: Titles of documents sent to the Rockefeller Commission and to the Department of Justice

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1. Memorandum for: The Inspector General Subject : The Nosenko Case Attachment : Summary of 1967 Document which outlines the Nosenko Case.	1967
(This 15-page report presents the SR Division and CI Staff position that Nosenko was a dispatched KGB agent and discusses Nosenko's involuntary confinement by the Agency for approximately three years.)	
2. Memorandum to Dept. of Justice from OGC listing nine documents requested by the DJ and attached.	30 Jan 1975
(1) Nosenko's request for political asylum dated 4 Feb 1964.	
(2) Nosenko's Secrecy Agreement dated 21 April 1969.	
(3) Nosenko's contract with CIA as Independent Contractor or Consultant, dated 21 April 1969 (\$16,500 per annum).	
(4) Nosenko's contract with CIA dated 1 March 1970 (\$18,500 per annum).	
(5) Receipt for advance of back salary, April 1964-March 1969, dated 25 Oct. 1972 (\$35,000).	
(6) Receipt for full payment of back salary, April 1964-March 1969, dated 16 Nov. 72 (\$52,052 in addition to prior payment of \$35,000).	
(7) Nosenko's Acknowledgement and Release to CIA, dated 12 July 1973.	
(8) M/R of 13 July 1973 concerning 12 July 73 acknowledgment and release.	
(9) Nosenko's revised contract dated 9 May 1974 (\$23,750 per annum).	

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3. M/R from John M. Maury, Subject: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko Case. (This briefing paper, for the Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services Committees, reflected the DDO's continued concern re Nosenko's bona fides. Copy attached as Tab C.) 5 Aug 1969
4. Office of Security memoranda re confinement instructions for Nosenko. 10 July 1964
5. Memorandum for USIB from DDCI Marshall Carter advising of Nosenko's defection. 12 Feb 1964
6. Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy from DDO advising of Nosenko's defection. 11 Feb 1964
7. Memoranda from the Office of Security to I&NS re Nosenko's alien status. 18 July 1969,  
24 July 1969
8. Memorandum from DCI to I&NS recommending permanent residency status for Nosenko. 9 Oct 1969
9. Asst. Atty General Memo to DCI concurring in permanent residency status. 20 Oct 1969
10. OGC memo to D/OS advising that CIA has responsibility for Nosenko. 3 Apr 1964
- ✓ 11. C/SR Div. M/R re discussion with Deputy Attorney General on basis for Nosenko detention. 2 Apr 1964
12. Office of Security summary on highlights of Nosenko case. CA 3 Feb 1975
13. The Executive Registry indicates this additional information was passed to the Rockefeller Commission:
  - a. Selected short summaries prepared by OGC for the DDCI. 14 Apr 1975
  - b. D/OS memo to I&NS advising of Nosenko's imminent arrival in the USA. 11 Feb 1964
  - c. OGC memos to D/OS re Parole Status of Defectors. 3 Apr 1964

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- d. OGC memo to D/OS entitled Nosenko Options (Rehabilitation program). 14 Feb 1969
- e. Memorandum to David W. Belin from DDCI responding to specific questions about Nosenko's period of confinement and about nature of Agency support for Golitsyn. 22 Jan 1975
- f. Memorandum to David W. Belin from DDCI listing identities for previous material. IDENs only were used. 24 Feb 1975

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*Recommendation (21)*

The CIA should strictly adhere to established legal procedures governing access to federal income tax information.

*Recommendation (25)*

CIA investigative records should show that the investigation was duly authorized, and by whom, and should clearly set forth the factual basis for undertaking the investigation and the results of the investigation.

### C. Handling of Defectors

Investigation of defectors is the responsibility of the CIA under a National Security Council Intelligence Directive, assigning this duty to the Agency as a "service of common concern" to the intelligence community as a whole.

Within the CIA, the Office of Security is charged with providing proper security for the handling of persons who have defected to the United States from other nations. A careful procedure has been developed for such handling.

Generally a defector can be processed in a few months' time. In one instance, however, a defector was involuntarily confined to a CIA installation for approximately three years. For much of this time, the defector was held in solitary confinement under extremely spartan living conditions. The defector was apparently not physically abused.

The justification given by the CIA for the lengthy confinement arose out of a substantial concern regarding the defector's bona fides. When the issue was finally resolved, the defector was given total freedom and became a United States citizen.

The confinement of the defector was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence on the written advice of the General Counsel. The FBI, the Attorney General, the United States Intelligence Board, and selected Members of Congress were all aware to some extent of the continued confinement.

In one other case, a defector was physically abused, although not seriously injured. The Director of Central Intelligence discharged the employee involved.

### Conclusions

Such treatment of individuals by an agency of the United States is unlawful. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Inspector General must be alert to prevent repetitions.



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CLC 67-0676

5 August 1969

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the  
Iden 1

1. The Director having approved the proposal in my draft memo of 19 June 1969 (copy attached) regarding the briefing of key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Iden 1 case, I have briefed the following staff officers of Agency congressional Subcommittees along the lines proposed on the dates indicated:

Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House  
Armed Services Committee -- 23 July 1969

William Woodruff, Assistant Chief Clerk, Senate  
Appropriations Committee -- 24 July 1969

Edward Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed  
Services Committee -- 24 July 1969

Robert Michaels, Staff Assistant, House Appropriations  
Committee -- 29 July 1969

2. I suggested to each that they mention the matter to the respective chairmen when and if they thought it appropriate. None of the staff officers registered particular concern or curiosity about the case and I think it doubtful that all of our chairmen have been informed. Nevertheless, I think we have adequately covered the matter and see no need to pursue it further at this time.



JOHN M. MAURY  
Legislative Counsel

Attachment:

Distribution:

Original - CLC Subject File

- 1 - DDP
- 1 - Chief, CI Staff
- 1 - Chief, SE Division
- 1 - D/Security
- 1 - CGC

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69-17-55/2

DRAFT:JMM - 19 June 1969

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Iden 1 Case

The following paragraphs are proposed as guidance for briefing key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Iden 1 case. They are based primarily on material provided by SB Division, and have been cleared by SB, CI Staff and the Office of Security. It is proposed that the Chairmen and/or senior staff officers of each of the Agency Subcommittees be briefed along the lines indicated.

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1. This case goes back sometime into history and you may recall having heard of it several years ago. From time to time it has received press play, both when it first broke in early 1964 and occasionally since.

2. Iden 1, a Staff Officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, and son of a former Minister of Ship-building in the USSR, defected to the Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, in

1964. He was then brought to the United States where he has since been in the custody of the Agency undergoing extensive debriefings by officers of the Agency and the FBI.

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3. Iden 1 had been a KGB officer for approximately ten years at the time of his defection. Iden 1 has provided a large quantity of counter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intelligence.

For example, one of his reports played a part in the negation of a major hostile penetration in Great Britain. Where appropriate, his information has been shared with the FBI, other U.S. Government agencies and foreign liaison services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing investigative activity. In addition, Iden 1 identified many hundreds of Soviet Intelligence Officers and provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and its techniques and methods.

4. In debriefing him it became apparent that Iden 1, the privileged and undisciplined son of a former ranking Minister of the Soviet Government, was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own importance. In this regard, certain aspects of his life history, when weighed against other information already in our possession, raised some doubts concerning his veracity. To permit extensive and prolonged debriefing, arrangements were made to accommodate Iden 1 under highly secure conditions. These arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases at least, by the additional need to provide Iden 1 with continuing personal protection since there was the distinct possibility that, as a KGB officer,

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he would be targeted for "executive action" if the Soviets should discover his whereabouts. With the passage of time, this latter factor is considered to be sufficiently diminished to justify a phased normalization of Iden I's situation--this despite the fact that some points remain unresolved concerning his bona fides.

5. The Agency, with the assistance of the FBI, is continuing to look into those questionable aspects of the case, while remaining alert to the possibility of hostile interest. However, during the full period of his stay in the United States Iden I has cooperated with his interrogators and with the other officers responsible for his safety and welfare, and our current efforts are being directed toward his gradual adjustment to a normal, independent status. As a step in this direction, he is now living in his own private apartment, subject to some protective surveillance.

6. This action is being taken in full recognition of the normal problems of readjustment experienced by many defectors as well as the fact that Iden I is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Iden I is sensible enough to realize that undue publicity caused by any rash action on his part could lead to unpleasant, perhaps even dangerous consequences, particularly for himself. We therefore believe it appropriate to take this